LIST OF CASES:

(1)
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR.

(2)
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF
APPEALS

(3)
JUAN GARGANTOS vs. TAN YANON and THE COURT OF APPEALS

(4)
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ vs. CAPITOL
SUBDIVISION, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(5)
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, DR. TRINO MONTINOLA, ESTATE OF BERNARDINO (RODOLFO)
JALANDONI, SALVADOR LACSON, et al.
G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO
VALDEZ SR., Respondents.

FACTS:
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents purchased from Feliciana Santillan a parcel
of unregistered land. Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was
already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc.
(hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane from the fields to petitioners sugar
mill.

When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away, private respondents inherited the land. However, unknown
to them, Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks
placed in its name.

Private respondents filed a complaint. In Bomedco's defense, they had been in possession of the lot in
good faith for more than 10 years, thus, it had already acquired ownership of the property through
acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is legally entitled to the easement of right of way over said land by virtue of
prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code

RULING:
NO.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes
or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of
right of way of railroad tracks is discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train
operated by a person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the servitude
depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an
easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications showing the existence of an easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that
categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs
only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way)
and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of
not building beyond a certain height is non-apparent.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of
an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code,
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately,
petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law,
donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted
in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad
right of way can only be acquired by title and not by prescription.
G.R. No. 90596 April 8, 1991
SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in
the name of the private respondent corporation. The private respondent's title came from a prior
owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way. The petitioner
claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the private
alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until the private respondent constructed steel gates
that precluded unhampered use.

Petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates removed
and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo shortly issued ex parted an order directing the
private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter moved to have the order lifted, on the
grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same person of the
dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the
petitioner has another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4)
the petitioner has not shown that the right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger.

RULING:
NO.

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.

According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to
say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of
the general public.

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we
said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of
that relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the
public –– if that is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal
easement.

In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as
we said, merger is not possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In
other words, the answer does not, in reality, tender any genuine issue on a material fact and cannot
militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.
G.R. No. L-14652 June 30, 1960
JUAN GARGANTOS, petitioner, vs. TAN YANON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square meters, with the
buildings and improvements thereon. One portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold
in 1927 to Tan Yanon, respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows
over-looking the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after
passing through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.

Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the roofing of the old camarin. The
permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof of the camarin. Gargantos again asked the
Municipal Council for another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and
warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.

Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from constructing a building that would
prevent plaintiff from receiving light and enjoying the view through the window of his house, unless
such building is erected at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the
lots of plaintiff and defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the
property of petitioner Gargantos.

RULING:
YES.

The law provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established
by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement
will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the
contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the
instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the
aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the
title that characterizes its existence. It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the
easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either
estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of
both estates.

By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line separating the two estates.
G.R. No. L-25887 July 26, 1966
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. CAPITOL
SUBDIVISION, INC. and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
The entire case originated in a suit filed by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (hereinafter the Central)
against Capitol Subdivision, Inc. (herein the Subdivision) "to award plaintiff a legal easement of right of
way over defendant's property known as "Hacienda Mandalagan".

The complaint averred that the original owners of said "Hacienda" had entered into a milling contract
with the Central stipulating that the planter gratuitously ceded for a right of way for the utilities that the
Central might require. The Central had built a railroad line for transporting to Sto. Niño Dock the export
sugar of the Central and its adherent planters, and other materials.

Upon the contract’s expiration, the Subdivision had demanded from plaintiff Central the removal of the
railroad tracks and threatened to close the same. Petitioner contends that such action, if carried out,
would cause irreparable damage to the Central and its planters. Petitioner prays for recognition of right
of easement upon payment of reasonable compensation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Central has a right of easement.

RULING:
NO.

The records submitted by the parties show that the Court of Appeals has correctly pointed out a fatal
defect in the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the Court of origin, and that is its having ignored
the undisputed fact that the Central's right to use the railway across the lands of the respondent
subdivision expired with its milling contract. The Central had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a
compulsory servitude without first establishing the preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) After payment of proper indemnity;
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts; and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.

By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way cannot be obtained unless the four
requisites enumerated are first shown to exist, and the burden of proof to show their existence was on
the Central. Nowhere in the complaint is any specific averment, nor is there in the Court of First Instance
orders for the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, and denying its reconsideration, any specific
finding, even preliminary, that each and every one of the four preconditions do exist.
G.R. No. L-33423 December 22, 1971
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
DR. TRINO MONTINOLA, ESTATE OF BERNARDINO (RODOLFO) JALANDONI, SALVADOR LACSON, ET
AL., respondents.

FACTS:
At about the end of the sugar crop year 1969-1970, the petitioner Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the Central) faced the prospect of a severe cut-off, in railway connections,
from the sugarcane plantations surrounding its mill. The respondents Trino Montinola, Estate of
Bernardino Jalandoni, and about 39 others (hereinafter referred to as the respondent landowners) had
refused to extend the 50-year contractual right of way granted to the Central's railway complex in the
Talisay Silay mill district and outlying areas. In order to keep its railway lines open, the Central obtained
several writs of preliminary injunction from the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Subsequently, however, these writs were dissolved at the instance of the respondent landowners.
Unable to revive the court's injunction orders, the Central came to us by way of special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Central has a right of easement.

RULING:
NO.

The factual disparity of the case at bar from the situations obtaining in the Bacolod-Murcia, etc., cases is
not substantial and does not give additional leverage to the Central insofar as it must deal with the
respondent landowners respecting its desire to obtain a legal easement of right of way for its railway
system.

First, as regards the requisite that the Central's mill must be shown to be surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway, the complaint clearly shows that the
Central, even as it assumes the role of a dominant estate, wants a railway access to the fields of its
planters to be able to haul the latter's sugarcane to the milling site. Second, the Central's offer to lease
the affected portions of the respondent landowners' properties for P0.20 per square meter per annum is
not the "prepayment" referred to in our previous decisions. Prepayment, as we used the term, means
the delivery of the proper indemnity required by law for the damage that might be incurred by the
servient estate in the event the legal easement is constituted. Third, as regards the requisite that the
isolation is not the result of the Central's own acts, the record shows that the Central has acted to
secure the continuance of its easements of right of way at the eleventh hour when its fifty year milling
contracts with the respondent landowners were on their last few months of life. Finally, the Central's
cardinal mistake is its assumption that the railroad route secured to it under its former milling contracts
with the respondent landowners is the same route the court would grant the Central in the event the
latter succeeds in proving its right to a legal servitude.

In sum, as in Bacolod-Murcia, Angela Estate, and Locsin, the herein Central's right to the legal easement
of right of way over the properties of the respondent landowners is not clear. And, unless it can show
otherwise during the hearing on the merits, the Central cannot ask for the establishment of the said
legal servitude in its favor, much less demand the restoration of the injunction orders dissolved by the
respondent court.