Government of The Philippine Islands V Martinez

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THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 

applicant-appellee,
vs.
CARMEN MARTINEZ and DOLORES MARTINEZ, claimants-appellants. JULIO
SALVADOR, claimant-appellee, G.R. No. L-11889            January 10, 1918

Thesis:

On May 11, 1914, the Martinez sisters instituted a cadastral proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration to settle the titles of the lots Nos. 873 and 450 situated Iloilo City.

Facts:

The Martinez sisters claimed that they have acquired the subject land through donation inter
vivos from Maria Sarlabus. And that they have been in possession of the land for about 25 years.
During the trial Julio Salvador, through his attorney, opposed the said ownership of the sisters
claiming that he was the in actual possession of the subject land. He claimed that his predecessor
in interest had in possession before him for at least 14 years.

Claimant-appellee, Julio Salvador presented a document of sale of said lots executed by Antonio
Domenech in favor of Julio Salvador on March 14, 1912 (Exhibit 1), and a certified copy issued
by the acting registrar of deeds of Iloilo and dated May 13, 1914 (Exhibit 2): acting registrar,
Roman Lacson, having appeared at the trial, indicated said registration in the book mentioned in
said certificate, and also stated that Exhibit 2 was a true and exact copy thereof. The sisters
presented the as proof of their claim Exhibits A and B for the purpose of proving their title to
said lots donation inter vivos.

The CFI of Iloilo denied the claim of the Martinez and adjudicated the lots in favor of Salvador.

Issue:

Whether the CFI erred adjudicating the lots in question in favor of Salvador which was based
only on a secondary evidence?

Ruling:

Yes.

The Court through J. Araullo ruled that whether said entry in the registry be considered as a
recital of said document in an authentic writing, or whether it be held that some witness had
some recollection of said document, this secondary evidence of said document should not have
been admitted by the court for the reason that the oppositor, Julio Salvador, had not first
complied with the provisions of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The best obtainable evidence should be adduced to prove every disputed fact, and a
failure to produce it, but an attempt instead to sustain the issue by inferior evidence, will
authorize the inference that the party does not furnish the best evidence because it would
tend to defeat, instead of sustaining, the issue of his part. In requiring the production of
the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence shall be
received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can
be had. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 903, par. 54, and cases therein cited.)

Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in the
actual production of the instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary evidence
of its contents cannot be admitted until the nonproduction of the original has been
satisfactory accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 903, par. 55, and cases therein
cited.)

Secondary evidence of the contents of writings if admitted on the theory that the original
cannot be produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered, within a reasonable
time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. And ordinarily secondary evidence is not
admissible until the nonproduction of the primary evidence has been sufficiently
accounted for. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 911, par. 66, and cases therein cited.)

Under the earlier English decisions no degrees of secondary evidence are recognized. The
American courts, however, have asserted that secondary evidence, to be admissible, must
be the best evidence obtainable under the circumstances. . . . It is a rule of evidence, too
ancient and too well understood to require proof of its existence, that the original
instrument is better evidence than a copy. Again, whenever a copy of a record or
document is itself made original or primary evidence, the rule is clear and well settled
that it must be a copy made directly from or compared with the original. If the first copy
be lost, or in the hands of the opposite party, so long as another may be obtained from the
same source, no ground can be laid for resorting to evidence of an inferior or secondary
character. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 912, par. 68, and cases therein cited.)

Preliminary to the introduction of secondary evidence under the principle herein referred
to, the proponent must establish the former existence of the primary evidence, and its loss
or destruction as the case may be. . . . It has been held that the existence of a deed is
sufficiently proved where there is a preponderance of proof in its favor. (Ruling Case
Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 75, and cases therein cited.)

The contents of a lost instrument cannot be proved unless it appears that reasonable
search has been made in the place where the paper was last know to have been, and if not
found there, that inquiry has been made of the person last known to have had its custody.
(Ruling Case Law, vol, 10, p. 917, par. 76, and cases therein cited.)

As the failure of the oppositor to present the original document in question was not accounted
for; as it is not proper to suppose that the original could not have been presented within a
reasonable time if he had exercised due diligence for he or his counsel had the means,
opportunity and time to find the original if it really existed; as no proof was adduced that said
document had been lost, or destroyed, or that proper search therefor was made in the general files
of notarial documents in the City of Manila, or that an attempt was made to secure a copy thereof
if it existed in said files; as the notary, Gregorio Yulo, a person well known in Iloilo, was not
asked directly and clearly as to the whereabouts of said document or some particular or data it in
order to obtain from him some conclusive and categorical answer; as said notary has not been
presented at the trial to be examined on these points; and, lastly, as it was not shown that the
party interested in the presentation of said document who is Julio Salvador, had made a diligent
and proper, but fruitless, search for said document in any place where it could probably be found
— therefore the secondary evidence presented by the oppositor, consisting of the testimony of
the witnesses, Saez and Madrenas, and the certified copy issued by the registrar of deeds of
Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is of no value for the purpose intended and such evidence was improperly
considered by the court in reaching the conclusion that said Julio Salvador was the owner of the
lots in question.

The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the claims of Julio Salvador is denied.

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