EVANGELINE LEDA v. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, Adm. Case No.

2505, 1992-02-21

Facts:

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two
Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present
Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a

Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983... on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted
marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under
Article 76 of the Civil Code[1] as one of... exceptional character

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in
1977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits,
though, that they had not lived... together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that
he was "single." He then passed the examinations

First complaint:

Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that

Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for
lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and
"abandoned" her

The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.

Tabang's answer:... he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage
"was not as... yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take
the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his
application to take the Bar "for reason that to my... honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my
marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant
had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that... the Complaint be
dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit or Desistance,
which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was
refraining from pursuing her Complaint against

Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take
his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1952.

Present complaint (disbarment):

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's
disbarment based on the following grounds:

"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is
not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

"b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar
exam.

"c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;

"d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of desistance and the
conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended... me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his
wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court."

Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to
Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he
was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could... not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered
her only a friend.

Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among
them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the... celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by
the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they
were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as... not to put her
family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing
you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter
was unsigned, Respondent's... initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").

Respondent denies emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging
in fantasy and fabrications.

Tabang's defense:

Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to
finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence
of the... requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to... administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they
had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar Examinations, he honestly believed
that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

Issues:

"a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is
not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

Ruling:

Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good
moral character sufficiently established.

Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is void.

The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of
the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official... duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.

Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this
Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing,
he has violated Canon 10 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as
well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the... court to be misled by any artifice."

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until
further Orders, the suspension to... take effect immediately.

Principles:

[A.M. No. 2001-9-SC. October 11, 2001]

DOROTEO IGOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. GILBERT SORIANO, Court Attorney VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, First
Division, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers.[1] Arrogating unto oneself, as in this case, the mantle of a Justice of the Highest
Court of the land for the purpose of extorting money from a party-litigant is an ultimate betrayal of this duty which can
not and should never be countenanced, because [i]t is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the part of those
who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely
corrodes the respect for the law and the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears apart the
very bonds of our polity.[2]

Complainant Doroteo A. Igoy is one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 141843, entitled Heirs of Gavino Igoy, et al, v. Mactan
Shangrila Hotel.[3] In a letter-complaint dated October 8, 2000,[4] written in the Cebuano dialect and addressed to the
Chief Justice, complainant alleged that while the aforesaid case was still pending before the Court of Appeals, he tried to
look for a person in the Supreme Court who may assist him in obtaining justice. Sometime in July 1999, a friend
introduced complainant to a certain Justice of the Supreme Court. He narrated to the said Justice the history of their
case. In turn, the said Justice asked for and received from him the sum of P20,000.00. However, the said Justice
reminded complainant that he could offer no help while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals.

In February 2000, they received an unfavorable decision from the Court of Appeals. Thus, complainant immediately
visited the said Justice at his office in the Supreme Court to inform him of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Justice offered to prepare the petition for review to be filed with the Supreme Court. Complainant subsequently met the
said Justice at the Maxs Restaurant, where the latter turned over the prepared petition for review. In consideration
therefor, the Justice asked for an additional P20,000.00. Since complainant did not have that amount of money with him
at that time, he undertook to send the same by courier as soon as he arrives in Cebu. Complainant asked for the said
Justices complete name and address, which he readily gave as: Atty. Gilbert Soriano, 22 Melon Street, Gatchalian
Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City.

As promised, complainant sent the amount of P20,000.00 through the Aboitiz Express on May 2, 2000. The parcel was
received by a certain Alvin Soriano, who turned out to be respondents son, on May 5, 2000.

Complainant was surprised to learn that on May 31, 2000, this Court denied the Petition for Review. Accordingly, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which this Court denied with finality on July 31, 2000.

Together with his letter, complainant submitted the following documents:

1. Photocopy of the Petition for Review allegedly prepared by the Justice;[5]

2. Shippers Copy of Prepaid Consignment Note No. E0993783C dated May 2, 2000, addressed to one Atty. Gilbert
Soriano of 22 Melon St., Gatchalian Subdivision, Phase 3-13, Las Pias City, with telephone numbers 826-1018, containing
cash in the amount of P20,000.00,[6] and sent by one Doroteo Igoy of Mactan, Lapu-lapu City, with telephone numbers
495-8-49;[7]

3. Letter dated May 5, 2000 of one Atty. Gilbert F. Soriano, addressed to Aboitiz Express, authorizing his daughter,
Christine Soriano, or his son, Alvin A. Soriano, to receive Parcel No. E0993783C on his behalf;[8]

4. Note dated May 5, 2000, evidencing receipt by one Alvin Soriano of the package on that date at 11:30 oclock in the
morning.[9]

In his comment dated November 6, 2000,[10] Atty. Gilbert Soriano denied that he was the Justice alluded to. He alleged
that his friend, Nic Taneo, introduced complainant to him because the latter was seeking help regarding a pending case
involving his poor relatives; that complainant requested him to go over their petition to be filed with the Supreme Court,
to ensure that the same would not be denied on technical grounds; he acceded to the request, after which complainant
told him that he will be sending him a token of gratitude, but he did not know that it was money.

Respondent further narrated that on May 4, 2000, he received a telephone call from Aboitiz Express, informing him that
complainant had sent him a parcel but the messenger was unable to locate his given address, and asking him to execute
a letter authorizing anyone in his house to receive the parcel. He recalled complainants promise of a token of gratitude,
so respondent authorized his children to accept the parcel. He was surprised to find inside the parcel cash in the amount
of P20,000.00. After several days of mulling over what to do with the money, respondent asked his friend to contact
Atty. Rodulfo Taneo, the counsel for petitioners in G.R. No. 141843. Atty. Taneo told him to hold the money and wait
until he arrives in Manila.

Respondent denied giving complainant any assistance other than checking the formal requirements of the petition for
review. He also denied that he entertained complainant in his office in the First Division of this Court which, according to
him, barely accommodates the staff therein with very little elbow room. Assuming that complainant was thus
accommodated in respondents office in the First Division, respondent could not have uttered the irresponsible and
degrading statements imputed on him by complainant. Further, respondent denied having received the amount of
P20,000.00 from complainant, arguing that, as a practicing catholic and active church leader, he can not in conscience
deceive anyone and ask for money.

Respondent likewise denied having demanded for an additional P20,000.00, countering that complainant merely
promised him a token gift for the little help that he extended, without mention of any amount. In fact, he almost forgot
about that promise, and he remembered it only when he was notified by the courier service that he had a parcel from
complainant. That was almost two (2) months after the case petition for review was filed with this Court.

In closing, respondent insinuated that if this Court should find that he committed a misconduct despite his explanation,
he shall offer to retire from the service.

On November 16, 2000, complainant wrote another letter to the Chief Justice, again written in the Cebuano dialect.
[11] Complainant averred that respondent was introduced to him by Engr. William Redoblado as one of the Justices of
the Supreme Court. He only learned that respondent was not a Justice when they met at the Cebu Mactan International
Airport on October 31, 2000. Respondent offered to return the P40,000.00, but be refused to receive the same. Instead,
he told respondent to just wait for the outcome of the complaint he filed against him with the Office of the Chief Justice.

In the same letter, complainant provided the following questions and answers, to wit:

1. What is the name of the Justice of the Supreme Court whom you contacted?

Answer: Atty. Gilbert Soriano.

2. Where did you meet/see him?

Answer: Inside the premises of the Supreme Court.

3. Who was the person who introduced him as Justice?

Answer: Engr. William Redoblado was the one who introduced to me that Gilbert Soriano is a Justice. I never knew that
Gilbert Soriano is not a Justice.

4. Where did you specifically give to the Justice the first P20,000.00?

Answer: At the ground floor of the Supreme Court beside the canteen where the parking area is located.

5. Who were with you at the Maxs Restaurant when the petition was given to you?

Answer: Engr. William Redoblado, Leonardo Paquibot, Atty. Rodolfo Taneo, Atty. Gilbert Soriano and myself
(complainant Igoy). Atty. Taneo returned the petition because it was lacking.

Respondent submitted his comment[12] to the second letter, wherein he contended that when complainant allegedly
gave him the sum of P20,000.00 on July 16, 1999, his case was still pending before the Court of Appeals; hence, there
was then no reason for complainant to approach respondent and give him money. Moreover, it is unnatural for a person
to give money to someone whom he does not know well and whom he met only for the first time. Respondent brands as
unbelievable the version that complainant handed the money to him at the parking area beside the Supreme Court
canteen, where many of the Courts employees and visitors frequently pass. He claimed that it was not Engr. William
Redoblado, but Mr. Taneo who introduced him to complainant.

Respondent alleged that on October 30, 2000, he informed Atty. Taneo that he was returning the money he received
through Aboitiz Express. He was told by Atty. Taneo to meet him in Cebu. On October 31, 2000, respondent arrived in
Cebu and met Atty. Taneo and complainant at an eatery near the airport. Respondent offered to return the P20,000.00
to complainant, but the latter refused to accept it. Complainant stated that he will withdraw his complaint only after the
Supreme Court decides their case in their favor. Respondent, however, informed complainant that as a mere employee
of the court, he could not dictate the outcome of the case.

On January 8, 2001, Atty. Soriano filed his letter of resignation/retirement under R.A. 1616, without specifying its
effectivity date.[13]

The Office of Administrative Services, to which this case was referred for evaluation, issued a Memorandum on May 30,
2001, recommending respondents dismissal from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits to which he may be entitled.

Respondents offer to resign was obviously an attempt to evade whatever penalty may be imposed on him. However, the
mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate him from the consequences of his acts. As this Court
pointed out in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:[14]

. . . Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in
the proper administration of justice.
Settled is the rule that in administrative cases of this nature, the Court may proceed with its investigation and mete the
appropriate penalty against erring officers of the court.[15] Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an
easy way out to evade administrative liability by court personnel facing administrative sanction.[16]

In recommending the dismissal of respondent from service, the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) reasoned that:

From the established facts, it is clear that complainant came to see respondent to plead for help in preparing a Petition
for Review. The respondent, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity to make the complainant believe that he has
the influence and connections in the court and would be easy for him (respondent) to help the complainant.

True, as respondent claimed, he was not urged by ulterior motives in preparing the Petition for Review or at least
reviewing the same, but not being his official duty to do so, his actuation led complainant to believe that it should be for
a fee. It would have been very easy for him to decline the offer of P20,000.00 even if it was gratuitously given if his real
intention was merely to help. He knew for a fact that the petitioners have a counsel who, presumably, knows the
appropriate pleadings to be filed with this Court.

Sec. 7 (D) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Ethical Conduct and Standard for Public Officials and Employees) specifically provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions

xxx xxx xxx

d. Solicitations or acceptance of gifts Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any
gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official
duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transactions which may be affected by the
functions of their office.

Respondent, who is himself a lawyer, should have avoided all the circumstances in which he might be accused of using
his office in the guise of helping others, for this taints the integrity of the Court.

The denial of the respondent of the receipt of initial payment of P20,000.00 cannot simply overcome the positive
assertions of the complainant. If no such initial payment took place, Atty. Soriano would not have claimed the
subsequent payment through the Aboitiz Express.

The claim of Atty. Soriano that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. To tolerate
such acts would open the floodgates to fraud or graft and corruption to be committed by officials and employees of the
Court.

Likewise, the fact that respondent tried to return the amount to Mr. Igoy after the Chief Justice required him to
comment on the complaint only strengthened the case against him. Even if the offer to return the money was accepted
by the complainant, it will never exculpate him of his administrative liabilities. Respondent by his brazen conduct
consummated an act that by itself is a disservice to the administration of justice and an affront of the image of the court
before the public.

It is admitted that respondent offered to resign, however, resignation should not be used as an easy way to escape
administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction. Respondent therefore cannot go scot-free
and be simply forgiven for the damage he caused to the institution he was bound by his oath and The Canons of Legal
Ethics to serve with utmost integrity.

Respondent may have been in the service for 28 years, but he has blemished his record irreparably and under the
circumstances, this office believes that dismissal as a penalty is warranted.

The Court adopts the foregoing findings and recommendation of the OAS. Time and again, this Tribunal has emphasized
that [t]he conduct or behavior of all officials and employees of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.[17] Their
conduct must, at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum in order to earn and
maintain the respect of the public for the judiciary.[18] Indeed, Canon 6, Rule 6.02, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states in no uncertain terms that

Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The foregoing command acquires particular significance given the prevailing facts of this case considering that
respondent is a senior lawyer of this Court. It bears stressing that government lawyers who are public servants owe
utmost fidelity to the public service, for public service is a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public eye.
[19]

The Court could not help but express its great disappointment over the conduct of respondent who, as a lawyer with
twenty-eight (28) years of government service behind him, should have been among the first to set an example to his
co-employees and fellow civil servants. Instead, he badly tainted the image of this Tribunal as well as the judiciary. Only
recently in In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with
Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,[20] this Court said that:

Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion.
Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost
prudence and discretion. For theirs is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the
Judiciary.

Respondent should be reminded in this regard that the nature and responsibilities of public officers enshrined in the
Constitution, and oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical words to be taken lightly as idealistic sentiments
but as working standards and attainable goals, that should be matched with actual deeds.[21] Those involved in the
administration of justice must live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service,[22]

In sanctioning errant officers and employees involved in the administration of justice, the Court has held:

Since the administration of justice is a sacred task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of
honesty, integrity and uprightness. It bears stressing once again that public service requires utmost integrity and the
strictest discipline possible of every public servant. A public office is a public trust that enjoins all public officers and
employees, particularly those serving in the judiciary to respond to the highest degree of dedication often even beyond
personal interest.[23]

All too often, this Court has declared that any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office, especially
on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be countenanced.[24] To reiterate, public
office is a public trust. Public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with the utmost degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[25]

This Court has also ruled that:

Time and again, we have emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court personnel are saddled with in
view of their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They must be constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. As we have held in the
case of Mendoza v. Mabutas (223 SCRA 411 [1993], citing Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705 [1991]), this Court condemns
and would never countenance such conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.[26]

Respondents acts seriously undermined the trust and confidence of the public in the entire judicial system. What makes
his infraction worse is the fact that he is not a mere court employee, but a senior attorney employed in the Highest
Court of the Land. He has indelibly sullied his record of government service spanning twenty-eight years, and in so doing
he has prejudiced the integrity of the Court as a whole. Once more, this Court is called upon to apply disciplinary
sanction on an errant member, and again it will not shirk from its responsibility. Thus, this Court imposes on respondent
the only penalty that he deserves --- that of dismissal from the service.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or controlled corporations. This dismissal shall be immediately executory.

Further, respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano is DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why he
should not, be DISBARRED. In the meantime, respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Gilbert Soriano and furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon,
Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Kapunan and Panganiban, JJ., on official leave.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]

Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR., respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should
not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members of the bar.

The Case

Before us is a Sworn Complaint[1] filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court,
seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyers oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:

x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In addition, Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do
so, respondent violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
[r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.[2]

The Facts

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu,[3] a
Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and
seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga
City.Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his
money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by respondent. The
Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then
issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither
appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal
Complaint[4] for estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5] On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC
issued a Warrant of Arrest[6] against Pan.

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest.[7] He also filed with the RTC of
Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a
business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the civil action
against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move
for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.

In his Comment[8] dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty.
Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that the suit was
groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded
as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pans Motion
for an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits and Evidence,[9] of the appeal[10] to the justice secretary, and of the
Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.[11]

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa
case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by
Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants connivance therein were discovered only after the
institution of the collection suit.
The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
[12] Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.[13]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation,[14] Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP
for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No.
4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had filed against respondents client. In his Comment,
respondenthimself claimed that the reason x x x was x x x the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and
consequent damages.

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage
against the estafa case, in which respondents client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and
highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the
alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil
Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP adopted the investigating commissioners recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two
(2) years.

This Courts Ruling

We agree with the IBPs recommendation.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.[15] Membership in the bar imposes
upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly.Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that [a] lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the collection of a sum of money,
damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture. It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was
later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints[16] alleged the following:

27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed to perform his
duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his rights under
the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation
was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and x
x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien
Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;

28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to defer for the
valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under
an invalid information and warrant of arrest.

29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to
harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to law,
morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.][17]

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies
strengthen complainants allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If
respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salangas resolution, they should have used the proper procedural
and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salangas decision to file an information for estafa.

In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed without
basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he
believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the
availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification.
The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit
shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case.It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a
personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions
demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according
to law, not to harass them.[18]

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their
comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they
deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between
clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified
recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession,[19] but
also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, the Lawyers Oath exhorts law practitioners not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.

Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is
flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit
violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery.[20] Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just
condemnation.Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when
they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.[21]

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be
purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite
conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of
professional duty.[22]

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law,
effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

Dacanay vs. Baker & McKenzie [A.C. No. 2131 May 10, 1985]

16AUG

Ponente: AQUINO, J.

FACTS:

[R]espondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he
be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead
of another law office.” Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practicing
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & McKenzie.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Baker & McKenzie, an alien law firm, could practice law in the Philippines.

HELD:

NO. Respondents were enjoined from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

RATIO:

Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
[R]espondents’ use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constituted a representation that being associated with the firm
they could “render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investment”. This was unethical because Baker & McKenzie was not authorized to practice law here.

GR 71177 | October 28, 1988 | Per Curiam

Facts:

Attys. Prescillano Adamos and Julian Barrameda filed in behalf of petitioner a petition for certiorari in SC assailing the
dismissal of NLRC of their MR of the POEA decision. They contended that the MR or appeal was seasonably filed within
10 working days from receipt of decision, allegedly pursuant to the 1984 POEA Rules Procedure, specifically Rule XXIV,
Sec 1 and Rule XXV, Sec 2 thereof.

SC required the counsels to furnish the source of the POEA rules in its resolutions and thereafter discovered the rule’s
non-existence. It required counsels to explain why they should not be “disciplinary dealt with for fabricating rules for the
purpose of trifling with court processes.” The counsels persisted in their claim and submitted not a certified but a xerox
copy of the alleged rules. SC issued a warning in its decision, but they again cited the non-existent rules in their MR.

They were directed to show cause why they should not be held in contempt and in their “Compliance”, the counsels
stated that they were “motivated by counsels’ desire to fully defend their client’s interest or cause with their
utmost/best efforts…”

Issue:

W/N the counsels may be held liable for their misconduct

Held:

Yes. The counsels committed a serious violation of the attorney’s solemn oath to do no falsehood due to its deliberate
effort to mislead the Court.

For a lawyer’s duty to his client does not mean freedom to set up false or fraudulent claims especially with respect to
provisions of law or administrative rules and that while lawyers are bound to exert utmost legal skill in prosecuting their
client’s cause or defending it, their duty, first and foremost, is to the administration of justice. The office of attorney
does not permit, much less demand, to support a client’s case, violation of law or otherwise, fraud or chicanery. A
lawyer must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Attys. Adamos and Barrameda are suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

Barbuco vs. Beltran

A.C. No. 5092.  August 11, 2004

Facts:
Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for malpractice of law. Complainant, through her
son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals
from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, which adverese to the complainants interest. On the same day,
complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.

However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief. The brief was only filed by respondent
43 days after the deadline of submission of the same.

When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade liability by alleging that he met a vehicular accident, which
incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish the appellants brief. Moreover, he sustained injuries in the
head, which as a result respondent lost track of  schedules of hearings and deadlines for submitting briefs.

Issue: 
Whether or not respondent's failure to file appellant's brief warrants sanctions.
Held:
Yes. the SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. An attorney
is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.  Failure to file brief within the
reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of FORTY THREE (43) days
resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot
serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not
just one lawyer.  This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and on
behalf of the Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office.  As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in the
law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.

Moreover, every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.  A
lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should be expected
of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of the law.  The
Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence and he
should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. "

G.R. No. 194578

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun
(petitioner) against Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas (Atty. Quinsayas), Ma. Gemma
Oquendo (Gemma), Dennis Ayon (Ayon), Nenita Oquendo (Nenita), Esmael
Mangudadatu (Mangudadatu), Jose Pavia (Pavia), Melinda Quintos De Jesus (De
Jesus), Reynaldo Hulog (Hulog), Redmond Batario (Batario), Malou Mangahas
(Mangahas), and Danilo Gozo (Gozo). Atty. Quinsayas and the other respondents, who
are not from the media, are referred to in this case as Atty. Quinsayas, et al. Petitioner
also named as respondents GMA Network, Inc. (GMA Network) through its news
editors Raffy Jimenez and Victor Sollorano, Sophia Dedace (Dedace), ABS-CBN
Corporation (ABS-CBN) through the Head of its News Group Maria Ressa (Ressa),
Cecilia Victoria Oreña-Drilon (Drilon), Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI)
represented by its Editor-in-Chief Letty Jimenez Magsanoc, Tetch Torres (Torres),
Philippine Star (PhilStar) represented by its Editor-in-Chief Isaac Belmonte, and Edu
Punay (Punay). Respondents Atty. Quinsayas, et al. and respondent media groups and
personalities are collectively referred to in this case as respondents.

The Antecedent Facts

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of then

Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and
journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak to
file Mangudadatu's Certificate of Candidacy[1] when they were accosted by a group of
about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, some four to
ten kilometers from their destination.[2] The group was taken hostage and brought to a
hilly and sparsely-populated part of Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan,
Maguindanao.[3] The gruesome aftermath of the hostage-taking was later discovered
and shocked the world. The hostages were systematically killed by shooting them at
close range with automatic weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in
mass graves and covered with the use of a backhoe.[4] These gruesome killings became
known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of 57 victims were killed, 30 of them
journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for Murder were filed and raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 221, and docketed as Criminal Cases No.
Q-09-162148-172, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652, and Q-10-163766. Petitioner is the
counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the
murder cases.

In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against

petitioner before this Court, docketed as Bar Matter No. A.C. 8827. The disbarment
case is still pending.

Petitioner alleged that on 22 November 2010, GMA News TV internet website posted
an article, written by Dedace, entitled "Mangudadatu, others seek disbarment of
Ampatuan lawyer," a portion of which reads:

On Monday, Maguindanao Governor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu and four others filed
a 33 page complaint against lawyer Sigrid Fortun whom they accused of "engaging in
every conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the proceedings by using and
abusing legal remedies available."[5]

On even date, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, also published an article, written by
Torres, which according to petitioner also stated details of the disbarment case, as
follows:

"Respondent Atty. Fortun had astutely embarked in an untiring quest to obstruct,

impede and degrade the administration of justice by filing countless causes of action,
all in the hope of burying the principal issue of his client's participation or guilt in the
murder of 57 people that ill-fated day of November 23, 2009," the petitioners said. [6]

Petitioner further alleged that on 23 November 2010, PhilStar published an article,

written by Punay, which gave details of the disbarment allegations, thus:

"Attorney Fortun used and abused legal remedies available and allowed under under
the rules, muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject
matter of the cases, read the complaint.

*****         *****         *****

"Respondent Attorney Fortun's act of misleading the prosecution and trial court is a
dishonest/deceitful conduct violative of Code of Professional Responsibility," read the
complaint.

"In so doing, he diminished the public confidence in the law and the legal profession,
rendering him unfit to be called a member of the Bar."[7]

Further, petitioner alleged that on 23 November 2010, Channel 23 aired on national

television a program entitled "ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao
Massacre." Drilon, the program's host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to
discuss the disbarment case against petitioner, including its principal points. Petitioner
was allegedly singled out and identified in the program as the lead counsel of the
Ampatuan family.

Petitioner alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the
disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on
the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent media groups and personalities conspired with Atty. Quinsayas, et al. by
publishing the confidential materials on their respective media platforms. Petitioner
pointed out that Drilon discussed the disbarment complaint with Atty. Quinsayas in a
television program viewed nationwide.

Petitioner alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him
exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference.
Petitioner alleged that opinion writers wrote about and commented on the disbarment
complaint which opened his professional and personal reputation to attack. He alleged
that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was to malign
his personal and professional reputation, considering the following: (1) the bases of the
charges were not new but were based on incidents that supposedly took place in
January 2010; (2) it was timed to coincide with the anniversary of the Maguindanao
Massacre to fuel hatred, contempt and scorn for Ampatuan, Jr. and his counsel and
violated the accused's right to presumption of innocence and due process; (3) it was
published following articles written about petitioner's advocacy for the rights of an
accused and negated the impact of these articles on the public; and (4) respondents
knew that the charges were baseless as petitioner always opted for speedy trial and
protection of the accused's rights at trial. Petitioner further alleged that in announcing
their "causes of action" in the disbarment case, respondents were only seeking the
approval and sympathy of the public against him and Ampatuan, Jr.

In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that it has no newspaper or any publication
where it could have printed the article. It alleged that it did not broadcast the
disbarment complaint on its television station. GMA Network alleged that the
publication had already been done and completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed
copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who reported
the news and the media groups that published it on their website, including GMA
Network, did not violate the confidentiality rule. GMA Network further alleged that
Dedace, a field reporter for the judiciary, acted in good faith and without malice when
she forwarded the news to the news desk. GMA News also acted in good faith in posting
the news on its website. GMA Network denied that it conspired with the other
respondents in publishing the news. GMA Network alleged that it posted the
disbarment complaint, without any unfair, critical, and untruthful comment, and only
after it was "published" by Atty. Quinsayas, et al. who furnished copies of the
disbarment complaint to the media reporters. GMA Network alleged that it had no
intention to malign petitioner's personal and professional reputation in posting the
news about the disbarment complaint on its website.

In her Comment, Dedace clarified that she is a field news reporter of GMA Network
and not a writer of the GMA News TV website. Her beat includes the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and the Department of Justice. Dedace alleged that on 22
November 2010, she received an advice from fellow field reporter Mark Merueñas that
the lawyer of Mangudadatu would be filing a disbarment case against petitioner. She
waited at the Supreme Court. At around 5:00 p.m., Atty. Quinsayas arrived. Atty.
Quinsayas gave copies of the petition to news reporters and Dedace received one.
Dedace prepared and sent her news story to GMA Network where it went to the editor.
Dedace alleged that she did not breach the rule on confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings against lawyers when she reported the filing of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner. She alleged that she acted in good faith and without malice in
forwarding her news story to the news desk and that she had no intention to, and could
not, influence or interfere in the proceedings of the disbarment case. She further
alleged that she honestly believed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner was newsworthy and should be reported as news.

PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website
through a syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that are
not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and Inquirer
Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations, with separate legal personalities, and
one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.

Torres[8] alleged in her Comment that on 17 November 2010, a private prosecutor told

her and several other reporters that a disbarment case would be filed against petitioner.
The disbarment case was actually filed on 22 November 2010 when Torres received a
copy of the complaint. Since the lead of the story came from a lawyer, Torres did not
consider that writing a story about the filing of the disbarment complaint might
amount to contempt of court. Torres alleged that the writing of the story was an
independent act and she did not conspire with any of the other respondents. Torres
maintained that she acted in good faith in writing the news report because the
Maguindanao Massacre was a matter of public concern and the allegations in the
disbarment complaint were in connection with petitioner's handling of the case. Torres
further asserted that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest
in his doings, affairs and character.

In her Comment, Ressa alleged that she was the former head of ABS-CBN's News and
Current Affairs Group and the former Managing Director of ANC. However, she was on
terminal leave beginning 30 October 2010 in advance to the expiration of her contract
on 3 January 2011. Ressa alleged that she had no participation in the production and
showing of the broadcast on 23 November 2010. Ressa adopts the answer of her co-
respondents ABS-CBN and Drilon insofar as it was applicable to her case.

ABS-CBN and Drilon filed a joint Comment. ABS-CBN alleged that ABS-CBN News
Channel, commonly known as ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok
Network News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program "ANC
Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-CBN
but it has its own juridical personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have interlocking
directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation and hosting of the
program were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. They alleged that the program was a
commemoration of the Maguindanao Massacre and was not a report solely on the
disbarment complaint against petitioner which took only a few minutes of the one-hour
program. They alleged that the program was not a publication intended to embarrass
petitioner who was not even identified as the respondent in the disbarment complaint.
Drilon even cautioned against the revelation of petitioner's name in the program. ABS-
CBN and Drilon further alleged that prior to the broadcast of the program on 23
November 2010, the filing of the disbarment complaint against petitioner was already
the subject of widespread news and already of public knowledge. They denied
petitioner's allegation that they conspired with the other respondents in violating the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings. Finally, they alleged that the contempt
charge violates their right to equal protection because there were other reports and
publications of the disbarment complaint but the publishers were not included in the
charge. They also assailed the penalty of imprisonment prayed for by petitioner as too
harsh.

In their joint Comment, respondents Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma alleged
that petitioner failed to prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of
the disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while they were the ones who
filed the disbarment complaint against petitioner, it does not follow that they were also
the ones who caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that petitioner did
not provide the name of any particular person, dates, days or places to show the alleged
confederation in the dissemination of the disbarment complaint.

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, and Mangahas, in their capacity as members of

the Board of Trustees of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists, Inc. (FFFJ) and
Atty. Quinsayas, former counsel for FFFJ, also filed a joint Comment claiming that the
alleged posting and publication of the articles were not established as a fact.
Respondents alleged that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles
and he only offered to submit a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program
where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by Drilon. Respondents alleged that,
assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to support his allegations that
they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.

In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that on 22 November 2010, Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. went to this Court to file the disbarment complaint but they were not
able to file it on that day.[9] Atty. Quinsayas, et al. were able to file the disbarment
complaint the following day, or on 23 November 2010. PhilStar and Punay alleged that
their news article, which was about the plan to file a disbarment complaint against
petitioner, was published on 23 November 2010. It came out before the disbarment
complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article on the disbarment
complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the article was a
true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article was
straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author. They
alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment
complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he perceived it to be a
newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a
privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression,
speech, and of the press under the Constitution. They also alleged that the case is a
criminal contempt proceeding and intent to commit contempt of court must be shown
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. They further alleged that they did not commit any
contemptible act. They maintained that the news article did not impede, interfere with,
or embarrass the administration of justice. They further claimed that it is improbable,
if not impossible, for the article to influence the outcome of the case or sway this Court
in making its decision. The article also did not violate petitioner's right to privacy
because petitioner is a public figure and the public has a legitimate interest in his
doings, affairs, and character.

Pavia died during the pendency of this case[10] and was no longer included in the
Comment filed for the FFFJ Trustees. Gozo resigned as member of the FFFJ Trustees
and was no longer represented by the FFFJ counsel in filing its comment. [11] Gozo did
not file a separate comment.

The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.

The Ruling of this Court

First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of a criminal contempt.
In People v. Godoy,[12] this Court made a distinction between criminal and civil
contempt. The Court declared:

A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice
which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil
contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be done by a court in a civil
action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is, therefore, an offense against
the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.

A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an
offense against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against
public justice which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the
proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a
civil contempt are remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a felony nor a
misdemeanor, but a power of the court.

It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and
that no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear
that he intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since
the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant's intent in
committing the contempt is immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to
violate the court's order is not a defense in civil contempt.[13]

The records of this case showed that the filing of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner had been published and was the subject of a televised broadcast by
respondent media groups and personalities.

We shall discuss the defenses and arguments raised by respondents.

GMA Network, Inc.

GMA Network's defense is that it has no newspaper or any publication where the article
could be printed; it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint in its television
station; and that the publication was already completed when Atty. Quinsayas
distributed copies of the disbarment complaint to the media.

GMA Network did not deny that it posted the details of the disbarment complaint on its
website. It merely said that it has no publication where the article could be printed and
that the news was not televised. Online posting, however, is already publication
considering that it was done on GMA Network's online news website.

Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.

PDI averred that it only shares its contents with Inquirer.net through a syndication.
PDI attached a photocopy of the syndication page stating that "[d]ue to syndication
agreements between PDI and Inquirer.net, some articles published in PDI may not
appear in Inquirer.net."[14]

A visit to the website describes Inquirer.net as "the official news website of the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, the Philippines' most widely circulated broadsheet, and a
member of the Inquirer Group of Companies."[15] PDI was not able to fully establish
that it has a separate personality from Inquirer.net.

ABS-CBN Corporation

ABS-CBN alleged that SNN is its subsidiary and although they have interlocking
directors, SNN has its own juridical personality separate from its parent company.
ABS-CBN alleged that SNN controls the line-up of shows of ANC.

We agree with ABS-CBN on this issue. We have ruled that a subsidiary has an
independent and separate juridical personality distinct from that of its parent company
and that any suit against the the latter does not bind the former and vice-versa. [16] A
corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from that of other corporations to which it may be connected. [17] Hence, SNN,
not ABS-CBN, should have been made respondent in this case.

Maria Ressa

Respondent Ressa alleged that she was on terminal leave when the program about the
Maguindanao Massacre was aired on ANC and that she had no hand in its production.
Ressa's defense was supported by a certification from the Human Resource Account
Head of ABS-CBN, stating that Ressa went on terminal leave beginning 30 October
2010.[18] This was not disputed by petitioner.

Sophia Dedace, Tetch Torres, Cecilia Victoria Oreña-Drilon,

and Edu Punay

Basically, the defense of respondents Dedace, Torres, Drilon, and Punay was that the
disbarment complaint was published without any comment, in good faith and without
malice; that petitioner is a public figure; that the Maguindanao Massacre is a matter of
public interest; and that there was no conspiracy on their part in publishing the
disbarment complaint. They also argued that the news reports were part of privileged
communication.

In Drilon's case, she further alleged that the television program was a commemoration
of the Maguindanao Massacre and not solely about the filing of the disbarment case
against petitioner. Even as the disbarment complaint was briefly discussed in her
program, petitioner's name was not mentioned at all in the program.

Violation of Confidentiality Rule by Respondent Media Groups

and Personalities

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and
confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its
decisions in other cases.

The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations
free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the
press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. We
have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of
administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters
may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court,
punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. x x
x[19]

In People v. Castelo,[20] the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the
principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The
Court ruled:

While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of
libel for both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression
guaranteed by our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise
be considered in the other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether
anchored in freedom of the press or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle
regarding privileged communications can also be invoked in favor of appellant. [21]

The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public
policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." [22] As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final
resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering
that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on
petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense
counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment
complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre
case.

The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the

massacre, 30 were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the
Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public interest and that the
personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public figure. The Court
explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he
could; for instance, if and when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because
a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content,
effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or notoriety.[23] (Boldface in the original)

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a
right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that
respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they received
when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.

The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by itself,
is not sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the
confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public
figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because the event
itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as legitimate
news. It would have been different if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a
private matter as the media would then be bound to respect the confidentiality
provision of disbarment proceedings under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the
press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a
fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a
legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must
preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain private and confidential
until their final determination.[24] Only the final order of this Court shall be published
like its decisions in other cases.[25]

Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and
personalities acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their
postings and publications of the filing of a disbarment complaint against him.
Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was a news item.
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent media groups and personalities acted with
malicious intent. Respondent media groups and personalities made a fair and true
news report and appeared to have acted in good faith in publishing and posting the
details of the disbarment complaint. In the televised broadcast of the commemoration
of the Maguindanao Massacre over ANC, the disbarment case was briefly discussed but
petitioner was not named. There was also no proof that respondent media groups and
personalities posted and published the news to influence this Court on its action on the
disbarment case or to deliberately destroy petitioner's reputation. It should also be
remembered that the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner entered the public
domain without any act on the part of the media. As we will discuss later, the members
of the media were given copies of the disbarment complaint by one of the
complainants.

Esmael Mangudadatu, Dennis Ayon,

Nenita and Ma. Gemma Oquendo

Respondents, while admitting that they were some of the complainants in the
disbarment complaint against petitioner, alleged that there was no proof that they were
the ones who disseminated the disbarment complaint. Indeed, petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegation that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma were the ones
who caused the publication of the disbarment complaint against him. There was
nothing in the records that would show that Mangudadatu, Ayon, Nenita, and Gemma
distributed or had a hand in the distribution of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner.

Melinda Quintos De Jesus, Reynaldo Hulog,

Redmond Batario, Malou Mangahas, and
Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas

Respondents De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and Atty. Quinsayas alleged that
petitioner was not able to establish the posting and publication of the articles about the
disbarment complaint, and that assuming the posting and publication had been
established, petitioner failed to support his allegation that they actively disseminated
the details of the disbarment complaint. They further alleged that they did not cause
the publication of the news articles and thus, they did not violate the rule on privacy
and confidentiality of disbarment proceedings.

Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other
respondents, namely De Jesus, Hulog, Batario, Mangahas, and even Gozo, who did not
file his separate comment, had a hand in the dissemination and publication of the
disbarment complaint against him. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint. In its Comment,
GMA Network stated that the publication "had already been done and completed
when copies of the complaint for disbarment were distributed by one of
the disbarment complainants, Atty. Prima Quinsayas x x x."[26] Dedace also
stated in her Comment that "Atty. Quinsayas gave copies of the disbarment complaint
against Atty. Fortun and she received one[.]"[27]

Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a
complainant in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and
an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of
disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty.
Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to
members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court. In Relativo v. De Leon,
[28]
 the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of the filing and
pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the confidentiality rule. [29] In that
case, Atty. Relativo, the complainant in a disbarment case, caused the publication in
newspapers of statements regarding the filing and pendency of the disbarment
proceedings. The Court found him guilty of contempt.

Indirect contempt against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank
is punishable by a fine not exceeding P30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six
months or both.[30] Atty. Quinsayas acted wrongly in setting aside the confidentiality
rule which every lawyer and member of the legal profession should know. Hence, we
deem it proper to impose on her a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect

contempt for distributing copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we order her to pay a FINE of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000).

SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7725           January 17, 1913

In the matter of the suspension of L. PORTER HAMILTON from the

practice of law.

L. Porter Hamilton, in his own behalf. 

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for the Government.

PER CURIAM : chanrobles virtual law library

These are disbarment proceedings, instituted against L. Porter Hamilton, an

attorney at law, who was practicing his profession in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu and in other courts of these Islands, at the time the charges
herein set forth were formulated.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The charges were filed by the fiscal upon the order of the Honorable Adolph
Wislizenus, judge of the Eleventh Judicial District, and the formal accusation
sets out four separate counts of professional misconduct, as follows:

1. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, being such for the plaintiff Luciano
Andrada, in civil cause No. 1344, defended and counseled, without the latter's
consent, the defendant Isabelo Alburo in the same manner or business.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, having received from the plaintiff Luciano
Andrada, in the above-cited case, various documents among which were
vouchers or notes signed by some municipal policemen of Cebu and counter-
signed by the defendant Isabelo Alburo, did maliciously and willfully keep and
deny that he had received said documents, for the purpose of thwarting the
complaint of Luciano Andrada prepared by himself on said instruments, as he
had undertaken the defense of the defendant Isabelo Alburo.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, being such in various affairs of Isabelo

Alburo, betrayed his client by instigating complaints against the latter, solely
in order that his client should entrust him with the defense of said complaints
instigated by him.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. The attorney L. Porter Hamilton, under date of April 8, 1911, proposed to S.

L. Joseph of Cebu that he be employed as attorney for the concern known as
the S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard, with a salary of P1,200 a year, under a threat to
compel the said Joseph to accept his proposition.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Therefore, the fiscal respectfully begs the court to proceed in legal manner to
suspend the attorney L. Porter Hamilton from the practice of his profession
and to recommend to the Honorable Supreme Court his exclusion from the list
of those admitted to practice law in the courts of the Islands.
The defendant answered formally denying the charges, and the cause came on
for final hearing before Honorable Jose C. Abreu, acting as a special judge for
the trial of this case, on January 22, 1912, and upon the proofs adduced, an
order or suspension from the practice of law was entered against the
defendant, and the case is now before this court for review.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

By agreement of counsel the case was submitted on briefs, and on the record
of the proceedings had in the court below. The only matters which need to be
inquired into at this time relate to the conduct of the defendant in civil cause
No. 1344 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled Luciano
Andrada vs. Isabelo Alburo, and his conduct in addressing to S.L. Joseph the
letter referred to under the fourth count of the accusation and filed as Exhibit
B for the prosecution, as to both of which matters the court below found the
respondent guilty of unprofessional conduct of so grave a character as to
justify and require his suspension.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appears from the record that the defendant advised and counseled with one
Luciano Andrada in regard to a claim which the latter had against Isabelo
Alburo, and that he prepared for Andrada a formal petition which was filed in
the office of the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Cebu under the
caption "Luciano Andrada vs. Isabelo Alburo, civil case No. 1344;" and that he
also prepared for the plaintiff Andrada in that cause papers relating to
attachment proceedings against the property of the defendant, Alburo. The
petition as well as the other papers filed with the clerk in this case were signed
by the plaintiff, Andrada, who himself delivered them to the clerk. Mr.
Hamilton's name was not noted as attorney of record for Andrada. It appears
that there was some formal defect in the papers relating to the attachment
proceedings, and on September 16, 1911, the defendant Hamilton addressed
the following communication to the clerk of court:  chanrobles virtual law library

[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]

CEBU, CEBU, P.I., September 16, 1911.

CLERK OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 

Cebu, Cebu, P.I.  chanrobles virtual law library

SIR: I beg that you permit Mr. Luciano Andrada to get the sworn statement in
civil cause No. 1344, to be exchanged for another true and correct sworn
statement; and further I desire to invite your attention to the rights this
gentleman has under section 34 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respectfully,  chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.

On October 2 following, the defendant entered his appearance as attorney of

record for the defendant, Alburo, in civil case No. 1344 as shown by the
following, which forms a part of the record in that case:

[United States of America, Philippine Islands. Court of First Instance of the

Province of Cebu. Luciano Andrada, plaintiff, vs. Isabelo Alburo, defendant.
Civil cause No. 1344.]
To the clerk:  chanrobles virtual law library

The clerk will please record my appearance for the defendant above-named,
Mr. Isabelo Alburo.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Cebu, Cebu, P.I., October 2, 1911.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON, 

Attorney for the defendant.

On the 12th of October, defendant as attorney for Alburo entered the following
demurrer to the petition which had been prepared by him for Andrada:

[United States of America, Philippine Islands. Court of First Instance of the

Province of Cebu. Luciano Andrada, plaintiff, vs. Isabelo Alburo, defendant.
Civil cause No. 1344.]

DEMURRER.

The defendant in this cause through the undersigned attorney demurs to the
complaint in this case on the following grounds:  chanrobles virtual law library

1. That the facts alleged do not constitute sufficient cause for action. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary  
chanrobles virtual law library

2. That the complaint is vague and ambiguous. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary   chanrobles virtual law library

Cebu, Cebu, P.I., October 12, 1911.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON, 

Attorney for the defendant.

Received today, October 12, 1911. 

(Sgd.) L. ANDRADA.

On the 13th of October an order was entered by the Court citing the defendant
to appear before the court on the following day, and explain his action in
appearing as the attorney for defendant in case No. 1344. As a result of the
investigation made by the court at that time, the fiscal was instructed to file
the formal accusation which forms the basis of the present proceedings.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the 14th of October the court made this additional order in the case:

The court provisionally directs that Mr. Porter Hamilton cease to act as
attorney for the defendant in this cause and the clerk of this court is prohibited
from receiving any document or paper presented in such character by Mr.
Porter Hamilton; and the court further directs that immediately and without
delay Mr. Hamilton deposit with the clerk of this court all the documents and
papers of any nature which he has at any time received from Mr. Luciano
Andrada, plaintiff in this case.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Cebu, Cebu, October 14, 1911.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, 

Judge of the Eleventh Judicial District.
In compliance with the foregoing order the defendant remitted to the court all
the papers and documents in his possession relating to case No. 1344, as
evidenced by the following communication, which forms a part of this record: 
virtual law library
chanrobles

[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]

CEBU, CEBU, P.I., October 14, 1911.  chanrobles virtual law library

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE FOR THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, P.I. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary   chanrobles virtual law library

SIR: In compliance with the order of this court of this date I have the honor to
transmit to your possession all the papers, documents, etc., belonging to Sr.
Luciano Andrada in the case of Luciano Andrada, plaintiff, vs. Isabelo
Alburo,  defendant, civil cause, No. 1344, and also of the other papers of Sr.
Andrada on all other matters which I have found in my office.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Respectfully,  chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.

Upon the hearing of the disbarment proceedings in the lower court Luciano
Andrada testified that the defendant had advised and counseled with him in
regard to his claim against Isabelo Alburo, and that an understanding had
been entered into touching the fees to be charged for his services; that the
latter was his attorney with respect to this claim, and that as such he delivered
to him certain vales and papers relating to the claim, and that he was
surprised when defendant appeared as attorney for Alburo.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defendant does not offer any satisfactory explanation of his conduct in this
matter. He admits that Andrada came to his office and consulted with him
regarding this claim against Alburo, and that he prepared the petition and
other papers in the case. He insists, however, that he did this solely as a favor
to Andrada and that he told Andrada at the time that he could not act as his
attorney in the matter. In his brief the defendant states that he refused to
appear as the attorney of record for Andrada for two reasons: First, because
he failed to secure him his fee, and second, because Señores Martinez and
Vamenta were Andrada's regular attorney at that time. The record clearly
establishes, however, that Andrada had no attorney of record in this matter. It
is possible that he had consulted other attorneys with reference to his claim
against Alburo, but so far as the record shows the defendant is the only person
who assumed the relationship of attorney to Andrada. He accepted from him
the papers relating to his claim, and to all intents and purposes he was his
attorney so far as such relationship could be established by overt acts. He did
all that was necessary to establish between himself and Andrada the
confidential relationship of attorney and client. He accepted from Andrada such
papers as he had relating to the claim against Alburo, papers which, as
Andrada testified, disclosed both the strength and the weakness of his claim.
He counseled with him regarding the subject matter of the suit and prepared
all of the necessary papers for the institution of the litigation, and in fact he
rendered all the necessary services of an attorney with reference to the whole
matter up to the time of his appearance as he had not done was to allow his
name to be affixed to the papers filed in the office of the clerk, and this act,
far from being to his credit, can only serve as cumulative evidence of the fact
that he was not acting in good faith with the man to whom he was rendering
professional services. Andrada claims that he was working for a stipulated fee,
but it is not necessary to determine here whether or not he had been secured
with his fee, or whether he was acting as he claims as a matter of favor to
Andrada. He voluntarily assumed the relationship of attorney to Andrada and
he received from the latter every confidence that such a relation implies; he
assumed the obligation of preparing the petition and other papers in the case
and of expediting the same to the point where an answer was forthcoming
from the defendant to the suit; and then without warning to Andrada he
entered his appearance as attorney for the defendant and filed a demurrer to
the very petition which he had prepared for the plaintiff. At the very time that
he appeared for the defendant he had in his possession papers belonging to
Andrada which pertained to the litigation and which had been delivered to him
as the attorney for the plaintiff, and these were only delivered up at the order
of the court.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

What may have been his motive in this matter we are only left to conjecture,
but from every standpoint his conduct was reprehensible in the highest
degree. The record clearly establishes the relationship of attorney and client
between the defendant and Andrada, and the conduct of defendant was a
violation of the confidence which naturally resulted from this relationship. It
was a violation of his oath as an attorney and officer of this court, in that he
did not offer his services in good faith to his client and failed to served his
client's interest as it was his sworn duty to do. If in serving Andrada in the
capacity that he did, he was acting in good faith, and if there had been any
reasonable grounds on which he could have justified his transferring his
services to the opposing litigant, he should have, and, we take it, he would
have, informed Andrada of his intentions and delivered up to him such papers
as he had relating to his claim. But without seeking permission from Andrada
or the court, and without disclosing his intentions in the matter, he suddenly
and unexpectedly, to the surprise of his former client, appeared in opposition
to the very suit he had instituted. His whole action in the premises reveals a
distorted conception of the ethics of his profession and an utter disregard for
his duty and his obligations to both his client and the court.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The second charge of professional misconduct against the defendant relates to

the following letter addressed by the defendant to Mr. S.L. Joseph, viz:  chanrobles virtual law library

[L. Porter Hamilton, lawyer, Cebu, Cagayan, and Surigao, P.I.]

CEBU, CEBU, P.I., April 8, 1911.  chanrobles virtual law library

Mr. S.L. JOSEPH, Cebu, Cebu, P.I.  chanrobles virtual law library

DEAR SIR: It has been some time since we have had anything to say relative
to the proposition of keeping up your collections and looking after your
delinquent contract men during your absence in the U.S. What is your opinion
relative to the proposition of P1,200 per year, or have you dropped your
original idea?  chanrobles virtual law library

By the way, I have an offer of P500 to make a thorough investigation into the
reason why the Mpl., Prov., and Ins. Govmts. buy so much lumber and so
exclusively from the S.L. Joseph Lumber Yard, and P500 more if the
investigation brings satisfactory results.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

What do you know about that and what do you think of the proposition?  chanrobles virtual law library

Very respectfully,  chanrobles virtual law library

(Sgd.) L. PORTER HAMILTON.

The lower court in passing upon this letter held that the second paragraph was
in the nature of a threat inserted in this letter solely to influence Mr. Joseph in
the employment of the defendant in the matter referred to in the first
paragraph, and that the defendant in writing such a letter was guilty of such
gross professional misconduct as showed him to be unworthy of that esteem
and confidence which is necessary in one who aspires to discharge the
important functions of an attorney.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense interposed by the defendant to the charge of professional

misconduct relating to this letter was that he did not use the language referred
to as a threat in any sense, and that it was never so understood by Mr.
Joseph; that he had been Mr. Joseph's attorney with reference to other
matters and had advised him with reference to the best interests of his
business, and that the information imparted in the second paragraph of the
letter was simply referred to in an incidental way. It is further contended that
the letter in question should have been considered as a privileged
communication, it having been addressed by him as attorney to his client.
Respondent claims that for that reason it is not proper to consider it as
evidence in a proceeding of this nature.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The letter is self-explanatory and needs but little comment from the court. A
careful examination of the language used by the defendant in the second
paragraph of this letter discloses that the defendant does not say that he will
not accept such employment, or that he refused to accept such employment.
The only reasonable interpretation that the language conveys is that he has
the matter under advisement and that he is holding his final decision in
abeyance. It is further quite evident from the context of the first paragraph of
the letter that Mr. Joseph had apparently dropped the question of employing
defendant with reference to the matter proposed, and that defendant was
anxious that he take the matter up for further consideration. No reasonable
explanation was given for the incorporation of the second paragraph in this
particular letter, nor does any reason suggest itself, unless it be that it was
inserted there as a threat. Following as it does immediately upon the
solicitation for employment, the reasonable and logical interpretation which it
bears is that it was used as a threat to induce Mr. Joseph to give favorable
consideration to the proposition advanced in the first paragraph of the letter.
This was the conclusion of the trial court and it is also our conclusion.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The contention that this letter is a privileged communication is not tenable.

The general rule is well recognized that professional communications are
privileged, but that statements made by a client to his attorney, or the
statements of an attorney to his client fall within this rule only when it is
shown that the relation of attorney and client existed with reference to the
matter to which the communication relates. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 58.)
Furthermore, in a proceeding of this nature, where the alleged client himself is
not insisting on the privilege, counsel can not be permitted to shield himself
behind the privilege.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The context of the whole letter in the present case shows conclusively that no
such relation existed with reference to the subject matter of the letter. The
defendant was soliciting employment, and this very fact is evidence that the
relation of attorney and client did not exist. As to the second paragraph of the
letter we can not accept the contention that this information was imparted as
professional advice.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a very careful examination of the whole record we have regretfully

reached the conclusion that the facts before us show a flagrant and willful
violation of the part of defendant of his professional obligations, and a reckless
disregard of the fundamental ethics of his profession.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We have encountered some difficulty in determining whether the name of the

defendant in these proceedings should be permanently stricken from the roll,
or whether, under all the circumstances, an order suspending him for a
substantial period would sufficiently subserve the interests of justice, and of
the administration of justice in these Islands.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code (art. 357) an attorney found
guilty of the unprofessional conduct of which, as appears from the record in
these proceedings, this defendant was guilty is liable to suffer the penalty of
temporary special disqualification, that is to say, disqualification for a period of
from six years and one day to twelve years; and after some hesitation we
have concluded that the suspension of the defendant for a period of six years
will secure the ends for which these proceedings were instituted. It is true, of
course, that, as was said by Mr. Justice Hooker, In re Shepard (109 Mich.
631).

This is not a proceeding by way of punishment, though the deprivation of the

privileges of an attorney may be a matter of serious importance to a
practitioner. It is a measure necessary to the protection of the public, who
have a right to expect that courts will be vigilant in withholding, and, if already
given, withdrawing, their certificates of qualification and character, upon which
the public rely.

But in determining the question whether the defendant should be suspended

or permanently disbarred, it would seem proper to have in mind the provisions
of the statute fixing the penalty to be imposed in the event that a criminal
action had been instituted against the defendant.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Let the proper orders be entered suspending the defendant in these

proceedings from the practice of law for a period of six years from the date of
his original suspension in the court below, with the costs of these proceedings
against him.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Arellano,  C.J., Johnson, Carson, and Trent,  JJ.,  concur.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO., INC.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Facts: 

Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of
Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union.
But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and
freedom for petition for redress of grievances. 

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business
which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers
would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. 

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed
to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO
were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement. 

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining
in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for
being filed two days late. 

Issue:

Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?

Held: 

No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position
as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

 Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

 Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995,
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April
1996.

Issue:

whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor 

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling: 

 1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.
Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713
(“RA 6713”).

 Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to]
represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no
true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

 Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x
conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.”

 2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

 Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers
with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of
law.”