Easement

La Vista Inc. VS CA

FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter
wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on
the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said
road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building
Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said
corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of
Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion
of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976,
Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the
parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s
7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property
wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.

ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6
cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the
residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a
third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola
residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not
yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can
find the details regarding it in the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between
admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met.
And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant
lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of
such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress
along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there
no such thing as a judicial easement)

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TRIAS VS ARANETA

FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc
(of Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the
condition that said lot should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to
the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms.
Rafael Trias. She was dismayed with the annotation that stated “5. That no factories be permitted
in this section.”

Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed as
mere surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the
vicinity. Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised
the issue to the court and received relief.

Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from a
valid sales transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no
authority to overrule such valid easement and impaired the right to contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition was valid.

HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which
provides that “every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and
not in contravention to the law, public policy and public order”

The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring residents.
The intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy, the
easement may not be eroded.

The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime,
allowing the erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar
factories remains binding.

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CORTES VS YU-TIBO
FACTS:
Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiff’s wife has certain windows on
her property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the plaintiffs hasn’t done
any formal act prohibiting the owner of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them to make
any improvements. Plaintiff claims that period of prescription started when those windows were
made and acknowledge by the owner of the adjacent lot. Defendant however claims that there
should be a formal act prohibiting them from doing a certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

RULING: NO.
GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a
window or opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a
prescriptive title without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes the
express or implied consent of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of
the right to oppose.

EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a
prohibition from exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed window
on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528,
windows with "similar projections" include sheds.

The exception applies in this case because

1) what is concerned is a party wall;
2) there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window
(Yu-Tibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).

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VDA. DE BALTAZAR VS CA
For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present: (1) the
estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietor’s own acts
and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.

FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on
the south by the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east by Lot 1025.
Directly in front of 1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.

Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and
perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it
found that there was a strip of land used by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for
30 years until it was closed and that the 2 other passageways were only temporary and was granted
to Panganiban when the right of way was closed. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of way

RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must
be present. (1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet
to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the
propietor’s own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on all sides
by immovables, the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite is
settled by a remand to the lower court for the determination of the proper indemnity. As regards
the 3rd requisite, it was found that Panganiban bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its
isolation was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage claimed is
the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites
therefore is entitled to the easement.

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ENCARNACION VS CA
An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a
public road and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires
payment of indemnity which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages
caused.

FACTS:
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the
servient estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the
Taal Lake. The servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.

Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no
particular point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a
roadpath 25 meters long and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant
nursery business on his land. When his business flourished, it became more difficult to transfer
the plants and garden soil through the use of a pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type
jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not pass through the roadpath so he
approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1 ½ meters of their
property to add to the existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.

Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement
of a right of way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint
for there is another outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus
the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-
of-way

RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded:
(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it
is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a
dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no egress or ingress from the
highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And
during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to
a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With
the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should
accommodate the needs of the dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that “the width of the easement
of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate …” To grant
the additional easement of right of way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and
Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy
the land is considered.

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ABELLANA SR. VS CA
Subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper authorities" simply
allow persons other than the residents of the subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are
inside the subdivision but do not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can
enter the subdivision from the back.

FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision, sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road which,
according to the petitioners, used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been
using since time immemorial, and that, hence, they had acquired, through prescription, an
easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the respondents around the
subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the subdivision road which gives the subdivision
residents access to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls enclosing the
subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be
opened to them.

The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it was
developed into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not
the shortest way to a public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the
public highway.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not an easement has arisen by prescription
2. Whether or not the pathway has become a public street

RULING:
1) No. Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and
may be acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a
footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at intervals
and depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over
somebody else's land. Hence, a right of way is not acquirable by prescription.

2) No. Petitioners cannot invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. — The owner or developer of a subdivision without access
to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such
right of way must be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government
authorities concerned.

a. Because the above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which
petitioners are not) without access to a public highway.

b. And the petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to subdivision roads

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have acquired the status of public streets, is not well taken. The municipal ordinances which
declared subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper authorities"
simply allow persons other than the residents of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads
therein when they are inside the subdivision but those ordinances do not give outsiders a right to
open the subdivision walls so they can enter the subdivision from the back. The closure of the dead
ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid exercise of proprietary rights. It is of judicial notice that most,
if not all, subdivisions are enclosed and fenced with only one or few points that are used as ingress
to and egress from the subdivisions.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS CA

When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal easement may be
constituted and thus no just compensation is required. It would be otherwise if the land were
originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part
thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.

FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in the
name of Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted subject
to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:

"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association
or partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or charitable purposes or
for a right of way; and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes
recognized and prescribed by law especially those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113
and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended..."

Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA
then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed
a complaint for damages against NIA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his
property for use as easement of a right of way.

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RULING: No.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as
those of Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in
the original title as may be subsisting."

Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject
to "to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law
especially those mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended." This reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited
by any time period and thus is a subsisting condition.

Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public
highways, railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar
works..."

We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within
the limit provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.

Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will
of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case,
we find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.

The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The
ruling would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just
compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right
of way.

RAMOS VS GATCHALIAN
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to justify a grant of right of way. Real
necessity must be shown.

FACTS:
Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Parañaque. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135.
Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road

8
right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the
respondent Asprecs.

Ramos alleged that, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right infront of his
premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate
entrance/exit to the public road. or highway, Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue,
Parañaque; that this house and lot is only about 100 meters from Sucat, Road passing thru
Gatchalian Avenue. Ramos also alleged that due to Gatchalian's construction,he was constrained
to use as his "temporary" way the adjoining lots belonging to different persons. Said way is
allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud
and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon." Moreover, according to Ramos, the road right of way which the
private respondents referred to as the petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing
road but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina
Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.

RTC and CA both denied Ramos' complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a right of way must be granted based on allegation of inconvenience?

HELD:
No. The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate
court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to
the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case,
there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as
Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still
undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public
highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the appellate
court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina
Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road
right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through
Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its
buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and
coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for
the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude,
there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."

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STA. MARIA VS CA/FAJARDO
Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1) surrounded by immovables and no
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is not due to the owner
of the dominant estate; 4) least prejudicial (and shortest if possible)

FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot
No. 124, in Bulacan.

Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof;
by Lot 126, owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot
6-b owned respectively by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on
the southwest; and by Lot 122, owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.

On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the
establishment of an easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded
by properties belonging to other persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs
have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either
of the alternative defendants' properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be
plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and shortest access to and from the provincial road; that
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing through the properties of defendants in going
to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to
grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the absence of an access from
their property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs' request for a right of
way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an easement. Thus,
plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established in their
favor. They also prayed for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement of right of way. On appeal, the Sta.
Maria's allege that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own actions which caused their lot
to be enclosed or cut-off from the road.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isolation was not caused
by the plaintiffs themselves?

HELD:
The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation.
As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither have the private respondents
been able to show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their
predecessors-in-interest's own acts." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have found the
existence of the requisites. The petitioners, however, insist that private respondents' predecessors-
in-interest have, through their own acts of constructing concrete fences at the back and on the right

10
side of the property, isolated their property from the public highway. The contention does not
impress because even without the fences private respondents' property remains landlocked by
neighboring estates belonging to different owners.

Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code,
to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);

2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);

3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.);
and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest (Art. 650).

QUIMEN VS CA
LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant
estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen.
However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan.
They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3
other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the road
while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind
Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public road.
Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter.

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway
a portion of anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the

11
pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia
from passing through her property.

After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located directly
behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house,
extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and
Anastacia’s perimeter fence.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through
Anastacia’s property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property
facing the public highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by
1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal
road. The way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way
through the brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through
Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was more practical
to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking
the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacia’s property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s property. The
court, however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when
she resisted the claim.

Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite the
fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She denies ever promising
Yolonda a right of way.

Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of way
she provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant
and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide
private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public
road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives
a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering
that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning
from it.

ISSUE:

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1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to
the parties

HELD: YES to both

1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person
or class of persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is surrounded by realties
belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant
estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner
thereof for the beneficial use of his property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:

(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private
respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she
offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner;
that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to
the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court,
more so that the trial court itself declared that “[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which
were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public
highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public
highway.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall be established
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.”

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established
on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

TC’s findings:
> Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s property and held that there existed
an available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between
the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father

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> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of
one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.

CA’s finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of
Anastacia’s property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store
made of strong materials.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records,
or are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that
would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right
of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
alternative should be preferred.

FRANCISCO VS IAC
An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public
highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due
to his own acts.

FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by
which an undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another
undivided 1/3 portion to the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion,
also an undivided third, was declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia
Dila. A partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dila’s lot
came to include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus
effectively isolated from said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of
Anacleta Dila.
Despit that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Francisco’s land but negotiations failed. Francisco's
proposal for an exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as
was supposedly the custom in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

14
Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dila’s lot.
Yet in August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing
the very right of way granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have
a right of passage precisely through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to
him, and he did not bother to keep quiet about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get
what he wanted.]
Francisco learned of Ramos' intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot
along Parada Road with a stone wall. Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him
asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging to
Francisco

HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate
his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate.
The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the
isolation of his property had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the
contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that
use of the passageway through Lot 860-B was dffficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the
contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even a truck, and also because it has
been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a
claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

FLORO VS LLENADO
A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant estate. The owner must
prove that the easement is absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the servient estate.

FACTS:
Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own
access roads from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado, owned
the Llenado Homes Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as
the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas
Creek, 5 which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed since Llenado Homes did not have any

15
passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road passing the abandoned
riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan of the former
Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by the HLURB.
Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought, and
were granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park . At this
point, remember that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a
contract.
Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy machinery.
He then barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially
implied Llenados to keep out off property.

Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by
LLenado, and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the same
against Mr. Floro.

HELD: NO.
As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way,
the preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These
include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision
development plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo
to create a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these
terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier
for him to create an easement via the Floro property.

The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.
Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an
access road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary
detriment of his neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.

16
COSTABELLA CORP. VS CA
The convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way
but rather, it should satisfy all four requisites (emphasis on 1st requisite- it should be merely for
convenience but it must be due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have an adequate
outlet to a public highway.

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such
construction, the private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the
provincial road, passed through a passageway which traversed the petitioner’s property. As a result
of the construction, this passageway, including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private
respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the same complaint the private respondents also
alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach fronting the latter’s property without
the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local fishermen, and trapping
debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that the have acquired the right
of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the “ancient road right of way”
(what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner
answered by saying that their predecessor in interest’s act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous
and in fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the
private respondents.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of
a passageway, on the petitioner’s property?

RULING:
1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive
prescription.

2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient
estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their respective
properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that there is another outlet for the
private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private respondents).
Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never a
gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere
convenience for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents made
no mention of their intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that “least
prejudicial” prevails over “shortest distance” (so shortest distance isn’t necessarily the best
choice.)

17
JAVELLANA VS IAC
When a positive easement is constituted, the servient owner is prevented from impairing the use of
such by the dominant estate.

FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo
River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main
canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses
the school property going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on
demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to the canal running thru the
school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and its vicinity because
the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties into the river. This prompted the school
and barangay officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the canal. When
Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by the
district supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for allegedly
denying his access to the use of the canal to his property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision
thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property

RULING: YES
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete as the
servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as dominant
estates since it has been in continuous use for no less than 15 years by the school fishpond as well
as by the nearby adjacent lands.

As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal without violating Art.
629 of the CC which provides that “The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner
whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or
of the manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient
to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs
or improvements thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or
manner equally convenient and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the
dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.”

When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike it impaired
the use of the servitude by the dominant estates.

18
VILLANUEVA VS VELASCO
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest and
becomes a continuing property right unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or
the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites
for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed
is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific Banking Corporation
which it acquired from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a
small house on its southeastern portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right
of way the Gabriel spouses granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private
respondents, in a contract of easement of right of way. Amongst others, the contract provides that
the easement’s purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang Sora which is the nearest public road and
the least burdensome (Espinolas’s property being the dominant estate and Gabriel spouses’s as the
servient estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement “shall be binding to the
successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will warrant the
circumstances.”

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the
easement against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash
the writ saying that he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should
not prosper since the easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioner’s title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was
not annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they
actively or passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as
a voluntary easement but as a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?

RULING:
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its removal is provided
for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the
conveyance conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded
by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the
right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent

19
consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest.
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and the same has become
conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement
obstructs the entry of private respondent’s cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what
kind.) Accordingly, the petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the easement.

ALCANTARA VS RETA
Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate the utilization of usufruct may constitute
as personal easement pursuant to Article 614.

FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara et. al. filed with the RTC, Davao City a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta,
Jr. for the exercise of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with
preliminary injunction, attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement.

Alcantara et. al. claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land; that the land has been
converted by Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the
land. They assert that they have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with
Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.

They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was
void ab initio for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.

HELD:
No right of first refusal. The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ). In fact, Alcantara et. al. filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting
that the land they were occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was
referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza, General Manager, National Housing Authority, for appropriate
action. The request was further referred to acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd
Indorsement dated July 1, 1986. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ
would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.

20
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to
areas proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones.11 Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any
right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one
must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home
on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously,
those who do not fall within the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and,
therefore, not entitled to the right of first refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the
land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price within a reasonable time.

Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186
from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease.
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form
and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his
gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the
Civil Code.
Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the
agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant
as defined by Presidential Decree No. 1517.

TANEDO VS BERNAD
An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different persons
is not a ground for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He
constructed an apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house, bodega
and a septic tank for common use of the occupants of the two lots.

Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Tañedo (pet). He also agreed that should be
decide to sell Lot B he would sell it to Tañedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim
(resp). Sim blocked the sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also
asked Tañnedo to remove that portion of his building encroaching Lot B.

21
Tañedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted that he
had agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the
Deed of Sale he had executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed the
complaint and the cross claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the land
and its subsequent sale to different owners.

RULING: NO.
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds
for the extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by
operation of law as provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided
in the deed of absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tanks before
he sold the lots. Accordingly, the spouses Sim cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the
servitude.

VALDERAMA VS THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO.

What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a larger
area of land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area occupied not
by causing wagons to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects being transported.

FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with
Miguel Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons
for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn
would furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from
the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North
Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al,
made other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The
hacienda owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by
its capacity, so the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners
of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against
North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that

22
North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation
of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane
from the hacienda owners’ lands

HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of
sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is
clear that the easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it
is the intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the
corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by
the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of
ownership and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing
in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in
Art. 543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area
or deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the
North Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to
occupy the same area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it
passes through the estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the
owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right
to the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes
produced by the owners has no basis.

23
AMOR VS FLORENTINO
FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house
to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor.
Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem
is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned
by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting
Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters
that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took
effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there
is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different
persons and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title
nor removed, an easement is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art.
624 is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil
Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement
is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amor’s supposition, the law on easement
was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

RONQUILLO VS ROCO
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous
easement.

FACTS:
Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an
easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for
more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the
road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation,

24
and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden
posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad
St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by
prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at
intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

SOLID MANILA CORP. VS BIO HONG TRADING CO.

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or
mortgaged separately.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. (Merger,
which presupposes ownership, is not possible.)

FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in the vicinity
of another parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior owner. In the
deed of sale between Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an easement of
way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hong’s title stating among other things
"(6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed
thereon; and (7) that the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the
public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall
not act (sic) for any indemnity for the use thereof”

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates) made
use of the above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in
1983, when, and over its protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent,
to have the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.

25
The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase
of the property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair
the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the
property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong and
the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the
intent of the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which
it granted subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both
1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solid’s contention that the alley was not included
in the sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement. As a mere right of
way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley ––
as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is
supposed to be open to the public.

2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and
servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a
community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In a
personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the
easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus,
merger could not have been possible.

26
RELOVA LAVAREZ
The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a
dam on the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto upon the
plaintiff by virtue of prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding
servitude.

FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water brought
from a river through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This was by virtue
of an easement the use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty years. On the land
of the defendants there was a dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to
control the flow of the water in the aqueduct, by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in
a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.

One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage
ditch, so that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the
plaintiff had some five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the
water resulting from the destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim
that the plaintiff is not the owner of any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as
padagat (rice lands planted in May). It was also alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by
the destruction of the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff which are cultivated with the aid of
water from the aqueduct are of the class known as binanbang (rice lands planted in August or
September), and the destruction of the dam in May and the consequent failure of water in the
aqueduct at that period did not, and could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper
cultivation of his lands.

Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish the existence of the
servitude in the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for the
maintenance of the aqueduct and dam in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.

HELD:
Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants were
outrightly disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact. However,
the Court ruled that there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam
had been in existence for more than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had exercised its use.
It was alleged that no benefit was granted to the plaintiff since his (plaintiff's) land is situated
higher than defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants had the right to open the gates of the
dam to prevent destructive overflow upon their land, this does not give them the right to stop the
flow of water altogether.

27
REYES VS SPS FRANCISCO VALENTIN AND ANATALIA RAMOS ET AL.
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition[1] of the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated August 12, 2010 and of the
Court of Appeals Resolution[3] dated October 28, 2010.

On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco, [4] filed a
Complaint[5] before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for easement of right of
way against respondents, Spouses Francisco S. Valentin and Anatalia Ramos. [6]

In her Complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner alleged that she was the registered
owner of a 450-square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan,
designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and covered by TCT No. T-343642-(M).[7] The property used to be
a portion of Lot No. 3-B[8] and was surrounded by estates belonging to other persons. [9]

Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and
that it was the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. [10] A 113-square-meter
portion of respondents' property was also the "point least prejudicial to the [respondents]." [11] The
easement sought was the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents' other lot.[12]

(please see image: G.R. No. 194488, page 2.)

Figure 1. Drawing showing the location of petitioner's and respondents' properties in

relation to the proposed easement. Petitioner's property is located on the leftmost part of the
drawing. Respondents' property and the proposed 113-square-meter easement are located on the
drawing's right side that contains petitioner's property. Barangay Malibong Bata Road can be seen
on the rightmost part of the drawing.
Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own acts. [14] When her mother
gave the property to her as part of her inheritance, there was no intention for the property to have
no outlet.[15]

According to petitioner, her and respondents' lots were previously owned by her mother.
Respondents' lot was given to Dominador Ramos (Dominador) who allegedly was respondents'
predecessor-in-interest. Dominador was also her mother's brother and caretaker of properties. [16]

Only 500 square meters were given to Dominador. Part of the 1,500 square meters was intended
as a right of way. Dominador was tasked to prepare the documents. But, instead of limiting the
conveyance to himself to 500 square meters of the property, he conveyed the whole 1,500 square
meters, including that which was supposed to be the access to the barangay road. [17]

Petitioner's mother only learned about what Dominador did when a meeting was called in 1989
regarding the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. [18] She did not
cause the recovery of her title because at that time, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan was razed by
fire, causing the destruction of the documents covering the subject properties. Dominador was also

28
her brother, whom she presumed would give her a right of way to the main road. Instead of giving
way, however, he closed the passage, causing petitioner's property's isolation. [19]

Despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to petitioner's
claims.[20]

In their Answer,[21] respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner's property was due to her
mother's own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency
of an agrarian case between her and her tenants.[22] The property chosen by petitioner as easement
was also the most burdensome for respondents.[23] Respondents pointed to an open space that
connected petitioner's property to another public road. [24]

Upon agreement by the parties, the Branch Clerk of Court conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises in February 2007, in the presence of the parties. [25]

After an Ocular Inspection Report[26] was submitted on March 2, 2007, the case was considered
submitted for decision.[27]

On April 11, 2007, the trial court issued its Decision,[28] dismissing the Complaint for easement of
right of way, thus:[29]

WHEREFORE, finding the prayer for a grant of compulsory easement of right of way on a 113
square meter portion of defendants' property to be devoid of merit, the same is hereby DENIED.
Consequently, the case is ordered DISMISSED with no pronouncements as to damages and
costs.[30]

The trial court found that petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient
estate of respondents.[31] It noted that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements,
such as respondents' garage, garden, and grotto.[32] The trial court also noted the existence of an
irrigation canal that limited access to the public road. [33] However, the trial court pointed out that
"[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal, no permanent improvements/structures can be seen
standing on the subject rice land."[34] Moreover, the nearby landowner was able to construct a
bridge to connect a property to the public road. [35] Hence, "[t]he way through the irrigation canal
would . . . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to reach the barangay road." [36]

Petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. [37]

On August 12, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the
Regional Trial Court's Decision.[38] It found no reversible error in the trial court's decision to
dismiss petitioner's complaint.[39] Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence
of the requisites for the grant of easement.[40] The Court of Appeals also found that petitioner's
property had an adequate outlet to the public road. [41]

29
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated September 8, 2010 was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on October 28, 2010.[42]

Petitioner filed this Petition on December 22, 2010[43] to assail the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.[44]

We are asked to determine whether petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over
respondents' property.

Petitioner argued that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that it
was not her property that was adjacent to the irrigation canal but her sister's. Her property was
surrounded by other estates belonging to other persons. Hence, she had to pass through other
properties before reaching the irrigation canal. [45]

Moreover, even if she traversed the other properties, she would only end up on the bank of the
irrigation canal without means to cross over.[46] The fact that she had to construct a bridge over the
irrigation canal supported her position that there was indeed no adequate outlet from her property
to the public road.[47] In any case, a bridge will necessarily be an obstruction on the public road. [48]

Petitioner further argued, citing Quimen v. Court of Appeals,[49] that "[t]he owner of the dominant
estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner
thereof for the beneficial use of his property." [50]

In their Comment[51] on the Petition, respondents argued that this case is already barred by prior
judgment.[52] Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and her children had already previously filed an
action for easement of right of way against respondents. [53] That case had already been dismissed
in favor of respondents.[54] The reason for the dismissal of the case was the possibility of
constructing a bridge over the irrigation canal. [55] Respondents further argued that the easement
must be real and not fictitious.[56]

The petition has no merit.

The issue of ownership is irrelevant

to the case; filing of a complaint for
easement is a recognition of the servient
property owner's rights

Petitioner points out that respondents' property was previously owned by her mother. She alleged
that her uncle who was her mother's caretaker of property fraudulently caused the titling of the

30
whole 1,500-square-meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter portion under his
name.[57]

These allegations are relevant only if we are determining the issue of the property's ownership.
However, this is not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question the ownership or the
registration of respondents' title over the property. We are limited to the issue of petitioner's
easement rights. On that matter, petitioner's act of filing a Complaint for easement of right of
way is an acknowledgement that the property is owned by respondents. It is tantamount to a
waiver of whatever right or claim of ownership petitioner had over the property.

II

Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil

Code requirements for the grant of
easement rights

The acts of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner's rights over the
property. One of the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the isolation
of the property is not due to the acts of the dominant estate's owners.

As shown in the pleadings submitted to the trial court, petitioner and respondents had conflicting
claims on this issue. Petitioner alleged that it was her uncle, Dominador, who caused the isolation
of her property through his act of appropriating for himself the whole property entrusted to him by
her mother. Moreover, he closed the passage from petitioner's property to the public road.

On the other hand, respondents alleged that the isolation was due to the acts of petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest. She allegedly subdivided the property in favor of her children, including
petitioner, without regard to the pending dispute over the property. If the latter is true, petitioner
could not claim any right to compulsory easement even if it was not she who caused the property's
isolation. Petitioner is bound by her predecessor-in-interest's act of causing the isolation of her
property.

Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner's
property, petitioner still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed portion
of respondents' property. This is because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of
right of way under the Civil Code.

Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way:

ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without

31
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the
needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the
value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate
surrounded by others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a
permanent way, the indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such
encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own
acts.

ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Based on these provisions, the following requisites need to be established before a person becomes
entitled to demand the compulsory easement of right of way:[58]

1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is

without adequate outlet to a public highway;

2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;

3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and

4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to another
person, the rights of the property's owner are limited. [59] An owner may not exercise some of his
or her property rights for the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way.
Hence, the burden of proof to show the existence of the above conditions is imposed on the person
who seeks the easement of right of way.[60]

We agree with the Regional Trial Court's and the Court of Appeals' findings that petitioner failed
to establish that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement
was the least prejudicial to respondents' estate.

32
There is an adequate exit to a public highway.

This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos[61] that the convenience of the dominant estate's
owner is not the basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs
may be satisfied without imposing the easement. [62] Thus:

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up
a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the
easement, the same should not be imposed.

Also in Flow v. Llenado, we refused to impose a right of way over petitioner's property although
private respondent's alternative route was admittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse
several ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said passage
is impassable during the rainy season.

And in Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., this Court refused to grant the easement prayed for
even if petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to other owners, as temporary ingress and
egress, which lots were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud because
such grant would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that mere convenience for the
dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis for the easement. [63] (Citations omitted)

Access to the public highway can be satisfied without imposing an easement on respondents'
property.

The Ocular Inspection Report reads, in part:

Upon reaching the said place, pictures were taken in the presence of both parties and their
respective counsel. The undersigned observed that fronting the lot where the house of the
defendant is erected, is Brgy. Malibong Bata public road. The property of the plaintiff is located
at the back of defendant's lot. Plaintiff, through her counsel, requested that the side portion of
defendants' lot where the latter's garage and a grotto are erected or a portion of defendants' newly
acquired adjacent lot be the right of way. This was objected to by Atty. Batalla arguing that to
grant the same is more prejudicial to the defendants considering that the improvements thereon
will be affected and that there is another existing public road which is nearer to the plaintiff's
property. Atty. Sali admitted that there is another existing public road but the right of way cannot
be done as there is more or less four-meter wide irrigation before reaching the said public road.

In order to confirm if there is indeed another existing public road which is nearer to plaintiff's
property, the undersigned together with the above-mentioned court personnel and the parties and
their respective counsel, proceeded to the said place. True enough, there is a public road also

33
named Brgy. Malibong Bata public road, fronting plaintiff's property. However, there is more or
less four-meter wide irrigation before reaching the said public road. It was also confirmed that the
two properties of the plaintiff are between the public road which is adjacent to the irrigation. Atty.
Sali manifested that they already requested before the officers of the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) for the grant of the right of way but the same was disapproved. Atty. Batalla
pointed out that there are already some concrete bridges nearby the properties of the plaintiff. [64]

Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In
between her property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be
traversed by constructing a bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.

There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to serve petitioner's needs. Another
adequate exit exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.

The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to
petitioner because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the
irrigation canal before she can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the
imposition of an easement on respondents' property because her convenience is not the gauge in
determining whether to impose an easement of right of way over another's property. [65]

Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of
way, the requirement of "least prejudice] to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the
dominant estate [and the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent
to the requirement of "least prejudice."

This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over
distance of the dominant estate to the public highway. [66] Thus, in Quimen, this court granted the
longer right of way over therein respondent's property because the shorter route required that a
structure of strong materials needed to be demolished. This court said:

[T]he court is not bound to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to
avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be
avoided by a round about way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the
shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established

34
on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage
should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.[68] (Citation omitted)

Petitioner would have permanent structures such as the garage, garden, and grotto already installed
on respondent's property destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for the right of way.

The cost of having to destroy these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an available outlet
that can be utilized for the right of way, negates a claim that respondents' property is the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

An easement is a limitation on the owner's right to use his or her property for the benefit of another.
By imposing an easement on a property, its owner will have to forego using it for whatever purpose
he or she deems most beneficial. Least prejudice, therefore, is about the suffering of the servient
estate. Its value is not determined solely by the price of the property, but also by the value of the
owner's foregone opportunity for use, resulting from the limitations imposed by the easement.[69]

Imposing an easement on the part of respondents' property for petitioner's benefit would cost
respondents not only the value of the property but also the value of respondents' opportunity to use
the property as a garage or a garden with a grotto.

Petitioner may use another outlet, which may provide longer access from her property to the public
highway, but is free from obstructions. The four-meter wide irrigation canal may be traversed upon
construction of a bridge. As noted by the trial court:

A neighboring land owner was able to construct a short concrete bridge wide enough even for
vehicles to pass through the irrigation canal from his property to the barangay road. The Court sees
no reason why plaintiff could not do the same and why it would not be allowed if carried in
accordance with the requirements set by NIA. [70]

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, a reading of the August 17, 2005 National Irrigation
Administration Letter-Response[71] to petitioner's query regarding the possibility of constructing a
concrete bridge over the irrigation canal shows that petitioner was not really disallowed from
constructing a bridge. She was merely given certain conditions, thus:

Wherefore, this office could not negate such decision.[72] However, request for grant of right of
way for the construction of bridge over an irrigation canal could be granted subject to the following
conditions[:] (1) that the landowner will shoulder the cost of construction subject to the design and
specifications approved by this office[;] (2) construction schedule must be informed for
inspection[;] (3) subject construction will not impede the free flow of irrigation water[;] (4)

35
distance between bridges will not hamper our mechanical equipment to move freely within the
area during clearing schedule; (5) active participation of the landowner in the clearing and
maintenance of the canal for continuous water flow; (6) any violation of the above conditions will
mean revocation of the permit and any damage to the canal structures will mean restoration of the
landowner at his own cost.[73]

It is true that an easement of right of way may be granted even if the construction of the bridge
was allowed. However, in determining if there is an adequate outlet or if the choice of easement
location is least prejudicial to the servient estate, this court cannot disregard the possibility of
constructing a bridge over the four-meter-wide canal. This court must consider all the
circumstances of the case in determining whether petitioner was able to show the existence of all
the conditions for the easement of right of way.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals also considered the aspect of necessity for an
easement in determining petitioner's rights.

The trial court found that there is still no necessity for an easement of right of way because
petitioner's property is among the lots that are presently being tenanted by Dominador and
Filomena Ramos' children.[74] Petitioner is yet to use her property. The Complaint for easement
was found to have been filed merely "for future purposes."[75] Thus, according to the Court of
Appeals, "[a]dmittedly, there is no immediate and imperative need for the construction of a right
of way as the dominant estate and its surrounding properties remain as agricultural lands under
tenancy."[76]

The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included in the requisites for the grant of
compulsory easement under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the question of "least
prejudice." An easement of right of way imposes a burden on a property and limits the property
owner's use of that property. The limitation imposed on a property owner's rights is aggravated by
an apparent lack of necessity for which his or her property will be burdened.

III

The case is not barred by prior judgment

Respondents argued in their Comment that the case was already barred by prior judgment because
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and her siblings had already filed an action for easement against
respondents in 2004. This case, according to respondents, had already been dismissed because of
the existence of another public road or highway, which can be accessed after the construction of a
bridge over the irrigation canal.[77]

Respondents alleged that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest not only subdivided her property
among her children, which included petitioner. Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest also converted

36
her property from farmland to home lots. This, respondents argued, is prohibited under Section
73(c) and 73(e), and Section 74 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. [78] Hence, the
conversion was illegal, and this case still involves the predecessor-in-interest's property prior to its
subdivision.[79]

In her Reply,[80] petitioner argued that the property was not barred by prior judgment because she
was already the registered owner of her property before the complaint for easement was filed by
her mother and her siblings. She was not a party to that case.[81]

Dismissal of a case on the ground of res judicata requires that a final judgment must have been
rendered between the same parties over the same subject matter and cause of action. [82]

Even if it is true that this and the alleged previous case involve the same issue, there can be no res
judicata if there is no identity of parties and/or subject matter. For purposes of determining if there
is identity of parties, two different persons may be considered as one identity if they represent the
same interest or cause.[83]

Based on the records, petitioner's certificate of title was issued in her name on April 12, 1999. [84] If
as admitted by respondents, the previous case for easement was filed in 2004 and petitioner was
not represented in the case, then there could have been no identity of the parties and subject matter.
Petitioner's interest could not have been represented by her predecessor-in-interest or by her
siblings because none of them were the owners of petitioner's property in 2004.

Respondents' insistence that the cases involve the same interests because the alleged conversion
of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest's property from farmland to home lots was illegal involves
the determination of whether there was such conversion. The determination of whether there was
conversion may be relevant to the issue of the validity of petitioner's title but is not relevant to the
issue of the existence of petitioner's easement rights. This determination needs proper reception
and assessment of evidence, which is not the province of this court. That issue should be threshed
out in a separate case directly attacking petitioner's certificate of title.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision promulgated on August 12, 2010 and its
Resolution promulgated on October 28, 2010 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

37
SPS. Manuel & Victoria Salimbangon vs. SPS. Santos & Erlinda Tan G.R. No. 185240 I
January 20, 2010
FACTS:
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate leaving a parcel of land at Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years
later his children executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition, adjudicating and
dividing the land among themselves. Lots A, B, and C were adjacent to a city street. But Lots D
and E were not, they being interior lots. To give these interior lots access to the street, the heirs
established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide
alley between Lots D and E that continued on between Lots A and B and on to the street. The
partition that embodied this easement of right of way was annotated on the individual titles issued
to the heirs.

But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the property, the heirs modified
their agreement by eliminating the easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its
place, imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran exclusively along the
southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street.

Petitioner Victoria became the owner of Lot A, one of the three lots adjacent to the city street.
Victoria and her husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this lot and built
two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while the other, located in the interior of Lot A,
used the alley or easement of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this
alley cemented and gated.

Respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan (the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their
owners. The Tans built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area. They also
closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons
lodged a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the Tans
filed an action against the Salimbangons for the extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and
damages with application for preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of right of way established by the partition agreement among the
heirs has been extinguished.

DECISION:
The easement of right way for the benefit of Lots D and E was extinguished. The Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals' decision that based on the testimony of one of the previous owners, Eduardo
Ceniza, the true intent of the parties was to establish that easement of right of way for the benefit
of the interior lots, namely, Lots D and E. Consequently, when ownership of Lots B, D, and E was
consolidated into the Tans, the easement ceased to have any purpose and became extinct.

38
EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT

LIZARES ET AL. VS. HON. KINTANAR ET AL.

NILO LIZARES, NICOLAS LEDESMA, JAIME CLAPAROLS, CARMITA C.

BALCELLS, EDUARDO CLAPAROLS, EULALIA C. ROSELLO, ENRIQUE YUSAY,
DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, INC., FIRST FARMERS' MILLING CO., INC.,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CESAR A. KINTANAR, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction questioning the orders of respondent
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dated June 30, 1970, July 20, 1970, December 10,
1970 and April 21, 1971 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The pertinent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:

Private respondent Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar
mill located in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental, manufacturing centrifugal sugar
from sugarcanes delivered to the mill by petitioners Nilo Lizares, Nicolas Ledesma, Jaime
Claparols, Carmita C. Balcells, Eduardo Claparols, Eulalia C. Rosello, Enrique Yusay, Domingo
Rodriguez, Inc., and First Farmers' Milling Co., Inc. pursuant to identical milling contracts
executed between the former and the latter. Under the provisions of the milling contracts, Central
was granted, inter alia, an easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners for
the passage of water from the Imbang River to its sugar mill. For this purpose, Central constructed
concrete water canals traversing the parcels of land of petitioners. The easement of aqueduct was
for a period of fifty (50) years, which began with 1920-21 crop year up to 1969-70 crop year. Prior
to the expiration of this period, Central, by means of separate letters, offered to lease from
petitioners the areas occupied by the canals. However, petitioners refused to entertain the offer of
Central.

On June 22, 1970, Central filed its complaints against petitioners Nilo Lizares, Nicolas Ledesma,
Jaime Claparols, Carmita C. Balcells, Eduardo Claparols, Eulalia C. Rosello and Enrique Yusay,
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 9438, 9439, 9441, 9442, 9443, 9445 and 9446, respectively, before
respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. On July20, 1970, Central filed its
complaints against Domingo Rodriguez, Inc. and First Farmers' Milling Co., Inc., docketed as
Civil Cases Nos. 9472 and 9473, respectively, before the same court. In all these cases, Central
prayed for the establishment of a legal easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by
petitioners (same areas presently occupied by the canals) and for the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the petitioners and/or their agents, representatives,

39
assigns, successors-in-interest from removing and/or destroying the canals or otherwise from
obstructing the passage of water from the Imbang River to its mill, through the canals, during the
pendency of the litigation.

On June 30, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction
with respect to Civil Cases Nos. 9438, 9439, 9441, 9442, 9443, 9445 and 9446, to wit:

"O R D E R

Verified petition dated June 22, 1970, 'having been filed' in the above-entitled civil cases in which
it is prayed among other things, that a writ of preliminary injunctions (sic) ex-parte (sic) be issued
to refrain the defendants from proceeding with certain acts which are particularly described
therein, and the Court, finding that it is a proper case for injunction, that the continuance of the
acts complained of during the litigation would work injustice to the plaintiff, and that great or
irreparable injury would result to the plaintiff, before the matter can be heard on notice, hereby
orders the immediate issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for upon the filing of
the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each case.

SO ORDERED." (p. 137, Rollo)

The writs of preliminary injunction were issued accordingly on said date (pp. 140-146, Rollo). On
July20, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction as
regards Civil Cases Nos. 9472 and 9473, to wit:

"O R D E R

A verified petition dated July 20, 1970, having been filed in the above-entitled civil cases in which
it is prayed among other things, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to refrain the
defendant from proceeding with certain acts which are particularly described therein, and the
Court, finding that it is a proper case for injunction, that the continuance of the acts complained of
during the litigation would work injustice to the plaintiff, and that great or irreparable injury would
result to the plaintiff before the matter can be heard on notice, hereby orders the immediate
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for upon the filing of the plaintiff of a bond
in the amount of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED." (pp. 138-139, Rollo)

The writs of preliminary injunction were issued accordingly on said date (pp. 147-148, Rollo).

On July 27, 1970, petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction which
was opposed by Central in a motion dated August 21, 1970. On December 10, 1970, respondent
court denied the motion to dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction, to wit:

40
"O R D E R

For the resolution of the Court are the Motion to Dissolve Injunction dated July 27, 1970, filed by
the defendants and the Opposition to Motion to Dissolve Injunction dated August 21, 1970, filed
by the plaintiff. After carefully considering the lengthy, oral and written arguments of the parties,
pro and con, the Court finds no sufficient ground to dissolve the writs of preliminary injunction
issued in the above-entitled cases. The position of the defendants is that the injunctions were
issued on the premature assumption that, even after the expiration of the plaintiff's contractual
easement of aqueduct, it was entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of aqueduct on the same
location or route, even without averment of the existence of the statutory requisites for the
establishment of such legal easement, citing the cases of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. et al.
vs. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al, 64 O.G. 1965; and Angela Estate, Inc., et al vs. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, et al. G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968; while the plaintiff maintains
the following positions: (1) that the contractual easement of aqueduct has not expired as yet when
the complaint was filed; (2) that the complaint has sufficiently and with clarity averred that the
statutory requisites for easement of aqueduct exist, hence, the propriety and legality of the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction; and (3) that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
Bacolod-Murcia Co., Inc., cases aforesaid are not applicable to the issue at bar. The Court is
inclined to sustain the position taken by the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dissolve Injunction filed by the defendants in the above-entitled
cases is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED." (pp. 466-467, Rollo)

On December 19, 1970, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof which was, however,
denied on April 21, 1971 for lack of merit (p. 486, Rollo). Hence, the present petition.

On January 27, 1988, considering the length of time that these cases have been pending with this
Court, and to determine whether supervening events have rendered these cases moot and academic,
We resolved to require the parties to move in the premises. On February 29, 1988 (p. 600, Rollo)
and June 23, 1988 (p. 603, Rollo), petitioners manifested that no supervening events have rendered
these cases moot and academic.

The issue is whether or not respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in having issued
the orders dated June 30, 1970 and July 20, 1970 directing the issuance of the writs of preliminary
injunction, the order dated December 10, 1970, denying the motion to dissolve the writs of
preliminary injunction and the order dated April 21, 1971 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners have failed to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent court in
issuing the questioned orders.

41
Petitioners allege that the cases of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. Capitol Subdivision,
Inc., et al. (G.R. No. L-25887, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 731), Angela Estate, Inc., et al. v. CFI of
Negros Occidental, et al. (G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 500) and Locsin, et al. v.
Climaco, etc., et al. (G.R. No. L-27319, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 816) constitute the leading
jurisprudence in the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction in cases of complaints praying
for the declaration of legal easement. In answer thereto, Central asserts that the aforementioned
decisions are inapplicable in these cases because they refer to legal easement of right of way.

The cases invoked by petitioners may be applied to this controversy only insofar as the general
principles on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction reiterated therein are concerned, but
not with regard to the other principles enunciated therein because they deal with legal easement of
right of way whereas Our concern here is legal easement of aqueduct.

A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and
before judgment, when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
that the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the defendant is doing,
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation
of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.[1]

The purpose of this provisional remedy is to preserve the status quo[2] of the things subject of the
action and/or the relation between the parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff respecting
the subject of the action during the pendency of the suit. Because, otherwise or if no preliminary
prohibitory injunction were issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the
doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final
judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff.

In praying for the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction, Central averred the following in
its complaints (pp. 57-136, Rollo): that should the defendants (petitioners herein) remove or
demolish the concrete water canals or otherwise interfere with the easement of aqueduct which has
been availed of by it for the last fifty (50) years through the use of said canals by obstructing,
impeding or preventing the passage of water thereon, irreparable damage would be caused to it, as
they all together have a yearly quota to fill including the export quota which constitutes part of the
commitment of the Republic of the Philippines to the United States; that during the crop year 1969-
70, Central manufactured 871,797.50 piculs of centrifugal sugar of which manufactured sugar
sixty (60%) percent thereof or 523,078,500.00 piculs more or less are export or "A" sugar shipped
to the United States to fill part of the aforesaid yearly quota, which at the price of P40.00 a picul
on the average, amount to P208,231,400.00, or $34,871,900.00 thereby availing to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines much needed dollars to bolster the depleted foreign exchange
reserve of the country which at the present time is dangerously low; that in fact no damage has

42
resulted or will result to the defendants (petitioners herein) from the continued use and exercise of
the easement of aqueduct while on the other hand, irreparable damage will be caused to Central,
the other planters affected and even to the sugar industry and the national economy as a whole,
unless it be allowed the continuous use of the canals and its continued use thereof be legally
recognized as a legal easement of aqueduct upon payment to defendants (petitioners herein) of a
reasonable compensation to be fixed by the court, the said legal easement to exist for a period
coterminous with the existence and operation of the mill; and that unless the defendants
(petitioners herein) are restrained from committing the act of either impeding or in any way
obstructing the passage of water from the Imbang River through the canals presently existing on
their properties by destroying said canals or otherwise, which defendants (petitioners herein) are
threatening to do, Central's mill operation will be completely paralyzed resulting in great and
irreparable loss and damage to it and its planters.

We agree with respondent court that Central has sufficiently established the necessity of issuing
writs of preliminary injunction against petitioners.

Petitioners contend next that assuming crop year 1969-70 ended only on August 31, 1970, by the
time respondent court issued its December10, 1970 and April 21,1971 orders, Central's contractual
right to the easement of aqueduct has already expired. On the other hand, Central avers that since
the writs of preliminary injunction were issued before the expiration of the contractual easement
of aqueduct, they were issued not only to protect an existing right then, but even after August 31,
1970, to preserve the status quo between the parties, pending judicial determination as to whether
or not it (Central) could convert its existing contractual easement of aqueduct into a legal easement
under Arts. 642-643 of the New Civil Code.

It frequently happens that, pending suits for injunctive relief, changes take place in the conditions
which give rise to the litigation, and the question is thus presented whether the suit should stand
or fall upon the facts as they existed at the time it was brought, so as to exclude all consideration
of subsequent changes or abandonment of the acts complained of. Generally speaking, it is the
condition of things at the time of the hearing of the suit which is material, and which furnishes the
basis for relief. The court is not only authorized, but it is its duty to determine not merely whether
the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction at the time he began the suit but whether the facts as they
appear at the time of the hearing warrant such relief, and it may refuse to grant an injunction where,
since the commencement of the suit, conditions have so changed as to render an injunction useless
and of no effect if granted. Injunctive relief will generally be refused where, before the final
hearing, the plaintiff loses his interest in or title to the subject matter sought to be protected, or
where the act sought to be restrained has been made lawful by statute or ordinance. This does not
mean, however, that the court should deny injunctive relief in every case of material changes in
conditions or abandonment of the acts complained of, for circumstances may still exist which, in
the face of such a situation, would justify the issuance of injunction as a matter of sound judicial
discretion (28 Am. Jur. 201, cited in The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines by Vicente J.
Francisco, 1985 Edition, p. 178).

43
In these cases, the writs of preliminary injunction were issued (as correctly averred by Central) not
only to protect the existing easement of aqueduct in its favor, but even after the end of 1969-70
crop year, to preserve the status quo between the parties, pending judicial determination as to
whether or not Central can convert its contractual easement of aqueduct into a legal easement of
aqueduct. If the writs of preliminary injunction were to be dissolved, the probability of the canals'
destruction or obstruction by petitioners would be great, considering that they refused the offer
made by Central to lease the areas covered by the canals. In the event that respondent court grants
Central a legal easement of aqueduct, this judgment might be rendered ineffectual by the
destruction or obstruction of the canals.

It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioners inasmuch as they dwell on the
merits of the case pending before respondent court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the orders of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental dated June 30, 1970, July 20, 1970, December 10, 1970 and April 21, 1971
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-
16281. He bought the land from the respondent’s sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land
which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the
respondent Adriano on the bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited
by Honorata and Felipe from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land
was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters long,
traversing the Respondent's land.
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the
irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.

44
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of
water rights.

A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring
the irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public
Works and Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.

In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water
to irrigate his watermelon fields was urgent.

Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered damages when he
failed to plant his fields that yearfor lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed the canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision
by issuing a final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio
Adriano's water rights which had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or
1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water right since then for a period of
more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law, hence the water rights did not
form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondent’s land.

RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondent’s land for the passage of water from the
Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the
plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in
Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of Apparent Sign):

Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title
in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of
the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of
them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.

The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right was
the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would
be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant
to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in
the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's

45
land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement
by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as
property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it
free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of levelling
the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

SALAZAR VS GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. L-21727, December 16, 1970
CRISPINA SALAZAR, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO GUTIERREZ, AND DAMASO
MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration and/or modification of the decision of this
Court dated May 29, 1970, with notice sent by registered mail to petitioner's former counsel of
record and subsequently to the new counsel who substituted him, but the first notice was returned
unclaimed and the second elicited no answer to the motion.
The first point raised by respondents has to do with the main issue in this case, namely, whether
or not petitioner had acquired an easement of aqueduct over respondent Gutierrez' lot No. 433 for
the irrigation of petitioner's adjacent property, known as lot No. 436. The arguments advanced in
connection with this issue have been sufficiently considered and discussed in the decision and we
see no reason to change our findings and conclusions.
The second point refers to the award of damages by the trial court as affirmed by us in the judgment
sought to be reconsidered. Respondents submit, that the said award was reversed by the Court of
Appeals and that such reversal has not been assigned as error by petitioner before this Court. It
should be noted that the Court of Appeals did not touch on the question of damages at all although
the same was raised squarely before it in the appeal thereto by herein respondents, and that the
reversal of the award was merely a consequence of the said court's decision to the effect that no
easement of aqueduct had been acquired. Petitioner came to us in turn for a review of that decision
and for the affirmance of that of the trial court, and for that purpose it was not necessary to attribute
error to the Court of Appeals on a question not passed upon by it.
By the same token, of course, respondents are not now precluded from asking this Court to take a
second look at the question of damages, especially since they did raise it before the Court of
Appeals.

46
The three amounts awarded by the trial court are: the P4,700 by way of actual damages suffered
by petitioner prior to the rendition of the judgment on April 10, 1956; P1,360 annually thereafter,
beginning with the agricultural year 1956-1957 until restoration of the irrigation canal in dispute
P5,000 as moral damages; and P1,000 as attorney's fees.
With respect to the item of actual damages, respondents submit that there is not enough evidence
to justify it, and that the failure of the crops on petitioner's land after the canal was closed by
respondents could have been due to a number of other causes, such as pests and plant diseases. The
finding of the trial court on this point, however is not without reasonable basis. The canal was
demolished on February 24, 1953. For the preceding three years the produce of petitioner's land
was as follows: 1949 to 1950 - 115 cavans (wet season) and 50 cavans (dry season), or 165 cavans
in all; 1950 to 1951 - 120 cavans (wet season) and 63 cavans (dry season), or 183 cavans in all;
and 1951 to 1952 - 130 cavans (wet season) and 75 cavans (dry season), or 205 cavans in all. The
average yearly produce during those three years, as correctly found by the trial court, was 184
cavans of palsy. After the destruction of the canal the yield was reduced to 54 cavans for the
agricultural year 1953 to 1954; 80 cavans for 1954 to 1955; and 9 cavans for the year after that. The
average loss therefore was 136 cavans a year, or 408 cavans far three years, which, added to 62
cavans unrealized during the dry season of 1952 to 1953, aggregated a total of 470 cavans. This
is the basis of the award of actual damages in the sum of P4,700, computed at the price of P10 a
cavan. The award, it is clear, is neither speculative nor unjustified.
We do agree with respondents, however, that the award of P5, 000 as moral damages should be
eliminated. This case does not fall under any of the instances wherein such damages may be
recovered, as enumerated in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. With respect to the latter
Article there is no clear showing that the demolition of the canal in question, which was admittedly
on respondents' property, was done by them willfully and in bad faith, that is, purposely to cause
injury to petitioner. The trial court's finding on this point is a mere conclusion, without reference
to any particular evidence of record.
In connection with the award of attorney's fees, the same is authorized in any case "where the court
deems it just and equitable that (they) should be recovered." We do not consider that the trial court
committed a reversible error in this regard, or that the amount fixed by it is excessive.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment is modified by eliminating therefrom the award of moral
damages, and maintained in all other respects.

47
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW

Case Digest: Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No. 198774 I April 04, 2016

FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land. Alolino initially constructed
a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also
extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both floors.
There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another
three (3) on the second floor.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their
house/sari sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter
wall of Alolino's house. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back
of Alolino's house, covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction
deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress
and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their
house in 1955, long before the plaintiff purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that
plaintiff only has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very boundary of
his lot without observing the required setback. Finally, they emphasized that the wall of their house
facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has no
window.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view; and (2) whether or not Alolino
has acquired an easement of right of way.

DECISION:
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement of right of way over the
respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of
right of way. None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the
barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.

On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting
from the time when the owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner
from blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate. Notably, Alolino had not
made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to their
construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through
prescription.

48
PURUGGANAN VS PAREDES
MARTIN, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is whether or not the summary judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Abra based on the pleadings and reports submitted by the commissioner in Civil Case No. 738
entitled Emilio P. Purugganan vs. Felisa Paredes, et al. was correctly rendered.
Plaintiff-appellee Emilio Purugganan is the owner of a piece of a residential lot subdivided as Lot
1 and Lot 2, situated at the poblacion of Bangued, Abra and technically described under Torrens
Title No. R-6 in his name, adjacent to and bounded on the North by the lot of defendant-appellant
Felisa Paredes. The lots of the plaintiff-appellee are subject to an easement of drainage in favor of
the defendants-appellants fully quoted in the Decree of Registration of the Court of First Instance
of Abra, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 3256, to wit:
"That the oppositor (Felisa Paredes) withdraws her opposition to the registration of the lots Nos. 1
and 2 of the applicant, and in compensation to said withdrawal by the oppositor of her opposition,
the applicant agrees to respect an easement of servitude over a portion of the lots Nos. 1 and 2
which is EIGHT AND ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in length commencing from point 4 of Lot No
2 and stretching towards Lot No. 1 going Eastward, and the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that
the rain water coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins
of her brick wall now standing along the Northeastern boundary of Lot 1 shall fall into the land of
the applicant."
In or about the month of March 1951, the defendants-appellants constructed a house on their lot
adjacent to Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee in such a manner that the southern side of their house
is exactly on the brick wall, the southern side of which is the demarcation line between the plaintiff-
appellee and the defendants-appellants, demolishing said brick wall and built thereon the southern
wall of their house with 3 windows. The house constructed by the defendants-appellants is 2-1/2
meters longer than the length of roofing allowed in the abovequoted Decree of Registration, and
has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the property of the plaintiff-appellee
which is .20 meter wider than that allowed in the same Decree of Registration, and the rain water
from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside Lots 1 and 2 of the plaintiff-appellee. The
defendants-appellants also placed 3 windows each on the first and second floors of their house on
the side facing Lots 1 and 2 of plaintiff-appellee. From the time the defendants-appellants started
to construct their house, the plaintiff-appellee has repeatedly and continuously been demanding
from the defendants-appellants that the construction of their house be in accordance with the
easement, but the defendants-appellants refused to observe the easement and to close their
windows. They also prohibited the plaintiff-appellee from constructing a party wall between points
1 and 2 of Lot 2 and between points 2 and 3 and 4 of Lot 1.
In their answer, defendants-appellants admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the complaint
with respect to the existence of an "Amicable Settlement" with the plaintiff-appellee but
interposing a denial of the rest and alleging that the ruined brick wall which stands between the
properties of the plaintiff-appellee and their properties solely and exclusively belongs to them to
the exclusion of the plaintiff-appellee, the same having been inherited by defendant-appellant
Felisa Paredes from her ascendants from time immemorial, possessing them, peacefully,
continuously and adversely against any other party for so many years up to the present; they also
admitted having constructed a house on the very lot owned by them, with windows on the side

49
facing the south, the same as the house which turned into ruins by reason of the bombing of
Bangued in March 1945, but they denied that the same was constructed in or about March 1951,
as said house was reconstructed and re-erected on the ruins of a Spanish-built house sometime in
later months of 1950. They further alleged that the house standing on the dominant estate
pertaining to Felisa Paredes was constructed long before the issuance of the Decree of Registration
alluded to in the complaint and that they have not violated the terms of the Decree of Registration
referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint; that the windows alluded to in paragraph 7 of the
complaint had long existed before the Decree of Registration in question was issued, in the same
way that said windows existed long before the bombing of Bangued in March 1945 and therefore,
plaintiff-appellee, as owner of the servient estate, is estopped from questioning the existence of
said windows; that since time immemorial, the house bombed in March 1945, on which ruins
stands the present house, had windows facing Lot No. 1, in the same way the windows of the
present house are so constructed facing same Lot No. 1 a long time with notice, knowledge and
acquiescence of the plaintiff-appellee as owner of the servient estate. Defendants-appellants
prayed that plaintiff-appellee be ordered to respect all existing construction on their lot and to
refrain from constructing a party wall to obstruct the easement of light and view: that the easement
of light and view be inscribed on the title of plaintiff-appellee's lots as well as to pay the actual
moral and consequential damages.
On September 7, 1959, the trial court pursuant to a pre-trial agreement issued an order appointing
the Provincial Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands, Ilocos Norte, or his duly authorized
representative to relocate the monuments and determine the boundary line between the lots of the
parties involved.
On May 5, 1962 plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for summary judgment in accordance with the
prayer of his complaint except the portion relative to damages where he reserved his right to
present his evidence. He supported his motion for summary judgment with an affidavit of merits
to which he has attached the Original Certificate of Title No. R-6, the Decree of Registration for
the issuance of said certificate of title, the Order dated September 7, 1959 and the report of the
Commissioner. In asking for summary judgment plaintiff-appellee contended that from the
respective pleadings of the parties and the Commissioner's Report relative to the relocation and
boundaries of his lands and the adjacent lands of defendants-appellants which are both covered by
Torrens Certificate of Title, it is evident that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, except
as to the amount of damages.
On June 4, 1962 defendants-appellants opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground
that their answer to the plaintiff-appellee's complaint has raised genuine and material issues of
facts. In their supporting affidavit, defendants-appellants alleged that the plaintiff-appellee was the
private surveyor who surveyed their lot in 1925 and that in the course of his survey he had acted
in bad faith when he excluded the portion of their land, which was the subject matter of their
opposition to the registration of plaintiff-appellee's lots; that they constructed their house in 1950
without any protest from the plaintiff-appellee and was almost complete when the Decree of
Registration was issued by the court; that the plaintiff-appellee knew fully well that the defendants-
appellants were merely reconstructing a house which had been existing prior to the bombing of
Bangued in 1945; and that the brick wall standing along the house is exclusively owned by them.

50
On July 30, 1962, the lower court rendered the now questioned Summary Judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
(a) Ordering the defendants to reconstruct the roof and eaves of their house on the southern side
now existing on their lot such that the falling water shall not fall on curve into the lots of the
plaintiff beyond one meter from the boundary line and by 8-1/2 meters in length and to remove
the said protruding eaves and roof;
(b) Ordering the herein defendants to reconstruct the wall of their house on the southern side either
by placing in two meters north of the boundary line if they desired their windows on the first and
second floors to continue to exist, or to permanently close the three windows on the second floor
and such other openings and apertures facing the lot of the plaintiff;
(c) Ordering the defendants to comply with what is ordered above in Pars. (a) and (b) within sixty
(60) days from the finality of this judgment. Upon their failure to do so the Provincial Sheriff of
Abra is hereby authorized to implement this judgment and execute the acts mentioned in Pars. (a)
and (b) hereof, at the expense of the defendants;
(d) Enjoining perpetually the herein defendants from prohibiting the plaintiff from making such
legal and lawful constructions on his lots up to the boundary between plaintiff's lot and defendants'
lot, provided always that such construction in whatever form, as a firewall, fence, etc., shall not
violate the easement of drainage in favor of the defendants, and to conform with the provisions of
Art. 675 of the New Civil Code; and
(e) Ordering the defendants from further encroaching into plaintiff's lots and molesting the said
plaintiff in the lawful exercise of dominion over his own property."
Plaintiff-appellee reserved his right to adduce evidence with respect to damages.
On September 3, 1962 defendants-appellants moved for reconsideration of the foregoing decision
on the ground that there is a genuine and material issue of fact and that said decision is unsupported
by law and evidence. Whereupon the court a quo, deferring in the meantime any action on the
motion, issued an order appointing Atty. Gelacio Bolante, Clerk of Court, to act as commissioner
to make an ocular inspection on the premises of the lot in question and to measure the eaves of the
house of the defendants-appellants to find out whether it conforms with the annotation contained
in the Torrens Certificate of Title of the plaintiff-appellee.
On December 4, 1962 the Clerk of Court submitted his report. After receiving a copy of said report
defendants-appellants manifested to the court that they agree with the findings of facts therein and
prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith and that their ownership of the brick
wall mentioned in said report be confirmed.
On July 23, 1963 the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of its summary judgment.
Hence, this appeal.
Defendants-appellants contended that the lower court erred in rendering a summary judgment
because (1) there is actually a genuine issue of material facts raised in the pleadings; (2) that it
made a finding of fact not supported by any evidence; and (3) that it rendered a summary judgment
without any legal basis. They claimed that after denying the allegations of plaintiff-appellee's
complaint that they have violated the easement of drainage there was actually a genuine issue of
material fact presented. The allegation referred to is that contained in paragraph 6 which states that

51
the roof of defendants' house protrudes by .2 meter wider and 2-1/2 meters longer than that allowed
by the Decree of Registration. This denial in paragraph 4 of the Answer of the defendants-
appellants reads as follows:
"That the defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 6 of the complaint, and allege that the house
standing on the dominant estate pertaining to Felisa Paredes, was constructed long before the
issuance of the Decree of Registration alluded to in the complaint, the herein defendants not having
violated the terms of the Decree of Registration referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint."
Again in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, defendants-appellants repeated the
same denial and averments by alleging therein:
"Defendants specifically denied these allegations of the plaintiff and alleged that (a) the house of
the defendants was constructed sometime in the latter months of 1950, before the issuance of the
Decree of Registration adverted to by the plaintiff, and therefore could not have violated that said
Decree, and (b) that the windows complained of by the plaintiff are reconstructed windows of the
reconstructed house of the dominant estate which had been in existence since the Spanish Regime,
with the knowledge, acquiescence and toleration of the plaintiff and his predecessors in interests
for more than sixty (60) years."
Even the supporting affidavit of defendants-appellants alleged that the brick wall standing along
their house and adjacent to the land of the plaintiff-appellee is owned by them. A close look at the
foregoing denials however, will show that the allegations defendants-appellants were trying to
challenge relate to the validity of the easement of drainage as annotated in the Certificate of Title
of plaintiff-appellee and not to the allegation that the roof of defendants-appellants protrudes by .2
meter wider and 2-1/2 meters longer than that allowed by the Decree of Registration. This must be
the reason why in his summary judgment, the trial judge noted the first issue as: "(1) that the house
now standing on the lot of the defendants was constructed before the issuance of the Decree of
Registration and, therefore, such construction did not violate said Decree of Registration
particularly the easement annotated on the Original Certificate of Title No. R-6 * * *."
It is only in their Motion for Reconsideration that defendants-appellants made the clarification that
the issue is not whether their house was constructed before or subsequent to the Amicable
Settlement but whether or not the roofing was .2 meter wider and 2-1/2 meters longer than the
distance allowed in the Decree of Registration. So after the clarification, the trial judge ordered
that an ocular inspection of the premises of the lots in question be made and the eaves of the house
of the defendants-appellants be measured whether it conforms with the annotation contained in the
Torrens Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee. After the ocular inspection defendants-appellants
readily manifested their conformity to the findings of fact made by the commissioner appointed
by the court. Under such a situation it would seem that there was no need for a trial on the merits
to resolve the question as to whether the defendants-appellants' roof was constructed in violation
of the easement of drainage of plaintiff-appellee. All that remained for the trial court to do was to
evaluate the facts and the arguments in the pleadings and the reports of the commissioner.
Defendants-appellants faulted the trial court for concluding that they have violated the conditions
of the easement of drainage without taking into consideration the report of the commissioner
appointed by it. After going over the pleadings of the parties and the reports of the commissioner,
we find no substantial ground to disturb the conclusion of the trial court. Defendants-appellants
have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration to the

52
roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase "servidumbre de
vertiente de los tejados" constituted on the land of the plaintiff. Translated, it means the easement
of receiving water falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the land of the
plaintiff-appellee. Consequently, the distances prescribed in the Decree of Registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof of the defendants-appellants' house but to the
distance of the rain water falling inside the land of the plaintiff-appellee because the encumbrance
is not the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the property of the plaintiff-appellee. The
Amicable Settlement, which was the basis of the Decree of Registration, clearly states that the
servitude on the land is to the extent of the distances setforth thus:
"* * * the applicant agrees to respect an easement of servitude over a portion of the lots Nos. 1 and
2 which is EIGHT AND ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in length commencing from point 4 of Lot
No. 2 and stretching towards Lot No. 1 going Eastward, and the width is ONE (1) meter, in order
that the rain water coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the
ruins of her brick wall now standing along the Northeastern boundary of Lot 1 shall fall into the
land of the applicant."
And the Decree of Registration tersely states that a portion of Lot 1 and 2 consisting of 8-1/2
meters long and 1 meter wide is subject to the easement of receiving water falling from the roof.
If these distances were made to correspond to the measurement of the roof then the encumbrance
on plaintiff-appellee's property would be more than the distances specified in the Certificate of
Title. The report submitted by the Commissioner appointed by the lower court to make an ocular
inspection of the premises involved shows that the eaves of the house of defendants-appellants juts
98 centimeters inside the property of the plaintiff-appellee and measures 8 meters and 20
centimeters in length; that during ordinary rain the water falling from the eaves of the defendants-
appellants' house fall within one meter from the boundary line of plaintiff-appellee's property and
during heavy rains more than one meter from said boundary line. The foregoing findings and
observations of the Commissioner weaken defendants-appellants' disclaimer that they did not
violate the conditions of the easement of drainage of plaintiff-appellee. There is such a violation
because the roof of the defendants-appellants protrudes by 98 centimeters over the property of
plaintiff-appellee, so that during a heavy rainfall the propulsion of the water would go as far as
one meter over the property of the latter. Obviously the lower court is correct in finding the
defendants-appellants to have violated the conditions of the easement of drainage of plaintiff-
appellee.
Defendants-appellants also blamed the trial court for ruling that they have not acquired an
easement of light and view of the property of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court's ruling that
defendants-appellants have not acquired an easement of light and view on the property of the
plaintiff-appellee is premised on Section 39 of Act 496 in accordance with which the servient
estate was registered. Said Section provides:
"Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration * * * shall
hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate * * *."
The same section, however, provides: "But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a
parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights
shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land
until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate or in any other manner (Sec.

53
39, Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, and Sec. 4, Act No. 3621). In the case of Cid vs.
Javier, 108 Phil. 850, 853, plaintiff's lot (dominant) as well as defendants' lot (servient) are covered
by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 7225 and 7545 respectively. In both of them, there does not
appear any annotation with respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which
counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914 would have already ripened by 1937, date of
the decrees of registration. In said case our Supreme Court held:
"Granting that in the instant case an easement of light and view was acquired by prescription, it
was cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System
without the easement being annotated on the corresponding certificate of title, pursuant to Sec. 39
of the Land Registration Act (Act 496)."
The lower court correctly applied the foregoing doctrine to the case at bar.
Indeed if defendants-appellants had acquired the said easement of light and view by prescription
through user since time immemorial why did they not intervene in the registration proceedings for
the inclusion of said easement in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-appellee as an encumbrance
thereon, in the same manner that the easement of drainage was annotated in the Certificate of Title
of plaintiff-appellee? The easement of drainage was inscribed in the Certificate of Title of plaintiff-
appellee in their favor by virtue of an amicable settlement resulting from their opposition to the
registration of plaintiff-appellee's property. In this light, their defense of user "since time
immemorial" becomes flimsy and is merely being used to simulate a factual issue.
Finally, defendants-appellants argued that the summary judgment of the lower court has no legal
basis. Summary judgment is employed as a method of disposing a case when the pleadings,
depositions, admission and affidavits filed by the parties show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law (Section 3 of Rule
34). In the case at bar the plaintiff-appellee's right to the reliefs sought is dependent on the existence
or non-existence of the easement of drainage and of light and view in favor of the defendants-
appellants as well as on the conditions attached to such easements. There is no dispute that
plaintiff-appellee's property was registered in 1951 under the Torrens System and that only the
easement of drainage is annotated on his Certificate of Title, subject to prescribed distances. But
what defendants-appellants have advanced as factual issues are: (1) that they have not violated the
prescribed distances of the easement of drainage; and (2) that the easement of light and view was
in existence since time immemorial. The first factual issue was resolved by the report submitted
by the commissioner to which defendants-appellants have given their conformity. The second
factual issue is immaterial to the disposition of the case because the servient estate was registered
in 1951 without the easement of light and view being annotated on the title. Since the supposed
easement of light and view is not annotated on the title, it becomes immaterial whether such
easement existed since time immemorial. On this point, there is no need to have a trial on the
merits and a summary judgment would appear to be in order.
In view of the foregoing, the summary judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against defendants-appellants. So ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

54
GARGANTOS V. CA- Easement
FACTS:
Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to
Tengtio, whol sold to Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan
Yanon. A third portion with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when latter
asked from the Municipality for a permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher
one. Yan Yung opposed for it would block his window and impair his right of loght and view.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established

RULING:
Yes. Again, Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person
who introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house contructed on the first estate
extends to the wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first
estate, there existed on the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as
passages for light and view, there being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light
and view will not be established, the apparent sign of easement between the two estates is
established as a title.

CID vs. JAVIER- Notarial Prohibition

Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription. Also Registration of the
Immovable without the registration of the easement extinguishes the easement.

FACTS:
The easement in dispute here is an easement of light and view, which is a negative easement. The
respondents Javier, et al are the owners of the building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot. Respondents have claimed that they had acquired by prescription an
enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and
light. The lower courts have ruled in their favor.

Note: easement of light and view is continuous and apparent so it is subject to prescription.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot
with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement
of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have

55
been made upon petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which
lots being covered by Torrens titles.

RULING: NO.
Art538’s requirement is a “formal act” and not just any verbal or written act. “Formal act”
contemplated in art538 in the OLD Civil Code pertains to an instrument acknowledged before a
notary public. Prescription for a negative easement only begins when there is a notarial prohibition
by the dominant estate. Respondents could have not acquired the easement by prescription because
they have not fulfilled this requirement. Even assuming they have acquired it, the easement no
longer exists because the properties were registered under the Torrens system without any
annotation or registration of the said easement.

56
NUISANCE

TAMIN VS. CA- Abatement of Public Nuisance

FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the
ejectment of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land
located in Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD
365 and that during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the
condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the
defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the
efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium
within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the
buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under
Article 694 of the Civil Code.

Held:
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that “Art. 694. A
nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else
which: … hinders or impairs the use of the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is either public or
private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.”

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:

1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance

2. civil action
3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil
action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before summarily abate
a public nuisance.

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition
would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private
respondent.

57
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.- Attractive Nuisance Doctrine
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water
tanks) as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than
the mere water and its location.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their
son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of
water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the
gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t
have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank
inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia
secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is
liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves
cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s death.

ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance

City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance
which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial
determination.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding
the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The
defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the

58
smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or
suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate
the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as
nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special
circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private
individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial
function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts
of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of
municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere
resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been
pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The
resolution is obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

VELASCO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.- Nuisance

Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

FACTS:
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the
last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20
meters away from appellant’s house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the
streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with
appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such,
appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered
the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and

59
imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in
Velaso’s property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the
average intensity levels of residences.

ISSUE:
Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?

HELD:
Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact,
Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The
determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However,
appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account
of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound
exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were
more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having
caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is
the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was
44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss
the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce
the produced sound to around.

SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO- Public Nuisance

The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed upon other
officers as may be designated by special provision of law.

FACTS :
This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City
Engineer of Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the demolition of their
respective houses situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these
constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially
entirely without consent. However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or damages for
the use of the land with the agreement that such payment and consent shall be without prejudice
to an order to vacate. The time came when the City Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the
occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the houses. Petitioners contend that by

60
virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District Health
Officer, not in the City Engineer.

ISSUES:
Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineerhave authority to cause the abatement of the
nuisance?

HELD:
There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4, classifying as a nuisance the
obstruction of free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a
community or neighbourhood. The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at
all times the streets. As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or
ordinance.

Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through
demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon
him. Arts. 700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because
of the principle that special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance
authorized the action sought to be taken by respondent.

61
DONATION

Hemedes v. CA
MAXIMA HEMEDES v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINIUM REALTY
AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, ENRIQUE D. HEMEDES, and R & B INSURANCE
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 107132. October 8, 1999
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
FACTS:
The instant controversy involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land,
situated in Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of
Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled Donation
Inter Vivos With Resolutory Condition whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject land,
together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the
following resolutory conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to
any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public
document conveying the property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage
contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically
revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.
Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kausapin executed a Deed of Conveyance
of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property
except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain vested in Justa
Kausapin during her lifetime, or widowhood and which upon her death or remarriage shall also
automatically revert to, and be transferred to Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained in the amount of
P6,000.00., R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes
failed to pay the loan even after it became due. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B
Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff in its favor. Since
Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was
maintained in the new title.
Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to
the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose
Hemedes. Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction
Corporation (Dominium). Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery,
Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the signing of the contract of lease, constructed two
warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia
Brewery’s constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a letter informing the

62
former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No. 41985 issued in its favor and of
its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Binan,
Laguna for the annulment of TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the
reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Dominium was the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the deed of sale executed
by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as
evidenced by the Kasunduan. The plaintiffs asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land
to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration
proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes, The
Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Which of the two conveyances by Justa Kausapin, the first in favor of Maxima Hemedes and the
second in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes, effectively transferred ownership over the subject land?
HELD:
Public respondents finding that the Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property By
Reversion executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Maxima Hemedes is spurious is not supported
by the factual findings in this case. In upholding the deed of conveyance in favor of Maxima
Hemedes, we must concomitantly rule that Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium,
did not acquire any rights over the subject property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her
stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes the ownership of the subject
property pursuant to the first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband.
Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof
did not exist at the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the
sale of the subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter
cannot acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent
purchaser for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which
it relied.
Whether or not R&B Insurance is a purchaser in good faith
R & B Insurance alleges that, contrary to public respondents ruling, the presence of an
encumbrance on the certificate of title is no reason for the purchaser or a prospective mortgagee
to look beyond the face of the certificate of title. We sustain petitioner R & B Insurances claim
that it is entitled to the protection of a mortgagee in good faith.
The annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Justa Kausapin upon Maxima Hemedes OCT
does not impose upon R & B Insurance the obligation to investigate the validity of its mortgagor’s
title. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the
property and may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of
usufruct, even by a gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary
shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct.
Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The
owner of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform,

63
and even destroy the same. This right is embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that the owner
of the property, the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter
the propertys form or substance, or do anything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.
There is no doubt that the owner may validly mortgage the property in favor of a third person and
the law provides that, in such a case, the usufructuary shall not be obliged to pay the debt of the
mortgagor, and should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt,
the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.

ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ- Donation Mortis Causa

All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed together in case of conflicting statements
in order to determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.

FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children,
Olimpia, Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with
reservations on certain lots, to their children and daughters-in-law and with conditions that they
are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd persons while the couple are still alive and that they
shall continue to administer the same until their death. The donees manifested their acceptance in
the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed a deed of donation in favor of
Angel and Andrea, giving the siblings each a ½ portion of Lot 2377-A. When Severa died, Andrea
sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the surviving
spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502.

The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the
properties donated did not pass to the donees during the donor’s lifetime but was transmitted to
the donees only ―upon the death of the donors‖. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502
since it was an extrajudicial partition. Both parties appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it
is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro contending it to be mortis causa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING: Donation inter vivos

The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as
provided in Art. 729. It was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the donors to
the donees, the latter are donating wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien

64
and debt. Likewise, it was accepted by the donees which is a requirement for donations inter vivos.
Donations mortis causa are never accepted during the donor’s lifetime.

The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the
couple is still alive implies that the ownership already passed.

Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to themselves the administration,
ownership and rights over the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that
ownership will pass only after their death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked
title and what the donors reserved to themselves by means of that clause was the management of
the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

BONSATO V. CA/UTEA, 95 Phil 481

If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the owner’s
share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be ―irrevocable,‖ it is
not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.
FACTS:
Josefa Utea and other heirs of deceased Domingo Bonsato and Andrea Nacario filed a complaint
to annul the donations of several parcels of land made by Domingo Bonsato in favor of Juan and
Felipe Bonsato. The donations were embodied in two Notarial deeds which the Josefa Utea and
the heirs allege were obtained thru fraudulent inducement.

In the Notarial deeds, the donor reserved for himself a portion of the fruits of the properties and
expressed ―that after the death of the donor, the aforesaid donation shall become effective.‖
CFI ruled that the donation was inter vivos therefor valid. CA ruled it was mortis causa therefor
invalid for not following the required formalities.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was inter vivos?

HELD:
Inter Vivos. If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime
the owner’s share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be
―irrevocable,‖ it is not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.

The solemnities required for a donation inter vivos are those prescribed by Art. 749 of the Civil
Code. But only half of the property conveyed shall be valid since the property is conjugal and only
Domingo made the conveyance without any consent from Andrea.
Note: Many portions of the case are in Spanish.

65
MAGLASANG VS. HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, 383 SCRA 6- Donation Mortis
Causa

In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
is still alive.

FACTS:
On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a
"Deed of Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." Four (4) other deeds of donation
were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 1995, bestowing upon: (a)
petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land;(b) Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a
parcel of land; and (c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of land.These deeds of donation contain
similar provisions, to wit:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the
DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon,
to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event
that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)

On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents (Heirs of Corazon
Cabatingan) filed an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations
and Accounting, seeking the annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed. Heirs allege,
inter alia, that petitioners, fraudulently caused the donations and that the documents are void for
failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.

RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was mortis causa?

HELD: Mortis Causa.

In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
is still alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:

(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but

66
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed;
And

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of
the properties to petitioners during her lifetime.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.

67
SICAD VS. CA- Donation Mortis Causa

The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties
as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

FACTS:
Capiz, Dec 1979:
Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her heart, drew up a Deed in favor of
her darling grandkids Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed bore the title
―Deed of Donation Intervivos.”

Thereafter, Aurora’s able secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for the purpose of canceling
the original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three donees.

A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached the donees; Aurora retained the
document and maintained possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.

The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn
Sicad. Simultaneously with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation. She
asserted that the donation took the nature of mortis causa and was therefore revocable anytime.
She further averred that the same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.

Aurora’s grandchildren found their grandma’s reversal vexing. They insisted that the Deed was
one intervivos and therefore irrevocable. The RTC adjudicated and found for the grandchildren.
Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket during proceedings.

The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property took Aurora’s her place in the litigation.
Sadly, the CA reaffirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Donation took the nature of one inter vivos

HELD: No. The donation is mortis causa.

The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take effect
within her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her death.
Second, she inserted a prohibition on the sale of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she
continued to possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed
of donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the
Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of ownership.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language
and the intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated ―that all rents, proceeds,
fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor,

68
during her lifetime; and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated
properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other
way possible.

A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that right to dispose
of the donated property during the donor’s lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation
mortis causa ― the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

Because of Aurora’s actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of donation in question to her
grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right
to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did
not acquire the right to dispose of the property – this would accrue to them only after ten years
from Aurora’s death. Moreover, they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.

These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation
mortis causa, envisioning a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on Heaven’s door.

REYES V. MOSQUEDA- Donation Inter Vivos

The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation ― inter
vivos or ― mortis causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of
his late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special
Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascual’s estate. Ursula then filed a
motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these were donated to her in a donation
mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in
a separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI
from enforcing the order.

Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of
donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation.
When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the
certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title which was granted
and she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.

69
Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of Ofelia’s TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against
Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelia’s TCT was null
and void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos

RULING:
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final
determination in a separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties, it can determine whether or not the properties should be included
in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action.

(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled ―donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in
a deed of donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body
of the document which should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the
property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and
independent of the death of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient
properties for himself to maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked
ownership immediately after execution of the deed of donation.

70
GESTOPA VS. CA FACTS- Acceptance in Donation

Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form
of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

FACTS:
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation mortis
causa in favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend, cancel,
or revoke the donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another
donation, this time inter vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights
to the fruits of the land during their lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the
properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses
Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent filed a petition to quiet title, stating
that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court ruled in favor of
petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations,
and that they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a different
application to a donation mortis causa. Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter: (1) that
the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation
inter vivos; (2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for
maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance,
contained in the deed of donation. Once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked,
except for officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke.

CUEVAS VS CUEVAS

Facts:
On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized conveyance entitled "Donacion
Montis Causa," ceding to her nephew Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered
land in Nueva Ecija.
In the same instrument appears the acceptance of Crispulo Cuevas.
on May 26,1952, the donor executed another notarial instrument... purporting to set aside the
preceding conveyance... on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First Instance to
recover the... land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the donation being mortis causa, it had been

71
lawfully revoked by the donor; and (2) even if it were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because... the donor did not reserve
sufficient property for her own maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitude,
for having refused to support the donor.
Court of First Instance denied the recovery
Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court... crux of the controversy revolves around the
following provisions of the deed of donation:
"Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas m samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ang lupa na
ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin ang patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagpapatrabaho,
makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa akin pa rin hanggang hindi ko
binabawian ng... buhay ng Maykapal at ito naman ay hindi ko ñga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay
mamatay na ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya."... apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that
the donor reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation, harvesting and other rights and
attributes of ownership while I am not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same
donor... states that she "will not take away" (the property) "because I reserve it for him (the donee)
when, I die." :
Issues:
whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a disposition of property mortis causa revocable
freely by the transferor at any time before death
The question to be decided 13 whether the donpr intended to part with the title to the property
immediately upon the execution of the deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the
donation is operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted... with a disposition mortis
causa, void from the beginning because the formalities of testaments were not observed
Ruling:
We agree with the Court below that the .decisive proof that the present donation is operative inter
vivos lies in the final phrase to the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko
ñga iya-alis" in the priginal) the land "because I am reserving it... to him upon my death." By these
words the donor expressly renounced the right to freely dispose of the property in. favor of another
(a right essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of the conveyance of the
naked, title to the property in favor of the... donee.
It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that the donor intended that she should
retain-the entire beneficial ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee... and when the donor stated that she would continue to retain the
"possession, cultivation, harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she meant
only the dominium utile, not the full ownership.
the words "rights and attributes of ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the
preceding rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly enumerated in the deed.
Had the donor meant to retain full or absolute ownership... she had no need to specify possession,
cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full or absolute ownership; nor
would she then have excluded the right of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of
ownership" that she reserved for herself.
Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A was a valid donation inter vivos, with
reservation of beneficial title during the lifetime of the donor.

72
The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the deed "merely recites that (1) the
donee has duly read all the contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its terms';
and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his... gratitude" but there is no show of
acceptance (Appellant's brief, p. 7), is without basis. To respect.the terms of the donation, and at
the same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence, constitutes sufficient acceptance.
Also unmeritorious is the contention that the donation is void because the donor failed to reserve
enough for her own support. As we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived.
Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeable with ingratitude, because it was expressly stipulated
that the donee had a total income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support himself, his
wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not allow him to add the... donor's support to
his own burdens.
Principles:
neither the designation mortis causa, nor the provision that a donation is "to take effect at the death
of the donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of donations (Laureta vs. Mata
As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is characteristic
of donations inter vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post mortem.
Witness article 828 of the New Civil
Code, that provides:
"Art. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or
restriction of this right is void."... it is highly desirable that all those who are called to prepare or
notarize deeds... of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity of clearly
specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they wish to retain the right to control and
dispose at will of the property before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of
the... beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be conclusive indication that
the liberality is to exist only at the donor's death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should
be observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free... disposition would place
the inter vivos character of the donation beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals

73
 LAURETA VS MATA
PAULO LAURETA, as administrator of the estate of Severa Magno y Laureta, deceased,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO EMILIO MATA and ESTER MAGNO, defendants-appellants.
N. Segundo and Pedro L. Valdes for appellants.
Jose Fonacier for appellee.
STATEMENT
The following instrument, known in the record as Exhibit A, omitting the description of the lands
and other personal property, was executed February 2, 1918:
DEED OF DONATION
In the municipality of Solsona,
EXECUTED BY SEVERA
Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands, I,
MAGNO Y LAURETA IN
Severa Magno y Laureta, widow,
FAVOR OF PEDRO EMILIO
seventy years old
MATA
and resident of the municipality of Solsona, Ilocos Norte, Philippine Islands, a proprietor by
occupation, hereby declared that for the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single,
seventeen years old, resident of this municipality and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and
Ester Magno, a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection
toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis cause" to
said youth all the properties described as follows:
(Here follows an accurate description of a large number of parcels of real estate, and a large amount
of personal property.)
I declare that all the rice lands above mentioned are my exclusive property, and to identify in a
clear manner the halves mentioned in some of the foregoing clauses I hereby state that they are the
one-half that was allotted to me in the petition had between me and the heirs of my deceased
husband, and, therefore, all the part that was allotted to me in the said partition is the subject of
this donation.
I also declare that I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of
land situated in Mariquet, on which I hold a mortgage for the sum of P250, subject to the conditions
stipulated in the document executed to evidence the said mortgage.
I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall
be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also
to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.
I, Ester Magno, widow, of age, resident of the municipality of Solsona, and mother of the young
Pedro Emilio Mata, the donee under this document, hereby accept this donation on behalf of may
said son, thanking the donor for her liberality and affection toward my said son, Pedro Emilio
Mata, the donee, with all the conditions imposed by the donor.
In testimony whereof we affixed our marks to these present in Solsona, this 2d day of February,
1918.

74
(Marked) SEVERA MAGNO
(Sgd.) ESTER MAGNO
(Sgd.) PEDRO EMILIO MATA
Signed in the presence of :
(Sgd.) IGNACIO FLORES
(Sgd.) ELIAS DULDULAO
(Then follows the notarial acknowledgment in due and regular form.)
It is admitted that at the time of its execution, the grantor was the owner in fee simple of all the
lands therein described. In the course of time the grantor died and at the time of her death Pedro
Emilio Mata, the grantee in the deed, and Ester Magno, entered upon and took possession of the
lands.
The plaintiff applied for and was appointed administrator of the estate of the grantor Severa Magno
y Laureta, deceased, and made a demand upon the defendants for possession of the lands which
was refused, resulting in this action by the plaintiff as administrator, to recover possession of the
premises and the sum of P9,000 as the value of the products of the land from April 9, 1918, until
the termination of the case, for the sum of P1,200 damages, for the unlawful and wrongful
withholding of possession, and costs.
For answer the defendants made a specific denial of all of the material allegation of the complaint,
and pray judgment for costs.
Upon such issues the case was tried and submitted upon a stipulation of facts to the effect that any
title or right of possession which Pedro Emilio Mata has to the possession of the premises is
founded upon Exhibit A.
The lower court rendered judgment to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of
the lands in question and the sum of P1,050, the agreed rental value and costs, from which the
defendants appeal, assigning nine different errors, the combined substance of which is that the
lower court erred in holding that the donation made by the deceased, known as Exhibit A, should
be construed under the provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code, and that the defendants did not
acquire title to the lands under it, that their possession was illegal, and that the land was the
property of the heirs of the deceased, and in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, and in overruling
the defendants' motion for a new trial.

JOHNS, J.:
Its execution having been admitted, the question involved is the construction, legal force, and
effect of Exhibit A. Among other things it recites that I, Severa Magno y Laureta, widow, seventy
years old . . . hereby declare that for the purpose of giving the young Pedro Emilio Mata, single,
seventeen years old, . . . and son of Pastor Mata, already deceased, and Ester Magno, "a reward for
the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affections toward him and of the fact
that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate "mortis causa" to said youth all the properties
described as follows." In the second paragraph it is said: "Therefore, all the part that was allotted
to me in the said partition is the subject of this donation." In the third it recites: "I also declare that
I likewise donate to the said youth the right to, and usufruct of, two parcels of land situated in
Mariquet, etc." In the fourth — "I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee
cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor, etc."

75
The donee, Pedro Emilio Mata, was the son of Pastor Mata, deceased, and was seventeen years
old at the time the instrument was executed. The instrument further recites that Ester Magno, a
widow and the mother of Pedro Emilio Mara, with all the conditions imposed by the donor,
accepted the donation on behalf of her son, and thanked the donor for her liberality and the
affection for her son.
The plaintiff contends and the trial court found that Exhibit A should be construed under the terms
and provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code as follows:
Donations which are to become effective upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
disposals of property by will and shall be governed by the rules established for testamentary
successions.
As we analyze it, Exhibit A is a donation in præsenti and conveyed the fee simple title to the lands
in question subject only to the life estate of the donor. It must be conceded that during her lifetime
the grantor had a legal right to convey the fee simple title to her lands to any person in her
discretion, reserving to herself a life estate. In legal effect, that is what she did here. The
conveyance of the lands took effect upon the making and delivery of the deed, reserving a life
estate only in the donor. The conveyance itself was not "to become effective upon the death of the
donor," but took effect at the time of its execution. The instrument does not recite that the
conveyance itself is not to become effective until the death of the donor, but, in legal effect, it
recites that an actual conveyance is made subject to the life estate of the donor. Upon its face
Exhibit A comes squarely within the provisions of article 623 of the Civil Code, which reads:
A donation is perfected as soon as the donor has knowledge that it has been accepted by the donee.
Here, it appears from the instrument itself that Ester Magno accepted the donation on behalf of the
son, and the acceptance is incorporated in the body of the instrument and made a part of it, and is
signed by the donor and acceptor in the presence of witnesses and the instrument as a whole is
legally acknowledge before a notary public.
Again, when the instrument is construed as a whole it shows upon its face a delivery and
acceptance. The donor conveys the land, and in and by the same instrument the mother of the
donee accepts the conveyance upon the terms and conditions stated in the deed.
Corpus Juris, vol. 18, p. 208, says:
Where, however, a deed containing a provision that it is not to take effect until the grantor's death
is actually delivered to the grantee during the lifetime of the grantor, it will be sustained as a present
grant of a future interest.
That is this case. Legally speaking, it was a delivery and an acceptance of the deed. The facts bring
the case squarely within article 623 of the Civil Code. Here, there was a donation and an acceptance
both in the same instrument which made it a perfected donation within the meaning of article 623.
Commenting on article 620 of the Civil Code in volume 5, page 82, of the 1910 edition, Manresa
says:
In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a resolutory condition
the property is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of the donor and as to this point
there is no question.
When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the
death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise.
To avoid it we must distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the

76
donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the property must be made during his life or after
his death. From the moment that the donor disposes freely of his property and such disposal is
accepted by the donee, the donation exists, perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until
the day arrives or until the condition is fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot
be realized. Thus, he who makes the donation effective upon a certain date, even though to take
place at his death, disposes of that which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation
nor dispose of the said property in favor of another. If the thing is lost thru the fault of the donor,
or if it is damaged, indemnity may be recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive conditions,
it is sufficient to read articles 1120 and 1122 to understand the effects which this kind of donation
has during the lifetime of the donor. He who makes a donation effective after his death, makes a
donation, not a legacy. The mere name of the act, when a different intention does not clearly
appear, is enough in order to make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations.
However, if the ill-named donor not only postpones the date of the execution of the donations until
his death but also reserves the right to revoke said act at his pleasure, then this act is not valid as a
form of contract; this is in truth a disposition of property mortis causa which requires the same
solemnities as required in making a will.
Although it is not include in the stipulation of facts, it does appear from the record that some of
the property described in Exhibit A was sold and disposed of by the donee during the lifetime of
the donor.
In any event, Exhibit A was a donation in præsenti as distinguished from a gift in futuro, hence
does not come under the provisions of article 620 of the Civil Code.
The effect of this decision is to hold that Pedro Emilio Mata took and acquired a valid title to the
premises in dispute at the time Exhibit A was executed, subject only to the life estate of the donor,
and he is now the owner of the lands described in the pleadings. But the defendants made a general
denial, and did not ask for affirmative relief, hence none can be granted.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with costs
in favor of the defendants. So ordered

77
CONCEPCION VS CONCEPCION
LORENZA CONCEPCION, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. EMILIA
CONCEPCION, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present appeal involves the interpretation of Exhibit A, a deed of donation,—whether it is
inter vivos or mortis causa, because if the former, it is valid having been duly accepted by the
donee, but if the latter it would be void because being in the nature of disposal of property by will,
according to article 620 of the Civil Code, it shall be governed by the rules established for
testamentary succession. According to the law governing the execution of wills, a will should be
attested by three witnesses, and there should be an attestation clause. But here there are only two
witnesses to the deed of donation (Exhibit A), and it contains no attestation clause. For a better
understanding of and to facilitate reference to said Exhibit A, we reproduce its pertinent provisions.
ESCRITURA DE DONACIÓN 0NER0SA MORTIS CAUSA

Sepan Todos Por La, Presente:

"Yo, Manuela Concepción, mayor de edad, viuda, Filipina, con residencia y dirección postal en el
municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Filipinas, hago constar que, en consideración
a los buenos servicios prestados a mi por mi sobrina, Emilia Concepción, antes y durante estos
días y teniendo, además, especial predilección por sus buenas cualidades y el cariño que tengo de
ella, en quien cifro un porvenir provechoso, por la presente declaro que hago DONACION
MORTIS CAUSA a favor de mi citada sobrina, Emilia Concepción, sujeta a las condiciones que
mas abajo se especifiean, de las siguientes propiedades que se describen a continuación, a saber:

(Description of the properties donated.)

CONDICIONES

Que las condiciones de esta DOXACION son las siguientes, a saber: (a) Que el producto de una
tercera (1/3) parte del terreno arriba descrito como parcela No. 1, o sea la cosecha de una extensión
superficial de SEIS MIL DOSCIENTOS CINCUENTA METROS CXJADRADOS (6,250 m, c.)
equivalentes a una balita, hacia el lado Este de diclino terreno, será separado anualmente y se
empleara para los gastos de la celebración de mi aniversario, en caso de mi muerte, y en memoria
también de la muerte de mis mayores y parientes y en sufragio de las almas de los difuntos, por lo
menos una vez al año, pero también puede hacerse dicha celebración tantas veces como creyera
conveniente y propio la mencionada donatoria, Emilia Concepción, que no pasara de P50 al año.

Que yo declaro además que no tengo hijos, ni ascendientes ni descendientes, ni herederos forzosos,
motivo por el cual me he creido con derecho y facultad suficiente para disponer en la forma como
lo hice de mis citadas propiedades, habiéndome reservado lo necesario para mi mantenimiento.

Que estas parcelas de terreno arriba descritas y deslindadas no están aun registradas bajo la ley del

78
Registro de la Propiedad No. 496 ni bajo la Ley Hipotecaria española, por lo que las partes
convienen, para los efectos que procedan, registrar esta escritura bajo las disposiciones de la Ley
No. 3344.

Que yo declaro por ultimo que esta DONACION MORTIS CAUSA como su mismo nombre lo
indica, ha de producir efectos sol aviente por muerte de la donante.

ACEPTACIÓN

Yo, Emilia Concepción, mayor de edad, soltera, filipina, con residencia y dirección postal en el
municipio de San Antonio, provincia de Zambales, Pilipinas, por la presente hago constar que
acepto la donación arriba expresada por lo que quedo sumamente agradecida a mi dicha tia, Dona
Manuela Concepción, por tal generosidad, y me comprometo a cumplir fielmente todas y cada una
de las condiciones arriba impuestas.

En testimonio de todo lo cual firmamos la presente en el municipio de San Antonio, provincia de

Zambales, Filipinas, hoy a 7 de Marzo de 1944, A.D.
(Fda.) MANUELA CONCEPCIÓN
(Donante)

(Fda.) EMILIA CONCEPCIÓN

(Donatoria)
A little more than three years after the execution of the above-quoted deed of donation, or rather
on November 18, 1947, the donor Manuela Concepcion died. Plaintiffs-appellees who are six
nephews and nieces of the donor, all surnamed Concepcion instituted special proceedings No. 491
of the Court of First Instance of Zambales for the summary settlement of the estate of their aunt,
the donor. Because the estate or the greater portion thereof sought to be summarily settled and
distributed was included in the donation, the donee Emilia Concepcion filed opposition to the
petition for summary settlement claiming that the six parcels subject of the donation belonged to
her. The Court in said special proceedings without deciding the title and right of possession to the
six parcels claimed by Emilia, merely ordered the partition of the estate of Manuela Concepcion
among all her heirs who are besides the six petitioners, Emilia Concepcion and her four brothers.
Thereafter, and because Emilia refused to give up the parcels said to have been donated to her,
including a house and a granary as well as personal properties, the six original petitioners in the
special proceedings filed the present action (civil case No. 1230) in the Court of First Instance of
Zambales to have themselves declared owners of and entitled to the possession of their shares in
those properties claimed by Emilia in the proportion of one-eleventh (1/11) for each.

In her answer Emilia claimed title to said properties by reason of the donation and submitted a
copy of the deed of donation. After trial, the lower court found that the donation was one mortis
causa, and because it was not executed in the manner required by the law on wills, it was declared
null and void; the properties therein included were all declared part of the estate of the deceased
Manuela Concepcion subject to distribution among the heirs in the proportion of 1/11 for each as

79
declared by the court in special proceedings No. 491; defendant Emilia Concepcion was ordered
to deliver to each of the plaintiffs their respective shares of the products of the land for the
agricultural year 1947-48 and those to be obtained thereafter in the proportion of 1/11 to each heir.

Emilia Concepcion appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the parties filed their
respective briefs, but finding that only questions of law were involved in the appeal, said court by
resolution certified the case to this Court.

Examining the deed of donation, Exhibit A, we find the title using the phrase mortis causa which
phrase was repeated in the paragraph just before the aceptacion with the clause that the donation
was to "producir efectos solamente por muerte de la donante." The lower court, evidently,
impressed by these features, concluded that the donor intended to make her donation effective after
her death, and that consequently, it was a donation mortis causa.

The trial court is not entirely to blame. The deed of donation is really confusing and far from clear.
The one who drafted the document would appear to have been himself confused, and in using legal
phraseology rather added not a little to the confusion. We confess that the distinction between a
donation inter vivos and a donation mortis causa, in spite of the comments of legal writers and the
doctrines laid down by the courts is not always sharp and clear, specially when the donation is
couched in language which admits of possible different interpretations. But, it is a rule consistently
followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained
therein, and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here,
the donation is entitled and called donation onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we
find that the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services
rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services
rendered to her freely and in goodwill. The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable
consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory
nature, besides being partly motivated by affection.

We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase
"mortis causa" in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In
the case of De Guzman et al vs. Ibea et al. (67 Phil., 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice
Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivios, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.

In the case of Laureta vs. Mata et al. (44 Phil., 668), the court held that the donation involved was
inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as—
"a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him
and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa' to said youth
all the properties described as follows:

"I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of the
properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said donee shall

80
be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my soul, and also
to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals."
It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in both
cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a
token of affection for the donee; the phrase "mortis causa" was used; the donee to take possession
of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray
the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's death, including church
fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case of Laureta this Court held that
the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro. In support of its ruling, this Court reproduced
the comment of Manresa on article 620 of the Civil Code reading as follows:
"In pure donations, in donations until an affixed day, and in donations with a resolutory condition
the property is of course conveyed to the donee during the life of the donor and as to this point
there is no question.

"When the time fixed for the commencement of the enjoyment of the property donated be at the
death of the donor, or when the suspensive condition is related to his death, confusion might arise.
To avoid it we must distinguish between the actual donation and the execution thereof. That the
donation is to have effect during the lifetime of the donor or at his death does not mean the delivery
of the property must be made during his life or after his death. From the moment that the donor
disposes freely of his property and such disposal is accepted by the donee, the donation exists,
perfectly and irrevocably (articles 618 and 623). Until the day arrives or until the condition is
fulfilled, the donation, although valid when made, cannot be realized. Thus, he who makes the
donation effective upon a certain date, even though, to take place at his death, disposes of that
which he donated and he cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property
in favor of another. If the thing is lost thru the fault of the donor, or if it is damaged, indemnity
may be recovered. Regarding donations with suspensive conditions, it is sufficient to read articles
1120 and 1122 to understand the effects which this kind of donation has during the lifetime of the
donor. He who makes a donation effective after his death, makes a donation, not a legacy. The
mere name of the act, when a different intention does not clearly appear, is enough, in order to
make applicable thereto the rules of law referring to donations. However, if the ill-named donor
not only postpones the date of the execution of the donation until his death but also reserves the
right io revoke said act at his pleasure, then this act is not "valid as a form, of contract; this is in
truth a disposition of property mortis causa which requires the same solemnities as required in
making a will."
In the case of Sambaan vs. Villanueva, (71 Phil., 303), the donor made a donation "en
consideracion al afecto y earino que profeso a mi ahijado Jesus Flavio Villanueva." The donor
furthermore imposed the condition that "esta donation la otorgo bajo las consideraciones que;
solamente surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte, * * *." This court citing the same
comment of Maxiresa just quoted above held that since the donation was simply made in
consideration not of the death of the donor but of "the affection to the donee, the donation was
inter vivos and not mortis causa, and that the condition imposed to the effect that the donation
"solamente surtira efectos despues de ocurrida mi muerte," did not argue against the nature of the
donation.

81
Again, in the case of Joya vs. Tiongco (71 Phil., 379), wherein the donor made the donation of a
parcel of land to the brothers Agustin and Pedro Joya because of her relationship to them, and
where said donation was duly accepted and registered, the decision of the Court of Appeals which
found the donation to be mortis causa was reversed by this court and the donation was held to be
inter vivos for the reason that the death of the donor was not the consideration of the donation but
only a suspensive condition, and that the mere fact that the property donated was not to be delivered
immediately to the donee but only after death of donor did not render the donation mortis causa.

From all the proceeding considerations, it is clear that even when the donor calls the donation
mortis causa instead of inter vivos, even if he says it is to take effect after his death, when from
the body of the instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the
donation is not the death of the donor but rather services rendered to him, by the done or his
affection for the latter, then the donation should be considered as inter vivos, and when duly
accepted, it transfers title immediately to the donee, and the condition that the donation is to take
effect only after the death of donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits of the property donated should take place only after donor's death. To this
effect, is the holding of this court in the case of Balaqui vs. Dongso (53 Phil., 673), where the
donor Hipolita Balaqui made a donation to Placida Dongso in consideration of her good services
rendered and because the donee had lived with the donor as a daughter, the donation containing
the following paragraph:
"This gift to said Placida Dongso resident of Candom, Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, in
recompense for her services to me, does not pass title to her during my lifetime; but when I die,
she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned parcels, including my house and shed
thereon, and she shall be rightfully entitled to transmit them to her children. I also "bind myself to
answer to said placida and her heirs and successors for this property, and that none shall question
or disturb her right."
This court in that case held that the donation was inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa,
notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership
of the two parcels of land donated, until upon her death, for such a statement could mean nothing
else than that she only reserved to herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because
the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid right after her death.

In the present case, we may well hold as we do that the donor or rather the person who drafted the
deed, in using the phrase "mortis causa" and in providing that the donation should take effect only
after the donor's death simply meant that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits of the
properties donated should take effect only after the donor's death and not before, although this
intention is rendered even dubious due to the fact that in one paragraph of the donation, she stated
that she had reserved what was sufficient and necessary for her maintenance which may mean that
all the properties donated were deemed transferred to the donee immediately after the donation
had been accepted.

One other consideration may be mentioned in support of our stand. The donation here was accepted

82
by Emilia; said acceptance is embodied in the deed of donation, and both donor and donee signed
below said acceptance conclusively showing that the donor was aware of said acceptance. The
deed and acceptance was by agreement of both recorded or registered. Everything was complete.
Only donations inter vivos need be accepted. Donation mortis causa being in the nature of a legacy
need not be accepted. (Manresa, Vol. 5, Fifth edition [1932], p. 83.) Presuming that the donor
Manuela and the donee Emilia knew the law, the fact that they not only agreed to the acceptance
but regarded said acceptance necessary argues for their understanding and intention that the
donation was inter vivos.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the donation in question is inter vivos and not mortis causa,
and that it is valid because the requisites of the law about the execution of wills do not apply to it.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed with costs.

CARLOS VS. RAMIL

G. R. No. 6736, September 05, 1911 ALEJANDRA CARLOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
VS. ANTONIO RAMIL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

DECISION
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte,
the Hon. Dionisio Chanco presiding, declaring that the plaintiff had not made out a cause of action
against the defendant and dismissing the complaint upon the merits, with costs.
This is an action to test the title and right to possession of the land described in the complaint.
It appears from the proofs in this case that the lands in question were many years ago owned by
one Agustin Carlos, a relative of the plaintiff. Agustin Carlos and his wife, Juliana Carlos, had no
children and, so far as the record shows, died leaving no heirs except the plaintiff. Getting old and
needing someone to care for them, Carlos and his wife took to live with them a young girl of the
neighborhood. She grew up with them, giving them the best of care and doing for them all that
could be required of a faithful and dutiful child. In the year 1901 the said daughter was about to
marry the defendant in this case, Antonio Ramil. The old people, fearing that the husband would
remove the daughter from the house and take her to live with him separately, and feeling that this
would deprive them of the only person who would give them the care which they needed in their
old age, Agustin Carlos and his wife on the 5th day of April, 1901, after the marriage of said
daughter and the defendant, made an agreement with them that if they would remain, living in their
house, caring for them as long as they should live, they, Carlos and his wife, would give to the
children the real estate described in the complaint in this action.

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This agreement, which was duly signed and executed by all the parties thereto, assumes somewhat
the appearance of a remunerative donation, and it was upon the theory that it was such that this
action was tried and decided by the trial court and upon which the appeal is taken to this court.
A careful examination of the record, however, demonstrates clearly that the instrument in question
is not a remunerative donation within the meaning of that term used in the Civil Code, but is rather
a contract by which Carlos and his wife transferred to the defendant and his wife the lands
described in the complaint upon the consideration that the latter should give to the former the care
therein mentioned and prescribed. That contract was fully executed upon the part of the defendant
and his wife. They cared for Carlos and his wife as long as they lived, giving them food, clothing
and shelter. If the transaction between Carlos and the defendant was a donation it was una
donacion con causa onerosa and not una donation remuneratoria. One of the leading differences
between these two classes of donations or gifts is that in the one con causa onerosa the services
which form the consideration for the gift have not yet been performed, while in the other they
have. At the time of the transaction heretofore referred to none of the services which formed the
consideration for the agreement in question had yet been performed. They were all to be performed
in the future. Under the provisions of the Civil Code una donacion con causa onerosa is governed
by the provisions of said code relative to contracts. That being so, the arguments of appellant
relative to the validity of the instrument in question are entirely inapplicable and beside the point
for the reason that they relate solely to a remunerative gift. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA- Donation Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos

The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed
does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the donor merely
reserves power to destroy the donation at any time.

FACTS:
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain
properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and
nieces, children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to
Ariston Magbanua. Besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation.
One, entitled DONACION MORTIS CAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of
her niece, Estela Magbanua. The deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled
"ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua
Peñaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land.

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peñaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor
of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949

84
indicates that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation
would be superfluous.

ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

HELD:
The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that
the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis
causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death.

The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it
meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel
the property elsewhere.

Agapay vs Palang
Agapay vs. Palang
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii
a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court
found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in
Pozzorubio Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other
hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted
of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter
instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly

85
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda
Agapay.

HELD:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However,
their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If
actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and had
a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to
but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years old
compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance
for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such property for P20,000
when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase
price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

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Matabuena v. Cervantes
CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, (D)
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:
 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage
to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
 Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.
 November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question
that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and
void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did
assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to
the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on
November 19, 1965.
 The lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the
spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of
the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they married
on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed."

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as
pro indiviso heirs to the property

HELD:
 Yes, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
 It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any
other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the
Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot
be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such
irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with
benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is
ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit

87
 of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be
apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
adherence to its avowed objective.

KAPUNAN VS CASILAN
109 Phil. 889
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari a decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the respondent
Alipio N. Casilan owner of certain real property described in the complaint and ordering petitioners
to deliver possession thereof to said respondent.
The facts are not disputed. The property in question, which is a commercial lot [1] located in
Tacloban City, was on October 2, 1935 donated by the spouses Ruperto Kapunan, Sr., and
Iluminada Fernandez de Kapunan to their daughter Concepcion K. Salcedo, who accepted the
donation in the same document. The deed of donation was acknowledged on the same date by the
donors and donee before Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, the donors' son-in-law and the donee's
brother-in-law. The property, however, remained in the possession of the donors.
On December 23, 1939, Concepcion K. Salcedo donated the same property to her daughter Marita
Antonia Salcedo, then a minor. In behalf of said minor, Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan,
the donee's grandmother and acting guardian with whom the said donee was then living as her
parents were estranged from each other, accepted the donation. The acceptance was contained in
the deed ot donation itself, which was authenticated by the same Notary Public Mateo Canonoy. "
On November 4, 1944, Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo and the respondent Alipio N. Casilan
executed a "Deed of Conditional Sale" wherein the former accepted the letter's offer to purchase
the land in dispute, and received the sum of P2,000 as part of the purchase price, the balance of
P4,500 to be paid within 3 years therefrom. Notwithstanding the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of the petitioners and respondent Alipio N. Casilan knew that Concepcion
Kapunan Salcedo had previously donated the said property in favor of her daughter Marita Antonia
Salcedo, the said respondent on June 14, 1945 proceeded to buy the same and paid the balance of
the purchase price on the assurance given by the donor that the donation was not legal. The deed
of sale was annotated on July 27 of the same year in the Daily Book of the Register of Deeds of
Leyte, but not on the original certificate of title because of the refusal of Iluminada Vda. de
Kapunan to deliver the duplicate certificate of title.
In due time, the respondent Casilan filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to compel
Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan to surrender the transfer certificate of title, but the petition was
dismissed. In connection with this petition, Concepcion K. Salcedo, on March 9, 1946, gave a

88
deposition that she had knowledge of the acceptance by her mother Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan
of the donation she made to her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo.
To recover title and possession of the property in question, respondent Casilan filed the present
action in the Court of First Instance of Leyte against Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo, Iluminada
Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan and Marita Antonia Salcedo. Juanita, Trinidad, Ruperto, Jr., Emma,
Lilia, Socorro and Rosario, all surnamed Kapunan, intervened as alleged co-owners of the land in
dispute and as heirs of their late father Don Ruperto Kapunan, Sr. On March 31, 1950, after
hearing, the trial court, Judge Hipolito Alo presiding, rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff,
herein respondent Casilan, to be the owner of the property in question and ordering the defendants
and intervenors to deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff. The trial court also dismissed the
complaint in intervention. Acting, however, upon the motions for reconsideration filed by the
defendants and intervenors, the lower court, through Judge Jose S. Rodriguez, in a resolution dated
May 30, 1950, reconsidered its decision and declared the sale of the property in question by
Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan null and void. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, that court reversed the decision and awarded the land in dispute to AJipio N.
Casilan. Hence, this petition for review.
It is petitioners' contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in
the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish
Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the
Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation,
according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil
Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the
donation was inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that
the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 4.96. We find this
ruling to be correct. In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda.
de Estuart vs. Garcia (Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old
Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and another and
different notarial law and system became the law of the land with the enactment of Act No. 496."
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the donation in favor of Marita Antonia
Salcedo was null and void in that there was no "constancia autentica" given to the donor
Concepcion K. Salcedo that the donation had been accepted. Article 633 of the Civil Code of 1889
provided that-
"Art. 633. In order that a donation of real property be valid it must be made by public instrument
in which the property donated must be specifically described and the amount of the encumbrances
to be assumed by the donee expressed.
"The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate public writing*; but it shall
produce no effect if not made during the lifetime of the donor.
"If the acceptance is made by separate instrument, authentic notice thereof shall be given the donor,
and this proceeding shall be noted in both instruments."
Under the above legal provisions, a donation transfers title effectively if it is accepted with all the
formalities that must accompany the acceptance of donations of realty, to wit, thru the medium of
a public instrument with authentic notice to the donor, unless the acceptance is made in the deed
of gift itself- (Tagala vs. Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200). In the present case, the deed of donation

89
executed by Concepcion K. Salcedo in favor of her daughter Marita Antonia Salcedo states "that
the said donee, Marita Antonia Kapunan Salcedo being a minor and being represented by her
maternal grandmother, Iluminada P. Vda. de Kapunan, does hereby accept and receive this
donation and gift, and further does express her appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of
said donor." The acceptance having been made in the deed of gift itself, notification thereof to the
donor in a "constancia autentica" was evidently not necessary. It is true that the acceptance was
made on another date and in a place other than that where the deed was executed, but the deed of
donation as so worded implied a previous understanding between the parties who intervened
therein, and, what is more, the donor, Concepcion K. Salcedo, admittedly knew of the actual
acceptance by the donee through the latter's grandmother. Pursuant to Art. 623 of the old Civil
Code, her knowledge of such acceptance perfected the donation.
It is also argued that the acceptance of the donation by the donee's grandmother was not valid since
at the time of the acceptance she had not yet been appointed legal guardian of the donee. Under
article 626 of the old Civil Code, a donation to an incapacitated donee requires its acceptance by
his lawful representative.[2] This rule, however, appears to be applicable only in case of onerous
and conditional donations, where the donee may have to assume certain charges or burdens. As
was said by former Justice Montemayor in Perez vs. Calingo (CA, 40 Off. Gaz., Supp.ll, p. 53),
"In simple and pure donations, a formal acceptance is not important for the donor acquires no right
to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. In this
case, the acceptance may be said to be a mere formality required by law for the performance of the
contract. Whenever the donation does not impose any obligation upon the donee the acceptance
may be made by the donee himself." Anyway, if under the rule provided in Article 626 of the old
Civil Code the donation of realty to a minor may be accepted in his behalf by his mother (Laureta
vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668), we see no reason why a simple and pure donation made by the mother
herself in favor of her own minor daughter may not be validly accepted through the grandmother
the donee's acting guardian who was later appointed as her legal guardian. It should here be stated
that Iluminada Vda. de Kapunan who accepted the donation in behalf of the minor donee was
appointed legal guardian of the said minor on June 12, 1944, or prior to the execution of the deed
of conditional sale between the donor Conception & Salcedo and herein respondent Alipio N.
Casilan. There being no showing that the donation had been revoked prior to the. appointment 4of
the donee's grandmother as her legal guardian, it is apparent that said donation had been confirmed
and impliedly ratified by the parties intervening therein before the execution of the deed of sale
referred to. (See Atacador vs. Silayan, 67 Phil., 674.)
In conclusion, we find and so hold that the donation of the property in dispute to^ Marita Antonia
Salcedo by Concepcion K. Salcedo was valid, and consequently the sale thereof by the latter in
favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan was null and void. Said respondent, however, may still
recover what he has paid under the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is reversed and the sale of the property in controversy in
favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan declared null and void. Without costs.

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SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs ROQUE
G.R. No. 148775. January 13, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its
president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now
deceased, over a parcel of land in the name of Roque. Petitioner issued to Dr. Roque a check for
P250,000.00 by way of “reservation payment.” Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise
entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a
commercial building complex on the property. Conformably with the agreement, petitioner issued
a check for another P250,000.00 “downpayment” to Dr. Roque.
The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized,were never annotated on
the Certificate of title because of the untimely demise of Roque. Roque’s death constrained
petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr.
Roque, but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. In a letter, respondent advised
petitioner “to desist from any attempt to enforce the aforementioned contract of lease and
memorandum of agreement”. On 15 February 1995, respondent filed a case for annulment of the
contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, with a prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction before the RTC alleging that he had long been the absolute owner of the
subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents,
Dr. Felipe Roque and Elisa Roque, and that the late Dr. Felipe Roque had no authority to enter
into the assailed agreements with petitioner. The donation was made in a public instrument duly
acknowledged by the donor-spouses before a notary public and duly accepted on the same day by
respondent before the notary public in the same instrument of donation. The title to the property,
however, remained in the name of Dr. Felipe C. Roque, and it was only transferred to and in the
name of respondent sixteen years later.
Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere
administration of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner
only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of
Lease and Memorandum of Agreement.
ISSUE: W/N there was valid donation to respondent?
HELD: YES. The existence, albeit unregistered, of the donation in favor of respondent is
undisputed. The trial court and the appellate court have not erred in holding that the non-
registration of a deed of donation does not affect its validity. As being itself a mode of acquiring
ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee. In donations of immovable property, the law requires for its validity that it should be
contained in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the
charges which the donee must satisfy. The Civil Code provides, however, that “titles of ownership,
or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the Registry
of Property (now Registry of Land Titles and Deeds) shall not prejudice third persons.” It is
enough, between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, that the donation be made in
a public document but, in order to bind third persons, the donation must be registered in the registry
of Property (Registry of Land Titles and Deeds).

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Lagazo vs CA Case Digest
LAGAZO V. CA
287 SCRA 18
FACTS: Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was
awarded a 60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta.
Mesa, Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed
for sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a
house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob executed
a special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing him to
execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney
granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in
Canada. Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of
the same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-
appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and found
out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in arrears and the
remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate the
premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However,
defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence, plaintiff-
appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against defendant-
appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not be
stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose any
charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in fact and
in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required by
Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of his right
of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the donation.
ISSUE:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed consideration
being purely one of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid charges imposed on
the property like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation be deemed onerous and
thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally
communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and
subsisting?
HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous
one. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached),

92
while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to
or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full payment
of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however
imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The
words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent Court that the
payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This much can be gathered from his
testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a burden or charge had been imposed by
his grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina
Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the
fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant to be a
burden in the donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation, following
the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor
knows of the acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in
both instruments.”
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void.

AUSTRIA-MAGAT VS. CA- Donation Inter Vivos

Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property
donated, he is in effect making a donation inter vivos.

Here, the 2nd characteristic of a donation mortis causa (revocable at will) is absent.

FACTS:
Cavite, 1953:
Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a Deed of Donation to her five children
covered by Transfer Certificate 3268, with an area of 150 square meters. The said document reads
as follows:
“xxx Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng
apat na anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic),xxx”

93
Thereafter, the parties executed another notarized document that stated”
“xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan
ng Bagong Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder o possession ng
Ina, na si Basilisa Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay
hindi mapapasangla o maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa
Comerciante. Xxx “
On Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Apolinaria Austria Magat for P5000.
Basilia’s children contested the act, saying that the donation was intervivos and thereby
irrevocable. The trial court disagreed, stating it was mortis causa and therefore revocable. The case
went to the CA and the case was reversed. CA found the document to be intervivos because of the
phrase “ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit”

Basilia, to their mind, definitely had no plans of revoking the donation. The document executed
thereafter upheld such irrevocability.

The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation was intervivos.

HELD: YES.
The court found that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the
donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.

In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a donation mortis causa,:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;

(2)That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
For the case at bar, the phrase “hindi na mababawi” definitely exudes the character of an intervivos
agreement. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not
go against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the
provisions which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there
is a prohibition to alienate, encumber is mortis causa. The court disagrees. The said provisions
should be harmonized with its express irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed
of donation would also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor to
enjoy the fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only mean that “after the donor’s
death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated
property, free from all liens and encumbrances.

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In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily
defeat the inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains with
the donor is the right of usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property
donated. In the case at bar, the provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will
remain in the possession of the donor just goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title
of ownership thereto and has maintained only the right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus
possidendi) the subject donated property.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be construed as a valid act
of revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764 which speaks of an
action bearing a prescriptive period of 4 years from non compliance with the deed of donation. In
this case, the 4 year prescriptive period does not even apply because none of the terms (if any)
were even violated.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY VS. CA- Resolutory Condition

Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
When a person donates land to another on the condition that a construction be made, the condition
is akin to a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The non-compliance to the condition extinguishes the
right to the donation, but it need not occur first in order for the donation to be effected and
validated.
FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of trustees of Central Philippine
University when he executed a donation to the school, stating that the land must be for exclusive
use of a medical college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul the
donation, stating the failure of the school to construct the medical college over the land. RTC ruled
in favor of respondents, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition

RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a medical college would
give the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the
donor. It is therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the period was not stated, and the courts
should have fixed a period, in this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus
fixing a period would serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.

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EDUARTE V. CA- Revocation of Donation
Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation of donation.

FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation inter
vivos of ½ of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of
donation inter vivos ceding the other ½ of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a
protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and
conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to
annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the ground that the deed of donation was a
forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of offense
against the person, honor or property of donor [par. 1])

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against
Calapine (considering that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude
and are causes of revocation.” Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their
classification under the RPC by deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered crimes against the person of
the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security
under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court to be
revocable. The Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were registered
lands and it has already passed from the forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte,
et al.).

Imperial v. CA
GR No. 112483, October 8, 1999
FACTS:
In 1951, Leoncio sold his 32, 837m² parcel of land to his acknowledged natural son Eloy Imperial.
However, in 1953, Leoncio filed a copmplaint for annulment of the sale alleging that he was
deceived by his son. They entered into a compromise agreement that Leoncio will recognize the
validity and legality of the sale but Eloy has to sold the 1000m² to Leoncio. In 1962, Leoncio died
and Victor, his adopted child, substituted him in the execution of the compromise agreement.

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However, in 1977, Victor died single and without issue. After 4 years, Ricardo, Victors’s natural
father, died too. Cesar and Trasa, children of Ricardo, filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of res judicata. The trial court dismissed
the case. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Cesar and Teresa filed an Amended Complaint alleging that the conveyance impaired
the legitime of Victor. The RTC ruled that the donation is inofficiousimparing the legitime of
Victor. CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for inofficious donation has prescribed.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme court applied Article 1144 of the Civil Code which atates that “actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right accrues. Here,
the right accrues from the moment Leoncio died, but it took the respondents 24 years to file the
action.
Also, there is estoppel by laches on their part. First, Victor is a lawyer; he even substituted his
father in the execution of the compromise agreement regarding the contested conveyance of parcel
of land. Second, Richardo is the lessee of the contested land and it is expected that he was aware
of the sale of the land. And, the respondents only institud the complaint five years after the death
of Ricardo.
The petition is granted.

Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.

Case Digest: Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.
Published by kbautista on February 5, 2014
Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.
G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969
Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated
the two parcels of land to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter’s
marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took possession of the properties, but the
Certificates of Title remained in the donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua later executed a deed
of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. A TCT
were issued to Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, sought the
annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of
possession of the properties which was granted by the court. The decision became
final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in
possession of the land.
Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint for annulment of the
donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned claiming that
in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own

97
support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua.
While the cases were pending, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua died. The Court of Appeals held
that the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s
other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and
defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of
494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots.
ISSUE: Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the donation proper?
No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to determine the legitime, the value
of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts,
and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the
hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are
subject to collation, at the time he made them. In other words, before any conclusion
about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting a payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by
the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory
heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not
a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be
reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the
properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence
then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved
here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

YULO VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC

THIRD DIVISION G.R. NO. 133705, March 31, 2005 C-J YULO & SONS, INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN PABLO, INC.,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
Appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated
December 19, 1997 and Resolution[2] dated April 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 45392, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 34, which ruled in favor of the herein petitioner C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., in a suit for

98
revocation of donation with reconveyance of title, thereat commenced by the petitioner against the
herein respondent, Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.

The facts are not at all disputed:

On September 24, 1977, petitioner donated unto respondent a parcel of land at Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna with an area of 41,117 square meters and registered in its name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82803. The deed of donation which also bears the acceptance of
the donee recites the considerations therefor and the conditions thereto attached, to wit:

WHEREAS, Donee is a religious corporation engaged in much (sic) humanitarian Christian

work in Laguna and elsewhere, educating and forming the young, caring for the infirm and the
aged in the fulfillment of its mission;

WHEREAS, Donor recognizes the need for a privately endowed institution that will care for the
homeless and destitute old people in the community, as well as the other senior citizens who for
some reason or other find themselves without family with whom to live the last years of their life:

WHEREFORE, Donor is willing, in order to help establish and support such an institution to
donate the land necessary for its housing, as well as an area of land whereon it may raise crops for
its support and for the sustenance of its residents;

WHEREAS, Donee is willing and able, with the wanted help of Donor and of other benefactors,
to establish, operate and maintain such a home for the aged.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing premises, Donor hereby transfers
and conveys to Donee by way of donation all its rights, title and interest in that certain parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-82803 of the Land Records of Laguna, the technical descriptions of
which are recited above, subject to the following conditions and covenants, each of which is a
material consideration for this Deed:

So much of the land as may be necessary shall be used for the construction of a home for the
aged and infirm, regardless of religion or creed, but preferably those coming from Canlubang,
Calamba, Laguna; provided that retired and/or aged priests may be admitted to the home; and
provided further that any senior citizen from the area who has retired from business or work may
likewise be admitted to the home, subject to the payment to the institution of such sum as he may
afford for his support.

A Green Belt that is 15 meters wide shall be established and maintained by the Donor along
the length of the land to separate and insulate it from the projected highway.

Such part of land as may not be needed for the residence and the Green Belt shall be devoted
by Donee with the help of such residents of the home as are able, to the raising of agricultural

99
crops for the consumption of the residents of the home, and of such other crops that may be sold
to defray the cost of running the home and feeding its residents; provided, that should the area later
become so fully urbanized as to make this limitation on use economically, impractical, any portion
of the land may, with the written consent of the Donor, be put to commercial use by the Donee by
leasing the same for wholesome and socially-acceptable activities; provided further that the rentals
from such commercial leases shall be used, first, to meet the expenses of the home; second, to
enlarge its population and expand its facilities; and finally for other charitable purposes in Laguna,
in that order.

Donee acknowledges that Donor's generous act will greatly aid Donee in accomplishing its
mission on earth, and, recognizing the generosity of the Yulo family as the reason for such act,
Donee undertakes to cause every year the celebration of masses for the intention of the various
members of the family of Mr. Jose Yulo, Sr., on festive and solemn occasions in the said family.

Except with prior written consent of the Donor or its successor, the Donee shall not use the
land except for the purpose as provided above in paragraph 1 hereof, nor sell or dispose the land
for any reason whatsoever, nor convey any portion of the same except in lease for commercial use
as provided above in paragraph 3 hereof, otherwise the said land with all real improvements
thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor for prompt disposition in favor of some other charitable
organization that Donor may deem best suited to the care of the aged. (Underscoring supplied).

On the basis of the same deed, TCT No. T-82803 of the donor was cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. T-91348 in the name of donee Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.

Thereafter, or sometime in 1980, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter
fence on the donated property and the construction of a nucleus building for the aged and the
infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to one Martin Gomez who planted said portion
with sugar cane. There is no dispute that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee without
the prior written consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez
ended in 1985.

The following year, 1986, a portion of the donated property was again leased by the donee, this
time to one Jose Bostre who used the leased area as a ranch. As explained by the donee, it entered
into a lease agreement with Bostre to protect the premises from vandals and for the electrification
of the nucleus building of the home for the aged and in the infirm, which was named as "Casa dela
Merced." As before, however, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior written
consent of the donor.

After the termination of the Bostre lease agreement, the donee, for the third time, leased a portion
of the donated property to one Rudy Caballes who used the leased area for fattening cattles. The
donee explained that the lease agreement with Bostre was also for the purposes of generating funds
for the completion of "Casa dela Merced." Again, however, the donee did not secure the prior
written consent of the donor.

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Hence, on September 20, 1990, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president
Miguel A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the
donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee's non-compliance with and
material breach of the conditions thereunder stipulated. In the same letter, the donor requested for
the turn-over of the donee's TCT No. T-91348 over the donated property.

In a reply-letter dated November 5, 1990, the donee, through Bishop Pedro N. Bantigue, D.D.,
denied any material breach of the conditions of the deed of donation and manifested its continued
and faithful compliance with the provisions thereof. In the same letter, the donee refused the turn-
over of its title to the donor.

It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on November 19, 1990, in the Regional
Trial Court at Calamba, Laguna the donor, alleging non-compliance with and violation by the
donee of the conditions of the deed of donation, filed its complaint in this case against donee
Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Pablo, Inc., therein reciting the imputed non-compliance and
violations by the donee of the terms and conditions of the deed of donation, as follows:

a) non-construction of the home for the aged and infirmed in the lot despite the lapse of a
reasonable and considerable length of time;

b) present land use of the area is a cattle farm, the owner of which has a lease contract with the
donee; and

c) no prior written consent of the donor has been obtained for the present and actual use of the
property donated,

and accordingly prayed that the subject deed of donation be adjudged revoked and void and the
donee ordered to return and/or reconvey the property donated.

In its answer, defendant donee alleged that it was doing its best to comply with the provisions of
the deed of donation relative to the establishment of the home for the aged and the infirm, adding
that the leases of portions of the land were with the express, albeit unwritten consent, of Jesus
Miguel Yulo himself. In the same answer, defendant donee interposed the defense that the donor's
cause of action for revocation, if any, had already prescribed because the leases were known to the
latter since 1980.

In a decision dated December 22, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment for donor-plaintiff C-J
Yulo & Sons, Inc., thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant, declaring
the Deed of Donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exh. "C") REVOKED, affirming plaintiff's
revocation of the same in the letter dated September 20, 1990 (Exh. "D").

101
 Defendant and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to immediately vacate
the premises of the donated property and to hand over to plaintiff the peaceful possession of the
aforesaid premises.

To avoid multiplicity of suits, the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna, is hereby ordered to
require the defendant to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-91348 (Exh. "B") and
thereafter cancel the same and issue, upon payment of the required fees, a new Transfer Certificate
of Title in favor of plaintiffs, with cost against the defendant.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, donee-defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., went to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45392.

In the herein assailed Decision dated December 19, 1997,[3] the Court of Appeals reversed that of
the trial court and upheld the donation in question, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated December 22, 1993 is hereby REVERSED
and the donation dated September 24, 1977 (Exhibit C) which conveyed title to the donated
property in the appellee's name is hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its Resolution of April
30, 1998,[4] donor C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc., has come to this Court via the present recourse on its
sole submission that br/>
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (THAT THE REVOCATION OF THE
DONATION BY PETITIONER WAS IMPROPER) IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.

We DENY.

The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that the donation is an onerous one since
the donee was burdened with the establishment on the donated property of a home for the aged
and the infirm. It likewise agreed with the trial court that there were violations of the terms and
conditions of the deed of donation when the donee thrice leased a portion of the property without
the prior written consent of the donor. Likewise upheld by the appellate court is the ruling of the
trial court that the prescriptive period of the donor's right to revoke the donation is ten (10) years
based on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, instead of four (4) years per Article 764 of the same Code,
and therefore the action for revocation filed by the petitioner is not barred by prescription.

102
Even then, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, the reversal being premised on
the appellate court's finding that the breaches thrice committed by the respondent were merely
casual breaches which nevertheless did not detract from the purpose of which the donation was
made: the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm.

We agree.

Petitioner contends that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central Philippine University
vs. Court of Appeals,[5] where the donee failed for more than 50 years to establish, as required, a
medical school on the land donated, and where this Court declared the donation to have been
validly revoked.

To the mind of the Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case of Republic
vs. Silim,[6] where respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the condition that
the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. Although a
school building was constructed on the property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers
Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building could not
be released because the government required that it be built on a one-hectare parcel of land. This
led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger one.

In Silim, the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:

Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple
donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On
the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding
the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional or
modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the
donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is
inferior than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon
the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a
valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.

Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is
because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law on donations but
by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds
the value of the burden imposed.

103
 The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden
imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law on donations
because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a burden imposed upon
the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We thus quote with approval
the terse ruling of the appellate court in the challenged decision:

First, the violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely casual
breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the purpose by which the
donation was made, i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In order for
a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case
wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to establish a home for the aged and the infirm
(Exhibit C), may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach of the conditions
thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected
(Tolentino, "Civil Code of the Philippines," Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp. v. Court
of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case
of "Ocampo v. C.A." (ibid), citing the case of "Angeles v. Calasanz" (135 SCRA 323, 330), the
Supreme Court ruled:

The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is not
absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that:

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,
but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties
in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821,827). The
question of whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances
(Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).

Heirs of Rosendo Sevilla Florencio vs. Heirs of Teresa Sevilla De Leon (G.R. No. 149570,
March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 447)

FACTS:
Teresa Sevilla de Leon, owned a residential lot with an area of 828 square meters located in San
Miguel, Bulacan. In the 1960s, De Leon allowed the spouses Rosendo and Consuelo Florencio to
construct a house on the said property and stay therein without any rentals therefor.

In November 1978, De Leon, then already a widow, died intestate. In deference to her wishes, her

104
heirs allowed Rosendo Florencio to continue staying in the property. In March 1995, Florencio
died intestate, but his heirs, the respondents, remained in the property. On April 26, 1995, the heirs
of De Leon, through counsel, sent a letter to the heirs of Florencio, demanding that they vacate the
property within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. The latter refused and failed to vacate the
property.

De Leon's heirs contends the following: a). Defendants’ possession of the premises was merely on
the tolerance of the late Teresa de Leon. b). The alleged Deed of Donation does not exist, is patently
a falsified document and can never be the source of any right whatsoever.

At their very first answer to the complaint, Florencio's heirs contend that the plaintiffs had no cause
of action against them, as Teresa de Leon had executed a Deed of Donation on October 1, 1976
over the said parcel of land in favor of their predecessor, Rosendo Florencio. The latter accepted
the donation, as shown by his signature above his typewritten name on page one of the deed.

Florencio's heirs argue further that: a). Defendants do not have only a better right of possession
over the questioned parcel of land and they do not have only the absolute and lawful possession of
the same but they have the absolute and lawful ownership of the same not only against the plaintiffs
but against the whole world. b). Defendants are entitled to their counterclaim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners, as heirs of Rosendo Florencio, who appears to be the donee under
the unregistered Deed of Donation, have a better right to the physical or material possession of the
property over the respondents, the heirs of Teresa de Leon, the registered owner of the property.

HELD:
The petition has no merit.

As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property
from the donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the
acceptance by the donee, provided that the donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from
accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable, and
the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure
by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance,
to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in
the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donee’s acceptance must come to the
knowledge of the donor. In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must
be made in a public document. Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or
in the Assessor’s Office is not necessary for it to be considered valid and official. Registration
does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The necessity
of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the
heirs are bound by the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.

105
DE LUNA VS. JUDGE ABRIGO- Onerous Donation
Category: Property, Ownership and Its Modifications
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation
was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions.
In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When
the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna “revived” the said donation by
executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:

1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten
School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the
date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation

The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area
was retained by the De Luna.

The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the
RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The
Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the
conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The
heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of
the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 –enforcement of a written contract)

RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not
by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for
the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The
same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed.

106
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation
must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of
Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on
prescription and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

DBP v. CA – G.R. No. 28774

Facts:
DBP bought 91,188.30 square meters of land, consisting of 159 lots, in the proposed Diliman
Estate Subdivision of the PHHC. However, the sale of the lots to DBP, Lots 2 and 4, which form
part of said 159 lots, were still sold by PHHC to the spouses Nicandro, for which 2 deeds of sale
were issued to them by PHHC. Upon learning of PHHC’s previous transaction with DBP, the
spouses filed a complaint against DBP and the PHHC to rescind the sale of Lots 2 and 4 by PHHC
in favor of DBP. The CFI held that the sale of Lots 2 and 4, to DBP is null and void, for being in
violation of Section 13 of the DBP Charter.
Issue:
Do the spouses possess the legal personality to question the legality of the sale?
Held:
Yes. The spouses stand to be prejudiced by reason of their payment in full of the purchase price
for the same lots which had been sold to DBP by virtue of the transaction in question.The general
rule is that the action for the annulment of contracts can only be maintained by those who are
bound either principally or subsidiarily by virtue thereof. However, a person who is not obliged
principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is
prejudiced in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment
which could positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.

107
 TEVES VS PHHC
G.R. No. L-21498 June 27, 1968
ENCARNACION TEVES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
V. G. Plantilla for plaintiff-appellant.
Leopoldo A. Balguma and Antonio H. Castro for defendants-appellees M. L. Santos and C. L.
Santos.
Asst. Govt. Corp. Counsel Romualdo Valera for defendant-appellee People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
From the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dismissing her complaint against
defendants People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and spouses Melisenda L. Santos and
Cesar L. Santos, in Civil Case No. Q-6904, plaintiff Encarnacion Teves interposed the present
appeal.
The pertinent averments of the complaint in this case, filed on January 9, 1963, read as follows:
2. That sometime in October, 1950, the herein plaintiff and her husband Celestino Teves who died
in a plane crash with the late President Ramon Magsaysay ... occupied a portion of land of the
Diliman Estate Subdivision, known as the Quezon Memorial Grove, belonging to the defendant
PHHC, said portion of land with an area of 252 square meters, more or less, is known and
designated as Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision located in Diliman, Quezon
City.
3. That since then (October, 1950) the herein plaintiff and her deceased husband have continuously
occupied said portion of land and have constructed thereon their residential house with an assessed
value of P3,250.00 and which still remains existing to the present time.
4. That, because at the time that portion of the Diliman Estate Subdivision known as the Quezon
Memorial Grove was not intended for subdivision and distribution the occupants thereof, including
the herein plaintiff and her deceased husband, have joined themselves together and made repeated
requests and insistent representations with the officials of the PHHC and, with the help and
assistance of the Social Welfare Administration, the Board of Directors of the defendant PHHC
acceded to the occupants' petition and by virtue of Resolution No. 21, Fiscal Year 1951-52,
adopted on September 19, 1951, converted said estate into a subdivision for distribution and sale
to the actual occupants thereof who are qualified to acquire residential lots under the rules and
regulations of the defendant PHHC.
5. That, after due investigation conducted sometime before August, 1951, the then Chief of the
Sales Division of the defendant PHHC found the husband of the herein plaintiff to be the actual
occupant of said Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision and, having been found to
be likewise qualified to acquire said lot by purchase it was recommended that same be awarded to
him.
6. That after the death of the plaintiff's husband on March 17, 1957, the herein plaintiff filed
another application in her own name to purchase said Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate
Subdivision and thereafter made repeated and insistent requests and representation with the

108
officials and personnel of the Sales Division of the defendant PHHC to process and forward her
application for approval by the Board of Directors of the said defendant corporation but said
officials and personnel of the Sales Division of defendant corporation in flagrant disregard and
violation of their duties and with evident bad fifth prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff
deliberately refused to act on the requests and insistent representation of the plaintiff.
7. That on or about February 23, 1961, the defendant Melisenda L. Santos, through her attorney-
in-fact Estela Leyva, filed with the Sales Division of the defendant PHHC her application to
purchase said Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision, and in spite of the fact that the
officials and personnel of the said office have actual knowledge that said lot has long been
occupied and applied for by the herein plaintiff they deliberately concealed from the latter the
filing of the application of the defendant Melisenda L. Santos, thus depriving said plaintiff of her
legal rights to oppose the approval of said application and to bring to the higher authorities her
preferential rights to acquire the said lot in question.
8. That by reason of the negligent acts and deliberate refusal of the officials and personnel of the
defendant PHHC to act accordingly on the plaintiff's application, ... the defendant Melisenda L.
Santos, with the help and assistance of an influential politician, was able to secure the approval of
her application and the consequent execution in her favor of the deed of sale of the lot in
question,....
9. That, upon registration of the deed of sale ... with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, said office, on January 23, 1962, issued the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title No.
59796 in favor of the defendant Melisenda L. Santos.
10. That the deed of sale ... and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 59796 ... in the name of the
defendant Melisenda L. Santos are null and void and of no effect whatsoever by reason of the fact
that the same were secured by means of acts and omissions amounting to fraud and
misrepresentations, and political influence, aside from the fact that said sale was made in violation
of the established policy, rules and regulations of the defendant PHHC, particularly Resolution
No. 21, fiscal year 1951-52 of the Board of Directors of the defendant corporation.
11. That, as a consequence of the anomalous and illegal transaction between the defendants with
respect to the lot in question the herein plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of her rights to acquire
the same thus causing her great mental anguish for which she is entitled for a judgment for moral
and exemplary
damages ... actual damages ... attorneys fees and ... incidental expenses...."
The complaint prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring the deed of sale in favor,
and the transfer certificate of title issued in the name, of defendant Melisenda L. Santos null and
void, and directing defendant PHHC to execute in favor of plaintiff the corresponding deed of sale
over the lot in controversy on installment basis under the terms and conditions prescribed by the
rules and regulations of said corporation.
On February 6 and 12, 1963, defendant PHHC and defendants Melisenda L. Santos and Cesar L.
Santos, respectively, filed separate motions to dismiss, both motions based principally upon the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action. On February 16, 1963, the lower court issued
an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The order of dismissal stated that as plaintiff was not a
party to the deed of sale executed between the PHHC and defendant Melisenda L. Santos, she
cannot maintain an action to annul the same.

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Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the order of February 16, 1963 having been denied, she
brought the present appeal directly to this Court, on a question of law, contending that "the lower
court erred in dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint on the alleged ground of failure to state
a cause of action against the defendants-appellees."
We find merit in plaintiff's appeal.
A cause of action is defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation
of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."1 The rule is
well-settled that when the motion to dismiss a complaint is based upon the ground that it states no
cause of action, the sufficiency of the cause of action can only be determined on the basis of the
facts alleged in the complaint,2 and admitting the facts as alleged, whether or not the court can
render a valid judgment against the defendant based upon said facts as prayed for in the complaint. 3
The paragraphs of the complaint, hereinbefore quoted, contain allegations of facts which show that
the plaintiff had acquired a right — a preferential right to buy Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman
Estate Subdivision, that the defendants were aware of plaintiff's right, and that defendants had
committed acts in violation of plaintiff's rights; and such being the case, the plaintiff is entitled to
a relief as against the defendants.
The right asserted by the plaintiff, in her complaint, has for its basis the policy that was adopted
by the PHHC, an instrumentality of the government, as embodied in its Resolution No. 21, Fiscal
Year 1951-52, the resolutory part of which provides as follows:
RESOLVED, that in the sale of lots in the former Quezon Memorial Grove site, the occupants
therein be given the first chance in purchasing said lots; Provided, however, that no sale shall be
made to any person, whether an occupant or an outsider unless previously investigated and cleared
by the MIS; and Provided further, that nothing in this resolution shall be construed to affect nor
encroach the rights and prerogatives of the corporation.4
The complaint alleges that since October, 1950 plaintiff and her husband had been occupying Lot
9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision (formerly known as the Quezon Memorial
Grove), and they had built thereon their residential house with an assessed value of P3,250.00; that
upon due investigation conducted sometime before August, 1951 the Chief of the Sales Division
of the PHHC found plaintiff's husband to be the actual occupant of said land and having been
found to be qualified to acquire said land by purchase it was recommended that the lot be sold to
plaintiff's husband; that plaintiff's husband died on March 17, 1957, before the lot was actually
sold to him, and so plaintiff, as successor in interest of her husband, filed an application in her own
name to purchase the lot in question; that thereafter plaintiff made repeated and insistent requests
and representations with the officials and personnel of the Sales Division of the PHHC to process
and forward her application to the Board of Directors of the PHHC for approval, but said officials
and personnel ignored the requests and representations of the plaintiff; that instead of respecting
plaintiff's preferential right, and in spite of the fact that the officials and personnel of the PHHC
knew that plaintiff was the actual occupant of the lot, and without giving notice to the plaintiff that
a party was applying to purchase the same lot, the PHHC sold the same lot to defendant Melisenda
L. Santos who applied for it only on February 23, 1961 through an agent; that on January 12, 1962,
a deed of sale of the lot — with the full balance actually paid — was executed, and shortly
thereafter, or on January 23, 1962, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 95976 covering the lot was

110
issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in favor of said defendant. The complaint contains
allegations that the plaintiff was fraudulently deprived of her preferential right to buy the lot in
question, and that defendant Melisenda L. Santos was able to secure the approval of her application
to purchase the lot and the execution of the deed of sale in her favor through the help of an
influential politician.
A perusal of the complaint would elicit the position of the plaintiff in her case against the
defendants, to wit: she had a right which she had acquired pursuant to the very policy promulgated
by the defendant PHHC; she was deprived of the enjoyment of right when defendant PHHC sold
the lot in question to defendant Melisenda L. Santos who was never an occupant of the lot and
who applied to purchase said lot through an agent much later; the sale of the lot to the defendant
Melisenda L. Santos was made without her knowledge, much less with her consent, and was in
violation of the policy of the PHHC, so that the sale should not be given effect; that she was
deprived of her rights through fraud and/or bad faith, on the part of the officials and personnel of
the PHHC and of defendant Melisenda L. Santos; that defendant Melisenda L. Santos had taken
advantage over her by availing of the help of an influential politician; and that she had suffered
damages.
In contending that the complaint states no cause of action, the defendants urge that since plaintiff
is not a party to the deed of sale which was executed between the PHHC and defendant Melisenda
L. Santos, and neither was there in said deed any stipulation referring to plaintiff, the plaintiff
cannot maintain an action to annul the deed of sale. The defendants cite the provision of Article
1397 of the Civil Code which states that "The action for the annulment of contract may be instituted
by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily ...", and point out that because in the
deed of sale plaintiff was not party and she has no obligation under that deed, either principally or
subsidiarily, she cannot maintain the action to annull said deed. The lower court sustained the
contention of the defendants.
We note, however, in reading the complaint, that the plaintiff is seeking the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of sale not as a party in the deed, or because she is obliged principally or
subsidiarily under the deed, but because she has an interest that is affected by the deed. This Court
has held that a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudice in his rights with respect to one of
the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which would positively result to him from the
contract in which he had no intervention.5 Indeed, in the case now before Us, the complaint alleges
facts which show that plaintiff suffered detriment as a result of the deed of sale entered into by and
between defendant PHHC and defendant Melisenda L. Santos. We believe that the plaintiff should
be given a chance to present evidence to establish that she suffered detriment and that she is entitled
to relief.
We gather from the reading of the complaint that plaintiff seeks the declaration of the nullity of
the deed of sale because it was executed contrary to public policy and that fraud was exercised by
defendants PHHC and Melisenda L. Santos in its execution. The complaint, therefore, had posed
before the trial court the question of whether that deed of sale was null and void because it was
executed in violation of a public policy, and whether that contract was executed in fraud of a third
person.

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The ruling of this Court in the case of Huerta vs. Acosta, G.R. No. L-20497, promulgated on
January 31, 1966, has relevance to the question of whether the plaintiff in the case now before Us
has a cause of action based on policy, in connection with the sale of residential lands owned by
the government, of giving preferential right to purchase the land to persons who are prior actual
occupants of the land. In this case it appears: that long before the Government acquired the Fabie
Estate through expropriation proceedings under Republic Act 1162 for the purpose of subdividing
the same and reselling the subdivided lots to the tenants or occupants or other persons qualified
under the law to acquire said lots, Antonia Vda. de Huerta had occupied a portion of the
aforementioned estate. In order to carry out the function of subdividing the Fabie Estate into small
lots the Land Tenure Administration prepared a plan showing the subdivided lots and allotted the
subdivided lots to the tenants or occupants. Antonia Vda. de Huerta filed an application to purchase
Lot No. 14 and an agreement to sell covering said lot was entered into between her and the Land
Tenure Administration. Dionisio H. Acosta filed an application to buy Lot No. 13, which adjoins
Lot 14 that was sold to Huerta, and an outright sale was executed in Acosta's favor and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50570 was issued in his name. Finding later that the septic tank of her
house and other improvements previously put up by her are found in a portion of Lot 13, Huerta
requested the Land Tenure Administration to award to her Lot 13 in addition to Lot 14, or that
portion of Lot 13 where her septic tank is found be segregated and made part of Lot 14 inasmuch
as said portion was never occupied by Acosta. Huerta's request was denied. Since Huerta continued
occupying the disputed portion of Lot 13, Acosta filed an action before the Court of First Instance
of Manila to recover possession and ownership of that portion of Lot 13 occupied by Huerta.
Huerta, in her answer, set up the defense that she had a preferential right to purchase the disputed
portion because she was the bona fide tenant or occupant thereof. The trial court decided the case
in favor of Huerta, and adjudicated to her the portion of Lot 13 where her septic tank was located,
with an area of thirty square meters. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
but on appeal to this Court the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. This Court said:
It is admitted that the disputed portion of Lot 13 containing 30 sq. m. had never been occupied by
Dionisio Acosta, for even long before the Government acquired the Fabie Estate through
expropriation proceedings said portion had been occupied by Antonia Vda. de Huerta on which
she had constructed a house of strong materials and other permanent improvements including a
septic tank, and that portion formed part of the lot which she was then leasing from the former
owner of the Fabie Estate. Huerta, therefore, had the preferential right to purchase the disputed
portion from the Government under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1162, as amended,
particularly Section 3 which provides that the estate should be subdivided into small lots ... and
shall be sold at cost only to tenants or occupants.... (Emphasis supplied)
It is our considered view that the complaint in the case at bar states a cause of action, because it
contains allegations clearly showing violation of plaintiff's rights by the defendants. It can be said
that at least, the complaint alleges facts which show violation of plaintiff's rights under the
provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, on the subject of human
relations. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendants had not acted in good faith; that the
employees of the defendant PHHC, in the performance of their duties, had not given the plaintiff
her due; that the defendants had wilfully caused injury to the plaintiff in violation of a policy of
the PHHC which is a government instrumentality; and that the plaintiff, in her dealings with

112
defendant PHHC, found herself at a disadvantage because she was up against defendant Melisenda
L. Santos who had availed of the help of an influential politician — a circumstance which may
justify a recourse to the court for the protection of her right. 6 If these allegations are supported by
evidence, it is obvious that plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Accordingly, We hold that the complaint in the case at bar states a cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and this case is remanded to the court a quo
for further proceedings, with costs at this instance against defendants-appellees Melisenda L.
Santos and Cesar Santos. It is so ordered.

GARRIDO VS CA
G.R. No. 101262, September 14, 1994
SPOUSES ALBERTO GARRIDO AND COLOMA DAGURO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RUFINO AND CONRADA SUPLEMENTO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Tomas Hingco, a widower, originally owned Lot 209 of the Dingle Cadastre, Iloilo. He married
Consolacion Rondael, a widow, who had a daughter Magdalena Rondael. In 1947 he donated one
half (1/2) of Lot 209 to his stepdaughter Magdalena subject to the condition that she could not sell,
transfer or cede the same. When he died, Consolacion inherited the remaining half of Lot 209
which, in turn, was inherited by Magdalena upon the death of Consolacion. Consequently, the
entire Lot 209 was registered in the name of Magdalena Rondael, married to Lorenzo Daguro,
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13089.
In 1973 Magdalena sold a portion of Lot 209 (Lot 209-B) to Mariano Platinos and Florida
Macahilo. The remaining portion (Lot 209-A) with an area of 343 square meters is the subject of
this litigation.
In 1976 Lorenzo Daguro died. Magdalena then filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a
petition to cancel the lien prohibiting her from disposing of Lot 209-A because she needed money
for her subsistence and medical expenses as she was then in her 80's. Besides, she was sickly. [1]
Her deposition on oral examination in connection with her petition was taken on 24 January
1979.[2]

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On 17 August 1978, during the pendency of her petition, Magdalena executed a Conditional Deed
of Sale of Lot 209-A in favor of respondent spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento "subject to
the lien subsisting and annotated on the face of the Certificate of Title."[3] Magdalena agreed to
bear the cost of the cancellation of the lien and respondents to be bound thereby as long as it
subsisted, with the understanding that in the event the lien was not cancelled, the amount already
paid would be refunded. It was further stipulated that "out of the Nineteen Thousand (P19,000.00)
consideration x x x only Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos x x x shall be paid pro rata monthly
for ten (10) years and to convene (commence?) one (1) year from the date of this Deed."[4]
On 24 January 1979 the petition for cancellation of encumbrance was denied for the reason that
the ground cited for the cancellation was not one of those allowed by Sec. 112 of Act 496 and that
Magdalena failed to produce the deed of donation which contained the alleged restriction.
Nonetheless, on 19 July 1979 Magdalena executed with the conformity of her husband a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering Lot 209-A in favor of respondents, spouses Rufino and Conrada
Suplemento.[5] The deed was notarized on the same date. On 13 April 1982, Magdalena died. On
2 December 1982 TCT No. T-108689 was issued in the name of the Suplementos.[6]
Magdalena had two (2) daughters but only one is still living, Coloma Daguro, married to Alberto
Garrido, the spouses being the petitioners herein. They were based in Davao City and would visit
Magdalena only on occasions. In February 1984, Alberto Garrido visited the Suplementos in the
house where Magdalena used to live.[7] He wanted to find out if the taxes on the house were being
paid. In reply, respondents showed him the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by his parents-in-law
and it was only then that he came to know that Lot 209-A no longer belonged to his in-laws.
On 28 October 1985 petitioners Coloma Daguro and Alberto Garrido filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 209-A,
reconveyance and damages claiming that the deed was fictitious since Magdalena's signature
thereon "appears to have been traced" and Lorenzo Daguro's signature was likewise a forgery since
he died prior to the execution thereof, or on 9 October 1976.[8]
The trial court, relying on the deposition of Magdalena on 24 January 1979, found that she wanted
to sell and did in fact sell Lot 209-A to the Suplementos. In addition, the court found that the
genuineness of Lorenzo Daguro's signature was not germane to the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale as said signature was not necessary to convey title to the paraphernal property of
Magdalena. To petitioners' credit, it held that no evidence was adduced by respondents to show
payment of any installment of the balance of the purchase price to Magdalena before her death or
to her heir, Coloma. Thus, judgment was rendered on 19 October 1988 declaring the sale of 19
July 1979 valid but ordering the Suplementos to pay petitioners P16,000.00 with legal rate of
interest until fully paid.[9]
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Iloilo trial court in its decision
of 27 February 1991[10] and denied reconsideration on 29 July 1991.[11]
Petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that they have no personality to assail
the Absolute Deed of Sale and the genuineness of the signature of Magdalena Rondael.
Petitioners assert that the issue raised in the trial court was whether Magdalena Rondael could sell
the property despite the prohibition in the deed of donation. In ruling that they were incapacitated
to question the non-observance of the condition, respondent court went beyond the issue, hence,
exceeded its jurisdiction.

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We find for respondents. Petitioners have no personality to question the violation of the restriction
because they are not heirs of the donor. When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
imposed by the donor, it is the donor who has the right to impugn the validity of the transaction
affecting the donated property, conformably with Art. 764 of the Civil Code, which provides that
the right to revoke may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor and may be exercised against the
heirs of the donee, and the action prescribes four years after the violation of the condition.
Petitioners' lack of capacity to question the non-compliance with the condition is intimately
connected with the issue regarding the validity of the sale on account of the prohibition in the deed
of donation. Thus, we have established the rule that an unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question properly assigned is dependent,
may be considered by the appellate court.[12]
Petitioners also submit that the finding of the appellate court that the signature of Magdalena
Rondael in the Deed of Absolute Sale is genuine has been overtaken by events. In a letter dated 1
August 1991, the Regional Director of the NBI, Iloilo City, furnished the Iloilo City Prosecutor
with a copy of NBI Questioned Document Report No. 413-791 dated 23 July 1991, purporting to
show that the questioned signature as well as the standard/sample signatures of the deceased
Magdalena Rondael were not written by one and the same person,[13] hence, a forgery.
Admittedly, the NBI report was never adduced before the lower courts; in fact, it is presented for
the first time and only before this Court. Obviously, this is not a newly discovered evidence within
the purview of Sec. 1, par. (b), Rule 37, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners should have thought of
having the signature of Magdalena Rondael on the deed of sale examined when the case was still
with the trial court. Nothing would have stopped them from doing so. Hence, it is now late, too
late in fact, to present it before this Court.
Petitioners' reliance on the NBI report as basis for new trial on the ground of "newly discovered
evidence" is a mistake. In the first place, the rule is explicit that a motion for new trial should be
filed before the trial court and within the period for appeal. In the second place, in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as "newly discovered" for the purpose of
granting new trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence had been discovered after
trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and, (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative,
cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted would probably alter the result.[14]
At the pith of these requirements is that what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party
now submitting it; rather, that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in producing
or locating such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The NBI
report does not qualify as newly discovered evidence because the second requirement was not
complied with. Petitioners did not exercise reasonable diligence in procuring such evidence before
or during trial. By their own admission, the Fiscal sought NBI assistance only after the trial of the
case. They could have done so themselves when their case was tried. Besides, when the City
Prosecutor requested the NBI for a handwriting examination in connection with petitioners'
criminal complaint for falsification against respondents, the initial response of the NBI was: "no
definite opinion can be rendered on the matter due to lack of sufficient basis necessary for a
scientific comparative examination."[15] From there it can be deduced that petitioners did not

115
submit adequate documents before the NBI at the first instance, thus showing their want of
reasonable diligence in procuring the evidence they needed for a new trial.
We accord finality to the finding of respondent court, supported as it is by substantial evidence,
that the alleged discrepancy between the signature of Magdalena Rondael appearing on the Deed
of Absolute Sale and her signatures on the Conditional Deed of Sale, petition to cancel the
annotation prohibiting the sale of the donated property, petitioners' reply to opposition,[16]
transcript of her deposition dated 24 January 1979, and the deed of sale of Lot 209-B, does not
exist. Having alleged forgery, petitioners had the burden of proof. Here, they utterly failed. They
even attached to their complaint five receipts purportedly signed by Magdalena but, except for one
which was signed "Magdalena Rondael," said receipts were signed "Magdalena Daguro." [17]
Besides, there is no showing that the signatures presented as bases for comparison are themselves
genuine. On the other hand, the Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document which carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of 27 February
1991 as well as its resolution denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Quilala v. Alcantara 371 SCRA 311 (2001)

FACTS:
1. On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area
of 94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17214 of
the Register of Deeds for Manila.

2. The deed of donation was registered with the Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No.
17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala. On
November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984.

3. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.

4. The trial court found that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta,
was acknowledged before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signing on the wrong side of the page of the document invalidates it?

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RULING: No. The lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also
render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be
considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public
instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment
is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and
voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which contains the
Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the
notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.

ALDABA vs. CA- Donation

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not
the form required by law in donations.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba
and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her
until her death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her
brother Cesar Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the
respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted
an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them
as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which reads, ―Huag kayong umalis diyan.
Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo.‖ They also argue that the property
was for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The respondents contend that
the letter no way proves a donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners?

RULING: NO
For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be
considered as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as
indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the
petitioners during those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way
proves the alleged donation. If at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property

117
was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in
the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.

The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents
Jane did not even expect to be compensated.

SUMIPAT vs BANGA
G.R. No. 155810. August 13, 2004
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land.
The couple was childless.
Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children out of an extra-marital affair, namely:
herein defendants-appellees.
Lauro Sumipat executed a document denominated “DEED OF ABSOLUTE TRANSFER
AND/OR QUIT-CLAIM OVER REAL PROPERTIES” (the assailed document) in favor of
defendants-appellees covering the three parcels of land (the properties). On the document appears
the signature of his wife Placida indicating her marital consent thereto.
It appears that when the assailed document was executed, Lauro Sumipat was already very sick
and bedridden; that upon defendant-appellee Lydia’s request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera
lifted the body of Lauro Sumipat whereupon Lydia guided his (Lauro Sumipat’s) hand in affixing
his signature on the assailed document which she had brought; that Lydia thereafter left but later
returned on the same day and requested Lauro’s unlettered wife Placida to sign on the assailed
document, as she did in haste, even without the latter getting a responsive answer to her query on
what it was all about.
After Lauro Sumipat’s death, his wife Placida, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, and
defendants-appellees jointly administered the properties 50% of the produce of which went to
plaintiff-appellant.
As plaintiff-appellant’s share in the produce of the properties dwindled until she no longer received
any and learning that the titles to the properties in question were already transferred/made in favor
of the defendants-appellees, she filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of titles, contracts,
partition, recovery of ownership now the subject of the present appeal.
Defendant-appellee Lydia disclaims participation in the execution of the assailed document, she
claiming to have acquired knowledge of its existence only five days after its execution when Lauro
Sumipat gave the same to her.
RTC decided the case in favor of defendants-appellees holding that by virtue of the assailed
document the due execution of which was not contested by plaintiff-appellant, the properties were
absolutely transferred to defendants-appellees.

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ISSUE: Whether the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has
validly transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners?
HELD: NO. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property —
a donation — although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his
wife, Placida, shall be entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land
for their subsistence and support.
Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of
donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified
thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate
instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In this case, the donees’ acceptance of the donation is not manifested either in the deed itself or in
a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation is patently void.
Neither can we give effect to the deed as a sale, barter or any other onerous conveyance, in the
absence of valid cause or consideration and consent competently and validly given.

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