Jcs 1986spring Macdonald
Jcs 1986spring Macdonald
Jcs 1986spring Macdonald
FOREWORD
I would like to address two general questions Question one is, :What
are the fundamental concepts that must be clarified and defined before dia-
logue about curriculum can take place?" Question two is, '"What do I see as
the Domain of Curriculum?"
Answering question one is a prior requirement to coping with question
two, and I would first like to share my thoughts about fundamental concepts
Most curriculum thinkers and developers operate from one of three
major philosophical orientations. I am not now speaking of their specific value
patterns, but of their beginning point for conceptualizing their tasks. These
three orientations are the primary groups of concerns that philosophers also
have. Thus, I feel that curriculum thinkers (or at least a given statement of
theorists) tend to fall into categories of ontologically oriented statements,
epistemologically oriented statements, or axiologically oriented statements.
What this means to me is that curriculum thinkers tend to originate their
concerns from (1) what they consider to be the fundamental reality of curric-
ulum as a part of the educational process, (2) what they feel is the fundamental
nature of knowledge, or (3) what they feel are the fundamental value pre-
scriptions necessary for curriculum.
Sooner or later everyone touches base in some manner with all three
kinds of concerns, but the beginning point is of considerable importance in
the conceptual schemata that occur.
Thus, if one takes an epistemological orientation, one's primary concerns
are questions such as: "What knowledge is of most worth?" 'What is the
structure of knowledge?" "What are the logical scope and sequence patterns
for acquiring this knowledge?"
If, on the other hand, one begins with an axiological orientation, one is
primarily concerned with a prescriptive curriculum design and is prone to
raise questions about the goals of education, the philosophy of the program,
the commitments to students, and so on, as beginning points.
An ontological orientation is grounded in concern for the nature of reality
that shapes curriculum-not only a social reality that the school reflects, but
an underlying reality that reflects a concern for the nature of being and
relating-in-the-world.
The orientation of my statement is from this third source-the ontolog-
ical. However, the questions I raise are not on a fundamental philosophical
level but rather a middle range, perhaps metatheoretical, level. From this
point of view the fundamental questions to' ask are: What can be learned?
What is learned? Why is it learned or not learned?
James B Macdonald 207
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
This form of thinking leads me to project four fundamental concepts that
need definition and clarification before much can be said about the domain
of curriculum These are (1) What are the boundaries of curriculum (e.g., the
set of relevant variables)? (2) What is the fundamental conceptual unit for
curriculums (3) What are the relationships and principles (if any)? and (4)
What are the ethical and/or moral dimensions in curriculum? When these
questions are engaged, I can begin to see an outline for the domain of
curriculum.
Boundaries One may hold that everything in time and space is related
to everything else and that to explain anything one must explain everything.
I suppose that this is at least a tenable philosophical position. However, I wish
to suggest that some things are more important than others in their influence
upon the curriculum, and that conceptual clarity necessitates the identification
of boundaries if for no other reason than the problem of communication
among interested parties.
There are a few curriculum thinkers who take a creative and/or highly
imaginative approach to curriculum. They believe that the identification of
boundaries at this time is a form of premature closure. Again, I am somewhat
sympathetic to this position, but for the sake of discourse about a "domain" I
shall project my own boundaries.
My thinking about boundaries begins with an assertion that the only data
that are significant in curriculum are those data that may be observed or
208 7he Domain ofCurriculum
'Editors' Note For a more detailed presentation of Macdonald's sub-system variables, see
his "An Example of Disciplned Curculum Thinking," Theory Into Practice 6 (October 196')
166- 1l,and his "Curriculum Theory Problems and a Prospectus," unpublished paper presented
at a meeting of Professors of Curriculum, Miami Beach, April 3, 1964
210 The Domain of Cumrculum
of a staff planning behavioral objectives for use in school is an event and not
an objective, and the final outcome of the specific plan cannot be explained
solely by the objectives. There is, in other words, no fundamental reality
divorced from the event and action structure of reality.
Rational decisions, per se, are also excluded as fundamental units of
curriculum discourse. Rational decisions emerge from situations, events, and
actions of persons. They are influenced by the character and quality (whether
political, anti-intellectual, or what have you) of the events. Thus, to expect to
explain what really happens in schooling by a linear chain of rational decisions
abstracted from their event structure makes no more sense than attempting
to explain what is actually learned in terms of a set of objectives.
The relationshipsof variables Events and actions are, however, related
to each other. That is, events that take place in the domain of curriculum are
influenced by events from all three social sub-systems. Thus, administrative
events interact with curriculum planning events, and instructional events
interact with administrative events, and so on. And, of course, in each of these
event structures, personal actions (staff and/or students) have transactional
relationships within the events.
The relationships of variables may be talked about in many ways. Thus
(after Huebner)2 we may talk in technical terms-that is, how one event
relates to another in terms of getting some job done. We may talk in scientific
terms-that is, what cause-effect relationships or principles there may be. We
may talk in political terms-that is, what implications events have for the
maintenance of the system and the alignment and. access of persons to power,
status, and role. We may also talk in aesthetic and ethical terms about the
relationships of variables. For example, we may ask whether the flow and
form of the interactions of events are pleasing and whether event relationships
reflect our values and especially our concerns about how we wish to be
treated as human beings.
There is, I would say, enough scientific and experiential data to validate
the connections between at least some aspects of the variables in all areas of
the curriculum domain with what is actually learned. Thus, for example,
administrative events that lead to the reorganization of instructional events
do influence what is learned as do curriculum planning events; and the
characteristics of persons influence the quality of events and the eventual
relationships of events to each other. It should be recognized, however, that
there is also a great deal we do not know about the relationships of events to
each other. One would hope that research efforts in curriculum would focus
upon these relationships rather than be aimed primarily at technical problems
as they presently seem to be.
'Editors' Note: Macdonald is referring here to various forms and uses of language cited by
Dwayne Huebner in his "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," in Language and
Meaning, ed. James B Macdonald and Robert R Leeper (Washington, D C Association for
Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1966), pp 8-26
James B Macdonald 211
Piaget described in different words. Intelligence, for Piaget, is not the figurative
content of culture but the operations performed in relationships between
objects. Again, it is the concept of acting, action, or activity that is central.
This has led Piaget to be a strong exponent of what has variously been
called progressive, free, or open schooling with one major difference. What
Piaget adds to spontaneous activity is what to him is a clear notion of the
operations of intelligence in developmental terms.
In both cases, the epistemology is grounded in an ontological position.
Neither of these men begins with knowledge as a primary starting point, but
with "pure experiences" (James) or with developmentally monitored intel-
lectual operations (Piaget). In each case the conclusion is similar-that it is
in the doing that we find reality, knowledge, and intelligence.
Although perhaps neither of these men would accept a general theory of
action as a framework for conceptualizing action, I would suggest that it is a
useful metaphor for helping locate variables and their relationships without
violating the concept of activity in events as the central unit of the curriculum
domain.
Thus, it would appear to me that If we can entertain this concept of action
as the central unit in the curriculum domain, we must raise serious questions
about many of the current curriculum development projects 3
Edltoor' Note: At the time of his death James B Macdonald was working on a book that
elaborated upon this conception of the domain of curriculum and grounded it more fully in
philosophical and theological traditions, which he thought fundamental to sound education
Some of his former students and colleagues are now at work attempting to bring this book to
publication
Copyright © 1986 by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development. All rights reserved.