Issues in South Asia Author(s) : Anirudha Gupta Source: International Journal On World Peace, DECEMBER 1996, Vol. 13, No. 4 (DECEMBER 1996), Pp. 3-16 Published By: Paragon House

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Author(s): Anirudha Gupta


Source: International Journal on World Peace , DECEMBER 1996, Vol. 13, No. 4
(DECEMBER 1996), pp. 3-16
Published by: Paragon House

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752100

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA
Anirudha Gupta Professor of International Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi
India

Anirudha Gupta is Professor of International Studies at Jawaharal Nehru University, New


Delhi, India. He is an expert on African and South Asian Affairs. His publications include
Politics in Nepal (1964), Indians Abroad: Asia and Africa (1971), Government and Politics
in Africa (1975), Revolution by Ballot: India's 1977Election (1977), Politics in Africa (1988),
Minorities on India's West Coast (1993); and co-authored with Dennis Austin Lions and
Tigers: A Study of Tamil Sinhala Conflict (1988), and Politics of Violence in India and South
Asia: Is Democracy an Endangered Species! ( 1991).

The author argues that the


In more than one sense, South Asia, compris
traditional geopolitical and
ing seven independent states and accounting
military analysis of national
security neglects the most for about one-sixth of world population,
fundamental threat to peace presents a unique case to the study of geopoli
in South Asia?poverty. He tics. It is not, like other peninsulas, confined
covers both the problems of
to a single region or even a continent. Its
economic development and
northern ranges link it with the "heartlands55
geopolitical relations, both
within the region and with
of China and Central Asia, while its southern
major powers. peninsula touches the Indian Ocean and gives
Since the end of the
it a central position to oversee the sea-routes
Cold War, geopolitical and from Malacca Straits to South Atlantic via the
strategic analysis have con South African rim. This then invests a
tinued to emphasize con
tri-continental dimension to South Asia5s
flicts and crises. However,
analysis of international re geopolitical position.
lations in a peaceful world Within the subcontinent, India5s large
should also include possible landmass provides it strategic depth. All other
areas of cooperation.
countries, including the littoral states of the
Indian Ocean, are too small and weak to pose
a security threat to India.
The only exception is China; but the
Himalayas, separating the two countries,
preclude the possibilities of a decisive military

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

engagement between the two, barring perhaps a few minor border


skirmishes in selected areas. Happily, however, the Sino-Indian relations are
on an upturn and the two countries have agreed to settle their border
demarcation dispute peacefully (see Cheema, 1993).
Yet, the peace and security of South Asia are by no means wholly
assured. Instead, a continuous interplay of global and regional forces, along
_ with ever new domestic compulsions and
disturbances, keep the region in a state of
The traditional
perpetual tension. The traditional state of
geopolitical concept enmity between India and Pakistan some
of security such as time threatens to escalate over their rival
defense of a territory
claims on Kashmir and, at other times, by
and containing or
shifts in the position of external powers in
neutralizing external
threat to a nation's favor of or against the two protagonists.
Similarly, disputes over the borders, or
sovereignty has come
inflow of refugees and joint sharing of river
to be regarded as waters vitiate India's relations with the
narrow and even
smaller neighbors. Also, external factors
self-defeating.
Instead, there is an often impinge on regional stability. For
instance, an uninterrupted supply of oil
attempt now to from the Gulf is a matter of direct concern
expand the
for the South Asian states. Hence, a war
parameters of security such as between the US-led UN forces and
to include theories of
economic the Iraqi army or an intensification of
development, social Iran-US differences has destabilizing conse
reconstruction and quences for the entire region. So, also, any
empowerment of military build-up in the Indian Ocean as in
human rights. the days of the Cold War.
Moreover, in the phase of post-Cold
War, the very concept of security has come
under intensely critical scrutiny. The traditional geopolitical concept of
security such as defense of a territory and containing or neutralizing
external threat to a nation's sovereignty has come to be regarded as narrow
and even self-defeating. Instead, there is an attempt now to expand the
parameters of security to include theories of economic development, social

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

reconstruction and empowerment of human rights. The advance of


democracy in South Asia as elsewhere has encouraged trends toward
popular participation in the spares of both defense and development. In
other words, the two can no longer be separated. As UNDP's Human
Development Report 1993 puts it:

Greater people's participation is no longer a vague ideology based on the


wishful thinking of a few idealists. It has become an imperative?a
condition of survival (HDR 1993, p.99).

In the pages that follow, we make an attempt to integrate the newer


concepts of social empowerment and human development with the
expositions of geopolitical experts. By this we do not mean that such
expositions have become outdated, nor do we totally dismiss the contention
by Colin Gray that the military card "was as relevant to yesterday's
international order as it is to the coming age of cgeoeconomics"3 (Gray,
1992, p. 59). Instead of focusing opposition between the two, what we
intend to show is the area of complementarity between geopolitics and
geoeconomics. We begin first with a brief sketch of the state of human
development covering South Asia.

Human Needs and Resources


If we place the peninsula nations of Asia into two major clusters (East
Asia and West Asia) and compare their demographic profiles with South
Asia's certain immediate facts emerge (see Table 1). The size of population
in South Asia dwarfs into insignificance the total population of these two
major clusters; but its GDP falls far below the two. India's per capita GDP
comes to $1,072 as against South Korea's $6,733 or Malaysia's $6,140.
Only Myanmar with a per. capita GDP of $659 ranks below the Indian
index. But then, geographically and even politically until 1936, Myanmar
or Burma was treated as a contiguous part of South Asia.
Again, demographically South Asian societies remain highly stagnant
and rural. Around 75-80 percent of their population live in subsistence
agriculture and the extent of poverty among them is much larger than the

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Table 1
Three Peninsular Regions: Demographic Profiles
Country Population GDP Per Capita GNP Rural
(million) (Billion US$) US$ 1990 Population (%)
East Asia
Kampuchea 8.6 170 88
Korea 43.8 236.4 5450 28
Laos 4.3 0.9 200 81

Malaysia 18.4 42.4 2330 57


Myanmar 42.7 659 (in GDP) 75
Thailand 55.4 8.2 1420 77
Vietnam 68.1 78
West Asia
Bahrain 0.5 6830 17
Kuwait 2.1 15178 (in GDP) 4
Oman 1.6 7.7 5650 89
Qatar 0.4 15870 11
Saudi Arabia 15.4 80.9 7070 23
UAE 1.6 28.3 19870 22
Yemen 12.1 6.7 540 11
South Asia

Bangladesh 116.4 22.9 210 84


Bhutan 1.6 0.3 190 95
India 862.7 254.5 360 73
Maldives 0.2 450 70

Nepal 20.1 2.9 180 90


Pakistan 121.5 35. 5 400 68
Sri Lanka 17.4 7.3 470 79

Source: UNDP Human Development Report, 1993.

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

urbanized section. In Bangladesh, only 4 percent of the rural population


have access to sanitation facilities, compared with 40 percent of the urban
population. And in India, school attendance for children 5-14 is much
lower in rural areas (55 percent for boys and 35 percent for girls as
compared with 74 percent and 52 percent in urban areas).
Does the concentration of population in unproductive agriculture hold
back economic development? The question has come to be linked with the
current debate in South Asia about the course and prospect of market
reform and economic liberalization. The examples of the Republic of Korea
and Taiwan are cited where land reform increased employment and
enhanced income and purchasing power of the people. In addition, these
countries simultaneously invested in the health, education and skills of their
people?"so that the workforce was ready and able to take advantage of the
latest technologies and methods of production" (HDR 1993, pp. 37-38).
It has come now to be universally granted that any increase in the
productive capacity of poor and overpopulated countries depend on drastic
improvement of quality of their life, on the availability of skills and
infrastructure to produce trained manpower. In respect of all these, South
Asia lags far behind other regions. While life expectancy at birth has
increased from around 55 to 66 percent, infant mortality rate remains high,
and adult literacy rate still below 50 percent (see Table 2).

Table 2
Country Life expectancy access to safe wa adult literacy rate
per 1,000 (1990) ter (%) (1988-90) (%) (1990)
Maldives 62.5
Pakistan 57.7 50 35
India 59.1 75 48

Bangladesh 51.8 35

Nepal 52.2 37 26
Bhutan 48.9
Sri Lanka 70.9 60 88
Source: UN Statistical Yearbook 1995

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

The high rate of child mortality can be ascribed to lamentable lack of


health care, neglect of mothers' welfare and undernourishment of children.
Statistically, more children suffer from malnutrition in South Asia than in
tropical Africa?one of the world's most underdeveloped continents.
Experts are of the opinion that a child's malnutrition is not so much due to
food scarcity as due to the neglect of the mother's health and prevalence of
deep-rooted culture/tradition of downgrading women's position in the
household.
On the other hand, poverty has
gravest impact on children. In South
The problem of security Asia, some 200 million children have
and defense thus gets
their growth stunted because of under
compounded with the
nourishment and over 300 million, who
State's engagement
should be in primary and secondary
against internal
schools, are missing their education.
insurgencies such as in
Again, the lack of living space in urban
Kashmir, Sindh and Sri slums drive children to the streets for
Lanka's north. This
depletes national livelihood. India, according to HDR
resources which 1993, has the greatest number of street

in ordinary children: New Delhi, Bombay and


circumstances should Calcutta have around 100,000 street
have gone in larger children each, and Bangalore about
45,000. These children seek their liveli
measure to improve
health, education, hood by collecting rags, shining shoes,
sanitation and other scavenging rubbish dumps and so forth.
basic human resources. Many also take to petty crimes.
Obviously, there is a correlation
between social deprivation and rate of
economic growth. Rapid eradication of social iniquities is considered to be
the first step for overall human development of poorer nations. Hence, it
becomes important to examine what concrete steps the South Asian
governments have taken to mitigate the rate and extent of social depriva
tion. The record so far has been universally poor. It appears that of its $360
per capita GNP, India spends a total of $6.4 on health and education;
Pakistan $7.9 of its $400 per capita GNP; Bangladesh $3.1 of its $210, and

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Nepal around the same. At one time Sri Lanka spent over 30 percent of its
$500 per capita GNP on education and health, but the ethnic war launched
by Tamil militants (LTTE) has forced Colombo to hike its military
expenditure to nearly 40 percent of the national budget.
The problem of security and defense thus gets compounded with the
State's engagement against internal insurgencies such as in Kashmir, Sindh
and Sri Lanka's north. This depletes national resources which in ordinary
circumstances should have gone in larger measure to improve health,
education, sanitation and other basic human resources. In particular, the
rate of South Asia's economic growth has not reached as yet a level
comparable to those of the Gulf and East Asian countries. Neither has it the
prospects of raising surplus from trade and foreign direct investment. In
comparative terms, therefore, South Asia's military expenditure takes a
heavy toll on human resources such as not experienced by other peninsula
nations barring perhaps Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.

Table 3
Country Military expenditure Military expenditure Armed forces per
% of GDP 1960/90 as % of education & teacher/doctor
health

India 1.9/3.3 80 0.3/4


Pakistan 5.5/6.6 239 1.5/10

Bangladesh -/L6 57 0.3/6


Nepal 0.4/1.7 61 0.3/33

Taken by themselves, the above figures are not very alarming. Other
middle-income peninsula countries in Asia spend much more on the army:
Turkey, for instance, spends over 5 percent of its GDP on the military,
Oman 15.8 percent, and Saudi Arabia 17.7 percent. Even the lower-income
countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos spend a high percentage of
their budget on military items. But, when we consider the crying Basic
Human Needs of South Asia (BHN), we can easily perceive how the state's
primary emphasis on strengthening its armed forces twisted the develop
ment agenda in all primary sectors. Is it not a matter of grave concern that

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Nepal, a landlocked country with less than $200 per capita GNP, should
maintain 33 soldiers per doctor; Pakistan 10 and India 4? In South Asia,
rising security risks and internal disturbances overrule even modest plans
for poverty alleviation and economic development.

Regional Security
The roots of security problems in South Asia are thus indigenous, and
its threat perceptions are sufficiently diverse to preclude a common
approach for all. For India, the major sources of threat continue to be
Pakistan and China, despite the march of normalization processes and
formation of a regional organization
(SAARC). For Pakistan, and to a lesser
The major issue which
vitiates South Asia's extent, for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Nepal, the main threats emanate from
security climate is the
Indian policy pursuits. Undoubtably, India
state of permanent
is a dominant-power in the region and in
antagonism between
India and Pakistan. consequence its policies affect the security
The roots of this perception of its immediate neighbors.
However, Indian threat perception in
antagonism go back
to the 1947 Partition, cludes threats emanating not only from
which embittered developments within the region but also
relations of two from outside. It is precisely the interlock
independent states ing of regional and extra-regional factors
that has come in the way of normalization
right at their birth.
of Indo-Pakistan relations. At the same
time, the same factors have greatly compli
cated India's relations with the United States.
Undoubtably, the major issue which vitiates South Asia's security
climate is the state of permanent antagonism between India and Pakistan.
The roots of this antagonism go back to the 1947 Partition, which
embittered relations of two independent states right at their birth. The
Partition, according to a strong body of India's geopolitical experts,
weakened India's defenses across the north, up to the Khybar and Bolan
passes. This made India acutely conscious of its security needs vis-a-vis

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan, which in turn felt that India's game "was to cripple the newborn
State in her infancy55 (Arif, 1994, p. 161).
In spite of disputed origins, there was still the possibility that time
might heal past wounds and thus encourage development of a healthy
relationship between India and Pakistan. What unfortunately blocked the
process was their dispute over Kashmir, which propelled the two countries
on a path of confrontation. Kashmir provided the occasion for direct
military confrontation between the two, while on the other hand, to achieve
military parity, Pakistan leaned more and more on Western power
assistance. In time, Indo-Pakistan hostility came to be viewed through the
prism of the Cold War. As India moved towards the Soviet orbit with
invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, Pakistan came to be wholly integrated as
a "frontline state55 in the American strategy of combating the Soviet "evil
empire55 in Asia.
In pure military terms, the situation has not changed much even after
the passing of the Cold War. Though Indian military spending as a share
of its GNP is less than Pakistan's, it has maintained a 3:1 conventional arms
superiority over Pakistan. Over 90 percent of the Indian land forces are
deployed on the Pakistan border. In recent times, the American decision of
a military package to Pakistan, under the Brown amendment, has created
further apprehensions in New Delhi.
This is where we see how external factors have added "undesirable
complexities'5 to South Asia's security climate (Cheema, 1993, pp. 42-55).
Yet, at the end of the Cold War, the Indian policymakers took it for
granted that "being the natural political and economic center of South
Asia," India's security needs would receive favorable response from the
United States. In fact, India went out of its way to cultivate US goodwill
in order that it could take full advantage of the changed global situation.
Hence, it held joint naval exercises with US warships, provided refueling
facilities to American transport aircraft during the Gulf War, and held high
level talks with US military delegations. Also, with a view to opening its
economy, India gratefully accepted direct foreign investment from
American companies and also claimed that the USA had become its largest
trading partner. In turn, US private business houses welcomed India's

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

economic reforms and the General Electric Company announced a billion


dollars worth of business in India by the end of the decade.
This honeymoon, however, did not last long. America did not accept
India's plea that Pakistan be branded a "terrorist state," nor did it fully
endorse the view that India's trouble in Kashmir was entirely due to
Pakistan's military support to the insurgents in the state. Over and above,
the one-time exception to the Pressler Amendment to sell Pakistan
conventional arms came as a shock to most Indians.
In addition, certain general technical and military issues, such as
Indo-US differences over intellectual rights and India's attempt to secure
missile technology from the Russian Federation, forced the two countries
on a collision course. Referring to these developments, two geopolitical
experts commented: "The point of potential conflict between the United
States and India lies in the varying imperatives of their geopolitics. The
United States is a status quo power; India has sought to be an expanding
one" (Rikhye and Singh, 1994, p. 106).
This may be an extreme point of view. On many matters, including
nuclear non-proliferation, what we are witnessing is perhaps an attempt in
the post-Cold War phase. Even India's opposition to the Geneva draft of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) may be seen to be more an
attempt to clarify its own stand on the issue rather than a simple rejection
of it out-of-hand. What is unusually significant is that talks on CTBT have
started, for the first time, a vigorous debate in India on all aspects of its
nuclear policy. A team of eminent Indians consisting of diplomats, editors,
journalists, scholars and not to block or summarily reject a CTBT. The
statement emphatically noted

It would be tragic if India is seen to be negatively disposed towards a


treaty it had itself pioneered and as long canvassed for.... If the CTBT
talks fail, the post-Cold War momentum towards nuclear restraint would
be undermined, and even existing arms control agreements could unravel.
New Delhi must discharge the moral and political responsibility it proudly
assumed in 1954, by securing a good CTBT through a constructive,
consensual approach. {Mainstream, a New Delhi Weekly, July 20, 1996)

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

It is against this background that we must also try to review India's


current mpproachment with China. Many in India believe that by recogniz
ing Tibet as an integral part of China, India committed a "politico-strategic
mistake." They maintain that "recent Chinese policies, like the transfer of
nuclear weapon designs to Pakistan...equipping a naval base in Myanmar
to monitor Indian missile tests, are extremely troubling" (Karnad, 1994,
p.44). The general picture they draw about the future of Sino-Indian
relations is densely pessimistic. They think that in less than 20 years China
will have accumulated capital military stocks six times as large as India's and
its GDP and annual military spending will be respectively three and four
times as big. "They suggest therefore that a harder line towards China
would yield results just as New Delhi should capitalize on the kind of fear
and loathing for China that prevails in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and
the Philippines?the five major South East nations" {ibid, p. 41).
Not all, however, subscribe to such an alarmist picture of China's
power and intentions. Many China watchers point out that Beijing is
presently engaged in economic development and realizes the need to
maintain non-acrimonious relations with its neighbors. It has therefore
stepped up contacts with the SEAN countries, and with Japan and Russia,
China's desire to "buy" peace with India should be seen in this light.
There is another arena that has witnessed swift change in the geo
political situation. This is Central Asia: The rise of ex-Soviet independent
republics, which is seen by many strategists in India as the beginning of a
new axis involving Iran, Pakistan and China. Alternatively, they fear that
these new republics will be swept up by Islamic fundamentalism. Both
could be a particularly worrisome development for India. "The emerging
Muslim republics in Trans-Caucasia and Central Asia see themselves as
suppliers of Russian weapons and some technologies to Pakistan, Iran and
the Peoples' Republic of China, in return for hard currency and Chi
nese-enhanced weapons" (Rikhye and Sinah, p. 103).
But this again may not be the whole story. As in the case of other
developing countries, the new republics of Central Asia are equally eager
to improve their basic infrastructures, welcome foreign investment and seek
newer markets for their rich mineral products. This opens new possibilities
of trade and technology-transfer for India, which has the know-how as well

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

as the resources to assist these countries in joint ventures, provided it also


agrees to cooperate and not compete with Pakistan. For Pakistan's location
midway between Iran and the Central republics makes it absolutely essential
for the governments of these republics to seek its cooperation as much as
India's. It is here that one can visualize the possibilities of a new kind of
cooperative venture between India and Pakistan. (See Anirudha Gupta,
1996, p. 31.)

1 IB"B 1 " 1 1 Conclusion


The advent of the xhe trouble with geopolitical perspec
post-Cold War has tive is that it tends to view international
also pushed to the developments in terms of conflict rather
background purely than cooperation. As a realistic approach it
military calculations cannot perhaps be wholly dispensed with.
and brought to the But in the longer run, it also tends to view
fore new priorities for a nation's security in military terms, not
governments to accounting for basic human needs. Yet, how
rebuild societies on
much does security matter if a nation has
the basis of more soldiers to march around its borders
maximum good for than doctors to attend to the sick and dis
maximum number.
eased? How much must a nation spend on
Perhaps, this
its army so that its people starve and live
realization may shelterless? How far indeed can nations such
persuade national
as South Asia's progress if more than half of
governments to
their population remain in absolute poverty
emphasize the bonds
and around two-thirds stay illiterate?
that unite them rather
than the issues which These are no longer rhetorical issues.
The release of democratic forces in all coun
hold them apart. tries of South Asia has emboldened the
masses to weigh and question the doings of
their rulers. The poor and the helpless have now learned to ask "wha
blessing can democracy confer on them if they continue to crawl on thei
belly?"
The advent of the post-Cold War has also pushed to the background
purely military calculations and brought to the fore new priorities for

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

governments to rebuild societies on the basis of maximum good for


maximum number. Perhaps this realization may persuade national
governments to emphasize the bonds that unite them rather than the issues
which hold them apart. Such a realization is already at work as we see
popular pressures building up inside both India and Pakistan to seek
solutions to their bilateral problems, including rival claims on Kashmir.
Such a move, suggests General K. Sundarji, India's former chief of the
army staff, must "work towards a loose South Asian Federation based on
the South Asian Regional Cooperation by 2010. We must carry Pakistan
along as a major and honored partner in the enterprise. We must whole
heartedly support Pakistan's right to develop a minimum nuclear deterrent"
(Sundarji, 1994, pp.144-5).
And, almost matching these sentiments word by word, Pakistan's
former vice-chief of the army, General Arif comments: "To resort to war
is a poor option to establish peace or even hegemony. It is counter
productive to build up the security of one country on the insecurity of her
neighbors. To achieve peace in South Asia, efforts should be made to win
over hearts. And hearts cannot be won through conflict" (Arif, p. 173).
Are these aspirations unrealistic? Too idealistic? But then which way is
humankind moving despite failures and frustration, if not towards an
idealistic world order based on mutual trust and amity? And, no such order
can be stable if governments fail to raise the living standards of their
peoples; if half of them cannot receive minimum schooling, if their women
folk die during childbirth and more children take to the streets for survival.
Ultimately, it is not the geopolitical models of Mackinder and Spykman
that will govern the conduct of peoples and their governments. The
hard-hitting realistic school of geopolitics may no longer find any use in
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's thoughts. But the new post-Cold War order may
perhaps benefit from what Nehru wrote in 1946: "...self-interest itself
should drive every nation to wider cooperation in order to escape disaster
in the future and build its own free life on the basis of others' freedom."
Nehru pronounced that the international system had undergone a
sea-change; change propelled by the "feelings and urges of vast numbers of
people for freedom and peace" (Nehru, 1946, p. 539).

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ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA

Are the feelings and urges of people any less keen on "freedom and
peace53 now?

References_
1. UNDP, Human Development Report, 1993.
2. UN Statistical Yearbook 1995.
3. Bharat Karnad (ed.) Future Imperilled India's Security in the 1990s & Beyond
(Viking, 1994).
4. Ravi Rikhye & Pushpindar Singh "External Threats & India's Conventional
Capabilities: Perspectives Till 2010" in Karnad, n.3, pp. 85-115.
5. General Khalid Mahmud Arif, "The Roots of Conflict: A Pakistani Perspective,55
in Karnad, n.3, pp. 159-175.
6. General K. Sundarji, "Indian Military Compulsions,55 in Karnad, n.3, pp.132-45.
7. P. Iqbal Cheema, Security in South Asia "An Approach55 in S.U. Kodikara (ed.),
External Compulsions of South Asian Politics (Sage, 1993), pp. 42-55.
8. Anirudha Gupta, "Foreign Policy: A past yes, but a future too?55 IIC Quarterly
(New Delhi, Spring 1996), pp. 25-36.
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India (Signet, 1946).

16 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE


VOL. XIII NO. 4 DECEMBER 1996

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