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    17 - FILAMER Christian Institute v. IAC G.R No. 75112

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    November Lily Opleda
    This case involves a vehicular accident where Funtecha, a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute, was driving the school vehicle and hit a pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan. The heirs of Kapunan filed a case against both Funtecha and Filamer. Filamer argued it was not liable since Funtecha acted outside the scope of his duties. However, the Court ruled that Filamer was also liable because Funtecha was an employee of the school and was driving the vehicle in furtherance of the school's interests by taking it home, as was routinely done. Thus, even if Funtecha's specific job was not driving, his act

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    17 - FILAMER Christian Institute v. IAC G.R No. 75112

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    November Lily Opleda
    914 views3 pages
    This case involves a vehicular accident where Funtecha, a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute, was driving the school vehicle and hit a pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan. The heirs of Kapunan filed a case against both Funtecha and Filamer. Filamer argued it was not liable since Funtecha acted outside the scope of his duties. However, the Court ruled that Filamer was also liable because Funtecha was an employee of the school and was driving the vehicle in furtherance of the school's interests by taking it home, as was routinely done. Thus, even if Funtecha's specific job was not driving, his act

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    17- FILAMER Christian Institute v. IAC G.R No. 75112

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    This case involves a vehicular accident where Funtecha, a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute, was driving the school vehicle and hit a pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan. The heirs of Kapunan filed a case against both Funtecha and Filamer. Filamer argued it was not liable since Funtecha acted outside the scope of his duties. However, the Court ruled that Filamer was also liable because Funtecha was an employee of the school and was driving the vehicle in furtherance of the school's interests by taking it home, as was routinely done. Thus, even if Funtecha's specific job was not driving, his act

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    914 views3 pages

    17 - FILAMER Christian Institute v. IAC G.R No. 75112

    Uploaded by

    November Lily Opleda
    This case involves a vehicular accident where Funtecha, a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute, was driving the school vehicle and hit a pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan. The heirs of Kapunan filed a case against both Funtecha and Filamer. Filamer argued it was not liable since Funtecha acted outside the scope of his duties. However, the Court ruled that Filamer was also liable because Funtecha was an employee of the school and was driving the vehicle in furtherance of the school's interests by taking it home, as was routinely done. Thus, even if Funtecha's specific job was not driving, his act

    Copyright:

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    of 3

    Republic of the Philippines

    SUPREME COURT
    Manila

    THIRD DIVISION

    G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992

    FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,


    vs.
    HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as
    Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO KAPUNAN,
    SR., respondents.

    PARTIES:

    Funtecha- Part-time Janitor who drove the car


    Allan Masa- Official Driver
    Filamer Christian Institute- Employer
    Potenciano Kapunan- Pedestrian/Deceased

    FACTS:

    Funtecha was a working student of Filamer Christian Institute. Being a part-time janitor and a scholar
    of petitioner Filamer, he was considered an employee even if he was assigned to clean the premises
    for just 2 hours every day.

    Allan Masa, the son of Filamer’s president, was the official driver of the school’s vehicle. Funtecha and
    Allan lived in the same house. Funtecha, being a holder of a student’s driver’s license, requested Allan
    to take over the vechile and drive it home. Allan Masa truned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after
    driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A fast
    moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so they swerved right to avoid collision. Upon swerving,
    they hear a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but did not stop to check.
    Unfortunately, their jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in
    his lane.

    PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:

    The heirs of Kapunan filed an action against Filamer for damages. They assert that under Article 2180
    of the Civil Code an injured party has recourse against the servant as well as the master (petitioner)
    because at the time of the incident Funtecha was an employee of the petitioner and was performing
    an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner.

    DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION:

    In its defense, Filamer alleged that Funtecha acted outside of his scope of authority. Therefore, it was
    only Funtecha who was liable and not Filamer.
    THE IAC ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that
    the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily
    answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of
    the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

    ISSUE:

    WON Filamer Christian Institute is liable for the acts of Funtecha? (YES)

    RULING:

    YES, Filamer is also liable for the acts of Funtecha.

    For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff
    and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship
    between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an
    independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer.

    Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside
    is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home
    the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. It is indubitable
    under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven
    home for the said purpose.

    In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely
    was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his
    own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school.

    Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
    was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
    responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the
    scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes
    any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
    employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.

    WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED.
    The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED. SO
    ORDERED.

    ADDITIONAL INFO:

    1. Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors
    its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
    administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. It is merely a
    guide to the enforcement of substantive law on labor. It is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages
    instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and
    against the school itself.

    The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged
    employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
    the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance
    on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of
    the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
    avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

    2. Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's
    position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
    that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that
    Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not
    relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence
    on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner
    has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
    employees Funtecha and Allan.

    3. The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for
    damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff
    Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and
    presumably was one authorized by the school to drive.

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