Plus ça change…

A Historical Survey of Western Interference in Haiti

Major Christopher John Young, CD, MA

A Thesis
In the Department
Of
History

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (History) at
Concordia University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

July 2020
© Christopher John Young
 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY
School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the thesis prepared

By: Christopher John Young

Entitled: Plus ça change… A Historical Survey of Western Interference in Haiti

and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (History)

complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standard with respect to
originality and quality.

Signed by the final Examining Committee

_______________________________ Chair
Dr. A. Nash

_______________________________ External Examiner

Dr. P. Bellegarde-Smith

_______________________________ External to Program

Dr. J. Schofield

_______________________________ Examiner
Dr. E. Reiter

_______________________________ Thesis Co-Supervisor

Dr. F. Chalk

_______________________________ Thesis Co-Supervisor

Dr. C. Fick

Approved by ________________________________________________
Dr. A. Zilberstein, Graduate Program Director

December 13, 2019 _______________________________________

Dr. M. Penney, Dean of History
 ABSTRACT

Christopher Young
Concordia University, 2019

What historical lessons, positive or negative, can be gleaned from past Western
interventionist activities within Haiti that have application to the desired future goal of
rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status, to that of a fully functioning and
stable member state within the international community of nations?

This dissertation aims to determine what historical lessons, positive or negative, can be

gleaned from past Western interventionist activities in Haiti that are applicable to the desired

future goal of rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status to functioning and stable

state within the international community of nations. At the core of that problem is the need to

determine how to restrain the impulses of external nations who obstruct or divert Haiti’s chosen

path forward.

The findings show that the West has conducted a deliberate campaign against Haiti

composed of three destabilizing elements: criminalization of opposition to interventions;

economic warfare employing NGOs and SAP policies aimed at maintaining Haiti’s

attractiveness as a source of cheap, plentiful labour; and a deliberate failure to exploit

opportunities for fundamental, positive change in Haitian development. The analysis of Western

interference in Haiti has exposed a number of trends, including the use of force to coerce money

from the Haitian government; the deliberate undermining of Haitian sovereignty through

constant interference in Haitian elections, despite free and fair elections being considered the

bedrock of Western democracy; a preference for stability and the status quo in Haiti over social

revolutionary trends; and an historical, targeted funding of Haitian security forces, military and

police, despite both being the principal instruments of repression employed against Haitian

attempts at social revolutionary change.

iii
 As a metanarrative, the dissertation brings together various micro-narratives which

highlight Western impact on specific areas of Haitian culture, including colour and class,

militarism, land, and the predatory state. Set within a chronological framework, the dissertation

provides historical insight into practices which have had a significant influence on hindering

peacebuilding generally. Understanding those practices and identifying lessons from historical

analysis will prove useful in future peacebuilding work in Haiti and should help inform the

development of other fragile states.

iv
 DEDICATION
In memory of my brother,

Jeffrey Douglas,

who gifted me, so many years ago,

Wade Davis’ book The Serpent and The Rainbow
and got me started down this long road.

And, of course, to friends and family for their help and encouragement
on what has proven to be a long journey.

v
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my very great appreciation to Dr. Frank Chalk and Dr. Carolyn Fick, my
research supervisors, for their patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement, and extremely
useful critiques of my work.

I am also honoured that Professor Emeritus Patrick Bellegarde-Smith agreed to participate as

part of my doctoral thesis examination committee.

I am also indebted to Dr. Eric Reiter and Dr. Julian Schofield for working with me early on in
this lengthy process and providing me with the benefit of their invaluable expertise. And of
course, for sitting on my doctoral thesis examination committee.

I would also be remiss not to thank Ms. Donna Whittaker who has been on the other end of my
emails, patiently sorting out my emergencies when they occurred, which was usually overseas on
yet another deployment.

Finally, I need to acknowledge the three people who have been instrumental in getting me to the
finish line.

My mother-in-law, Jenifer: You took my ramblings at a key moment and applied your editing
expertise to show me that in fact there was some gold (or at least silver) hidden within.

My son, Andrew: You aided me more than you will know. Listening to the old man, reading my
scribblings, helping me sort out my muddled thinking …and, most of all, convincing me that this
was good enough.

Last but not least, SWMBO: Your nagging was probably the only reason I made it this far! That,
and that you kept following me around to talk about something else you had read on Haiti that
might be useful…and of course, always was!

vi
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………..............viii

Introduction…………..….………………………………………………………………………..1

Chapter One - Colour and Class in Haiti……….…………….………………………………….13

Chapter Two – Militarism and Haiti………………………………………….………………….34

Chapter Three – Haiti and Land……………………………….……………….………...............44

Chapter Four –Haiti: The State……………………………….………………………………….51

Chapter Five - Eighteen and Nineteenth Century Western Intervention in Haiti…….………….58

Chapter Six - The United States Marine Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934………106

Chapter Seven - Post-Occupation to the 1957 election of François Duvalier………………….160

Chapter Eight – The Duvalier Era……………………………………………………...............180

Chapter Nine – Haiti: Life after Duvalier……………………………………………................226

Chapter Ten –Understanding Foreign Dominance………………………………......................283

Chapter Eleven – Lessons from Interventions………………………………….........................327

Conclusion………….….…………………………………………………….…………............359

Afterword – A Brief Foray into the Field of Development Strategy…..………….…................366

Bibliography…….….……………………………………………………….…….…...……….394

vii
 LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Relationship between Themes, Time, and Lessons………………………………..…11

Figure 2: Rwandan Vision 2020 Development Strategy………………………………………381

viii
Introduction

Take a bow for the new revolution

Smile and grin at the change all around me…
Meet the new boss
Same as the old boss1
- The Who, “Won’t Get Fooled Again”
-
When you listen to the lyrics of The Who’s fabled song, “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” you

would not be faulted for thinking they had been writing about Haiti. That thinking might have

been shaken in December 1990, in what was a brief and shining moment in Haiti’s long and

troubled history, when successful democratic elections, judged by the United Nations

international observers to have been free and fair, appeared momentarily to signal the dawn of a

new era in Haiti.2 The election of Père Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Salesian priest, to Haiti’s

highest office was the result of a popular mass movement, Lavalas, which developed at the

grassroots level through local church and community groups, and proved capable of not only

pushing Jean-Claude Duvalier (otherwise known as Baby Doc) from power, but also ensured

Aristide’s election with over 67 percent of the national vote.3

Despite the initial optimism, that shining moment was regrettably extinguished eight

months later. Haiti’s military forced the nation’s first democratically elected president from

power and consigned him to exile. Aristide’s return to office would not occur until 1994, and

only then because the international community, led by the United States, turned away from a

long, erratic and ultimately failed diplomatic strategy, and instead finally embraced recognition

1
Lyrics from “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” The Who, 1971.
2
In response to a request from the then-interim government in Haiti, the United Nations created and deployed the
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) which, in conjunction with
Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observers and a number of other non-governmental agencies,
certified that the 1990 elections were “highly successful.” The material presented is drawn from the United Nations
backgrounders, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmihbackgr1.html.
3
The Lavalas movement was also largely responsible for the defeat of an attempted coup that took place only days
after the presidential election and before Aristide had even been sworn into office. See Peter Hallward, “An
Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” London Review of Books 29 no. 4 (February 2007): 9-13.

1
that the coup regime would only relinquish power and permit Aristide’s return to power when

threatened with force.4 Aristide’s confirmation as president brought an end to close to three years

of regime killings, economic pillaging and infrastructure destruction, all of which left Haiti in

what can only be described as a catastrophic condition.5

During his second term of office following his re-election in 2001, Aristide was again

confronted by violent rebellion. And again, Aristide was removed from power and forced into

exile. Unlike the first coup, however, evidence suggests the 2004 coup was orchestrated by a

Western coalition of nations that included Canada, France and the United States.6 All three

actively opposed the return of Aristide to power.7 The Jamaican Prime Minister and Chairman of

4
American involvement in the restoration of Aristide to power, and, for Haiti, a return to democracy, would not
come about without significant concessions. The US demanded, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank, a host of financial conditions which included the privatization of a number of state institutions:
those conditions, as will be shown, helped ensure that Aristide’s populist agenda was emasculated and, as has been
argued, may well have forced his government to fall back onto the tried and true Haitian model of authoritarianism.
See, for example, Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” Democratization 8, no. 3 (Sep 2010): 173-
188; and J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat, “Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The View from
Port-au-Prince,” Anthropologic 48, no. 1 (2006): 117-139.
5
See Bryant C. Freeman, “Strategy of Aristide Government for Social and Economic Reconstruction,” University of
Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies Occasional Paper No. 4, August 1994.
6
President Aristide, during an interview with Canadian journalist Naomi Klein, stated: “The coup, or the
kidnapping, was led by the United States, France and Canada. These three countries were on the front lines by
sending their soldiers to Haiti before February 29, by having their soldiers either at the airport or at my residence or
around the palace or in the capital to make sure that they succeeded in kidnapping me, leading [to] the coup.” Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, interview by Naomi Klein, 20 June 2005, quoted in rabble.ca, “Aristide: on the record about
Canada and Haiti,” June 23, 2005; http://www.rabble.ca/news/aristide-recordabout-canada-and-haiti. Canadian
journalist, David Pugliese, likewise reported Canadian Special Forces soldiers from the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2)
were present in Haiti and at the airport the night of February 29, 2004, their role apparently being to secure the
airport. Because their missions are classified, Pugliese was unable to confirm that their mission was in support of the
US-led alleged abduction of Aristide. See David Pugliese, “Elite JTF2 commandos are well aware of Haiti’s
dangers,” Ottawa Citizen, February 27, 2004, A3; http://proquest.com. For an account of the 2004 coup and the
interview with Aristide, see also Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman, Getting Haiti Right This Time
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004). For an account of Canada’s role in the coup, see also Richard
Sanders, “Top 10 Ways that Canada aided the 2004 coup in Haiti...,” The CCPA Monitor, April 2010,
www.coat.ncf.ca.
7
In response to a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) demand for the immediate deployment of a multinational
force to protect the democratically elected Aristide government, Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alan Rock,
stated: “For our part, we, the international community, must now ready ourselves to respond when the conditions are
right — not to defend one side or the other, but to protect the people of Haiti by restoring order and by creating a
stable environment to enable democratic processes to unfold. Canada will do its part in such a coordinated and
authorized international response.” Three days later, the Security Council would issue Resolution 1529 (2004),
which acknowledged Aristide’s ‘resignation’ and the swearing-in of Boniface Alexandre as acting president, and
called on the international community “to assist in restoring peace and security in Haiti” as well as “further[ing] the

2
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at the time, Percival Noel James Patterson, was one of

the few international leaders to address foreign involvement in the coup and the active

interference that prevented Aristide from remaining in power, stating:

we are bound to question whether his resignation was truly voluntary, as it comes after
the capture of sections of Haiti by armed insurgents and the failure of the international
community to provide the requisite support. The removal of President Aristide in these
circumstances sets a dangerous precedent for democratically elected governments
anywhere and everywhere, as it promotes the removal of duly elected persons from office
by the power of rebel forces.8

Far from being a precedent, the removal of Aristide from power was just one more

instance of foreign interference in Haitian internal affairs. True, Aristide was a democratically

elected president, making this the first instance of this type of interference. But foreign

interference in Haitian affairs has been part of a recurrent pattern and has included other

instances of thwarting democratic interests. Foreign trespasses have played a dominant role in

Haitian affairs, both domestic and foreign. Analyzing foreign intervention and its impact on

Haiti’s development and devolution into a “fragile state” is the crux of this dissertation.9

The impact of foreign intervention in Haiti is central to my thesis. Specifically, I examine

the effects of foreign intervention in Haitian affairs and how they contributed to Haiti’s

continued appearance at or near the top of the ladder of “fragile states.” I am not arguing that the

West has been responsible for all of Haiti’s development problems. While not within the scope

constitutional political process now under way,” making it clear the CARICOM request to restore Aristide to power
was not supported. See UN Security Council 3917th meeting minutes from 26 February 2004, S/PV.4917, 20; and
UNSCR 1529 (2004), S/RES/1529 (2004), 29 February 2004, www.undocs.org.
8
“This sets a dangerous precedent,” Jamaica Gleaner, March 1, 2004. http://jamaica-gleaner.com.
9
A fragile state should not be confused with US State Department’s diplomatic term “state of concern” which
denotes those states with “erratic authoritarian leaders” and which have a “history of sponsoring terrorism and
pursuing NBCD programmes.” Instead, I am using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) definition as any state with the “inability or unwillingness to provide for the physical security, legitimate
political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population.” See Anne
Friederike Röder, ed., Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (OECD Publication, 2006), 17.

3
of my thesis, there are ample academic studies that show that Haiti bears considerable

responsibility for its own national problems.10 However, documentation demonstrates the West

has undertaken deliberate policies that have exacerbated and exploited Haiti’s problems.

My historical analysis outlines how the West has employed a deliberate strategy against

Haiti that corresponds directly to continued and prolonged Haitian fragility. That strategy of

deliberate interventionist policies and activities began with Haitian independence and continues

today. My focus is primarily on the United States but includes other Western nations as

appropriate, to demonstrate how they also have stymied Haitian opportunities for real and

sustained economic and political development through self-serving interference.

My aim in completing such a macro-analysis of Western interference in Haitian affairs is

not to assign blame, but rather to identify, first, lessons from past foreign interventions in Haiti

and their consequences with the intent of informing future interactions with Haiti; and second, to

provide some guidance on how to help Haitians help themselves in developing their national

potential. By examining potential change in Haiti within the context of peacebuilding, a holistic

and dynamic systems approach to development, the risk of Haiti slipping back into conflict can

hopefully be reduced.

Peacebuilding for a fragile state necessarily encompasses numerous missions and avoids

treating state rehabilitation as an ad hoc and one-time activity.11 Without launching into a larger

10
See, for example, Philippe Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History - From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken
Nation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); or Annabelle L. Torgman, “Haiti: A Failed State? Democratic
Process and OAS Intervention,” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Reviews 44, no.1 (Fall 2012): 113-
137. Robert Fatton Jr. also explores the responsibility of the Haitian elites for Haiti’s failure to develop the political
and economic institutions necessary for stable, democratic rule. See Robert Fatton Jr., “Haiti: The Saturnalia of
Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1, From Nation-Building to
State-Building (2006): 115-133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017663.
11
Peacebuilding is a problematic term in that it is defined differently by various United Nations agencies, but the
best is that of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: “a range of measures targeted to reduce
the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-

4
doctrinal discussion, employing a peacebuilding framework provides a comprehensive approach

to rehabilitating a fragile nation.12 For a fragile state like Haiti, the overarching objective of this

development framework is the strengthening and broadening of civil society’s engagement in

statebuilding, crisis prevention, and the development of resiliency that allows grievances to be

managed without violence.

Ideally, any discussion of rehabilitation is framed by the question ‘How can we help

Haitians save Haiti?’ This is quite different from the normal conversation about Haiti that often

ends up discussing how ‘we can fix Haiti,’ leading to ‘solutions’ solidly rooted in paternalism on

a grand scale.13 The key to this discussion is collaboration. This implies choosing development

priorities as determined by Haitians rather than by outsiders which in turn guides external

assistance. With that understanding in mind, my research question is:

What historical lessons, positive or negative, can be gleaned from past Western
interventionist activities within Haiti that have application to the desired future goal of
rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status, to that of a fully functioning and
stable member state within the international community of nations?

term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted,
structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that
affect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and
legitimately carry out its core functions.” Peacebuilding then encompasses both state-building and nation-building
and includes so-called stabilization and reconstruction operations. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(UNPKO), “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” 2008, 18.
12
One of the earliest discussions of a peacebuilding framework founded on a model of inter-American economic
development was contained in a speech provided by Haitian intellectual Dantès Bellegarde, speaking to the
Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity in 1940. Bellegarde spoke about the idea of a “Pan-American
bloc” which would see individual nations preserving language, customs, law and education, while working on
“uniform legislation” for commerce, fiscal policy and customs matters. His ideas would later be echoed by Winston
Churchill’s 1946 call for the emergence of a “United States of Europe,” a concept which was later manifest in the
contemporary European Union. Bellegarde understood that national and regional stability was contingent upon
economic stability, something he saw as undergirding the regional Pan-American bloc approach. Bellegarde
advocated for the establishment of the safe and secure environment, nationally and regionally, as the foundation
necessary to ensure the development of an economic and political system “equitable to all, favoring personal
autonomy, individual initiative, and the full expansion of social energies.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “The
Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity,” Phylon (1940-1956) 1 (4) 1940: 327-335.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/272301.
13
Googling ‘Haiti’ and ‘fix’ leads to a myriad of articles and papers on how to fix Haiti. Note, for example, the
well-meaning discussion started by Mr. Alford, the co-founder of the US National Black Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., following the 2010 earthquake, entitled “Let’s Fix Haiti Once and for All.”
https://www.nationalbcc.org/news/beyond-the-rhetoric/1075-lets-fix-haiti-once-and-for-all.

5
 The thesis consists of an introduction, eleven chapters, a conclusion, and an afterword.

The first four chapters explore Haiti’s recurring themes - colour and class; militarism; land; and

the State – that have been manipulated by the West to shape Haiti’s development. Chapters Five

through Nine are chronological and explore Western interventionist activities and their impact on

Haitians. Chapter Ten examines the form of Western domination of Haiti while Chapter Eleven

explores the lessons that have been extracted from past interventions and which ought to shape

Western behaviour towards Haiti in the future. Finally, I have added an Afterword which

provides some preliminary thoughts on the form and direction Haiti’s development could take.

Chapter One explores issues of colour and class and discusses this theme in the context of

lost opportunities. Colour and class issues continue to be cited in historical studies of Haitian

society as a polarizing theme. Usually, this theme is understood as the means by which a vast

sector of Haitian society, overwhelmingly black and poor, has been isolated from power

(economic, political, and cultural). One of the key means by which the vast majority of Haitians

have been denied opportunity has been through the control of education policy. The other means

has been the manipulation of the Haitian military forces by Haiti’s political and economic elite to

maintain the status quo in Haiti.14 This latter issue, and the failure of Haitian parliamentary

14
The term ‘elite’ in discussions about Haiti is nuanced and evolutionary depending upon the historical period being
discussed. For example, the Haitian elite which emerged from the revolutionary period was derived from the
colonial “affranchis…often wealthy landowners, who had common economic interest with the whites, and who at
significant stages of the revolutionary struggle allied themselves to the colonists against the slaves.” The
“predominantly mulatto anciens libres retained the ownership of their lands” which became their source of power
and hence their badge of elitism. However, they were quickly challenged for power by “a rival black elite…most of
whom derived their power from [revolutionary army] positions,” and who were “particularly strong” in the north
and rural areas, whereas the mulatto elite was centred in urban centres within the south and west regions of Haiti.
This led to what David Nicholls identified as the nineteenth-century elite competition as between “a mulatto, city-
based, commercial elite, and a black, rural and military elite.” The elite would evolve with the mulatto elite
eventually shifting their power base from the land, ceding that to others, and instead turning to politics for power
and control. Other elite groups would emerge including several Syrian (or Arab) Haitian families who would
eventually dominate Haiti’s commercial sector, some through to the current era. Suzy Castor identified Haiti’s
disparate political elite as aligned through shared anti-democratic interests. She identified the grouping as including
“factions of monopolistic bourgeoisie, businessmen who deal in smuggled goods, the landed and business oligarchy,

6
authority to subordinate the military to Haitian societal needs, will be explored in the next

chapter on militarism.

Chapter Two examines the development of Haiti’s militarism as a guarantor of Haiti’s

survival within what has been, for most of Haiti’s existence, a hostile international community.15

The overarching intent of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the complex civilian-

military relationship that developed in Haiti, and which has never seen the military embrace the

principle of military subordination to civilian control. That relationship has a significant nexus

with the issue of colour and class relations, particularly when the role of the military is that of

controlling the majority of Haiti’s citizens.

Chapter Three looks at Haiti’s land issues, including those related to the environment,

and the impact of Haiti’s competing ideologies on the debate over land registry reform and land

use.16 Culturally, land issues, like the challenge of militarism, cannot be explained without

reference to colour and class. Understanding the cultural, social and economic significance of

drug dealers, mid-level executives, the military hierarchy, and officials of the Catholic and Protestant churches.”
Thus, discussions around Haiti’s elite must be understood not only as part of their era but as part of an evolving
composite elite. See Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 7-10; and Suzy Castor, “Democracy and Society in
Haiti: Structures of Domination and Resistance to Change,” Social Justice 19, No. 4 (50), Latin America Faces the
21st Century (Winter 1992): 126-37.
15
Militarism was defined by historian Alfred Vagts as “a domination of the military over the civilian, an undue
preponderance of military demands and emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales of value….”
Michael Klare went further: “ We can define 'militarism' as the tendency of a nation's military apparatus (which
includes the armed forces and associated paramilitary, intelligence and bureaucratic agencies) to assume ever-
increasing control over the lives and behaviour of its citizens; and for military goals (preparation for war, acquisition
of weaponry, development of military industries) and military values (centralization of authority, hierarchization,
discipline and conformity, combativeness and xenophobia) increasingly to dominate national culture, education, the
media, religion, politics and the economy, at the expense of civilian institutions.” See Alfred Vagts, A History of
Militarism Civilian and Military, (New York: Free Press, 1959), 12. http://ktp.isam.org.tr/pdficn/071936ic.pdf; and
Michael Klare, “Militarism: The Issues Today,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 9, no. 2 (1978): 121.
16
Those competing ideologies are Marxism, socialism, indigénisme and of course noirisme. David Nicholls explores
ideology in Haiti from the period 1915 forward to 1946 and specifically identifies the development (evolution?) of
class structure in Haiti, including the recognition of an emerging middle class. Central to that development is the
role of land and its use vis-à-vis the different Haitian classes. See David Nicholls and Ch. Carlier, “Idéologie et
mouvements politiques en Haïti, 1915-1946,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 30, no. 4 (July-August 1975):
654-679. See also David Nicholls, “Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-1946,” Journal of Contemporary
History 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 3-26.

7
land, particularly for the peasantry, will provide context for understanding Western

(mis)behaviour and the effects of interventions.17

Chapter Four will conclude this part of the thesis with an examination of the complex,

related terms of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ under the rubric of state control and oppression.18 In

particular, if the most important elements of a ‘good’ state are its governance institutions and

agencies that allows all societal groups to live together in peace and relative harmony, this

chapter will discuss why the Haitian state has not achieved that goal and, instead, has become

largely dysfunctional, predatory in nature, and has been classified by the West as fragile. This

chapter will also trace the history of state development as it evolved from a regionalized

framework to a centralized framework, with state institutions centralized in Port-au-Prince, the

former regional power bases having been eliminated from competition. Finally, I will explore

how, in the absence of effective and responsive government, the peasantry has maintained a

focus on local and cooperative/collaborative organizations in order to create some measure of

control over their lives.

Chapters Five through Nine break down Western interventionist activities and behaviour

within into five specific periods: Haitian independence to 1914; the US Marine invasion and

Occupation from 1915 to 1934; the end of the Marine Occupation to the election of François

17
The peasantry as a term is used to designate the majority of Haiti’s rural population. Haitian historian Suzy
Castor, for example, has identified “la grande masse rurale” as including “un grand nombre de locataires de petites
propriétés de l'État, de métayers, demi-serfs dépendant des grands propriétaires fonciers, et enfin de paysans sans
terre” as well as the Haitian Army’s “grades subalterns” which were reserved exclusively for peasants. See Suzy
Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 3e éd. (Port-au-Prince, Haïti : CRESFED, 1988), 20.
18
Particularly relevant here is the idea put forward by Michel-Rolph Trouillot about Third World states suffering
from inherent tensions because of their position on “the periphery of the capitalist world” requiring them to be
outward looking “if only because they are economically dependent on capitalist centres,” yet they are required also
to be inward looking to “exercise primary control over a definite territory and derive their momentum from the
dynamics of coercion and consent within that space.” That permanent tension becomes the central feature of the
Third World state, overriding its ability to focus on necessary domestic development and instead forcing it to make
significant and continuous compromises. See Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 22-3.

8
Duvalier from 1934 to 1957; the Duvalier era from 1957 to 1986; and the post-Duvalier era from

1986 to the present. Each chapter explores Western interventionist behaviour during a specific

period and within the context of those four recurring themes.

Chapter Five examines the period from Haitian independence in 1804 to the arrival of US

occupation forces in Haiti in 1915. The chapter begins with a description of Haiti’s isolation,

stemming from the lack of formal, diplomatic recognition from any major power after

independence. It then turns to the significance and conditions under which the forced indemnity

to France was signed in 1825 and the long-term effects of that mechanism. That is followed by

an analysis of developments after 1825, and finally, an exploration of the influence and

behaviour of the Great Powers in precipitating the US invasion in 1915 by destabilizing

successive Haitian governments and fomenting a period of chronic coups. This includes a look at

Germany’s role in spreading bribes within Haiti.

Chapter Six covers the Marine invasion and occupation period from 1915 to 1934.

Central to this period is an examination of the counter-insurgency campaign mounted by the

Marines, a campaign which I will show morphed into an exterminatory campaign aimed at

eliminating all Haitian opposition to the foreign occupation. Education policy also underwent a

major reorientation during this period, determining the type and direction of Haitian education

and limiting the opportunities of young Haitians.

Chapter Seven discusses the years from 1934 to 1957, spanning the period from the end

of the Marine occupation in 1934 to the election of François Duvalier in 1957. Moving beyond

the reasons for the rise of the Duvaliers, this chapter will examine American economic activities

centred on the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA) rubber plant

9
cultivation fiasco, as well as the emerging role played by the United Nations in Haiti from 1947

onwards.

Chapter Eight examines the Duvalier era from 1957 to the departure of Jean-Claude

Duvalier in 1986. As the primary focus is on US activities which supported the Duvaliers and

allowed them to retain power, the chapter will include the economic transfers of aid monies, etc.,

military training programs provided to the Haitian military and police and arms and equipment

transfers sold or transferred to Haitian security forces, including the infamous Tonton Makoutes

paramilitary organization.

Chapter Nine examines the post-Duvalier era, from 1986 to the present. This chapter will

focus on the American responses to the 1990 election of Aristide, the lead role of the United

States in the international work to restore Aristide to power following the 1991 coup, and

generally, American attitudes toward, and work to undermine, Artistide thereafter until the

second, Western-orchestrated coup removed Aristide permanently from power in 2004. An

examination of the re-engagement of the UN in Haiti including its ineffective peacebuilding

campaign will be examined, as well its role in suppressing democracy.

Chapter Ten brings together the recurring themes and the historical survey of Western

behaviour and, through trend analysis, isolates and outlines the strategy employed by the West

against Haiti, a strategy which has perpetuated Haiti’s fragile status. That strategy targets those

areas identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

definition of a fragile state, namely, national security, the development of political processes and

institutions, the economy, and the provision of social services to the Haitian citizenry.

Chapter Eleven extracts lessons from past Western interventionist activities and situates

them within the concept of peacebuilding, but with an aim to positively influence future Western

10
behaviour on interventions. The approach taken is pragmatic and approaches interventions not

from the perspective of whether they should or should not happen, but rather, it assumes they

will happen, and therefore the priority is to identify lessons which will minimize the damage

from those inevitable interventions.

The theoretical framework for the trend analysis is visually represented in Figure 1

below:

Colour and Class

Marine Invasion and Occupation, 1915-34

End of Marine Occupation to Election of

François Duvalier election, 1934-57
Independence to 1914

Militarism

Post-Duvalier, 1986 to present Lessons

Duvalier Era, 1957-86

Land

The State

Figure 1: Relationship between Themes, Periods and Lessons

Finally, and rather than end on a negative note, the Afterword will briefly explore

development strategies in relation to the recurring themes. By understanding the historic

foundation of the Western strategy employed against Haiti and its impact on specific Haitian

themes that have presented themselves throughout Haitian history, I will outline possible

development strategies which can be employed to facilitate Haiti moving away from fragile

status. Bearing in mind those extracted historical lessons relative to my research question and

11
keeping the adage: ‘How can we help Haitians save Haiti’ at the forefront, the proposed

strategies will present a collaborative way forward that avoids, as much as possible, the

neocolonial approach that has consistently underlain modern Western interventions.

My thesis will add to the analytical literature about Haiti and Haitian development

generally. The historical survey of Haitian development as influenced by Western interference

represents a macro study of the problem, something I believe has not received adequate attention

in the current literature. While specific periods of Haiti’s history have been explored vis-à-vis

Western intervention, a comprehensive survey of Haiti’s ‘life history’ has been missing. I believe

this survey will add to that particular gap.

It also more generally explores the intersection between international interventions and

fragile state development, particularly as it relates to the determination of successful

peacebuilding, and seeks to add to an understanding of how to move peacebuilding away from

neo-colonialism.19 Using Haiti as the basis for trend analysis and lesson development, I believe

my thesis will add to the material available to guide future peacebuilding in fragile nations like

Haiti. While each fragile country is different, and a template for a generic development

framework has been proven to be a dubious concept, there are nonetheless axioms that should be

captured and employed to guide future interventions. This is a further area where I believe my

work can contribute to the literature on interventions.

19
For a definition of neo-colonialism, I fall back on that of Kwame Nkrumah: “The essence of neo-colonialism is
that the State […] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality
its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the
Last Stage of imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1965).

12
Chapter One - Colour and Class in Haiti: Making Sense of the Struggle for Equal
Opportunity

Indigenist and revitalization movements occur generally under the impact of disruption
from outside….1
- Professor of Ethnomusicology Gage Averill

The first attempt to overcome issues of colour and class in the newly independent nation

of Haiti can be found in the Constitution of 1805.2 Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Haiti’s first ruler,

included a number of articles that at first glance seek to tackle the deep animosities between

anciens libres and the nouveaux libres.3 Specifically, Article 14 of Dessalines’s Constitution of

1805 included the statement “…les Haitiens ne seront désormais connus que sous la

dénomination générique de noirs [Haitians shall hence forward be known only by the generic

appellation of Blacks],” while Article 3 identified all citizens of Haiti as being equal under the

law.4 Yet that reading ignores the forced labour schemes that were embedded not only within the

Constitution of 1805 but also within previous constitutions. Toussaint Louverture’s revolutionary

Constitution of 1801, for example, included both Article 14 which states: “The colony being

1
Gage Averill, “Haitian Dance Bands, 1915-1970: Class, Race, and Authenticity,” Latin American Music Review
10, no. 2 (Autumn – Winter 1989): 209.
2
The previous revolutionary Constitution of 1801, promulgated by Toussaint Louverture, provided some foundation
for moving beyond colour and class in Article 4: “There shall exist no distinction other than those based on virtue
and talent, and other superiority afforded by law in the exercise of a public function. The law is the same for all
whether in punishment or in protection.” However, and like the 1805 Constitution, it too would shift its emphasis
toward the pseudo-feudal system of forced agricultural labour (the fermage system brought into play by Toussaint
Louverture).
3
The typology of anciens libres (colonial freedmen of colour) and nouveaux libres (former slaves) would eventually
‘shift’ into the more commonly understood societal divisions of mulatto elite and black peasantry. Distinction
between the two groups was primarily class and colour based. A significant component of class is related to the
social construct around land use and access. The anciens libres, for example, were identified as landowners and
sometimes also had slaves, whereas the nouveaux libres did not. Both classes were linked with land in the Marxist
sense of the feudal system then being entrenched in Haiti. Class and colour (social) distinctions would take on other
identifiers including accents, education, religion (vodou versus Catholicism), language (Creole versus French), and
of course, urban versus rural. A second category of nouveaux libres – not peasants – was comprised of soldiers,
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, most of whom fought in the war for independence. These soldiers
had joined and risen through the ranks of the military for social advancement, both before and after independence.
Economic factors would also eventually come into play and of course, the typology would expand once a Haitian
middle class began to emerge.
4
Article 14 of the 1805 Constitution. From Julia Gaffield, “Race and the Haitian Constitution of 1805,” Unique at
penn. https://uniqueatpenn.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/race-and-the-haitian-constitution-of-1805.

13
essentially agricultural cannot suffer the least disruption in the works of its cultivation” and

Article 15 stating: “Each plantation [habitation] shall constitute a manufacture that requires the

gathering of cultivators and workers; it shall represent the quiet haven of an active and constant

family, of which the owner of the land or his representative shall be the father.”5 The historical

context provides a better understanding of the reason for Dessalines’ push to overcome colour

and class issues. He saw unity as the only means by which Haiti could defend itself from the

clear and present dangers threatening the new nation.

With independence on January 1st, 1804, Haiti was in desperate straits. The new nation

was decimated by the revolutionary war. With a population well below 400,000 people, Haiti

had lost fully one-third of its pre-war population. It was bankrupt from the costs of the war, the

colonial plantation system was in ruins and revenues from major exports close to zero. The

alliance between the mulattoes and the blacks was tenuous at best and was unwinding quickly.

Further, the international community included at least one nation, France, that was actively

interested in re-establishing slavery in its former colony. For Dessalines, the threat was all-

consuming in terms of the scope of what was needed to secure the nation and required

extraordinary measures to counter. Dessalines saw the threat against Haiti and decided upon a

dramatic and necessary military tactic: the murder of virtually all French individuals remaining

in Haiti.

5
Article 16 did seek to cushion the blow of the imposition of a quasi-feudal system by employing the family homily
and stating, “Each cultivator and each worker is a member of the family and shares in parts of the revenues.” See
Laurent Dubois and John D. Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 1789-1804: A Brief History with
Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2006), 169. See also
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English) (trans. Charmant Theodore,
June 2000).

14
 Some historians have portrayed the killings as a genocide, claiming that Dessalines killed

all whites remaining in Haiti.6 However, the killings were selective. Laurent Dubois, for

example, points out that a number of North American white merchants were able to dine in Haiti

unmolested as the killings were taking place, indicating the killing only targeted the remaining

French military and property owners, and not all whites as some writers have alleged.7 Julia

Gaffield identified Dessalines’s February 22, 1804, proclamation as directing his generals to

round up those French “known to have taken part in the campaign commanded by the French

generals…Leclerc and Rochambeau….”8

Among those spared included the Polish and German soldiers who had deserted the

French army, many of whom ended up supporting Dessalines during the war for independence; a

group of German colonists who had intermarried and settled in the colony prior to the revolution;

and a small number of medical staff (mainly doctors), a number of whom were French.9

6
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn have identified three motives behind genocides: “to eliminate a perceived threat;
to spread terror among real or potential enemies; to acquire economic wealth; or to implement a belief, theory, or
ideology.” Of the three, Dessalines’s motive appears to have been to eliminate a perceived threat, although the
killings could and likely did have the impact of spreading terror amongst Haiti’s enemies. Finally, the killings did
allow Dessalines to claim the French estates for the new state, although that could have been accomplished without
the killings. Regardless, the killings were selective and while genocidal, cannot be understood as a genocide. See
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).
7
The presence of the German military engineers in the immediate post-independent period would reinforce that
likelihood.
8
Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2015), 83-4.
9
See Philippe Girard, “Caribbean genocide: racial war in Haiti, 1802-4,” Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (2005):
138-161; and Sibylle Fischer, Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2004). The Polish soldiers were members of the Legia Naddunajska [Polish
Danube Legion] and originally numbered around 6,000 strong. They were led by General Władysław Franciszek
Jabłonowski, a Pole of African descent, who requested the Legion be sent to Haiti in May 1802. Jabłonowski died of
yellow fever in September 1802 as did over 4,000 members of the Legion. Members of the Second Battalion of the
Legion (then known as 113th French Demibrigade) were under command of Dessalines. Heinl and Heinl claim that
when the Legion fought its way to the Cape, French General Leclerc remarked that the Poles remaining were “all
but naked, badly armed, and due over three months’ pay.” Of those remaining, only 400 were identified as having
requested to remain in Haiti with Dessalines, and of that number, only 120-150 Poles switched sides to join with
Dessalines to fight against the French. See Jan Pachonski and Reuel K. Wilson, Poland’s Caribbean Tragedy: A
Study of Polish Legions in the Haiti War of Independence 1802-1803 (New York: Eastern European Monographs,
1986). See also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 112n10.

15
 Dessalines’s selective killings reinforce this as a military tactic. Dessalines was

confronted with a strategic dilemma. His new nation was weak and vulnerable. Those French

remaining understood the situation in Haiti and, for Dessalines, if they were simply deported,

they would have been excellent sources of sensitive and militarily important information about

Haitian vulnerabilities and combat capabilities. Alternately, had the French been allowed to stay

in Haiti, they posed the risk of becoming agents of espionage against Haiti.

Further, attempting to imprison and care for the numbers of French left would not have

been feasible. The numbers of French killed have been estimated at between 1,000 and 5,000.

While Philippe Girard has claimed the number is between 3,000 and 5,000, Julia Gaffield has

provided a more detailed estimate that strongly suggests the number is no more than 1,000

French victims.10 Whether 1,000 or 5,000, however, imprisoning and caring for that many

French survivors, most of them soldiers, would have required a substantial diversion of fighting-

age men away from their primary role as defenders of Haitian independence and casting them

into the unfamiliar and difficult role of prison guards. Given the new nation’s impoverished state

at the conclusion of the revolution, it could have ill afforded the requirement to feed that number

of prisoners for an indefinite period of time.

Julia Gaffield points out one other key strategic consideration when examining

Dessalines’s justification for the killings. Dessalines was given a copy of a petition signed by

several French residents in Saint Domingue, demanding the French crown return Donatien-

Marie-Joseph de Vimeur, vicomte de Rochambeau, to Saint Domingue as governor, his role

10
The number of French killed on orders from Dessalines is unknown. Gaffield has identified 1,000 at most as
having been killed. However, several sources identify the number killed as “perhaps several thousand” while
Philippe Gerard is more definite, identifying the estimated number of “white colonists killed after independence” as
between 3,000 and 5,000 whites. See Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, 42; and Phillippe R. Girard, The
Slaves Who Defeated Napoleon (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 322.

16
being to re-establish slavery and French rule. Gaffield believes the killings were justified by

Dessalines under the guise of “an execution…since it was a state-sanctioned punishment for

[the] crime…of conspiracy against the government.”11 Notwithstanding the Haitian desire for

retribution for similar atrocities (not to mention the horrors perpetrated throughout slavery),

murdering the remaining French based on the compelling threat they posed would have appeared

to be the best option available and, more importantly, justifiable as a military necessity.12

At the very core of the Constitution of 1805 lay a war measures act, which provided

Dessalines with enormous authority and outlined his strategy for defending Haiti. First,

Dessalines laid out the Haitian chain of command, identifying himself as ‘head of the Haitian

family’ (Article 14 identified Dessalines as the head of State), and confirmed himself alone to

determine the direction of Haiti’s military strategy (Article 32 gave him the right to make war or

peace, as well as conduct diplomacy).13 Haiti was to be governed by a military hierarchy with

general officers governing each of the six military divisions that made up the new country.14 The

generals of each division had direct access to Dessalines and were directly responsible to him for

affairs in their individual divisional area of responsibility.

Second, Dessalines sought to unite ‘his children,’ both mulatto and black, under the new

identification as ‘noirs.’ The ongoing conflict between the two groups was, in Dessalines’s

11
Gaffield also makes clear in her tweets that she views the massacre as having been greatly exaggerated. Julia
Gaffield. “I will add a few points,” Twitter, April 9, 2019, 11:32 a.m.,
https://twitter.com/JuliaGaffield/status/1115684007558176768.
12
Girard argues there were two other motives behind the massacres. The first was that Dessalines viewed the
killings as a “form of nation building.” He quotes Dessalines as saying, “You suffered the same calamities, you
struck your enemies with the same ardor, you faced the same punishment, so the same interests now make you
inseparable.” The second was the post-killing looting and the confiscation of French estates. Yet the looting and
confiscation were not dependent upon the killings. Dessalines, having won the war of independence then simply
proceeded to confiscate the French estates as spoils of war legitimately belonging to the new nation. See Girard, The
Slaves Who Defeated Napoleon, 322.
13
Dessalines used the family metaphor liberally within his Constitution, referring to himself as the father of the
Haitian family, and the quarrelling mulatto and black (noir) groups as his children.
14
On the governance side of the house, Article 30 reserved for the Emperor the right to promulgate laws and appoint
and revoke at will key members of government including the judiciary and the military.

17
opinion, distracting them from the real danger outside Haiti. As father (“chef d’état”), his duty

was to promote reconciliation between his children through legislation. He also sought to prevent

his ‘children’ from fleeing his call to arms under Article 7, which called for death or confiscation

of property for those who abandoned their citizenship and instead called on all his ‘children’ to

do their duty by recognizing the requirement to serve in the defence of Haiti. For this, Article 9

required that, to be worthy of being a Haitian, one must “especially [be] a good soldier.”15 His

Council of State was composed solely of generals.

Dessalines went further in defining his vision. He recognized the importance of

agriculture to Haiti’s future, crowning it the most important and most noble of the arts. Article 21

under ‘General Dispositions’ went further and identified it as the most important area to be

protected by the national military, setting the precedent for military forces to control those rural

areas of Haiti outside of the metropole. Tied to agriculture was, of course, the sacred nature of

land (Article 6) and the prohibition against any whites claiming the title “master or proprietor”

from stepping foot on Haitian soil (Article 12).

Despite the very real threats to Haiti, Dessalines’s vigorous strategic measures aroused

considerable resentment and resistance. His reliance and enforcement of “caporalisme agraire,”

or militarized agriculture, led to his assassination in 1806 and thrust the new nation into civil

war.16 The civil war would result in Haiti being split into two parts, the northern Kingdom of

15
Flight from military duty in this sense is reminiscent of marronage, or the “act or state of being a fugitive slave,”
during the colonial period. Fick, Making Haiti: Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1990), 5-6.
16
‘Caporalisme agraire’ as Trouillot termed it, sought to forcibly coerce the plantation workers to remain on the
farms, the intent being to generate revenues necessary for the state’s survival. That coercion required labourers to
remain on specific, resurrected plantations and restricted movement to specific local areas. The military became the
both enforcers and beneficiaries, along with the state, of the imposed restrictions, as well as ensuring labourers met
specific production levels. Not surprisingly and despite the reasons behind it, the quasi-feudal system was
tantamount to slavery, borrowing as it did many of the customs and practices associated with plantation slavery, and
consequently inspired a significant degree of resistance. See Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 43.

18
Haiti under the control of Henry Christophe, Dessalines’s successor; while General Alexandre

Sabès Pétion took control over the southern Republic of Haiti.

The civil war and split would see the unravelling of the unifying national narrative spun

by Dessalines and competing narratives emerged, albeit also authoritarian in nature. Christophe’s

narrative, based on the continuation of the militarized plantation system as reinvigorated by

Dessalines, was quite familiar and comfortable to Christophe who had served as a general under

the command of Dessalines. Christophe understood and fully supported a military government

system with its reliance on coerced plantation labour as its economic engine. However, his Code

Henry did formalize the relationship between the landowners and the agricultural workers by

establishing the responsibilities and obligations of both parties, and of course the consequences

for violating that relationship.

In the southern Republic, Pétion’s competing narrative reflected his more laissez faire

approach and the cultivation of personal loyalty through gifts and favours rather than

maximizing agricultural production. While most of his land grants went to key members of his

army, he also allocated land to lower ranking soldiers, non-commissioned officers from the

independence war, and others from the lower classes simply willing to cultivate it, leading to “a

tremendous ideological impact” on them.17 Not surprisingly, Pétion was reported to have been

quite a popular leader with the masses.

17
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 47-8. Haitian historian Dantès Bellegarde provided an excellent overview
of Alexandre Pétion who believed “the best means of developing national spirit was to attach the citizen to the soil”
through land ownership. Towards this end, Pétion broke up the large plantations and made what Bellegarde calls
“national gifts” on a sliding scale with senior officers receiving considerably more than junior officers and non-
commissioned officers from the “Army of Independence.” Bellegarde argued the result was not only the birth of
small peasant farms, but of “rural democracy” which he believes fostered a high degree of opposition to any form of
“collectivism” save for the local co-operative programs known as “coumbite.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “Alexandre
Petion: The Founder of Rural Democracy in Haiti,” Caribbean Quarterly 3, no. 3 (December 1953): 167-73.

19
 The government regimes established by Christophe and Pétion did share one thing in

common. Both governments relied on agricultural labour, and were responsible for establishing

the trend that would see future Haitian leaders moving down the same path of peasant

exploitation. They exploited their citizens in different ways, however.

Under Christophe’s regime, the owner or lease holder of the land paid the government

taxes and received half of the crop production. The plantation laborers or cultivateurs did not

have claim to the land, and instead were given claim collectively to a quarter share of the crop,

with the government receiving the last quarter.18 Pétion allowed peasants to own land and

produce crops. The land-owning peasants were responsible for paying taxes on crop production

directly to the government. That distinction aside, domination of the political arena by the elite in

both states meant their respective citizens – peasant or cultivateur – were subjected to “political

isolation,” which facilitated their continued exploitation.19

Not surprisingly, the struggle amongst the black and mulatto elites for political control of

the state and the resulting control of the Haitian peasantry is a longstanding theme in Haitian

historical studies.20 Complicating the issue of control has been the impact of outside, foreign

powers, the effects of which will be explored in later chapters.

18
The plantation workers received a quarter share collectively, which was then divided based on a sliding scale
according to position, sex and other factors.
19
Trouillot argued that the Haitian elite eventually gave up control of the land in return for domination of Haitian
politics. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 40.
20
Notwithstanding their competition for power, Haitian historian Suzy Castor identified the early black and
mulattoe ruling sectors as “formaient une oligarchie homogène face au peuple.” Citing Arthur Millspaugh,
American Financial Adviser-General receiver of Haiti from 1927 to 1929, Professor Castor identifies the ruling elite
as composed of “la caste militariste, les grands seigneurs féodaux et la bourgeoisie marchande.” See Castor,
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 31.

20
 Throughout Haitian history, the simplest and most visible means of categorizing Haitians

by outside observers has been colour.21 Colour categorization began in the colonial period,

partially as a preoccupation with social categorization based on intermarriage and interbreeding

between slaves and owners. Examining colonial Saint Domingue, the French lawyer, writer and

slave owner, Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry, devised a colonial skin typology which

included nine colour variations based on the degree of ‘black’ or ‘white’ blood.22 With the

independence of Haiti, the distinctions based on colour became more binary for non-Haitians,

with the Haitian elite described as light skinned while non-elite masses were described as black.

Even Haitian elite have been divided between the two, with the political and military elite in the

north being black, while the southern elite was mulatto. For Haitians, however, skin colour alone

– dark versus light – was a misnomer. Haitians understood colour as also incorporating other

physical features, such as the texture of one’s hair and the colour of one’s eyes.

To further muddy the waters, social differentiation also pertains to class differentiation.

While it appears obvious on the surface, consider the 1843 Haitian proverb, credited to the

guerrilla leader, Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau: “Neg rich sé mulat, mulat pov sé noua.”23 It roughly

translates as “a rich black is mulatto, whereas a poor mulatto is black,” and demonstrates that

21
One of the earliest examples of that simplistic categorization was one by James Redpath, whose ‘Guide to Hayti’
sorted “the blacks of Hayti” by African tribal origins. See James Redpath, ed., Guide to Hayti (New York: G.
Woolworth Colton, 1861), 130-1. https://archive.org/details/guidetohayti00inredp.
22
Doris L. Garraway, “Race, Reproduction and Family Romance in Moreau de Saint-Méry's Description de la
partie francaise de l'isle Saint Domingue,” Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Winter 2005), 227-46.
Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry’s Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de
la partie française de l’isle Saint-Domingue outlined a skin colour based upon nine categories of skin colour ranging
from sacatra, griffe, marabout, mulâtre, quarteron, métis, mamelouk, quarteronné, and finally to sang-melé.
23
Acaau was described as “jeune, fier et d'assez beaux traits.” In addition to being able to read and write, Acaau had
been a lieutenant in the gendarmerie or rural police. He became the leader of the Armée souffrante once he launched
the Piquet rebellion in 1844.

21
wealth can overcome colour.24 His proverb also shows that colour and class are intertwined

concepts that should not and cannot be understood in isolation from each other.

Colour and class have provided Haiti’s elite with the means to exclude the peasantry from

politics. They have also been responsible for rivalry between the black and mulatto elites, both of

whom have shown contempt for the largely black peasantry. But that contempt on the part of the

mulatto elite was directed against black political figures as well as the black peasantry, and can

be seen in their policy of “politique de doublure” or the “politics of the understudy.”25

The political tactic originated in the aftermath of the Piquet rebellions of 1844-48,

whereby the party of the mulatto elite rescinded their claims to presidential office and installed a

series of black presidents, which they thought they were able to control. The tactic was intended

to appease the black property owners seeking equal political access to the presidency and to

appease the peasantry that had revolted under the leadership of Acaau for social justice and

education.

Colour and class have been identified and employed by Haiti’s elites as weapons aimed at

suppressing attempts by the peasantry to become politically, socially, and economically active in

influencing government policies at the national level that would benefit them. Critically, the

international community has not only been complicit in suppressing peasant inclusion, it has

actively supported undermining peasant activities intended to advance their development.

Western powers have adopted a primary understanding of colour and class within Haiti. As

24
Gustave d’Alaux argued the proverb should be understood in the longer form (“Nèg riche, qui connin li, écrit-cila
milatt. Milatt pôvre qui pas connin li, écrit-cila nèg.”) which roughly translates as: “The Rich Negro who can read
and write is mulatto; a poor mulatto who cannot read nor write is Negro.” James Ivy claims the proverb is found in
Maurice Casseus’ novel Viejo. See James W. Ivy, “The Wisdom of the Haitian Peasant: Or Some Haitian Proverbs
Considered,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct 1941): 485-8; Nicholls, Haiti in Caribbean Context,
22; and Gustave d’Alaux, L’Empereur Soulouque et son empire (Paris: Michel Levy frères, 1856). Cited in Mimi
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers: Peasant Democracy in the Early Republic of Haiti,” New West Indian Guide 74,
no. 1&2 (2000): 49.
25
For detail on la politique de doublure, see Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 79.

22
historian and theologian David Nicholls has pointed out, “white racialism” has meant that

Haitians were lumped together into a single grouping: black.26

On those occasions when Western scholars have attempted to disaggregate Haitians, the

most common Western stereotype has identified two main historical groupings.27 The first is a

small but wealthy mulatto class, which has held positions of true power and authority within

Haiti (colloquially, lelit or l’élite); while the second, the majority, is the poor, largely black

peasantry, which lacks both power and wealth (the pep (peuple) or mas (masse)).28 Too often,

Westerners and Western leaders have also understood Haiti as simply a black nation. The

international community’s systemic racism meant that Haiti found itself isolated strategically,

forcing the nation to fight for a place within the international community of nations as a peer

nation. Unfortunately, that peer status continues to elude Haiti, and interventionist activities have

reinforced its marginalized position within the international community, as will be shown in later

chapters.

Thus, discussions of Haitian colour and class differences must examine the power

dynamics at play between the mulatto and black elite. Collectively, both have employed the state

26
See Robert Fatton Jr, “Killing Haitian Democracy,” Jacobin 17 (2015). https://www.jacobinmag.com. Note Mary
Renda provides a more complete analysis of the American attitude towards Haiti and Haitians generally, including
the extremely paternalistic and racist attitudes of key Marines during the Occupation. See Mary A. Renda, Taking
Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2001).
27
John Lobb, a sociologist, identified a slightly different typology for colour and class in Haiti. Writing in 1940,
Lobb identified the two main categories of Haitians, the Elite and the Noirs, but then subdivided the two groups into
three sub-categories. For the Noirs, the three groupings were “at the bottom, the poverty-stricken known as the
‘unlucky’; the middle class…who get along on their small holdings; and at the top a small number of people of
wealth and those powerful in the vodun cult.” For the elite, the sub-divisions included a “small but highly influential
fraction” of the elite; “just below them in prestige is a small section definable as the ‘accepted’…though not held for
so long a time” as the top elite; and “the ‘fringe’” elite. Surprisingly, the last group is identified as including “urban
artisans, some of the domestic servants, and recently arrived country people, usually light-colored” who are
described as defying immediate classification. See John Lobb, “Caste and Class in Haiti,” American Journal of
Sociology 46, no. 1 (July 1940): 23-34.
28
Gage Averill, A Day for the Hunter, a Day for the Prey: Popular Music and Power in Haiti (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 3.

23
institutions of power against the peasantry in a strategy aimed at control and containment,

leading to a denial of opportunities for most Haitians to improve their quality of life. Opportunity

is dependent upon unhindered access to education, employment, health care and position without

colour or class-based discrimination. This chapter focusses on that power dynamic,

understanding its impact on Haitian politics and its role in mal development which has led in turn

to the most visible indication of stagnant social development, the late emergence of a middle

class in Haiti.29

So, what is meant by a ‘middle class’ and why is it considered important when judging

development?30 In the urban centres, the middle class was generally a class of professional and

business workers who are not engaged in manual labour and were usually educated. Education

allows entry into professions like law, education, and teaching. In the rural areas, large and

middle-sized landowners could also be considered to have middle class status, but they did not

represent the majority of the peasantry. A middle class requires an education system that is

accessible to all and effective in transferring higher skills to the citizenry (students). Literacy

training is the primary core skill required, followed by numeracy.

The absence of an open and inclusive education system in Haiti doomed it to remain a

quasi-feudal agrarian society possessing at best low technology assembly industry.31 A high

29
By mal development, I am looking at the idea of ‘good governance’ as a development goal. Good governance is
defined by a respect for human rights, the rule of law, equality, accountability, political participation, and
legitimacy. When the goal of development undertaken by society’s elites take it down the path of kleptocracy,
corruption, repression and deprivation of rights and freedoms, that can, in my opinion, be categorized as mal
development.
30
Most scholars accept that a real middle class (as understood in the context of Western nations) began to emerge in
Haiti in the 1940s, as evidenced by the “Revolution of 1946” and the presidential election of Dumarais Estimé. The
sociologist and anthropologist, George Eaton Simpson, for example, wrote about a “diminutive” middle class in the
early 1940s, but identifying it primarily as small shopkeepers, rural coffee buyers, various artisans and mid level
government employees. The distinguishing characteristic for him was that all were urban dwellers. See George
Eaton Simpson, “Haiti’s Social Structure,” American sociological Review 6, no. 5 (October 1941): 640-49.
31
Leon Pamphile’s Clash of Cultures provides an excellent recap of education and its development (or lack thereof)
in Haiti. David Nicholls (From Dessalines to Duvalier) also provides an overview of key external influences on
education, including the Roman Catholic Church and other European influences. For the period of 1804 through to

24
illiteracy rate, which has persisted to the present, has deprived Haiti of skilled labourers and

condemned Haitians to producing low profit agrarian goods. Without access to higher exchange

value, Haitian workers remain locked out of social and economic mobility within their society.

Despite these dire conditions, the government of Haiti provides no economic safety net to

ameliorate these systemic problems. Social programs are either absent or lack proper funding or

are dependent upon foreign assistance.

The economist John Maynard Keynes argued that the middle-class spurs consumption, in

its desire to acquire goods and elevate its status over the lower classes.32 This in turn stimulates

investment in consumer goods that demand a higher level of skilled labour and investment in

high technology machinery and craftsmanship. With its lower propensity to spend, the upper

class saves more and spends a lower percentage of its income on consumption than the middle

class. And of course, the peasant class does not possess the wealth to invest in other than those

goods and services essential for the maintenance of life. In Keynes’s opinion, the middle class is

the engine of economic growth within an emerging democracy.

There is a second important factor related to the later emergence of Haiti’s middle class.

The absence of a large middle class in Haiti until arguably the 1940s was not simply a signal of

mal economic growth, but also of stagnant social progress. From a Western perspective, a stable

and thriving middle class is a signal of societal dynamism. Its absence points directly to a lack of

opportunity for advancement within the society. In Haiti, stagnant social progress created what

Trouillot spoke of as “urban parasites”, which he identified as including “professionals, retailers,

soldiers and state employees” who had “latched onto the alliance between rulers and

1915, see Job B. Clément, “History of Education in Haiti: 1804-1915 (First Part),” Revista de Historia de América
87 (Jan. - Jun., 1979): 33-74, 141-181.
32
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
1936).

25
merchants.”33 Their hopes for social progress, and of course the potential for personal

enrichment, were based on the possibility of elevation into a government ministry, appointment

to a diplomatic post, or “the field of haut commerce.”34

Roland Wingfield and Vernon Parenton spoke of a similar problem that they identified

from independence to the 1940s which featured “[a] small group of skilled workers, ruined

politicians etc… usually moving up or down between the bourgeoisie and the mass. They did not

constitute a middle class but simply a transient group with no particular class identification of

their own.”35 Trouillot likewise saw a transient group, but one which he saw as urban parasites

“augmented by individuals who had fallen from power or dropped out of haut commerce, as well

as by peasants who had ‘come down’ from the countryside.”36 He saw them as parasitic by

having established themselves as the intermediaries between the elite and the peasants,

occupying state positions as bureaucrats or as soldiers. That allowed them to benefit from the

surplus drawn from the peasantry by the government they served.”37 In return, this parasitic

group was expected to keep the peasantry away from the ruling elite. The problem was that

Haiti’s peasant productivity began stagnating at the same time urban parasitic groups were

beginning to grow rapidly. While not stating it directly, Trouillot would certainly not have

considered this parasitic group a middle class, especially when considering the stagnating

production levels.

33
The alliance to which Trouillot is referring was forged between the “elite group of light-skinned officers
associated with the ruling mulâtres” and the foreign merchants operating in Haiti during the regimes of Pétion and
Boyer from 1807 through 1843 and thereafter. The alliance saw the Haitian elites becoming fronts for foreign
retailers; providing service companies like insurance and transport for haut commerce; or creating joint investment
opportunities for “wholesale firms.” Trouillot points to their French education and language abilities as well as their
lighter skin, making them more attractive and accessible to foreigners. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 75,78.
34
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 79.
35
Roland Wingfield and Vernon Parenton, “Class Structure and Class Conflict in Haitian Society,” Social Forces
43, no. 3 (March 1965): 339.
36
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 80.
37
Trouillot, 79.

26
 James Leyburn also referred indirectly to a similar concept of a middle grouping. He

pointed out that up until the 1920s, a class or grouping existed between the elite and the poor

peasant class, being composed primarily of urban-dwelling wage earners. While he did not

consider them to be a middle class, they did include “townspeople… [including] servants, day

laborers, delivery clerks, menials in general… [who] considered themselves one step removed

from the peasants….”38 They also included ex-soldiers or cultivators” who were fortunate

enough to lease small plots of land. Suzy Castor likewise identified “les secteurs moyens” as

suffering from “conditions de vie assez précaires” which have been masked by the absence of

accurate historical data. She however believed their precarious condition was primarily related to

the instability of retail trade in Haiti, as it suffered disproportionately from political upheaval and

violence.39

However, on the issue of a ‘true’ middle class in Haiti, Maurice de Young has argued it

appeared only after 1959, stating that

[a]lthough it is flatly denied by some writers that there is any sign of an emerging middle
class, by the test of class solidarity both in the written word and in political action there
appears to be no question that not only does such a class exist, but is today in Haiti one of
the most important and active groups.40

Education in Haiti is clearly linked to colour and class. Mimi Sheller has argued, “Haitian

peasants recognized literacy (as well as class) as a status boundary excluding them from civil and

political participation.”41 Yet understanding how and why education has been employed as a tool

to suppress the Haitian peasantry, and by extension, the emergence of a middle class, requires a

38
Leyburn, The Haitian People, 48, 98.
39
Castor identified this middle class or middle sector as being small in numbers and including “les fonctionnaires,
les petits commerçants, les artisans et les professions liberals.” See Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 31-2.
40
See Maurice De Young, "Class Parameters in Haitian Society," Journal of Inter-American Studies 1, no. 4 (1959):
457.
41
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers” 49.

27
detailed examination of not only the Haitian elite for the role they played in the manipulation of

education policy, but also that of the external powers like the United States who similarly

exploited education doctrine and policy for their own ends.42

At the same time, lack of access to education only partly explains the blockage in Haitian

society. The other significant element was the manipulation of the economy and economic policy

by Haitian elites and their Western allies. This section explores the means by which Haitian

development was impeded as it related to colour and class in Haiti. Specifically, part of this

chapter examines the manipulation of education and the economy to impede progress.

In the immediate aftermath of the Haitian Revolution, Dessalines situated education

within a national security framework, writing in Article 19 of the General Dispositions of his

Constitution of 1805: “Dans chaque division militaire, une école publique sera établie pour

l'instruction de la jeunesse.”43 That inclusion within the Constitution served two aims. First, it

affirmed the importance of education (literacy in particular) to the new nation; and second, it

linked the military to education in a very direct way. Dessalines’ assassination in 1806 meant his

education policy would not be fully enacted.

Nonetheless, both Henri Christophe and Alexandre Pétion recognized the importance of

education within the context of national development and more so as a means of asserting

equality for Haiti within the international community. Pétion stated his belief that “l’éducation

élève l’homme à la dignité de son être,” and Christophe expressed similar sentiments in an 1818

speech:

42
Accepting that Haitian society incorporated lifelong learning into its culture through the vodou religion (for
example, Claudine Michel, “Of Worlds Seen and Unseen: The Educational Character of Haitian Vodou,”
Comparative Education Review 40, no. 3 (Aug 1996): 280-294), the term education in this chapter refers to the
formalized process of teaching or instruction within a school or university.
43
Louis-Joseph Janvier, Les Constitutions d'Haïti (Paris, Marpon et Flammarion, 1886). http://mjp.univ-
perp.fr/constit/ht1805.htm#9.

28
 We will confound the calumniators of our race by proving ourselves in no respect inferior
in moral and physical powers to other inhabitants of the globe, and by showing that we
are capable of acquiring and practicing the sciences and the arts and attaining to an equal
degree of improvement and civilization with Europeans.44

Christophe also recognized the important role of education vis-à-vis Haiti’s national

security, and its continued independence. He feared the French would seek to re-subjugate Haiti

by employing “intrigue and corruption” against its citizens.45 Christophe believed those tactics

could be countered by fostering literacy and the ability to reason as skills essential to Haiti’s

survival.46 His education strategy, therefore, sought to invest heavily in schools and teachers. He

went so far as to invite missionaries to establish schools in his kingdom and also enlisted English

abolitionist intermediaries to hire a number of foreign teachers.47 He further intended to develop

a national historical narrative to be taught within the school system, as a means of strengthening

his citizens’ ties to his Kingdom through the propagation of its “anti-slavery mission.”48

44
Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 8-9. In an earlier 1816 letter to Thomas Clarkson, Christophe had expressed similar
sentiments, writing: “For a long while, my intention, my dearest ambition, has been to secure for the nation which
has confided to me its destiny the benefit of public instruction…I am completely devoted to this project….So if God
blesses my handiwork, and grants me sufficient time, I hope that the inhabitants of Haiti, overcoming the shameful
prejudice which has too long weighed upon them, will soon astonish the world by their knowledge.” Earl L. Griggs
and Clifford H. Prator, eds. Henry Christophe and Thomas Clarkson: A Correspondence (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1968), 91.
45
In an 1818 letter to Clarkson, he elaborated upon this fear: “The French colonists would assuredly use every
means within their power not only to perpetuate slavery in the Spanish part of the island, but also to sow the germs
of dissension and revolt in Haiti, and by their intrigues to rob us of the peace which we at present enjoy. See Jennifer
Y Conerly, “‘Your Majesty’s Friend’: Foreign alliances in the Reign of Henri Christophe.” Master’s thesis,
University of New Orleans Paper 1625, 2013, 116.
46
Note that his education strategy was aimed at the children of his Kingdom’s elite and was not a ‘public’ system
including the children of his agricultural workers, etc. The system would likely have been extended to those
identified for service within his public service as well, however.
47
Jennifer Conerly provides an excellent overview of the relationship between Christophe and the abolitionists,
Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, and highlights their collaboration on Christophe’s education policy and
reforms. See Conerly, “’Your Majesty’s Friend’,” 116. Note that Carl Campbell argues that Christophe was likely
not the architect of education strategy for which he is given credit as “his education policies were too constructive
for an illiterate man…” Instead, he believes the strategy was presented to Christophe by his educated advisors. See
Carl Campbell, “Education and Society in Haiti 1804-1843,” Caribbean Quarterly 50, no. 4 Haiti – Essays in
honour of the Bicentenary of Independence 1804-2004 (Dec. 2004): 19.
48
Peter Wirzbicki, “’The Light of Knowledge Follows the Impulse of Revolutions’: Prince Saunders, Baron de
Vastey and the Haitian Influence on Antebellum Black Ideas of Elevation and Education,” Slavery and Abolition 36,
no. 2 Jul 2014): 279-80.

29
 Christophe’s education planning was also aimed at ending Haiti’s international isolation

and at convincing key international community members such as England and France, that Haiti

deserved “the status of an enlightened nation.”49 Christophe saw intellectual discourse as a

means of achieving equality. He wrote “[a]fter having established our rights by the sword, we

acquire a new lustre in the eyes of the world, when we defend them by the pen.”50

Unfortunately for Haiti, the international community did not cooperate. One of the

international institutions that denied Haitians a proper education at this time was the Roman

Catholic Church. Through the Jesuits, the Catholic Church had provided ministry to the slaves of

Saint Domingue and, primarily with those slaves engaged in work on Jesuit properties, attempted

to educate them as well. For their troubles, the Jesuits were ejected from the colony in 1763 after

being found guilty of the charge of “corruptor of slaves” as a consequence of their educational

work.51 The Catholic orders that replaced the Jesuits understandably showed little inclination to

follow the Jesuit lead, nor did they possess the quality of missionaries, and from that point

onward, the Church largely refrained from providing education to the slaves, focussing instead

on indoctrination of Church rituals.52

Following independence, the Church remained disengaged from Haiti.53 Citing the

violence of Haiti’s birth as the reason for cutting ties, the Church would not re-establish itself in

49
Conerly, “’Your Majesty’s Friend’” 11.
50
Conerly. Christophe’s statement notwithstanding, he did not formally extend his education policies to include the
mass of agrarian laborers. They remained, for the most part, illiterate.
51
George Breathett, “Catholic Missionary Activity and the Negro Slave in Haiti,” Phylon (1960-) 23, no. 3 (3rd
Quarter 1962): 284.
52
International relations professor, Anne Greene, cites a 1794 letter from a Catholic priest in the colony claiming
that “since the expulsion of the Jesuits, most priests in St. Domingue have behaved so indecently that the inhabitants
and negroes have lost all of the religious sentiment that the Jesuits gave them.” See Anne Greene, The Catholic
Church in Haiti: Political and Social Change (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1993), 79.
53
The Church cut ties with the new nation because of the passage of laws which made the Church “subservient to
the state…allowed divorce, required civil marriage ceremonies, and gave inheritance benefits to illegitimate
children.” See Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti, 87.

30
Haiti until the signing of the 1860 Concordat.54 Regardless, the Church’s absence after the

successful revolution sent a specific message to the new country and its leaders.55 Trouillot

makes the argument that the Vatican committed a sin of omission by failing to establish “an

independent diocese in Haiti.”56 He points out that historically, Catholic dioceses were

established quickly in colonies with substantial Catholic representation. Likewise, the diocese

was charged with constructing a Catholic Church school system, its mission being to reinforce

Catholic doctrine through instruction. Not surprisingly, the failure of the Church to establish its

normal diocesan presence and its attendant education system led to Trouillot’s conclusion that

the Holy See “crippled the Haitians’ chances of building a solid and wide-ranging system of

formal education.”57

After Christophe’s death in 1820, education policy had taken a dramatic turn in Haiti,

shifting away from national security interests driving literacy, and instead adopting the idea of

education as a tool for promotion of internal security or perhaps more accurately, exercising

internal control over the black masses. In addition to the sin of omission committed by the

Church, the administration of Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-1843), Alexandre Pétion’s successor in

the South, treated education with suspicion. President Boyer feared its ability to empower

peasants and incite newly literate peasants to abandon their fields. He saw education as

54
Greene suggests that the Concordat pursued by the Church was motivated partially because of President Pétion,
and later, President Boyer’s, welcoming attitude towards Protestantism. However, she points to the popularity of
Freemasonry in the nineteenth century as being of greater concern for the Church. See Greene, 85-6.
55
See Tim Matthewson, “Abraham Bishop, ‘The Rights of Black Men,’ and the American Reaction to the Haitian
Revolution,” The Journal of Negro History 67, no. 2 (Summer, 1982): 148-154. See also Greene, The Catholic
Church in Haiti.
56
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 51. Note that Protestant schools were established in Haiti, by those
American blacks immigrating during Boyer’s administration in 1821. Those schools, however, would have been
conducted in English and would have been mainly filled with Americans and not likely many Haitians outside of the
elite families. See Clément, “History of Education in Haiti: 1804-1915,” 43.
57
Trouillot would argue that by 1860, Haiti’s “urban elites had already tuned the educational system so that it would
serve their needs exclusively.” Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 51.

31
enlightening the wrong people. He has been credited with declaring: “to extend education was to

sow the seed of revolution.”58

The education legislation enacted in December, 1848, during the imperial presidency of

General Faustin-Élie Soulouque (1847-1849) aimed at providing a rural education focussed upon

cultivating crops and tilling the soil, with minimal focus on the elements of religion, reading,

writing and basic arithmetic.59 The idea of providing vocational education based on agrarian

techniques, rather than a literary education, would become a familiar theme for rural areas of

Haiti and would be continued by the US Marines once they attained control over Haiti’s

education policy during their occupation.

Even with the signing of the Concordat between the Vatican and Haiti in 1860, education

in Haiti did not significantly improve for the masses. The Concordat, which channelled Vatican

money into Haiti to pay for schools and teachers, nonetheless came about well after the formal

and more comprehensive education system had been institutionalized in the hands of Haiti’s

elite. The majority of Haitians, if they were even able to access the developing national system,

were, in the words of Léon Pamphile, firmly held in a “French cultural grip on Haitian

society…reinforced by the establishment of a Catholic stronghold.”60 This Catholic and French

language hold on Haitian education would also undermine any competition with the Church,

58
Wirzbicki, “’The Light of Knowledge Follows the Impulse of Revolutions’,” 280-81.
59
The key legal articles were as follows: “Article 117: There shall be established on the rural habitations national
schools where shall be taught the precepts of religion, reading, writing and the fundamentals of arithmetic. The
pupils shall learn to apply the best possible methods for the most productive cultivation of the land. The girls shall
learn to sew. Article 118: There shall be boarding schools where the greatest possible number of children of
agricultural families shall be educated at government expense. They may also admit boarding and day students
supported by parents or municipalities. Article 119: There shall be annexed to each rural school sufficient land
which, when cultivated by the children themselves, shall provide for the total or at least a part of their subsistence.”
Mercer Cook, Education in Haiti, US Office of Education (Bulletin 1948, No. 1): 15. www.dloc.com
60
Pamphile argues that the masses of Haitians within the interior of the country were not reached as the Catholic
school system tended to remain within the largest towns and cities like Port-au-Prince. By 1904, only three percent
of Haiti’s school age population was attending regularly. Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 11-12.

32
including the challenges posed by the Vodou religion and use of the Creole (kreyòl) language.

For the majority of peasants who spoke only Creole, the insistence on the monopoly of French in

educational instruction would be particularly devastating and became a serious impediment to

mass education.61 It would soon become apparent that the cost of Vatican recognition, late as it

was in Haiti’s development, threw a wrench into the engine of Haiti’s social/cultural

development – education.

As late as 1940, sociologist John Lobb hoped that “[w]ith the broadening of educational

opportunities…it may be anticipated that the cultural barrier will be lowered, and from the

merging of the Elite "fringe" and the upper-stratum Noirs there will develop the necessary

middle class.”62 Clearly, the use of education initially as a tool to reinforce control over the

peasantry, and later, as a means of oppressing the majority of Haitians, can be understood as a

lost opportunity. What will become evident in later chapters is that the outside world understood

the importance of education, but rather than using it as a force for progress, instead wielded it as

a tool to retard Haitian development. The US Marine Occupation (1915-34) treated education in

the same sabotaging manner. Likewise, the United Nations would later treat Haitian education

within a similarly oppressive framework, producing similar tragic results.

61
Interestingly, the French historian Sylvie Laurent claims “[l]e français fut ainsi selon la légende nationale
haïtienne le « butin de guerre » de la nation émancipée en 1804.” English, on the other hand and more particularly
since the Marine Occupation, has become the language of the occupier. See Sylvie Laurent, “Littérature haïtienne :
Edwidge Danticat, une créolité à l'américaine,” Esprit 376, no. 7 (Juillet 2011) : 48, 50.
62
John Lobb, “Caste and Class in Haiti,” 34.

33
Chapter Two - Militarism and Haiti

In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive
Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War has the same tendency to render the head too
large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long
be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been
always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim
to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies
kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.1
- American Founding Father and President James Madison

James Madison’s warning foreshadowed the problems Haiti confronted following the

Haitian Revolution, namely, that a large standing army serving a military government would

eventually become an instrument of tyranny in repressing the peasantry of Haiti. Understanding

how Madison’s nightmarish predictions came to pass in Haiti requires an understanding of the

role militarism played in that nation, including the nature of the civil-military relationship that

developed. That understanding will shed light on the question: how and why was the Haitian

military able to avoid subordination to civilian control?2

Militarism is defined as the “predominance of the armed forces in the administration or

policy of the state.”3 A somewhat innocuous-sounding idea, at its core, it defines the civil-

military relationship built within a society.4 That relationship – repressive or otherwise - is

1
Gaillard Hunt, ed.., The Writings of James Madison: 1787: The Journal of the Constitutional Convention (New
York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1902), 3:317. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1935.
2
Note that while that avoidance can in part be found within colonial Saint Domingue’s past history, it is within the
post-independence history that external influence comes into play to either exacerbate or encourage that continued
militarism within Haiti. Accordingly, the question to be explored in Part Two of my thesis as it relates to militarism
are the questions: to what extent did the behaviour of Western nations and international agencies like the United
Nations exacerbate or encourage Haitian militarism? How did Western interventionist activities shape Haiti’s civil-
military relationship?
3
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 2000. Note the Concise
Oxford Dictionary provided the following definition - “undue prevalence of military spirit or ideals” – which I felt
was too general and not as useful for the purposes of this thesis.
4
Without expanding this thesis to argue about the role of the military in its society, I would simply make the case
that from a liberal democratic point of view, the ideal relationship is one in which the military has embraced and
understands the importance of its subordination to civil control. That understanding is achieved through constant
training of military members that would include acculturation leading military leaders to view military interference
in society and societal politics as anathema to the military’s professional values. Save for the direst of circumstances

34
informed and shaped by past cultural behaviour and influences, both internal and external, and is

frequently dynamic and evolutionary. In its worst form, militarism is embodied by a militarized

state; therein, military and security forces are often less interested in protecting against external

threats and/or interference and focus instead on suppressing internal criticism of the regime in

power. Associated with authoritarian regimes, the militarized state is prone to conduct violent

attacks on the very citizenry it has sworn to protect.

In the case of Haiti, the militarized state has flourished and has led to a historic civil-

military relationship that can best be described as toxic in nature. Militarism has and continues to

be a significant, pervasive, and deleterious factor impairing normative development of any

meaningful democratic institutions in Haiti.5 As this thesis will show, too often the response to

any civil disturbance or protest in Haiti is a military response.

Laying the Foundation: The Origins of Haitian militarism in colonial Saint Domingue

For Haitian men citizenship first took the form of military service, and the army became
one of the main avenues of male political participation, as well as a route to land
ownership.6
- Sociology Professor Mimi Sheller

Militarism in post-independence Haiti can be attributed to one major factor: the threat of

the re-introduction of slavery. Haitian fear of a re-invasion that aimed to roll back the clock on

slavery led to the retention of a strong army and the construction of expensive defensive works,

(e.g. violent insurrection), military leaders ideally would view repressive policy enacted against political opponents
or other interest groups within the society as completely contrary to the military’s raison d’être and therefore to be
avoided. Unfortunately, for Haiti, this has not been the case.
5
Interestingly, Martin Shaw has pointed out that the study of militarism as it relates to Haiti has been dismissed and
viewed as “academically marginal.” For a so-called academically marginal area of study, it has nonetheless sparked
a fair amount of academic interest! This then raises the question: how to move militarism within Haiti from the
margins of academic study and into the center of academic relevance? See Martin Shaw, “Twenty-first Century
Militarism: A Historical-Sociological Framework,” in Stavrianakis and Selby, Militarism and International
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 19.
6
Mimi Sheller, “Sword-Bearing Citizens: Militarism and Manhood in Nineteenth-Century Haiti,” in Alyssa
Goldstein Sepinwall, ed., Haitian History: New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013), 165.

35
including the massive Citadelle Laferrière. It is important, however, to not over-emphasize the

impact of that initial period on modern Haiti and its historical problem with militarism. Post-

independence regimes certainly had means and opportunity to change the military-civil

relationship positively yet failed to do so. Understanding when those opportunities were

available, and why they were not capitalized upon is critical to understanding the role of

militarism in Haiti’s history.

By the mid-1700s, colonial militia service was moving towards a more ‘professional’

force which witnessed the emergence of career officers. To increase the prestige of militia

service, colonial authorities began to expand the officer commissions to include responsibility

for the local parishes, giving key militia commissions the added title and authority of “parish

administrators.” This gave militia officers responsibility for oversight of local infrastructure

development and fortifications, in particular, maintenance of control over the local slave

population; and the conduct of censuses.7 As early as 1755, royal officials within the colony

were complaining about the usurpation of the judicial function by military leaders within Port-

au-Prince.8 This trend of the military encroaching significantly into areas of local governance

would become a constant and unhealthy theme in Haiti which would continue into modern times

in various forms.9

7
Parish administrators would later be upgraded to the position of commander of the local parishes. Garrigus, Before
Haiti, 30.
8
Garrigus, Before Haiti, 31.
9
That trend-cum-theme would see the institutionalization of merging political and military authority within outlying
regions of Haiti and was to become a significant problem. Contemporarily, President Aristide’s regime ran into
serious opposition and armed resistance when he announced plans to dismantle the section chief program. Many of
those affected by the dismantling of the program would unite with other anti-democratic paramilitary elements and
become a formidable force in opposition to his regime. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The
Promise of Deliberative Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 29-30, 241n33. For a broad
overview of the chefs de section program including its historical background, see Max Blanchet, trans., The Rural
Police: An Institution that Deserves to be Uprooted. By Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen, ed., Bryant C Freeman,
University of Kansas Occasional Paper No. 18, 1998. A more limited examination of the program can be found in
Pnina Lahav, “The Division of Legal Labor in Rual [sic] Haiti,” Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee / Law and Politics
in Africa, Asia and Latin America 8, no. 3/4 (1975): 465-81.

36
The emergence of the militarized state: Haiti looks to survive

We have seen that the strategy of Louverture’s party had required a formidable army
whose main task was to impose and maintain unconditional freedom in Saint-Domingue.
Even before independence, the rebel slaves saw themselves first and foremost as a people
united behind a military-type organization. The awareness of the nation came through
this organization. The army thus played a crucial unifying role in the formation of the
nation as a self-conscious community fighting for a new political order.10
- Haitian Professor of Anthropology, Michel-Rolph Trouillot

Michel Laguerre, too, pointed out that for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth

century, Haiti was a militarized society.11 Members of government either rose to power through

their military background and connections or achieved power as civilians through the support of

the military. This translated into the domination of Haiti’s government by its army, an unhealthy

relationship that saw the military and government comingling. Early Haitian governments never

formally subordinated the army to the civil government. Given the new nation lacked any real

experience in democratic civil governance, and that the only real functioning service was the

military, the predominance of the army was not surprising. Moreover, Laguerre noted that “the

existence of the indigenous army preceded that of the [Haitian] nation and, in effect, made

possible the state and the first government of the republic.”12

Colonial Saint Domingue was an agrarian-based society, but with the colonial economy

ruined by war, Toussaint as governor-general was forced to turn to drastic measures to re-start

export production to generate the capital needed for his military objectives. To that end, he

quickly embraced the armed plantation system or caporalisme agraire.13 Toussaint’s strategy for

10
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 87.
11
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 25. By militarized, I am viewing the phenomenon through the lens of
state-sponsored force used against its citizenry for any number of reasons.
12
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 26.
13
The armed plantation system was a militarized extension of the plantation system, or système portionnaire,
instituted by the French civil commissioners using ‘semi-free’ cultivators under the terms of the August 1793
emancipation proclamation of Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and that of his colleague, Étienne Polverel, shortly

37
ensuring the viability of caporalisme agraire was outlined in his Constitution of 1801 that not

only named him governor- general for life, but also laid the groundwork for the eventual

militarized state that would emerge with Haitian independence.

Articles 14 through 16 of the Constitution set the tone for his militarized system by

giving the landholders dominion over those cultivators working on the land while at the same

time denying cultivator rights to mobility or relocation.14 Under Article 67, Toussaint prohibited

plantation cultivators from creating cooperatives, unions or guilds, for purposes that were

considered “contrary to the public order.” The measure further denied economic and social

mobility to cultivators who were also forbidden from collectively purchasing large tracts of land,

thus preventing them from improving their social and economic status.

Other articles rounded out the militarized system’s defenses by imposing censorship on

Saint Domingue. Article 39 restricted the publication and circulation of any writings that could

“corrupt mores or trouble the new colony” with the “authors or colporteurs” subject to sanction.

Under Article 52, the military was cautioned not to question their orders – “they can never

deliberate” – and were to be ready for mobilization at any time.15 Members of the militia were

restricted to their parish unless authorized by the local military commander.

In the post-independence period, Haiti remained under the threat of French invasion and

the potential re-imposition of slavery. It was, virtually, an isolated nation, alone and feared by its

thereafter. The system was taken over and reinforced by Toussaint Louverture whose Constitution of 1801 placed
the farm workers directly under the supervision of the army.
14
Note that the only property holders who still owned plantations during this period were those pardoned white
colonists whom Toussaint allowed back into Saint Domingue to retake possession. His military and others who were
leased abandoned or sequestered plantations from the colonial government as well as the managers for absentee
proprietors, were referred to under Article 15 which refers to them, without additional specificity, thusly: “dont le
propriétaire ou son représentant est nécessairement le père. Carolyn Fick to author, 18 July 2020. Personal
correspondence.
15
Under Article 53, “the Armed Forces” referred to both the paid and unpaid colonial guard. The latter included all
the males capable of military service including the agricultural workers.

38
neighbours.16 Relief from the strategic threat posed by France would not emerge until 1825 when

détente with France was made possible through the coerced agreement to pay reparations to

French slaveholders for damage and loss of property suffered during the revolution. Until that

time, maintenance of a large standing army, coupled to defensive preparations and an arms

buildup, were strategic necessities, quite simply a matter of life and death.

The problem for Dessalines became one of generating the funds necessary to pay for

what was an enormous burden, financially and otherwise, on the new nation. Servicing the costs

associated with maintaining a large standing army and financing the substantial defensive

fortification projects erected in Haiti, were responsible for the diversion of significant amounts of

tax revenue. During Dessalines’s regime, the Haitian army included some 10 percent of the

Haitian male population and was involved in a massive defensive construction program that

included the famous Citadelle Laferrière.17 The manpower requirements and resultant drain on

the economy both in terms of salaries and lost productivity were prohibitive for the newly

created nation and were key factors in preventing the development of infrastructure for national

activities other than those associated with military defense.

16
Mark B. Bird, The Black Man: or, Haytian Independence, 1869, 60, cited in Charles H. Wesley, “The Struggle for
the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics,” The Journal of Negro History 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1917):
369-383. ‘Alone’ refers to the failure to receive any international recognition of Haiti by a major world power prior
to 1825. Christophe issued a proclamation in 1816 that disallowed any negotiation between his kingdom and France
until the economic and political independence of Haiti was recognized. Interestingly, Susan Buck-Morss points out
that Europe and the United States did in fact recognize Haiti following its self-liberation, but “…only in the form of
fear.” Julia Gaffield builds on historian Lauren Benton’s concept of “layered sovereignty” which argues that
international relations were undertaken at different levels and in different domains (diplomatic, economic, etc),
allowing what appeared to be almost normal interactions at times between states but without complete and formal
recognition. For Haiti, this meant that nations would be willing to trade with Haiti (including military supplies), but
without extending formal recognition. Sovereignty then was considered divisible, leading to differing levels of
diplomatic interaction. Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and General History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2009), 39; and Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World.
17
Heinl and Heinl claim the Army was closer to 15 percent. See Leyburn, The Haitian People, 37.

39
 Not surprisingly, Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued that Haitian militarism developed as

a product of the “way in which production was organized and surplus extracted….”18 Post-

revolutionary Haiti presented Dessalines with a surplus of land, albeit bereft of most plantation

infrastructure and ravaged by years of warfare, and with a shortage of agricultural labour.19 His

1805 Constitution included the statement that all property that had formally belonged to

Frenchmen now defaulted to the state. As head of state, he was then able to lease or rent out, as

had Toussaint Louverture before him, former plantation lands to members of the elite, partially

solving his revenue requirements.

He also created an agricultural labour pool from those not in the military or not

possessing an urban trade that could be exploited through taxation. The system was

institutionalized, and the cultivators were controlled by regulating both movement and

advancement outside the agricultural field. Family members of agricultural workers were not

able to find employment outside agriculture without special permission, the intent being to

ensure Haiti retained a steady and future supply of farm labourers.20 James Leyburn argues that

18
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 27. Suzy Castor likewise argues that the feudal system implemented in
Haiti after independence lent itself to militarism as “la survivance des rapports de production féodale faisait de
chaque propriétaire terrien une force économique.” Note that during the period from 1804 to 1825, a number of
European nations were still under the thrall of feudalism (usually some variant of serfdom), so Haiti’s turn to its own
form of feudalism in the form of caporalisme agraire should not necessary be seen as unique or unusual. Castor,
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 30.
19
There is disagreement over the state of Haiti’s economy inherited by Dessalines. James Leyburn wrote that “[t]he
warfare of 1802-3 had left the country in chaos. Plantations and agricultural projects were almost totally ruined. His
point of view is supported by a number of other academics as well. Yet Mats Lundahl points out that that whereas in
1795 “none of the major exports was even up to 3 percent of its 1789 volume…In 1802, coffee was up to 45 percent,
sugar to 38 percent, and cotton to 58 percent of the pre-revolution level.” While Dessalines had a tough road ahead,
Lundahl believes it was considerably easier than that which Toussaint Louverture had faced. See Leyburn, The
Haitian People, 33; and Mats Lundahl, “Defense and distribution: Agricultural policy in Haiti during the reign of
Jean-Jacques Dessalines,1804–1806,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 32, no. 2 (2011): 85.
20
Such a regulated system of plantation labor was continued under the rule of Dessalines’s successor, Henri
Christophe (1807-1820) and then of President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818 to 1843), the latter having introduced
legislation that sought to force workers to remain on the land. Boyer’s Rural Code of 1825, for example, included
Article 4 that prohibited the emigration of those “whose employment is agriculture …” without permission.
Ironically, the indemnity signed in 1825 should have allowed some respite from the massive expenditures involved
in national defence. Instead, the indemnity imposed new financial hardship that Boyer felt necessitated the
continuation of the semi-feudal system with its targeting of future Haitian generations. Article 5 of the Rural Code

40
Dessalines’s “entire social and economic order was based upon the subservience of the many to

the few.”21

His Constitution of 1805 institutionalized the military government, dividing his empire

into six military districts commanded by a general officer in each.22 Article 19 also proclaimed

Dessalines, as Emperor, the commander in chief of the Army who retained the sole prerogative

to declare war or make peace, as well as conduct diplomatic relations including treaties. While

he created tribunals in Haiti’s major cities, he reserved military crimes for special tribunals

outside of civilian control. Finally, the Emperor’s council of state was solely composed of those

general officers commanding divisions and brigades.

An additional element of the militarized system also came into play at this time and

became a mainstay of Haitian regime change: the “dechoukaj” or violent cleansing.23 In 1804,

Dessalines began his rule with the massacre of those French remaining within the newly minted

country of Haiti.24 What is significant about the slaughter is that from a geopolitical perspective,

it can be considered a major error in judgment.25 The killings reinforced the Western narrative

about the horrors of slave insurrections and were linked to the fear of slave revolution being

specified that children of agricultural workers were not allowed to move into another profession without the express
permission of a justice of the peace. See The Rural Code of Haiti in French and English (London: McMillan, 1827),
3-4. https://books.google.ca/books.
21
Leyburn, The Haitian People, 42.
22
Interestingly, Dessalines distrusted his divisional commanders as Article 17 stated: “These generals of division
shall be independent of one another, and shall correspond directly with the Emperor, or with the general in chief
appointed by his Majesty.”
23
It could be argued that the dechoukaj which took place with some routine was in fact simply a violent reaction to a
previous regime’s repressive measures. Either way, the post-regime cleansing was allowed by the militarized state to
take place without any significant effort being taken to prevent it, making it, after a while, seem to be a customary or
institutionalized element of the militarized state. The dechoukaj that took place at the end of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s
regime in 1986 was anticipated as a major cathartic event, but ended up being one which many Haitians complained
had been cut short and not properly completed. See, for example, Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 222-24.
24
The motivation for the massacres was explored in Chapter One.
25
Philippe Girard provides perhaps the most biased and extreme account of the 1804 massacres. He has gone so far
as to term the killings genocide. Likewise, Adam Jones and Nicholas Robins identify the massacre as “subaltern
genocide.” See Girard, “Caribbean genocide,” 138-61; and Nicholas Robins and Adam Jones, eds., Genocide by the
Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009).

41
exported abroad. Internally, the massacres created a narrative that linked them to the later use of

the dechoukaj in the aftermath of any regime change, a phenomenon that would continue to be

repeated throughout Haitian history. That narrative was used later in the nineteenth century by

the Great Powers against Haiti for selfish reasons.26

The development or growth of militarism in the immediate post-revolutionary period can

be seen as a result of a number of factors: the exploitation of the population’s perception of the

Haitian army as savior of the nation; the idea of the military being the only defense of the nation

against the re-introduction of slavery; the perceived need to re-establish the armed plantation

system, which led to subsequent entrenchment of the militarized state; and the army as a symbol

of the nation for the majority of Haitians who fought under its banner. Not surprisingly, given the

growth of the militarized state, Haiti began to develop what Laguerre has argued was a “military

caste.”27

Yet until at least 1825, the Haitian army was both the savior and the key to continued

freedom. That status allowed the military to move easily into a position of strong involvement in

national governance, adding another role to the Army in addition to security and ensuring

economic production.28 In Trouillot’s eyes, “[m]ilitarism reinforced the state’s visibility within

26
The reaction in 1825 of the French Foreign Minister to the massacre was typical. He was quoted as saying:
“[r]ecognition of a Black Empire founded on Insurrection, and upon the Massacre of the White Population, would
have a most pernicious moral Effect.” An argument has been advanced that the massacres deprived Haiti of much
needed expertise for proper governance, but that argument has not been well developed. Further, Dessalines did
allow some select whites to be protected and unmolested, which further undermines the argument for genocide.
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 156.
27
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 26. The Haitian Constitution of 1806 alluded to this development
through the inclusion of Article 48, which restricted the choice of Senators to those “who serve or have served a
civil or military function with integrity and honour.” Julia Gaffield, “Complexities of Imagining Haiti,”94.
28
The reality of combining military and political governance under the same individuals, with its foundation in
Haiti’s colonial past, was institutionalized in Haiti’s early Constitutions. For example, Article 28 of Toussaint
Louverture’s 1801 Constitution made him both the governor of Saint Domingue and the commander-in-chief of the
army. Dessalines went further in his Constitution of 1805, combining his position as emperor with that of first
magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army (Article 19). However, he also gave himself absolute control over
the military in Article 30, which allowed him the authority to appoint and dismiss any military officer at will. See

42
the nation.” 29 The Haitian Army was the only true transnational state organization and one of the

few institutions that introduced many Haitians to their national government. At some point, the

necessity for a strong military became a circular and reinforcing argument. A large standing

army was necessary based on Haiti’s geopolitical threats, and funding the army required

Dessalines to return to caporalisme agraire. Yet to maintain that coercive system required a

strong military to repress the very citizens it claimed to protect.

Julia Gaffield, “Complexities of Imagining Haiti: A Study of National Constitutions, 1801-1807,” Journal of Social
History 41, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 81-103.
29
Trouillot believed this led to the problem whereby the military reinforced the separation of state and nation by
virtue of the militaristic role it played within Haitian society. What he meant was that, contrary to normative
development, any response by the state to development issues was all too frequently in the form of “arrests,
assassinations, rebellions.” Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 88.

43
Chapter Three – Haiti and Land

Finally, permanent freedom from slavery had been won through independence. But the
masses had not yet won the freedom to till their own soil. And this, perhaps more than
anything else, sums up what the peasant masses expected out of freedom. A personal
claim to the land upon which one labored and from which to derive and express one's
individuality was, for the black laborers, a necessary and an essential element in their
vision of freedom. For without this concrete economic and social reality, freedom for the
ex-slaves was little more than a legal abstraction. To continue to be forced into laboring
for others, bound by property relations that afforded few benefits and no real alternatives
for themselves, meant that they were not entirely free.1
- Professor of History Carolyn Fick

With a dense population and no industry, land is life, and more especially it is freedom.2
- Professor of Economics and Sociology Emily Greene Balch

Land ownership and use in an agrarian-based society like Haiti is subject to both

customary usage and laws which in turn have shaped the ideological development of all groups

within the civil society. Land ownership and usage rules have influenced the ideological leanings

of the peasantry more than they have the elite.3 This is not surprising given the vital peasant

connection to land and the origins of that relationship during the colonial period.4 That

relationship can be described as deep, visceral, and paradoxical. On the one hand, slavery has

been described as hell on earth and many slaves were worked to death on the land. On the other

hand, working the land, when it was to their own benefit on their small garden plots, also became

1
Fick, Making Haiti, 249.
2
Emily Greene Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti: Being the report of a Committee of Six disinterested American
representing organizations exclusively American, who, having personally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor
the restoration of the Independence of the Negro Republic (New York: The Writers Publishing Company, Inc.,
1927), 75.
3
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 34.
4
I am using the following definition for the peasantry: “small agricultural producers who, with the help of simple
equipment and the labour of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of
obligations to the holders of political and economic power.” Teodor Shanin, “Peasantry as a Political Factor,” cited
in Ǿyvind Ǿsterud, “The Class Quality of Peasantry: A Conceptual Exploration,” Scandinavian Political Studies 11,
no. A11 (January 1976): 37. See also Teodor Shanin, ed., Peasant and Peasant Societies (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1971).

44
a means of achieving a degree of independence or freedom from their enslavement, if only

temporarily.5

For the elite, the importance of land would quickly shift from the plantation system to an

abandonment of that system by landowners in the South during the reign of President Pétion,

“surrender[ing] land in order to win control of the state.”6 According to Carolyn Fick, by the

1820s and 1830s, “large landowners began to reconcile themselves to the poor returns from

large–scale production and of refractory labourers, who spent more time cultivating their own

crops than those of the owner.”7 Owners shifted to more lucrative commercial activities in urban

areas, either selling off their land or renting it out as absentee landlords.8

Key to that shift away from the armed plantation system was the signing in 1825 of the

forced indemnity with France, and the ostensible ending of the state of war between the two

nations. The value of land then shifted away from its initial importance as a national strategy for

survival, and instead moved to the periphery, becoming important once again when tied, from

time to time, to various foreign schemes.9 For the peasantry, though, land remained crucial to

their economic and cultural well-being as it was the pivot around which their subsistence farming

revolved.10 The lakou system, for example, was based on land and had its roots in African

practices. It features a common yard around which people built their housing, and was overseen

5
Trouillot, for example, argued that during Toussaint Louverture’s rule, those coerced agriculture workers were
equating liberty with continued access to Sunday markets and of course, “the right to work on garden plots.” Both
were colonial practices which carried over into independent Haiti. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 44.
6
Trouillot, 48.
7
Carolyn E. Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: From plantation labour to peasant proprietorship,” Slavery and Abolition
2, no. 2 (Aug 2000): 34.
8
The system that evolved was known as “metayage” or “de moitié” with the peasant retaining 50 percent of the
crops from their agrarian production. Fick argues that essentially “they had become virtual freeholders.” Ibid., 34.
9
One such scheme revolved around the 1910 national railway concession granted to the American, James P.
McDonald, which included a provision granting McDonald a 20-kilometer buffer of unoccupied public land on
either side of the proposed rail route. That 20-kilometer swath of land was granted to McDonald for the raising of
bananas. See Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 21.
10
For more information on Vodou and its relationship to peasant land uses, see, for example, Alfred Métraux,
Voodoo in Haiti (New York: Pantheon, 1989).

45
by village elders or the village priest or priestess.11 It was intended to provide shelter and

protection from political and/or economic shocks through collective organization.12 Central to

the lakou system was “a network of thriving and bustling markets” that connected the peasantry

to an informal nation within the state.13

What allowed the system to work was expansion of traditional markets into areas

excluded from market activity during the colonial and post-colonial period.14 From an economic

point of view, the local markets and their association with the lakou system allowed the

development of local or micro-economies that were partially insulated from the vagaries of the

international markets and international commerce, and permitted a reasonably stable standard of

living.15 The crops grown locally on those plots of land and available to the members of the

lakou became the foundation of the Haitian micro-economy.

Socially, the lakou and linked market system brought social relations into the local

economy. Social capital embedded in familial and kinship ties are more important to the local

11
The chef de section is an example of a feature of Haitian rural life that had its roots in the lakou system. An
excellent overview of the relationship of the chef de section and the local Justice of the Peace in a rural village
setting is provided by Lahav, “The Division of Legal Labor in Rual [sic] Haiti,” 465-81.
12
The lakou system in Haiti has been identified, for example, as providing a mother’s support network, whereby
several mothers provide support to each other and care and supervise the young children within the housing cluster.
That important lakou function has been disappearing with the modern mass migrations to the urban areas and away
from the rural villages that supported the lakou system. See Yanique M. Edmond, Suzanne M. Randolph, and
Guylaine L. Richard, “The Lakou System: A Cultural, Ecological Analysis of Mothering in Rural Haiti,” The
Journal of Pan African Studies 2, No. 1 (November 2007): 19-32. For more detail on the lakou system, see
also, Jean-Yves Merilus, “Rural Development: The Economic Potentials of Haiti’s ‘Lakou’ System,” Focus on
Geography 58., no. 1 (Spring 2015): 36-45.
13
Merilus, “Rural Development,” 37.
14
Mats Lundahl wrote: “with the transition from plantations to small farms and the expansion of the latter across
Haitian territory new market-places were created in rural areas to permit an increasing exchange of goods to take
place between peasants…Periods of free rural trade alternated with periods of severe restrictions on the functioning
of the rural market-places, and it was not until 1952 that the survival of the latter was finally legally assured.” See
Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 124.
15
By insulation, I am referring to the local monetary values that are assigned to specific crops, independent of
international pricing. Thus, a fixed amount of coffee will retain, through either local sales or barter, a definite and
non-changing value to locals that is often less than the international price. This local market price is what allows the
local citizens to maintain a certain standard of living while earning what are considered to be ridiculously low wages
from an international point of view.

46
peasant. Intangible social capital from such ties factored into access to land, labour, and local

loans. They have also given rise to a “sexual division of labour” with the men doing most of the

farm tasks and the women handling most of the market sales.16 The role of women is central to

peasant society, notwithstanding the paternalistic nature of Haitian society. That centrality is

embedded in the Haitian proverb, “Fam se poto mitan [Women are the pillars of society].”17

One particularly problematic customary and legal issue that influences decisions

involving land in Haiti is that of the land registry system. Typically, a land registry system

provides a record of transactions involving land and confirmation of legal ownership status,

including, often, customary usage rights. Haiti’s land registry system, to the extent it exists, has a

long and troubled history, beginning with the colonial practice of providing unregistered and

unofficial land grants to “les libertés de savanne” [slaves unofficially freed by their masters].18

Later land practices would likewise contribute to the problems. President Pétion’s land

distribution program that began in 1809 led to Haitian landowners breaking up their large estates

and shifting their attention to urban commercial activities instead. It also began leasing

arrangements with peasants for small parcels of land, under share-cropper arrangements. Those

arrangements became the basis for the many and varied customary claims to specific plots of

land by descendants. Land squatting also became more frequent during this period: it allowed

16
As Lundahl found, “[n]early every peasant woman during the course of her life acquires a considerable amount of
trading experience…several try their luck as professional tradeswomen.” Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 146.
17
Cited in Yanique M. Edmond, et al., “The Lakou System” 20.
18
As Robert Lacerte has pointed out, the plantation owner never actually finalized the severance and transference of
the land to his informally freed slaves. However, and notwithstanding their official status as slaves, they “came to
consider it [the parcel of land] theirs and even passed it on to their children….” Carolyn Fick has pointed out the
number of libertés de savanne would have been difficult to determine as they were not demographically identified as
such in the official census records. Robert K. Lacerte, “The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution,
1791-1820,” The Americas 34, no. 4 (Apr. 1978): 452; and Carolyn Fick to author, 9 October 2015. Personal
correspondence.

47
“over time, [the fixture of] …their family names to the holdings they cultivated.”19 Land

squatting remains a common practice in Haiti today.

Further complicating the orderly registration of land ownership were developments in the

period from the end of the nineteenth century to the start of the US Marine Occupation. The

many coups during this period led to the confiscation of land holdings of rival groups and re-

distribution to supporters on the winning side. Not surprisingly, records were often either altered

or destroyed, leaving a chaotic mess. The land registry system in the rural areas mixed formal

and customary understandings of land ownership and use.20

Periodically, the resulting confusion led to conflict. A recent example is the ongoing

conflict in the Artibonite Valley region. Between 1999 and 2001, President René Préval (1996 to

2001) undertook what can be termed modest land reform in the Artibonite Valley area, re-

distributing some 5,000 carreaux (over 15, 000 acres) of land to almost 6,000 families. Préval

took land from both state land holdings and from the holdings of large landowners, and

distributed it to peasants, resulting in each receiving around a half carreau or 1.6 acres.

The re-distribution program was undertaken by the National Institute for the Application

of Agrarian Reform (INARA), part of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture.21 However, the land

in question was not then owned by the peasants who received the small individual plots doled out

by the state. Instead, the land was attached to “a usufruct contract” with the state, meaning the

19
Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 35.
20
Dr. Emily Greene Balch, a renowned professor of economic and sociology, believed the Haitian attitude to land
was “non-commercial…[and treated] land…not like other commodities, that the arbiter of claims is custom, and that
rentals tend to become fixed charges with no relation to changing land values…the mere fact of using a piece of land
either as a tenant or as occupier, without a legal title, tends to harden into ownership… .” Balch equated that concept
of ‘ownership’ with “a principle akin to ‘squatter titles’ in the US.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 65.
21
The material presented is drawn from Beverly Bell’s interview with Ronel Thelusmond, Director of the technical
division of the Haitian Institut National de la Réforme Agraire [National Institute for the Application of Agrarian
Reform] (INARA). See Beverly Bell, “Redistributing Haiti's highly concentrated land is essential for the sustenance
of agriculture and of farmers,” World Pulse, 03 March 2011. www.worldpulse.com

48
peasants had “the right to use the land and own all products from it,” but the Haitian state

retained ownership of the land and the peasants had no legal recourse if there were contractual

issues.22

At the same time, complementary planning for other commercial activities intended to

“decrease the pressure put on the land” did not materialize, and the land re-distribution program

was eventually ended by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue after he took office in 2004 following

the coup against President Aristide. Shortly thereafter, major landowners began to seize back

their lands and started eviction proceedings against the peasant farmers. The attempts at evictions

would lead to conflict erupting in the area.23

Reformation of the land registry system continues to be debated. For example, OXFAM,

reporting in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, indicated that land reform is required, particularly

because of the land speculation, forced evictions and land squatting that occurred.24 The

organization advocated for a rigorous legal system that would facilitate quick resolution of

disputes.

Conversely, Smucker et al have argued that land registry reform has no definitive link to

development. Instead, they argue that peasants “are preoccupied more by political and economic

insecurity than insecure tenure.”25 What is clear is that customary and formal systems for land

22
See Beverly Bell, Fault Lines: Views across Haiti’s Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
23
As recently as 2013, Haiti saw gunfire break out over a land conflict involving some four acres of land in the
Artibonite area: over 250 houses were burned out and some 300 families were reported displaced as a result. Details
on the 2013 conflict are taken from the UN MINUSTA report, “A land conflict in Artibonite mobilizes the
humanitarian community,” 22 January, 2014. https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/land-conflict-artibonite-mobilizes-
humanitarian-community.
24
Henry F. Etienne, “Land Rights, Land Tenure, and Urban Recovery: Rebuilding post-earthquake Port-au-Prince
and Léogâne,” Oxfam America Research Backgrounder series, 2012. www.oxfamamerica.org.
25
Glenn R. Smucker, T Anderson White and Michael Bannister, “Land tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural
Technology within Haiti,” CAPRi Working Paper 0006, Washington DC: IFPRI, 2000.
http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/capriwp06.asp.

49
tenure require harmonization and synchronization to protect peasant rights.26 In my view,

without reform to the Haitian legal system generally, peasant insecurity is only heightened by

tampering with land tenure reform.

26
One other complication, which will be highlighted later, involves the forced opening of land ownership by the
Marine authorities during the Occupation, allowing foreign ownership of Haitian land. Professor Emily Balch issued
this warning in 1926, foreshadowing later land abuses by foreigners: “If no safeguards are evolved a system which
invites foreign land ownership in Haiti may create evils that ages cannot solve.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 73.

50
Chapter Four - Haiti: The State

The [Haitian] government has never seen its duties as including a responsibility for the
welfare of its individual subjects in general, and a failure to recognize this fact has been
one of the reasons why foreign observers frequently misunderstood the nature of
Duvalier’s administration and its prospects for survival. The fact that his government did
almost nothing to improve the lot of the average Haitian was irrelevant to his claims of
legitimacy. No government in the history of Haiti had done anything significant to
improve the lot of the masses and this is not the criterion by which a regime was judged.
At least Duvalier usually refrained from interfering with the life of the peasant, and this
was all they could hope for from a government.1
- Professor of History and Theology David Nicholls

When discussing the state and its development, we naturally turn towards what we know

and understand— the liberal democratic state here in the West. When we examine the Haitian

state, it is, fortunately or not, through a similar lens. We are measuring it using the liberal

democratic metrics associated with the rule of law, citizen rights, and whether the state meets the

economic and social needs of its citizenry. A ‘good’ state then is one that is characterized by

specific values like egalitarianism, individual liberty, and an absence of corruption. It also often

encompasses moral values such as tolerance and accommodation.

The most important elements of a ‘good’ state can be understood to be its governance

institutions and agencies, which should allow all parts of the society to live together in peace and

relative harmony. Employing those metrics, the development of the Haitian state has been

problematic from its inception. Its development has been impaired and limited, and the state

itself has consequently been described as dysfunctional, predatory, and failed in relation to its

governance obligations.

Understanding how the Haitian state has arrived at this point requires a review of Haitian

state-building historically. What events precluded Haiti from developing ‘normally’ and instead

1
Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 247.

51
launched it down the long path to its current status as a ‘bad’ or predatory state? This question

will, in turn, allow the exploration, in later chapters, of the role played by foreign interventions in

that mal development. Finally, I will touch briefly upon national identity and its relation to the

Haitian state.

Background

Haiti clearly followed the European, in particular the French model, throughout the
nineteenth century - during and not after the era of intense nationalism. Haiti was thus a
new nation amongst the powerful nations of the West - or at least it strove to be accepted
as such. The Haitian dominant class was oriented towards France and the political and
cultural processes on the other side of the Atlantic therefore had all the more impact on
Haiti's national development.2
- French Studies academic Gérarde Magloire

Trouillot has argued that the state and the nation are different but related concepts.

Within Haiti, he claimed the two “were profoundly at odds” to put it mildly.3 By state and nation,

I defer to the definitions put forward by historian Hugh Seton-Watson for whom a state is “a

legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its

citizens” whereas a nation is “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a

sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness.”4 The former can be understood

as involving the development of those institutions at the state level that allow a monopoly on the

use of legitimate force, the control of national territory, and the development of the institutions

of national power related to governance. The latter involves intangibles like the fostering of

2
Gérarde Magloire, “Haitian-ness, Frenchness and History: Deconstructing the History of the French Component of
Haitian National Identity,” Journal of Haitian Studies 5, no. 6 (1999-2000): 31.
3
Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 16.
4
Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 1.

52
national identity, common or shared cultural heritage and values, and national unity. Those ideas

manifest themselves in a shared national narrative that becomes a national identifier.5

Haiti’s national narrative, at its core, is about independence. Haiti was the only New

World slave colony to throw off the yoke of slavery through successful revolution.6 David

Geggus wrote what is perhaps the most commonly accepted national story of Haiti’s origins:

The Haitian Revolution was never just a slave revolution. Although the destruction of
slavery constitutes its core, only the simultaneous struggle of free and enslaved
nonwhites explains its outcome. Despite their antagonism, slaves and free coloreds each
owe much of their success to the other. Free people of color won the abolition of racial
discrimination in April 1792 because the French knew they could not defeat the slave
insurrection without their help. The inability of the French to suppress the slave
insurrection had much to do with their having to fight the free coloreds at the same time.
And only when the slaves and free coloreds united in the fall or 1802 could they oust the
French and preserve their respective gains by ending colonial rule.7

While that narrative has painted Haiti as a nation that has embraced independence and

freedom, there are also a number of elements that have been excluded or ignored. Front and

centre of course is the controversial role undertaken by national leaders and heroes of the

revolution like Toussaint Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe, who proved willing to

reinforce feudalistic practices, in many ways akin to slavery, and sacrifice the personal freedoms

of the peasantry in order to ensure Haiti’s independence. That willingness to override individual

5
Without digressing into a discussion of the theory behind nation and state-building, suffice it to say that my
understanding is those shared values and common heritage shape a national unity with a common or shared bond, a
bond which shapes a commonly accepted and shared national narrative. That narrative in turn is built upon a
foundation of coherence, unity, and shared interests. State and nation development are best understood as a dual
track process that typically begins with the development of state institutions necessary for governance, and then
incorporates at some point the development of the shared, national identity: both goals should be understood and
undertaken as complementary and may overlap. In the case of Haiti, however, the state “was formed on the back of
the nation and never fully incorporated the shared values of national identity.” The peasantry had developed their
understood identity while the elite dominated the state development and warped it towards their own ends, creating a
radically different national identity and concept of governance. Carolyn Fick to author, 19 June 2019. Personal
correspondence.
6
Trouillot argued that the Haitian victory was “the sole empirical reference point of Haitian nationalist discourse”
prior to the American occupation in 1915 and that the occupation caused many who had embraced that narrative to
question the claims of links back to their ancestors. See Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 130-1.
7
David Geggus, ed., Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 95.

53
liberty in the name of national survival can be understood and celebrated from a Machiavellian

point of view.

Eventually, however, the relationship between state and nation devolved considerably,

with peasant oppression and the inability of the state to provide social goods undermining the

credibility and moral authority of the state. What emerged very early in Haiti’s development

were two competing narratives. One was associated with the former slaves who sought

development opportunities from the Haitian state; and the other was that of the ruling elites who

sought to exclude the peasantry from the state arena while simultaneously profiting from their

labours.8 The ruling elite’s narrative and national consciousness was built on the idea of political

and social control; whereas the peasantry sought a narrative based on personal freedom and was

willing to shape it by employing resistance, accommodation and negotiation.9

Given these competing narratives, the elite often found itself having to compromise in

order to maintain that control and President Pétion’s system of land redistribution was a prime

example of such accommodation. Yet compromise to meet peasant demands was tempered. As

Haitian historian Jean-Alix René argued, Pétion’s land distribution policies legitimized the

authority of the state as both benefactor and protector of the peasantry at the same time as it

ensured its domination over it.10

By the 1820s and 1830s, peasant resistance and rebellion were proving successful. “La

petite culture” had triumphed over “la grande culture” insofar as the plantation system was

8
The ruling elite is not a monolithic group of unchanging families. My readings suggest that various families
manoeuvred for power at different times, leading coups when possible. Those coups often led to those in power
being unseated from power and either forced into exile, or murdered. In either case, their wealth was usually
confiscated and distributed among the supporters of the winning side.
9
Steven Mintz, ed., African American Voices: A Documentary Reader, 1619-1877 (Oxford: Brandywine Press,
2009), 201.
10
See Jean-Alix René, Haiti après l’esclavage : formation de l’État et culture politique populaire (1804-1846),
(Port-au-Prince, Imp. Le Natal, 2019).

54
disappearing and instead the peasantry was allowed to spend their time cultivating their own

crops and looking after their own standard of living.11 In effect, the peasant goal of personal

freedom was, at least in theory, achieved but, from an exclusively Western perspective, within

the framework of poverty. Further, repression and oppression of the peasants continued, ensuring

that any reconciliation of nation and state would remain elusive.

Generally speaking, Haitian governance has been identified, rightly or wrongly, with the

more general theme of Latin American caudillismo.12 The post-revolutionary period saw the

emergence of a central government that featured state institutions typically headed by military

officers. With the notable exception of the presidency of Lysius Salomon (1879 to 1888),

domestic military governments remained in place until the US Marine Occupation when it

shifted to a foreign military government.13 That merging of political and military functions into

one role was particularly bad for the development of both arenas. Professionalization of the

military was severely retarded as was institutional development of proper governance. In

addition to military paternalism (the continuation of the militarized plantation system in the

immediate post-revolutionary period being the best example), corruption also became a dominant

theme.

11
As noted earlier, the indemnity agreement with France in 1825 also significantly lowered the previous strategic
threat of invasion that underlay the massive defence spending and the consequent requirement of proceeds from
caporalisme agraire. James Leyburn cites the historian Romuald Le Pelletier de Saint-Rémy who claims the
Haitians “when they saw themselves freed, by a solemn treaty, seemed to allow their arms to drop relaxed at their
sides, saying, Let’s take a rest.” Leyburn believed “the Haitian army as a disciplined force ceased to exist” with the
removal of the threat to Haiti’s existence. At the same time, he believed with the end to the army’s discipline, Haiti
“lost its last chance of economic prosperity through a system of forced labour.” See Leyburn, The Haitian People,
71.
12
Robert Lacerte has made the argument that the economic decline between 1820 and 1843 “made the first black
nation virtually ungovernable after 1843 save by the rule of caudillos.” Robert Lacerte, "Xenophobia and Economic
Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843." The Americas 37, no. 4 (1981): 499-515.
13
Without delving into political science theory, the argument can be made that the early Haitian governments were
classified as stratocracies, that is, governments which, constitutionally, saw the melding of the state functions with
military positions, the result being the dominance of the Haitian government and state apparatus by military officers.

55
 Michel Laguerre detailed the ramifications of the Haitian system that saw cabinet level

appointments going largely to general officers.14 This allowed those same officers to use their

influence as cabinet-level appointees to foster their own protégés within the military, promoting

friends and allies over rivals. Not only did this create specific cliques within the army, it also

resulted in an army that was quite top heavy, loaded with a large number of colonels and general

officers. Additionally, many politicians or individuals of social or monetary importance were

appointed to senior ranks, many of whom were political appointees and not in any sense

professionally trained in the art of war. Both practices complicated any movement towards

professionalization of the Haitian Army and created a hopelessly complicated military hierarchy.

The system was further dominated and complicated by regionalism. Because Haitian

governments from the beginning were chronically short of funds, one of the primary means of

rewarding service and/or loyalty was through an award of land. Land grants not only secured

loyalty or provided a means of rewarding service, it also tied officers through the land grant to

specific regions within Haiti. That latter effect meant that often individuals who rose to

prominence owed their allegiance not to the government but to the region where they had

developed ties and could exploit them for advancement. Indeed, prior to the Marine Occupation

period, rising to power in Haiti was more about raising regional support, including support from

adjoining regions through their key military leaders.

This regionalist dynamic meant that regions became quite powerful in politics and were

able to counter-balance (or block) the interests of the central government. Presidents were forced

to either cater to regional interests or develop alternate alliances to remain in power. Too

frequently, failure to build and maintain a coalition of support led to rivals exploiting regional

14
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 33-35.

56
discontent to develop and launch revolutionary activity from that base of discontent, building

support and momentum as it progressed towards the capital. At the same time, achieving success

meant promising possible future rewards to supporters. Building alliances and manufacturing a

base of support meant corruption and graft became tools of necessity. Loyalty, through monetary

compensation or through the provision of positions and advancement, created a system of

normalized corruption and graft. Further, raising the caco armies meant promising them

opportunities to loot as they marched towards the capital.15 In short, the predatory system

became normalized throughout Haiti.

Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal identified the predatory nature of the state that

developed in Haiti as part of the “soft state” that lacked “the social discipline necessary for

successful economic and social development.”16 Corruption is the key result of that lack of

mature institutions necessary for proper governance. Mats Lundahl, for his part, has argued that

corruption, rife during the colonial period, continued in the new state after independence.

Government service became a lucrative profession for enriching oneself and not surprisingly was

reserved for the educated elite. The military as a means to advancement would become more

difficult after 1825 when new rules were introduced for promotion.17

15
See Chapter Six of this thesis, “The United States Marine Invasion and Occupation,” for a discussion of cacos.
16
Cited in Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 327.
17
Lundahl., 328.

57
Chapter Five – Eighteen and Nineteenth Century Western Intervention in Haiti.

If ever a country had an opportunity to start absolutely fresh in choosing its own social
institutions, Haiti had that opportunity in 1804. Free at last, with no traditions to uphold,
the first independent Negro state in the world, owing allegiance to no man or nation, the
Haitians might (theoretically, at least) have invented an entirely new little world of
economic, political, religious, and social life. All paths were open to them.1
- Professor of Sociology James G. Leyburn

Michel-Rolph Trouillot called Haiti’s revolutionary path to independence “an

unthinkable history.”2 He argued that because any revolution by black slaves was seen by

Western thinkers as impossible and therefore ‘unthinkable,’ “explanations [were found by the

key Western leaders of the day] that forced the rebellion back within their worldview, shoving

the facts into the proper order of discourse.”3 In the aftermath of the revolution, Haiti was

isolated and ostracized by the international community because of its temerity in successfully

defying its white masters and gaining independence.

Yet a closer reading of the evidence by Julia Gaffield and others demonstrates that, as

with all things Haitian, a cursory view of the situation is much too simple. While Haiti was

denied international recognition, the independent state sustained commercial and trade relations

with a number of nations, including France. This has led Gaffield to conclude that the

international community pragmatically negotiated its relationship with Haiti through “multiple

layers of recognition and non-recognition.”4

While the root decision to isolate Haiti diplomatically can be found in Trouillot’s

‘unthinkable history’ and international racism, the international community used two key events

to justify Haiti’s isolation. The first was the significant impact of the massacres of 1804 directed

1
Leyburn, The Haitian People, 32.
2
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “An Unthinkable History,” in Sepinwall, Haitian History, 42.
3
Trouillot.
4
Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, 184.

58
by Dessalines. Critically, in 1804, US President Thomas Jefferson elected to embargo US arms

sales to Haiti at this critical juncture in Haiti’s existence, reportedly in response to French

diplomatic pressure.5 Tim Matthewson has pointed out that the American decision to embargo

the exportation of weapons to Haiti represented a significant change in policy for the Jefferson

administration as US merchants had provided Dessalines arms and ammunition in 1803 and US

armorers would continue to work in support of his regime as late as 1805.6

The second event was the emigration of French planters and other whites fleeing Haiti for

safer lands during the revolutionary war, starting as early as 1791 and continuing through to

Haiti’s independence. Most of the émigrés saw their departure as temporary, and fully expected

to return once order was re-established in the colony. Many settled in Cuba, Louisiana, and the

United States, while others returned to France; and spread their narrative of terror upon fleeing a

black uprising and the horrors it encompassed.7 That narrative fed into the paranoia of local slave

owners and was no doubt reinforced by reports of the 1804 massacre.8

5
Philippe Girard has argued that the massacre was responsible for the replacement of “wariness with outright
hostility, panic even…” on the part of the Great Powers and that gunboat diplomacy, for example, was merely
“lasting, and understandable, prudence.” There is little evidence to support this position, but I include it as the case
of the Devil’s advocate. See Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History, 157.
6
Sparked by fear of slave rebellions and racism, Jefferson justified the US embargo by citing the 1804 massacres as
its rationale. Secretary of State James Madison declared “it is probably in the interest of all nations that they
[weapons] should be kept out of the hands likely to make so bad use of them.” Tim Matthewson, “Jefferson and the
Nonrecognition of Haiti,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 140, no. 1 (Mar 1996): 29.
7
A number of those who fled the colony were waiting for the conclusion of the fighting (and white success in
suppressing the revolution) and were actively planning to return to their former homes and lifestyles. The failure to
suppress the revolution would have been a shock. Matthewson, 59-62.
8
The argument has been raised that the narrative provided by those whites fleeing revolutionary Saint Domingue
changed the massacre from French ‘whites’ to whites in general, the aim being to make other slave colonies more
cognizant and more empathetic to the isolation and eventual invasion of independent Haiti. However, that narrative
did not resonate with the British. For example, in 1803, British diplomats chose to support the rebelling blacks over
the French because of “the enmity the French in all their action shew [sic] towards our country [Great Britain].”
That support was tempered after the 1804 massacre but was continued as commercial interests won out over any
concerns the British may have had. Moreover, Dessalines had taken pains to protect British merchants in Haiti,
going so far as to post guards to secure their persons and property, measures which were eventually communicated
with the Home Office in London. See Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, 68-9, 85-6.

59
 Haiti’s diplomatic ostracism and isolation profoundly impacted its budget and drove

Haitian militarism. Internally, with the reinstatement of the armed plantation state, the army was

necessary for ensuring internal dissention was kept under control. Externally, in addition to the

threat of a direct invasion by France, Haiti also faced active cross-border incursions from the

eastern end of the island of Hispaniola. The invasion of Santo Domingo in 1805, at the time

under French control, was precipitated by the French authorities allowing, if not actively

condoning, the “enslaving of Haitians along the border.”9 Understandably, the security of the

state became the highest priority for Haitian leaders following the revolution and led to the

diversion of enormous sums of money and the best people into a powerful standing army and

defensive fortifications as deterrents against the all too real threat of invasion.10 Further, Haiti

was largely surrounded by slave colonies, with the United States, in close proximity to the north,

fanning exaggerated fears of Haiti’s revolutionary message taking root on American soil.11

Consider the impact of the foreign menace on Haiti’s limited manpower. A post-

independence census carried out in 1805 estimated Haiti’s population at roughly 380,000, with

women (around 228,000) outnumbering men (152,000) by a factor of three to two.12 The Haitian

army was believed to have been somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of the total population

9
See Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2004), 75.
10
Haiti also was forced to confront an early civil war (1806-11) which saw the state split into two parts: the north
under the control of Henri Christophe and the south and west under the control of Alexandre Sabès Pétion.
11
That proximity was also responsible for Haiti’s regional shunning. Fear of black insurrections and attacks on
property rights continued to ensure Haiti was excluded from the international and regional communities, both of
which hoped the new black nation would either founder and collapse, or would eventually submit and become “the
pawn of a ‘major’ international power.” When it became clear neither scenario would happen, Trouillot argued that
Western nations sought either to “erase” or “trivialize” the events in Haiti, silencing the revolutionary narrative and
replacing it with their alternate historical narratives about slavery. See Trouillot, “An Unthinkable History,” in
Sepinwall, Haitian History, 43; and Sheree Alicia Henlon, “The Black Pariah: Representation of Haiti and Haitians
in Nineteenth Century Literature of the Hispanic Caribbean.” PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2007.
12
Leyburn, The Haitian People, 33. Those numbers are very rough. Mats Lundahl, who cites Leyburn, feels the total
number of Haitians at this time was likely closer to 400,000. By 1824, he believes the number had risen to 600,000
and by 1864, the census showed a population which had almost doubled to 1.1 million. See Lundahl, Peasants and
Poverty, 190.

60
(38,000 to 57,000). The remainder of the male population capable of work would have been

required to take up arms to repel invaders when required.13

Most of those serving in the standing army were not available to undertake any other

profession, including farming. This not only represented lost labour and a loss in national

revenue for the new state, but soldiers also required precious food as well as money for their

salaries. Added to that massive bill were the enormous and capital-intensive projects undertaken

to provide Haiti with defensive positions throughout the country, including the famous Citadelle

Laferrière completed by Christophe in 1820. Haiti also expended precious foreign currencies to

purchase weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies, none of which was produced

locally.

Not surprisingly, spending for the standing army and the construction programme, as well

as the cost of imported military supplies, severely curtailed domestic economic initiatives.

Outside of security and national defense, other development would have to wait for safer times.14

Defence spending and the 1804 massacre of the French also deprived Haiti of technological and

bureaucratic expertise. Educated civil servants so necessary for the functioning of the

government bureaucracy were in short supply, and Haitian leaders would be forced to look

outside Haiti for expertise and advice.15

13
Heinl and Heinl maintain the army was closer to 15 percent of the total population, citing the figure of 52,000.
(Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 130) Robert Lacerte, citing Thomas Madiou (Histoire d’Haiti, 1922), claims the
post-revolutionary army was around 49,400-men strong and a navy existed that numbered an additional 3,000.
(Lacerte, “The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution, 455). Prosper Avril identified the original
army under Dessalines, on paper at least, as being 52,500 all ranks, divided into 29 demi-brigades which in turn
formed four divisions and a number of other specialized independent units. That figure included a naval strength of
3,000 as well as cavalry and artillery units. See Prosper Avril, From Glory to Disgrace: The Haitian Army 1804-
1994, 42-3.
14
Paying for war, which Haiti was required to do in its post-independence re-building phase, would have required
one of three approaches: raising taxes, which it essentially sought to do through the armed plantation system
approach; borrowing money from external powers, the approach it would later adopt; or print more currency, which
encourages inflation, in effect acting as a tax on the national economy.
15
This should not be seen as suggesting that educated Haitians (mainly mulattoes) were not available and capable of
providing government service once trained. Boisrond-Tonnerre wrote the Acte de l'Indépendance in 1804. Haiti’s

61
 Nevertheless, ending Haiti’s isolation still required reconciliation with France. Between

1816 and 1825, sporadic negotiations were held between the two nations, the Haitians seeking

formal recognition and the French offering various relationships which invariably included some

form of French authority over Haiti (including, for example, France treating Haiti as a

protectorate).16 That reconciliation came about in April 1825 when France presented President

Boyer a royal ordinance from King Charles X, demanding Haiti pay 150 million francs as an

indemnity to compensate former colonists for property loss and allow France to enjoy a 50

percent reduction in duties on goods entering or leaving Haiti on ships flying the French flag.17

The indemnity, which provided for French recognition of Haiti’s full independence, was borne

by a full French naval squadron.18 That squadron would eventually be joined by two others.

Outgunned, and in spite of vigorous domestic opposition, President Boyer signed the agreement.

first historian was the eminent Baron de Vastey who functioned as Christophe’s secretary. However, Haiti lacked
sufficient people trained to function as government bureaucrats and, accordingly, the institutions of government
suffered. Seeking out French assistance was obviously out of the question, and accordingly other avenues were
explored. One example was that of Henry Christophe, who took advice on education policy for his northern
kingdom from English abolitionists, including William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson. See Conerly, “’Your
Majesty’s Friend’,” 116; and William Wilberforce, Robert Wilberforce and Samuel Wilberforce, eds. The
Correspondence of William Wilberforce, Volume 1 (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1840: repr.,
Cambridge University Press edition, 2011).
16
See Robert K. Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843,” The Americas 37, no.
4 (April 1981): 499-515; and J.N. Léger, Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors (New York: The Neale Publishing
Company, 1907). For an understanding of the negotiations between the French envoys and Haiti’s leaders
(Christophe, Pétion and Boyer), see François Blancpain, Un siècle de relations financières entre Haïti et la France:
1825-1922 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001).
17
The French recognized that despite their desire to repossess Haiti and return it to colonial status, that was not
going to happen. The indemnity was understood as the next best option, particularly given it was designed to be
quite lucrative. Carolyn Fick to author, 04 July 2019. Personal correspondence.
18
The value of the indemnity in today’s dollars is difficult to determine because of the damage caused by the tariff
reductions. The cash payment of 150 million francs initially demanded would be reduced to 90 million. The
predatory loans required to meet the indemnity payment scheduled have been described as crippling. In 2004,
President Aristide called on France pay US$22 billion in reparations for the indemnity. Isabel Macdonald, a
journalist who helped draft the 2010 letter to then French President Nicolas Sarkozy demanding France repay Haiti
for the ignominious indemnity, placed the value at over US$17 billion, while Ottawa historian Jean St Vil believes
those valuations are low and has placed a value of US$40 billion. See Isabel Macdonald, “France’s debt of
dishonour to Haiti,” The Guardian, 16 August 2010, www.theguardian.com; Westenley Alcenat, “The Case for
Haitian Reparations,” Jacobin, 14 January 2017, www.jacobinmag.com; and “Haiti France and the $40B Elephant”
(published 09 April 2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIcJWlcKKEg for the interview with Jean St Vil.

62
 The effects were immediate, dramatic, and long-lasting for Haitian development. Boyer

was forced to seek a loan from France to pay for the initial installment of the indemnity, an

amount set at 30 million francs. The loan, floated through Parisian banks, obligated Haiti to

repay the full 30 million francs, but only provided 24 million francs to Haiti, the banks holding

back six million francs for fees and interest. Haiti would be forced to use its limited hard foreign

currency to repay the reduced loan in addition to the initial 6 million francs withheld.

Yet that was not the worst result of the indemnity treaty. The 50 percent reduction in

duties on French goods would have more immediate and long-term effects. At a time when Haiti

desperately needed foreign currency, the reduced duties meant that fledgling Haitian industry

could not compete with French goods flowing in at reduced rates. Yet the cheap French

manufactured goods discouraged Haitian investors from committing their capital to establish

domestic manufacturing. Further, France demanded the indemnity be paid in hard foreign

currency, which Haiti obtained solely through the collection of foreign duties at its customs

houses.19 With no hard currency and limited amounts of gold to back up the Haitian currency, the

ability to purchase foreign goods dried up. Foreign merchant ships began to avoid Haitian

ports.20

It was not until 1838 and the renegotiation of the indemnity agreement with France that

Haiti was able to feel secure in its relations with France. The new indemnity ordinance not only

eliminated the French duty reduction, it also reduced the indemnity to 90 million francs.

19
In 1834, the indemnity agreement was declared unlawful by a law firm engaged by the French government and
the tariff reduction ended. However, in 1838, the French and Haitians negotiated what became known as “Traité
d’Amitié” which reduced the indemnity debt but re-instituted the tariff reductions on French goods. The French
understood the long-term consequences of ensuring Haiti did not compete with foreign imports through the
development of domestic industry. Not only exclusion but also the tariff and its non-competitive grounding ensured
Haiti did not develop any domestic industry and instead remained agrarian based, albeit largely sustainment based.
See Blancpain, Un siècle de relations financières entre Haïti et la France: 1825-1922.
20
Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 499-515.

63
Unfortunately, the damage was already done. Haiti was still obligated to fulfill repayment of the

initial 30-million-franc bank loan, something often referred to as the ‘double indemnity’. Haiti

was now heading down the path of dependence upon foreign loans to enable its government

operations. Foreign loans were not only predatory in nature, but would prove too enticing for

future leaders, and marked the start of a long history of graft and corruption within Haitian

political and military circles.

Ironically, the stability apparently offered through the 1838 revised indemnity would be

too late for President Boyer. The massive earthquake of May 1842 coupled with discontent over

a worsening economic situation caused by the indemnity and the rise of an emerging generation

of young, educated men (the so-called Liberal revolution of 1843), would signal the end of

Boyer’s regime.21 Further complicating the signing of the revised indemnity agreement was the

increased presence of French naval forces and merchant ships in Haitian waters, all suggesting

that Boyer had “sold out to France.”22 Fighting over the Haitian presidency after 1843 became

21
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 33-56.
22
Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 505. Foreign naval interference in Haiti had already been
increasing ever since the signing of the initial indemnity with France in 1825. After 1827, Haiti was assaulted by an
era of gunboat diplomacy. An American presence in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean had been sporadic
between 1790 and 1830 and had been largely occupied with fighting piracy and illegal privateering. An American
presence in the region would not become permanent until the 1820s with the stationing of the West Indies naval
squadron to focus on anti-piracy operations as a result of the US Congressional decision to pass “An Act to Protect
the Commerce of the Unites States, and Crime of Piracy” in 1819. The permanent presence of the American
squadron meant that gunboat diplomacy became the new norm whenever Haiti erupted in conflict. Ironically, the
American squadron was not particularly effective in anti-piracy operations until it was able to collaborate with
British anti-piracy protection. Haiti also collaborated with the British in the anti-piracy efforts in the area, but unlike
the Americans, was much more effective. In 1820, President Boyer had dispatched the Haitian warship, Wilberforce,
out into the Caribbean to conduct anti-slavery interventions against Spanish slavers. Despite employing a full
squadron, the British acknowledged that the single Haitian warship outperformed them on anti-slavery operations.
Ironically, while the Haitian deployment coincided nicely with British anti-slavery efforts ongoing at the time,
Boyer’s strategy was primarily aimed at interdicting the Spanish ability to resupply Santo Domingo, which was back
in Spanish hands by this time, his aim being to lower the threat from that side of the island. Boyer also expected the
British would “retaliate if Spain attacked a ship whose ‘official’ mission was suppression of the international slave
trade.” Once the American permanent presence was established, Haiti likewise cooperated with them on anti-
slavery, and provided the US squadron with basing permissions at Cap Haïtian. The USS Galatea was the only
American ship identified as using Cap Haïtian regularly as her base. Her mission was to provide protection to mail
steamer convoys which plied the route between New York City and Colón, Panama. See Eric Anderson, “Black
Emigres: The Emergence of Nineteenth-Century United States Black Nationalism in Response to Haitian

64
common, particularly as control of the presidency became more lucrative because of the

availability of foreign loans.

Foreign lending opened to the door to more frequent foreign interventions in Haiti.

Gunboats were initially used to safeguard foreign financial interests in Haiti but soon were

employed to ensure the ‘right’ faction came to power.23 By the 1860s, Haitian domestic politics

were regularly subjected to foreign interventionist activities, military and otherwise, with much

of that activity taking the form of gunboat diplomacy.24 Notable dates for gunboat activity

included the years 1862 (Spanish); 1868 (US); 1883 (French, Spanish, American, German,

Swedish, and Norwegian); 1891 (American); and 1897 (German).25

It is important to emphasize that gunboat diplomacy was not merely geared towards

protection and advancement of foreign economic interests, commercial or otherwise. Rather, the

strategy of employing gunboat diplomacy against Haiti should be understood within the West’s

broader exclusionary strategy begun in response to Haiti’s independence and continued despite

the signing of the indemnity with France.26 From a foreign relations perspective, gunboat

Emigration and Colonization, 1816-1840,” 49th Parallel 1. https://49thparalleljournal.org/2014/07/12/issue-1. See

also Charles E. Brodine, Jr., “The Navy’s Campaign against the West Indian Pirates, 1790-1830,” US Navy Naval
History and Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil.
23
There are two schools of thought over gunboat diplomacy as to why it was employed against Haiti. The first is
based on the idea that it allowed the Western powers to coerce Haiti into behaving in the interests of the West.
Whether that was the aim or not, that was an effect of the coercion. The second argument is that gunboat diplomacy
was a rational means of dealing with Haiti in light of its violent past, namely the 1804 massacre and of course the
not too distant Revolution. This latter argument – that any dealings with Haiti were best accomplished by presenting
any messaging or demands from a strong and well-armed naval force to preclude Haitian violence – was reinforced
by the coup activity that became more frequent and would, ironically, spark more foreign interference. Robert Fatton
provides an excellent summary of the latter school of thought. See Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism.
24
Tellingly, the first instance of gunboat or coercive diplomacy occurred in 1825 with the arrival of the French
naval squadron to force Haiti into signing the indemnity agreement. It was likewise the most egregious instance and
the one which arguably had the greatest destructive impact on Haiti.
25
Paul Farmer has expanded the list to include the incidents, for example, when American gunboats would show up
ostensibly to “protect lives and property of US citizens.” Farmer’s list includes the following years: 1849, 1851,
1857, 1858, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1876, 1888, 1891, 1892, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908,
1909, 1911, 1912, 193, 1914 and 1915. See Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 77-8. See also Trouillot, Haiti: State
against Nation, 57-8.
26
The argument can be made that the US continued gunboat diplomacy into the modern era, with the dispatch of US
warships to Haiti in 1971 to ensure the successful transition from Francois Duvalier, to son Jean-Claude; and in

65
diplomacy should be understood as a tool intended to demonstrate to Haitian leaders that Haiti

was firmly excluded from normative international relations and not protected by international

law. The events involving Haiti and the Île de la Navasse, or the Navassa Island Affair,

definitely made this point to Haitians.

The Navassa Affair

[A] riot occurred at Navassa, an island in the Caribbean Sea, in which a number of
Americans were killed…It is learned at the Navy Department that the US steamer Galena
is now on her way to Navassa, and will probably arrive there tomorrow. She was at St.
Nicholas Mole, Hayti, when news of the riot was received…and was at once ordered to
Navassa. This island is under no particular jurisdiction but is regarded as under the
protection of the US.27
- Extract from The New York Times

The Navassa Affair was significant because it represented a complete abrogation of

Haitian sovereignty.28 In 1857, an American sea captain, Peter Duncan, formally occupied and

annexed the Île de la Navasse, a small unoccupied island lying between Haiti and Jamaica.

Previously claimed by Haiti, the island had been included under various Haitian constitutions,

beginning with the Constitution of 1801, with the phrase “other adjacent islands.” 29 In 1804,

1982, when US Coast Guard cutters were permanently stationed in Haitian waters to stem Haitian migration by
those fleeing the Duvalier regime, in addition to conducting drug interdiction operations. In December 1982, the
Coast Guard also played a role in the attempted invasion by several Haitian émigrés. The invasion force, numbering
no more than 40 persons, became divided, with some landing on Île de la Tortue, while the rest landed on the
northern shores of the mainland. The Coast Guard became involved once the invasion was defeated and 26 survivors
from the Tortue landing were rescued at sea. See Jean Métellus, “Haïti: Perspectives,” Journal of Haitian Studies 2,
No. 1 (Spring 1996): 23-37, www.jstor.org/stable/41715009; and “Around the Nation: Haitians Given Probation For
Invasion Attempt,” The New York Times August 31, 1982, 10, www.nytimes.com.
27
The New York Times, September 20, 1889, 5. www.nytimes.com.
28
Sovereignty has two components. The first is freedom from outside interference and the second is the freedom for
a state to act as it sees fit within its internationally agreed upon boundaries. It is unfortunately a relative and not
absolute idea, subject, as Haiti has experienced over and over again, to external influences.
29
Note that the Constitution of 1874 specifically included Navasse for the first time, within Article 2: “These
adjacent islands are: La Tortue, La Gonâve, l’Ile-à-Vaches, les Cayemittes, La Navase, la Grosse-Caye and all the
others which are located within the limits prescribed by the rights of the people.” Serge Bellegarde has put together
a paper that outlines Haiti’s claim to the island. See Serge Bellegarde, “Navassa Island: Haiti and the US, A Matter
of History and Geography,” (Oct 1998), http://windowsonhaiti.com/windowsonhaiti/navassa.shtml. See also
Michaelle Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island: a case study,” World Maritime University Dissertation 474,
2014. https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/474.

66
when Haiti became independent, all the territories which had previously belonged to France and

were considered to be part of the entire island, Saint Domingue, became Haitian property,

including Île de la Navasse.30

Duncan, however, made his legal claim to the island based on the US Guano Islands Act

of 1856. The Act allowed any American citizen to claim on behalf of the United States any

unclaimed and unoccupied islands which contained bird guano.31 The government of Haiti

protested the annexation but was unable to enforce its counterclaims. The American

administration of President James Buchanan eventually issued an executive order claiming

sovereignty over the island and ignored the Haitian claims. In time, Captain Edward O. Cooper

bought out Duncan’s interests in the island and began mining operations in 1857. In 1858, when

Haitian Emperor Faustin Soulouque found out that mining was taking place, he dispatched two

warships to order the Americans to halt their mining operations.32 Cooper appealed for help from

his government, which led the United States to dispatch a diplomatic note claiming a right to

mine the island for its guano: the note also stated a cruiser would be sent to the area to ensure

American rights were respected.

30
Under the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, the Spanish had recognized French claims over the western third of
Hispaniola who in turn were able to legally establish the colony of Saint Domingue. In 1795, the Treaty of Basle
extended French sovereignty over the eastern (Spanish) side of Hispaniola and allowed Toussaint, in his
Constitution of 1801, to make the claim that the entire island of Hispaniola as well as all the adjacent islands were
under his jurisdiction. Île de la Navasse had specifically been a Spanish discovery and under the Treaty of Basle,
became a French possession. The indemnity agreement of 1825 removed Haiti from its status as a ‘colony in revolt’
and extended recognition of Haitian sovereignty, including adjacent islands as outlined in the 1795 Treaty of Basle.
See Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island.”
31
Bird guano was required for the production of agricultural fertilizer. It also contained saltpeter (the mineral form
of potassium nitrate), a key ingredient for gunpowder manufacture. Guano’s strategic value led to the adoption by
the United States of Title 48, Chapter 8 of the US Code which specifically stated: “Whenever any citizen of the
United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other
government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and
occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to
the United States.” See www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text.
32
Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island,” 11.

67
 In 1858, Soulouque was overthrown by General Fabre Geffrard and Haiti’s strong foreign

policy position on Île de la Navasse shifted. While still a point of contention between the two

powers, Haiti was content to pursue its claim through diplomatic channels. American mining

operations on the island continued as the American Navassa Phosphate Company began

operations in the 1860s and built a significant amount of mining infrastructure on the island. In

1865, the company brought in a number of black workers under contract from the United

States.33 The working conditions on the island reportedly deteriorated quite quickly, and by

1889, the black workers described them as inhumane and verging on slavery. Not surprisingly,

the workers decided enough was enough and rebelled against their treatment, killing a number of

the company’s overseers.

The US government response was swift. A Navy gunship was dispatched to the island

and the workers were taken into custody. They were then transported back to the US mainland

and brought to trial for murder, eventually being found guilty.34 Haiti launched a protest over the

trial, arguing that the island was under Haitian sovereignty and therefore the rebelling workers

33
Cooper’s American Navassa Phosphate Company had originally relied on white convict labour but with the end of
the American Civil War and the large numbers of African Americans available and looking for work, the company
shifted its recruiting to blacks. Despite being illiterate, they were signed to a three-year contract and ended up on the
island, working under conditions described as akin to slavery. Their confrontation with the white overseers ended in
five white deaths. The National Order of Gallilean Fisherman (Baltimore, Maryland) published short biographies of
the 18 men charged as a result of the revolt as well as the argument presented for their trial defense. See Jennifer C.
James, “’Buried in Guano’: Race, Labor, and Sustainability,” American Literary History 24, no.1 (2012): 115-42;
Alonzo P.B. Holly, “Our Future Relations with Haiti,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 156, no. 110 (1931): 112; and Thomas I. Hall and Columbus Gordon, The Navassa Island Plot: Illustrated,
1st ed. (Baltimore: The American Job Office, 1889).
34
President Benjamin Harrison later commuted their death sentences to “life with hard labour.” During his State of
the Union message, Harrison commented on the Navassa Affair, stating “[i]t is inexcusable that American laborers
should be left within our own jurisdiction without access to any Government officer or tribunal for their protection
and the redress of their wrongs.” Cited in James, “’Buried in Guano,” 130-31.

68
should have been tried in Haiti. Haiti’s arguments would make it to the US Supreme Court,

which “ignored the claims of Haiti, and gave the United States legal jurisdiction over Navassa.”35

Central to the Navassa Affair was the suspension of international law as it related to

Haitian sovereignty when it did not suit the United States government. A dubious claim to the

island was made by the US and sustained when it was clear, from a geographic and legal point of

view, that the island should have been recognized as under Haitian sovereignty. The island

remains in dispute between the two nations, the United States having designated it a wildlife

refuge in 1999 and retaining its claim to sovereignty.

Not only did gunboat diplomacy highlight the disregard the international community had

for international legal norms when it concerned Haiti, it also placed the spotlight very firmly on

the disruptive effects of gunboat diplomacy on Haitian governance. Because gunboat diplomacy

was conducted by independent naval captains often operating with little to no supervision from

their governments, the naval forces would decide upon their own humiliations to be visited upon

Haiti. Often, in addition to demanding indemnities, they would include demands for public

apologies and, often, some acknowledgement of Haiti’s surrender to the foreign demands. Not

surprisingly, the Haitian government in power, by acquiescing to foreign demands, would

become the focal point for Haitian anger and frustration, leading to insurrections against the

government upon which the humiliations were inflicted.

The island, which remains in American hands today, was eventually turned into what was termed “a National
35

Wildlife Refuge” under the jurisdiction of the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Holly, “Our Future Relations with
Haiti,” 112. See also the US Geological Survey, http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/navassa.

69
The Bulldog Affair

I have no right to protect you, but I will try to bluff these fellows this time. But you must
not come here under a charter for the [Geffrard] government again…flying our [British]
flag…if you do, I will not protect you.36
- British Sea Captain Charles Wake

An excellent example of the role played by gunboat diplomacy was the Bulldog Affair

which grew out of an earlier 1862 incident involving the Spanish and the government of

President Geffrard (1859-1867).37 When Santo Domingo President, Pedro Santana, reconciled

with Spain and made arrangement to return Santo Domingo to its old status as a Spanish colony,

President Geffrard was alarmed and reacted quickly. He committed units from his trusted

Tirailleurs presidential guard to the Dominican insurgency which opposed Santana’s plans. The

Haitian troops allowed the Dominican insurgency some initial success but sparked a quick and

overwhelming Spanish response. In July 1861, a Spanish naval squadron arrived in Haitian

territorial waters outside Port-au-Prince and, under threat of a naval bombardment, demanded

Geffrard close the Haitian-Dominican border and tender an apology to Spain for his conduct.

The apology was to be accompanied by a 21-gun salute and an indemnity in the amount of

US$200,000. Geffrard would eventually negotiate a reduction in the indemnity to US$25,000 but

the apology and the salute were still provided as demanded by the Spanish.

A number of groups in Haiti saw the results as a humiliating surrender to the Spanish,

and a betrayal of Haitian honour by the government. The groups began actively working to

36
Quote by British Captain Charles Wake of the Bulldog, speaking to the Captain of the British-flagged packet ship,
Jamaica, running supplies for the Geffrard government. “Mr. Peck [Haitian Legation of the USA] to Hon. William
H. Steward [US Secretary of State],” 11 December 1865, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Papers
Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the
Thirty-ninth Congress, Document 410.
37
The material for the 1862 incident is drawn from Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 221-2.

70
overthrow Geffrard’s regime.38 One of leading insurrectionists against Geffrard was General

Sylvain Salnave. By September 1864, Salnave had raised sufficient rebel forces to capture Cap

Haïtien. One of the prizes seized was a government steamer named the Voldrogue, which

Salnave promptly rechristened the Providence. The Providence was quickly put into action, and

set off, with a suitable escort of ships, for the area of l’Acul.

Once in the area, the commander of the flotilla, Captain Villaneuava, began a blockade of

the harbour, the intent being to prevent reinforcement and resupply of government forces from

the sea. One of those intercepted by the Voldrogue was a British-flagged packet ship named the

RMS Jamaica Packet, carrying war supplies destined for troops supporting the president.39

Attempting to dock on 19 October, the Jamaica Packet was forced to flee Haitian naval gunfire.

A British warship, HMS Bulldog, which happened to be in the area, interceded on behalf

of the Jamaica Packet. Despite the intervention of the Bulldog, the Haitian rebels demanded the

right to board and inspect the Jamaica. Captain Wake refused their request and instead

threatened to punish Captain Villaneuava for what Wake termed “his insufferable impudence.”

The rebel “Committee of Public Safety” in Cap Haïtien then decreed that none of the Bulldog

crew would be allowed to land and that government refugees then taking shelter in the British

consulate in the town were to be turned over to the rebels. When that decree was ignored, a rebel

force “menaced” the British consulate and forced the refugees to be given into their custody.

Captain Wake, at that point, demanded satisfaction for what was termed “singular and

outrageous conduct.” When negotiations failed, on 23 October, Captain Wake and the Bulldog

38
Material dealing with the Bulldog Affair is drawn from FRUS, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying
the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867), Document. 410. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1866p2/d410.
39
Warships of the line in the British Royal Navy were given the prefix of ‘His (or Her) Majesty’s Ship’ (HMS)
whereas British mail ships were given the prefix ‘Royal Mail Steamer/Ship’ or RMS.

71
were observed approaching the harbour at high speed and, upon making it into the harbour,

began to bombard the fort’s defences. The steamer Providence was eventually sunk by the

Bulldog, but Wake was unfortunate in that his ship ran aground.

While Wake was undertaking his attack on the fort, the USS De Soto under command of

Captain William Walker was in the process of evacuating foreigners from Cap Haïtien which, at

the time, was under fire.40 Walker confronted Captain Wake over his surprise attack on the town,

pointing out that his attack had placed foreigners in the town in considerable danger. Not only

did the American ship have to contend with naval gunfire from the Bulldog, they were also in

danger of attack by enraged townsfolk who were cowering under the British fire. Fortunately,

General Salnave was able to calm the townsfolk’s anger, for which the US Legation would later

commend him.

Captain Wake was not able to free his ship from the sandbar and elected to blow it up

rather than allow it to be captured. He then made his way to Jamaica aboard a US ship and

reported what had happened. The result was that British officials in Jamaica dispatched a fresh

and larger British flotilla to the area. Once they arrived, the flotilla commander sent the rebels a

communique which stated that the town defenses would be attacked the next day in retaliation

for the consulate attack, unless the rebel leaders left the country aboard any ship in the area. The

rebels did not depart and on 8 November, the British opened fire, having previously coordinated

their gunfire with the government forces in the area. By evening, Geffrard’s forces had

reportedly taken the town and placed the rebel leaders including General Salnave in custody.

They were taken aboard USS De Soto and would eventually be taken to the Dominican Republic

and placed in custody there.

40
The American naval prefix ’USS’ stands for United States Ship and was used for US Navy warships.

72
 In addition to its significance in highlighting the disregard for international legal norms

when it concerned Haiti as well as spotlighting the disruptive effects of gunboat diplomacy on

Haitian governance, the Bulldog affair has a third critical element. It would be the first time a

foreign power employed violence in support of, and with the complicity of, a Haitian

government against other Haitians.

Germany and Haiti

It was the [American] occupation as well which forced Haiti to take action against
Germany and to sequester German property. That there was some reason for this action is
clear when we remember that the Germans had large control over the business interests of
the country. The point I wish to make is that such action would probably not have been
taken by the Haitians, into whose prominent families many of the Germans had
married.41
- Extract from Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo by
the United States Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo

Returning to Gaffield’s thesis regarding multiple layers of ‘recognition and non-

recognition,’ Haiti’s relationship with Germans and Germany has been very useful for study. It

also provides a useful understanding of the shifting nature of the relationship and the Germans

embracing of gunboat diplomacy. It also highlights the degree of independent action accorded to

the naval authorities in their ‘diplomatic’ missions.

Germans had been present in Haiti since independence, and even before that.42 Not

surprisingly, the German government was involved in Haitian affairs since that time, the period

41
Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo by the United States Senate Select
Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 1300.
42
In 1764, the first Germans arrived as migrants to Saint Domingue, displaced from Louisiana. The Germans had
left Louisiana when Spain re-acquired the territory from France under the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1762) which was
announced in 1764. A contingent of French Acadians also departed Louisiana at the same time and headed to Saint
Domingue, but were directed to settle away from the Germans, local Saint Domingue authorities believing they
could not peacefully co-exist. The new arrivals, around a thousand in number, were directed to settle in a new
commune known as Bombardopolis, within the arrondissement of Môle Saint-Nicolas in the Nord-Ouest
department. The colony of Germans became coffee producers and survived the revolutionary war. The colony
members were not only spared from the massacre of the whites as ordered by Dessalines, they were also granted

73
from the later nineteenth century until the US Occupation of 1915 witnessing the most

significant impact of Germany and Germans on Haitian affairs, including some responsibility, as

will be shown, for prompting the US invasion and Occupation in 1915. By the 1860s, German

presence in Haiti had increased considerably. Brenda Plummer identifies Germans from

Hanseatic cities migrating to Haiti “as employees of French mercantile houses.”43

By the turn of the century, German Haitians, despite their numbers having dwindled

down to roughly one-fifth of their original numbers, were nonetheless reported to have

significant commercial interests within Haiti, out of proportion to the size of their community,

and including control of the utilities in both Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien, plus the port

facilities in the capital.44 At the same time, Brenda Plummer points out that the geopolitical

implications of German economic activities within Haiti were “greatly exaggerated” and

citizenship in the new nation. A second group of Germans, soldiers from German units which had been employed by
Napoleon in his attempt at re-conquering the rebellious colony, became upset with the conduct of the campaign in
Saint Domingue. Some of those soldiers deserted the French forces and joined up with the Haitian forces working
for independence, although there is no doubt that the popular myth of entire units deserting to fight for the Haitians
has been grossly inflated (see, for example, Jan Pachoński, and Reuel K. Wilson, Poland's Caribbean Tragedy).
Although this work only tackles the issue of Polish deserters, it can be considered representative of the German
soldiers’ condition as well. After the revolution, Dessalines’s secretary, Louis Félix Mathurin Boisrond-Tonnerre,
suggested to Dessalines that the Poles who deserted and served with the revolutionary forces be retained for their
expertise and service to Haiti. Dessalines approved his recommendation and extended Haitian citizenship to the
Poles, which saved them from the post-conflict killings and from expulsion. Finally, based on the presence of
German military engineers in Haiti following the declaration of independence, I conclude Boisrond-Tonnerre was
also able to ensure that some German soldiers were granted citizenship and spared killing or expulsion as well.
German military engineers planned and supervised the construction of the great Haitian citadel fortress, Citadelle
Laferrière, during the period of 1804-1820. Although it is unclear whether they were part of Napoleon’s
expeditionary troops, their presence nonetheless strongly adds weight to Germans having also joined the exodus
from the French colonial forces. See de Saint-Méry, Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et
historique de la partie française de l’Isle Saint-Domingue, 227, 265; Article 13 of Dessalines’s 1805 Constitution ;
and also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 127.
43
Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 125.
44
For example, while Melvin Small shows that Germany’s share of the Haitian commercial market remained low,
having increased from two percent in the 1903-4 period, to five percent in 1911-12, Germany was estimated to have
“gained an extremely large proportion of the internal trade, perhaps as much as 90 percent…” See Melvin Small,
“The United States and the German ‘Threat’ to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914,” The Americas 28, no. 3 (Jan 1972):
256-7.

74
reflected Germany’s “aggressive economic imperialism” rather than a desire to take control of

Haiti from a formal colonial political perspective.45

The key to the commercial success of Germans within the region, and in Haiti

specifically, appears to have been their strong links to the home country and their regional

networks.46 Through marriage to Haitian nationals, Germans were able to successfully

circumvent the prohibition on foreign ownership of land in Haiti while maintaining a strong

loyalty to Germany.47 Brenda Plumber points out that Germany encouraged such loyalty by

organizing “patriotic societies” which conducted fundraising events for the German military.48

Commercial influence and success was also linked to German control of shipping to and from

Haiti.49 The German-owned Hamburg-America Lines generated considerable profit by

providing most of the shipping to and from Haiti.50 At one point, over three-quarters of all trade

to and from the island nation was being carried by the German company.51

45
The American historian and Woodrow Wilson scholar, Professor Arthur Link, likewise felt that the danger of a
European, and especially a German, intervention in Haiti was “une grande exagération et même une fausseté.” See
Arthur Link, La polltica de los Estados Unidos en América Latina, 1913-1916 (México : Fondo de Cultura
Economica, 1960), cited in Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 46. See also Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and
the Great Powers, 12-3; and Small, 258.
46
See, for example, the report by the American military attaché to Peru on the migration of Germans to Latin
America in 1912. Cited in Small, “The United States and the German ‘Threat’ to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914,” 253.
47
Dessalines’ 1805 Constitution was the last to prohibit ‘whites’ from owning Haitian land. Subsequent
constitutions included a prohibition against foreigners owning land, a legal constitutional statute which continued
until the US Marines rewrote the Haitian Constitution in 1918 to include Article 5: “Le droit de propriété
immobilière est accordé à l'étranger résidant en Haïti et aux sociétés formées par des étrangers pour les besoins de
leurs demeures, de leurs entreprises agricoles, commerciales, industrielles ou d'enseignement. Ce droit prendra fin
dans une période de cinq années, après que l'étranger aura cessé de résider dans le pays ou qu'auront cessé les
opérations de ces compagnies. See Digitheque MJP [Jean-Pierre Maury], online at
https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ht1918.htm#Titre_premier._Du_territoire_de_la.
48
Plummer points out that the society began as early as 1897. During a 1901 fundraising drive, the society raised
over DM 800,000 for German naval procurement. See Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 134.
49
Plummer, 121-2.
50
Albert Ballin, the owner of the Hamburg-America Lines, was “initially an avid supporter of [Grand Admiral
Alfred von] Tirpitz’s naval plans” and was willing to use his fortune and company to further German aims in Latin
America, which at the time were believed to involve the development of German basing options in the region. See
Chapter Three of Holger H. Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-
1941 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976).
51
Suzy Castor also points out that Germans had control of over 80 percent of the commercial houses within Haitian
ports and that “le tiers des exportations de café était dirigé sur Hambourg.” See Castor, L’occupation américaine
d’Haïti, 44.

75
 German military involvement in Haiti lay in two areas. Prior to 1850, German military

activity in Haiti was largely confined to defense construction activities, the largest being the

design and building of Henri Christophe’s Citadelle Laferrière by German military engineers. By

the 1870s, and like most European powers, Germany was employing gunboat diplomacy to

coerce settlements from the Haitian government to pay for alleged damage to German citizens

and their commercial interests.52 Two of the most egregious examples were the Batsch Affair of

1872 and Lüders Affair of 1897.

The Batsch Affair

The mission of this squadron here was, it is believed, entirely friendly. But a remarkable
feature of this visit was the presence in these waters once more of Captain Batsch, still in
command of the same corvette, Vineta, with which, in connection with the Gazelle, he
seized the Haytien fleet in this harbor in June last. This fact caused some discussion in
Haytien circles, and seems to be, for the time being at least, something of the refutation
of the pretences alluded to in my No. 171, of the 6th instant, and given out by General
Brice, the Haytien envoy, who claimed to have received assurances at Berlin that Captain
Batsch’s conduct here in June last would be disowned by his government.53
- US Ambassador to Haiti, Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett

In 1865, the British bombardment in support of Haitian government forces operating

against insurgents in the Cap Haïtien region resulted in considerable damage to the city core.54

The British squadron coordinated their gunfire with President Geffrard’s troops and were

successful in reducing the rebel strongpoints within the harbour forts. As noted previously, this

was the first instance of Western support for a Haitian president. It was also the first instance of a

Western nation being offered a Haitian base of operations in return for support. The rebel leader,

52
The definition of who was provided with German diplomatic or military protection was controversial, and ranged
from expatriate Germans to the children from unions between Haitian women and German men.
53
FRUS, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1873), Document 209. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1873p1v1.
54
The American Civil War concluded in April 1865 and the American West Indies squadron was involved in
wrapping up blockade duties. The squadron had been headquartered at Cap Haïtian but was involved throughout the
civil war in maintaining the Union blockade of Florida.

76
General Salnave, offered the US Navy a coaling base station in Haiti in return for supporting his

rebellion but the offer was refused. However, as Heinl and Heinl have pointed out, “the tactic of

dangling or proffering a base…to foreign powers was to become a stock item of Haitian

diplomacy.”55

Despite the initial positive outcome from the British naval support provided to the

government forces of President Geffrard, the support caused considerable repercussions. For

Geffrard, the use of the British stirred up considerable rancor against his presidency, as well as

costing his government over 100 million gourdes [around US$20 million] to suppress the

uprising in Cap Haïtian. Further, in 1872, the Haitian government of Jean-Nicolas Nissage Saget

(1869 to 1874) found itself on the receiving end of a bill from the German government.56 The

bill, presented from the decks of two German warships, demanded US$15,000 for damage

suffered by two German commercial enterprises during the 1865 British attack.57 Acting on his

own initiative, the German commander decided to seize two Haitian warships in the harbour,

ostensibly as leverage to force payment.58 Haiti’s payment of the indemnity demanded by the

Germans saw them depart the area, allowing the Haitian navy to regain control of its ships.

However, the Germans left a calling card. The scene encountered once the Haitian ships were re-

crewed is described by Heinl and Heinl as follows:

With the special finesse Hohenzollern diplomacy reserved for lesser breeds, the German
boarding parties left calling cards. When the Haitians were allowed back, they found their

55
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 230-1.
56
Geffrard’s expenses included contracting British packet ships like RMS Jamaica Packet to carry war supplies and
personnel to the Cap Haïtian area in support of his operations. Geffrard, however, was heavily indebted at this point
in his presidency and the additional expenses in suppressing the rebellion meant his government was bankrupt. Mats
Lundahl argues that “Geffrard’s [larcenous] behaviour was a signal for completely unchecked robbery by
subsequent administrations.” See Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 329-30; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood,
228.
57
Ironically, the British consul in Port-au-Prince was involved as the intermediary and negotiated the eventual
settlement. Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 75-6.
58
Alternately, the seizure could have been done to ensure the Haitians were not able to counter-attack and drive the
Germans out of the area.

77
 cherished flag spread out on the bridge of each ship, smeared with shit. It was, remarked
[Haitian statesman Anténor] Firmin, the republic’s first contact with the methods of
German diplomacy.59

The Lüders Affair

I have received no official instructions from my Government on the subject yet. The case
has assumed in the press proportions far greater than it deserves. It is simply a question of
collecting an indemnity for an offence against a German citizen residing in Haiti. Beyond
this all is conjecture and there is no basis of fact whatsoever for the reports as to what
might ultimately occur. The demand is similar, I am told, to many in which the United
States has demanded indemnity from South American republics….in any event, the case
is of too little importance to attract serious consideration, and it is needless to conjecture
on future probabilities or possibilities.60
- German Ambassador to the US, Theodor von Holleben

Like the Batsch Affair, the Lüders Affair was a second example of gunboat coercion

seeking economic restitution. Unlike the Batsch Affair, the Germans demanded a much more

public humiliation to resolve the ‘diplomatic’ issue. In 1897, while in the process of arresting a

Haitian national for theft, Haitian police in Port-au-Prince were assaulted by Emile Lüders, a

German national who came to the defence of the accused thief. Lüders, the son of a Haitian

mother and a German father, was previously convicted of assaulting a Haitian police officer.

That assault conviction, coupled to the new charges, were judged by Haitian authorities as

enough to result in Lüders being sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, followed by deportation

back to Germany.61

When informed of the sentencing, the German Chargé d’Affaires, Count Ulrich Graf von

Schwerin, became quite enraged. Upset with the verdict, he “bypassed the usual diplomatic

channels and demanded a personal audience with [Haitian] President Simon Sam [1896-

59
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 256.
60
Theodor von Holleben, German Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States, speaking to
New York Times reporter about the Lüders Affair. The New York Times, December 02 1897, 3. www.nytimes.com.
See also The Indianapolis News, Vol. XXVIII, Fourth ed., 1 December 1897, 1. www.newspapers.library.in.gov.
61
Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 76-7. See also Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 139.

78
1902].”62 Initially, von Schwerin demanded the release of Lüders, and the firing of the police

officers involved in the arrest. President Sam agreed to both conditions and Lüders left Haiti in

October of 1897.

Despite that quick victory, von Schwerin did not let the affair die. Instead he requested

that Germany dispatch warships to Haiti to back up his next set of demands. When two warships

arrived in December 1897, the commander of the flotilla rowed ashore and presented Germany’s

demands for the attention of President Sam. They included the payment of a US$20,000

indemnity; a formal apology to Lüders and Germany; a salute to the German navy; and the flying

of a white flag by Haiti to signal Haitian surrender to German demands.63

In addition to the German naval presence, there was significant American diplomatic

pressure on the Haitians to comply with the German demands, in part because the Americans

feared their own commercial interests in Port-au-Prince being damaged in the threatened German

bombardment. Not seeing any means of resisting the German demands without considerable

bloodshed, and in the face of considerable foreign pressure, President Sam acquiesced to the

German demands in full. Unfortunately for him, a Haitian newspaper editor, upon learning of the

German demands, published a satirical editorial, announcing:

You are invited to the funeral of young Haiti, cruelly assassinated by President Tiresias
Augustin Simon Sam. The funeral procession will leave the mortuary, located at the
National Palace, to give itself to the court of Berlin….64

Gunboat diplomacy not only had an impact on the national psyche of Haiti beyond the

indemnity payments extorted, it also had a significant impact on Haiti’s economy. By 1898, Haiti

62
Michael Largey, Vodou Nation: Haitian Art, Music and Cultural Nationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006), 80.
63
Largey.
64
Largey, Vodou Nation, 80..

79
was paying France about 50 percent of its government revenue to service the 1825 indemnity.

What little remained was being siphoned off to pay the extortion on claims of men like Lüders

and Batsch, perhaps the most prominent of a number of similar legal demands made against the

Haitian government.

Such indemnity payments meant money badly needed for Haitian development work was

not available. It was an additional burden for the Haitian masses who saw their taxes increased to

pay these unjust foreign demands. Support for the government was undermined, not only

because of the higher taxes, but also because Haitians faulted the government for not standing up

for Haiti against foreign powers and allowing the looting of Haiti’s treasury. Haitian politician,

Jacques Nicolas Léger, best summed up their sentiments when he bitterly stated:

The peaceful Haitian who, never having filled public office and deriving from work only
his means of existence, sees his painfully acquired property disappear in flames, and
loses in several hours the fruit of several years labor, cannot fail to have bitter reflections
when the State, after a civil war, is generous only to foreigners whose very nationality is
often doubtful.65

The Lüders affair highlighted the ugly nature of the German-Haitian relationship. At its

core, it reflected a willingness on the part of Germany specifically, and foreign powers generally,

to employ military power to shape economic and diplomatic dealings with Haiti. Further, it

exposed the overt racist attitudes towards Haiti on the part of other nations as Haiti was seen as

the unnatural result of a successful black revolution against the white-imposed status quo. That

the revolutionary struggle was against the evil of slavery was immaterial to many. For German

leaders, racism was further influenced by Germany’s colonial experiences, the most egregious

example of that colonial racism manifesting itself from 1904 to 1907 in genocidal massacres

65
Plummer, "The Metropolitan Connection,” 128.

80
undertaken by the German Army in German South West Africa against the Herero, Nama and

San peoples.66

This is not to say that German military activity regarding Haiti began and ended with

gunboat diplomacy. Germans, likely with guidance or permission from the motherland, were also

actively engaged in subversion. Payments flowed through local German contacts in Haiti to

revolutionary groups when their revolutionary aims and activities coincided with German mainly

economic interests.67 Much of that money probably originated in continental Germany.

Hans Schmidt has argued that the financing by Germans and Germany of the opposition

groups was strictly because of the lucrative nature of the loans made to the Haitian government

when dominated by those groups. In the event of success, government re-payment of the loans

could yield as much as 40 percent interest to the lenders. In addition to supplying money, the

German consulate was often a refuge for those political revolutionaries whom the Germans

viewed as having future value for promoting their interests as noted by a 1910 US Legation

report which included the following observation:

It is now easy to cause trouble as there is always a safe place to run to. The German
Consulates have always taken refugees, as they are always mixed up in the revolutionary
movement.68

Interestingly, German subversive behaviour backfired in 1907 when Germans “backed

the wrong horse,” which eventually led to the overthrow of the pro-German clique in 1912.69 In

response, the US had hammered out an agreement with Haitian authorities, getting them to agree

66
Off topic, but for an excellent recent account of the genocide, see David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, The
Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 2010).
67
For example, Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal claimed Germans were quite active in paying the rebel forces who
eventually overthrew President Simon Sam in 1902. Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural
Successes, 23.
68
See Small, “The United States and the German ‘Threat’ to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914,” 257; and Heinl and
Heinl, Written in Blood, 359.
69
Small, 258.

81
to not lease out the Môle St. Nicholas coaling station to anyone. While ostensibly generic in

nature, the agreement was clearly intended as a reaction to the US recognition of the burgeoning

expansionist interests of Germany in the Latin American and Caribbean region.70 Recognizing

the danger, the administration of US President Woodrow Wilson began planning contingencies

for the invasion and occupation of Haiti.

With the American Occupation of Haiti in 1915, German activity was severely curtailed.

The 1917 declaration of war against Germany by the United States led US Marine Corps

Occupation leaders to persuade Haitian leaders to evict German nationals from Haiti and

confiscate their lands and commercial holdings. The Haitian declaration of war against Germany

in July 1918 was also prompted by American interests, although the Haitians were already

uneasy due to German submarine activity in the region. With the end of the war, evicted

Germans were allowed to return and were given back their business and property possessions,

along with some compensation.71

German subversive behaviour in Haiti was one of the factors behind the US invasion and

eventual Occupation of Haiti. Its significance was two-fold. First, it was responsible for the

acceleration of regime change that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

70
While there is debate over how serious the Germans were about acquiring the Môle Saint-Nicholas location, they
were clearly interested in acquiring coal refuelling sites within the region. Plummer claims that Germany “badly
wanted a Caribbean base, which would give it some control over and access to the proposed isthmian canal.”
They were reported to put together a loan package for the Haitians which included them leasing Môle Saint-
Nicholas for a coal fuelling site and Germany taking control of the Haitian customs houses, in return for a badly
needed loan of two million deutschmarks. The proposal was turned down. See Small, 258. See also Plummer, Haiti
and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 89; and Herwig, Politics of Frustration, 69-70.
71
US Marine Corps General John H. Russell wrote in his June 1921 diary entry the Germans “are doing all in their
power to have the sequestered goods returned to them and it is even said that the Haitien Government, or at least one
or two prominent members of it are working very hard to that end with the ultimate view of re-establishing the
Germans in their former almost impregnable commercial position in Haiti.” In August, he wrote “There is a
rumour…that members of the Council of State received $500.00 a piece for voting for the passage of the law
relating to the return of German property and that members of the Council of the Secretaries of State received
$1,000.00 a piece for promoting said law.” The German compensation for their confiscated property would have
been quite a significant amount for the government of Haiti to afford. Papers of John H. Russell, “Daily Diary
Report,” PC 114 box 2, folder 9, United States Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C.

82
in Haiti. German money funnelled into Haiti allowed regional leaders to provide wages to their

own armies for revolutionary activities, including the fomentation of coups. Second, German

activity in Haiti challenged the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which asserted that the United States

would not tolerate interference with any of the newly independent nations within the Americas

and any European interference within the region generally.72 It also clearly formed part of the

impetus for the adoption of the Roosevelt Corollary.73 While the American public narrative may

have emphasized fear of a German military takeover of Haiti, the trigger for US concern was

increasing German influence within the commercial and banking sectors of Latin America and

the Caribbean.

Despite the use of legal means to restrict the infiltration of foreign commercial

competition into Haiti by employing restrictions on foreign land ownership enshrined in Haiti’s

constitutions, by the turn of the century, Haiti had largely lost the battle. Brenda Plummer

identified a number of factors that weighed against Haiti in this fight. The first was the growing

importance of steamships in maritime commerce. Previously, sea transport in sailing ships meant

that cargoes tended to be large for efficiency, and thus travelled in slow moving ships at

72
The Monroe Doctrine, authored by US President James Monroe, established de facto the Western hemisphere as
an American sphere of influence and shaped its foreign policy to discourage the development of European
colonialism within the Americas. Any attempt to establish a new colony in the Americas was understood as a direct
challenge to the US. See US Office of the Historian, Department of State, “Monroe Doctrine, 1823.”
www.history.state.gov.
73
The 1904 Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was in large part the result of the 1902 crisis over
Venezuela which involved British, German, and Italian naval forces seeking to enforce payment of foreign debts
incurred by previous Venezuelan regimes. US President Theodore Roosevelt, to ensure that the Caribbean remained
firmly under American control, identified the foreign policy of the US as involving intervention in those states
which had “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized
society” and would “ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.” To prevent European intervention in
the region, Roosevelt instead claimed the right of American intervention. He claimed the US would “interfere…
only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home
and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the
entire body of American nations.” He also stated that freedom and “the right of such independence cannot be
separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.” Theodore Roosevelt, “State of the Union Address to
Congress,” 1904. https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-14-the-united-states-and-
latin-america/primary-documents-w-accompanying-discussion-questions/document-33-roosevelt-corollary-1904.

83
relatively greater expense. That expense meant that those involved in the import-export business

required either great wealth or access to significant credit. This explains, for example, the

Haitian measures taken to restrict foreign commercial interests by limiting aliens to trading only

along coastlines or, alternately, requiring any sales they arranged for cash crops like coffee to be

handled by a Haitian broker as intermediary.74

The move to steamships broke that protective system. Steam ships made more frequent

trips and were faster, making the reliance on large cargoes obsolete. Instead, smaller shipments

of goods were possible and economical, opening the import-export field to traders outside Haiti’s

elite. Instead of relying on access to large amounts of capital to finance large cargoes,

[d]irect importation [became]…easiest for those who could engage in high-volume

trading and establish[ed] links with overseas companies and manufacturers. Foreigners
thus had an important advantage, especially as aggressive and often patriotic promoters
of a particular nation’s wares.75

The second factor was the significant decline of worldwide agricultural prices in the

1890s which reduced Haiti’s buying power and undermined its ability to compete internationally.

As Plummer notes, with falling prices, many of the elite Haitian trading houses lost their access

to the credit essential for operations and were forced to move into other fields.76 Nature abhors a

vacuum, and foreign players were quick to enter the field. The third factor cited by Plummer was

persistent “civil strife.”77 The ‘revolution of 1902’, which resulted in the burning of Petit-Goâve,

exemplified such strife and had a major disruptive effect on Haitian trade. What was significant

74
Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” Latin American Research Review, 123.
75
Plummer, 122.
76
Plummer, 124.
77
Plummer.

84
about civil strife was that it was encouraged, underwritten, and exploited by foreign competitors

to Haitian commercial interests.78

These three factors – frequent insurrectionist activity, the shift to steamships, and the

waning agricultural prices – contributed to a disastrous outcome for Haiti, namely an increase in

foreign competition within Haiti leading in turn to “reduced Haitian trade.”79 Foreign

competition was aided by foreign control over Haiti’s banking system and by the frequent use of

gunboat diplomacy in support of foreign commercial ventures by the various major powers––

France, Britain, the US, and Germany in the main––which benefited the foreign commercial

interests in Haiti out of proportion to their size to the detriment of their Haitian competitors.

Syrians and Haiti

Up to a few years ago one could see on the country roads hundreds of country merchants
or peddlers with their donkeys loaded with all classes of merchandise leaving the cities
by the several roads, going into the interior to trade with the country people and with
those who live in the interior towns or cities. To-day their places are supplied by these
people [Syrians], who, instead of the donkey to carry their merchandise, employ one of
the natives to be guide and porter for them through the country. He continues his journey
from place to place until his goods are sold, when he returns for a fresh supply. There is
no road anywhere in the Republic where one of these people can not be found. In doing
so they obtain the right to travel when and where they please…I may also add…that all
the money they make, above their immediate wants, is sent to Syria, to which place they
eventually return when they secure sufficient wealth.80
- William F. Powell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Haiti

By 1900, the Haitian merchant group which had operated in the port cities had largely

been displaced by foreign interests. European and US firms were able to convert diplomatic and

military advantage into economic advantage. This section will explore one such foreign

78
Plummer also points out the widespread use of smuggling and the fabrication of revolution rumours to avoid
paying customs duties as other examples of foreign exploitation. See Plummer, 125-6.
79
Plummer, 124.
80
FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1904), Document 570. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1903/d570.

85
merchant group that supplanted Haitian merchants, the ‘so-called’ Syrians, as they have come to

epitomize foreign advantage as it was wielded in Haiti.

The Syrians came to Haiti in the late nineteenth century and were largely Christian

Lebanese, rather than Syrians.81 Fleeing religious persecution, the Syrians as they came to be

known, quickly established themselves as traders. Plummer points out that Syrian migration to

the Americas peaked between 1880 and 1914. They created their trading companies in Haiti

initially by selling their wares in the less well served interior areas of Haiti.

Employing rustic means of travel, and offering a wide-range of “inexpensive goods”

formerly unavailable to the peasants, they extended credit which allowed indigent peasants to

enjoy some of the benefits of their urban cousins.82 Aided by pooled capital “and the habit of co-

operation within their community,” the Syrian merchants soon came to dominate “the middle

sector of the trading economy.”83 In effect, the Syrians chose the road less travelled and supplied

a missing service - the sale of low-cost dry goods to the peasant masses.

The Syrians soon forged a strong and profitable relationship with US manufacturers who,

early in the twentieth century, were providing some 60 percent of all imported goods sold to the

peasantry.84 The Syrians turned to US exporters because of their profit margin, and the rapidity

by which they would receive the American merchandise compared to goods imported from

Europe. They also provided a wider market for American manufacturers, who, for a variety of

reasons including overt racism, had avoided setting up storefront facilities in Haiti like those

81
Brenda Gayle Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean: The Syrians in Haiti, 1903-1934,” The
International History Review 3, no. 4 (October 1981): 517-18.
82
Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 519.
83
Plummer, 519-20.
84
Plummer, 521.

86
swiftly opened by the Syrians. This suited both groups. In exchange, the United States

government provided the Syrians with a degree of protection. 85

In 1903, the Haitian government began a campaign against foreign merchants, hoping to

revitalize the Haitian merchant sector. As Plummer points out, the Syrians, because they did not

conform to the normal behaviour exhibited by other ‘whites,’ quickly became “suspect and

despised.” 86 They also showed up in Haiti when Haiti was suffering from economic stagnation

and was beginning to decline quite dramatically. Syrians thus presented an excellent target to

blame for Haitian woes.

Plummer points out that their diverse nationalities further reduced their influence as many

of their countries of citizenship lacked clout within the international community. Few Syrians

were reported to have taken Haitian citizenship. At the same time, the diversity of citizenship

meant that the community “could cloak itself in a remarkable array of foreign flags, making

foreign identification and regulation…difficult.” 87

Initially, the government campaign focussed on enforcement of old laws which had

restricted foreign aliens’ commercial activity. The new campaign coupled stricter enforcement

with a public narrative that voiced strong criticisms of foreigners and the Syrian community in

particular. A typical circular offered this lengthy diatribe aimed at the Syrians:

Death to the invasion.

Such is the heartrending cry that comes from the bosoms of all Haitians; the foreigners
[sic] friends of Haiti bewail the unfortunate fate of the national commerce on account of
the invasion of the Syrians.
The people, fatigued with a rivalry as disloyal as monstrous, seeing the ruin of all the
hard-working families of the country, come to ask of the paternal government of General
Nord to disentangle them from the claws of these birds of prey that are named Syrians.
The cry of women, of widows, of unfortunate young girls, of orphans, of old men, finally,

85
Plummer argues that the US used the Syrians as a litmus test for the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary.
Plummer, 522.
86
Plummer, 519-20.
87
Plummer, 519-20.

87
 of all those who suffer.
We beg the chief of state, in the name of the glorious martyrs of the independence, of
those who have spilled their precious blood to league [sic] to us this little corner of land,
to lend an attentive ear to these complaints, to all these cries and groans, coming from all
parts to claim a sacred right.
It is the voice of a whole nation that makes itself heard, asking the expulsion of the
Syrians from the territory of Haiti, as the Venezuelans asked a year ago. President Castro,
taking in serious consideration the solicitations of the people, decided to dismiss all the
orientals residing on the territory of Venezuela.
The president of the great starry Republic has not spared the Chinese to satisfy the desire
of his people reclaiming their rights.
The honorable old man who directs the destinies of Haiti will reply, we are sure, to the
complaint of the population whose sufferings reach up to the presidential palace.
The expulsion of the Syrians, after the formation of the administrative inquiry
commission, will be one of the most beautiful acts that the chief of state could
accomplish.
VOS POPULI VOX DEI [The voice of the people is the voice of God].88

The result was a significant and violent campaign against the Syrian community which

eventually spurred US authorities in Haiti to advocate for intervention on behalf of the Syrians.89

That intervention was both diplomatic and military in nature. Despite US intervention, by 1905

many of the Syrian traders had left Haiti. Reportedly, they not only took most of their stock, they

also flooded the local real estate market by dumping their properties en masse, resulting in a

significant devaluation of local real estate prices.90 With the regime change to General Antoine

88
The circular was translated from French by the American legation in Port-au-Prince. See FRUS, With the Annual
Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1904), Document 571. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1903/d571.
89
Plummer identified an incident in which the US Minister to Haiti, William F Powell, patrolled the Syrian area of
Port-au-Prince during the worst of the violence with the US military commander in Haiti and the US Vice-Consul.
Plummer argues that such an “extraordinary and improper action not only illustrated the crude power the US could
exercise in Haiti, but also attests to the strength of the American commitment to the Syrians.” Plummer, “Race,
Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 525.
90
In March 1905, Syrians were under threat of expulsion and began dumping their inventories onto the Haitian
market. Early expulsions included “those without valid papers, Franco-Syrians abandoned by the French Minister,
Syrians with Turkish passports, and Dominican Syrians.” By the summer of 1905, Plummer notes that “fewer than
thirty legitimately naturalized Syrian-Americans” were still in Haiti but were having problems. Throughout this
period, the Haitian government was approaching the Syrian expulsion with kid gloves, seeking to avoid giving
offense that could lead to US intervention. Consequently, Plummer notes that the commercial activities of the
remaining Syrian traders, while subject to sanction, was still continuing. By 1906, US pressure had restored the
Syrian traders still in Haiti to their former status. In 1908, in the aftermath of the coup against President Nord
Alexis, Haitian policy towards the US and Syrian traders shifted dramatically. The regime of General Antoine
Simon dropped the anti-Syrian campaign and Syrian commerce picked up again. Plummer, 528-32.

88
Simon in 1908, the Haitian government “abandoned his predecessor’s Syrian policy” leading to

many of the Syrian traders deciding to return to Haiti and re-establish their commercial

operations. President Simon’s decision to “unabashedly open the country to unregulated foreign

capital penetration” allowed US banking initiatives in Haiti to create an atmosphere conducive

for the resumption of their trading.91 The result saw Haitian consumption of US goods sold

through Syrian traders grow dramatically, as it “doubled between 1903 and 1911.”92

At the same time, that unregulated trade quickly aroused the ire of the masses, who

rebelled against the Sam government in 1911. Insurrectionary activity, some of which was

probably underwritten by German money, led to the overthrow of the Sam regime and brought

the Cincinnatus Leconte military faction to power.93 Leconte’s platform was based on promises

to deal with the Syrian problem yet again. By 1912, and despite US activity working to prevent

it, including “making representations for the protection of American citizens of Syrian origin,”

most Syrians were forced to leave Haiti, not to return until the US Occupation of Haiti was well

underway.94

In February 1913, the American Legation in Port-au-Prince reported the newly appointed

president, Jean-Antoine Tancrède Auguste, was claiming the expelled Syrians, who were now

settled mainly in Jamaica, were raising money to support a revolution against Auguste’s

government. The American consul investigated but was convinced that the accusations were

baseless.95 Nonetheless, Auguste continued to believe the rumours and maintained a crack-down

91
Plummer, 532.
92
Plummer, 531-2.
93
The rumours that the violence of 1911 was underwritten by German monies appears highly probable given that
German commercial interests were the most likely at the time to benefit from Syrian expulsions.
94
FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1919), Document 718. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1912/d718.
95
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1920), Document 656. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1913/d656.

89
on the Syrian community. His modus operandi, according to the Americans, was “to harass and

annoy them [Syrians] so that they, too, will leave of their own will, or the Government pretends

to have evidence implicating them in revolutionary movements and expel them.”96

Brenda Plummer identified two especially useful lessons from the Syrian experience in

Haiti. The first was the refusal of the international community, including the US, to grant Haiti

the right to enforce the same protectionist policies which they themselves claimed and enjoyed.

The second was that “the old Haitian habit of relying on imports for the most fundamental

commodities…continued…[and] engineered a woeful dependency from which Haiti has not yet

emerged.”97

Anatomy of a Coup: Understanding the Transition to Power in Haiti

The Republic of Haiti, which gave itself the trouble of founding a State Bank, confided in
it the service of the Treasury and endowed it with the considerable privilege of the issue
of notes, cannot but find the loyal cooperation of this Bank at the difficult hour where
outside circumstances, that we have not created, bind painfully the nation.98
- Telegram from US Minister Blanchard to the US Secretary of State

Before leaving this period, an overview of foreign influence and interference in the

transition of power in Haiti through the coup process is required. This section will outline the

Haitian experience during the 1914 coup which overthrew President Michel Oreste Lafontant

(1913-14). In 1913, the Oreste government had lost popularity amongst the elite due to attempts

at reform. The Zamor brothers, Charles and Oreste, emerged as the leading revolutionary chiefs

96
FRUS, Document 656.
97
Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 538.
98
This extract from a 15 December 1914 diplomatic note passed from the Haitian Department of Foreign Affairs to
the US Legation was part of a series of notes protesting the American decision to spirit Haitian gold held in the Bank
out of Haiti and into holdings in New York. The gold was reportedly returned a number of years later, with interest.
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1922), Document 577. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d577.

90
seeking to overthrow the government, and began their separate advances on Port-au-Prince with

the intent of wresting the presidency from Michel Oreste.99

The volatile situation immediately attracted the attention of the US Legation in Port-au-

Prince. In January 1914, a diplomatic cable describing the situation was sent to the State

Department and included a request for a US naval presence to protect against threats “made

against the property of foreigners.”100 Clearly, the US eschewed neutrality in this revolution and

came down firmly on the side of the Oreste government, which it saw as representing American

interests best.101 By late January, the USS Nashville had been dispatched to Haiti, and was

quickly followed by the cruiser USS Montana.

The Nashville was ordered to proceed to Fort Liberty with orders to pick up Haitian

Interior Minister Pradel, seen at that time as the Oreste government’s most capable minister and

likely to resolve the crisis. American embassy staff in Port-au-Prince identified Pradel as

“urgently need[ed] here [in Port-au-Prince] as the strongest man to preserve order.”102 The

Montana, at the same time, was sent to Port-au-Prince to support the US Legation, with orders

for the American ambassador to seek out and advise President Oreste that the captain of the

Montana was “ordered to act as [President Oreste] and his Cabinet requested. [The State]

99
Heinl and Heinl point out that Charlemagne Péralte was Charles Zamor’s brother-in-law as well as a “general de
place at Port-de-Paix” at this time and a key military leader in the Zamors’ campaign for president. See Heinl and
Heinl, Written in Blood, 384, 387-88.
100
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1922), Document 487. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d487.
101
One of the chief issues of concern to the US government at the time was having the Oreste government rescind
the Syrian Exclusion Law which called for the expulsion of those persons of Syrian origins (targeting mainly the
Syrian merchants). The law had been put in place by the previous administrations (Leconte and Auguste), and was
not supported by Oreste. FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913, ed. Joseph V.
Fuller(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), Document 655.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1913/d655.
102
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1922), Document 489.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d489.

91
Department is disposed to do anything proper to support [the] constituted government.”103 Yet by

27 January 1914, with the approach of the armies under the control of the Zamor brothers, and

despite American support, President Oreste made the decision to resign and subsequently took

refuge aboard the German war ship Vineta.104 The approach of the Zamor brothers in command

of two revolutionary armies clearly demonstrated their ability to overmatch any forces available

to Oreste.

The Zamor brothers’ march on the capital, however, did raise the alarm among the

foreign legations, many of which had already called for their own troops and ships to be

dispatched to Haitian waters. A number began to land those troops in anticipation of defending

their national interests. The Americans, for example, had a Marine company ashore by the end of

January, while the Germans landed 70 of their soldiers. The French and British would quickly

follow suit.105 Oreste Zamor entered Port-au-Prince on 7 February, at the head of a 4,000-man

army. The Haitian National Assembly promptly voted him into the presidency. The American

ambassador reported that Zamor’s accession to the presidency was peacefully effected and

offered up the comment that “he has preserved order since coming in.”106

The failure of American interventionist activities to halt the successful coup by Oreste

Zamor led the US to undertake damage control. The State Department directed the Legation to

ensure the new regime was aware of the strong American interest “in the proper administration

and collection of customs,” the revenues from which were the means by which Haiti was

103
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 489. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d489.
104
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 495. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d495.
105
The French likewise dispatched a war ship to the area from Mexico where it had visiting. FRUS, With the
Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing
Office, 1922), Document 496. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d496.
106
FRUS, Document 496.

92
servicing various foreign loans.107 The Legation also undertook to clarify the fate of Môle Saint-

Nicholas, a potential site for a naval coal refuelling station. While the US was not interested in

leasing the station, it was nonetheless quite adamant about making clear to the Haitian leadership

that it would not look favourably upon the station being made available to any other nation.

In a telegram dated February 26, 1914, the Secretary of State directed the ambassador to

ensure Zamor stood by the previous “understanding” reached with President Oreste and that it

“remain undisturbed.” The gist of that gentlemen’s agreement included the promise “that no

other power other than the US should gain a foothold in that section of the Republic.”108 Thus,

despite American reservations, Oreste Zamor was confirmed as president by March 1914 and

duly recognized by the US

By mid-March, the Zamor regime was itself facing fresh opposition. While the Zamor

brothers had been the main revolutionary chiefs arrayed against the Oreste government, they

were not the only ones. General Joseph Davilmar Théodore had also been building support in the

Gonaïves area, but had suffered from a number of problems including financing for his army.109

However, while Zamor was being confirmed in the presidency, Théodore was reported to have

secured financial assistance for his military campaign from the Dominican Republic and was

renewing his march on Port-au-Prince.110

107
The Americans had been pushing for control over the Haitian customs houses, but were constantly rebuffed on
that point, and would not achieve control until the Marine Occupation.
108
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 506. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d506.
109
On February 1, 1914, the Zamor brothers’ combined armies had been reported by the US Embassy as having
defeated General Joseph Davilmar Théodore in a battle at Gonaïves. By the end of February, the Embassy reported
that Théodore had been unable to pay his army and his revolutionary quest was in danger of total collapse.
FRUS, Document 506.
110
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 511. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d511.

93
 That additional funding bolstered his forces significantly and led to a reversal of the

previous analysis sent by the US Legation in which they had dismissed his chances of success.

The Legation was now recommending sending ships and men into Haitian waters as Théodore

was seen as a strong threat to Haitian peace and stability, as well as to American interests. At the

same time, the USS Nashville was ordered to proceed to Cap Haïtien and begin negotiations with

Théodore for a cessation of hostilities while the USS Montana was stationed in the Gonaïves area

in support of the negotiations. Nonetheless, despite the American support, the negotiations would

fail.111

Meanwhile, the Zamor regime was in trouble financially. A June 1914 internal

subscription had raised just over US$300,000 mainly from small German merchants.112 It is

unclear whether the monies raised were voluntary contributions paid through increased taxes or

were coerced contributions to the government’s coffers. Reports by the American Legation

indicated the money was raised through “subscriptions…to an internal loan” which suggested the

loans would be paid off with interest, a dubious proposition given Théodore’s revolutionary

activity and progress.113

Based on the uncertainty generated by Théodore, the Banque Nationale de la République

d'Haïti or BNRH, then under foreign ownership and control, refused to provide the Zamor

government with funding necessary for the “convention budgétaire,” the funds being essential

for daily government operations.114 The tactic of refusing to release convention budgétaire funds,

111
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 513. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d513.
112
FRUS, Document 513.
113
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 519. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d519.
114
The “convention budgétaire” was an agreement between the Haitian government and the BNRH, whereby the
bank, then under the control of French, American, and German interests, provided the government with its operating
funds. Without those funds, the government could not pay its civil service and would cease to function. Walter H
Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” The Americas 20, no. 3 (Jan 1964): 235-6.

94
which did lead to a halt in Haitian government operations, was a deliberate US tactic employed

to gain American control over the Haitian customs houses. American Legation officials expected

that “the [Zamor] Government when confronted by such a crisis, would be forced to ask the

assistance of the US in adjusting its financial tangle and that American supervision of the

customs would result.”115

Recognizing the government could not operate without funds, the US presented the

Zamor government with its conditions for further loans. These included a proposed convention

that allowed for the appointment of an American Receiver General to Haiti who would receive

all payments of customs duties and would make all decisions on disbursements of that revenue

based on American-established priorities. Those prioritized disbursements were, first, to pay the

salaries and expenses of the Receiver General and his assistants and employees; second, to retire

the public debt of Haiti; and third, to cover the day-to-day costs of government operations.116

Foreign influence over revolutionary activities continued and sparked complaints from

the Zamor government to the US Legation regarding the harbouring by various legations of

revolutionary leaders. The German Legation was the main culprit in many of the US telegrams

on the subject.117 Yet it was on the economic front that most of the damage was done to the

Zamor government and led directly to its overthrow. The Zamor regime’s attempts to obtain

international loans required to pay for government operations were deliberately foiled by the

international community. German consular officials, for example, let their American

counterparts know that the German government had informed the German Haitian community

115
Cited from a June 9, 1914, message from Minister Smith to the US Secretary of State. Posner, “American
Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 235-236.
116
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 525. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d525.
117
See, for example, FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller
(Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 528.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d528.

95
they “would not support any claims based upon subscriptions to the proposed loan.”118 It is very

likely that other nations provided similar notices to their own national communities.

By the end of July, and despite having received some funding of the convention

budgétaire, the inevitable occurred and the Zamor government found itself without operating

cash. Desperation led it to offer up a novel guarantee for loans in the form of a “guaranty [of]

revenue from stamp taxes… valued at $100,000 a year” in exchange for US$300,000. The funds

raised were to be used to pay for operational expenses in the fight against the Théodore

revolutionary movement.119 Interestingly, while the BNRH had refused to provide the loan

requested, it “admitted that the guaranty offered [was] worth the amount sought.”120

Meanwhile, the US resumed loan negotiations with the government, offering the Zamor

regime a loan while renewing its demand, as a key condition, for the appointment of an

American Receiver-General to oversee Haiti’s budget.121 Once again, the Americans included

the ability to oversee how Haitian revenues were employed, including an insistence that foreign

loans and American loans to Haiti in particular, be the first items serviced by Haiti’s revenue.

By September, the Zamor government had some success in operations against Théodore

and was able to seize the arrondissement of Ouanaminthe in the northeast. Once again, though,

Haiti’s economic situation undid the regime. Zamor’s government was only successful in

receiving half the monies it required for continued operations since the BNRH, acting in

accordance with US interests, had refused to provide further funds, and the international

118
FRUS, Document 528.
119
FRUS, Document 528.
120
FRUS, Document 528.
121
Haiti’s only other option for funding at this point would have been with other entities who were able to thwart the
US interests by making the loan but would have demanded exorbitant interest rates in compensation.

96
community had likewise turned its collective back on Haiti. Other funding sources had failed to

materialize, and consequently, the government found itself in a critical financial situation.122

One final remedy was planned. The government proposed a bill allowing for the issuance

of an additional 12 million gourdes [US$2.4 million] of paper money. This immediately alarmed

foreign investors including the US government as it would have seriously diluted Haiti’s

monetary supply and driven the value of foreign investments down significantly. The planned

remedy, though, became moot by the end of October as the Théodore offensive against Port-au-

Prince succeeded and President Zamor was forced to flee the capital into exile aboard a Dutch

vessel.

As was the usual modus operandi in the case of a Haitian coup, many of the major

foreign powers dispatched war ships and marines to Haitian waters, ostensibly to protect

foreigners and their commercial interests. For example, the USS Hancock, a transport ship

carrying 800 Marines, was ordered to Haiti to join the warship USS Kansas already on station in

the area. Interestingly, the Hancock was ordered to “take charge of Port-au-Prince and…restore

Charles Zamor [the former President’s brother] to his Cabinet functions.”123 That would prove

to be unachievable.

The new regime led by Joseph Davilmar Théodore (1914-15) took power in Haiti on 13

November and immediately sought formal recognition from the United States. The US, however,

decided to play hardball and refused recognition until Théodore agreed to sign a convention

settling five key issues: the signing of the proposed customs convention; confirmation of

American railway interests in Haiti; the re-establishment of normal relations between the BNRH

122
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 529. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d529.
123
Both Zamor brothers in fact eventually fled Haiti.

97
and the Haitian government; the protection of foreign interests; and the renewal of the agreement

over the Môle Saint-Nicholas station.124

The Théodore administration refused the American demands, but still took the time to

provide a counterproposal, as it remained extremely interested in American recognition because

of the benefits that carried. Once again, however, as with the Zamor regime, monetary concerns

of the new government took centre stage as the new regime found the government financial

cupboards bare. Copying the Zamor regime’s planning, Théodore also initiated the issuance of

additional paper money, in the amount of almost 16 million gourdes. Repeating its previous

stance on the issue, the US immediately condemned the plan, and this time used its influence

with Haitian BNRH’s authorities to make them refuse to recognize any new issue of money as

legal tender.125

That objection notwithstanding, the Théodore regime, like others, was forced to push

ahead with printing more money, the alternative being to accept American sovereignty in the five

areas noted above. The US State Department response was to telegram the diplomatic staff in

Port-au-Prince and order them to “inform Théodore that the US will refuse to regard as legal any

such issue of paper money as he proposes. French and German Ambassadors in Washington

have been advised in this sense, in order that their nationals in Haiti may be informed.”126 The

US went further in its planning and began operations aimed at spiriting some US$500,000 worth

124
The Môle Saint-Nicholas station agreement only allowed the station to be leased by the United States. A sixth
priority, added later on November 16, 1914, called for US citizen claims against Haiti to be decided through
arbitration. FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller
(Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 546.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d546.
125
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 552. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d552.
126
Clearly, the American refusal to regard the Haitian issuance of additional currency as legal undermined Haitian
sovereignty, essentially declaring the Haitians did not have the right to determine their own fiscal policy. FRUS,
With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government
Publishing Office, 1922), Document 558. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d558.

98
of gold bullion out of the BNRH, despite a counter-proposal from the Théodore regime which

refused American control over Haiti’s custom houses, but did offer significant economic

concessions to American interests and agents in Haiti.127

The decision to evacuate the Haitian gold from the BNRH was intended to force Haiti,

once again, into reliance on foreign loans, all of which came with significant American

conditions attached. To attach an air of legitimacy to what the Haitian government felt was theft,

the first request for a transfer of the gold came from the BNRH vice- president, Henry H.

Wehrhane. His December 8, 1914, telegram requested a US warship provide the secure

transportation of the gold to safeguard it from revolutionary activity. Initially, the plan was to

transfer about US$110,000 of gold but the amount demanded would be revised and increased to

US$500,000 on 14 December.128 The gold would eventually be taken aboard the USS Machias

without incident, the shipment guarded by unarmed Marines.129

The Haitian response to what they termed a theft was communicated diplomatically on 22

December and stated that Haiti “deeply deplores an arbitrary and offensive intervention, which

carries a flagrant invasion of the sovereignty and independence of…Haiti.”130 The Haitians also

127
The Haitian counterproposal included provisions for 20 years of US exclusivity within the then-developing
mining industry in Haiti. The Haitian government was to receive one-third of the stock in the new endeavour.
Further, the US was to assist Haiti in obtaining loans which would allow for debt consolidation including the
consolidation of its past fiscal obligations. The US refused the counterproposal, claiming that it did “not give any
assurance that the Government of Haiti is stable or any promise of a reign of peace and prosperity.” FRUS, With the
Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing
Office, 1922), Document 568. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d568.
128
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Documents 563, 564, and 565.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d563,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d564 and
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d565.
129
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington:
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 575. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d575.
130
Haitian Minister Solon Menos, who signed off the protest to the US over its invasion and seizure of the gold,
claimed that the gold in question was being held to retire currency issued and related to an earlier 1910 French loan
to Haiti, and was not in fact related to any US monetary agreements or loans. The US responded on 31 December
and stated that the removal of the gold was for reasons of security; the fear being that had the revolutionary forces
seized the gold, bank officials believed they would have been held liable. The US government stated further that

99
protested that the American position on Haiti’s economic problems was hypocritical. On the one

hand, the Americans made the decision to assist in the withdrawal of Haitian gold, claiming that

Haiti had violated the Haitian BNRH’s constitution by seeking to issue more paper money. On

the other hand, the same constitution specifically states that “[a]ll diplomatic intervention [in

BNRH affairs] is formally prohibited.”131

In the case of the latter, Haiti protested that the continued US insistence that any currency

issue by Haiti would be regarded as illegal, was such an intervention. The result was that

Théodore’s government issued a diplomatic note on 15 December which stated that the regime

considered itself free of the conventions related to the BNRH and was free to seek out new

relationships which would benefit the regime and its monetary requirements.132

Despite that decision, Théodore was unable to find the funding necessary to support his

regime and was forced to resign from office in February 1915 when confronted by General Jean

Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (president from 4 March to 27 July 1915) and his forces. Ironically,

whereas Sam came to power by ousting the bankrupt Théodore government that had been

financially starved by the international community, the Sam regime would likewise be subject to

rebellions, but this time over claims his regime had given too much away to the international

community to obtain the financing necessary for Haitian government operations.

both the gold within the National Bank vaults and that removed to New York would be released to the Haitian
government for the retirement of currency “when the conditions in Haiti render the resumption of this procedure
advisable.” FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller
(Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922), Documents 562, 564, and 570.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d562,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d564 and
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d569.
131
The Haitian argument over the illegality of US actions regarding the National Bank is best summed up in the
Haitian Foreign Office note passed through the US Legation on 15 December 1914. FRUS, With the Address of the
President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922),
Document 577. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d577.
132
Government activity took on a more active approach with the report from the US Legation in late December 1914
that government officials had seized some US$65,000 from the vaults of the National Bank of Haiti.

100
Summary

While Haiti’s economic dependency and poverty are shared by other Caribbean nations,
its history of underdevelopment serves as a prototype for them. Haiti’s political
independence, achieved in 1804, set the stage for an increasingly difficult struggle to
survive among imperialist states. Haiti prefigured the modern Latin American experience
and thus provides a classic example of how national aspirations in the hemisphere were
derailed. Equally significant, it illustrates the manner in which commerce, rather than
plantation enterprise or extensive capital investment, could foster socioeconomic
decline.133
- Professor of History Brenda G. Plummer

Haiti was beset by foreign interference almost immediately after independence. Despite

diplomatic isolation which saw Haiti being precluded from international recognition as a

sovereign state, Haiti was nevertheless subject to predatory economic relations. Initially, the

fledgling nation sought out trading opportunities to generate the hard currency so necessary for

the purchase of arms and ammunition to defend the nation against lethal adversaries who had

demonstrated through act and word their interests in subjugating Haiti and re-establishing

slavery. Not surprising, Haitian leaders found themselves hard pressed to adopt policies that

would have allowed Haiti to implement sorely needed social and economic improvements.

For Haiti, the forced French indemnity was quite literally a game changer. First, it pushed

Haiti into the world of predatory international loans. The first instalment of the indemnity

required Haiti to obtain a French loan to meet the demand! That ongoing requirement of

obtaining foreign loans made Haiti vulnerable to fiscal policy manipulation. One such example

was the American threat of refusal to recognize Haiti’s additional paper currency in 1914, a

threat which clearly infringed on Haitian sovereignty. In the end, Haiti would be forced to

manage as best it could, all the while watching as development opportunities, including those

brought about by the industrial revolution, pass it by without so much as a brief touch.

133
Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 119.

101
 The indemnity also significantly impacted on commercial development in Haiti. As

pointed out earlier, the reduced tariffs provided to the French under the indemnity agreement was

a contributing factor to Haitian domestic businesses not being able to compete with cheaper

imported goods from France, as well as stifling the development of any commercial activity

within fields dominated by France. That retardation of commercial development in Haiti had

perhaps as great an impact on Haiti, if not greater, as the monetary demand and the follow-on

predatory loans required to pay the indemnity.

Even with diplomatic recognition, manipulation and exploitation of Haiti would continue,

especially during the period of gunboat diplomacy. Political turmoil during this period saw

foreign naval forces being employed to extort money from the Haitian government for real or

alleged damages to foreign citizens and their businesses. Ironically, foreign money was often

behind the political turmoil, particularly that of Germany at least until the American Occupation

in 1915. Germany has been frequently cited as the main culprit in fomenting revolutionary

activity.

That activity, especially gunboat diplomacy, would continue right up to the Marine

invasion and constituted a form of economic warfare. While the Germans employed economic

tactics in and against Haiti, they were largely seeking to develop economic markets for their own

goods and services. The Americans, on the other hand, waged economic warfare against Haiti

through a strategy known as “dollar diplomacy” or “financial imperialism.” Before turning to the

Marine Occupation, dollar diplomacy first needs to be explained and understood within the

context of American foreign policy interests within the region.

Dollar diplomacy as defined by the American politician, writer and lawyer, Frederic C.

Howe, is the “right of a lending nation to interfere with the internal affairs of the borrowing

102
nation.”134 Howe summarized US foreign policy in the employment of gunboat diplomacy in

support of national commercial interests operating abroad:

[Dollar diplomacy] means that the American banker, concession seeker and exploiter
shall be permitted to negotiate any kind of a contract and once the contract is secured it
shall have back of it the strong arm of the government to enforce its terms. If revolutions
break out that threaten the investment, if the interest is too heavy to be paid, the army and
navy shall be dispatched to suppress the revolution or bring about a government selected
by the financiers to ensure their investments; for foreign loans and concessions are
accompanied by treaties. Treaties are part of the contract of borrowing. And under the
treaties the borrowing power guarantees the investments and by implication authorizes
intervention by force, if necessary, to validate contracts, if it is unable to insure them
itself.135

Dollar diplomacy is generally understood as a foreign policy tool first employed by

Théodore Roosevelt and further refined and changed by both the Taft and Wilson governments.

Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine allowed the US to intervene in any Latin American

nation that engaged in “chronic wrongdoing” to restore order, stability and prosperity. Chronic

wrongdoing included taking on too much debt. William Walker, writing on American foreign

policy, provided an excellent summary of the American stratagem for Latin American region,

including Haiti:

the advent of North American financial domination in the 1910s offered the prospect of
fiscal stability while simultaneously favoring the emplacement of ruling oligarchies,
which in each case were ushered into the 1920s by US armed forces. The United States

134
Frederic C. Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy and Financial Imperialism under the Wilson Administration,” The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 68 (November 1916), 315. Howe argues that right
originated with the British in 1850, when they employed gunboat diplomacy against Greece during what is known as
the Don Pacifico affair. British by birth, Don Pacifico was the former Portuguese consul-general to Greece until
relieved from this post for overstepping his authority. Pacifico was also Jewish and was attacked in his home by an
anti-Semitic mob of Greeks who damaged his residence and damaged his furniture and effects. Pacifico
subsequently submitted a claim for damages against the Greek crown, but the amount claimed was disputed by the
Greek government as being unreasonably large. When they refused to pay the demanded compensation, Pacifico
appealed to British Lord Palmerston for assistance. Britain imposed a blockade on Greece, which was under the
protection of France, Great Britain, and Russia. The blockade caused a diplomatic row between the two sides
(Britain against France and Russia) and would be ended within two months but only after compensation was finally
paid to Pacifico. See also Dolphus Whitten, Jr., “The Don Pacifico Affair,” The Historian 48, no. 2 (February 1986):
255-67.
135
Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy,” 314.

103
 followed a pattern that included the collection of customs revenues, control of national
banks, refunding public debts, and training local security forces.”136

As Emily S. Rosenberg has pointed out, Roosevelt’s administration worked with private

banks to extend “controlled loans…to countries that…needed to be subject to US administration

in a time when Congress would never have approved the overt seizure of colonies.”137 The

controlled loans under the guise of dollar diplomacy were secretive in nature and lacked

transparency as Roosevelt sought to shield them from Congressional oversight. That practice

would continue and intensify under presidents Taft and Wilson and would extend to the various

military, largely counterinsurgency, campaigns undertaken in target countries including Haiti.

Frederic Howe condemned the practice as harmful to American interests. He identified

the adoption and practice of dollar diplomacy as leading to an

ending of the splendid isolation of the US from questionable relations with other peoples;
it involves the conversion of the state department and the army and navy into collection
and insurance agencies for Wall Street interests, concession seekers, munition makers,
and those who will exploit weaker peoples under the philanthropic assurance of
promoting their development.138

Similarly, political scientist Suzanne Mettler has pointed out that the controlled loan

process, lacking transparency and openness, would shift into a program that became coercive and

self-perpetuating. It forced nations like Haiti to take out new loans through American officials,

and created what Mettler termed a “submerged state.”139 Dollar diplomacy should be understood

136
William O. Walker, III, “Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin
America,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1, (January 2006): 83–117.
137
Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to US Empire,” Diplomatic History 38, no.4
(2014): 856.
138
Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy,” 312.
139
Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy
(Chicago: 2011). Cited in Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to US Empire,” 856.

104
as not only predatory in nature, but also as a deliberate and key element of the economic war

waged against Haiti by the United States.

105
Chapter Six - The United States Marine Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934

The government of the United States has no ambitions to gratify at your expense, no
policy which runs counter to your national aspirations, and no purpose save to promote
the interests of peace and assist you, in such manner as you may welcome, to solve your
problems to your own proper advantage.1
- US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes

[I]t will be very hard for Hayti ever again to emerge as an independent state…[Yet] Hayti
must become a very different country to that which is at present breaking the heart of all
those who really love her, shocking and disgusting the sensibility of the civilized world.2
- 1915 Jamaica Times editorial

In 1888, US Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee called Haiti “a public nuisance at

our doors.”3 That statement of exasperation came as civil war broke out once again in 1888

within Haiti, this time involving the United States directly in the conflict.4 By July 1915, the

Haitian nuisance had become sufficiently critical that US President Woodrow Wilson launched

what became the 19-year long occupation of Haiti by the US military.5 The invasion and

occupation was directed by the US State Department and sanctioned by President Wilson. The

1
Quote by US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes from December 1922 speech to the Conference of Central
American Republics. From Davis, Black Democracy, 296.
2
“Hayti," Jamaica Times, August 14, 1915, cited in Matthew J. Smith, “Capture Land: Jamaica, Haiti, and the
United States Occupation,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, No. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of
Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015), 183.
3
Cited in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1995), 31.
4
In October 1888, the Haitian naval man-of-war, the Dessalines, seized the American steamship, the S.S. Haytian
Republic, an American transport ship which had been transporting rebel troops and supplies (arms and ammunition)
between the Cape, Port-de-Paix and Gonaïves, supplying the rebel army under General Hyppolite. In response, the
Americans dispatched two warships, the USS Yantic and Galena to Port-au-Prince. Their arrival prompted the
government to return the now stripped ship back to the US Navy in December, ending the episode peacefully. Heinl
and Heinl, Written in Blood, 304.
5
US plans to invade Haiti included, as early as 1911, instructions to military attaché staff in Haiti to map out the
countryside. That led to the New York Times reporting on US Army Captain Young, the sole coloured officer on the
attaché’s staff, “pacing his way through the mountainous countryside.” At the same time, the US Navy was
conducting and recording depth soundings in Haitian waters. Cited in Alonzo P.B. Holly, “Our Future Relations
with Haiti,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 156, No. 110 (1931), 111-12.
The telegram which launched the invasion of Haiti was sent to Admiral Caperton over the US Navy radio system,
and stated “STATE DEPARTMENT DESIRES AMERICAN FORCES BE LANDED PORT-AU-PRINCE AND
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INTERESTS PROTECTED…” The interests to be protected included both US
personnel and those commercial enterprises in Haiti that involved American interests. Heinl and Heinl, Written in
Blood, 401.

106
US strategic plan pursued three key outcomes: to gain control over the customs houses in Haiti,

to ensure that Haitian revenues were not being seized as plunder and instead serviced Haitian

loans; to settle all outstanding issues regarding the national railway and bank, both of which

represented significant American commercial interests; and to protect Haiti from the influence

and control of foreign governments, especially Germany.6

Wilson’s motivation for invading and occupying Haiti continues to be debated, but it is

generally accepted by historians such as Suzy Castor, Hans Schmidt and Mary Renda that it

involved several factors.7 First, the Haitian political climate was seen by American policy

makers as chaotic and out of control, posing a danger to regional stability.8 Often cited were the

frequent coups that took place within Haiti. James McCrocklin, for example, points out that

before the Marine Occupation Haiti had seven presidents in seven years.9 More telling, though.

was a quote from Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing (1915 to 1920), which provides an

understanding of the racism endemic within the American foreign policy towards Haiti:

"The experience of Liberia and Haiti show that the African race are devoid of any
capacity for political organization and lack genius for government. Unquestionably there
is an inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization
which are irksome to their physical nature. Of course, there are many exceptions to this

6
McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934, 9-10.
7
Part One of Suzy Castor’s L’occupation américaine d’Haïti lays out the “antecedents et causes” of the eventual
American occupation. She also makes it clear that many Haitian professionals and intellectuals recognized that the
American geopolitical interests in the region, coupled to Haiti’s own internal political instability, made an American
intervention increasingly likely. See Chapters I through III of Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti. See also
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934; and Renda, Taking Haiti.
8
William Alexander MacCorkle began his presentation with a consideration of “the governmental and social
condition of the Republic of Haiti…and the probability of it becoming a menace to the fundamental principles of the
Monroe Doctrine.” While claiming not to be interested in “indicting an entire people,” MacCorkle made the
extraordinary statement that “[s]ince the evacuation by the French, Haiti has been a land of seething revolution,
despotism and crime against religious and governmental law.” He then included the following shocking quote from
a colleague in his presentation, appearing to obliquely advocate genocide as a solution to Haiti’s chronic instability:
“Nothing short of extermination, some aver, could effect a reform in the Haitian body politic; but as this age does
not tolerate the radical measures of the olden time it is not probable that the present generation will experience a
reformation.” See William A. MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and its Application to Haiti,” Annals of American
Academy of Political and Social Science 54, (July 1914): 28-56.
9
McCrocklin pointed to the seven-year period from 17 December 1908-17 December 1915 and argued, as have
others, that the “principal occupation of the chief executive… [was the] …raising of money to maintain an army and
thus remain in office.” See McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934, 6.

107
 racial weakness, but it is true of the mass, as we know from experience in this country. It
is that which makes the negro problem practically unsolvable."10

A second factor was Haiti’s strategic position adjoining the region’s sea lanes and its

proximity to the Panama Canal. With the acquisition of the Panama Canal in 1904, the United

States could not tolerate foreign powers exercising influence over Haiti.11 Former West Virginia

Governor William A. MacCorkle, in an influential presentation to the American Academy of

Political and Social Science in 1914, made the case, stating simply that:

Next to Cuba, it [Haiti] is the most important strategic point in the Gulf of Mexico and
the Caribbean Sea. It is directly on and commands the two great passages of the Atlantic
Ocean…It thus practically controls the great bulk of the commerce of the United States to
the East and the Pacific Ocean.12

European influence in the Caribbean region, and in Haiti specifically, posed a challenge

to US aspirations to enforce the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and establish the

United States as a hegemonic power in the Caribbean.13 Germany, having clashed with the US

over other possible territorial acquisitions, was aware of the US desire to reform Haiti and

convert it into a stable, pacified trading partner. 14 Challenging those ambitions directly,

Germany, proclaimed in a 1914 communique that:

10
Cited in Schmidt, The US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 62-3. Lansing included this in a January 1918
communique to Rear Admiral James Oliver, the First Governor of the American Virgin Islands and former head of
US Naval Intelligence (1914 to 1917). Lansing was not the only official in Wilson’s cabinet who felt this way.
Schmidt quotes the Assistant Secretary of State, William Phillips, who likewise spoke about Haitian “complete
political incompetence” in failing to “maintain the degree of civilization left them by the French…” Schmidt, 63.
11
John W. Blassingame, "The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-
1920," Caribbean Studies9, no. 2 (1969): 31-32.
12
MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and its Application to Haiti,” 31-2.
13
Blassingame explains in detail how the idea of Manifest Destiny was promulgated by the press between 1904 to
1920, including the idea that “Haitians and Dominicans needed “energetic Anglo-Saxon influence.” The
Independent wrote: “It would plant another star in the blue sky of the flag and plant the flag prophetically in the
waters of the Caribbean.... If the United States has one 'mission' it is to propagate liberty under the direction of
education and morality... But it is said that annexation would be the ruin of a negro state. If so, so be it.... And if the
Negroes or the white men of Santo Domingo, or of the South, under fair laws, cannot swim, they must sink, call it
fate or law or what we will. It is best that the best should survive.” (March 3, 1904). Blassingame, 32-34.
14
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31-4, 43.

108
 [T]he German Government has joined with other European governments in representing
to Washington that the interests of European countries in Haiti are so large that no
scheme of reorganization or control can be regarded as acceptable unless it is undertaken
under international auspices.15

A key element to the Roosevelt Corollary and the establishment of the US as a

hegemonic power in the Caribbean was the most favoured nation principle for foreign trade in

the Caribbean. The US administration was desirous that Haiti should sign on for the status but

was thwarted initially by Haiti’s strong cultural and financial ties to France. France owned the

Banque Nationale d’Haïti or BNH, from 1880 until 1910, was one of Haiti’s main trading

partners, had preferred trading status with a fifty percent reduction in tariffs, and Haitians

preferred French goods. The Haitian elite, educated in France, spoke Parisian French, and

followed French rather than American customs. Finally, Haitian elites interacted in French (and

German) society as equals, while the Americans culturally showed little respect to Haitians, in

large measure due to racial prejudice conditioned and typified by widespread Jim Crow laws.16

The US quickly formulated a plan to undermine European financial interests in Haiti, and

were able to acquire a fifty percent ownership stake in the newly created BNRH from Germany

and France in 1910-1911.17 American bankers joined European bankers in implementing

schemes that virtually invited European and US military intervention in Latin America and the

Caribbean as part of their routine loan practice:

15
Carl Kelsey, The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Philadelphia, 1922), 135.
http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00001149/00001.
16
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31-5.
17
Schmidt, 38. The consortium led by the US was quickly able to exploit the contractual obligations under which
the new Haitian bank, BNRH, was created in October 1910. Loans made by the international community through the
new bank carried horrendous terms for Haiti. A new Haitian government loan of 65 million francs carried an
incredible 72.3 percent interest rate per annum, with some eight million francs withheld initially for the first
repayment. An additional ten million francs were held back by the new bank’s interests to allow for the retirement of
excess paper monies. As if that was not enough, the Haitian government was charged an additional one percent
interest on the monies held on deposit with the new bank, rather than receiving interest on those deposits.
Coincidentally, American invasion plans for Haiti were drawn up in 1911. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 355-6.

109
 [F]oreign financial interests would float loans at exorbitant rates to an unstable and often
corrupt Latin-American government… [Once the government defaulted on the loans, the
foreign powers would intervene] …If diplomatic pressure and intervention succeeded in
forcing a settlement of the debt, the foreign investors would enjoy high-risk rates of
return on their loans where there was actually no risk involved at all….18

That exploitation of a mal-credit paradigm in Haiti allowed US and European bankers to

create a self-sustaining system within which Haitian regimes had to seek additional international

funding to service previous loans, leading Haiti down the path to over-extending its public

borrowing, and falling into extreme credit dependency. The chronic predatory loan system

created a vicious cycle of the worst kind. Haitian instability generated high profits for foreign

banks and investment houses with no checks and balances.19 In April 1914, for example,

Madison Smith, the US Minister to Haiti, outlined just one means by which American interests

were manipulating Haiti:

The suspension of the ‘convention budgétaire’ most likely would bring the Government
to a condition where it could not operate. It is just this condition that the bank [BNRH]
desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the Government when confronted by such a
crisis, would be forced to ask the assistance of the United States in adjusting its financial
tangle and that American supervision of the customs would result.20

What is clear was that the United States was seeking to manipulate Haitian leaders into a

position where they would be forced into requesting American assistance, assistance that would

come with strings attached. Thus, while President Wilson would state that the US was

intervening in Haiti for the “protection of foreign lives and property…and to preserve order,” in

reality, planning for the intervention had been underway since mid-1911 and was principally

18
Note the relationship between foreign economic investment in Haiti through arms and monies transferred to rival
factions, and Haiti’s increasingly frequent changes of government due to military coup. This is not to suggest that
arguments about ideological basis for a quasi-civil war are wrong: indeed, the frequency of coups may be related to
such ideological struggles, but they were clearly made more likely and more lucrative through the infusion of
foreign capital and equipment. Schmidt, 43-4.
19
This highlights the vicious cycle in Haiti whereby manipulation and instability go hand-in-hand.
20
Cited in Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 235-6.

110
aimed at securing US economic and financial interests.21 Indeed, the first article in the

Occupation convention quite clearly identified the aim of putting Haiti’s finances “on a firm and

solid basis” as a priority of the invading force.22

The critical nature of Haiti’s strategic position within the region was more economic than

geographic. David Nicholls points, paradoxically, to the creation of the national bank during the

presidency of Louis Étienne Félicité Lysius Salomon (1879 to 1888) as contributing to the

eventual invasion and occupation: “the take-over of the Banque [BNRH] by US interests in 1911

was a decisive step towards the occupation of the country.” Nicholls also cites Haitian politician

and academic Edmond Paul who “likened the bank to a Trojan horse which would introduce into

our country foreigners bent on annexation.”23

The United States Government’s emphasis on protecting loans from American banks to

Haiti was not surprising. American Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan took advice on

Haiti from Roger L. Farnham, an executive with the National City Bank of New York, which

owned a significant share of the BNRP.24 Farnham not only retained his position as vice-

president within the National City Bank of New York, he also became vice-president of the

21
Haitian historian, Suzy Castor, points out that Haitian writers and intellectuals were well aware of the likelihood
of a US intervention from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. In 1903, Sténio Vincent, then a prominent
Haitian lawyer and later Haitian president (1930-1941), wrote that "l'hypothèse d'une intervention nord-américaine
est indiscutable, c'est presque une certitude." See Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 61.
22
That the intervention was primarily to secure economic and financial interests is bolstered by the earlier December
1914 intervention when US Marines landed in Haiti and seized the Haitian national bank’s holdings of gold bullion
(some US$1 million worth) which they promptly transported to New York. Further, the US had been negotiating for
some time, often with the threat of force, for control over Haiti’s customs houses. See Leon D. Pamphile, Haitians
and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy and Hope (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 103;
James Weldon Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti: Four articles reprinted from The Nation embodying a report of an
investigation made for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (New York: University of
Miami’s The Nation, 1920; Project Gutenberg, 2011), 10; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 383-90.
23
Nicholls, Haiti in Caribbean Context, 44.
24
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 48. See also Renda, Taking Haiti, 99.

111
BNRP. Further, he would later assume the presidency of Haiti’s national railway, because of

National City Bank’s controlling shares in the railway company.25

For US political leaders, control over the Haitian customs houses became an important

policy goal after Farnham advised the State Department it was necessary.26 The customs houses

were part of the national network responsible for collecting all import and export taxes on behalf

of the Haitian government. The Haitian government continually resisted the request of the BNRP

to be the receiver of their import and export taxes. Control of the customs houses network

allowed the US to collect customs and excise taxes and ensure that all American loans to Haiti

were paid.27 Once US Marines invaded Haiti, one of the chief functions of the BNRP was to act

as “sole depository of all revenues collected in the name of the Haitian government by the

American Occupation, receiving in addition to the interest rate a commission on all funds

deposited.…” That function meant that control over the bank, now firmly in American hands,

conveyed control of Haiti’s economic and monetary policy.28

The Effects of the Occupation

God is too far, and the United States is too close.29

- Haitian Historian and Diplomat Dantès Bellegarde

25
In 1920, James Weldon Johnson wrote a series of four articles for The Nation entitled “Self-Determining Haiti,”
which comprised an investigation by the US National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) into the Marine Occupation. The reporting pointed out that Roger Farnham has just been made the
receiver of the National Railroad of Haiti and provided detail on the bond manipulations which had allowed
Farnham, through his bank, to gain control over the Railroad and its “valuable territorial concessions.” See James
Weldon Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti.
26
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 53. By 1915, Farnham was threatening Bryan with
the removal of American financial interests from Haiti if the US government did not intervene. See also Renda,
Taking Haiti, 99.
27
Schmidt, 48-50.
28
Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti, 21.
29
Quoted in Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, In the Shadow of Powers: Dantès Bellegarde in Haitian Social Thought, 2nd
ed. (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2019), 30.

112
 It is the Nemesis of governments that do not rest on the consent of the governed that what
they do with the best of intentions may be as harmful as bad actions.30
- Professor of Economics and Sociology Emily Greene Balch

Because past negotiations had not produced any Haitian interest in yielding sovereignty

over domestic economic and fiscal policy, the United States decided to use force to achieve their

aims.31 The effects of the Occupation should be understood within a framework of violence

employed against Haiti. Despite James McCrocklin’s argument that intervention in Haiti was

“not a ‘Marine show” but rather a closely controlled State Department operation, the reality was

quite different.32

The US employed the Marines in Haiti as the instrument of its military solution to ending

that “public nuisance at our doors.”33 Employing the military to solve problems usually results in

a military solution, one based on violence. This is particularly true when the US Marines are

employed.34 The downside of making the Marines central to American policy in Haiti was that

30
Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 81.
31
The Americans had already put the Roosevelt Corollary into action in Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican
Republic. “This policy of guaranteeing foreign financial investments by American police action served as a
precedent for subsequent interventions.” Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 44.
32
Historian Suzy Castor identifies two components contributing to the success of the American occupation. The first
was a strong Marine presence coupled to the later development of the Haitian Constabulary to deter opposition; and
the second, “une équipe ‘d'experts’ qui se confondaient presque avec la force armée. Cet appareil civil imposait les
ordres du Département d'État.” However, because all State and War Department communiques flowed through the
office of the military commander, Admiral Caperton, the US civil service team took its day-to-day direction from
the military. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 79.
33
Quoted in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31.
34
Interestingly, as far as senior military and diplomatic Occupation officials were concerned, the Marines in Haiti
were not understood as US Marines per se but rather were seen as members of the Haitian Gendarmerie and
therefore Haitian government tools, albeit serving American interests. This ‘distancing’ from responsibility was
made particularly clear in 1917, when Occupation officials sought to have a new constitution approved by the
Haitians, but that the Haitian politicians refused. Major Smedley Butler was called upon to confer with Colonel
Cole, his Regimental Commanding Officer, as well as other senior American officials, including the American
Ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Arthur Bailly-Blanchard (1914 to 1921). Butler recounted being told by Colonel Cole that
“la constitution proposée était inamicale aux Américains et que notre gouvernement ne l'approuverait pas. Le
ministre était requis de prendre des mesures pour empêcher le vote de cette Constitution. — « Quelque chose doit
être fait immédiatement à ce sujet, observa Cole. Mais Anderson est un amiral de la flotte et je suis moi-même un
officier de l'infanterie de marine au service des États Unis. Nous ne pouvons faire le coup nous-mêmes. Vous êtes le
seul qui puissiez agir, Butler. Vous êtes un officier haïtien.” Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of
Smedley Butler, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933, in Dantès Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne: (L'occupation
américaine d'Haïti): Recit d'histoire contemporaine, (Montréal: Les Éditions Beauchemin, 1937), 45-6.

113
many of the accomplishments of the occupying force -- the road network, for example, and the

redesigned education system -- were later erased by Haitians or abandoned because of their

association with the Occupation.

One example of an area of violence committed against Haiti during the Occupation was

the increase in, and apparent tolerance of, prostitution.35 In 1926, Mr. Perceval Thoby, a Haitian

lawyer based in Port-au-Prince, spoke to the visiting Women’s International League for Peace

and Freedom (WILPF) team, stating

A great moral wrong is also done to Haiti. It is the rapid spreading of prostitution with its
venereal diseases, inseparable from any military occupation. From the neighboring
islands and across the Dominican border, girls invade Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien,
lured by the dollars of the marines. All the dancing places are places of open prostitution.
Before the American Occupation, such things did not exist.36

Three key areas of the Occupation had long-term effects on Haiti. The first was the

counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign conducted by the US Marines against any and all Haitian

opposition to the invasion and occupation, under the guise of fighting the insurgent cacos who

opposed to the US presence in Haiti. That COIN campaign would have significant long-term

effects on Haitian governance, including the eventual rise of Duvalier’s authoritarianism. The

second was infrastructure development undertaken by the Marines and its contribution to

centralizing military and political power in the capital, Port-au-Prince, at the expense of Haiti’s

35
In addition to an increase in prostitution, the Occupation also saw an increase in illegitimate children, the majority
of whom were abandoned by their American fathers, downloading the social and financial costs onto Haitians. See
Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 135.
36
Balch, 119. Thoby later wrote to W.E.B. Du Bois, claiming that the Marines were covering up various rapes
committed by Marines, the most flagrant being a rape committed by American Marine Lieutenant O’Donnell, who
assaulted an 11-year old child. Thoby claimed O’Donnell was promoted and moved from the area when the rape was
made known to the Marine authorities. A local newspaper editor was dismissed from his position as head of the
passport division within the Department of the Interior. See letter from Perceval Thoby to W.E.B. Du Bois,
September 22, 1926, https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312-b036-i079/#page/1/mode/1up.

114
regional power centers. Third, the Occupation produced serious long-term effects on the

economic and commercial relationship between Haiti and the international community.

Opposition to the Occupation: Ethnic Cleansing?

On our approach to Fort Bertol it was observed that the fort was garrisoned by about ten
to fifteen Cacos, all of whom evacuated the place on our approach…we occupied the fort
without opposition…it appears evident that the Cacos in the vicinity are ready to quit.
Through their women, I have tried to communicate to the Cacos the fact that, if in the
future a single shot is fired by them, or if they blow any more conches, or otherwise
create any disturbance, we would return and burn all their houses and completely destroy
their crops37
- US Marine Captain Chandler Campbell’s diary extract, 8 November 1915

Historians in the US in particular, have not been kind when discussing the active and

armed Haitian resistance to the US invasion and occupation, in part because of limited

accessibility to historical sources.38 It is worth tracing how the American mindset came to label

the cacos initially, and subsequently any later opposition, as bandits. The Marine hierarchy

lacked any understanding of how Haitian society functioned, and the different roles played by

the elite. Marines perceived Haitian professional politicians, consisting of French educated

Haitian elites, as “hav[ing] always set themselves against good government. It is an historical

37
Diary extract by USMC Captain Chandler Campbell, Commander 13 th Marine Company, First Marine Regiment,
First Marine Brigade, 08 November 1915. From “Diary 13 th Company,” Folder 1 (“Diary of Activities, Haiti,
1915”), Alex O. Campbell papers, PC 55, Personal Papers Collection (PPC), USMC Research Center Archives,
Quantico, VA.
38
Non-US sources, including many Haitian historians of considerable merit, have often not been considered or
included in such discussions. That exclusion, whether because of language issues or inherent bias or simply
ignorance about the existence of such sources, has left an largely one-sided discussion when speaking about the US
invasion and COIN campaign. One such source, largely overlooked or ignored, is Dantès Bellegarde’s L’occupation
américaine d’Haïti: Ses conséquences morales et économiques (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1929. Reprint, Les Editions
Fardin, 2019), offering a compelling narrative from a key historian who experienced first-hand the Occupation and
observed the COIN campaign from a Haitian perspective. Haitian historian Roger Gaillard has also compiled a
multi-volume history on the Occupation, although distribution was limited, especially outside of Haiti proper. More
recently, Haitian historian Suzy Castor produced the excellent L’occupation américaine d’Haïti (3e éd. Port-au-
Prince, Haïti: CRESFED, 1988).

115
fact and needs no proof at this time.”39 The evidence that Haiti’s government was predatory and

guilty of massive graft and corruption was a compelling and widely accepted fact. The Marine

command decided those members of the elite who opposed the occupation were in fact opposed

to proper American-style governance and thus were treated as members of the resistance.

Understanding Grassroots Democratic Movements: the Piquettistes and the Cacos

Arising out of the ashes of self-liberation from slavery, peasant democratic republicanism
lived on in a popular vision of national liberty, civic fraternity, and racial equality,
expressed through the Piquet Rebellion and other instances of popular mobilization in
defense of democratic citizenship.40
- Professor of Sociology Mimi Sheller

Initially, the main instrument of that resistance were the cacos and piquets, whom the

Marines believed were controlled by the elite in their quest for the presidency. Breaking that

instrument became the immediate task of the Marines. The piquettistes should be understood as

forming a grassroots movement that sought “black civil and political rights and demand[ed] a

more democratic constitutional government.41

In the 1820s, a generation of young (largely light-skinned) educated members of the

Haitian elite who were born after the revolution were coming of age in a new era where the

requirements of national defense were not well understood nor viewed as particularly critical.42

39
"Excerpts from Report of Court of Inquiry into Haitien Matters, 1920: Summing up of Judge Advocate; and
Findings of Facts and Conclusions," Papers of John H. Russell, PC 114 box 2, folder 9, United States Marine Corps
Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C., 8-9.
40
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 36.
41
Sheller.
42
Trouillot quotes Haitian Senator Beaubrun Ardouin who, as a landowner, ran a coffee plantation and saw his
cultivators diminish in numbers as the years passed. He lamented that he had no means by which to force them to
remain on the land and instead has been forced to watch them install themselves on their own plots of land and
produce for themselves. Trouillot called this period “The Defeat of the Landlords” many of whom were military
officers. He also points out that this portended the end of rent as the main “mode of extraction of peasant surplus,”
leaving the elite to find new methods, with taxation on products produced for export eventually becoming the most
common mode. Leyburn also points out that this period saw a shift away from serfdom and towards the development
of a genuine peasantry, as Boyer’s attempts to re-implement forced labour failed. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against
Nation, 74; and Leyburn, The Haitian People, 86.

116
Instead, this young cohort saw the need to wrest control of the government away from the

military and turn it towards a more participatory form. They viewed President Boyer as

representing the old order and began a vocal public campaign for social and political reforms.

Boyer, however, implemented repressive measures that included press censorship accompanied

by violence against his critics.43

By the 1830s, opposition to Boyer had exploded and began to include the military.44 As

Mimi Sheller pointed out, the indemnity agreement with France caused Boyer’s opposition to

begin questioning the military footing maintained by Boyer, and how the military, and in

particular the spending required to maintain it, was “impeding the civil practices of

democracy.”45 The indemnity was also creating economic problems for Boyer which he had

attempted to resolve by implementing measures tying peasants to the land and enforcing

production quotas to generate more government revenue.46 That discontent with Boyer on the

part of the peasant farmers was exploited by the young elite who sought to mobilize them as a

counter to the military, still largely under Boyer’s control, using visions of a more inclusive

education system and better prices for their produce.47

43
Historian Sheller identifies the Darfour affair as the catalyst that solidified opposition to Boyer and shifted
opposition behaviour towards revolution. Felix Darfour published a number of articles detailing black grievances at
the hands of the mulatto elite which Boyer found seditious and for which he subsequently had him shot in
September 1822. He also expelled a number of senators from the legislature. It is unclear which action garnered
more anger. Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 114.
44
Sheller points out the army garrison in Saint Marc revolting in 1839. The military was dominated at this time by
old military generals who had participated in the revolutionary war and remained committed to military-dominated
government. Sheller, 116.
45
Boyer attempted to bribe the military with money and land to ensure its loyalty, which in turn furthered the
economic problems created by his fiscal policy of printing money when his regime felt they required it. Sheller, 38.
46
Boyer’s 1826 rural code was basically unenforceable by this time as many of the large landholdings had already
been broken up and distributed out in small parcels. Worse, his military rapidly declined in quality once the French
threat was removed, in their minds leaving him without an effective means of enforcing his rural code provisions.
History professor Bob Corbett makes it clear that Boyer also committed a major strategic error with his rural code.
By exempting the towns from the Code, Boyer “gave implicit recognition of the two Haitis, “[a] rural Haiti of black
subsistence farmers ruled by a mainly black army… [and a] “mulatto urban life ruled by the official government of
Haiti, a mulatto government.” See Bob Corbett, “1820-1843: The rule of Jean-Pierre Boyer,” July 1995,
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/boyer.htm.
47
Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 122.

117
 The Liberal Revolution began in January 1843, and quickly gained momentum as well as

new adherents, including whole military units which refused to fire on the revolutionaries and

instead deserted en masse.48 Citing Madiou, Mimi Sheller also points to women as “central

protagonists” and playing a key role during “several key events of 1843.”49 On 12 March, 1843,

the massing of the city women in opposition to Boyer’s troops “led him [Boyer] to desist” in a

key attack and “probably conclude that all was lost.”50 His reign over, Boyer fled to Jamaica in

exile aboard a British ship.

Despite the success of the revolution, competing elite ideas on the direction and amount

of democratic reform quickly began to undermine the fragile revolutionary alliance. Regional

divisions based on colour and class issues began to resurface. Further, General Charles Rivière-

Hérard, a key military leader who had conspired against Boyer, began manoeuvring for power by

rewarding key military supporters with “military offices” rather than reducing the military as had

been expected.51

The provisional government in place was almost immediately confronted by an uprising

of black landowners in the south under the leadership of the Salomon family, claiming to

champion the elimination of colour as a discriminator.52 By August 1843, the Salomons had

rallied their peasant supporters to take up arms, including wooden pikes, leading to what became

48
Sheller, 124.
49
Sheller, 125.
50
Quote from British missionary Mark Bird, cited in Sheller, 125.
51
Sheller, 128.
52
Sheller points out that the Salomon family turned against the provisional government when results of “the primary
electoral assembly” went against them and the mulatto clique which had defeated them “excluded many black men.”
(Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 44.). David Nicholls likewise has challenged the idea of Salomon as a
“proletarian class leader” and argued instead that while his National Party was largely black, his success in
mobilizing peasant support was “only because he was marginally less arrogant and exclusive than were his mulatto
opponents.” Louis Étienne Félicité Lysius Salomon would go on to become president of Haiti from October 26,
1879 to August 10, 1888 and was known for his efforts at modernizing Haiti. For an excellent perspective on his
presidency and more generally, his beliefs, see David Nicholls, “The Wisdom of Salomon: Myth or Reality?”
Journal of Intramerican Studies and World Affairs 20, no. 4 (November 1978): 389-90.

118
known as the first piquettiste uprising.53 President Hérard defeated them and ensured the

Salomons were quickly exiled. Mimi Sheller termed this second revolutionary phase “the

revolution within the revolution, when an influential black landholding family mobilized the

smaller landholders and farmers of the south to challenge racial inequality and the continuing

‘aristocracy of the skin.’”54

The third phase developed once again in the south, this time in 1844. The uprising was

led by a political-religious leader known as Jean-Jacques Acaau, who was able to mobilize the

black peasants under the banner of reform and popular democracy. He emphasized access to

education as the route to upward social mobility and called for the Salomons to be returned from

exile, to carry on the democratic revolution started earlier. The uprising, led by Acaau’s Armée

de l’Égalité in the name of the ‘peuple souffrant’, was initially successful against the government

forces as it controlled large portions of the South for over three years until, ultimately, it was

dispersed and defeated in 1847.

Sheller points out that Acaau would ultimately be betrayed by the Salomons who “used

their influence in the South to contribute to the neutralization of the Acaau movement in 1844.”

Lysius Salomon – the younger of the two – would win election as a senator and then sign the less

than democratic Constitution of 1846 against which Acaau’s piquettistes had fought. Sheller

notes that “[t]he democratic window of opportunity was slammed shut” at this point,

representing “the triumph of statist autocracy over the potentially democratic alliance of radical

segments of the bourgeoisie with peasants and cultivators.”55

53
The Salomons agreed to go into exile in return for their supporters being pardoned and allowed to disperse, which
Hérard allowed. Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 130.
54
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers, 37.
55
Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 138.

119
 Acaau would continue his struggle until his defeat following a battle at Fort Saint-

Laurent at l'Anse-a-Veau against the government forces of President Jean-Baptiste Riché when

he took his own life rather than risk capture.56 Sheller points to an additional series of

“piquettiste (s) movements” breaking out in January 1865, in 1866-67 and in 1868, but the

piquettiste grassroots movement seeking democratic reforms would be suppressed.57

By contrast, the caco or kako movement was first mentioned in written records of 1867 as

originating in the north but is believed to have appeared earlier.58 Unfortunately, caco would

become a catch-all phrase, encompassing insurgents, mercenaries and bandits alike and, like

piquettistes, has been applied to members of Haiti’s nascent democratic movements but

emerging mainly from the north. Hans Schmidt identified cacos as “consist[ing] of part-time

military adventurers and conscripts recruited and loosely organized by local military

strongmen.”59 Philippe Girard echoes this idea, but is much less flattering, pointing out that prior

to the 1915 US invasion, cacos in particular were understood as armed men who sold their

services to a presidential candidate, and while acting as the candidate’s private army, would

often resort to looting of rival businesses and dwellings for pillage and profit.60

56
Jacques N. Léger, Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1907),
198, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Haiti:_Her_History_and_Her_Detractors.
57
Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 138.
58
The Haitian historian H. Pauléus Sannon, writing in 1933, claimed the term caco was derived from a colloquial
term for Haiti’s national bird, the red-plumed Hispaniolan trogon and that after Dessalines had dealt with peasants
agitating for civil and political rights, they were given the term cacos because “ils se cachaient, comme l’oiseau de
ce nom [the trogon, a.k.a. le caco], sous feillée pour surprendre et attaquer l’ennemi.” The phrase translates roughly
to say that the cacos hid under cover, much like the trogon, until they were able to emerge, surprise and attack their
enemy. See Horace Pauléus Sannon, Histoire de Toussaint Louverture, Tome III, Port-au-Prince: A.A. Héraux,
1933, 142. University of Florida Digital Collections, http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00008866/00003.
59
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 82-86.
60
Harold Davis, made the same point, stating they were understood “as peasants from the hills who sold their
services to presidential aspirants and made up the chief personnel of the revolutionary armies. See Philippe Girard,
Haiti: The Tumultuous, 59-62; and Harold P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York: Lincoln
MacVeigh – The Dial Press, 1928), 145.

120
 This understanding of cacos as rogue elements within society, willing to sell their

services to the highest bidders, came to preoccupy the American occupation leaders. Eschewing

an alternate understanding of cacos, including the idea of movements embodying rural peasant

unrest, US Admiral William B. Caperton imposed a racist and nasty martial law regime on the

newly occupied nation. Indeed, Caperton made it clear that he considered one of the first and

perhaps most important task of the Marines was to destroy the power of the cacos. He embarked

on this task by denying the leader of the cacos at the time, Dr. Pierre François Joseph Benoit

Rosalvo Bobo, the presidency.61

Opposition to the US invasion was immediate.62 Upon landing in Haiti, the Marines

reported “slight casualties” on their march into the capital.63 Historian Walter Posner wrote the

Marines “marched into the capital…with only scattered opposition from snipers.”64 They also

61
Dr. Rosalvo Bobo was a Haitian nationalist who opposed the American intervention. Described as “une figure
politique atypique … qui n‘était pas un militaire et qui jouissait d‘une grande popularité auprès de divers secteurs de
la population. Il était aussi d’un patriotisme irréprochable: il s’opposa toujours à l’ingérence des Nord-Américains
dans la vie nationale.” Jean-Baptiste Chenet, ʺMouvements populaires et Partis politiques (1986-1996) : la
restructuration manquée de l'ordre politique agonisant.ʺ (PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris,
2011), 250.
62
While much of the focus when discussing Haitian opposition to the invasion has traditionally centered on the
violence and insurgency that developed, there were two different forms of opposition. Suzy Castor categorized the
two as, first, “la forme politique et journalistique dirigée par la fraction nationaliste de l'élite urbaine” led by Jean-
Baptiste Pétion and d'Antoine Morency; and the second, “la résistance armée, manifestation essentielle du
nationalisme de souche paysanne” led by Charlemagne Péralte and Benoît Batraville. See Castor, L'occupation
américaine d'Haïti, 150.
63
The initial landing party on 28 July 1915 consisted of 340 sailors and Marines including the Marine detachment
from the USS Washington, the 12th Expeditionary Marine Company, and three companies of sailors, under
command of Captain George van Orden, who normally commanded the Washington detachment. Interestingly,
Admiral Caperton’s Chief of Staff, Captain Edward L. Beach was sent ashore prior to the landing taking place, to
notify the Haitian leaders in Port-au-Prince of the planned landing. See US Naval History and Heritage Command,
“US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-
alphabetically/u/us-occupation-of-haiti-1915-1934.html. See also John F. Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations:
Lessons from Haiti, 1915,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 3 (March 1994): 71.
64
While Posner claims Haitian casualties the first day numbered 20 in total, the US chargé in Port-au-Prince
identified “[t]wo bluejackets [sailors as opposed to Marines] killed by snipers last night” in his 30 July 1915 cable to
the Secretary of State. However, reporting suggests confusion over the source of the fire which killed the two
sailors, with fratricide or friendly fire being a possibility. See FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress
December 7, 1915, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), Document 545
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915/d545); Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,”
246; and Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations,” 74-5.

121
disarmed any Haitians they encountered along their route, at one point collecting over five

wagonloads of confiscated arms and ammunition.65 They did encounter an angry mob at one

point, but firing over the heads of the Haitians quickly dispersed them.

Despite that slight resistance, Marines returned fire with considerable vigour, killing or

wounding over 20 Haitians on their short journey. Within a couple of days, a number of key

Haitian leaders including Charles Zamor, Rosalvo Bobo and Charlemagne Péralte, had come

together to form a “Revolutionary Committee” which would issue a call for the Marines to

withdraw and allow for the restoration of “la liberté…l’ordre…et…le progrès” in Haiti.66 These

signs of opposition led Caperton to order all former Haitian soldiers and cacos who did not

reside in the capital to leave. He required those who lived in Port-au-Prince to disarm. Anyone

who refused was arrested.

At least two Haitians were killed during the confrontations with the Marines. The order to

leave the capital was followed up with a general curfew which targeted those persons Caperton

thought to be “hostile” to the occupying forces; specifically, “any Negro or dark person out of

doors after 9 o’clock, whose behavior makes him seem like a sympathizer with Caco rebels.

[Such ‘hostiles’ were] to be shot on sight by the [Marine] patrol if they did not surrender

immediately.”67 Soon the Marines attacked not only those identified as caco but those seen to be

caco supporters. And all “Negros and dark people” were suspects.

The initial campaign against the cacos was dramatic and began with skirmishing in the

Gonaïves area on 7 September 1915.68 It devolved into the Marines firing upon anyone they

65
Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations,” 74-5.
66
Yveline Alexis, “Nationalism and the Politics of Historical Memory: Charlemagne Pératle’s Rebellion against US
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1986,” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, May 2011), 43-5.
67
Renda, Taking Haiti, 141.
68
The cacos received international support during their insurrection, with British and Germans “dont les intérêts
économiques avaient été lésés.” Their assistance came in the form of “une aide économique, des vivres, des
munitions, des informations de caractère militaire parfois inestimables, comme la disposition des troupes dans la

122
encountered when out in the field, anyone with the demeanor of a caco and any person carrying a

weapon. These encounters quickly spiraled into a scorched earth policy that saw the Marines

indiscriminately destroy houses and cultivated fields in the remote areas of Haiti. This policy is

illustrated in the diary extracts written by USMC Captain Chandler Campbell between 30

October and 14 November 1915:

…few Cacos were reported seen, one of whom was killed.

…five Cacos were seen, fired upon and it is believed one was hit; burned all shacks in
this vicinity.
Fort Capois…was observed to have a garrison of 150 to 200 Cacos…
Fired at a few Cacos enroute…proceeded to north-eastward burning all shacks…
…several shots fired at Cacos enroute…burned about 100 shacks…
some women…told me that the Cacos had gone to their homes and quit.
Small engagement with a band of Cacos at long range. This band was between our
column and Capt Low’s column. They retreated to northward. Burned many shacks along
the trail in this section.
We burned some shacks in this section and destroyed what trenches time permitted us to
stop for. Some Cacos were seen going up the slopes of the mountain in the direction of
our abandoned base.69

By November 1915, the ‘First Caco War’, as it was labelled in Marine Corps

publications, was drawing to a close. After sealing off the porous Haitian-Dominican Republic

border, the Marines drove the cacos into a kill zone in the area of Fort Rivière (an old French

built fort in the northern Haitian interior), and ended the uprising with a notorious massacre.70

capitale, etc.” At some point during his campaign, Charlemagne Péralte reportedly placed an order for weapons and
ammunition through one of his British contacts. It is not clear whether the requested munitions were ever recieved.
See Jean Désinor, Tragédies américaines (Port-au-Prince, Imprimerie de l'État, 1950), cited in Castor, L'occupation
américaine d'Haïti, 159. See also McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 113.
69
USMC Archives, Quantico, VA, USMC Records of Haiti, 1914-1935. Entries for 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12 and 13
November 1915, from Campbell, Chandler O. Record: Coll/3135. Home: A/14/H/2/5.
70
For accounts of the battle, see Major Thomas E. Thrasher Jr., “The Taking of Fort Riviere,” Marine Corps
Gazette 15, no. 4 (February 1931): 31-33, 64; and H.W. Snyder, “Butler at Fort Riviere,” Marine Corps Gazette 64,
no. 11 (November 1980): 83-7. The former is a firsthand account written by Major Thrasher who was involved in
the assault on the fort. Major Butler Smedley received his second Medal of Honour for his role in the assault.

123
The ‘First Caco War’ ended with over 250 Haitians dead and just two American casualties, the

sailors killed early in the campaign, possibly by friendly fire.71

By 1916, the Marines had determined the need for a local military force and created a

paramilitary, the Gendarmerie d’Haiti.72 The new force consisted of Haitian enlisted soldiers led

by US Marine officers. Most of the Marines who filled the officer billets were sergeants. The

Gendarmerie initially was configured to fulfil a policing function in Haiti, although it would

shift its focus to counterinsurgency quite quickly. For the first few years, the Gendarmerie

required US Marine occupying forces to fight alongside it to ensure success and provide

command and control.

The Gendarmerie shifted to counterinsurgency with the beginning of the second caco

uprising in the fall of 1918. Part of the provocation for the uprising was a backlash against the

Marine implementation of the infamous corvée system.73 The corvée system, a holdover from

colonial Saint Domingue, was a system of unpaid labour employed by French colonial

authorities to build civil works projects.74 The system initially allowed for the provision of

71
The number of Haitians killed were based on Marine estimates and were not independently confirmed. They were
in fact significantly higher as the Marines under-reported the number killed. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, noted
that the Marines killed around 200 Haitians during the attack at Fort Rivière, but only identified 51 cacos killed in
the official battle record, a significant discrepancy. See Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,
84n.
72
Interestingly, Suzy Castor points out that one of the first acts undertaken by Admiral Caperton was to
decommission four Haitian warships and sell them off to an American company for US$14,000. The company in
turn sold the four ships in New York for US$500 thousand. “Le bénéfice fut réparti entre les intéressés et il n'y a
aucune évidence que les 14.000 dollars aient été versés au trésor haïtien.” Castor points out that this was an early
example of the embezzlement carried out by Occupation forces. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 132.
73
The corvée system was re-introduced into Haiti in August 1916. Initially, it was more nuisance than irritant, but it
would quickly be abused. In some areas, the Marines would find it hard to generate the numbers required for road
and other construction and began instead to ensnare peasants for weeks and later months at a time. The human rights
abuse eventually escalated and was partially responsible for the second caco uprising. By 1918, the corvée was
identified with “les plus mauvais souvenirs du régime colonial” because of the Marine practices. See United States
Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and
Santo Domingo: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 112, 67th Congress, First and Second Sessions Vols. 1 and 2,
(Washington, 1922): 114-15; and Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 66. See also Paul H. Douglas, “The American
Occupation of Haiti II,” Political Science Quarterly 42, no. 3 (September 1927): 376.
74
The French corvée system, which targeted almost exclusively the peasant population, has been identified as one of
the key factors behind peasant support for the French Revolution.

124
unpaid labour in lieu of paying taxes but later evolved into a yearly obligation of labour. During

the Marine Occupation, the system would be further bastardized and exploited, leading mainly to

the servicing of public works created by unpaid, forced labour, eventually including, ironically,

the jails that served to house Haitians labelled and arrested as cacos or bandits for opposing the

re-introduction of the corvée system.

The Marine abuse took a particularly heavy toll on those Haitians too poor to bribe their

way out of service.75 Haitian historian Roger Gaillard interviewed a Haitian survivor of the

Marine occupation specifically about his experience with the corvée and asked him why he

considered the practice to be slavery. His experience with the corvée continues to resonate:

[T]he work is not paid. Second, you work with your back to the sun…. Third, this work
does not have an end; you can only leave if you are sick. Fourth, you ate badly, mayi
moulin and poi congo. Fifth, you sleep in prison or at the work site. Six, if you try to save
yourself the gendarmes shoot you. So, what is that? Is it not slavery?76

The Marines also instituted prison camps for the insurgents which became infamous for

their harsh conditions and chronic abuses including murder. During the US Senate Inquiry into

Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, also known as the

McCormick Committee, the prisons were described in quasi-bucolic terms:

At the larger prisons, Port au Prince and Cape Haitien, the prisoners are taught a trade,
and when their product is marketable they are given a percentage on their work. The
money derived in this manner is given to them on release or may be allotted by them to
their families if the term of confinement is for a long period. All the gendarme uniforms

75
Although pre-Occupation, the 1907 case of Mr. David Backer provides a useful understanding of the corvée
mechanism and its past history of unorthodoxy in obtaining unwilling workers. Backer, an American citizen, was
travelling on horse and headed towards a field to allow the horse to graze. He was approached by a Haitian senior
officer whom the US Embassy later identified as a general officer. The Haitian was accompanied by a number of
Haitian soldiers on foot. The officer questioned Mr. Backer and then decided to pressgang him onto a local road
work gang. Backer refused, indicating he was not only a foreigner, but was not resident in that region either. Backer
was then attacked and beaten by the Haitian soldiers. The beating ceased only after other people in the area came
forward and identified him as a foreigner. FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to
Congress December 3, 1907, (In two parts), Part II, (Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1910), Documents
162 and 163. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/d162 and
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/d163.
76
See Roger Gaillard, Hinche mise en croix, 1982. From Kate Ramsey, The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power
in Haiti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 143.

125
 and the clothing for prisoners are manufactured by prison labor. A garden is required for
prisons for the betterment of the gendarme and prison rations. At Post Chabert, near Cape
Haitien, a prison farm is in operation, giving healthy, open-air work to over 300
prisoners. The idea of this farm is in addition to aiding the ration in cost, to experiment as
to the methods of cultivation, mostly in native products, and to give the benefit of better
methods to the Haitian general public, letting them graphically see the results. Gardens
are also in operation at all posts.77

The Haitian perspective on the prisons was quite different. In December 1920, Le

Courrier haïtien included the following editorial:

A Chabert…c'est I'esclavage organisé. Sous le plus petit prétexte de cacoïsme, on arrête

des Haïtiens, puis on les envoie à Chabert pour la culture de la pomme de terre, etc. Ces
pommes de terre, patates et autres sont vendus au profit de I'occupant. Les prisonniers
meurent à Chabert sous le coup de toutes sortes de tortures, quand ils ne sont pas fusillés.
II y a un cimetière à cette fin. D'ailleurs personne n'entre à Chabert que les Américains, et
parfois des gendarmes dont la criminalité est éprouvée.78

Once again, former general Charlemagne Péralte emerged as one of the key insurrection

leaders, this time supported by Benoît Batraville. Haitian folklore identified Péralte’s motivation

for becoming involved in the caco rebellion as his mother, Madame Masséna Péralte. Madame

Peralte, as folklore goes, was rounded up by Marines as part of a larger group of Haitians who

were then forced to work, as part of the corvée, on a local construction project. The treatment of

Péralte’s mother at the hands of the Marines sparked his decision to lead the resistance to the

American occupation.79

77
Each major town in Haiti had a Marine element responsible for leading the local gendarmerie unit. Each of the
town had a district headquarters and each HQ included a prison. Official Marine reports maintained prisoners were
opponents to the occupation, largely either captured cacos or bandits. However, the prisons were also employed to
jail Haitians being held for corvée work. The most infamous of the camps was at Chabert. US Senate, Inquiry into
Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Saint Domingo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1921), 80-1.
78
Le Courrier haïtien, 21 décembre 1920. Cited in Roger Gaillard, Les Blancs débarquent tome VI: 1918-1919:
Charlemagne Péralte, le Caco (éditions Roger Gaillard, 1930), 320.
79
See the ‘Haitian History Blog,’ www.haitainhistory.tumblr.com. Laurent Dubois highlighted other incidents that
involved Peralte including, in October 1917, his residence having been burned to the ground by Marines and he and
his brother arrested and imprisoned in retaliation for a caco raid on the Marine detachment in Hinche; and the later
retaliatory killing of his three brothers, then in prison in Hinche, for his COIN activities in October 1918. See
Dubois, Haiti, 243-9.

126
 Unfortunately for the cacos, they were no more successful the second time than the first.

A premature assault on Port-au-Prince in October 1919 allowed the Marines to defeat the

resistance and end any hope of forcing the occupying forces to withdraw.80 In 1919, US forces

abandoned the term caco and instead Admiral Caperton ordered all Marine reports to use the

term ‘bandit’.81 Indeed, the US Marine reports classified resistance under the heading of

banditry, an effective method of marginalizing and demonizing opponents to the American

administration in Haiti. A post-invasion review by US Marine General Merwin Silverthorn was

quite typical, proclaiming explicitly:

They [cacos] were called bandits…any group of dissenters who weren’t for the
government were called bandits. They may be very honorable people with a different
political feeling. Nevertheless, they were bandits, and they were chased around the hills
and shot at and killed whenever you could catch them.82

The use of the term bandit allowed the criminalization of those who acted in opposition

to the Marine-sponsored regime, whether their behaviour involved violence or not.83 In addition

80
The US Naval History and Heritage Command official history states “This insurrection [the second caco uprising]
quickly outran the ability of the Gendarmerie to contain it. Consequently, a large part of the counter-guerrilla war
was conducted by the First Marine Brigade, reinforced by additional marines from outside the country.” See US
Naval History and Heritage Command, “US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,”
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-occupation-of-haiti-
1915-1934.html.
81
Toni Pressley-Sanon, “Haitian (Pre)Occupations: Ideological and Discursive Repetitions: 1915-1934 and 2004 to
Present,” Caribbean Studies 42, no. 2 (July-December 2014): 127.
82
Cited in Renda, Taking Haiti, 144.
83
The Marine experience in Santo Domingo provides an excellent understanding of the effects of this policy. USMC
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col) Charles Miller wrote about his experiences on the other side of the island, seeking to
implement Marine Corps General Order #1 in that theatre, which required the use of the term bandit. In that
instance, the breakdown of who was considered a bandit was identified by Miller: this rough categorization can be
understood to have been similar to that used in Haiti:
“The individuals who composed the groups were not motivated by the same influences or stress of circumstances
that led to their entrance into banditry. A rough classification would include the following:
a. Real bandits or gavilleros, who may be termed professional highwaymen.
b. Revolting politicians, instrumental in organizing banditry for the purpose of furthering their own political
aspirations or of their more influential friends.
c. The vagrant or less scrupulous laboring class forced to accept banditry for want of legitimate employment,
frequently excreted from the industrial conditions of the sugar producing areas.
d. Those who under duress or fear of the bandit leader, were compelled to join bandit groups.

127
to the corvée, chain gangs consisting of so-called bandits became more common throughout

Haiti to support the road construction programs and other public works. The term “bandit”

created the idea of a class of habitual criminals within Haitian society. This in turn reinforced the

idea of areas infested by bandits and requiring aggressive military action to cleanse them. The

Marines situated bandits as deviants outside the boundaries of normal society and beyond the

protection of the laws of war.84

This stigmatization of government opponents was allowed and encouraged by US

leaders. The testimony of US Marine witnesses at Congressional inquires held to investigate US

behaviour in Haiti revealed that such lethal labelling was used to justify extrajudicial killings

which had become a normal part of violent counter-insurgency campaigns reeking of

exterminatory intent. Indeed, a June 1926 article on the history of Haitian Gendarmerie,

published in the Marine Corps Gazette, rationalized the early campaign:

the frequent revolutions had developed a number of bands of outlaws who roamed the
interior at will, pillaging the gardens of the small farmers and killing and driving off their
cattle. Consequently, the first problem that confronted the Gendarmerie was the
suppression of banditry and the creation of a feeling of security…so as…to encourage the
production of the products for export on which the country depended for its economic
existence.85

e. Roving criminals, who preyed on the population committing depredations singly or in small groups, but not
belonging to the organized groups.
All five of these individual groups conduct or participate in armed opposition against the Military Government.”
See LtCol Charles J. Miller, USMC "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experience in Santo Domingo, part 1,” Marine Corps
Gazette 19, no. 1 (Feb 1935): 49.
84
British historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote the seminal work on bandits. He identified lords and states as being unable
to exert constant control over their citizens all the time; and noted that there “was usually room for evasion.” That
meant the “very institution of formalized outlawry, from which bandits take their name, indicates the shallowness of
the power system. Everybody was entitled to kill the outlaw [or bandit], because no authority was in a position to
apply their law to him.” Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1969), 14.
85
Note the identification of the threat posed by banditry to Haiti’s survival in a way that deftly ignored the Marine’s
interest in the proper servicing of loans. Anonymous, "The Haitien Gendarmerie,” Marine Corps Gazette 11, no. 2
(June 1926): 75-6.

128
 In November 1919, the Marines successfully infiltrated Péralte’s fortress hideaway and

assassinated him, effectively destroying any hopes for the creation of a provisional government

in the north of the country capable of mounting a challenge to US rule.86 In 1920, a combined

Marine-Gendarmerie force would destroy what little fighting opposition remained and killed off

most if not all of the remaining influential resistance leaders.

This did not end Haitian resistance to the occupation.87 Rather, the Marine campaign was

able to destroy all remaining Haitian armed opposition, and then employed the Occupation

military forces to successfully suppress any other resistance.88 The results of the Marine

campaign, for the period 1918 through to 1920, was over 2,000 Haitians killed.89 The 1915

campaign by comparison had resulted 250 Haitian deaths.

86
The Americans recruited the Catholic Archbishop in Haiti, Monseigneur Conan, to bribe Charlemagne into ending
his command of the insurgency, but “le leader ne se prêta à aucun compromise.” When bribery failed, the Americans
then turned to plotting assassination. The first attempt failed. The second did not. See Castor, L'occupation
américaine d'Haïti, 171.
87
Suzy Castor points out that opposition to the Occupation varied based on societal position. Initially, for example,
much of Haiti’s ruling elite saw the Occupation as a means of suppressing the peasantry and “les aideraient à
amasser des fortunes stables dans un climat de paix.” As the occupation progressed, however, attitudes changed.
Much of the commercial sector became disenchanted with the occupation as early as 1917 as the legislation put in
place disadvantaged Haitian traders in relation to those of foreign birth, the Syrian-Palestinians and Italians in
particular “jouissaient de tous les privilèges des conquérants.” For the clergy, support for the Occupation was a
given and actively preached from the pulpits, something Castor points out should have been expected given the
priests were all French in origins and did not share Haitian nationalist sentiment. See Castor, L'occupation
américaine d'Haïti, 88-92.
88
Haitian historian, Michel Hector, provides an excellent outline of the domestic opposition which continued during
the 1920s in the aftermath of the defeat of the insurgency. In particular, he highlights how Haitians including Sténio
Vincent, working through the new protest committee, “l’Union Patriotique,” actively courted international support
to end the occupation through “une campagne de dénonciation des méfaits de la domination étran-gère.” As Hector
points out, their activities were only partially successful as the occupation authorities were able to maintain an
opaqueness to their activities. See Michel Hector, Crises et mouvements populaires en Haïti (Montréal: Les Éditions
du CIDIHCA, 2000), 164-5.
89
Once again, the reporting on the numbers of Haitians killed are suspect and clearly under-reported. While
officially, Occupation officials claimed to have only killed around 2,000 Haitians during COIN operations, a 1920
US Secretary of the Navy report identified over 1800 Haitians having killed in 1919 alone. Both the high number of
killings and the obscured reporting were partially explained by the findings of the McCormick Committee which
noted “[t]here was a period of about six months at the beginning of the outbreak [of the second caco insurgency]
when the Gendarmerie lost control of the situation, and was not itself sufficiently controlled by the higher powers,
with the result that subordinate officers in the field were left with too much discretion as to methods of patrol and
local administration…” In addition, Bellegarde cites l’Union Patriotique d’Haiti claims that over 4,000 prisoners
died while held in the infamous Cap-Haitien prison, and an additional 5,475 died in the Chabert “concentration
camp.” See Balch, Occupied Haiti, 126-7; and Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 57.

129
 Organized Haitian resistance to the Occupation would not re-emerge until 1920 and

largely took the form of protests and demonstrations in addition to strong oppositional

journalism, rather than armed resistance.90 As a result of the change in tactics, the Occupation

authorities were likewise forced to shift their focus away from the use of COIN engagements to

information operations.91 By 1921, the US pacification of Haiti entailed a stronger campaign of

increased suppression of the press, a recognition of the press’s increasingly virulent opposition to

the Occupation.92 An August 1922, proclamation by the American High Commissioner to Haiti,

Brigadier General John A. Russell, stated:

It has been brought to my notice that a very active campaign has been inaugurated by
certain persons directed against the officials of the Haitian Government and the
development work being undertaken by said Government. Such agitation is a menace to
the condition of law and order that now prevails, tends to undermine the authority of the
officials of the Haitian Government, and look[s] to the destruction of the constitutional
government, leading to anarchy with the possible consequent destruction of property and
life and prolonged misery for the Haitian People…Your attention is therefore directed to
the proclamation of May 26, 1921, and especially that portion of it which refers to

90
Suzy Castor points to a factor that worked against the Haitian insurgency: “la faiblesse de la propagande qui priva
le mouvement d'un appui national et continental.” As she points out, the lack of an international appeal did not
attract either regional or international attention to, and support of, the insurgency. She points to Charlemagne’s
exploits having been ignored in neighbouring Dominican Republic. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti,
183-4.
91
Information operations in this context refers to the actions taken to influence Haitians to actively resist the
Occupation. The actions in this case refer to the dissemination of media articles and opinion pieces that critiqued the
Occupation and exposed its violent behaviour.
92
This should not be construed as suggesting the Haitian press was not actively voicing opposition to the
Occupation prior to the 1920s. Anti-occupation press editorials began prior to the 1915 invasion. Haitian newspapers
“hosted protest events or subvert[ed] official [Occupation] events” throughout the Occupation period. However, in
the 1920s, Haiti’s media became more strident in their opposition, with a number of “traditional [pro-Occupation]
newspapers abandon[ing] pro-occupation editorials outright” as it became clear the Occupation was neither ending
quickly nor providing the promised benefits to Haiti. Hans Schmidt has identified the 1920 release of Marine
Commandant Barnett’s report on “indiscriminate killings” during the closing stages of the 1920 election campaign
as the key event precipitating media intensification in anti-Occupation sentiment (see Schmidt, The United States
Occupation of Haiti, 119). Further, the emergence of Jean Price-Mars and his colleagues in the mid-1920s, and
publication of their influential writings, represented a new high point in Haitian resistance. Shearon Roberts, "Then
and Now: Haitian Journalism as Resistance to US Occupation and US-Led Reconstruction," Journal of Haitian
Studies 21, no. 2 (2015): 241-68. http://www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/43741129. See also John H.
Russell, Brigade Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (18 January 1921), Box 1, Folder 13, John H. Russell
Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps
History Division, Quantico, VA.

130
 propaganda of an incendiary nature attacking the President of Haiti or officials of the
Haitian Government.93

Resistance to the Occupation did not die, despite the suppression of the press.94 With

declining world coffee prices due to the beginning of the Depression and a poor coffee harvest,

riots and physical conflicts with the Marines became more frequent in 1929.95 Armed resistance

to the Marine occupation flared up in April and May 1930, hastening the planned departure of

the Marines. The Port-au-Prince fire department was forced to deal with what it termed “a period

of terrorism” typified by an arson campaign mounted mainly against Marine and Gendarmerie

targets, including burning the home of the Marine Brigade Commander, Colonel Richard Cutts.96

The press reported that the arson campaign lasted fifteen days. 97

Haitian jurist, historian and diplomat, Dantès Bellegarde, identified the most dangerous

and long-lasting effect of the COIN campaign undertaken by the Marines as “le mépris général

de la loi qu’elle a fait naître.”98 He argued the Occupation taught Haitians that the ‘law’ as

practiced and implemented by the US regime was something to be obeyed in order to escape “ses

sévères sanctions…appliquées par la force brutale.” The Occupation authorities manipulated and

applied the law as it suited them, creating a situation where the law of the land no longer

emanated from “l’authorité supérieure qui représente la conscience de la nation….”99 Further, he

93
Anonymous, “The Chronicle of the Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 3 (Sep 1922): 315.
94
For an excellent account of the Marine campaign against the Haitian press, see Chapter XIV, The Press and the
Prison,” from Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 143-48.
95
The riots began in 1929 as student protests but escalated into larger riots across the country. It culminated into the
Cayes Massacre. 1500 Haitians marched on 20 Marines. One Haitian leader made a suspicious move and the
Marines assaulted him. The Marines opened fire on the crowd, killing and wounding at least 50 people. Schmidt,
The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 196-200.
96
Fred Belton, “History and Development of Haitian Fire Department,” The Leatherneck 14, no. 7 (July 1931): 9-
11.
97
See Roberts, “Then and Now,” 241-68.
98
Dantès Louis Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti: Ses conséquences morales et économiques (Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, 1929. Reprint, Les Editions Fardin, 2019): 19.
99
Bellegarde, 25. Bellegarde elaborates further, pointing out, presciently when examining the emergence of
François Duvalier, that “Nous leur enseignons à accepter le contrôle militaire comme la loi suprême et à acquiescer

131
believed “cette œuvre de domestication menace plus gravement son existence que les massacres

et tueries des premières années de l’Occuaption militaire.”100 In other words, Haitians were

taught that their sovereignty was conditional and something to be negotiated with those

exercising superior power. The corollary to this lesson is, in essence, captured in the Haitian

practice of marronage, which Professor Bellegarde-Smith defined as “the refusal to accept defeat

even in the face of defeat.”101

Centralizing Power in Port-au-Prince

We were all embued (sic) with the fact that we were trustees of a huge estate that
belonged to minors. That was my viewpoint; that was the viewpoint I personally took,
that the Haitians were our wards and that we were endeavouring to develop and make for
them a rich and productive property.”102
- US Marine Major Smedley Butler

“The peasants who form the mass (85 percent) of the population and who have so long
been held by their literate brothers in a backward state, have the mentality of a child of
not more than seven years of age reared under advantageous conditions.103
- High Commissioner to Haiti and Marine General John H Russell, Jr.

The Marine occupation’s second long-term effect was the destruction of Haiti’s system of

regionalism, since regional centers had the means and the military power necessary to counter

the domination of Port-au-Prince. A number of policies implemented by the Marine

à l’usage arbitraire de l’autorité.” Historian Kate Ramsey highlights the abuse of the rule of law, stating “U.S.
control in Haiti was guaranteed by the imposition of martial law, press censorship, and efforts to alter the country’s
legal apparatus[;] it was perhaps even more pervasively effected through the enforcement of selected Haitian laws,
with opportunistic disregard for customary legal practice.” See Kate Ramsey, The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and
Power in Haiti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), cited in Matthew Casey, “’Haitian Habits’ or
Occupation Policies? Harris Lifschitz and the unevenness of State Building in Haiti, 1898-1921,” Journal of Haitian
Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2015), 123.
100
Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 26.
101
Comment from Professor Patrick Bellegarde-Smith during my December 2019 thesis defense.
102
Testimony by USMC Major Smedley Butler at the US Senate Hearings – Inquiry into Occupation and
Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th
US Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1922. Cited in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 89.
103
Quote from Marine General John H Russell, Jr., High Commissioner to Haiti, 1919-22. Cited in Pamphile, Clash
of Cultures, 42.

132
administration resulted in the centralization of power, military and political, in the capital. First,

the counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Marines and its success in eliminating political

opposition to the Occupation, made community leaders like Charlemagne Péralte vulnerable to

deliberate targeting and targeted reduced the number of community leaders willing to step

forward and assume leadership positions within the beleaguered communities.

The elimination of the national army, an army tracing its heritage back to the ex-slave

army responsible for Haiti’s freedom, and the US substitution of the newly created Gendarmerie

d’Haiti, also shifted power away from the regions. In theory, the mission of the national army

was to operate as a national instrument of power “to fight foreigners and in defense of the

national community.”104 Instead, the new Gendarmerie was “specifically designed to fight

against other Haitians.”105 It carried on the tradition of repressing political opposition already

embedded in Haitian election practices but with far more violence.

Michel Laguerre outlined the means by which power was centralized in occupied

Haiti.106 The headquarters of the Gendarmerie, located in Port-au-Prince, was linked throughout

the country by the telephone and telegraph system introduced by the Marines. Those two

systems, coupled to the road building that took place, allowed more centralized military

command and control from the capital. This in turn diminished the ability of regional strongmen

to build up power and then launching coup activities against Port-au-Prince and the Marines. At

the same time, having the ability to quickly communicate throughout Haiti allowed the central

government to have more direct control over regional bureaucratic administration, further

104
Trouillot also points out the new Gendarmerie (and later Garde) quite explicitly sought to attract those Haitians
who understood its new role in suppressing Haitian voices and did indeed attract those “who had a taste for violent
solutions…”. Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 105-6.
105
Trouillot, 105-6.
106
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 69-77.

133
undermining the power of local regional leaders. Laguerre argued that the centralization of

power in Port-au-Prince also ensured that the political interests of the residents of the capital

were favoured over the regions in the new power structure.107

Understanding the Role of the Rural Police System as a Centralizing Agent

The army and the sheriffs are the king makers in the countryside… the result of the fact
that they play multiple roles in the rural areas such as: army representative, judge, public
notary, surveyor, civil clerk, fiscal agent, information and propaganda officer, forest
agent, development promoter, landowner, etc., and even at times religious teacher and
preacher...Thus, regardless of a peasant's decision to stay out of trouble by keeping a low
profile, he is very likely to have problems nonetheless because he always runs into the
sheriff in the course of his activities. The system interferes with the private as well as the
public lives of small peasants.108
- Professor of French Bryant Freeman

A particularly significant measure taken by the Marines during their Occupation was the

decision to transform the rural police organization from a civilian to a military organization, and

place it under the control of the Gendarmerie.109 As Professor Freeman’s quote above illustrates,

the rural police system provided a variety of local, social functions that would otherwise be

missing in most rural areas of Haiti. By moving the organization into the military chain of

107
Laguerre, 72.
108
Bryant Freeman, ed., “Dosye Chèf Seksyon,” University of Kansas Occasional Paper No. 10, 1995, 17-8.
Freeman’s Occasional Paper, which provides the material for this section, is drawn from a March 1991 report issued
by the collective organization, Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small Producers of Haiti]. That report
was edited by Professor Bryant C. Freeman of the University of Kansas and issued as an occasional paper in 1995
entitled “Dosye Chèf Seksyon.” That occasional paper was in turn translated into English and re-issued in 1998.
109
Rural policing traces its roots back to colonial slave plantation practices including the development and
employment of the maréchaussée. Haiti’s early leaders, as outlined in Chapter Two, re-instituted the militarized
plantation system and left the army to police the peasantry and ensure agricultural workers stayed in their regions
and worked on the state-controlled farms. “La police rurale a pour object la sûreté des personnes la protection des
propriétiés la surveillance des cultures le maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquilité publique la répression du
vagabondage et l'exécution des lois et actes du gouvernement.” Rural police were used as well in France at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. See Fabien Gaveau, “De la sûreté des campagnes. Police rurale et demandes
d'ordre en France dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle,” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies
4, no. 2 (2000): 53-76. http://journals.openedition.org/chs/824.

134
command, the Marines not only removed local accountability with the system, they also failed to

recognize the important social functions provided.110

Traditionally, the chefs de section had multi-roles in Haiti’s rural areas, functioning as

local judicial officials, notary publics, and gendarmerie/army representatives. They made,

interpreted, and enforced the law in their role as chefs de section. Yet at the same time, they

represented the government and were the only form of Haitian governmental authority in many

rural areas. Chefs de section were held to some measure of civilian accountability, albeit in a

system that reeked of corruption and exploitation.111

Operationally, each rural chief controlled a small army of rural guards, often no more

than an armed gang.112 These armies were frequently subsumed under the title caco or piquet.

They were routinely employed in support of politicians seeking the presidency and received as

payment, the right to loot along the route to the capital or to collect bribes once the new

administration secured foreign loans. Typically, the local chiefs were related to the candidate

they supported.

In 1922, the US Marines altered the sheriff’s program and placed it under the command

structure of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. The program’s focus changed. Marines employed the rural

110
In 1863, President Geffrard (1859-67) issued a revised Rural Code which re-introduced the corvée system of
mandatory labour, which had been allowed to lapse. He also created district rural police or sheriffs and farm guard
positions. The new rural police had control of the regional farm guards, public and private roads, and guarding
against vagrancy, codifying the practice of restricting farm workers’ mobility. This hierarchical system remained in
place under local regional politicians, most of whom were general officers, until changed during the Marine
occupation. See Article 66 of the Code Rural d’Haiti. 1863, 27, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00004195/00001/38j.
111
The Marines took over many of these duties, being made “communal advisers…[as well as] representatives of the
[Occupation government’s] Department of Public Works, Public Health, and the General Receiver of Customs…” in
many of the more remote posts. In 1925, they were also appointed “ministères publiques,” providing them with a
judicial role “in order that police cases might be properly prosecuted.” See Balch, Occupied Haiti, 132.
112
When not dealing with support to coups, the rural chief held the positions of chief of police, the local magistrate
in his region, and often in some capacity like that of a mayor. In that last role, the chefs de sections would make
decisions based upon development funds which flowed into their areas, often pocketing much of the monies and
funneling the rest into either pet projects or projects which offered bribes. This allowed them to subvert both the
security and political roles in his area and created a dangerous hybrid system that encouraged corruption and abuse
of power.

135
sheriffs as a repressive tool against any political dissent that emerged. More significantly, the

centralization of command and control of the rural police and the sheriff system under the

military structure further eroded the regional power bases.113

Later, in 1952, the rural sheriff program again changed. The sheriffs now belonged to a

specialized corps within the Gendarmerie d’Haiti, but one with its own command and control

hierarchy. It would remain unchanged until 1962, when President François Duvalier announced

the rural sheriff program would be placed under the control of rural administrative councils

(RACs). The RACs were to provide local control of the sheriff’s activities, but according to the

Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small Producers of Haiti] peasant collective, the

councils were never formed.114 In spring 1991, as one of his first acts, President Aristide

abolished the institution of the rural sheriff.115

Long-term Effects on Haiti’s Economic and Commercial relationships

Haiti cannot progress without foreign assistance.116

- American Financial Adviser-General Receiver Sidney de la Rue

The third long-term effect resulting from the occupation was the domination of Haitian

land by foreign commercial interests, made possible when the occupiers rewrote the Haitian

113
Professor Balch also noted that local governance suffered under the Occupation and the changes to the sheriff
program. Her interviews found Haitians were “irked” because of local Marine commanders sitting in on local
communal meeting, invited or not, and dominating the local decision-making process. Because the Marines
controlled the purse strings, local decisions on improvements were heavily influenced by Marine preferences,
whether they reflected local interests or not. Balch, Occupied Haiti, 132.
114
Freeman, “Dosye Chèf Seksyon,” 7. The translation of the national peasant farmer movement is taken from “The
Canada-Haiti Information Project,” www.canada-haiti.ca. Father Jean Marie Vincent, the Catholic priest who
founded the organization, was assassinated on 28 August 1994 by the military regime. The organization dates to the
regime of François Duvalier, having been founded in 1970.
115
While the coup leadership under the direction of General Raoul Cedras would re-institute the program, Aristide
would abolish it again when he returned to power in 1994. It has since been replaced by a system of local councils
providing input to the Haitian National Police which have responsibility for all policing within Haiti.
116
Statement by Sidney de la Rue, Financial Adviser-General Receiver. Sidney de la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report of
the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1930 – September 1931, Port-au-Prince:
Service National de l‘Enseignement Professional, 1931, 48. http://ufdc.ufl.edu.

136
constitution in 1918 and opened land ownership to foreigners. Other laws furthered foreign

financial manipulation, opening new opportunities for foreign investors to run amuck in Haiti.

Foreign ownership was not compatible with Haiti’s haphazard land registry system and allowed

the exploitation of the Haitian legal system by foreigners, often to the financial detriment of the

Haitian state.117 That exploitation has continued in various forms through to the present.

Dantès Bellegarde, having served as Minister of Agriculture from 1915 until 1921 within

President Philippe Dartiguenave’s administration, was quite critical of the US Occupation’s

effects on the Haitian economy, pointing out that the American claims to have helped

dramatically improve the Haitian economy were false. Instead, for the period 1918 to 1922,

Bellegarde identified “les bienfaits de l’Occuaption Américaine pour le commerce haïtien…n’a

eu aucune influence sur l’exportation de pays” and instead, Haiti’s economic situation remained

quite unstable.118

Exploitation: The Case of the Haytian American Sugar Company (HASCO)

[S]ugar is so expensive in Haiti that peasants cannot afford to buy it. In Milot, in the
north of Haiti, peasants report that this has destroyed much of the local market for
oranges and grapefruits, which traditionally are made into a heavily sugared juice.
Without the sugar, people aren’t drinking juice and the fruit is left to rot.119
- Economist Lisa McGowan

117
See, for example, Matthew Casey, “’Haitian Habits’ or Occupation Policies? Harris Lifschitz and the unevenness
of State Building in Haiti, 1898-1921,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 121-51.
118
Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 29. Bellegarde further noted that the American Occupation
officials resisted any attempts at accountability, meaning Haitians had no idea of the actual state of their economy.
Rather, with the American emphasis on paying down Haitian debt, Haitians were expected to be satisfied with
seeing their increasing taxes allocated towards that end. Bellegarde, 36-7.
119
This statement was made in reference to conditions after the HASCO facilities had ceased operations in 1987 and
domestic sugar production from cane had effectively ended and illustrates the knock-on effects of that cessation. See
Lisa McGowan, Democracy Undermines, Economic Justice Denied: Structural Adjustment and the Aid Juggernaut
in Haiti, Washington, D.C.: Development Group for Alternative Policies, 1997, 25.
http://www.developmentgap.org/uploads/2/1/3/7/21375820/democracy_undermined.pdf.

137
 Created in 1912, the Haytian American Sugar Company (HASCO) was a cooperative

commercial venture, largely funded by European and US businessmen, and intended to provide

both sugar refining facilities and to act as a brokerage through which Haitian sugar would be sold

on the world market. By 1917, the US government was actively working to exclude German

commercial interests from operating in Haiti. Cooperating in that endeavour, HASCO moved its

financial operations from a German bank to a US bank.120

In 1920, HASCO took over the railway between Cul-de-Sac and Léogane to the Port-au-

Prince wharf. It also built a sugar mill on the north side of the capital with access to the wharf.121

The mill was supported by the construction of a sugar cane plantation constructed on some 2600

carreaux purchased by HASCO in the Cul-de-Sac area, purchases made possible because of the

constitutional changes during the Occupation that permitted foreign (i.e. white) land

ownership.122 Those same land purchases led to the eviction of scores of local sharecropping

peasants who were forced to find alternative lodgings and sources of revenue. Many ended up

moving into the city, further aggravating the squalid conditions therein. Employment on the

HASCO lands meanwhile turned largely into manual labour, including the digging of irrigation

ditches and the cutting of sugar cane and associated agricultural tasks.123

120
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 95. In addition to taking over a plantation owned by
Germans, HASCO would later purchase “wharfage rights, the electric light plant, and the street railway, which had
previously been owned by German interests.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 55.
121
No land purchases in Léogâne area were made other than railway and depot sites. See Karen E. Richman,
“Peasants, Migrants and the Discovery of African Traditions: Ritual and Social Change in Lowland Haiti,” Journal
of Religion in Africa 37, no. 3 (2007): 371-97.
122
Volume VII of The London Encyclopedia (Thomas Tegg, ed., London, 1829) provides the following statement:
“2,290,000 English acres, or 771,275 carreaux of French measurement, 350 feet on every side of the carreau.”
Those figures result in approximately 2.97 English acres per French carreau. If we instead work with an area of
122,500 square feet per carreau (using the ‘350 feet per side’), the result is approximately three acres per carreau.
123
For an interesting discussion regarding the failure to develop local technical expertise in support of the sugar cane
industry, see Humberto García-Muñiz, Sugar and Power in the Caribbean: The South Porto Rico Sugar Company in
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, 1900-1921 (San Juan, PR: La Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico,
2010). Specifically, the chapter on the so-called sugar tramps operating out of Louisiana during this period provides
an excellent example of the maintenance of a technical monopoly within the sugar trade and a failure to develop
local talent until well into the twentieth century.

138
 Land appropriations by absentee landowners to profit from the potential of sugar

production, at least as claimed by HASCO officials, became more common.124 The result,

according to anthropologist Karen Richman, was the creation of “a regional and mobile work

force which was forced to depend upon slave wages on resurrected sugar plantations.”125 Indeed,

this was recognized officially by the US. In his 1930 report on Haiti, Sidney de la Rue, the US

Receiver General in Haiti, stated, in an argument against raising the Haitian minimum wage, that

“[t]he greatest asset Haiti has is its cheap labor – labor whose daily cost to an employer does not

exceed the labor of other lands whose products are similar. Should labor costs here be increased

artificially, that capital will go where conditions are more favorable.”126

By the 1920s, that mobile labour force was declining as over 20,000 Haitians annually

were migrating to Cuba for seasonal work within the agricultural sector, where most of them

were employed by the US-owned United Fruit and General Sugar companies.127 Yet even with

the land appropriations and other measures accorded HASCO, the company declined financially

and was soon in trouble.128 By 1922, HASCO entered receivership and required US intervention

to eventually recover by 1929.129

124
For example, Karen Richman identified Joseph Lacombe, the largest landowner in the Léogane area and CEO of
West India Management and Consultation Company, as having signed over 40-year leases on his lands with
HASCO in 1920. See Richman, “Peasants, Migrants and the Discovery of African Traditions,” 375.
125
Richman, 371-97. García-Muñiz (Sugar and Power in the Caribbean) points out that as of 1920, Dominican
sugar plantations were benefiting from the regional mobile work force, with official records showing Haitian
workers on said plantations had reached parity with West Indians, the more traditional source to that point in time of
migrant sugar workers.
126
De la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report, 117. See also Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 170.
127
Schmidt, 171.
128
Haitian historian Guy Pierre argues that HASCO’s financial situation was complicated and needed to be
understood as having both a domestic and international component. Internationally, HASCO had not obtained a
written agreement with the United States to sell it sugar and remained a bit player in the world market.
Domestically, though, HASCO had been helped by the Haitian state to become a “monopsony” and as a result,
Pierre terms domestic sales as “very ‘juicy’ for HASCO.” To ensure the HASCO products remained alone in the
domestic market, the Haitian government imposed an eight cents per kilo duty on imported refined sugar, marking
foreign products uncompetitive. See Guy Pierre, “The Frustrated Development of the Haitian Sugar Industry
between 1915/18 and 1938/39: International Financial and Commercial Rivalries,” in Bill Albert and Adrian Graves,
eds., The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression 1914-40 (London: Routledge, 1988), 121-30.
129
Renda, Taking Haiti, 212.

139
 Hans Schmidt makes it clear that one of the reasons for that financial trouble was the

somewhat dysfunctional US approach to Haiti: “Occupation officials were constantly faced with

the dilemma of trying to encourage American investments while simultaneously protecting Haiti

against blatant despoliation.” The end result was that many of the practices and concessions

enjoyed by firms like HASCO prior to the Occupation were discontinued afterwards, resulting in

a considerable degree of consternation on the part of HASCO officials.130

To deal with the financial limitations of sugar production, HASCO officials decided to

diversify and moved into sisal production, in part because of the emphasis placed upon its

production by US Occupation officials.131 By 1930, HASCO had managed to acquire some 630

acres of land leased directly from the state, in addition to acreage it had previously purchased,

much of which went into sisal production.132 Its sisal activities quickly came under scrutiny,

attracting a denouncement by the Union nationale, “a pro-independence organization,” which

claimed in a published pamphlet that the sisal producing companies had burned out peasant

homes and destroyed local crops when “sisal competed with subsistence crops for acreage.”133

Interestingly, Schmidt notes that HASCO, had emerged from receivership by this point,

had tripled its 1918 sugar production levels, and was now profitable.134 However, that

profitability came at a cost. By the time Duvalier came to power in 1957, HASCO had remained

in business and profitable by maintaining an artificially low wage and discouraging trade unions.

One such practice, for example, saw HASCO resorting to “sub hiring [workers] through native

130
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 168-69.
131
Renda, Taking Haiti, 212.
132
Sisal or Agave sisalana is a plant used mainly for rope and twine, but can be made into paper, clothes, footwear,
carpeting and other fibre-based goods. It tends to be resistant to saltwater, making it particularly valuable to the
nautical trade.
133
Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 239.
134
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 171.

140
[Haitian] gang bosses,” removing HASCO’s obligation to pay a living wage and foreshadowing

similar labour practices undertaken by the Duvalier regimes.135

By 1985, the government of Francois Duvalier had put laws in place which prevented

HASCO from refining sugar at its facilities.136 Instead, the government began to import refined

sugar at world prices and then sold it at a profit. That quickly resulted in a spike in smuggling of

basic foodstuffs including sugar. Sugar exports from Haiti in 1988 had dropped to zero and, by

1995, Haiti had become an importer of sugar to the tune of some 25,000 tonnes per year.137 The

HASCO sugar mill was privatized in 1987 (purchased by the wealthy Haitian Mevs family) and

promptly closed, putting some 3,500 employees out of work and reportedly affecting an

estimated 30 to 40,000 “small sugar-cane planters in regions around the capital.”138 The

company cited smuggling, largely across the Dominican border, as making domestically refined

sugar uncompetitive.139

The Primacy of Foreign Obligations:

Understanding the Role and Power of the Financial Adviser –General Receiver

Mr. White [US Assistant Secretary of State] says that, under the terms of the Treaty
between the US and Hayti of 1915, the Financial Adviser is vested with full authority to
levy fines of this character and his position cannot be challenged or over-ruled…140
- Canadian Legation in Washington, D.C.

135
Schmidt, 178.
136
The HASCO mill closed in Spring 1987.
137
Because of the age of much of the sugar refining machinery, the costs of refining Haitian sugar was believed to
be at least double the costs of other international sugar production. Haitian sugar was also undercut by sugar
smuggling that was taking place across the Dominican Republic border. See Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Haiti: A
Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989); and Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood:
Haiti and the Politics of Containment (London: Verso, 2007), 58-9. http://countrystudies.us/haiti/
138
“Another Blow for Haiti: A Sugar Mill Closes,” The New York Times, April 12, 1987. www.nytimes.com.
139
Note that the HASCO closure came days within that of the Usine Sucriere des Cayes (USC), which affected a
similar number of workers and dependent industries. See Jean-Pierre Cloutier, “HASCO Closes its Doors,” The
Haitian Times, May 1987. http://www.cyberie.qc.ca/jpc/haiti/hasco.html.
140
Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, G1, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, Canadian Legation to Washington Letter No.
1074, 26 October 1932. Accessed May 2015.

141
 To understand the power and role of the American financial adviser during the Marine

Occupation requires a grounding in the US strategy employed in the region: “dollar diplomacy.”

Emily Rosenberg points out that the American strategy of “dollar diplomacy” initially involved

American administration officials using private loans from American banks as leverage to force

unstable nations like Haiti to accept control of their fiscal policy by an embedded foreign (US)

financial adviser.141 While the State Department had been quite content to relinquish control over

Haiti on a day-to-day basis to the US Marine leadership in country, the Marines had no interest

or expertise in financial policy and were quite happy to have the State Department look after that

aspect of the mission. The Americans soon seized control over the Haitian customs system, the

BNRH, and the printing of Haitian currency.142

Exercising control over the customs houses and Haitian fiscal policy by virtue of control

over Haitian currency, the US State Department next imposed on Haiti the appointment of an

American Financial Adviser–General Receiver, a shadowy figure who shared power with the

military leaders.143 The financial adviser was an integral part of the dollar diplomacy strategy as

he was expected to ensure that the unstable nation, in this case Haiti, directed its revenues

towards the servicing of its foreign (primarily US) debts.144 Yet once the power of the financial

141
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, Introduction 1-3.
142
Dantès Bellegarde related the relentless pursuit of total control over Haitian affairs by the Occupation authorities.
In August 1918, Mr. Louis Borno, the Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made a “gentlemen’s agreement”
with the American authorities, advising them that “tout projet de loi portant sur l'un des objets du traité serait, avant
d'être présenté au pouvoir législatif d'Haïti, communiqué à la Légation des États-Unis pour l'information de son
gouvernement et, s'il était nécessaire, pour une discussion entre les deux gouvernements.” Bellegarde points out the
American Legation “étendit jusqu'aux extrêmes limites le sens de ce « gentlemen's agreement » en prétendant que
tout projet de loi, quelle qu'en fût la nature, devait être soumis à son approbation ou à sa censure : elle s'attribuait
ainsi un droit de veto dont elle se servit pour bloquer toute l'activité gouvernementale.” Requests from the Haitians
for clarification from Washington were met with silence. See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 83.
143
Note that the American fiscal position continued until 1941, well after the Marines had been withdrawn in 1934.
Indeed, Hans Schmidt noted that the position’s functions were incorporated into the “fiscal department of the
Banque Nationale [BNRH], which remained under US supervision until full redemption of the 1922 [US] loan [to
Haiti] was completed in 1947.” See Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 229.
144
The credentials and expertise of the US- appointed financial advisors were suspect for the entirety of their
history, save, perhaps, Sidney de la Rue, who had previously served in that capacity in Liberia. As an example of the

142
adviser was understood, and the coercive power of controlling a nation’s fiscal policy was

recognized, American officials identified other areas of the unstable nations that would benefit

from “modernization” and the application of “science.”145

Because American strategic objectives in Haiti were focussed mainly on ensuring Haiti

met its (i.e., US) foreign debt obligations, almost all the essential state-building required to

provide for stability and security within Haiti was abandoned. This effect was acknowledged by

the Financial Adviser-General Receiver, Sidney de la Rue, in his 1930-31 fiscal year report:

[T]he treasury surplus which had been carefully accumulated over the years of relative
prosperity made it possible to meet all obligations of the State with no strain upon the
treasury or additional borrowing…the ambitious development program of recent years
largely has been given up. Funds have been insufficient to extend the system of
vocational education, to strengthen the police and constabulary, or to construct many
badly needed improvements.146

An excellent example of this policy was highlighted by United States professor of

industrial relations, Paul H. Douglas, who deployed to Haiti as a member of the six-person team

dispatched by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to study the

effects of the Marine Occupation.147 Douglas pointed out that the Protocol of 1919 between the

lack of expertise or credentials, and demonstrating that the financial adviser was concerned only with ensuring
Haiti’s foreign debts to the US were serviced properly, consider the case of Mr. Addison T. Ruan, appointed as
financial adviser to the Haitian government in 1917. In testimony provided before the US Senate Finance Committee
on February 10, 1932, Haitian lawyer Georges N. Léger pointed out that Mr. Ruan had been a clerk in the US Navy
Department before being sent to Haiti. Léger called Ruan “a dictator” and regularly fought with the Haitian
government, going so far as to cease payment of government expenses over loan negotiations. Léger also claimed
that, in 1918, when a local Haitian newspaper published information indicating Ruan was to be recalled by
Washington, the Marine authorities promptly arrested the paper’s editor, fined him US$300 and sentenced him to
three months in jail. The paper was likewise closed for three months. Ruan was recalled in large part because of his
involvement in extorting the Government of Haiti into extending the mandate of the Haitian-American Treaty in
return for a desperately required loan. Ruan was replaced in 1919 by Mr. John MacIlhenny who had been president
of the US Civil Service Commission. See US Senate Committee on Finance: Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in
the US, 72nd Cong, Part 4 (January 27 and February 10, 1932). See also “Charges We Forced Loan to Hold Haiti,”
The New York Times, 11 February 1932. www.nytimes.com. See also Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti,
74-81, 119-22.
145
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, Introduction 2-3.
146
De la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report, 2.
147
Paul Douglas, an economist, was also a Quaker and a Marine in the Second World War, and was later elected to
the US Senate in 1948.

143
US and Haiti was largely concerned with monetary reform and retroactively included a

requirement for Haiti to pay the outstanding interest on over US$3 million worth of National

Railway of Haiti bonds, rather than allowing the dispute over the railway to be settled first. As

Douglas pointed out, the accrued interest was not paid until 1922. However, between 1919 and

1922, the price of the outstanding railway bonds fell quite dramatically at which point

it might have been possible for the then Financial Advisor [John Avery McIlhenny] to
have purchased a considerable amount of the bonds…thus have saved the interest and
principal which the Haitian government would otherwise have been compelled to
pay…the value of the entire bond issue…was little, if any, under [US]$800,000.148

The one area where the US attempted to implement long-term and lasting social

engineering in Haiti, unsuccessfully as it turned out, was in the field of education. Dollar

diplomacy as it related to Haiti, beyond assuring loan repayments, was focussed on Haitian

education in the 1920s.149 Initially, occupation officials pursued minor changes to the Haitian

education system, without much success, and without any support from the 1915 Haitian-

American Treaty.150 Indeed, historian Rayford Logan, who visited Haiti for field work, notes that

the coerced treaty had “an almost inexplicable omission” on the matter of education.151 By the

early 1920s, occupation leaders had decided that political stability and economic development in

148
Instead of making the US$800,000 bond buyout, McIlhenny eventually paid out over US$2 million in 1922 to
meet the accrued interest payment debt. Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 42-3.
149
Education was the one area that had ostensibly remained outside of American control when the US occupied
Haiti. See A.J. Angulo, “Education during the American Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” Historical Studies in
Education 22, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 1-17. www.historicalstudiesineducation.ca.
150
Dantès Bellegarde, the Minister of Education during the early period of the Occupation, demonstrated that the
Dartiguenave government had a proposed plan for overhauling the education system, but that Occupation authorities
refused to fund, thereby killing off the initiatives. Key is that the Haitian proposal for education reform was Haitian
generated but was rejected without reason. For Bellegarde’s account of his dealings with the American Occupation
authorities while serving as Haitian Minister of Education, see Chapter V, “La lute pour l’École,” in Bellegarde,
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti.
151
He claims the original pretext for the American occupation included “the necessity for training the natives in self-
government” and that the school system to accomplish that aim was not planned for nor organized until quite late in
the occupation period. Rayford W. Logan, “Education in Haiti,” The Journal of Negro History 15, no. 4 (Oct.,
1930), 440.

144
Haiti required dramatic improvements to the education system. As Emily Rosenberg notes, white

American experts thought that “industrial education” was the most appropriate form of education

for non-whites, which meant vocational schools focused on manual labour rather than a literary

education in the liberal arts or engineering and science that they favoured for white students.152

In Haiti, the occupation officials identified vocational education with agriculture and not

surprisingly, in 1924 created the Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de l'Enseignement

Professionnel.153 More importantly, the Service Technique represented a new element of dollar

diplomacy. Up to this point, American efforts at shaping Haitian education had been limited,

stymied by Haitian politicians understandably reluctant to give up sovereignty over such an

important sector of Haitian society.154 US High Commissioner John Russell embraced a new

strategy, one that involved “bypass[ing] the traditional Haitian school system and create[ing]

beside it a vocational school system aimed at increasing productivity.”155

152
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 14-26. Suzy Castor points out that in 1920, President
Dartiguenave, whose government had been fighting quite vigorously against American attempts to encroach in
education, was on the verge of appealing to the League of Nations against the US and their attempts to control
Haitian education. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 102.
153
Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 78-9. Rayford Logan claims that the Service Technique was laughed at by the
Haitians and called it “a sewer into which is thrown Haitian money without any control.” Logan, “Education in
Haiti,” 447.
154
Dantès Bellegarde believed the American authorities in Haiti were pursuing a deliberate economic policy of
“affamement [starvation]” to allow them to seize control and shape Haitian education. This policy manifested itself
early in 1918 with the American financial advisor refusing to allocate monies to Haitian-generated education
policies. As he points out, Arthur C. Millspaugh, the US Financial Advisor, would concur with Bellegard’s
assessment when in 1928, following an examination of American behaviour, Millspaugh wrote: “Aux écoles
haïtiennes étaient refusés tous moyens financiers pour leur propre développement jusqu'à ce qu'elles fussent
absorbées.” Bellegarde identified the first tangible attempt to seize control of Haitian education came about shortly
after the US Marines Commandant, Major-General John A. Lejeune, made known, in December 1920, his desire to
establish an effective education system in Haiti. Professor Emily Balch likewise echoed the same perception of the
American strategy towards Haitian education. See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 105; and Balch, ed.,
Occupied Haiti, 116.
155
Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 79.

145
 The new school system was identified as “a fact of the economic development program

rather than as an attempt to increase literacy or promote general education.”156 General Russell,

in his last report as High Commissioner, identified the basis for his new strategy:

Up to the time of the American intervention, the entire school system of Haiti, from the
primary grades up, emphasized classical studies, almost to the complete exclusion of
industrial education. As a consequence, the children and young men of Haiti have been
guided from, rather than toward, productive industry….This emphasis of classical studies
and practical exclusion of agricultural and industrial education has necessarily led to the
creation of a class of young men who desire to take up professions and occupations such
as law, medicine, commerce and clerical; a great proportion of the latter seeking
governmental positions. The members of this class do not know how to use their hands
and have no idea of the dignity of labor. As a result there is a regrettable shortage of
agriculturalists and skilled workers. It is among such a class that revolutions are bred. 157

A number of problems beset the education system as established by the American

authorities. One aspect was the racial bias that Rayford Logan noted in 1930. Logan was certain

Haitians would probably be “best served” by emphasizing vocational training, but he believed

the American position was based on the “crude implication that vocational training is the only

kind to which Haitians are suited.”158 A second was the lack of consultation with the Haitians

and the failure to shape education reform based on Haitian values.159 Third, the American system

involved the use of white teachers, from the American South, none of whom spoke Creole or

French. Logan complained that the attitude “of these States towards Negro education is too well

known to need any comment.”160 One last problem worth identifying was raised by Logan: the

American system made no provisions for training “young Haitians with a view to supplanting

156
Pamphile.
157
American High Commissioner in Haiti, General Russell. Cited in Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 94.
158
Logan, “Education in Haiti,” 442.
159
Pamphile identifies an apparent ‘dread’ expressed by Haitians regarding the “Anglo-Saxoniz[ation]” of their
education system and an elimination of the French cultural aspects. Clearly, those objecting were among Haiti’s elite
and not the peasants for whom education was largely absent. Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 85, 87.
160
Logan, “Education in Haiti,” 447.

146
eventually the American instructors.”161 As will be seen, the lack of planning for the

Haitianization of social services in post-Occupation Haiti was not limited to the education sector.

Case Study: The Financial Advisor-General and the Royal Bank of Canada

It will be seen from this memorandum that the Financial Advisor’s office last year
exercised the power if not the right to dishonour an award of the Haytian Courts. I have
always refused to allow the British Legation to become involved in that case for the
reasons set forth in the memorandum, and I have repeatedly told my American colleagues
that so long as I had faith in the equity of the financial Advisor and American Treaty
authorities generally I would be loth [sic] to press any matter which would embarrass
them. As I saw things, the situation now was that for their own reasons the Financial
Advisor and his staff had veered round from a dictatorial attitude to one of feigned
complete helplessness with regards to Haytian law, and the change was being
accomplished in part at the expense of the most important British Empire interest in the
Republic.162
- British Legation in Haiti

This case study provides a better understanding of the role of the Financial Advisor-

General in Haiti during the Marine occupation. Sidney de la Rue, the US Financial Adviser –

General Receiver, has been identified by Emily Rosenberg as having “a fairly good record for

honest, modest, competent, and culturally sensitive service” while he filled the role of financial

adviser in Liberia.163 At the same time, because he was white, like all the other advisers

appointed world-wide under the strategy of dollar diplomacy, he “looked and acted like a

colonial ruling elite.” Those complaints aside, de la Rue believed in the requirement for the

161
Logan, 448.
162
Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, British Legation Letter to British Foreign Office
(Marquess of Reading), 14 September 1931. Accessed May 2015.
163
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, The Questionable Impact of Supervisory Missions 2/35. That
assessment of Sidney de la Rue should be balanced against his manipulations of the Liberian government and the
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, while involved in the 1927 loan negotiations between Firestone and Liberia.
De la Rue sought to gain Harvey Firestone’s acceptance of a loan proposal that would have endowed him, as
General Receiver, with “dictatorial powers.” Unfortunately for de la Rue, Firestone rejected his power play and his
scheming nearly resulted in him losing his position. It certainly poisoned his relationship with the Liberian
government. See Frank Chalk, “The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone’s 1927 Loan to Liberia,” Canadian
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 1, no. 1 (March 1967), 12-32. See also Frank
Chalk, "Du Bois and Garvey Confront Liberia: Two Incidents of the Coolidge Years," Canadian Journal of African
Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 1, no. 2 (1967) : 135-42. doi:10.2307/483527.

147
financial adviser to have full administrative power over the national financial matters of Haiti. 164

The case studies below demonstrate the extent of that power.

The manoeuvrings of Canadian and American interests during the occupation period is of

particular interest as it illustrates the manipulations of the Haitian government by both parties. Of

particular interest were the activities of the Royal Bank of Canada as it sought to extend its

influence within Haiti. Indeed, the Royal Bank of Canada was in competition with the BNRH

and was considered by some to have worked to “undermine the standing of the latter bank.”165

Two such clashes between the two North American neighbours are detailed below.166

During the occupation, the only real rival to the BNRH was the Royal Bank of Canada.167 In

1920, the civilian Financial Advisor-General Receiver of Haiti, John A. McIlhenny (1919-1922),

put forward a recommendation that his office control the import and export of foreign currency

into Haiti.168 The Royal Bank, which did not have the right to issue Haitian currency, was only

able to make loans by importing foreign (mainly US) currency and then buying up Haitian

gourdes through its tellers. McIlhenny’s proposal would have forced the bank to halt operations

in Haiti. Naturally the Royal Bank protested and was able to convince the Haitian government to

refuse the recommendation by pointing out it would likely have given the US-controlled BNRH

164
Rosenberg points out that, following his tour in Liberia as financial adviser, de la Rue was offered the adviser
position with the Turkish government. However, the Turks refused to grant him the powers requested, so he turned
the position down, claiming his office would quickly become “a scapegoat” for any financial problems that he felt
were sure to arise. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 2-4/35.
165
Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 255.
166
Material in this section is taken from Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, G1, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, Canadian
Legation in Haiti to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Letter, 26 October 1932. Accessed May
2015. All amounts are in Canadian dollars.
167
Paul Douglas makes this argument regarding the Royal Bank’s status in Haiti. See Douglas, “The American
Occupation of Haiti II,” 388.
168
Suzy Castor points out the Royal Bank was not the only opponent to this measure which also gave the National
City Bank of New York a monopoly over the importation of gold into Haiti. “Les légations française, anglaise,
italienne, la Banque Royale du Canada (récemment établie) et même une institution américaine, l'American Foreign
Banking Co., protestèrent.” See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 99.

148
a monopoly.169 Such a monopoly would have forced the Haitian government to pay significantly

higher interest payments on loans.

In May 1931, then-Financial Advisor to Haiti, Sidney de la Rue, undertook an inspection

of the financial records of the BNRH, at the time, in all but name, a branch of the National City

Bank of New York. He determined that the BNRH had contravened the stamp tax act that

governed the taxation amounts to be paid for bank transfers and documents shipped into and out

of Haiti. The bank had not “affixed and cancelled” the stamps required and was in default of

“some $150 for taxes…”. In addition to the taxes, the BNRH was also subject to a fine. Bank

officials naturally sought to appeal the ruling within the Haitian courts.

While awaiting their appeal, the Port-au-Prince branch manager of the Royal Bank of

Canada was contacted by the Director General (DG) of the Internal Revenue Department of Haiti

(a US national operating under the auspices of de la Rue’s office). The DG announced that a

June 1931 audit of the Royal Bank’s financial records determined it had, like the BNRH, failed

to properly abide by the provisions of the August 1903 Haitian stamp law. The Royal Bank

mistake, the DG explained, was that it had stamped mail transfers in and out of Haiti at the rate

of one cent per US$40, rather than the correct rate of two cents. The audit also pointed out that

the discrepancy spanned a number of years, an error which resulted in the Royal Bank being

assessed a delinquency tax of US$500 (the actual difference between the one cent levied and two

cents required). In addition, however, the Royal Bank was hit with an additional penalty per the

169
Dantès Bellegarde wrote that the Haitian administration resisted US pressure to pass the proposed legislation,
resulting in McIlhenny resorting to coercion, by “confisqua[nt] les indemnités du Président de la République, des
ministres et des conseillers d'État.” Despite withholding their salaries, President Dartiguenave refused to cave in to
the American demands. Further, “[Haitian] opposition to the proposal was so strong that the bill was killed.” See
Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 81-2; and Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 54.

149
stamp act amounting to “20 percent of the face amount of the items with a minimum of US$80

per item.” That amount came to a staggering US$304,842.48!

The Royal Bank was quick to react, arguing that the stamp act was ambiguous and that its

use of the wrong stamp was “a mistake and unintentional….” Further, Royal Bank officials

stated, “according to English law and the law of most civilized countries a fine for non-payment

of a tax is leviable only in cases of wilful evasion.” Finally, they pointed out “the law had not

previously been strictly applied… [and] the law was regarded as inoperative.”

The Royal Bank worked through the British legation in Haiti and argued if the onerous

fines were enforced, “it would necessitate the withdrawal of the Royal Bank from Haiti.” The

British representatives pointed out to Haitian authorities that “it was deemed highly desirable to

maintain cordial relation existing between the Haitian and British Governments and the foreign

credit of Haiti…”, which translated into an indirect threat against Haiti obtaining further credit

assistance within the international community. Initially, Haitian government officials, reacting to

British pressure, “exonerated the [Royal] Bank and cancelled the fine.” The British chargé

d’affaires declared “the question…settled” in December 1931.

However, in February 1932, Sidney de la Rue became involved and took exception to the

cancellation of the fines, writing:

In view of the fact that the Haitian Government is opposed to the action of the
administration of contribution in the present case, I have no other alternative but to
submit officially the question to the American Legation in order to receive the
instructions of the American Government.

The Haitian government, seeking to avoid a showdown with the American Financial

Advisor, quickly passed through legislation in September 1932 which backtracked on the

exoneration promised the Royal Bank: they instead legislated fines in such matters that

amounted to “ten times the amount by which the amount of the stamp tax has been less than the

150
legal requirement.” That lesser fine worked out to US$5,000 rather than the original

US$340K.170

This left the Royal Bank with three options. First, pay the lesser fine; second, continue

legal action based on the earlier exoneration and closure which risked the larger fine being held

extant; or third, appeal to Washington, something which was not expected to yield support.

Indeed, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Francis White, was of the

opinion that:

there is no chance that the [US] Department of State can be persuaded to intervene in
order to secure the withdrawal of the claim…it seems highly probable that the United
States authorities will fully support the Financial Adviser in seeking to collect the fine in
its reduced amount.

In the end, the Royal Bank took the prudent course and paid the reduced fines: with

payment, the matter was considered closed. The Royal Bank affair highlights the power wielded

by US officials operating in Haiti, particularly that of the Receiver-General, who was ostensibly

acting in Haiti’s interests. Foreign loan operations in Haiti were quite lucrative and entities like

the Royal Bank were not willing to risk being forced out of that market, a power which the

Receiver-General had. At the same time, the Haitian government was not above pushing back

against US officials; the reduced fine was a way for the Haitian Government to push back and

allow it to save face during this affair.

The two episodes demonstrated a key lesson to be learned. Challenging the American

Financial Advisor was ill-advised and potentially dangerous as his arsenal included possible

shutting off of Haitian access to critical foreign (i.e., US) credit sources. At the same time, the

170
The Haitian government backtracking on this issue was likely the result of behind the scenes blackmail. Because
the US controlled Haiti’s customs houses and therefore the monies available for Haitian government operations
(including salaries), the Haitian government was quite vulnerable.

151
Financial Advisor demonstrated some flexibility on economic issues, reflecting the reality of

dealing with multinational interests and proved willing to accept a reasonable solution to the

stamp tax error that allowed all parties to save face.

Withdrawal from Haiti

Within six days, the last Marine will be leaving Haitian soil. August 15, 1934 should be
recorded in golden letters within the Marine Corps annals as marking the termination of a
glorious and humanitarian task which has been achieved by your fellow countrymen. I
wish it known throughout the Americas…all have accomplished meritorious works, and
are deserving of commendation and thanks for the services which they have lent to a
young sister republic which has been striving against all manner of vicissitudes since the
early times when she emerged from slavery and became independent.171
- Haitian Paul C. Toussaint

The US withdrawal from Haiti was intended to be sequential: it was planned to begin

with the departure of the Marines; was to be followed by the civilian members of the US-Haitian

treaty’s “Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de 1'Enseignement Professionnel” [Technical

Service for Agriculture and Professional Education], the Public Health Service and various other

public services including public works; and, lastly, by the Financial Advisor and his staff who

were intending to stay in Haiti until Haiti’s debt obligations to the US were discharged under the

terms of the 1922 loan consolidation plan.172 The 1915 Treaty was set to expire in 1936, which

became the target date for the completion of the US withdrawal.

171
Paul C. Toussaint, “Haiti Speaks,” Letter to the editor, Leatherneck 17, no. 10 (October 1934): 33. This excerpt
from a ‘Letter to the Editor’ identified Paul Toussaint as a Haitian from Port-au-Prince who claimed to be “stating
the matter from the Haitian viewpoint.”
172
Dana G. Munro, prior to becoming a Latin American history professor, joined the US State Department from
1920 until 1930 before becoming the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Haiti from 1930 to 1932.
He was involved in the withdrawal planning and negotiations with the Haitian government. Dana G. Munro, “The
American Withdrawal from Haiti, 1929-1934,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 49, no. 1 (Feb. 1969): 1-
26.

152
 That orderly plan was tossed out the window with the escalation of protests and rioting

against the Haitian government and the Marine presence. The protests reached their zenith in

1929, following the October announcement by Haitian President Louis Borno (1922 to 1930) to

cancel the scheduled presidential elections for that year.173 Tragically, that decision, later

rescinded, coincided with the start of the Great Depression. Not only did the international coffee

market collapse, the international migratory labour market was largely closed to Haitian workers,

and the Occupation authority, to make up for the lost export revenues, announced an increase in

taxes as well as “pressing new tax collections.”174 Following the government scholarship

funding cuts, students joined the general strike action. By November 1929, discontent was

widespread and involved large segments of Haitian society.

A factor which contributed to discontent was the increasing accumulation of land under

foreign commercial control during the Occupation. Haitian historian Suzy Castor points out that,

by 1929, Arthur Millspaugh had estimated seven key American companies as controlling almost

100,000 acres of prime Haitian land, “[l]a majorité des terres accordées…situées dans les riches

plaines du nord de la vallée de l'Artibonite." As the land was accumulated, Haitians were

likewise being evicted from the areas, often forced as a result to migrate in search of

173
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1929-1934, 194.
174
Schmidt, 196-7. One of the less well publicized aspects of the Marine Occupation was the continuous stream of
Haitians forced to migrate outside Haiti in search of jobs, often because of Occupation policies which
disenfranchised peasants from the land. Citing Mr. Séjourné, the “Inspecteur Général des Douanes,” Suzy Castor
points to “plus de 300.000 Haïtiens [qui] abandonnèrent le pays durant les 19 ans de l'occupation et aucun ne revint
à sa terre natale.” The majority ended up either in Cuba or the Dominican Republic in search of employment. “Cette
émigration constituait un apport de main-d'œuvre presque servile aux raffineries de sucre cubaines et dominicaines,
propriétés de capitalistes américains. La United Fruit, par exemple, employa 8.000 de ces émigrés en 1926 et 12.000
en 1927.” Citing Millspaugh, Castor believes that Occupation officials encouraged the migration, identifying it as
“une solution au problème démographique, puisque la population de la République était au-dessus de sa capacité
productive.” Castor points out that “l'émigration massive était devenue une soupape de sûreté pour les crises agraires
suscitées par les dépossessions [américaines].” See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 114-17.

153
employment.175 Castor believed the annual reports from the American Financial Advisor

deliberately and substantially underreported the amount of Haitian land under American

commercial control.

Despite American moves to quell the strikes by identifying Borno as a “non-candidate” in

the upcoming and reinstated elections, the protests continued and became more widespread. By

December, fearing a complete loss of control, High Commissioner John Russell responded by

declaring martial law including a national curfew; he began a crackdown on the press and

dispatched Garde troops to key towns in a vain attempt to quell the uprisings.176 Those measures

appalled the US State Department, but before the State Department rescinded his orders, the

popular discontent came to a head on December 6th with what became known as the les Cayes

massacre committed by Marines.177

The tragic events began when Haitian longshoremen and customs workers halted the

unloading of docked ships and went on strike on 4 December 1929.178 The local Garde

commander, US Lieutenant Fitzgerald Brown, requested reinforcements from the capital, his

intent being to use force to get the striking workers back to work. The reinforcements proved

insufficient to the task, however, as the striking workers became violent. In response, Brown

requested and received Marine air support which conducted a series of limited strafing runs on

the workers, leading to their dispersal and an end to the impasse and violence.

175
Castor identified most of the over 50,000 Haitians evicted from land in the Artibonite Valley area as settling in
the Dominican-Haitian borderlands. Tragically, many were caught up in the Parsley Massacre, becoming “victime
des vêpres trujillistes d'octobre 1937.” Castor, 109-10.
176
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1929-1934, 198-200.
177
About the massacre, Munro writes “…popular demonstrations against [Haitian President] Borno and against the
American occupation became so violent that for the first time in several years the American marines had to
intervene to restore order.” Munro, 5-6. For an account of the massacre, see Castor, L'occupation américaine
d'Haïti, 204-6.
178
This particular account of the massacre is drawn from Benjamin Beede, ed., The War of 1898 and US
Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 96.

154
 Two days later, however, a crowd of 1500 gathered and marched on the town. They were

under the mistaken belief that the striking longshoremen and customs workers has been able,

through their previous strike action, to obtain tax relief, something the new crowd of protesters

likewise wanted. However, the tax relief protesters found their way barred by armed Marines and

a stand-off developed.

At some point, the Marines are believed to have become threatened by the size and

demeanour of the crowd, and opened fire with their heavy machine guns and rifles. The results

were tragic. Twenty-four Haitians were killed and another 51 were wounded.179 Ironically, the

patrol commander responsible for opening fire, Marine Second Lieutenant John D. Blanchard,

was rewarded for his “laudable presence of mind and leadership in promptly taking effective

measures to quell the up-rising and save the lives of his patrol,” and was awarded the Navy

Cross, the third highest award for combat heroism and other distinguished service.180

Although a presidential commission to Haiti had been planned prior to the uprisings, the

Forbes Commission dispatched in 1930 was charged with a different mission, to extricate the US

from Haiti as quickly and painlessly as possible.181 Despite success in ridding themselves of

Borno as president and the appointment of a provisional president to oversee the transition to

Haitian rule, uprisings in Haiti did not stop. If anything, opposition to the Marines intensified and

included the previously mentioned arson campaign in 1930 targeting Marine housing.

The election of nationalist president, Sténio Vincent in November, 1930 increased

pressure on the US administration to accelerate the Haitianization of government agencies

including the leadership of the Garde. That acceleration resulted in a less than orderly handover

179
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 200.
180
Blanchard’s full citation is available at www.homeofheroes.com.
181
Schmidt identified the Commission as intending to “accommodate Haitian nationalists in order to avoid further
bloodshed and embarrassment to the US.” Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 208.

155
of government responsibilities: instead, Haitians often had their new positions and

responsibilities dumped on them without any further guidance. The goal became a rapid and

complete disengagement on the part of the Americans. The exception, of course, were those

fiscal/financial responsibilities related to ensuring payment of the Haitian foreign debt. To ensure

it was properly serviced, the US maintained the position of the Financial Advisor. Other than that

office, the end of the US Occupation of Haiti was punctuated by the withdrawal of the last

Marine company in August 1934.

Summary

The intervention in Haiti seemed for a time the most successful of the American efforts
during the first decades of the century to impose political stability and promote economic
and social progress in several of the Caribbean states. The United States exercised more
effective control over a wider range of government activities for a longer period than in
any of the other countries. The majority of the treaty officials in Haiti were competent
and enthusiastic, and in most of the services they were able to build up efficient, well-
trained native staffs.182
- Professor of History and US Special Envoy to Haiti Dana G. Munro

As a student of Central American interventionist history, Dana Munro sought to transfer

his understanding of that area and its relationship with the US, to Haiti.183 His thesis would

foreshadow not only the American occupation and its effects in Haiti, but also correctly forecast

the impact of gunboat diplomacy, to which he was a witness, when he wrote:

Even an intervention to protect foreign life and property often determines, as a matter of
fact, the outcome of a civil war, and the influence upon internal politics is still greater

182
Munro, “The American Withdrawal from Haiti, 1929-1934,” 26.
183
Dana G Munro wrote and published his doctoral thesis, entitled The five republics of Central America: their
political and economic development and their relations to the US. Published in 1918, he believed that the five
republics studied had made considerable strides forward since the end of Spanish colonial domination and that they
would be capable of self-rule within a democratic framework. See Dana G. Munro, The five republics of Central
America: their political and economic development and their relations to the US (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1918).

156
 when the US used diplomatic pressure or force to prevent revolution…the US practically
imposes upon the country affected the rule of one or the other political group.184

Interestingly, he also spoke about the need to seize the customs houses in Santo

Domingo, for example, to not only ensure the servicing of foreign debt in a timely manner, but

also to “prevent that portion of the [customs house] receipts which are not used for the service of

foreign debt from being misspent.”185 For Haiti, that advice would prove prescient with the US-

appointed Receiver-General staying until 1941. Yet despite his extolling the success of the

American intervention and his perception that the US had left Haiti with ‘efficient, well-trained

native [Haitian] staffs,’ that was not the case when the US departed. Rather, the Haitianization of

the public service had been ignored by Russell for much of his tenure and only became a priority

late in his term of office. That ‘realization’ emerged in the 1930 U. S. Commission for the Study

and Review of Conditions in Haiti and Its Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American

Policy which identified the need for a long-term plan to build the middle class from which

qualified Haitians could emerge to begin the process of creating an effective civil service. The

Commission believed, based on interviews and observations, that the process could not be

realized earlier than 1936. Sadly, the events of 1929 meant that planning was never begun.186

Beyond the failure to develop a domestic Haitian bureaucracy so necessary for

governance, the Occupation would have two other lasting effects on Haitian society, both of

which have remained unresolved up to the present time. The first was the disarmament of Haitian

society generally through the Marines’ COIN campaign and its lasting impact (not least of which

was a suspicion and anger by the masses of Haitians at any future US military involvement in

184
Munro, 309.
185
Munro, 312.
186
Henry Prather Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” Foreign Affairs 8, no. 4 (Jul. 1930): 533-548.

157
Haiti). The violence of the campaign by the US, which saw an incredible number of extra-

judicial killings in the name of ridding the countryside of ‘bandits,’ eliminated the ability of

peasants to settle their grievances with the political elite in the capital by mobilizing and joining

the caco movements. Regional power bases had been empowered by a large and armed peasant

population. That option disappeared dramatically as a consequence of the COIN campaign and

related Marines disarmament operations. The result:

la paysannerie haïtienne demeura plongée dans une profonde apathie qui l'a transformée
en une proie plus facile pour la classe féodale, la bourgeoisie commerçante et les
politiciens corrompus.187

The second related effect, partially intended, was the centralization of power in the

capital and the de-construction of regional power bases throughout Haiti, both militarily and

economically. Locations like Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves and others once represented regional power

bases, capable of mounting challenges to the capital. However, disarmament of the peasants, the

destruction of their regional leaders, many of whom opposed the occupation and were killed like

Charlemagne Péralte as bandits, and the centralization and professionalization of the Haitian

Garde in Port-au-Prince, all allowed the capital to become “an instrument of political

domination.”188 At the same time, Port-au-Prince’s rise as the beneficiary of the limited

development funds dispersed by the American occupation forces made it the central economic

hub that Port-au-Prince would become for Haiti at the expense of regional ports like Cap

Haïtien.189

187
Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 127.
188
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 235.
189
Haitian sociologist Jean Rénol Elie has worked with a number of academics to create a plan for reversing the
centralization effected by the Marine Occupation with an aim to provide voice to disenfranchised rural areas of
Haiti. See Jean Rénol Elie et al., Aménagement du territoire et décentralisation (Port-au-Prince:
CRESFED/UNASUR, 2014).

158
 The American occupation created a military force that was, once again, lean, efficient,

and trained to a fairly high standard.190 Unfortunately for Haitians, its proficiency had come

about at the expense of those seeking independence. Its COIN capabilities were easily applied to

the repression of Haiti’s own citizenry. Haiti’s military forces, despite trying to remain

‘professional’ and depoliticized, quickly became a political weapon, conducting coups when its

leaders determined it was necessary. From an occupation point of view, the most lasting of

effects of the Marine Occupation were not tangible items like road construction, but intangibles

like the effective repression of democratic expression.

190
The Marine Corps used the mission, as well as other Latin American operations including the one in Santo
Domingo, to begin its work on the integration of air power into ground operations. In Haiti specifically, Marine
Lieutenant L.H.M Sanderson was credited with developing the use of dive bombing in support of Marine
counterinsurgency operations, although his technique is now more accurately known as glide bombing. The Marine
Corps deployed Air Squadron E to Port-au-Prince, Haiti on March 31, 1919, in support of the 1st Marine Brigade
operations against the cacos. Initially, aircraft were used for bombing runs in support of ground campaigns but
would be expanded by the 1920s to include use for the evacuation of Marine and Gendarmerie wounded. Squadron
E consisted of six HS-2 flying boats and six JN-4 Jennies. The Squadron would remain in Haiti until 1934. See
Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912-1940 (Washington,
D.C.: HQ USMC, 1977), 53; and John C. Fredriksen, The United States Marine Corps: A Chronology, 1775 to the
Present (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 85-6. Laurent Dubois also provides a short summary of the effects
of the Marine air campaign against the cacos: see Dubois, Haiti, 258-60.

159
Chapter Seven - Post-Occupation to the 1957 election of François Duvalier.

When the last Marine unit departed from Haiti 20 years later, it left behind a country
which had once again resumed its place in the community of nations as a solvent,
responsible democracy, a bulwark to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere.1
- US Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C Shepherd, Jr.

…[O]ne unintended but significant outcome of the U.S. occupation was the newfound
pride among Haitian intellectuals in the nation’s African origins. This emergence of black
consciousness among Haitian intellectuals, combined with their sharpened understanding
of class antagonism, ensured the situation would become increasingly volatile. New
scholarship by disaffected middle-class intellectuals continued to alienate the Haitian
intelligentsia from the status quo.2
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus Patrick Bellegarde-Smith

The withdrawal of the US Marines in 1934 has been heralded, prematurely, as Haiti’s

second independence, or désoccupation.3 Yet, American control over Haiti continued until 1941

through the powers exercised by the US-appointed Financial Adviser-General Receiver.4 The

withdrawal of the US Marines might have heralded a new period of independence for Haiti

rather than the continuation of American domination in Haitian internal affairs. Examining the

immediate post-occupation period raises several questions about the contributions of the US role

in Haiti and its continued problems. While the period has been characterized by historian

Matthew Smith as sparking “the establishment of a popular labor movement; the rise of political

parties; a bitter and vibrant ideological struggle; and a shift toward an assertive brand of Haitian

1
Quote from USMC Commandant, General Lemuel C Shepherd, Jr., 15 December 1955. Cited in James H.
McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine
Corps, (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Company Inc.1956), v.
2
Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 115.
3
The term ‘Second Independence’ or Seconde Indépendance, appears to have been coined by President Sténio
Vincent and exploited to solidify his 1930 election to the presidency. See Sténio Vincent, Sur La Route de la
Seconde Independence: En Compagnie du Soldat et du Citoyen Haïtiens (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l’État,
1934), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00081277/00001.
4
Those powers were largely exercised over Haitian finances and fiscal policy to ensure Haiti continued to meet its
foreign debt obligations. Indeed, as late as 1937, the US identified its desire to cease infringing on Haitian “financial
sovereignty” save when necessary to protect “the holders of bonds of the 1922 Haitian loan.” FRUS, Diplomatic
Papers, 1937, The American Republics, Volume V, eds. Matilda F. Axton, Rogers P. Churchill, N. O. Sappington,
John G. Reid, Francis C. Prescott, Louis E. Gates and Shirley L. Phillips (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1954), Document 458. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1937v05/d458.

160
black nationalism, noirisme…,” it would also see the Haitian military become more professional

and hence a less political organization.5

At the same time, the “semi-professional Haitian Garde” was in a poor state of affairs:

Jean Price-Mars, for example, describes the post-occupation Garde in quite scathing terms:

At the end of the occupation, the military equipment left to this force [the Haitian Garde]
was obsolete and clearly insufficient and inadequate. On the other hand, public finances
were still handicapped by contractual obligations that did not allow the government to
incur any expenses beyond those of a skimpy budget.6

Further, the nation’s infrastructure was in disrepair. Roads, constructed to allow access to

the interior in support of the Marine counter-insurgency operations, were difficult to maintain by

the cash strapped Haitian government. Consequently, the roads disintegrated once the Marines

departed. The leadership of the Garde also lacked professional qualifications. Allowing Haitians

to assume leadership roles, particularly as commissioned officers, was resisted by the Marines

for the entirety of their involvement with the Garde. That policy was reversed by the Haitian

government after the American withdrawal from Haiti. By then, it was far too late to properly

train the leaders required. Instead, the majority of the Garde’s post-Marine leadership found

itself ill-prepared for command and under-trained for the responsibilities they inherited.

5
Matthew Smith defines noirisme as an ideology which “advocated total control of the state apparatus by black
representatives of the popular classes.” While noirisme is related to indigénisme as expressed by Jean Price-Mars
(Ainsi parla l’oncle [Thus Spoke the Uncle]), it is more radical in its expression. While it emphasized Haiti’s
African past, it also offered a more radical view of power in Haiti, viewing it as a constant struggle for supremacy
between the mulatto elite and the black masses, and that the emerging black middle class was the best suited to
exercise power on behalf of blacks generally. David Nicholls argued noiriste leaders like Duvalier “believed that
power should be in the hands of an authoritarian government acting on behalf of the masses whose basic interests
they were said to share.” Two events contributed to its emergence: the Marine Occupation, which gave rise to its
foundation through indigénisme; and later, the 1937 Dominican massacre of Haitians along the Haitian-Dominican
border, linked to President Vincent’s deliberate lack of response. See Matthew J. Smith, Red and Black in Haiti:
Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934-1957 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009),
2-32; and Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 168. See also Jean Price-Mars, Ainsi Parla l’Oncle: Essais
d’Ethnographie New York: Parapsychology Foundation, Inc., 1928. Nouvelle édition, 1954.
6
Cited in Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 88.

161
 That lack of readiness would become all too clear in October 1937 with the Dominican

Republic’s genocidal attack on Haitians in the shared border region. Known as the Parsley

Massacre, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo Molina ordered Dominican soldiers to kill any

Haitians found in the northeastern border region. The week-long slaughter resulted in the murder

of an estimated 20,000 Haitians.7 The motives behind the sudden slaughter, coming seemingly

without warning or provocation, have been difficult to explain.

Historian Richard Turits has, however, provided an understanding that focusses on the

liminality of the border between the two nations having spawned a population independent of

either nation. That “bicultural and transnational frontier world collectively made by ethnic

Dominicans and ethnic Haitians” became an immediate threat to “the dominant, essentialized

construction of Dominican nationality as founded on a putatively transhistorical anti-

Haitianism.”8 Turits’s thesis gains support when examining the timing of the demarcation

investigations which preceded the massacre. A 1929 treaty between the two nations, with the US

Marines representing Haiti, established the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

However, that description remained on paper until 1935 when the border was demarcated by a

joint commission with US assistance and oversight, which completed the physical survey work

and on-the-ground markings of the border.

Crucially, that 1935 work drew attention to the border region, and its “unmoored”

society. The border society that developed was based on a high rate of intermarriage between

Dominicans and Haitians. For Dominican elites, this undermined an historical founding

7
Richard Turits provides an excellent analysis of the numbers of Haitian lives lost in the massacres. Richard Turits,
“A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic,” Hispanic
American Historical Review 82, no. 3 (2002): 589-635. See also Edward Paulino, Dividing Hispaniola: The
Dominican Republic’s Border Campaign Against Haiti, 1930-1961 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016).
8
Turits, 593-4.

162
narrative, especially because of blended “black” Haitian and “white” Dominican families.

Dominican myths of white “Spanishness” mixed with whipped up fears of a “pacific invasion” of

the Dominican Republic by Haitians formed a volatile brew ready to explode whenever

Dominican President Rafael Trujillo gave the command to his soldiers. For added measure,

Trujillo claimed that Haiti harboured his political enemies and therefore deserved punishment.9

Matters in Haiti would worsen after the massacres. Not only had the international coffee

market begun its crash, leading to lowered prices and consequently much lower revenue flowing

into Haiti’s treasury, but an infestation of the Mexican boll-weevil struck the cotton industry

cutting cotton production for export purposes almost completely.10 Infestations also decimated

Haitian cocoa plantations. The cumulative effect was a collapse in Haiti’s exports. In 1936,

France struck an additional blow to the Haitian economy by declining to renew the favourable

tariff policy Haitian exports had enjoyed, subjecting them instead to the same general tariff rates

that other nations paid.11 All these blows added up to an economic catastrophe for Haiti.12

Not surprisingly, by 1937, Haiti had defaulted on its 1922 loan payments and was once

again negotiating new financing, beginning again the spiral into dependency on foreign lending

for operating funds. Initially, the US government resisted helping Haiti garner the necessary

9
Turits points out that prior to the Parsley Massacre, Haitian authorities had complained to Dominican and
American leaders about Dominican soldiers forcing Haitians out of disputed border areas. Further, Dominican
authorities sought to colonize those disputed border areas with Dominicans in order to ensure border negotiations
were favourable to Dominican interests. When Spain began its ascendency in Europe, northern Europeans began a
campaign to discredit the Spanish using race as one of its key justifications for supremacy. Spain, and those of
Spanish extraction, have zealously guarded their right to belong as ‘white” Europeans. Turits, “A World Destroyed,
A Nation Imposed,” 599. See also Baltasar Fra-Molinero, “The suspect whiteness of Spain,” in At Home and
Abroad: Historicizing Twentieth-Century Whiteness in Literature and Performance, ed. La Vinia Delois Jennings
(University of Tennessee Press: 2010) 147-169.
10
Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 67.
11
Lundahl, 303.
12
The only success story during the 1930s in Haitian agriculture was, ironically, the Standard Fruit Company’s
monopoly in banana production which “launched a veritable boom in the country.” That was undermined between
1945 and 1947 when President Vincent broke up the Standard Fruit Company and Steamship Company’s monopoly
by granting “lucrative regional monopoly concessions” to political cronies. That cronyism resulted in policies which
saw Haiti’s banana exports undermined and eventually destroyed. Lundahl, 303, 307.

163
funding, but when the German government of Adolf Hitler showed renewed interest in Haiti, the

State Department swiftly stepped in and encouraged Wall Street firms to open their vaults. After

American bankers demurred, however, the State Department called upon the Export-Import

Bank.

The Export-Import Bank tied its funding to very closely supervised infrastructure

projects. Not only did they insist upon US expertise supervising all the proposed Haitian

projects, they also demanded that Haiti break the projects into smaller parcels with a value of no

more than US$5 million each. Two of the projects funded by the Export- Import Bank are worth

exploring: the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (or SHADA); and the

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Marbial Valley

project. Both were funded under the Bank’s auspices and within the US$5 million funding

envelopes.

Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA)

The Shada project has stimulated a considerable amount of ill feeling among the
Haitians…they have objected also to the manner in which the program has been
administered, to its waste, to its cost, to the large number of Americans it has employed.
They have tried to escape responsibility themselves by claiming the whole idea was
thought up by Americans, and that Americans maintained control of the organization’s
policy thru…their control of the common stock…While there is some truth in all this, the
fact remains that the Haitian Government entered into the agreement freely.13
- US Diplomat Willian B. Connett, Jr.

The outbreak of the Second World War saw the withdrawal of German and Italian money

forcing Haiti to rely almost exclusively on the US for trade. As a result, American companies

13
FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 520.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d520

164
bought all of Haiti’s cotton and sisal crops.14 Despite the revenue from the sales, Haiti found

itself again in dire economic straits. By 1938, Haiti was again seeking loans from the US

government, this time to fund ongoing development projects. The US Export-Import Bank would

eventually disperse some US$24 million for infrastructure work such as roads, schools, and

irrigation work, but President Vincent and his supporters siphoned away most of the money from

the projects to line their own pockets.

Fortunately for Vincent, US Second World War strategic raw materials requirements

included natural rubber. The American government prevailed upon Vincent to accept US

assistance for rubber plantations in Haiti. Vincent’s request was quickly approved and in 1939,

the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) dispatched Thomas Fennell, a tropical agriculture

engineer, to Haiti. Fennell had previous rubber growing experience and favoured starting rubber

production in Haiti.15

In 1941, the USDA and the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture (HMA) concluded an

agreement for the creation of an experimental plantation near Jérémie at Marfranc. That April,

work began to plant 4,800 heavea rubber trees.16 By August, the two parties had concluded an

agreement to establish the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (or

14
An exception to the American purchase monopolization of Haitian products was sparked by the British decision to
end its purchases of Haitian sugar and cotton during the immediate pre-war period. Rather than the Americans
stepping in, the Japanese government surprisingly stepped in and bought up the “British share and more.” Heinl and
Heinl, Written in Blood, 534, 539.
15
Fennell was eventually made President and General Manager of Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement
Agricole or SHADA. See Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.”
http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/leftover/rubber.htm.
16
The rubber plants were introduced into Haiti by University of Michigan Professor H.H. Bartlett who had been sent
to the Philippines by the US Department of Agriculture in 1940 to procure large quantities of rubber seeds and
plants. A second University of Michigan colleague, Arthur W Bechtel, was sent to assist him in Haiti in 1942. The
University of Michigan ended up supplying many of the botanists and agronomists involved in the rubber trade,
including a number who worked for the US Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, as well
as Goodyear. See Carl D. LaRue, “Michigan Botanists Play Important Role,” The Michigan Alumnus 49, no. 1 (2
October 1943): 57-8.

165
SHADA) and finance it with a US$5 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank.17 In 1942,

SHADA added sisal production to its mandate. The US / Haiti agreement led SHADA to

purchase an additional 24,000 acres of land with the prior approval of the Vincent government.18

The agreement allowed SHADA to expropriate whatever land it needed:

The Haitian Government agrees to grant every facility to the SHADA and to the private
interests concerned in order that they may obtain possession of the necessary lands,
whether government or privately owned, and to facilitate the employment of such United
States technical personnel as may be necessary.19

SHADA soon decided to base latex production on the faster growing cryptostegia bush

which produced a high-quality latex rubber over heavea trees, which take seven years to produce

latex for commercial production.20 By June 1943, it had six divisions and eleven plantations

growing cryptostegia.21 Over 75,000 acres had been acquired by SHADA with about one-third

planted: Haitian employees numbered over 77,000. By November 1943, SHADA had obtained a

“cost-plus” contract from the USDA for the harvest of natural rubber from some 100,000 acres

of cryptostegia plants.22 Notwithstanding the acreage under control of SHADA, rubber

production was low, with the 1944 forecasts topping out at only 3,000 “long tons.”23

17
In exchange for the loan, SHADA was granted a 50-year lease over some 150,000 acres of pine forest and a 50-
year monopoly on the production and export of natural rubber from Haiti. SHADA was also reportedly extended an
additional US$7 million line of credit in 1942. See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542; and Corbett, “Haitian
Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.”
18
FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics, Volume VI, eds. William M. Franklin and E.R.
Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), Document 481.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v06/d481.
19
FRUS, Document 481. The land agreement, tendered through the US Rubber Reserve Company, also examined
potential new sources of rubber cultivation; it had also been responsible for rubber recycling and conservation
efforts. The Rubber Reserve Company, established in 1940 by the US government, existed to deal with US
vulnerabilities to its supplies of natural rubber.
20
Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.”
21
Corbett.
22
Thomas A. Fennell, “Rubber from Haiti: A Battle against Time,” Journal of Geography 43, no. 4 (Jan 1944): 153-
158.
23
Fennell, 154.

166
 Nonetheless, the US desperately needed all the natural rubber it could get in 1944 and

1945.24 US investment and interest in rubber production remained in place and ambitious as

reflected by continued growth in land acquisitions.25 US Embassy cables from Port-au-Prince in

1944 reported about US6.5M spent on cryptostegia development with 50,000 Haitians enjoying

employment paying “better than average wages.”26 That success was not to last. “An unusual

drought” dragged on well into 1944 and was coupled to a decreased requirement for natural

rubber. In February 1944, the Rubber Development Corporation gave SHADA the bad news: it

was recommending termination of the USDA contract with SHADA, citing “poor production”,

waning demand for natural rubber and successful synthetic rubber production in the US.27

Haiti’s appeal of the decision was unsuccessful and SHADA was forced to begin

preparations for the return of rubber plantation land to thousands of displaced former owners:

clearing the land was accomplished by burning the cryptostegia plants.28 SHADA’s rubber

24
Frank R. Chalk, “The US and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941,” PhD diss. (Madison: University
of Wisconsin, 1970), 273-4. When the US fought the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, it was virtually out of
natural rubber, still essential to the manufacture of truck tires.
25
In a 1944 article published on SHADA, Fennell claimed less than two percent of the total area of Haiti was under
sisal and cryptostegia production. Robert and Nancy Heinl, though, have claimed that while that figure may be
correct in terms of total acreage, the reality was that the two percent really represented “more than 5 percent of
Haiti’s best land…”. See Fennell, “Rubber from Haiti – A Battle against Time,” 158; and Heinl and Heinl, Written
in Blood, 542.
26
FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins, Almon R. Wright,
David H. Stauffer and Velma Hastings Cassidy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), Document 1166
(footnote 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v07/d1166.
27
The US Rubber Development Corporation was “a wholly owned subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation,” itself a US government owned entity. US Comptroller General of the United States, “Letter from
Lindsay C Warren to Robert J Albers (B-39199),” 19 Jan 1944. http://www.gao.gov/assets/390/386430.pdf. Email
from Frank Chalk to author, 04 July 2019. See also Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.
28
This included an agreement to compensate former landowners to the paltry tune of about US$175000 in total. The
number of affected owners was estimated in the neighbourhood of 35000 to 40000 which meant each was receiving
between $5 and $25 per carreaux. See Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.” See also Haiti Liberté,
“Haiti’s Grim History of Being ‘Open for Business’,” https://haitiliberte.com/haitis-grim-history-of-being-open-for-
business/.

167
experiment would end in 1944.29 For Haiti, however the experiment would have long term and

disastrous consequences:

…Fennell and SHADA ran roughshod over peasant proprietors, condemning choice
agricultural plots, bulldozing cailles [houses], even sacred houmforts [Vodou temples],
standing crops, coffee bushes, cashew, avocado, and banana tress (an estimated million
fruit-bearing trees and shrubs in all), paying in pittances, and rehiring as day laborers
expropriated peasants who had been subsistence farmers. Everything Fennell touched
went badly.”30

In the end, not only was the abrupt termination of SHADA’s rubber cultivation

operations a significant blow to Haiti’s economy, leaving it with an additional US$5 million in

debt, it was also an environmental disaster. The sisal and cryptostegia operations led to the clear-

cutting of significant portions of Haiti’s precious pine forest as well as over one million fruit

trees which were reportedly cleared from prime agricultural land in the Grand’Anse region.31

When the lands were given back, they were found to have been contaminated by acidic

wastewater from rubber processing. On top of that contamination, the land transformation carried

out by SHADA not only made identification of individual owner’s plots very problematic, it also

changed for the worse the drainage patterns of the area.

29
Paul Wendt identified the improving state of the West’s natural rubber requirements in 1944-45 which led to the
termination of the Haitian experiment: “Stocks of natural rubber and latex declined rapidly during 1943-44 and in
October 1944 reached a low point of 90,590 long tons, below the Baruch Committee recommended minimum of
100,000 long tons. By this time monthly synthetic rubber production of 66,000 long tons exceeded current monthly
consumption and synthetic stocks were being built up rapidly. Delays in military conversion to synthetics and a
large increase in stated military requirements for 1945 gave new importance to increasing natural rubber supplies.
To meet this need, increased quantities of Ceylon, Indian, and African rubber were allocated to the United States by
CRMB. (United States natural rubber imports from November 1944-February 1945 totaled 60,364 long tons as
compared with 35,691 long tons during the previous four months.) The reduction in stated military requirements
with the changing course of the war early in 1945 and an accelerated rate of conversion to synthetics removed this
new threat to exhaustion of natural rubber supplies and by December 1945 natural rubber stocks had increased to
118,715 long tons.” Paul Wendt, “The Control of Rubber in World War II,” Southern Economic Journal 13, no.3
(January 1947): 206.
30
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542.
31
Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. See also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542-3.

168
 SHADA continued forestry and sisal operations, but on a much-reduced experimental

scale. Ironically, at the end of 1944, SHADA reported a profitable year with employment at

“4,080 labourers and 488 salaried personnel.” The yearly production of cryptostegia rubber

amounted to 8,000 pounds, while heavea rubber was around 6,500 pounds.32 Despite a lowered

operational capacity, SHADA operations continued to draw rebukes. In 1952, for example, the

American ambassador to Haiti raised concern over SHADA having ventured into plantation-

level development and abandoning its original mandate, that being to aid peasant agricultural

development.33 He expressed astonishment regarding the level of incompetence on the part of the

American decision-makers, writing that “the present situation [September 1952] is so disastrous

that it is inconceivable that it was not foreseen at least five years ago.”34

Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the SHADA experiment was that it foreshadowed

a casual disregard for Haitian food production requirements in favour of experimentation

intended to further US commercial and strategic interests. That attitude would raise its ugly head

time and again in Haiti, as will be shown in later chapters. As Haitian professor Myrtha Gilbert

has noted:

Parce que, la vision de la paysannerie haïtienne, c’est de cultiver la terre et d’échanger

ses produits contre ceux dont elle a besoin par le commerce, alors que l’autre vision, c’est
’je me fiche que tu aies besoin de manger, parce que, moi, j’ai besoin de caoutchouc, de
pite et d’autres choses. Et, c’est ce que tu vas produire sur tes terres’, même si ce sont les
plus fertiles et que la population meure de faim.35

32
Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.
33
Ambassador Folsom also raised concerns about sisal production in Haiti. He pointed out US experts had failed to
establish a rotational plantation cycle for planting of sisal in Haiti. Instead, the sisal was planted at one time, leading
to its harvesting likewise occurring at the same time. His diplomatic traffic alluded to other crop errors but did not
specify the mistakes. See FRUS, 1952-54, Volume IV, The American Republics, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William
F. Sanford, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 522.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d522.
34
FRUS, Document 522
35
See Myrtha Gilbert, cited in Karenine Francesca Théosmy, “Haïti / États-Unis : L’histoire de Shada, reflet d’une
réalité immédiate de dépendance,” AlterPresse, 27 April 2012. http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article12767.

169
Enter the United Nations… UNESCO and the Marbial Valley project

The name of Marbial is little known, even in the Caribbean area. It is a forgotten valley.
It has neither villages nor hamlets, and its people, living in their scattered wooden huts,
are no part of any community: They are merely the folk of Marbial. They have to work
hard to keep alive. A few decades ago, as the older ones still remember, life was much
easier. Since then tropical disease, soil erosion and over-population have combined to
spread ignorance and misery…In this picture of desolation, the practices of Christianity
are but a thin veneer over the old African traditions. The terrors of the supernatural
world, of voodoo and magic, are still important in the lives of the people of Marbial. But
none of these practices helps to provide what is so deeply needed in this atmosphere of
deterioration - hope.36
- French journalist Tibor Mende

In addition to SHADA, the years from 1947 to 1949 were noteworthy as it marked the

first engagement of the fledgling United Nations organization in Haiti. In December 1946, the

General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution calling upon member nations to

provide assistance and advice to underdeveloped nations.37 In 1947, Haitian educator and United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) staff member, Emmanuel

Gabriel, pressured his organization from within to help his homeland. Thanks to Gabriel’s

lobbying campaign,

UNESCO would place at the disposal of the Haitian Government an expert on

Fundamental Education [FE], who would visit the area to study local conditions and
advise the Haitian Government during the initial stage of the Project.38

36
Tibor Mende, “Marbial Valley Project,” Caribbean Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1951/52): 18-19.
37
US support for the provision of technical support to underdeveloped nations was firmly entrenched in US foreign
policy by President Harry Truman, in his 1949 inaugural address, when he pledged to “embark on a bold new
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas. US President Harry Truman’s Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm.
38
The project has been described by UNESCO as combining, for the first time, the work of three UN agencies:
UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The
UNESCO report suggests that it would be seeking the participation of the International Labour Organization (ILO)
once the small business side of the project was up and running. UNESCO Paper entitled “Fundamental Education
Project in Haiti: Working Plan,” Paris, 26 Feb 1948, 1. See also Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of
Julian Huxley." Journal of World History 21, no. 3 (2010): 393-418.

170
 Working with the Haitian government of President Dumarsais Estimé (1946-1950), the

decision was made to begin the FE project within the parish of Marbial (in the Jacmel area).39

For UNESCO, the location was controversial and not initially well supported at headquarters. It

was a region troubled by some significant issues including “poverty, over-population,

superstition, tropical diseases, impoverished agriculture, and major land issues from erosion”;

and was, to boot, “fairly remote…but not impossibly inaccessible.”40 What UNESCO claimed

tipped the scales in favour of employing the site for the project was the demonstration of what

the organization termed “a tremendous spontaneous enthusiasm among the local peasants”

towards any education opportunity.41

The aim of the project was “to help men and women live fuller and happier lives in

adjustment with their changing environment, to develop the best elements in their own culture,

and to achieve the social and economic progress which will enable them to take their place in the

modern world.”42 To accomplish this aim, the project aimed to employ what they termed

“improved text books and visual and oral aids…to demonstrate how educational methods can be

effectively used to raise the social and economic levels of an under-developed community.”43

39
‘Fundamental Education’ was identified by UNESCO as “that kind of education which aims to help children and
adults who do not have the advantage of formal schooling, to understand the problems of their environment and their
rights and duties as citizens and individuals, to acquire essential knowledge and skill for the progressive
improvement of their living conditions and to participate effectively in the economic and social development of their
community, making full use of facilities and techniques brought to the community from outside.” UNESCO
Working Paper on the Definition of Fundamental Education, UNESCO/2, Paris, 15 June 1956.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001797/179727eb.pdf.
40
UNESCO, 3. Concerns over the choice of the Marbial site led UNESCO to delay finalizing the agreement with
Haiti until September 1949. Indeed, the UN FAO had reported the site was not suitable, an assessment that was
backed up by Alfred Métraux, a noted Swiss anthropologist, ethnologist, and human rights advocate. He was also
leader of the 1948-50 UNESCO Marbial Valley anthropological survey. See Chantalle Verna, “Haiti, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953,” Diplomatic History,
9. Advance Access published 27 February 2015, doi:10.1093/dh/dhu075. See also Alfred Métraux, E. Berrouet and
Dr. and Mrs. Jean Comhaire-Sylvain, Making a Living in the Marbial Valley (Haiti), UNESCO Occasional Papers in
Education #l0, Paris, 1951; and UNESCO Monograph on Fundamental Education, The Haiti Pilot Project (Phase
One), Paris, 1951.
41
UNESCO, “Fundamental Education Project in Haiti,” 3.
42
UNESCO.
43
UNESCO.

171
This in fact is what differentiated the UNESCO initiative: the deliberate decision to conduct the

education project within the local social and cultural milieu. In the case of Haiti and the Marbial

Valley, for example, this meant that education was conducted in the local Creole or kreyòl

language rather than French.44

The project’s education plan was fairly comprehensive, and included not only primary

classes for children along with adult literacy classes, but also health and medical education,

agricultural and basic veterinary education, community cultural activities, and basic commercial

training like that required to run a small business.45 UNESCO planned the Marbial project to last

at least five years, and aspired to build domestic expertise by training the Haitian trainers to

implement the project’s aims in other parts of Haiti.46

The initial plan of action included a six-month period in which to conduct what was

termed the initial survey; that baseline survey was intended to provide the yardstick against

which future development and progress within the community would be measured. It recognized

the importance of understanding the local culture and societal conditions before measuring the

progress of the educational and social development plans. It also recognized that education

required opportunities for graduates of the program and that opportunity in a remote area like the

Marbial valley was provided through the development of local skilled jobs. Accordingly, the

project sought to introduce small, sustainable industries into the valley area, largely those

associated with peasant crafts such as basket weaving, and projects based on woodworking.

44
Verna, “Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953.”
45
UNESCO, “Fundamental Education Project in Haiti,” 3.
46
The UNESCO report identified the objective as “to raise the social and economic level of the community and to
train up Haitian staff so that it may become self-sustaining as rapidly as possible by the withdrawal of non-Haitian
personnel.” It also identified that the so-called final objective of the project was to “satisfy the needs…of the
Marbial area and in some degree the rest of…Haiti, for teachers and workers trained in the most advanced ideas and
methods of Fundamental Education.” UNESCO, 5, 7.

172
 In April 1948, UNESCO published a report which spoke about shifting the Marbial area

into a co-operative organization for farming based on the traditional coumbite working

association.47 In September 1949, Haiti and UNESCO reached a formal agreement to launch the

pilot project. By 1950, according to UNESCO experts, the project was beginning to show

positive results. A small co-operative funded by UNESCO was launched that year and had over

one hundred members. The adult literacy program was attended by some 800 adults and

supervised by some 20 student-teachers. Classes were programmed around the daily routine of

rural Haitians. A primary school was also constructed and had at the time over 100 students.

UNESCO sanitation education was introduced into the area and included several practical

public health applications for the community such as a DDT spray program to combat malaria

and other insect borne diseases, the construction of pit latrines and an abattoir, and the

introduction of sanitary standards to regulate the local markets. UNESCO also established a local

clinic with a doctor visiting the valley four times a week and a dentist coming into the area once

a week.48

From an economic development point of view, the Marbial Valley project was also

beginning to show progress. The journalist Tibor Mende reported in 1951 that at least two

merchants from Jacmel were beginning to trade in the valley and were in the process of

establishing offices.49 The UNESCO Courier indicated that “[a]t the end of the first [year], it

looked impossible. Now by the end of the second year, its achievements and future possibilities

47
La coumbite or la koumbite is best understood as a form of collectivized work and is identified by a number of
sources as a Kreyòl term. It was and is a small socialized working gang which moves around members’ farms on a
regular rotation, providing labour contribution in return for a like contribution on their own farms.
48
Mende, “Marbial Valley Project,” 18-21.
49
Mende, 21.

173
have been dramatically recognized. The success is a tribute to the peasants of the Valley of

Marbial.”50

Summarizing, the report claimed the project had “proved the basic principle of

fundamental education – that progress must be made not FOR the people, but BY the people

themselves.”51 Despite that apparent success, in 1953, UNESCO funding hit the five-year mark

and stopped in accordance with UNESCO guidelines. Those guidelines spelled out that the host

country, Haiti, was now expected to take the bulk of the responsibility for continued funding of

the Marbial project. Along with that funding expectation came a project status downgrade to

“associated project.”52 Ironically, despite the five-year window on funding, UNESCO itself

advocated a slow, steady program towards change. Indeed, the scale of the project would have

mandated a slow progression towards the project’s goals.

Yet without consideration for the inability of the Haitian government to begin funding the

project, UNESCO stepped away and then appeared surprised when it failed. In 1954, the

UNESCO team revised its thoughts on the Marbial project, which it now termed “an experiment”

that yielded a number of useful lessons.53 UNESCO recast the project retroactively; its new aim

was “to establish contact with the people and to help them to understand and solve their

problems.”54 From an evaluation perspective, the provision of education became the yardstick for

measuring success. Gone was the earlier project aim, to “achieve the social and economic

progress which will enable them [Haitian peasants] to take their place in the modern world.” By

1956, Swiss anthropologist Alfred Métraux reported back to UNESCO that the project “had

50
Supplement to UNESCO Courier, Vol. II, No. 5 (June 1949), 8.
51
Supplement to UNESCO Courier.
52
Verna, “Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953.”
53
UNESCO, The Courier, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1954), 13.
54
UNESCO, The Courier.

174
virtually no effect” on conditions within the Marbial Valley and “the project is virtually

defunct.”55

The UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti

The technical assistance furnished shall (i) not be a means of foreign economic and
political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned and shall not be
accompanied by any consideration of a political nature; (ii) be given only to or through
Governments; (iii) be designed to meet the needs of the country concerned; (iv) be
provided, as far as possible, in the form which that country desires; (v) be of high quality
and technical competence…56
- UN General Assembly Resolution 200 (III)(1948)

The UNESCO project on fundamental education would lead, a year later, to a more

comprehensive approach to engagement in Haiti. In July 1948, the Haitian government,

prompted by the US in particular, formally requested that the UN organize a mission to Haiti to

“examine the problems of and the conditions affecting the economic development of Haiti

primarily in the field of agriculture, industry and related activities” with the aim to producing an

economic plan that included the provision of technical assistance.57 Inasmuch as the mission to

Haiti was a pilot and became the template for other missions within Latin American, it is likely

that the Haitians were convinced it would be to their benefit to make the request.

In response, the UN organized what it termed the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to

the Republic of Haiti, a fact-finding and analytical mission based on a team of experts from the

UN’s Division of Economic Affairs, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture

55
UNESCO, The Courier.
56
The General Resolution outlines the terms under which technical assistance was to be rendered to developing
states like Haiti. UN General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), “Technical assistance for economic development,”
Para. 4.(d), A/RES/200(III), 04 December 1948.
57
UN Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti (New York, July
1949), xiii. http://ufdc.ufl.edu.

175
Organization (FAO), UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO).58 The Mission was

described very broadly as:

a practical, businesslike way of preparing the ground for great projects of capital
development which will be necessary in the future if the standards of life of the
underdeveloped countries are to be raised. It is a scheme which will teach people at a low
level of technical culture some of the elements which have to be mastered if great
economic problems are to be solved. It is a means of educating the people of the world
regarding some of the hard realities which must be faced and overcome if their standards
of life the elements which have to be mastered are to be sensibly raised.59

The Mission team spent two months on the ground in Haiti, compiling a comprehensive

development plan intended to be multi-disciplinary but with a primary focus on Haiti’s economic

development. At the heart of the plan lay two critical factors. First, Haiti would be expected to

provide the bulk of the resources required to implement the Mission’s recommendations for

development: “we [the UN through the Technical Mission] stress the necessity for the

development effort, if it is to be lastingly successful, to rely in the first instance on the efficient

utilization of the nation’s own means.”60 Second, how Haiti’s resources were employed would be

overseen and guided by UN experts: the Mission visit report clearly identified “a desirability, not

to say the necessity, of Haiti’s having recourse to continued expert assistance.”61

Unfortunately, the development plan suffered from several deficiencies. Astonishingly,

the Mission neglected to provide cost projections for the development work that would permit

the creation of a realistic budget. It foresaw that planning would be based on sequential

development intended “to allow the economy-strengthening results of first priority projects to

58
Rayford W Logan claimed in his review of the UN mission report that a representative from the International
Labour Organization (ILO) was not included in the mission because the ILO had previously conducted its own
survey of Haiti. See Rayford W. Logan, review of “Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical
Assistance to the Republic of Haiti,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 30, no. 2 (May 1950): 242.
59
David Owen, “The United Nations Program of Technical Assistance,” Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 270, (Jul 1950): 116-7.
60
UN Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti, xvii.
61
UN Mission to Haiti.

176
take effect before adding new foreign debt commitments.”62 It assumed that while the program

would be implemented slowly and take some time to achieve momentum, it would eventually

become self-sustaining. One of the first recommendations implemented in Haiti was the

appointment of a UN economic advisor to serve as the governor of the Haitian BNRH, a revival

of a post like that of the US Financial Advisor, a position that ended finally in 1941.

Additionally, one of the more controversial recommendations of the Mission encouraged Haitian

emigration, a recommendation based upon the fear that a steadily increasing population plagued

by scarce natural resources, especially food, would starve. The Mission urged entire families to

move to those nations within the Caribbean area that were under-populated, willing to receive

Haitians and, in the words of the Mission, “whose population is largely of the same stock as that

of Haiti….”63

Despite the deficiencies of the Mission plan, it did create a template for the international

coordination and integration of social and economic development. Given that this was the first

time a number of the UN agencies had worked together on a project this massive and

complicated, the Mission came quite close to what US President Harry Truman advocated under

his “Point Four” concept of a “co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through

the United Nations and its specialized Agencies wherever practicable.”64 That alone should have

sparked a fair degree of optimism for the future. Unfortunately, and because of the political

instability that followed François Duvalier’s assumption of the presidency, the Mission achieved

only limited results in Haiti, and most of these were quickly reversed or abandoned. The

Mission’s recommendations would quickly fade into the realm of what might have been and

62
UN Mission to Haiti.
63
UN Mission to Haiti, 12.
64
Craig N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 54.

177
were soon forgotten, even by the UN itself, when the UN was mission planning for later Haitian

operations.

Summary

The United States had hoped to stabilize Haiti and strengthen oligarchic control, but the
U.S. occupation had failed to change political norms appreciably, having been itself a
brutal dictatorship. In a sense, postponed by the U.S. occupation, the crisis of the
‘traditional’ political system and political culture recurred, since none of the underlying
causes for mass nonparticipation had been resolved.65
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus Patrick Bellegarde-Smith

Key to this period was that the American presence in Haiti did not end until 1941 with

the departure of the American Financial Advisor-General Receiver. Despite the appearance of

having achieved fiscal sovereignty, Haiti would continue to be subject to US oversight and

interference on projects funded through the American Export-Import Bank. That continued

control foreshadowed the eventual substitution of NGOs as the means by which the US

continued to control Haitian development activities. Further, projects like SHADA demonstrated

the priority of US interests over Haitian. Not only was the project pushed through regardless of

the damage done to peasant-controlled lands, it would eventually be abandoned when the

requirement for natural rubber was reduced by new means of synthetic production.

For promising projects like the fundamental education project in the Marbial Valley,

there was a significant lack of cultural understanding of the relationship dynamic between the

capital, Port-au-Prince, and outlying rural areas like the Marbial Valley. The will on the part of

the Haitian national government to continue funding the project beyond the five-year mark was

clearly absent. The international community through UNESCO showed no interest in forcing

compliance with the agreement to provide that funding, nor was there any real ability to adjust to

65
Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 124.

178
the shifting commitment. Instead, the project was allowed to flounder and eventually fail despite

its early promise. It, too, highlighted an issue plaguing the international community and

development in Haiti, that is, recognizing that for stable and lasting development, the

commitment would have to be measured in decades and five-year planning horizons.

179
Chapter Eight - The Duvalier Era

His [Duvalier’s] aim was to placate the US government by presenting himself as a

peaceful candidate who would establish a government of national unity, which would
cooperate with all sectors of Haitian society. This neutralist strategy was especially
designed for the American ambassador who had unequivocably (sic) shown pro-Déjoie
sentiments.1
- Professor of Anthropology Remy Anselme

At the time of François Duvalier’s election in 1957, American foreign policy in the

Americas was obsessed with preventing the spread of communism. That preoccupation led to the

US decision to refuse recognition to the short-lived provisional government of Pierre Eustache

Daniel Fignolé (25 May to 14 June 1957) because of his socialist leanings.2 Earlier

demonstrations led by Fignolé against Paul Eugène Magloire’s pro-US regime (1950 to 1956)

led American officials to label him “a rabble-rouser” who appealed to the “masses and the rank

and file of the Army….”3 None of that was surprising considering Fignolé’s leadership of the

labour movement, Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP).

By undermining Fignolé’s mandate, the US began a cascade of events which were

disastrous for Haiti. Because of his broad support and his personal appeal, Fignolé was “the only

candidate with enough influence to stabilize the worsening situation” in Haiti, a situation which

was spiraling out of control not in terms of violence, but more so from an economic point of

1
Remy Anselme, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” Caribbean Studies 14, no. 2 (Jul. 1974): 55.
2
Fignolé was profiled in The New York Times as “making no secret” of his socialist leanings, while denying being a
communist. He was accused of making use of “an aroused populace” as a political weapon to spread “terror and
destruction.” Matthew Smith also points out that traditional support from the US African American Congress
members and from the African American leaders generally was missing largely because of their own preoccupations
with the civil rights movement underway in the US. The African American press in the US was likewise missing in
action as far as Haiti was concerned at this time, largely because of problems understanding the complex political
and cultural shifts occurring in Haiti. See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 179-181.
3
Magloire would flee the country in December 1956 when his attempt to prolong his presidency sparked strikes and
demonstrations. Fignolé would become the fourth in a line of interim presidents that had been installed since the
departure of Magloire. He had scheduled new elections within a month of his interim appointment. FRUS, 1955–
1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia
Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 337.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d337.

180
view.4 Yet that refusal was not the worst of American interference. As Matthew Smith has

pointed out, the US was already aware of a Haitian military plot to overthrow the new president!5

The Eisenhower administration also questioned Fignolé’s willingness to provide “assurances

regarding international obligations” to continue servicing Haiti’s foreign debt obligations.6 Those

assurances, as Fignolé’s case showed, overrode those instances where the government was under

threat of a coup. While anti-communism was understood as an important strategic consideration

to secure the US Government’s acceptance of a Haitian government, a Haitian government’s

enthusiasm towards its foreign obligations was as important and possibly more so.7

As feared, Haitian Army commander, General Antonio Thrasybule Kébreau, quickly

overthrew the Fignolé administration.8 Fignolé supporters, however, did not roll over following

the coup. Instead, they took to the streets, staging widespread protests throughout Port-au-Prince.

The Army’s response was swift and brutal. General Kébreau, a known Duvalier supporter,

ordered the Army into the La Saline and Bel Air districts of Port-au-Prince. Once inside, the

Army sprayed the neighborhoods indiscriminately with machine gun fire, killing an estimated

300 Haitians.9 Making matters worse, not only did the US State Department not acknowledge the

4
Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 179.
5
Smith, 181.
6
FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan
M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 349.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d349.
7
American government internal communications about Haitian regimes during this period recognized the significant
role the US played in propping up infamous regimes through aid monies and foreign loans. Embassy staff, for
example, pointed out in February 1955 that the Magloire presidency’s survival was directly tied to the loans and aid
the US provided, going so far as to write “[i]n so far as the political picture is concerned the Embassy and the
Department are of the opinion that the failure to receive adequate aid in the immediate future will leave Haiti in such
a weakened economic situation that the stability of the Magloire regime will be threatened.” FRUS, 1955–1957,
American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts
and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 339.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d339.
8
Kébreau, a seminary student before switching careers and enlisting in the Army, was trained in the US at the US
Army’s Infantry School as well as spending time at Fort Leavenworth. “Haiti’s Soldier Chief: Antonio Thrasybule
Kebreau,” The New York Times, September 28, 1957.
9
Sources for the number slaughtered during the two-day killing spree by the Army vary considerably; estimates
from the opposition leaders, including Louis Déjoie differ. The New York Times places the number of dead at around

181
slaughter, the Eisenhower administration quickly extended formal recognition to the military

junta led by General Kébreau within the week!10

With the orchestrated removal of Fignolé from contention for the presidency, the contest

in the upcoming elections boiled down to Louis Déjoie, a mulatto agricultural businessman and

senator epitomizing the mulatto bourgeoisie versus the middle-class professional Dr. François

Duvalier, a black physician and former Minister of Health and Labour under noiriste President

Dumarsais Estimé (1946 to 1950), and Clément Jumelle, a less prominent independent

moderate.11 Déjoie campaigned on a platform that “pledged rehabilitation” of Haiti’s weak

economy and “intensive development” of Haiti’s agricultural sector.12 His own businesses

including Établissements Agricoles et Industriels, employed several thousand Haitians. Déjoie

was also involved in the HASCO project and credited with introducing the essential oils industry

into southern Haiti.13

300 whereas Matthew Smith quotes Carleton Beals, a reporter for The Nation, identifying the murdered at 476. See
“Haiti’s Soldier Chief: Antonio Thrasybule Kebreau,” The New York Times, Sep 28 1957; and Smith, Red and Black
in Haiti, 182.
10
The quick recognition was identified in a July 1957 telegram from the Secretary of State to the US Ambassador in
Haiti, stating the “Department concerned over continuing deterioration Haitian political and economic situation…
While fully appreciating significance of fair and free elections Department would prefer recognition independent of
election pledge from Junta. It is assumed that Junta if recognized would accept friendly advice on the subject as well
as be prepared to cooperate in an aid and stabilization program of the nature clearly indicated. We cannot very well
install an aid program without a recognized government to deal with and furthermore our recognition might
conceivably strengthen the Junta’s position politically just enough to see it through into a calmer period when
further progress could be expected [emphasis added].” FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral;
Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 354.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d354.
11
Jumelle, a US trained economist, was the Secretary of State for Public Health and Public Works in the Magloire
administration. He withdrew from the elections, claiming the vote had been rigged by Duvalier and went into hiding
at the Cuban Embassy, fearing reprisals for his protests. Jumelle died of kidney failure on 11 April 1959, a few
months after Duvalier’s Makoutes had assassinated his brothers. See Wien Weibert Arthus, “De l'affrontement à la
reconciliation: François Duvalier et l'Église catholique (1957-1971),” Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses 1, no.
29 (2014) : 61-82; Albin Krebs, « Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty,”
The New York Times, 25 April 1971, www.nytimes.com; and “Former Haitian President Dead at 73,” Associated
Press, 28 August 1986, www.apnews.com.
12
Paul Kennedy, “Freed Politician to run in Haiti,” New York Times, Dec 17, 1956.
13
Déjoie began vetiver production in the area of les Cayes. Pierre-Raymond Dumas, “Il y a 57 ans, Louis Déjoie
…,” Le Nouvelliste, 26 Dec 2014. www.lenouvelliste.com.

182
 In addition to business dealings, Déjoie had been quite active in Haitian politics. Just

prior to the 1957 elections, he was released from prison after serving just under six months for

his vocal criticisms of President Paul Magloire’s abysmal economic and agricultural

development record. His criticism had culminated in the organization of worker strikes intended

to paralyze Magloire’s government, tactics which echoed similar strike actions organized against

the Élie Lescot regime late in 1946 and that of Dumarsais Estimé in 1950.

Déjoie also led similar actions against interim leaders, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, in

February 1957 and Franck Sylvain in March 1957, likewise targeting their unwillingness to

undertake development work which Déjoie saw as obvious and essential to Haiti’s well-being.

Those bona fides notwithstanding, Déjoie did not enjoy meaningful support outside Port-au-

Prince.14 Consequently, and despite his political action résumé, the peasantry saw Déjoie as a

member of the mulatto elite who had cultivated American business partnerships in connection

with his agri-businesses.15 The business connection with the Americans shaped his appearance as

the presidential candidate with US support and approval, an image Duvalier exploited throughout

the electoral campaign.

Ironically, US support for Déjoie’s candidacy evaporated about a month prior to the

elections.16 Unfortunately for Déjoie, his supporters were implicated in the 1957 bombing of the

Casernes Dessalines in Port-au-Prince, an event which came close to driving Haiti over the brink

14
Opposition to Déjoie came when he announced his bid for the presidency, “an act seen as an ominous return to
‘mulatto rule’ that had dominated the presidencies under, and throughout the decade after the US occupation.”
Carolyn Fick to author, 20 June 2019. Personal correspondence.
15
Note that while Duvalier had likewise dealt with Americans, his dealings were on the humanitarian side of the
house, through various US-sponsored health group who were active in the Caribbean. Notwithstanding the
humanitarian nature of their business, such NGOs were often viewed with some suspicion.
16
Matthew Smith points out that American support for Duvalier was important but came late in the election
campaign and was the result of Duvalier and his Army supporters blackmailing the Americans into supporting his
candidacy by threatening to torch the embassy. By contrast, Heinl and Heinl claimed that both the US AID director
in Haiti and the American Episcopal bishop gave “ostentatious support” to Duvalier, which they claim helped
Duvalier get elected. See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 183; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 582.

183
into civil war.17 This got the Americans’ dander up. Civil war was the nightmare which

communist elements in Haiti might exploit to seize control of Haiti.18

To reduce the likelihood of that scenario, the US shifted its support away from Déjoie

and behind his rival, Duvalier, instead. Within Haiti, the September 1957 election of François

Duvalier was seen as the “logical end-result of a power struggle between…the mulatto

bourgeoisie and the emerging westernized black middle class.”19 Duvalier played up his noiriste

background, and identified himself as “heir apparent” to the post-Estimé noiriste movement. At

the same time, he found time to assuage American concerns over the likelihood of “radical

reformism.”20 With Déjoie’s fall from grace, Duvalier came to represent for the Americans what

Patrick Bellegarde-Smith has termed the “political maturity” of the Haitian middle class. That

perception would come back to haunt several US presidents!21

The Start of the Duvalier Era

A more fundamental source of public apprehension stems from the increasingly obvious
domination of the civil Government by the Army under Chief of Staff General
Kebreau…General Kebreau seems satisfied to exercise rule through personal domination
of the President and his Ministers. It is generally conceded that President Duvalier would
not long stay in office without Army support and that on the other hand the Army could
not long rule without the reasonably popular President as its front man. The uneasy

17
The Caserne Dessalines was an army barracks built in 1921 and located in the capital, next to, and behind, the
National Palace. Under Duvalier, the Caserne housed the Volontaires de Sécurité Nationale (VSN) with part of it
used as a prison and interrogation centre.
18
See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 178.
19
Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 41.
20
Remy, 161, 183. Note that Marvin Chochotte has made a convincing argument that while Duvalier was a noiriste
in his ideology, he nonetheless shifted towards a class-based populism during the presidential campaign which
manifested itself in his justice sociale framework of public works built around peasant requirements. See Marvin
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,”
(PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2017), 87.
21
Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, ''Class Struggle in Contemporary Haitian Politics: An Interpretive Study of the
Campaign of 1957,'' Journal of Caribbean Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 122-23.

184
 alliance between the two does not add to the public’s estimation of the permanence or
objectivity of the present regime.22
- US Ambassador to Haiti Gerald A. Drew

Barely a week into his presidency, Duvalier was forced to deal with a crisis involving the

death of Mr. Shibley Jean Talamas, a Haitian-born member of a prominent Syrian family in Haiti

who also enjoyed US citizenship. Talamas was killed by the Haitian police while in their

custody. He was suspected of involvement in the deadly Kenscoff police station attack, which

resulted in the killing of four police officers.23 His death from beating during his interrogation

was horrific enough, but what made this murder particularly problematic from the perspective of

American-Haitian foreign relations was that Talamas had taken refuge with US consulate

authorities and had been convinced by consular officials to surrender for questioning by the

police after the consular officials had received assurances from the Haitian government that he

would not be mistreated.24

While the killing of Talamas occurred prior to Duvalier assuming office, and despite

Duvalier not being responsible for the killing, the attempted cover-up of the death did fall within

Duvalier’s term as president. American officials, already outraged by the death, were furious

over the pressure brought against the Haitian medical coroner who subsequently issued a death

certificate, claiming Talamas died of natural causes (heart attack) despite incontrovertible

22
FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane,
Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 359.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d359.
23
The Kenscoff police station attackers showed up at the station and asked for assistance from the officers on duty.
They claimed they had been enroute to the hospital with a woman about to give birth, when their car broke down.
The duty officer unlocked the station to allow them to access the station’s phone at which point they pushed their
way inside and opened fire on the officers, killing four before fleeing. Tragically for Talamas, his wife had gone into
labour the same night and Talamas had rushed her to the hospital. However, he was found to have been outside his
residence without approved documentation during the hours of the military-mandated curfew then in effect. See the
Haitian Sun, October 6, 1957, 1,12. www.ufdc.ufl.edu.
24
See Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988),
76-7; and FRUS, Document 359.

185
evidence of a savage beating.25 The Eisenhower administration was quick to respond, launching

an official protest over the beating death and attempted cover-up, as well as suspending three

major technical aid programs and recalling Ambassador Gerald Drew in protest. They demanded

immediate action by Duvalier to resolve the Talamas case quickly and satisfactorily.

Despite American indignation, and fortuitously for Duvalier, a determined US focus on

the importance of supporting regimes believed to be anti-communist and more so those capable

of ensuring that foreign debt obligations were met, almost immediately triumphed over

humanitarian principles related to life and liberty. In February 1958, the Talamas case was

considered resolved as far as American officials were concerned, with an apology from Duvalier

for the death of Talamas, as well as the courts martial of two of the Haitian police officers

involved in his death and a one-time payment of US$100,000 to Talamas’ widow and infant son,

who had fled Haiti to Ohio following his death. The widow pointedly termed the payment

“completely inadequate.” Nonetheless, and not without considerable unease, the Eisenhower

administration re-established relations with Duvalier shortly thereafter, and dispatched

Ambassador Drew back to Haiti.26

American aid continued to roll into Duvalier’s Haiti, including the resumption in 1958 of

several technical aid programs for the Haitian Army. Likewise, the US Navy put Haiti back on

its approved list for naval port calls for recreational purposes. Yet despite restarting aid, the US

Embassy was already voicing concerns over human rights and the Duvalier regime. Ambassador

25
Time magazine reported that Washington sent Haiti a diplomatic note charging Haitian authorities with covering
up Talamas’s death: the note read “murder by beating . . . particularly repugnant because repeated assurances were
given that Talamas would not be mistreated.” “Haiti: Murder by Beating,” Time, October 14, 1957.
26
“Haiti Pays $100,000 for American’s Death,” Montana Standard, February 7, 1958.
https://newspaperarchive.com.

186
Drew wrote the State Department in June 1958, not long into Duvalier’s rule, expressing his

frustration through a frank and unreserved condemnation of Duvalier:

I find myself becoming increasingly repelled by the thought of a mission here when the
jails are crammed with political prisoners . . .; when defeated candidates . . . are beaten,
tortured and hounded into exile; when a restrained opposition press has been ruthlessly
snuffed out of existence; and when masked night riders . . . operate from their
headquarters in the National Palace.27

Unfortunately, and despite continuing to raise concerns about Duvalier throughout his

residency, Drew’s pronouncements did not receive much attention. A month after Drew’s

condemnation, a coup attempt would lead to even more American military support.28 An

unsuccessful July 1958 coup would lead to the Eisenhower administration apologising for the US

adventurists who formed part of the coup party. That apology would signal confirmation of the

importance of Duvalier as a source of stability and strength vis-à-vis Eisenhower’s foreign policy

and trumped those in the US administration like Drew who had voiced their opposition to

Duvalier because of his horrendous human rights violations.29

In addition to Eisenhower’s apology for what Duvalier termed “an act of international

brigandage,” the US administration decided to establish a US Marine training mission.30 The

27
US Ambassador to Haiti, Ambassador Drew, cited in FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V, eds. N.
Stephen Kane and Paul Claussen (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), Document 309.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309.
28
The July 1958, coup attempt, led by then-exiled Captain Alix Pasquet, a Haitian member of the famous Tuskegee
Airmen and a Haitian Second World War hero, featured an aircraft, loaded with guns, ammunition and men,
departing Miami enroute to Haiti. On board was a party consisting of Pasquet, two other former Haitian Army
Lieutenants, two ex-Dade County (Florida) deputy sheriffs and three other Americans. The group failed to lay any
groundwork for support from opposition in Haiti and was quickly put down by the Haitian Army which killed seven
of the coup members including Pasquet. Life magazine reported on the abortive coup in its 11 August 1958 issue: a
Haitian government minister was anonymously quoted in the article having stated in the coup’s aftermath that
Ambassador Drew should be recalled because “he is going too far in our internal affairs.” See New York Times, 29-
30 July 1958. Cited in Wien Weibert Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism in the US-Haitian Relations under
Eisenhower and Duvalier” (George Washington University.edu, 23 April 2010), 3.
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/Arthus_cwc.pdf; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti,
1959-1963, 20.
29
Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism,” 3.
30
The initial approval as of 23 September 1958 by US Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy was for a
temporary Marine training mission. That temporary mission was contingent upon later approval of a permanent
Marine training mission which was eventually approved as 24 December 1958. See Louis Galambos and Daun Van

187
mission was established as a US Naval Mission and was charged with the mission of de-

politicizing the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FAd’H).31 While Duvalier wanted the Mission to train

his Makoutes, US Marine Colonel Robert Heinl, the Mission’s commander, argued instead that

his mission to “revitalize” the FAd’H was more akin to state-building:

Haiti's armed forces are not only the fulcrum of the country's internal stability but also an
important agency for progress. Besides police work, they deal with communications,
rural medicine service, immigrations, prisons, lighthouse service, the national airline,
coast guard, and commercial ship-repair. My job was to help the Haitian military to do
these jobs better and at the same time get them back into trim as a fighting force capable
of holding off coups at home as well as adventures by Fidel Castro.32

The 69-man strong Navy/Marine mission was not novel nor was it planned solely as a

result of the coup.33 As mission commander until declared persona non grata and expelled in

1963, Colonel Heinl pointed to several similar missions having been established throughout the

1940s and 1950s. He saw them as the “sleepy predecessor[s] to that [Naval Mission] established

in [Haiti] in 1959.”34

Yet Duvalier did not stop with the Naval Mission. He very cannily linked the attempted

coup with an international community conspiracy he argued was aimed at Haiti and other nations

Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol 19 (The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2001), 811; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 23.
31
The US Marines at this time were a service under the command and control of the US Navy, which meant the
training mission, given its international nature, was a Navy Mission despite being manned and run by Marines.
32
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 619. Heinl’s ‘dream’ of the FAdH being involved in his vision of development
and being an agent for progress would not come to pass. The Haitian Army continued to be employed as an agency
countering Haitian democratic development.
33
The mission had been identified at least a month prior to the coup attempt and had drawn considerable opposition
from US Ambassador Drew who was not enamoured with Duvalier and his ruthless methods. Heinl and Heinl, 606.
34
Heinl and Heinl, 602, 620. The Naval mission, although overwhelming manned by Marines, remained a Naval
mission because of the earlier presence of the senior service (the US Navy) which had been providing military
assistance to the Haitian Coast Guard. When the Marines arrived, the two missions were rolled into one under
Marine command. There was an Air Force mission as well, commanded by an Air Force colonel. It, like the other
missions, was rolled under the overall command of the new American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG
– stood up and commanded by Heinl upon his arrival) which was given responsibility for coordinating all the service
missions into “a coherent military assistance plan for Haiti within the framework of the Haitian-American Common
Defense Plan of January 1955.” See Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 61-2.

188
in the region, and requested assistance in combatting communist “henchmen.”35 In addition to

the Marine training mission, Duvalier was able to convince the American officials to release

US$3.5 million in economic and development aid monies to Haiti that had been frozen prior to

the coup attempt.36 The funds were rumoured to have subsequently disappeared into the

president’s accounts.37

Duvalier was able to further bolster his anti-communist position when Fidel Castro and

his communist government took control of Cuba and promptly began a radio campaign against

the Duvalier regime, calling for “all revolutionary sectors and citizens to unite in opposition to

the Government of Haiti.” That early radio campaign would eventually be followed up by an

attempted invasion of Cuban revolutionaries, launched from Cuba in August 1959. The Cuban

invasion of Haiti on 12 August surprised both the Haitians and the US Marines then deployed as

part of the training mission.38 The Marines were quick to respond. Colonel Robert Heinl,

accompanied by key staff, met with the Haitian Army Commander and his staff. At the same

time, the US Marine junior leaders headed to the main Haitian Army caserne in Port-au-Prince to

organize the soldiers for an armed response.39

35
US Naval mission planners determined that a potential roadblock to the mission was funding. As a Military
Assistance Program (MAP), legislation did not allow the mission to be funded because the Haitian Armed Forces’
“main function” was internal security. However, a loophole did allow funding of a MAP mission if communism was
threatening the country. Fortunately for the US, Arthus points out that Duvalier saw the Cold War as “a window of
opportunity” and not as requiring a commitment on his part within the larger US Soviet ideological conflict,
meaning he was not above exploiting communism for the desired Naval mission. See Williamson, 21; and Arthus,
“The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 504.
36
Louis Galambos, ed., The Paper of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol 19 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2001), 1048f4
37
Mats Lundahl, “Papa Doc: Innovator in the Predatory State,” Scandia 50 (1989), 56-7.
38
In hindsight, the invasion could be traced to several events including the June 1959 assassination attempt on the
Cuban Ambassador in Port-au-Prince by forces traced back to Clément Barbot, Duvalier’s head of the Tonton
Makoutes. Additionally, Duvalier appeared friendly with Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo who had
already been the target of one invasion attempt by Castro.
39
At the time of the Cuban invasion, Captain Charles Williamson was an Advisor-Instructor under Heinl’s
command. He was directly involved in the Marine response. The material in this section draw from his account. His
account is found in Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 69-73.

189
 Marine involvement in the counter-invasion activities were restricted to organization of

the Haitian Army response and the provision of intelligence from at least one aerial (helicopter)

reconnaissance made of the landing zone and the areas into which the Cuban landing party had

ventured. That limited assistance proved to be valuable as did the reconnaissance flights as they

guided the response, allowing the manhunt for the invasion party to succeed, albeit requiring ten

days to eventually hunt down and kill all the Cuban invaders.40 At the same time, the American

refusal to become directly involved in combatting the Cuban invasion would sour relations with

Duvalier and his supporters. Williamson wrote that the Naval Mission was “damned if we do and

damned if we don’t.” Colonel Heinl’s refusal to allow the Mission members to become involved

in more than aerial reconnaissance, and of course readying the FAdH to deal with the

emergency, would undermine the Mission’s credibility, something that quickly became apparent

to the Mission members. The backlash, which came quite quickly, manifested itself in the overt

animosity of Haitian soldiers as well as Haitian government obstruction as the Americans sought

to fulfill their mission mandate.

Duvalier would continue to manipulate the US, employing the threat of communism

when needed, and for quite some time, emphasizing that narrative resonated with the

Americans.41 Between 1957 and 1963, Haiti received over US$60 million in the form of grants

and loans from the United States.42 That compared very favourably to the US$40 million Haiti

40
Williamson’s account differed from that of Colonel Heinl, the Mission Commander. Heinl stated in his account
that the Mission Marines were involved in combat. Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 71.
41
The June 1960 speech given by Duvalier in Jacmel, known as the ‘Cri de Jacmel,’ became the best example of
Duvalier’s naked campaigning for additional aid money. The speech at the dedication, ironically, of a new wharf
paid for with US aid funds, has been described as Duvalier straddling the fence between maintaining Marxist
support while demanding American assistance without imposed conditions or without Duvalier extorting American
aid in return for not embracing either non-aligned status or the far left socialist/communist camp. See, for example,
Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 220-21; or Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism.”
42
Terry Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and
Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/104, October 2013, 11; and Jean-Claude

190
received between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and Duvalier’s election in 1957.43

The aid allowed Haiti to weather the fallout from the collapse of the international coffee market

in 1959.44 Yet it is important to understand that Duvalier had structured and run his regime in

such a manner that he could survive with or without foreign aid. Foreign aid was not critical to

his hold on power.

To understand the nuances of Duvalier’s use of foreign aid, an examination of his

embezzlement techniques is warranted. Much of the military aid that flowed into Haiti paid the

salaries of American servicemen and arrived in the form of equipment transfers, neither of which

allowed the Duvalier regime to embezzle the payments. In addition, foreign aid was usually

handled by outside agencies – now by NGOs – and not directly by the Haitian government,

further blocking embezzlement opportunities. Embezzlement and graft occurred in those spheres

but was usually difficult to arrange and required considerable planning to effect.

Instead, Duvalier’s embezzlement techniques were accomplished by inflating the number

of workers employed on an aid project, with the extra funds siphoned into Duvalier-controlled

bank accounts. Alternately, the price of supplies would be inflated in terms of price or quality,

with the proceeds pocketed. Duvalier employed traditional means of graft many having already

been employed by previous Haitian presidents (plus he invented a few of his own). President

Salomon, for example, was implicated in the Afffaire des mandats, which involved BNRH debt

markers being presented to the bank for payment twice and, when caught, claimed innocent

Gerlus, “The Effects of the Cold War on US-Haiti's Relations,” Journal of Haitian Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995):
36.
43
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 614n 28. The total World Bank investment during the Duvalier era (1956 to
1986) has been set at US$489 million. Terry Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the
Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/104,
October 2013, 12.
44
FRUS, Document 309.

191
mistakes in accounting had caused the gaffe.45 That creativity notwithstanding, Duvalier took

embezzlement and swindling to a new level, and built theft into a government industry.

The centrepiece of Duvalier’s economic strategy became the government tobacco

monopoly, the Régie du Tabac et des Allumettes, originally created by President Dumarsais

Estimé (1946-1950) as an unregulated and off-the-books taxation agency. Duvalier expanded the

role of the Régie to collect national taxes on everything from cigarettes and matches, to sugar,

cement, flour, soap and beer along with a host of other consumer products.46 Duvalier then used

the misappropriated funds to pay for, among other items, the Tonton Makoutes. The stolen tax

monies were deposited in the Banque Commerciale d’Haïti, a private concern owned by a

Duvalier supporter, Clémard Joseph Charles, later arrested by Duvalier and exiled.47 The Régie

du Tabac allowed Duvalier freedom of movement by freeing him from dependency on foreign

aid, but transferred the regime’s dependency onto the backs of his citizens.

Duvalier also developed other mechanisms and schemes. For example, he struck deals

with the Dominican Republic and other nations to supply an annual migration of Haitian workers

(mainly sugar cane cutters) for plantation work, collecting a fee for each worker that likewise

found its way into his Banque Commerciale accounts.48 A host of additional involuntary taxes

became the law of the land, again with proceeds flowing into Duvalier’s coffers. In 1961,

Duvalier authorized a state lottery requiring participation – the lottery never publicized the grand

45
Hans C. Blomqvist and Mats Lundahl, The Distorted Economy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 240-1.
46
Claire A Payton., “Building Corruption in Haiti,” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 2, (2019): 184-187.
Haitians were identified as the most heavily taxed people in the Americas.
47
See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 588, 645, 654; and Prosper Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 176.
In 1980, after release from jail, Charles was granted asylum by the US and settled in New York City. In 1989, he
was arrested, along with three others, on charges of embezzlement of tens of millions of dollars through a bank
mortgage fraud he ran out of his luxury apartment.
48
By 1982, the contracts with the Dominican Republic set up by François Duvalier were netting around US$2
million for Jean-Claude Duvalier. See Richard J. Meislin, “Haitian Labor: Dominicans Rely on it,” The New York
Times, August 30, 1982.

192
prize winners. Despite flowing into the family coffers, Duvalier used most of this graft and

corruption to buy the loyalty of his Tonton Makoutes.49

The Nexus between the Tonton Makoutes and American Aid Money

Yon ti bonnonm k ap jwe A boy was going to play

Grenpe sou yon branch bwa He climbed out on a tree branch
Manman I di I pitit desann la a His mama told him to come down
Yon tonton makout ki t ap pase mande I A passing tonton makout asked her
Ou vle m fè I desann pou ou "Do you want me to bring him down for you"
li rale revòlvè I ti touye ti nèg la. He drew his pistol and killed the boy.50

- Haitian poet René Philoctète

Two factors played a role in the 1962 US suspension of the majority of its aid to the

Duvalier regime.51 First, Duvalier’s exiled opponents directed attention in Washington to the

connection between Duvalier’s justice sociale program and its role in land grants and land

redistribution program to peasants, tying the redistribution to socialism, a grave sin at the time

because of American concerns about Cuba and Castro. Second, they also underscored the

regime’s lack of economic expertise.52 The development of Duvalier’s justice sociale strategy --

49
Claire A. Payton, “Building Corruption in Haiti,” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 2, (2019): 182-187.
Trouillot points out that after Duvalier had eliminated the many possible leaders within society like military officers,
professionals and others, “the number of pretenders to political leadership” was considerably reduced. The
organization of the Makoutes then “neutralized the potential for mass revolt” by creating a hierarchical system based
upon “divide and conquer.” Much like the colonial slave system, Duvalier corrupted those towards the bottom of the
social hierarchy by offering them status at the expense of becoming informers on peers, friends, and family.
Trouillot terms the system invoked by Duvalier as “auto-neutralization” because threats were quickly defused by
opponents seeking greater status within the dog-eat-dog system. Yet “auto-neutralization” was even more sinister.
It was not just that threats from within could be defused through betrayals, etc. of individuals seeking greater status.
Duvalier’s systematized reign of terror and fear became so generalized throughout the population that ordinary
Haitians, ostensibly or even falsely claiming duvalierist links, could terrorize their fellow Haitians. In this way
“auto-neutralization” engulfed the entire society. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 155-56.
50
“Tonton Makout/Tonton Makout” Callaloo 15, no. 3 (Haitian Literature and Culture, Part 2, Summer, 1992): 673-
4.
51
Some aid was continued, including US$1.5 million for the UN malaria program then ongoing in Haiti. See Albin
Krebs, “Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty,” The New York Times, April
23, 1971, www.nytimes.com.
52
The US was also concerned about Duvalier’s human rights abuses, but it is unclear if those played a factor in the
aid suspension debate.

193
largely a blueprint for public works within the agricultural sector -- generated peasant support for

Duvalier. It also served to “augment the national economy that relied heavily on peasant

production” by targeting rural infrastructure for improvement to “augment state revenue and

strengthen [state] control over the peasant economy.”53 The example of the construction of the

Artibonite Valley dam and a connected irrigation system upgrade and expansion offers a good

example of one such project which required significant foreign aid to complete.54

That strategy was thrown into disarray by the Kennedy administration’s October 1961

decision to cut American aid suspension, which forced Duvalier to develop an alternative if he

was to remain in power. That alternative took the form of a peasant-manned milice civile [civil

militia].55 The milice had been created in the aftermath of the doomed July, 1958, coup attempt

as a security service loyal and responsive only to Duvalier.56 Marvin Chochotte argues that the

militia was created then “as a way to institutionalize popular support in the countryside before

withering away along with US aid.”57 The militia not only empowered Haitian peasants

53
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in
Haiti,” 94-5.
54
Chochotte outlines in detail the program and its goals, as well as the means by which it was undermined, noting
that much of US foreign aid during this period was going towards development projects which formed the heart of
Duvalier’s program. Chochotte, 85-107.
55
Prosper Avril identified Pasquet’s coup attempt as the moment when Duvalier created the milice. He witnessed
the spontaneous response by “Duvalierist militants” who raced to the National Palace to respond and protect their
president and decided to operationalize that type of response nationwide instead of “setting-up the independent
police force foreseen by the 1957 Constitution.” (Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 135.) The creation of a popular
militia in support of an authoritarian regime has been a long-established tactic for maintaining power used by
various groups including the Chinese Communists under Mao, and of course, Castro in Cuba. See Chochotte, “The
History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,” 104, 109-10.
56
Trouillot points out that Duvalier, as Chief of State, had created a flat hierarchy in which power was enjoyed only
by those with a direct connection to the Chief of State. In his creation, Duvalier was “the only actor. One spoke
either in his name or against him.” That binary was intended to prevent the creation of hierarchies and with them,
challengers to the authority of the Chief of State. See Chapter 6 of Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation.
57
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in
Haiti,” 104.

194
individually through membership and responsibilities, it also made them loyal to Duvalier as

president.58

The foundations of the milice civile lay within les cagoulards, who were a group of

armed thugs working for Duvalier during his election campaign. In addition to personal security,

Duvalier used them surreptitiously to intimidate Haitians during the election campaign. They had

also functioned as spies for Duvalier to gather information on opponents and others who were

viewed as obstacles to his election.59 They became an auxiliary force to the Haitian army, called

out to support the army in case of an emergency like the July 1958 coup.60

The Cuban landing in Haiti on August 13, 1959, provided the first test for the new

organization. The 30-man Cuban armed party of barbudos [bearded revolutionaries] were all

killed or captured by the army and assisted by milice members.61 Following that success,

Duvalier implemented the next stage in the transformation of the milice. He directed the milice to

present a select few members, in their old police or army uniforms, as part of the Army cohort to

undergo training conducted by the Marine mission. Not surprising, most of the milice members

who showed up for the Marine training were indistinguishable from the Army members. Butch

Ashton, an American in Haiti at the time, claimed that the Marines conducting the military

assistance training saw through the deception but could not do anything about it.62

In August 1960, Duvalier displayed the milice as a formed, trained unit for the first time

in a public parade. Marvin Chochotte called the decision “an audacious response to the

58
Chochotte notes that Duvalier “portrayed the creation of the militia as an act to restore the militarized political
order which previously provided peasants with the means to defend their interests.” Chochotte, 108.
59
Patrick Sylvain has identified the cagoulards as having become Duvalier’s “Detective Services (SD).” That
designation would be consistent with reports of an espionage function during Duvalier’s first election campaign. See
Patrick Sylvain, “The Macoutization of Haitian Politics.” From Kate Quinn and Paul Sutton, eds., Politics and
Power in Haiti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 73-4.
60
Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 114-15.
61
Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 136.
62
Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 30-1.

195
temporary suspension of US aid and mounting opposition by exiled political groups.”63

Interestingly, while the Duvalier regime claimed the parade honoured the second anniversary of

the milice, Chochotte argues no one had heard of the organization prior to that point, leading to

one of two possibilities. Either the second anniversary announcement was misleading, and the

milice was new, which was unlikely; or, more likely, the parade “marked a new phase in the

militia’s buildup from an urban to a rural-based militia,” a scenario which also explained the

transition from the cagoulards (mainly urban-based) to the milice (country-wide).64

John F. Kennedy’s election to the US presidency and move into the White House in

January 1961, signalled the adoption of a new strategy towards Duvalier, one that would prove to

be contradictory. While Kennedy’s policy was, like Eisenhower’s, oriented towards preventing

communism from gaining a foothold in Latin America and the Caribbean, he disagreed with

Eisenhower’s pragmatic approach to dictators like Duvalier.

Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin America recognized that “[t]here is a trend

towards nationalist regimes…” within the region and that:

“[a] realistic and constructive approach to this need which recognizes the importance of
bettering conditions for the general population, is essential to arrest the drift in the area
toward radical and nationalistic regimes. The growth of nationalism is facilitated by
historic anti-US prejudices and exploited by Communists.”65

Eisenhower built his ‘realistic and constructive’ approach around the dollar diplomacy

strategy, seeking to build dependence in dictatorial regimes like Duvalier’s by fostering

economic development through loan programs from the Export-Import Bank, “accelerating and

63
See Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in
Haiti,” 104.
64
Chochotte.
65
FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr.
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 3.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d3.

196
increasing…as a necessary supplement to foreign private investment.”66 At the same time,

Eisenhower made it clear that dollar diplomacy did not include either development aid or the

promotion of political democracy.

Kennedy shifted away from Eisenhower’s approach and sought to balance,

unsuccessfully, anti-communism with an emphasis on long-term economic development linked

to social progress.67 The centrepiece of Kennedy’s new foreign policy was the “Alliance for

Progress” economic assistance program which he announced on March 13, 1961. The program

linked economic assistance to political democracy, economic growth, and social justice and was

also referred to as the Marshall Plan for Latin America. The program presented a dilemma as far

as Haiti was concerned. On the one hand, some Kennedy advisors advocated for continued

support to Duvalier as his dictatorship was understood not to be harming the United States

directly and his removal from power might open the door to a Castro-style communist takeover

of the nation. They believed that foreign aid through the Alliance for Progress would be the most

likely means by which to control Duvalier. Their opponents, however, pushed an agenda which

called for Duvalier to be further isolated and removed from power.68

Kennedy quickly made it clear that he did not support Duvalier because of his human

rights record and would not provide foreign aid if that helped his regime hold onto power. At the

same time, he held onto the more pragmatic view that actively working to remove Duvalier from

power was dangerous because of the communist threat of a takeover. In the end, Kennedy

66
Key to Eisenhower’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean was to work through the OAS in order to
avoid direct confrontation or violence. See FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N.
Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 1-13.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/ch1.
67
While Kennedy was able to rationalize foreign aid by centralizing it through one agency, the newly created
Agency for Aid Development or US AID, and created the new Peace Corps initiative worldwide, he offset that
progress with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, sending a contradictory message within the region.
68
Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 506-7.

197
elected to issue strategic guidance that straddled the fence. His administration would “continue to

live with the Duvalier regime so long as there is no acceptable alternative” while, at the same

time, he would “[c]onsciously direct US policy toward the development of a better alternative; to

this end increase the flow of intelligence information and identify elements and individuals

acceptable to the US as the nucleus of a successor government.”69 Kennedy’s strategists quickly

focussed on the Haitian Army as that viable alternative.70 Discovering the means by which it was

to be controlled and readied for its revolutionary role became a task of the US Naval Mission.71

Yet, Duvalier foresaw the use of the Army as a revolutionary force against his regime and

began measures to marginalize the military as soon as he took office. He forced the retirement of

key senior leaders and re-assigned others to positions from which they could not influence

Haitian politics.72 Further, over the years, Duvalier purged the Army of any officers trained by

69
FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor
Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 370.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d370.
70
American policy stated that the US sought the “[d]evelopment of a more reliable, constructive and respected
military establishment to fulfill its constitutional role,” which translated into: “[c]ontinue to provide Haiti with the
type and quantities of military assistance believed to be required in order to maintain constitutional law and order,
giving consideration to the recommendations developed by the country team in consultation with the special inter-
departmental team which was recently sent to Central America to assess the internal security situation of each
country.” FRUS, Document 370.
71
The US Naval Mission, discussed earlier in the chapter, operated from 1959 to 1963, when Duvalier demanded it
withdraw from Haiti. During its time in Haiti, the mission statement included the task of providing the Haitian Army
with “mobile tactical units capable of being integrated, if necessary, with the units called upon to provide for the
defense of the Western Hemisphere…[and] trained in the tactical employment of light modern weapons.” Charles T.
Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 14.
72
For example, General Kébreau, fired by Duvalier in 1958 for failing to transfer several Army officers, would later
be effectively exiled from Haiti when Duvalier appointed him Ambassador to Italy and the Vatican in 1961. Even in
that role Kébreau was considered too great a threat and Duvalier reportedly had him poisoned in 1963. Harris M.
Lentz, Heads of States and Governments since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1996), 356.

198
the Marines during the US occupation.73 Those who replaced them were younger, inexperienced,

and “not readily inclined to listen to a Marine Corps Mission.”74

By March 1961, the Kennedy government was willing to lift the aid suspension and

offered an “integrated aid program,” subject to Duvalier restoring a “satisfactory” relationship

with the United States.75 Washington offered the aid package despite Duvalier’s “heavy-handed

suppression of a student strike” and expulsion of several Catholic priests.76 Kennedy’s

73
While Duvalier’s purge of the Army, as horrific as it was, sounds logically based, there were instances of
grotesque absurdities. The Affair des 19 stands out as perhaps the worst instance. In 1966, Duvalier’s daughters were
married, one to Max Dominique whom Duvalier subsequently promoted to Colonel, and the other to Luc-Albert
Foucard. Foucard’s sister, Francesca Foucard Saint-Victor was Duvalier’s private secretary and, according to
Elizabeth Abbott, his mistress. The two families became bitter rivals, with each side seeking to vilify the other in the
eyes of Duvalier. A series of bombs in 1967 during Duvalier’s birthday celebrations provided the Foucard faction
with the means to destroy Dominique and his supporters. Those officers stationed in the capital who were friends
and supporters of Colonel Dominique were demoted and transferred out of the city. Three weeks after their transfers
out of the city, Duvalier ordered them back to the capital. Once back, they were tried for treason and mutiny and, on
June 7, 1967, were found guilty by a military tribunal. They were sentenced to death by firing squad. The following
day, the 19 were taken to Fort Dimanche and tied to stakes at the Army’s rifle range. Dominique and a number of
other members of the Haitian Army general staff had been ordered to the range, in the apparent belief that they were
expected to witness the gruesome event. Once at the range, however, Duvalier ordered Dominique and the other
general staff officers to take the loaded rifles offered and, on his command, they shot the condemned men. Prosper
Avril, a witness to the execution, later wrote, “It was one of the harshest lessons that the political power ever
inflicted on the Haitian military. Francois Duvalier had succeeded in enslaving the Haitian Army to the point of
making it its own torturer.” The execution was not the end of the affair, however. Duvalier also ordered a purge of
potential Dominique supporters from Dominique’s hometown of Cap Haïtien, as well as a partial purge of the
Makoutes in Port-au-Prince. The executions and the purges served to shake the more progressive elements of Haitian
society and instilled a great deal of fear amongst the Haitian population. Abbott points to over 100 Makoutes and
Duvalierists sought asylum in the wake of the horrifying events. See Abbott, Haiti, 142-46; and Avril, From Glory
to Disgrace, 150-173. For a graphic account including the firsthand account of a firefighter called in to clean up the
blood and remains following the execution, see Bernard Diderich, Le prix du sang. La réistance du peuple haïtien à
la tyrannie. Tome 1 : Duvalier (1957-1971), (Éditions H. Deschamps : Port-au-Prince, 2005), 26-31.
74
Years later, former President Prosper Avril claimed Duvalier’s purge of the Army in the wake of Pasquet’s failed
coup led to the loss of more than 80 percent of its superior officers, many of whom were forcibly exiled. See Avril,
From Glory to Disgrace, 131; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 19.
75
FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor
Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 365.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d365.
76
The expulsion of the Catholic priests took place between 1959 and 1961 and was part of the Duvalier war on the
Church and its position within Haitian society, particularly its control over education. Duvalier attempted to replace
those expelled with Haitian replacements of his choosing to further his noiriste ideology, but the Church refused to
allow the positions to be filled with Duvalier’s choices. The Church stated the positions were considered “seda [sic]
plena” or full. The Church would sign a revision to the concordat with Duvalier in 1966, allowing him to name
archbishops and bishops subject to the approval of the Holy See. In 1959, Haiti had 110 Haitian priests versus 180
Frenchmen, 40 Canadians and Americans, and 20 Belgians. Greene, 111-114, 126nn.292, 295. For an excellent
overview of the war between Duvalier and the Catholic church, see Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti, 111-17;
and Nicholls, “Politics and Religion in Haiti,” 400-414.

199
willingness to work with Duvalier despite his horrendous human rights record arose from

Duvalier’s anti-communism and Kennedy’s realization that the problem of containing Cuba was

far more onerous a task without Haiti and other nations in the region making “our general

Caribbean situation more difficult.”77

In September 1961, American policy guidance towards Duvalier shifted again while

retaining the core of the administration’s original strategy. In the short-term, the Kennedy

government remained pragmatic and sought to “keep Haiti on our side and to prevent further

economic and social deterioration and political chaos.” For the long-term, Kennedy was still

hopeful an acceptable alternative would become available but retained the idea of co-existing

with Duvalier until that occurred. What was new was Kennedy’s decision to pressure Duvalier to

reduce dishonesty and corruption in his regime, as well as putting an emphasis on human rights.

State Department policy, for example, stated diplomatic staff were to “urge Haitian officials to

avoid excesses and brutality and respect human rights.”78

Despite the State Department guidance avoiding mention of human rights development,

Kennedy’s policy was nonetheless quickly under attack, albeit for an unexpected reason. In

October 1961, the Dirksen Act was passed by the US Congress, amending the Mutual Security

Act and making it illegal for the US to provide foreign aid to nations that owed money to private

US citizens.79 Those nations owing money to American citizens had their aid restricted. Not

77
FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W.
Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 367.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d367.
78
FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W.
Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 370.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d370.
79
The Mutual Security Act governed both military and non-military foreign aid but was not linked to human rights.
During an interview, US Ambassador Raymond Thurston claimed the amendment “was deliberately aimed at Haiti
by [Illinois] Senator Everett M. Dirksen, because his brother-in-law was a contractor, had built some housing for the
pre-Duvalier Haitian government, and it involved a debt of three hundred thousand dollars and had never been
paid.” Cited in Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 511.

200
surprisingly, Haiti’s foreign aid dropped considerably and with that drop Kennedy’s influence

over the Duvalier regime, limited as it was, declined as well.

Meanwhile, Duvalier began implementing the next stage in his strategy. Not only did he

seek to undermine Kennedy’s foreign policy, he also sought to minimize the Haitian Army as a

revolutionary threat to his regime. To achieve the latter, Duvalier chose the milice civile as the

means to his end. Up to this point, the milice civile was primarily a national peasant-based early

warning mechanism, activated in case of a coup attempt, and given the mission of reinforcing the

Army. Now, Duvalier intended to turn the organization into a structured and trained paramilitary

organization. Toward that end, in 1962, the milice was named the Volontaires de la sécurité

nationale (VSN) and given a broader mandate for internal security, moving it out of the Army’s

shadow and making it a serious power rival.80

While the VSN continued its role of spying on and suppressing real and potential

opposition to Duvalier, including student groups, the Catholic Church, political opponents and

the business community among others, it was given an active internal security role that included

making threats to the Duvalier regime ‘disappear.’ Even while allowing gross human rights

violations to occur, Duvalier twisted them to fit into his anti-communism narrative spun to solicit

80
Trouillot states that the milice members adopted a ‘uniform’ in 1958-59 – “replacing their ski masks with dark
glasses” – and were more frequently seen in the daytime. Their new appearance also marked the widespread use of
their infamous nickname, the “tonton-makout.” In 1962, Duvalier created “the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale”
or VSN, “explicitly presented” by Duvalier as “an officialization of the dreaded tonton-makout.” However, Trouillot
makes it clear that not all Makoutes became VSN, suggesting a two-tiered paramilitary organization. Trouillot points
out that a number of Makoutes refused to “enroll or wear the VSN uniform simply because the militia [VSN] was a
lower-class organization.” Trouillot identified those who remained Makouotes, and refused to become VSN as well,
were “the middle-class members of the secret police…the men and women who did the real work.” The implications
are that while Duvalier established the VSN and sought to “equate” the VSN and Makoutes as the same
organization, Trouillot believes the VSN was more so intended to provide “local proof of state power” through
“reinforced coercion.” Thus, ambiguity and uncertainty was deliberately built into the system by Duvalier not only
to mask the secret services’ real organization and power, but perhaps more importantly, to make it next to
impossible for a rival power to emerge from either the Makoutes or VSN simply because none of their members
would have been sufficiently confident of their understanding of the VSN-Makoute power structure to gamble on a
coup. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 189-191.

201
American support. For example, the arrest and killings of left wing leaders was heralded as part

of his war to stop the spread of communism, with Duvalier speaking publicly about his “war

trophies” from the conflict.81 Duvalier also employed the VSN to target the Army and minimize

its role and importance, and therefore its potential strength. VSN members were encouraged to

transfer into the Army, and report from the inside, facilitating the targeting of Army officers and

soldiers who were considered threats.82 Once removed they would be replaced with Makoutes.83

Duvalier recognized that the VSN required training for its new missions and if it was to

have the capabilities necessary to overmatch the Army. That training was obtained from the US

Naval Mission by deception. The VSN quickly became an organization to be feared. Their

successful infiltration of the Army, coupled with the American Marine training, allowed the

VSN to become powerful and influential. Their new status also brought them into more frequent

conflict with the Army, particularly as Duvalier increasingly marginalized the Army.

Duvalier also began diverting aid money earmarked for the Army, to the VSN instead,

allowing the purchase of equipment and weaponry. The powerful chefs de sections were quickly

brought into the VSN organization, allowing Duvalier to shift the VSN from its urban

orientation, and set it on the path to becoming a powerful country-wide paramilitary force of

influence.84 And, to bolster his anti-communist image and curry favour with the US, Duvalier

81
Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 510.
82
Laguerre states that denouncements by a Makoute led to dismissal or forced retirement. Laguerre, The Military
and Society in Haiti,115.
83
One of the effects of the Makoute infiltration was to undermine the professionalization of the Army by turning it
into an organization in which careers were made or broken through denunciations. Further, Laguerre points out that
military salaries were not based on the rank held but whether the soldier or officer was a Makoute. Laguerre writes
extensively on the effects of the Makoutes on the Army and this process of Duvalierization. See Laguerre, 114-123.
84
Sprague points out the 1962 Rural Code put in place by Duvalier placed the chefs de sections under the command
of the Army. It is likely he made this move to ‘legalize’ them for training and/or military assistance under the
foreign military assistance programs then in effect. Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti,
30-1.

202
offered Kennedy land for American bases, including the Môle Saint-Nicolas site, as well as

basing options for punitive operations against Cuba.85

In January 1962, Duvalier mounted a major information operation against the US,

seeking to have the Dirksen Act reversed and foreign aid money flow back into Haiti. Duvalier

decided to launch his operation at the January 1962 Punta del Este (Uruguay) Organization of

American States (OAS) meeting where the US delegation planned to lobby the OAS for

immediate sanctions against Cuba and Castro. The US had left an earlier OAS preliminary

meeting, believing they had enough votes for sanctions. Duvalier’s vote was considered as

“being particularly determinant.”86 Prior to the meeting, Duvalier launched his campaign by

speaking to two Eastern European communist regimes, the Polish and Hungarian governments,

ostensibly to discuss how the two communist nations could help Haiti with foreign aid. Once at

the OAS main meeting, the Haitian delegation abandoned the pro-American group and instead

joined a group of six neutral or pro-Cuban Latin American countries.87

Duvalier’s manipulations worked. The night before the critical OAS vote, US Secretary

of State Dean Rusk met the Haitian delegation and promised to resume aid for Haiti through the

new US Agency for International Development (USAID).88 His aim achieved, Duvalier returned

to the American fold and voted for sanctions against Cuba.89 Yet despite Duvalier’s successful

85
Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 510-11.
86
Arthus, 509.
87
The new group became known as the “outer seven.” Arthus, 512.
88
The USAID was created through the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which replaced the Mutual
Security Act of 1951. It amalgamated three different foreign assistance agencies – the Mutual Security Agency, the
Foreign Operations Administration and International Cooperation Administration – under the AID umbrella. The
Foreign Assistance Act differentiated between military and non-military aid, something that the Mutual Security Act
did not, and made the USAID responsible for administering all US non-military economic assistance. Further, the
new Act specifically prohibited the provision of any of that aid being directed to a communist nation, subject to a
presidential waiver.
89
The US promised not only the funding necessary for a jet-capable airport and new hospital, they also pledged
US$10 million, to be administered through USAID. See Gilburt Loescher and John Scanlan, “Human Rights, US
Foreign Policy, and Haitian Refugees,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 26, no. 3 (August
1984): 324.

203
manoeuvrings, good relations with the US were doomed. With Cuba expelled from the OAS and

effectively contained, the US was no longer occupied with Castro and could instead turn its

attention on Duvalier the dictator and human rights embarrassment.

Kennedy’s policy experts had also revised their position on Haiti. Whereas previously

Duvalier’s departure was feared as a potential catalyst for a communist takeover of Haiti, the

American experience with Cuba instead showed that the authoritarian rule of Fulgencio Batista

had set the conditions that facilitated the Cuban Revolution. The US now saw Duvalier in the

same light, believing a similar outcome was tied to how much longer he remained in power.90 By

June, 1962, Kennedy decided to actively work towards Duvalier’s removal from power by

supporting any viable opposition alternative available. Ironically, American funding of the jet-

capable airport in Port-au-Prince would continue despite the concerns over Duvalier.91

Unfortunately for Kennedy, Duvalier was quite effective at ensuring his own internal

security. Opponents, while not hard to find, were not able or willing to work collaboratively

together.92 Further, American investigations of their plans led to the conclusion that “insofar as

90
Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 515. A memorandum between the State Department and
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, concluded that the development
of the Tonton Makoutes was the most likely avenue for such a communist takeover: “A partisan civil militia has
been developed from among the poorest, and in some cases, worst elements of the population. This militia, which is
highly susceptible to political manipulation, may eventually become powerful enough to neutralize the US-trained
and oriented regular armed forces, a circumstance which would open the way to a takeover by unscrupulous activists
and extremists, including Communist or pro-Communist elements. A small group of ultra-nationalistic and racist
advisers, all opportunistic and some receptive to strong Marxist if not Communist influence and some with
Communist backgrounds, has gradually consolidated its position within the regime and is exercising a dangerously
increasing influence. This group is believed to be trying to expand its authority within the Government and militia,
in the hope of taking over when Duvalier goes.” FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward
C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961),
Document 372. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d372.
91
The funding for the airport was the quid pro quo Duvalier obtained for his OAS vote. It would be cancelled in
1963 as a “consequence of Haitian defaults on previous US loans.” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican
Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office,
2005), Document 327. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d327.
92
An American intelligence report, “Haitians who Might Contribute Effectively to a Post-Duvalier Regime,” dated
July 1962, provided short biographies on Haitian opposition figures. On April 12, 1963, McGeorge Bundy, Special
Assistant to the President, was provided with a memorandum on the anti-Duvalier activities of Louis Déjoie. Both
were declassified and are available on WikiLeaks.

204
they had plans of action, these were on the whole fairly childish in concept…”and that most

groups were not suited for support.93 By 1963, and despite the use of “persuasion, aid, pressure

and all techniques short of the landing of outside forces,” Duvalier solidly remained in power.94

His hold over Haiti was secure, the VSN organization had achieved his intended national

presence and control, and the military was rendered impotent as a revolutionary tool.95 Planning

on the part of the US now shifted towards contingency planning for an intervention to secure

American non-combatants.

April 1963 presented just such an opportunity for regime change. The attempted

kidnapping of Duvalier’s children led to the Haitian police storming the Dominican Republic’s

embassy in Port-au-Prince, in turn sparking an international incident which escalated into the

Dominican Republic readying to invade.96 A US carrier naval force deployed into international

93
US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Marti, writing to the US Ambassador to
Haiti, Ray Thruston, also wrote: “I have had some feeling that the step up of unrest in Haiti was due as much to the
increased awareness of the military that time was against them in their competition with the militia as to any actions
we have taken to show disapproval of Duvalier.” He did indicate the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince would be
augmented with additional staff to “keep in touch more closely with various groups and individuals and know more
about their plans, to serve as a better basis for United States policy and action decisions here.” He reiterated that
official policy did not sanction working towards regime change, stating: “we had never, in considering
implementation of the basic objective, gone beyond authority to collect intelligence. We still have not done so. Any
action by us, covert or overt, can thus only take place as a result of a new decision at the highest level.” FRUS,
1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain
III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 373.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d373.
94
Arthus, 516.
95
The 1963 coup attempts (three different attempts were made at various times) by a group headed by former
Haitian General Leon Cantave, demonstrated the effectiveness of Duvalier’s VSN organization and its network. In
all cases, the coup attempts were based in, and launched from, the Dominican Republic. In each instance, the coup
attempt alerted the VSN network, allowing them to communicate the attack up the chain while preparing to repel the
invasion and assault into Haiti. See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana,
eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 342.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d342.
96
In April 1963, a group of Haitian Army officers hatched a coup plot against Duvalier. After seeking American
assistance but being turned down, they decided to carry out the plot regardless. The coup attempt would fail and as
part of the purge of the Army, President Duvalier announced the immediate retirement of a number of Army
officers. A number of those in the coup planning fled the country before the announcement and a number sought
refuge in the Dominican Republic Embassy in Port-au-Prince. On 26 April, a presidential convoy carrying
Duvalier’s children to school was attacked. The children were unharmed but the driver and two of the bodyguards
were killed. Duvalier was convinced one of the Haitian military officers who had taken refuge inside the Dominican
Republic’s embassy was responsible for planning the kidnapping. Over the radio, he ordered Haitians to find the

205
waters just off Haiti, but the success of an OAS mission defused tensions and allowed for a quick

settlement. 97

The incident would have long-term repercussions. The US position on Duvalier accepted

that Duvalier “faced little threat to his rule” and adopted a foreign policy that continued to seek

to work with the Duvalier regime through, for example, the Naval Mission, but would deny

Duvalier foreign aid other than strictly humanitarian assistance.98 For their part, in the

Dominican Republic, the military would use the threat of a potential Haitian invasion by the

revolutionary-reformist president, Juan Bosch, as part of the justification for the coup it launched

against him in September 1963.99 Duvalier launched a crackdown on domestic opponents,

perpetrators and bring them to justice. Two armed police officers forced their way into the Dominican Republic’s
embassy and seized a number of the former army officers. Embassy staff refused to allow them to leave with the
Haitian asylum seekers, sparking a stand-off. The Dominican Republic’s president, Juan Bosch, threatened to invade
unless the police withdrew from the Embassy without the asylum seekers. The OAS intervened, sending a team to
negotiate a settlement. The team was able to negotiate the removal of the Haitian police and safe conduct for the
asylum seekers to the Dominican Republic. Clément Barbot, the former chief of the Tontons Macoutes, would turn
out to have been the mastermind behind the kidnapping attempt. See FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American
Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1961), Document 378. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d378; and
Williamson, The Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 308-321.
97
Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 60. See also a declassified CIA memorandum entitled “Alleged Plans of
General Leon Cantave to Invade Haiti with the Support of the Dominican Army,” 02 July 1963. www.archives.gov.
98
The Naval Mission would soon be ordered to leave Haiti but would instead transfer its members over to the
MAAG, which was covered under a different treaty and was more difficult to force out of Haiti. On foreign aid, the
plan was to “Continue blocking AID, IDB and IBRD [foreign aid] loans and discourage assistance from [the
European] Common Market and other non-Communist countries on the grounds that such aid gives prestige and
material support to an undesirable dictatorship; Continue to insist that the IMF fully justify on economic grounds its
stand-by arrangements with Haiti; and Continue to press for payments on debts owed the United States Government
even if only on a token basis in deference to the precarious state of the Haitian finances.” FRUS, 1961–1963,
Volume XII, American Republics, “Proposed Plan of Action,” Washington, 13 November 1963, Document 391.
99
Bosch was overthrown by a military coup in September 1963, in part because of the military’s unhappiness with
the escalation along the Haitian border. The coup regime lasted less than two years before supporters of Bosch
launched an assault on the junta and removed it from power. In early April 1965, a civil war broke out, leading US
President Lyndon Johnson to order an invasion initially to evacuate American and allied citizens. That evacuation
force would later fight on the side of the anit-Bosch forces. The OAS negotiated a ceasefire towards the end of April
and the US forces withdrew. The OAS Inter-American Peace Force was present in the Dominican Republic until
September 1966. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background
to Intervention,” Caribbean Studies 10 no. 2 (July 1970), 30-55.

206
plotting coups or not, all the while claiming the moral high ground.100 The disappearance of

foreign support demoralized Duvalier’s military opponents and left him firmly in control.

Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 began a new chapter in foreign relations with

Duvalier. David Nicholls argues that from the mid-1960s onwards “the dictator [Duvalier]

reached a temporary accommodation with the business community, with the US following the

death of Kennedy, and with the church hierarchy.”101 Duvalier’s mid-1964 massacres of

dissenters in the towns of Mapou, Thiotte, Grand-Gosier and Belle-Anse, carried out by

Makoutes and Army troops, showed he had full control over the now compliant Haitian Army.102

Washington had learned the hard way that bilateral approaches to Haiti were less effective than

multilateral approaches which allowed more pressure to be brought to bear on Haiti and

Duvalier.103

Ironically, Kennedy issued what became known as the Kennedy Doctrine on 18

November 1963, four days before his assassination.104 The central point was a vow by Kennedy

100
Remy claims that the fear of being linked to foreign invaders, coming as it did within a couple of generations of
the last US occupation, led to the disbandment of the “Cassagnols, [a group of] mulattoes supporting the overthrow
of Duvalier” based in the Dominican Republic. See Remy, 60 (footnote 39).
101
David Nicholls, “Haiti: the rise and fall of Duvalierism,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct 1986), 1240.
102
Civilian victims of these massacres are believed to have been as high as 60,000 lower class Haitians (Patrick
Bellegarde-Smith to author, 18 December 2019. Personal correspondence). Further, and lest that combined operation
appear an outlier, the Makoutes and Army collaborated again in a massacre in mid-1969, seeking to exterminate the
remains of the Haitian Communist Party, members of which were then hiding in the area of Cazale. On the other
hand, the 1967 Affaire des 19 was a horrific reminder that Duvalier did not trust the Army and would turn on it in a
heartbeat. Prosper Avril goes further and claims that the macabre manner in which the execution of the 19 Army
officers took place resulted in Duvalier succeeding “in enslaving the Haitian Army to the point of making it its own
torturer.” See Diderich, Le prix du sang, 26-31; Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 33;
and Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 150-175.
103
A National Security study dated 1970 and produced for the US National Security Council (NSC)
Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs points to humanitarian assistance as the only area requiring a
bilateral approach to Haiti: multilateral assistance in all other areas “seems more likely to achieve the limited
economic and social objectives attainable under the present conditions…” See “National Security Study
Memorandum 70 – Haiti,” approved by the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs 08 January 1970,
declassified 1970/01/08. www.archives.gov.
104
Off topic, Heinl and Heinl wrote that Duvalier had champagne served when he learned of Kennedy’s death.
Duvalier was also reported to have claimed his ouanga [vodou term for a talisman] was responsible for Kennedy’s
death. See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 625n 40.

207
to “continue to support measures to halt communist infiltration and subversion. The American

states must be ready to come to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a take-over

linked to the policies of foreign communism rather than to an internal desire for change.”105 He

further stated “[w]e in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent

the establishment of another Cuba in this Hemisphere.” 106

Lyndon Johnson would commit his administration to preventing a second Cuba emerging

with all the means at his disposal in a May 1965 speech that outlined the Johnson Doctrine.107

That speech came on the heels of the April 1965 US invasion of the Dominican Republic and the

overthrow of the Bosch presidency by US forces.108 The Dominican Republic would remain

Johnson’s focus in the Caribbean. Haiti would receive little attention other than in the form of

foreign aid.109 In 1966, the US foreign policy focus for Haiti was to ensure the US was able to

influence both the choice and “character” of the successor government.110

105
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Subjects. President’s speeches: Latin
America speech, November 1963 (2 of 5 folders). www.jfklibrary.org.
106
Papers of John F. Kennedy.
107
The Johnson Doctrine focussed on providing technical assistance programs, encouraging foreign investment, and
limited direct foreign aid. Between 1964 and 1968, the USAID reported providing Duvalier with US$15.2 million
worth of grants. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 644n 59.
108
Pro-Bosch forces launched a coup against the military junta ruling the Dominican Republic after it had
overthrown Bosch as president. Johnson, however, supported the right-wing junta, finding Bosch’s left-wing
political leanings suspect. Worse, Bosch had refused, “on civil liberties grounds,” to “outlaw” the communist party
in the Dominical Republic. See Stephen G. Rabe, “The Johnson Doctrine,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1
(March 2006): 55.
109
US National Security Staff outlined why the US needed to maintain involvement in Haiti: “First, we may need
Haitiʼs OAS vote on one thing or another. Second, we may have to kick in at some time in order to stay in Haiti.
State [Department]… feels that we should not lose contact with Duvalier again. Haiti is only fifty miles from Cuba.
Also, Duvalier is a sick man, and could drop dead at any moment; and we want to be around if and when it
happens.” See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler
and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 328.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d328.
110
See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler and
Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 353.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d353.

208
 By 1970, the Nixon administration judged that American vital interests in Haiti were “not

greatly threatened…in the foreseeable future,” and recommended maintaining the status quo with

Haiti.111 Economist Lisa A. McGowan has argued that:

In 1971, at a time when development assistance to Haiti had been cut off due to the
terrible human rights record of the Duvalier regime, the Nixon administration agreed to
give political support to the transition of power from Papa Doc to Baby Doc—dictator to
dictator—in return for the establishment of generous incentives to attract US private
investors. These included maintenance of an extremely low minimum wage, the
suppression of labor unions, and the right of foreign companies to repatriate their
profits [emphasis added].112

An uneasy relationship between the two nations continued with some improvement in the

US-Haitian economic relationship. A State Department report to Henry Kissinger indicated that

US commercial firms had established some light assembly industry in Haiti and that tourism was

beginning to re-emerge.113 Pragmatically, Nixon’s advisors favoured a realpolitik approach to

Duvalier (whether father or son) to ensure a non-communist regime remained in power, even if it

meant sacrificing more stable and progressive institutions. The Administration assessed Jean-

Claude as “…self-indulgent, corpulent and far from brilliant…feckless and presumably

malleable,” quite likely to become a tool to “ensure the continuation of the duvalieriste

revolution.”114

111
“National Security Study Memorandum 70 – Haiti,” 19.
112
McGowan, p. 3.
113
Light industry in Haiti has included assembling baseballs, clothing, toys and electronics. By the 1980s, Haiti
became attractive not only because of its cheap labour, but also because it was within the Caribbean Basin Initiative
which allowed goods assembled in a Caribbean country to enter the US duty-free. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Haiti’s
Allure for US Business,” The New York Times, 17 June 1984; and “Review of Contingency Plans for Haiti,” 14
January 1971 Department of State Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, declassified 1971/01/14,
www.archives.gov.
114
“Review of Contingency Plans for Haiti.”

209
Passing the Torch to the Son: Jean-Claude Assumes the Presidency

Lòt peyi ap devlope men Ayiti ap anvlope.115

[Other nations are developing but Haiti is being enveloped]
- Haitian proverb

With the passing of François Duvalier in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, assumed the reins of

power. He swiftly delegated much of the day-to-day administration of Haiti to the supervision of

his mother, Simone Ovide Duvalier. His presidency began by ostensibly abandoning the harsh

activities of his father and introduced what the American Embassy described as “a new

liberalism,” including an apparent tolerance of criticism and a call for “equal justice for all – not

just Duvalierists.”116 By 1972, relations between Haiti and the US had improved so much that the

US Ambassador to Haiti wrote “with all its imperfections, the present government in Haiti

appears at this point to represent the most promising political development in the last several

decades of Haiti’s history.”117

Jean-Claude’s appeal to Washington was not only because of his regime’s stability, but

also because he remained firmly anti-communist. The Nixon administration resumed aid to Haiti

and in his first year, Duvalier saw it increase from US$3.8 million, to US$4.3 million.

Pragmatically, the US had decided to support Haiti and Jean-Claude to ensure that the Haitian

government was kept heading in the right direction. American Ambassador, Clinton E. Knox,

argued exactly that in a 1972 telegram:

IF WE WANT TO GET HUNG UP IN ISSUES LIKE REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT OR CORRUPTION WHICH VISITING AMERICAN

115
Haitian proverb.
116
FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents On American Republics, 1969–1972, eds. Douglas Kraft and
James Siekmeier (Washington: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2009),
Document 402. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d402. Elizabeth Abbot pains a
different story of Jean-Claude’s reign, pointing out that none of the liberalism identified by the US Embassy came
into being. Rather, behind the scenes, the same atrocities and ‘imperfections’ continued, but with Jean-Claude
deliberately avoiding any real knowledge of what was occurring. Abbott quotes Jean-Claude as stating to friends: “I
don’t want blood on my hands because once you start tasting blood, you can’t stop.” Abbott, Haiti, 174.
117
FRUS, Document 408. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d408.

210
 BUSINESSMEN TELL ME IS NO WORSE HERE THAN IN NEW YORK, ST.
LOUIS, OR PASCALOOSA -- THEN THE POSSIBILITIES OF KEEPING THE
HAITIAN GOVERNMENT HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION MAY WELL BE
LOST… OUR POLICY TOWARD HAITI OUGHT TO BE BASED ON THE
SITUATION HERE AS IT IS -- NOT AS WE MIGHT LIKE IT TO BE.118

To improve international relations and curry favour with the Americans, Jean-Claude

reduced the influence and power of the Tonton Makoutes organization.119 Almost immediately,

foreign observers credited his regime with reducing the national level of fear and suspicion in

Haiti.120 Jean-Claude had his own reasons for reducing the influence of the Makoutes. He

believed the organization created roadblocks to regional development, and actively opposed

government work including the obstruction of tax collection.121 His marginalization of the

Makoutes, who had infiltrated the Army during the era of Papa Doc and undermined its

professionalism, helped to revitalize the Army as urged by American leaders who contributed

assistance funds to the Army. The revitalization came with benefits in the form of military

assistance monies, an important source of funds for the impoverished regime.122

But the revitalization of the Haitian Army caused problems for Jean-Claude. Not only

was the Army a legacy internal security force designed to control of the Haitian peasantry, it was

118
FRUS, Document 408.
119
The reality was more likely that, because the Makoutes were more his father’s organization and because they had
become a liability to relations with the US, Jean-Claude was inclined to ending or marginalizing the organization. At
the same time, he recognized the need for an organization loyal to him personally and one which could provide
security against other military elements launching coup activities against him. Toward that end, he quickly created
his own Makoute-style organization, the Corps des Leopards which will be explored later.
120
Chochotte quotes Rony Gilot, a former member of Duvalier’s government, as confirming that the US pressured
Duvalier to “dissolve the militia in return for financial aid and military assistance.” Rony Gilot, Au Gré de la
mémoire, 115. Cited in Chochotte, “The History of Peasants,” 157.
121
Chochotte further points out that the Duvalier regimes (father and son) would denounce Makoute terror tactics
employed against the civilian population when it suited them, but rarely if ever when that behaviour was directed
against political opponents or, conversely on those rare occasions when it was employed ostensibly to protect the
civilian population from abusive police or taxation practices. Jean-Claude’s marginalization of the organization was
for practical reasons aimed at satisfying powerful critics of Haiti’s government. Chochotte, 150-2.
122
In a July 1971 telegram, US Ambassador Knox stated that Duvalier’s ruling “collegium” was willing “to consider
what amounts to a vassal relationship. In return they wish to be able to count on our [US] good will and sympathetic
hearing for the aid proposals they expect to make.” Ceding that amount of control, reminiscent of the effects of the
Marine Occupation, would have had a major impact on both foreign and domestic policy, as well as Haitian pride
and national spirit. FRUS, Document 402.

211
now forced to compete with the Makoute organization, which did not disband.123 Because neither

organization was seen as loyal to the new president, Jean-Claude created his own presidential

guard, the Haitian Corps des Léopards or Leopard Corps.124

The US regional strategy focussed on developing a pan-Caribbean, Latin American

campaign aimed at “turning the region into a counterinsurgency laboratory….”125 American

training missions as a consequence multiplied, with many being aimed at the other Haitian

security organization. For example, in December 1973, a US Drug Enforcement Department

(DEA) team provided counter-narcotics training to Haitian Army, police and coast guard

personnel.126 Jean-Claude quickly saw the value of the American program and made his

Léopards available for any American COIN training offered during his presidency.

Training for the Léopards was primarily provided by former US military members under

contract to a CIA front company, Aerotrade International and Aerotrade Inc. The contractual

arrangements were arranged through the US State Department.127 However, issues quickly arose

123
Note that the Haitian Army at this stage still remained strongly infiltrated by Makoutes from the Papa Doc era.
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants,” 160-67.
124
The perceived requirement for a presidential guard was not unique to Haiti obviously. As recently as 2004, for
example, recommendations for Iraq during its reconstruction included the reconstruction of the Republican Guard,
which, like Duvalier’s Léopards, also served “to counter-balance the influence of an officer corps that had become
accustomed to direct military involvement in politics…” See Julian Schofield and Micah Zenko, “Designing a
Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004), 685.
125
Sprague, 36. See also US Department of State Telegram, “GOH Position on Byers/Aero Trade Suit in US District
Court,” Wikileaks Cable: 1973PORTA01682_b, dated September 27, 1973,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PORTA01682_b.html.
126
The December team was the second training team that year, the first having targeted police services only.
Ironically, Haiti had no drug problem but rather was being employed by drug smugglers as a transshipment point,
according to this observation from the US Embassy:
“SINCE CONTROL OF NARCOTICS SMUGGLING IN WINDWARD PASSAGE AREA
INVOLVES US INTERESTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY (HAITIANS HAVE NO DRUG
PROBLEM OF THEIR OWN AND NARCOTICS DO NOT ORIGINATE HERE) AND GOH
RESOURCES TO PAY FOR THIS SORT OF TRAINING ARE SC ARCE, DEVELOPMENT OF
HAITIAN COASTAL PATROL CAPABILITY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY DEP END ON US
GRANT ASSISTANCE.” US State Department telegram, “Narcotics Training and Drug Smuggling Control in
Haiti,” Wikileaks Cable: 1973PORTA02166_b, dated December 21, 1973, 3-4,
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PORTA02166_b.html.
127
Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 36

212
over the quality of the training and the equipment provided through the CIA contracts. Both CIA

front companies provided ammunition and equipment which was either of unsuitable quality or

quantity, or they failed to provide the equipment stipulated in the contractual arrangements.

In May 1974, the two companies brought a lawsuit against the government of Haiti for

withholding payments. Haiti had held the money back when the delivered goods were

determined to be militarily unsuitable. The Aerotrade companies lost their lawsuits against Haiti

but not before questions were raised about their services, the poor quality of the equipment

provided to the Haitians, and their unsavory business practices.128 Speaking to the media after the

conclusion of the lawsuit, Aerotrade’s CEO, James Byers remained unapologetic, stating he had

no trouble exporting massive quantities of arms. The State Department signed off on the
licenses, and the CIA had copies of all the contracts. M-16 fully automatic weapons,
thousands and thousands of rounds of ammunition, patrol boats, T-28 aircraft, Sikorsky
helicopters. Thirty-caliber machine guns. Fifty-caliber machine guns. Mortars. Twenty-
millimeter rapid-fire cannons. Armored troop carriers.129

By the end of 1977, Duvalier was subject to considerable push-back from the Makoutes

over his apparent favouritism of the Army as well as his so-called liberalization efforts.

Economically, the nation was suffering. By 1975, foreign aid had become Haiti’s main source of

revenue.130 One of the major blows to the Haitian peasant economy was the 1978 African swine

fever (ASF) epidemic, which spread through the local Creole pig population and required the

eradication of the entire Creole pig population.131

128
See Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). www.law.justia.com.
129
Jeb Sprague pointed out that “[a] handful of veterans from this force would later serve, off and on, as key figures
in various paramilitary forces which the US used to carry out and maintain coups against the governments of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004. Cited in Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy
in Haiti, 37.
130
By the 1980s, Trouillot was describing the situation as dire, pointing out that “crushed by taxes and oligopolies in
the commercialization of export crops, the Haitian peasant was becoming an economic maroon, avoiding all
production that benefited the urban middlemen.” See Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 212. See also Abbot,
Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy, 169.
131
Much of the information in this section is drawn from Philip Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings: African
Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti,” Stretch, Fall 1990. www.faculty.webster.edu.

213
The African Swine Fever Epidemic

The first task is to find ways of inducing farmers to raise pigs as a cash crop rather than a
‘savings bank.’ Until this occurs the farmer will not be motivated to invest time and
money in processed or concentrated feed and other aspects of improved husbandry. If
farmers continue to see pigs exclusively as a savings mechanism, it is almost certain that
most of the pigs that they receive through this project will become scavenger pigs and the
level of productivity will return to what it was before the arrival of ASF.132
- Extract from USAID Project Paper

Ironically, the ASF outbreak came to Haiti from Europe, either from airline waste or

animal products first brought into the Dominican Republic and then spread across the border to

Haiti. Initial efforts at eradication centred on the Haitian-Dominican border. The military and

Haitian Ministry of Agriculture worked together to destroy all domestic pigs within 15

kilometers of the border. No compensation was paid to Haitians for the loss of their pigs during

this phase.133 The eradication program included a plan to protect the border area through

quarantine. That plan failed and by December 1978 AFS had killed over 30,000 Creole pigs in

Haiti.134

Once it became clear that the disease had crossed the border and that both the initial cull

and containment plan had failed, the OAS’s Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on

Agriculture (IICA) forced the Haitian authorities to accept a full eradication program, arguing it

was the only solution available to Haiti and was vital to protect the remaining domestic pig

populations in the rest of the Americas.135 Duvalier reluctantly agreed and, backed by funding

132
“Haiti: Project Paper: Interim Sime Repopulation (Amendment #II),” US International Development Cooperation
Agency (USAID), 23 Jun 1986.
133
Gaertner claims that 20,000 pigs were killed in the initial attempts at containment. Phillip Gaertner, “Whether
Pigs have Wings: African Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti” Stretch, Fall 1990.
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/misctopic/pigs/gaertner.htm.
134
Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.”
135
There is disagreement over whether the Haitian government authorities requested assistance or whether their
failure to ask for assistance prompted international action.

214
from the US, Canada and Mexico, the IICA developed a program to slaughter all swine within

Haiti’s borders and replace them with an “improved” breed.

At the time, the 1978 swine population in Haiti was estimated at just under 2 million pigs.

The importance of the Creole pig was its role as both a food source and a form of savings.

Owned predominantly by rural peasants, the pigs in fact were a food source of last resort. The

peasants kept the pigs on what amounted to a subsistence diet, garnered by scrounging on their

own, until such time as the pigs were required for a meal. Alternately, the pigs were used in trade

and bartered or sold as required.136

The African Swine Fever Eradication and Swine Industry Development Project

(PEPPADEP) was developed and launched in 1981 by a partnership between the UN’s Food and

Agriculture Organization (FOA); the OAS’s IICA; the International Development Bank (IDB);

and the governments of Mexico, Canada, the US and Haiti.137 By 1984, the program had killed

over 1.3 million pigs and ASF was considered eradicated in the affected countries.

The program remained controversial as the determination of success was unclear.138

Poorly publicized and executed, it suffered from numerous problems. For example, despite the

IICA push to compensate Haitians for their pig losses, the Haitian government, according to

Philip Gaertner, did not publicize the offer, either calling for voluntary slaughter or employing

the army to do the killing.139 Rumours also spread regarding the value of compensation, with

136
To maximize their value, just prior to their sale, their owners would switch them to a higher quality meal source
to fatten them up and obtain a higher price per pound.
137
Albert Ebert, “Porkbarrelling Pigs in Haiti: North American ‘Swine Aid’ an Economic Disaster for Haitian
Peasants,” The Multinational Monitor 6, no. 18 (December 1985). www.multinationalmonitor.org.
138
The diverse entities involved in PEPPADEP brought different understandings of success. Researcher Allan Ebert
pointed out the IICA, for example, saw the mission of the program as eliminating the "debilitating effects of the
African Swine Fever in Haiti," and starting "the development of profitable swine production," while the US through
USAID saw an opportunity to modernize Haiti’s swine production. Mexico and Canada saw the program through
the lens of protecting North American markets. Ebert, “Porkbarrelling Pigs in Haiti.”
139
Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.”

215
middlemen convincing peasants that payments for their pigs were substantially lower than the

government offered. They would then offer the lower amount and re-sell the pigs to the

government at a higher profit.140

The 1978 swine population was estimated as worth between US$70 and US$90

million.141 The IICA pig repopulation program had a budget of only US$8.5 million. It became

controversial, again, largely because of poor information management. The pigs it introduced

were judged by the peasants as unable to cope with the tropical sun and heat of the Haitian

climate. They required significantly more maintenance than the pigs they replaced for housing

and feeding and they succumbed to disease and malnutrition at a higher rate than their domestic

predecessor. Not surprisingly perhaps, they were dubbed “American Princes.”142

The relationship between the AID/IICA project and the Haitian-American Meat and

Products Company (HAMPCO), a troubled meat slaughtering company headquartered in Port-

au-Prince, also presented a public relations nightmare.143 HAMPCO had the monopoly rights to

all meat slaughtering in the Port-au-Prince area as well as the monopoly on meat products

exported to the US market.144 HAMPCO engineered a complicated leasing plan with the

AID/IICA project whereby its facilities were used as a breeding and slaughter facility, generating

140
Gaertner identified the rumour being spread that the IICA was only paying 40 gourdes per pig (US$8) rather than
the actual rate of US$40 per pig, a difference of over 500 percent! Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.”
141
Cristobal Zepeda, “The Social Impact of Disease Control and Eradication Programs: Case Studies,” in Antonio
Morilla, Kyoung-Jin Yoon, and Jeffrey J. Zimmerman, eds., Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine (Ames:
Iowa State Press, 2002), 18.
142
Patrick Bellegarde-Smith to author, 18 December 2019. Personal correspondence.
143
An excellent account of HAMPCO’s history and operations can be found in Claire A. Payton, “The City and the
State: Construction and the Politics of Dictatorship in Haiti (1957-1986)” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2018), 106-
121. www.dukespace.lib.duke.edu.
144
World Bank Report no. 2165-HA, “Current Economic Position and Prospects of Haiti, Volume 1: Main Report,”
22 December 1978, 15. www.worldbank.org.

216
US$1 million for the financially strapped company in revenues from the lease alone.145 However,

HAMPCO was expected to reap millions more through the breeding program.

In the end, by failing to properly educate Haitians regarding the program and its

ambitious aims, the program earned negative press coverage which reportedly led to active

subversion and sabotage by several NGOs.146 The negative experience of the rural farmers

throughout the ASF program further contributed to problems in 1996 when Haiti was forced to

deal with classical swine fever or CSF. CSF is easily treated with inoculations (unlike ASF), but

mistrust and paranoia compounded by the ASF program became a serious impediment to success

for the CSF program.147

AIDS and Duvalier’s Haiti

I realize that is a very broad category, quite damning the whole nation…But ethically we
felt we had to report it just on that broad category because the attack rate was so
high…We began to see cases that were referred in from other hospitals where they had
been cared for for weeks…It was immediately obvious to us what was going on. But by
the time we made the diagnosis and treated them it was too late. So we just felt ethically
that we had to get the information out that Haitians were clearly at an increased risk so
that people could start thinking about it and treating them.148
- American AIDS researcher Dr. Margaret A. Fischl

The first recognized case of AIDS in Haiti was identified in July 1978, when a 20-year-

old man died of seizures after two weeks in hospital and was found to have had central nervous

145
Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.”
146
Gaertner claims “many NGOs contributed greatly to the disinformation that threatened this project from the
start.” Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings: African Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti.”
147
Zepeda, “The Social Impact of Disease Control and Eradication Programs,” 18.
148
Dr. Fischl’s University of Miami medical team found “the rate of AIDS among Haitian-Americans in the Miami
area was so high, about one in 1,000, that her team had 'no qualms’ about saying Haitians were at a high risk.”
Interview with American AIDS researcher Dr. Margaret A. Fischl of the University of Miami Medical School, in
Lawrence K. Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY,” New York
Times, 31 July 1983. www.nytimes.com.

217
system (CNS) toxoplasmosis, a complication in the late stages of the AIDS disease.149 That case

made Haiti one of the first countries in which AIDS was recognized. The results have been

catastrophic for Haiti economically and socially. Economically, Haiti’s tourism industry virtually

collapsed overnight. In 1982, tourism had declined to some 70,000 visitors: by 1983, the number

was around 10,000 including business travellers.150 Goods produced in Haiti were reported to

have been refused in the US and marked ‘return to sender’. Haitians in the US were reporting

they were refused employment or fired from their jobs because of their nationality and were

unable to sell or purchase housing.151 By 1982, 34 Haitians living in the US had been recognized

as having AIDS.152

The discovery of AIDS-infected Haitians in America led the US Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC) to classify Haitian immigrants as an identifiable subgroup of

heterosexuals at risk, meaning that Haitian males were categorized as a group at high-risk of

contracting AIDS, along with homosexuals, intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs and recipients

of blood transfusions.153 The colloquial grouping became known colloquially as the ‘4-H

club.’154 Part of the problem was that a number of Haitian-Americans who died from late stage

149
Jean Pape and Warren Johnson point out that the determination of AIDS in Haiti was made “retrospectively.” See
Jean Pape and Warren D Johnson Jr., “AIDS in Haiti: 1982-1992,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 17, Supplement 2
(Controversies in the Management of Infections in Immunocompromised Patients, November 1993): S341-S345.
150
Marlise Simons, “For Haiti Tourism, the Stigma is Fatal,” The New York Times, November 29, 1983,
www.nytimes.com
151
Lawrence K. Altman, “Debate Grows on U.S. Listing of Haitians in AIDS Category,” The New York Times, July
31, 1983, www.nytimes.com.
152
US Center for Disease Control Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, “Opportunistic Infections and Kaposi's
Sarcoma among Haitians in the United States,” 9 July 1982. www.cdc.goc/mmwr.
153
In March 1983, the CDC asked Haitians to refrain from donating blood: the FDA would make that official policy
in 1984, barring any Haitian immigrants after 1977 from donating. By 1990, Haitian immigrants regardless of year
of entry into the US would be barred from donating. Amy L. Fairchild, and Eileen A Tynan, “Policies of
Containment: Immigration in the Era of AIDS,” American Journal of Public Health: Public Health Now and Then
84, no. 12 (December 1994): 2011-22.
154
Paul Farmer, AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2006), 211.

218
AIDS were found to have “toxoplasmosis,” but had been misdiagnosed as victims of

tuberculosis.155

For Haiti as a nation to be so classified devastated tourism. By 1983, a year later, the

Haitian tourism industry had declined by over 80 percent. One of the CDC epidemiologists

stated:

It's a working definition. If there turned out to be a large national or ethnic group, you
would single that group out. But when you translate a working definition to a small,
poverty-struck country like Haiti, it is devastating. It destroys one of their main cash
industries - tourism.156

Even worse, publicity struck as Haiti was identified as the likely birthplace of AIDS.157

Initially, the debate arose over whether Haitians passed the disease to Americans on vacation or

Americans visiting Haiti had passed it to Haitians. For Haitians living abroad, the stigma of

AIDS quickly made itself felt with many losing jobs or unable to sell property they held overseas

because of fears of contracting the disease. Ironically, by 1988, the World Health Organization

(WHO) was able to show that AIDS rates in Haiti were actually lower than those in other

Caribbean nations and the US! By 1990, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) dropped

the ban on Haitians donating blood. At about the same time, however, the US began to

155
Lawrence K. Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY,” New York
Times, July 31 1983. www.nytimes.com.
156
Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY.”
157
A 1981 CDC study of AIDS in the San Francisco area included a Haitian with AIDS identified as ‘Patient O’
meaning the patient was from ‘Outside of California.’ That label was instead interpreted to mean ‘Patient Zero’ and
identified him as being the Haitian point of origin for the disease. A 2007 medical study claimed the HIV subtype B
arrived in Haiti from Africa and was then transmitted on to the US, possibly as early as 1969. However, the virus
was identified not only in Haiti, but also the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago at around the
same time. Further, it also emerged amongst Haitian immigrants, meaning the nationality of the person who moved
the virus to the US cannot be reliably determined. Nonetheless, Haiti does remain erroneously identified as the point
of origin for HIV / AIDS. See M. Thomas P. Gilbert, Andrew Rambaut, Gabriela Wlasiuk, Thomas J. Spira, Arthur
E. Pitchenik, and Michael Worobey, “The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the Americas and beyond,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 104, no. 47 (20 Nov 2007): 18566-18570.

219
quarantine Haitian migrants infected with HIV at the Guantanamo Bay Naval base in Cuba, a

practice which continued for three years before it was discontinued.

The Vatican Strikes Back

It would appear that [François] Duvalier's policy towards religious groups in Haiti has
been dominated by an insistence that the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church should
no longer be foreign-dominated, combined with a determination to secure the political
neutrality or support of the religious bodies in the country. The conflict between Duvalier
and the Roman Catholic Church has partly also been concerned with the church's role in
education.158
- Professor of History and Theology David Nicholls

By 1979, the Duvalier regime’s problems were becoming quite noticeable to the

international audience. The US State Department wrote that “recognizable and increasingly

cohesive and outspoken opposition, including…. independent political parties” heralding the

beginnings of vocal and active discontent with his rule had now appeared.159 The following year,

protests materialized in the Haitian countryside, the traditional Duvalier support space.160 The

protests materialized for a variety of reasons, principally economic problems. In the Artibonite

Valley, for example, protests arose over the development of the irrigation system and related

issues of land ownership.161 The collapsing international economy caused the repatriation of

158
Nicholls, “Politics and Religion in Haiti,” 413. The US State Department commented on the volatility of the
emerging situation in Haiti, writing in August: “THE HAITIAN PEASANTRY, WHILE STILL LARGELY
UNEDUCATED AND POLITICALLY PASSIVE, HAS BECOME MORE AWARE OF BOTH INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING GOH FAILINGS AND ABUSES, THROUGH THE SPREAD OF
CREOLE-LANGUAGE RADIO BROADCASTING. IT IS THEREFORE LESS POLITICALLY
PREDICTABLE.” See US State Department telegram, “Recent Political Developments,” Wikileaks Cable:
1979PORTA03642_e, dated August 16, 1979, 2, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979PORTA03642_e.html.
159
US State Department telegram, “Recent Political Developments,” 2.
160
Chochotte argues that “the nature of the peasant protest[s] was collective and derived from community council
activities.” He believes the growth of community councils allowed rural peasants an access point to engage with the
State: those engagements, unfortunately for Duvalier, overwhelmed his State’s ability to mediate and would
eventually multiply and fester, leading to more and more protests. See Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton
Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,” 200-05.
161
Chochotte, 204.

220
many Haitians who had fled Haiti to enter the Bahamas and the US illegally. They carried their

economic grievances home with them.162

Growing unpopularity led Duvalier to seek out opportunities to shore up his image. One

of the means he seized upon was to invite the popular Pope John Paul II to visit the nation. This

was an error as it turned out.163 Jean-Claude’s somewhat frantic invitation was seized upon by

the church as an opportunity to reverse the 1966 Concordat amendment that allowed the

Duvaliers to nominate Haitian priests and bishops to the Pope.164

Jean-Claude agreed to the reversal of the Concordat in return for the Pope’s visit to Haiti.

What he did not realize, however, was that in his Papal address, the Pope would launch a direct

assault on the Duvalier legacy, condemning his regime and calling for immediate changes to

Haiti’s government.165 Pope John Paul II condemned the “excessive inequality and misery,

hunger and fear” all too common in Haiti. He also called on Haiti to “to develop'' so that its

people ''may work without constraint, without having to seek elsewhere - and often in pitiful

conditions - what they ought to find at home.''166 Further, the Pope would use the opportunity to

162
By October 1981, the tide of economic refugees fleeing Haiti for the US prompted the Reagan administration to
pass the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operation (HMIO) which involved permanently stationing US Coast Guard
ships in the Windward Passage to interdict Haitians fleeing in boats. Once intercepted, the Haitians were
interviewed and then returned to Haiti. The Coast Guard claimed almost all Haitians indicated they were enroute to
the US for jobs and were not fleeing political persecution. See William Steif, “Haitian Hell: A Government Gone
Awry,” The Multinational Monitor 6, no. 18 (December 1985).
163
The Catholic Church had a tumultuous relationship with Papa Doc. The original Concordat of 1860 between the
Church and the Haitian government had ceded to the Haitian president the right to nominate archbishops and
bishops, the Pope retaining the right to refuse their appointment. François Duvalier sought to ‘Haitianize’ the
Church and began a first round of expulsions of Catholic priests in the 1959-61 period, which led the Church to
excommunicate him in 1961. Duvalier expelled a second round of priests in the 1966-67 period. In 1966, the Church
offered Duvalier a bargain. In return for ending his attacks on the Church, his excommunication was lifted, and he
gained the right to nominate Haitian-born clergy. See Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti.
164
The 1984 amendment to the Concordat completely reversed the original Concordat of 1860 and removed the
president’s right to nominate bishops and archbishops, whether Haitian or not.
165
Elizabeth Abbott claims that as a result of the Pope’s visit, “a new spirit of radicalism was born in the land.”
Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: Shattered Nation (New York: Overlook/Duckworth, 2011), 263.
166
Marlise Simons, “Pope in Haiti, Assails Inequality, Hunger and Fear,” The New York Times, March 10, 1983.

221
attack Haiti’s Vodou religion, telling his listeners “not to submit to certain syncretic practices

inspired by fear and anguish before forces one does not understand.”167

The End?

The government did nothing to stabilize prices or alleviate the plight of the urban poor.
On the contrary, Jean-Claude Duvalier and his closest allies picked this very moment,
when most citizens were having difficulty obtaining their daily ration of food, to flaunt
their luxurious lifestyle. This alone was enough for some people to take to the streets.168
- Professor of Anthropology Michel-Rolph Trouillot

By 1985, the writing was definitely on the wall for Duvalier. Citizens of the city of

Gonäives broke into open revolt, raiding food distribution warehouses in the area and mounting

food riots. Protests spread and by January 1986, Haitians in six other cities were revolting

including Cap Haïtien. The Reagan administration quickly applied pressure on Duvalier,

particularly after school children were killed by his regime while supressing the anti-government

protests.169 American pressure included the suspension of aid to Haiti as of 31 January, cutting

off the government’s essential source of revenue.

Finally, facing the inevitable, Duvalier met with General Henri Namphy to discuss the

transfer of power to a Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG or National Council of

167
The address by the Pope accomplished the Church’s goal of distracting Haitians from previous support given by
the Church to the Duvalier regimes. Additionally, it provided the Church with a new image that allowed the Pope to
be credited with forcing Duvalier to step down and head into exile. Ironically, Pope John Paul II would revert to
form with the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and in 1991 would extend the Vatican’s recognition to the violent
military junta government installed following his coup. The Vatican was the only government in the world to
recognize the junta government under General Cedras. (Simons, “Pope in Haiti, Assails Inequality, Hunger and
Fear.”) David Nicholls argues a different point of view: “It would be unduly cynical to view the role of the church in
the last few years merely as a revenge for the humiliation suffered under François Duvalier or as part of an attempt
to re-establish its former role as a major political force in Haiti by siding with the growing opposition movement.
While these considerations may carry some weight, it is undoubtedly the case that many parish priests and some of
the bishops have genuinely and sincerely identified themselves with the cause of the poor and oppressed people of
the country. The church constitutes one of the few Haitian institutions to have retained sufficient credibility to act
effectively in the situation.” See Nicholls, “Haiti: the rise and fall of Duvalierism,” 1246.
168
Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 216.
169
That pressure included having US Embassy personnel meet with key Haitian Army officers who were plotting to
overthrow the Duvalier regime. Key leaders were identified as Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, Commander of
the Haitian Army, and Colonel Williams Regala. See Abbott, Haiti, 301.

222
Government). One of his last acts as president was to fire several right-wing Army officers and

re-appoint a number of moderate officers who had been previously driven out of the military in

an attempt to curb the probability the Army would employ violence to maintain his regime.

Elizabeth Abbott claims the last-minute appointments by Duvalier were to ensure that Army

units were commanded by officers who would refuse to fire on the Haitian people now in

revolt.170

Ironically, the CNG’s would launch a violent campaign against the democratic movement

that would result in more Haitians being killed between Jean-Claude’s departure and the January

1988 elections than had been killed over the previous fifteen years of Jean-Claude’s regime! Yet

despite the Army’s violent spree, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Elliott Abrams, was quoted

in the press as identifying General Namphy, the head of the ruling CNG, as “Haiti’s best chance

for democracy,” stating further that the CNG had “contributed importantly to laying the

groundwork for a new, more democratic Haiti.”171

Trouillot has a different and more plausible interpretation of Duvalier’s departure. He

argues that his departure was the result of “a high-level coup d’état executed with international

connivance” and that the “management of his departure, and its aftermath, effectively prevented

the complete dechoukaj that most Haitians were calling for.”172 At its core, Trouillot’s argument

claims the national elite was concerned with the “democratic steamroller” movement which

eventually removed Duvalier from power. It believed the steamroller “might not stop at their

door if the dechoukaj continued” and would ‘flatten’ the entire system. Unfortunately for the

elite, while the dechoukaj was halted and its position remained secure, the democratic movement

170
Abbott, Haiti, 304.
171
Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti – Then and Now, rev. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks,
2010), 237. See also Noam Chomsky, The Tragedy of Haiti.
172
Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 226.

223
did gain momentum, weather the storm under successive military rulers who succeeded Namphy,

and eventually triumphed to elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. That steamroller

would become known as the Lavalas movement.

To halt the dechoukaj before it was out of control, the Haitian elite sought out assistance

from the international community, intending to re-invigorate the Army. It was not disappointed.

It undertook two major initiative, the development of a new Haitian military unit,

With Duvalier’s departure in 1986 came two major initiatives. The first was the the

creation of a far-right paramilitary group, the Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien or

FRAPH which will be covered later in Chapter Nine. The second was the development of the

Service d’intelligence National or SIN unit. Ostensibly an intelligence unit intended to focus on

counter narcotics activities, it was quickly coopted into the battle against the outbreak of peasant

democracy.173 The unit was funded with CIA money and training support amounting to around

US$500,000 per year.174 Ironically, the CIA training and funding would enable SIN’s key leaders

to engage in drug trafficking and money laundering. By 1992, however, the US DEA agents

were investigating them several senior members of the SIN unit identified as involved in drug

trafficking and money laundering.175

173
The same capabilities are required whether developing intelligence on the narcotics trade or on political
opponents.
174
Kathleen Marie Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA: US Covert Action in Haiti", Southwestern Journal of Law
and Trade in the Americas 3, (Issue 2 1996): 303-332.
175
The suspects included three former SIN commanding officers. One of the suspects, Colonel Joseph Michel
François, was also involved in the 1991 coup. François was finally indicted by the US justice system in 1997, for
smuggling of over 66 thousand pounds of cocaine and heroin into the US. See Stephen Engelberg, Howards W
French and Tim Weiner, “C.I.A. Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade,” The New York Times,
November 14 1993; and Tim Weiner, “A Leader of Former Haitian Junta is Charged with Smuggling Tons of Drugs
to U.S.,” The New York Times, March 8, 1997.

224
 More damning, SIN leaders would play key roles in the overthrow of the Aristide

presidency.176 The unit was responsible for developing intelligence about Aristide and the

Lavalas organization, and then ‘shaped’ that intelligence to reflect badly on both parties. The

international press and politicians used the fake stories generated by SIN to argue against

restoring Aristide to power after the September 1991 military coup.177 This false narrative caused

the worst damage done by the paramilitaries, funded and trained by US intelligence agencies.

Other initiatives spearheaded by the international community included the US Foreign Military

Sales (FMS) program transfer of close to US$400,000 worth of riot control gear to the Haitian

Army.178 Even with the riot gear, the Army escalated to deadly force, lacking the training

necessary to conduct effective crowd control operations. On April 26, 1986, after using tear gas

on a peaceful protest estimated at 10,000 strong, the Haitian Army opened fire on the crowd,

leaving eight dead and dozens wounded.179

176
The SIN unit also played a hands-on role in the campaign against Aristide and his supporters. A high-profile
example was the 1989 arrest of Port-au-Prince mayor Evans Paul by Colonel Prudhomme, the head of SIN. While in
SIN custody, Paul was subject to a violent interrogation by SIN members, which left Paul with five broken ribs and
internal injuries. See Howard W. French and Time Weiner, “C.I.A. formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics
Trade,” The New York Times, November 14, 1993.
177
Whitney, SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA, 316-20.
178
Farmer, 109.
179
The march was intended to honour victims of Duvalierist violence and was led by a number of Catholic priests
including Aristide. Farmer, 109.

225
Chapter Nine – Haiti: Life after Duvalier

All important facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were,
twice. The first time as tragedy. The second as farce.1
- Philosopher Karl Marx

The emergence of popular democracy in post-Duvalier Haiti, in the form of free and fair

elections, can be accredited to General Hérard Abraham, the Army Chief of Staff under President

Prosper Avril. In March 1989, the terror tactics and authoritarian governance of then-President

Prosper Avril, a former Army officer, sparked public outrage and mass demonstrations, as well

as attacks on his supporters. With Avril’s resignation, General Abraham, in accordance with the

Haitian Constitution, handed the presidency to the Chief Justice of Haiti’s Supreme Court, Ertha

Pascal-Trouillot.2 In doing so, he also stated “Madame President, the armed forces of Haiti are at

your command.” For the first time in Haiti’s history, symbolically at least, a Haitian Army

general officer voluntarily subordinated the military to Haiti’s civilian authority.

Abraham’s work to promote democracy in Haiti did not end there. Not only did he work

closely with Pascal-Trouillot to ensure the 1990-91 general elections were free and fair by

ensuring the military under his control worked closely and properly with the United Nations

Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti or ONUVEH, a mission requested

by Pascal-Trouillot, he also forestalled at least one attempt to steal the nation away from

President-elect Jean Bertrand Aristide.3 Before Aristide could take power, Roger Lafontant, an

ex-Makoute leader and a former Interior Minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier, kidnapped Pascal-

1
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852. Cited in Henry F. Carey, “The Third US
Intervention and Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament,” Journal of Haitian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 111 (24f.).
2
Pascal-Trouillot also had the distinction of being Haiti’s first female lawyer and was ironically named Chief Justice
by President Avril.
3
For more detail on ONUVEH, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmihbackgr1.html.

226
Trouillot and forced her to resign, allowing him to assume the interim presidency.4 Once more,

Abraham upheld democracy by ordering the Army to crush the rebellion.5

On February 7, 1991, President Aristide was sworn in as president, an event which was

carefully safeguarded by Abraham. Aristide then promoted Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras to

Army Chief of Staff. Cedras was rewarded for his work on security for the 1990-91 elections,

having impressed both the French and Americans involved in the process.6 Cedras, who was a

former CIA informant, was also trained in special operations including counter-insurgency by

the Americans, and had served in Duvalier’s Leopard Corps.7 Meanwhile, Aristide retired

Abraham in July 1991, and then promoted Cedras to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the

Haitian Armed Forces.8

Post Duvalier American Foreign Policy: Considerations

…there is a more widely shared view among Haitians that the US ‘intervention’ of
February 1986 in combination with the Haitian army which finally helped oust Duvalier
served to ‘avoid the full victory of the people and to slow down the process of change,’ in
the words of a Haitian presidential candidate of the moderate centre…9
- Extract from Caribbean Council of Churches report

4
Pascal-Trouillot was arrested in April 1991 as a conspirator in the coup attempt but released the day after her arrest
with the charges against her dropped. Reportedly, US President George H. W. Bush intervened personally with
President Aristide and demanded she be released, and all charges dropped. See Abbott, Haiti, 358-9.
5
Lafontant drew his support from the Army’s senior NCOs, rather than the senior officer corps. Under Abraham, the
senior officers would not throw in with the NCO rebellion: that would change when Abraham, reportedly a
Duvalierist, was retired by Aristide and Cedras took control. See Howard W. French, “Former Chief of Duvalier’s
Militia Claims Power after Coup in Haiti,” The New York Times, January 7, 1991.
6
Laguerre identifies Cedras as a member of the “Jean-Claude Duvalier class of 1973,” the first class to graduate
from the Haitian Military Academy which had been re-opened by Duvalier in 1972. The class of 1973 was identified
as handpicked by Duvalier, advancing the sons of those Tonton Makoutes and Duvalierist families considered the
most loyal to his regime. See Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 10 (note 5).
7
A November 14, 1993 article in The New York Times identified Cedras as a paid CIA informant, years prior to the
1991 coup, and alleged that the CIA had covertly arranged for Cedras to be given responsibility for security of the
1990 elections. Such status would make sense considering the post-coup payments the US promised to Cedras and
his family in return for his departure from Haiti. See also Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA", 321.
8
Avril claims that Abraham was a Duvalierist and removed from power because of that taint. Meanwhile, Avril has
written that Cedras had previous experience in coups, implicating him as having been involved in the 1989 coup
attempt against Avril’s government, although Avril is not explicit as to Cedras’ involvement, stating only that those
who fail to denounce a coup plan when discovered are just as guilty as those carrying it out. See Avril, From Glory
to Disgrace, 246-7.
9
Caribbean Council of Churches, Mission to Haiti, in Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 201.

227
 Before turning to the 29 September 1991 military coup launched against Aristide, an

examination of American interests in Haiti is warranted. Haiti was on the American

government’s security radar first because Latin and South American drug cartels used it as an

important narcotics transshipment point; and second because thousands of Haitians fled the

country to seek refuge and a better life, with most immigrants aiming for sanctuary in the United

States. In theory, both problems drove American officials to pursue stable government and the

rule of law in Haiti.

In practice, US foreign policy directed at Latin America had the twin goals of containing

communism and popular democratic movements. Brenda Plummer has elaborated upon the

historical development of containment, pointing to its early roots:

Containment has always been a cornerstone of the US attitude toward Haiti…It explained
away Haitian sovereignty in exceptionalist arguments…The desire for political stability
in the Caribbean region is a thick thread running through the fabric of US diplomatic
history. Policy-makers unfortunately equated stability with the promotion and retention
of regimes that could neutralize endemic popular discontent.10

The centrepiece of US containment strategy was maintenance of the status quo. Radical shifts in

political power though coups or revolutionary movements were to be prevented. Coups were

bad, for example, because they led to mass migrations and destabilized regions. Likewise,

revolutionary movements also produced regional instability, leading Washington to downplay

human rights issues and tolerate authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist and capable of

suppressing popular dissent. Ideally, US foreign policy goals were served by a passive peasant

class, compliant with the needs of American commercial interests.

Radical behaviour within the region reflected badly on the United States and sent the

signal that the United States could not control its allies in its own backyard. Hence, American

10
Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 210-11.

228
assistance to totalitarian regimes included military assistance necessary to counter communism

as well as training to control local insurgent activities. In those instances when violent coups

occurred, the US expected the local militaries to step in, take control and guide the nation to the

next, non-communist, US-friendly government with a minimum of disruption. Political scientist

Morris Morley and journalism professor Chris McGillion described the phenomenon thus:

Consequently, Washington's policy toward the state in Latin America has remained
constant; toward the regime it has been variable. Whether we are discussing Eisenhower
policy toward Cuba, the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward the Dominican Republic and
Brazil, Richard Nixon's hostility toward Allende's Chile, Jimmy Carter's policy toward
Nicaragua and El Salvador, or Ronald Reagan's support for redemocratization in
Guatemala, the thread that linked them all was a singular determination to preserve key
state institutions (not least, the armed forces) in the event of a political transition, together
with a flexible approach regarding support for elected regimes or dictatorial rulers.11

The democratic election of Aristide on the back of a popular movement spearheaded by

peasants and the Port-au-Prince urban poor, dramatically shifted power within Haiti and signaled

the failure of the strategy of containment. The Haitian military also saw Aristide’s election as

dangerous and especially among the ranks of the Army’s senior NCOs. While the reasons behind

the 1991 coup against Aristide are complex and will be debated for many years, two triggers

stand out.12 One of the first acts undertaken by the Aristide government was the abolition of the

notorious chefs de sections program and its replacement by “communal police agents” under the

control of the Justice Ministry.13 Aristide retired the chefs de sections and granted them their

pensions, but declared that those guilty of human rights abuses would be brought to justice.14 He

11
See Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The
Clinton Administration and Haiti,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (Autumn, 1997): 363-4.
12
In addition to the forced retirement of a number of senior Army general officers, Aristide also created a 50-man
presidential guard trained by the Swiss, the creation of which may also have been a source of concern for the
military. For an excellent analysis of the Aristide presidency and its weaknesses in terms of power, see Bellegarde-
Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 234-47. See also Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 264-5.
13
Blanchet, The Rural Police.
14
Despite the best intentions of the Aristide government, justice proved very problematic. Tet Kole Ti Peyizan
Ayisyen, for example, noted that a number of former chefs de sections were able to move into the new communal

229
also ordered them to hand in their weapons and ammunition, leaving them defenceless and

facing retributive justice for their decades of predation. The way the program was dismantled left

many within the Army, particularly the non-commissioned officers, uneasy, to say the least.

The second trigger was Aristide’s emphasis on stopping Haiti from being employed as a

transshipment point for drugs. US agencies including the DEA have identified over the years

senior officers within the Haitian security forces involved in the narcotics trade. Aristide’s anti-

narcotics campaign severely reduced the incomes of many key senior leaders within the Army

and National Police who depended upon narco-trafficking. The Chief of the National Police,

Colonel Michel François, was a major player in the narcotics trade in Haiti and was indicted by

the US in March 1997. The indictment alleged he worked with the Colombian drug cartels to

open new routes to the US for Colombian cocaine.15

The Coup and the Response

Did we place too much trust in the Americans? Were we too dependent on external
forces? No. It would be mere demagoguery for a Haitian president to pretend to be
stronger than the Americans, or to engage them in a constant war of words, or to oppose
them for opposing’s sake. The only rational course is to weigh up the relative balance of
interests, to figure out what the Americans want, to remember what we want, and to make
the most of the available points of convergence. In 1994, Clinton needed a foreign policy
victory, and a return to democracy in Haiti offered him that opportunity; we needed an
instrument to overcome the resistance of the murderous Haitian army, and Clinton
offered us that instrument. We never had any illusions that the Americans shared our
deeper objectives. But without them we couldn’t have restored democracy.16
- Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide

police agent program despite being suspected of a number of human rights abuses. In some areas, the chefs de
sections quit their posts before the communal police agents were in place, effectively leaving some areas without
any policing whatsoever. See Blanchet, The Rural Police.; and Americas Watch, The National Coalition for Haitian
Refugees and Caribbean Rights Report, Haiti: The Aristide government’s Human Rights Record, New York,
November 1, 1991.
15
DEA agents arrested François in Honduras, but the Honduran government eventually declined to extradite him
and released him. See CNN News, “Haiti’s former police chief indicted on drug charges,” March 7, 1997; and The
New York Times, “A Leader of Former Haitian Junta is Charged with Smuggling Tons of Drugs to US,” March 8,
1997.
16
Jean-Bertrand Aristide from a July 20, 2006, interview with Peter Hallward. Cited in Hallward, “An interview
with Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” 9-13.

230
 The 1991 coup has been attributed to the Haitian Army commander, General Cedras; the

Chief of the National Police, Colonel Michel François; and Army Chief of Staff, General

Philippe Biamby. They were prominent as the face of the coup and spearheaded all the

negotiations with the international community. However, evidence strongly implicates the

Army’s senior NCO corps as the prime movers behind the coup.17 Prosper Avril, for example,

writes about the discontent with Aristide and the military protests that would eventually develop

into the coup. He suggests that that the senior NCOs presented Cedras with a fait accompli and

gave him the option of following the protest movement or being removed as an impediment to

it.18 Regardless of the background and his motivation, Cedras would become the front man for

the coup and synonymous with the undermining and removal of Haiti’s democratically elected

president.

International interventionist activities that followed the 1991 coup were understandably

controversial, complex, and inconsistent. For example, the commercial embargo placed on

Haiti’s regime leaders by the OAS on 30 September, 1991, two days after the coup, was

regularly flouted.19 American compliance with the embargo was non-existent for the first month

17
Prosper Avril made the same claim. On 17 September 1988, a group of senior NCOs approached him and
demanded he lead the new dictatorship on their behalf. While Avril presents himself as taking power to save lives,
the account nonetheless provides more evidence that military coups often develop from the ground up and not
necessarily within the officer corps. Instead, the officer corps often reacts to events as was claimed to be the case
with Cedras in 1991. Understanding where the impetus for a coup emerges and the potential powers behind the
throne can be useful in eventual negotiations to restore democracy. See Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 232-40.
18
Avril wrote that Cedras, “Faced with the rapid spread of the revolt inside the Army…chose to follow the
movement, perhaps for his own security.” One rumour claimed Cedras, when taken at gunpoint to the presidential
palace, found the coup leaders ready to execute Aristide. Cedras interceded and successfully argued against such
action as it would turn Aristide into a martyr and ignite a mass uprising. Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 265. See
also Whitney, “SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 303-332.
19
Felicia Swindells notes that OAS sanctions are not mandatory and were therefore not fully enforced by all OAS
members including the US. Mandatory UN sanctions would not be imposed until June 1993. See Felicia Swindells,
“U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction under Article 41 and 55 of the U.N. Charter,” Fordham International Law
Journal 20, no. 5 (1996): 1914.

231
and remained spotty until February 1992 when President Bush partially lifted the embargo to

exempt US assembly companies and allow them to ship their goods into the US.20 In 1992,

American imports of clothing sewn in Haiti totaled over US$62 million, despite the embargo.21

Further, throughout Aristide’s exile from office, the Bush administration sought to

distance itself from linking democracy in Haiti explicitly to Aristide’s return to power.22 Initially,

the distancing was quite subtle. In October 1991, for example, President George H.W. Bush’s

Secretary of State, James Baker, avoided mentioning Aristide and remarked that “we would send

an important message to those who have taken power in Haiti, as well as to the Haitian

people…This Organization…must not, and I am sure will not rest, until the people of Haiti

regain their democracy.”23 Serious consequences flowed from Washington’s ambivalence

towards Aristide. An after-action report prepared on Operation Uphold Democracy, the US

intervention in Haiti, 1994-5, included an analysis of the impact of US participation in

peacemaking:

20
The US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Donna Hrinack, testifying before
Congress, argued that the US suspended sanctions enforcement for those American companies with assembly
industries in Haiti “out of concern for the effect the embargo was having on poor Haitian workers employed by these
companies…We, likewise, acted to prevent what we concluded would have been disastrous and lasting damage to
the Haitian economy through the bankruptcy of the 807 companies or their shift to third countries…To lessen the
impact, we granted that sector a 30-day grace period during which companies could continue to ship materials and
assembled goods to and from Haiti.” See Swindells, “U.N. Sanctions in Haiti,” 1914 n238. See also Charles
Kernaghan, “Skirting the Embargo,” Multinational Monitor 15, no. 3 (March 1994). www.multinationalmonitor.org.
21
Paul Farmer, Mary C. Smith Fawzi and Patrick Nevil, “Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti,” The Lancet 361
(February 1, 2003): 420-23. doi:http://dx.doi.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1016/S0140-6736(03)12380-X.
22
As time progressed, Aristide would become more of an obstacle to US policy aims because of his perceived
unwillingness to compromise. Strategic assessments of Aristide produced by US intelligence agencies and shared
with key allies like Canada, portrayed Aristide as manic in behaviour and heavily medicated as a result of mental
health treatment received in Montreal. The assessments were later shown to be fabrications, but they were quickly
leaked and echoed in the media, leading to the portrayal of the president as erratic, unpredictable, and unsuited for
office. The CIA had several reasons for wanting anyone but Aristide to be in power in Haiti, the first related to the
agency’s intense distrust of adherents to liberation theology, which came back into vogue in the Americas at the
time. In addition, Emmanuel Constant had reported that the CIA had two agents within the Haitian Army
headquarters with General Cedras when the coup took place. There are unsubstantiated rumours that Cedras himself
was a CIA agent. See Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 303-332.
23
Roland I. Perusse, Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991-1995 (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1995),
23-4.

232
 US resolve on return of Aristide wavered; with many changes in policy – Policy
oscillations reduced efficiency of military shows of force and threats of military action. –
Limited US domestic support for Aristide and, later, events in Somalia fueled discord
over Haiti policy.24

The UN’s own background reports on Haiti and its past missions obliquely mentioned the

attitude shift of attitudes towards Aristide:

For this reason, the participants should resume an effective role in this process, and the
international community and especially those countries most directly concerned should
restore a unified approach in the negotiations. Without positive change, both from the
Haitian side and from the international community, [emphasis added] it was difficult
to determine what additional efforts the United Nations could undertake to resolve the
crisis.25

One controversial and early instance of that inconsistency that defied logic was the

decision by the Vatican to formally recognize the coup regime in March 1992. A major blow to

Aristide, the Vatican was fortunately the only state to take that dubious step.26 The Vatican’s

decision, while stemming from Aristide having embraced liberation theology, which the Vatican

loathed, was nonetheless surprising because attacking Aristide undermined the Catholic

Church’s standing among the Haitian peasantry.27

The initial international response to the coup, as with most violent transitions of power in

Haiti, was to impose sanctions. The OAS had imposed regional sanctions on Haiti in October

24
Adam Siegel, “OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: The US Intervention in Haiti, 1994-95: Lessons for
Operational Strategy,” Presentation to Office for Strategy, US Assistant SecDef, S&R, Slide 10, 31 May 1995.
25
See UNMIH Backgrounder, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html.
26
Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 233.
27
Anne Greene points out the Catholic Church was in the midst of its own civil war in Latin America, with a new
breed of liberation theologians in the form of priests like Aristide, arguing for a hands-on church tackling social
injustice, while the old breed church leaders were more inclined towards a hands-off approach emphasising
opposition to communism, or any real reformation revolution (the latter because they saw it as the gateway for
communism to take hold). Those conservative elements would triumph and by 1988 Aristide’s political activities
had led to him being expelled from his Salesian Order ostensibly for criticisms he had leveled at the Haitian Catholic
leadership for its complicity with the Duvalier regime. By 1994, the Church would pressure Aristide to leave the
priesthood, prompting this statement attributed to a close anonymous priest and friend of Aristide: “This is a sad day
for all of us…it is very disturbing to see that the same bishops who supported the coup and the military dictatorship
have now succeeded in forcing Aristide out of the church in the name of canon law.” Greene, The Catholic Church
in Haiti. Cited in Richter, Larry, “Aristide decides to quit as priest,” The New York Times, November 17, 1994.
www.nytimes.com.

233
1991, followed by the UN, which imposed international sanctions in 1993.28 Initially focused on

two objectives - the restoration of President Aristide to power and an end to the refugee stream

from Haiti to the US – commercial considerations undermined American enforcement of

sanctions from the start.29 The US, for example, during both the George H.W. Bush and Bill

Clinton administrations, allowed specific exemptions to the embargo by select US companies

that were then doing business in Haiti, as mentioned earlier.30 It would not be until 1993 that the

embargo regime grew any real teeth.31

American policy towards Haiti disguised itself as even-handed. Pressure was applied to

the coup leaders and Aristide to come to a solution that would alleviate the refugee crisis

precipitated by the coup and would allow Aristide to resume his presidency. In practice, the 1992

OAS Washington Accord was forced on Aristide by the Bush administration, requiring him to

28
The UN sanctions included UNSCR 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, which imposed an arms and oil embargo on
Haiti and froze the regime’s foreign assets (suspended 27 August 1993, by resolution 861 (1993) and then re-
imposed on 18 October 1993, by resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993); UNSCR 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994,
which expanded the embargo but excluded medical supplies and foodstuffs; and UNSCR 944 (1994) of 29
September 1994, which terminated the sanctions.
29
The OAS identified over 38,000 refugees as having been intercepted at sea by the US Coast Guard within six
months of the 1991 coup. Additionally, a significant number of Haitians either fled into the hills or across the border
into the Dominican Republic. In 1994, US authorities had recorded over 10,000 refugees in a 10-day period, this
shortly after “initiating on-ship refugee processing.” That the outflow of refugees from Haiti was due more to
political repression than economic issues can be seen in the dramatic drop in flow when Aristide assumed office and
the significant rise immediately following the coup. At the same time, the conditions within Haiti as a result of the
sanctions imposed by the OAS and later by the UN resulted in Haitians starving to death, many resorting to eating
mud pies in an attempt to survive. For a more complete picture of the Haitian refugee picture during this period, see
Patrick Gavigan, “Migration Emergencies and Human Rights in Haiti,” From the “Conference on Regional
Responses to Forced Migration in Central America and the Caribbean” paper, September 30-October 1, 1997.
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/gavigane.html. For a comprehensive study of US policy as it affected Haitian
boat migrants, see Christopher Mitchell, “US Policy toward Haitian Boat People, 1972-93,” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534, no. 1 (Jul 1994): 69-80. https://doi-org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1177%2F0002716294534001006.
30
See, for example, Kenneth Freed, “US Eases Sanctions Against Haiti: Embargo: Bush bows to pressure from
American businesses, angering OAS leaders,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1992,
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-05/news/mn-1261_1_american-business. See also Sydney Freedberg, and Rachel
Swarns, “Poorly Enforced Sanctions Botch US Embargo of Haiti,” The Seattle Times, November 3, 1994,
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19941103&slug=1939459.
31
As mentioned earlier, until June 1993, the UN was content to leave the OAS to impose sanctions on Haiti.
However, when it became clear in June that sanctions were not being enforced and were not having the effect
desired, the UN stepped in and passed mandatory sanctions on Haiti. From that point onwards, the suffering of the
Haitian people would dramatically increase as the sanctions were enforced more effectively.

234
make a number of concessions.32 One was the appointment of René Théodore, a former

communist and leader of the Movement for National Reconciliation, as Prime Minster in return

for Aristide returning to Haiti as president.33 Théodore was one of Aristide’s main political rivals

and not at all supportive of Aristide’s planned policies, but the US insisted on him, believing that

he would keep Aristide in check.

Other concessions included a general amnesty for the coup leaders; the requirement that

Aristide abide by all parliamentary legislation enacted since the start of the coup; and, in what

must have been the worst blow, an agreement for Aristide’s return without a confirmed date.34

Aristide was forced to accept that his return was predicated on the establishment of a safe and

secure environment, an ambiguous, discretionary and subjective metric. Ironically, and

notwithstanding the favourable terms granted the coup leaders, they were vigorously opposed to

it. Interim President Joseph Nérette quickly denounced the agreement, calling it the product of

“meddling foreigners.”35 The Agreement died a painful death on 27 March 1992, when the

Haitian Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.

32
The February 25th, 1992 Washington Accord signed between Aristide and Prime Minister-designate René
Théodore recognized Aristide as head of state; called for an OAS mission to be deployed to monitor the human
rights situation in Haiti; called for all parties to work with the Prime Minister to set the conditions for Aristide’s
eventual return; allowed for the immediate lifting of the OAS embargo and sanctions; and called for the
professionalization of the military to enable it to participate in the democratic process within its “constitutional
role.” Complete text of the Protocol between Aristide and Théodore under the Auspices of the OAS can be found
through UN Peacemaker, www.unpeacemaker.un.org.
33
Ironically, as a Marxist communist, Théodore won the backing of the US Ambassador Alvin Adams, “a steely
Donald Rumsfeld lookalike and counter-terrorism expert” who decided Théodore was the best candidate for the
position of Prime Minister. Unfortunately for Théodore, he was never confirmed in the position. Théodore remained
anti-Aristide throughout his life. In December 2002, a few months before his death and as part of a loose coalition of
anti-Aristide groups, Théodore signed a declaration demanding Aristide’s resignation. See Greg Chamberlain, “René
Théodore: Haitian communist leader who won US support,” The Guardian, June 20, 2003. www.theguardian.com.
34
The amnesty agreed upon excluded “common criminals”: media reporting alleged Aristide had called the coup
leaders ‘common criminals’ which was used to explain why that category was specifically excluded.
35
In response to the OAS agreement, Nérette stated: “I am chief of the state, the free, sovereign and independent
state of Haiti. My mission is to follow the constitution and [exercise] the public powers of the presidency until an
election of a new president…. Any solution has to be a Haitian solution, negotiated by Haitians. It is time to take our
own destiny into our own hands. We will never surrender. The solution is in our own hands and no negotiated
settlement will be forced on Haiti." His opposition appears to have been based on the accord having been, in his
words, foreign created and imposed. See Kenneth Freed, “Haiti’s Puppet Government Vows to Keep Power: Latin

235
 Into the newly created void, the coup regime brought forward its own Villa d’Accueil

Accord which outlined its terms for an end to the coup government. Not only did the new Accord

call for the “provisional government” to be recognized as legitimate, it also called for an end to

the OAS embargo, arguing that the installation of a provisional government had already ended

the coup. One of the unwritten goals of the Accord was clearly to prevent Aristide from returning

to the office of the presidency. No mention was made of Aristide nor was any role provided for

him in the provisional government.36 It is worth noting that while diplomatic negotiations were

underway from 1991 to 1993, the human rights situation in Haiti degenerated into a morass of

violence and killings. Human rights groups operating in Haiti estimated that some 3,000 extra-

judicial killings took place in Haiti during the period October 1991 to August 1992 with the

majority occurring in pro-Aristide Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods.37

The military, including police, met pro-Aristide demonstrations with violence. Any hope

of diplomatic action leading to a ‘safe and secure environment’ for Aristide’s return faded during

this period. Coupled to the democratic and human rights crisis was the ongoing refugee crisis

which President Clinton relieved by re-instituting Bush’s policy of forced repatriation of Haitian

refugees. When the recalcitrance of the coup regime was factored into the equation and a balance

drawn, the UN and OAS, at American urging, exerted the greatest amount of pressure to make

concessions on Aristide.

By 1993, the OAS was left behind, and the United Nations spearheaded Haiti policy with

a campaign of coercive diplomacy. The UN also launched a joint mission with the OAS in

America: An OAS accord to resolve the nation's political and economic crisis appears to be doomed,” Los Angeles
Times, January 14, 1992. www.latimes.com
36
See Chapter 1 of OAS IACHR Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83), 09 March
1993. http://www.cidh.org.
37
See Chapter 2 of OAS IACHER Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti.

236
March 1993, MICIVIH or the International Civilian Mission in Haiti, to verify “respect for

human rights.” The human rights monitoring mission included a public information and

education role. MICIVIH continued operations in Haiti until March 2000. Its size and mission

sets were expanded in 1994, the latter to include “democratic institution-building, civic

education, assisting with the repatriation and resettlement of displaced persons, and providing

medical assistance to victims of human rights abuses.” 38

The UN’s June 1993 ban on the importation of petroleum and arms into Haiti finally gave

the economic embargo some teeth, and was the key to Aristide and Cedras signing the

Governors’ Island Agreement.39 That agreement, much like the earlier Washington Agreement,

faced almost immediate resistance from Haiti’s Prime Minster Marc Bazin, who denounced the

agreement’s requirement for the deployment of human rights observers as the equivalent of

placing Haiti under “international tutelage.”40

Once again, the implementation of a proposed agreement was flawed. In this case, the

UN agreed to prematurely lift the economic embargo against Haiti on 27 August 1993, with the

signature of the Governors’ Island Agreement.41 With the signing of the Agreement and

deployment of the international human rights observers, Haitian police and military stepped up

their violent campaign against Aristide supporters and democratic activists, many of whom were

38
See http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/micivih.htm and http://search.archives.un.org/international-
civilian-support-mission-in-haiti-micah.
39
The key negotiator throughout this period was Dante Caputo, a well-respected former Argentinian politician and
diplomat, who was appointed Special Envoy to Haiti in 1992, representing both the OAS and the UN. He would
continue in that role in 1993 and has been credited with brokering the Governors’ Island Agreement. Interestingly,
an assessment of the embargo published in 1994 by the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace in Haiti
concluded that insufficient international attention had been paid to the porous Haitian-Dominican Republic border
and that the heavy commercial flow including petroleum products had not been impeded to any significant extent.
Cited in Chetan Kumar, Building Peace in Haiti (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25.
40
The phrase was attributed to Bazin and a speech he gave on 27 January 1993. See Howard W. French, “Mediation
Effort in Haiti Collapses.” The New York Times, February 5, 1993.
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/05/world/mediation-effort-in-haiti-collapses.html.
41
The Agreement also included a controversial amnesty program for the coup leaders, but termed it a “political
truce.”

237
openly attacked and beaten in front of UN observers then in Haiti.42 Confronted with the

likelihood of an Aristide return to power, the more radical elements supporting the coup regime

began a campaign of killing and intimidation which echoed some of the worst excesses

committed during the Duvalier era.

By September 1993, the right-wing para-military organization known as the Front pour

l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien or FRAPH emerged as a major terror force aligned with the

ruling regime and began terror operations in earnest. FRAPH’s sought to undermine the

democratic movement in Haiti and force Aristide, if he was to be allowed to return to his

presidency (and Haiti), to accede to a much-reduced vision for his presidency, one more in line

with US interests for Haiti and the region.43 Headed by a CIA informant named Emmanuel

Constant, FRAPH was the creation of General Philippe Biamby, a tool he would later employ to

consolidate his power within the coup regime.44

The Clinton administration’s strategy towards Haiti guided the CIA manipulations of the

FRAPH during this period. Through the CIA, Clinton sought to shape and present the FRAPH as

a reasonable political alternative to both the coup leadership and Aristide, somewhere on the

political spectrum between the two. That narrative found its way into the US military. During

Operation Restore Democracy, for example, deployed units were given operational orientation

briefings which specifically identified the FRAPH organization as a legitimate political party

42
Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F Baumann, and John T Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’: A Concise
History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth: USCGSC Press, 1998), 34-5.
43
See Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA", 303-331.
44
Ralph Pezzullo, US President Clinton’s former special advisor for Haiti, identified FRAPH as having been built
by Biamby to provide him with control of the coup regime. The FRAPH was similar in organization to Duvalier’s
VSN, not surprising given FRAPH included a large number of former Makoutes. The organization was reportedly
underwritten by the CIA and had a large number of members trained and equipped by US Special Forces. See Ralph
Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 2010), 210-12.

238
organization and directed that it be treated as such.45 That narrative was not universal within

American circles however. US embassy assessments flowing out of Haiti continued to identify

the group as extremist. FRAPH members were labelled as “gun-carrying crazies…. evolving into

a sort of Mafia.”46

FRAPH terror operations began with a campaign based on extrajudicial killings, arson,

torture, and sexual violence against women, including rape. All were aimed at weakening

support for Aristide by exposing his inability to protect supporters. Yet despite its heinous

activities, FRAPH would emerge as a player on the world stage only after its October 1993

encounter with the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) force.

On 11 October, the USS Harlan Country, a tank landing ship carrying a multinational

force of American and Canadian combat troops, was steaming into Haitian waters, with plans to

dock at the international port of Port-au-Prince. The ship was carrying the advance party for the

Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG), consisting of a US Navy construction

battalion (SeaBees); Canadian combat engineers; and US Marines.47 The JTF HAG was the

American multinational contribution to the UNMIH, established under UN Security Council

Resolution 867 (1993). Tasked with “modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a

new police force with the presence of UN personnel in their fields,” the force included 567 UN

police monitors (UNPMS) and a military construction unit of 700, 60 of whom were military

trainers. 48

45
Kretchik, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,” 96.
46
See Larry Rohter, “Cables Show US Deception on Haitian Violence,” The New York Times, February 6, 1996.
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/06/world/cables-show-us-deception-on-haitian-violence.html?pagewanted=all.
See also Whitney, “SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 323n150.
47
The role of the advance party was the provision of the expedient facilities required for the follow-on elements of
the JTF HAG. Because this was planned as a permissive environment, a beachhead was not established. Nor was air
support provided to the mission. See Kretchik et al, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,” 37.
48
UNSCR 867 (1993), S/RES/867 (1993), 23 September 1993.

239
 The JTF was dispatched to Haiti under the erroneous belief that the Agreement was

supported by all parties and a permissive environment for disembarkation existed. The FRAPH,

however, had a different plan in mind. Its members came out armed and in strength to oppose the

landing. The Haitian military stood aside while the armed FRAPH mob demonstrated. The

demonstrations by the armed protestors undermined the resolve of the US military leaders and

the decision was made to not land JTFHAG forces. Instead, the USS Harlan County withdrew

from Haitian waters and steamed back to Guantanamo Bay.49 Their decision to withdraw had

extremely nasty repercussions in Haiti. Emmanuel Constant, the FRAPH leader claimed:

“That’s the day FRAPH was born. Before [the USS Harlan County affair] everyone said
we were crazy, suicidal, that we would all be burned if Aristide returned. But now, we
know he is never going to return.”50

That retreat also heralded the moment when the coup leaders, General Cedras; Colonel

Michel François; and General Philippe Biamby, lost any control over the organization.

Emboldened by their success in standing up to the Americans, the FRAPH promptly embarked

on a fresh wave of violence, a rampage which targeted Aristide supporters in an orgy of terror

and murder. More troubling for the coup leaders, the FRAPH was “opening branches across the

country” and challenging the Army over control of the country.51 Ralph Pezzullo identified

Cedras confronting Biamby over his out-of-control terror force, “pounding on a conference

table” and yelling at co-coup leader Biamby: “You’ve got to stop this!” in reference to the terror

campaign then undertaken by the FRAPH which was undermining local military commanders. 52

49
The 3 October, 1993, events in Somalia were reportedly seen by the Haitian coup leaders as demonstrating a lack
of resolve on the part of the Clinton administration, something they believed could be exploited in Haiti through
public demonstrations against the international force. That appeared to be correct initially when the USS Harlan
County departed without landing its force. It would be proven wrong when the US returned and conducted a forcible
entry. For a complete outline of the events, see Kretchik et al, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 35-41.
50
Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti, 211.
51
Pezzullo.
52
Pezzullo.

240
 The UN delivered a textbook response to the renewed violence. The embargo was re-

instituted in mid-October, but this time, it included a global freeze on Government of Haiti bank

accounts as well as those personal accounts belonging to members of the coup regime.53 In the

end, and despite its efforts to undermine Aristide, the FRAPH would end up dramatically

imploding. Its role as a viable alternative to the Lavalas movement evaporated. Nonetheless,

FRAPH was a thorn in the side of the US and was at the centre of some serious operational

planning issues in what would become known as Operation Uphold Democracy.

“The Imperialists Must Leave us in Peace”: Operation Uphold Democracy54

In Operation Uphold Democracy, the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps was prepared to
carry out any of three distinct military operations. None of those operations were in fact
executed. Instead, a fourth military option evolved, literally while the operation was
unfolding.55
- US Army Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik, Dr. Robert F. Bauman
and Dr. John T. Fishel

Initially, the 30 September 1991, coup that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide

saw the American military ramp up its planning for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO)

into Haiti to rescue its own citizens and select foreign nationals, evacuating them from the

country.56 By February 1992, the US had conducted a limited and unopposed NEO operation,

and chose to “shelve” the plans for an opposed operation.

53
That freeze on funds had previously been provided for under UNSCR 841 (1993), dated 16 June 1993. See
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/841(1993).
54
Quote by Haitian human-rights lawyer Mario Joseph, representative of President Aristide while in exile. Cited in
Andy Blatchford, “Haitian lawyer accuses Montreal mayor Coderre of lying about Aristide '04 ouster,” Canadian
Press, February 27, 2014. Denis Coderre was the federal Liberal Minister for Immigration from 2002-03 within the
Jean Chretien government. In 2003-04, he would become the Special Advisor on Haiti to Prime Minister Paul
Martin as the Minister responsible for the Francophonie.
55
Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, xi.
56
A NEO may or may not be opposed, although planning for such an operation normally proceeds on the
assumption that the use of force will be necessary (i.e. entry will be opposed). Planning initially for this NEO
identified the evacuation of approximately 10,000 people over a 10-day period and was based on an opposed entry.
The NEO operation was run in October 1991, as Operation Victor Squared, but the details remain classified. What is
known is that the NEO operation was built around the US Coast Guard, with Marine Corps air protection, and had
the mission of removing American citizens from Haiti then reeling from post-coup violence. Operation Victor

241
 The signing of the July 1993 Governors Island Agreement between Aristide and the coup

regime initiated operational planning for what became the US Joint Task Force Haitian

Assistance Group or JTF HAG, which was, initially, given the mission to plan to

“professionalize and train” the Haitian Army.57 The JTF HAG boarded the USS Harlan County

on 3 October 1993, and headed to Haiti, taking aboard a number of US Navy construction

engineers and Canadian combat engineers.58

The arrival of the USS Harlan County in Haitian waters was met with armed

demonstrations by Haitian coup supporters, leading the US Task Force leadership on the ground

to conclude the environment was no longer permissive.59 US leadership decided prudence was

the better part of valor and withdrew from Haiti. The failed USS Harlan County mission shifted

operational planning from a permissive operation to a forcible entry operation.60

Planning for what would eventually be designated Operation Uphold Democracy was

based on a rapid, forcible entry into a hostile environment, the aim being to quickly neutralize

the Haitian military and establish the safe and secure environment that would permit Aristide’s

Squared had a strong influence on planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention,
‘Intervasion’, 32.
57
Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,35.
58
The USS Harlan County headed to Haiti the same time as the US was experiencing the fallout from the deaths of
a number of US Army Rangers during the UN Operation in Somalia II or UNOSCOM II. The US conducted
Operation Gothic Serpent using its special forces, the intent being to kill or capture one of the leading factional
leaders, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The operation led to the Battle of Mogadishu, and saw two US Black Hawk
helicopters shot down as well as the deaths of 18 American soldiers and an estimated thousand Somali militia
members. The battle would lead to the Clinton administration withdrawing US troops from UNOSCOM and would
significantly influence US operations in Haiti.
59
The recognition that the situation was no longer permissive rested with the Navy commander, US Navy
Commander Marvin Butcher, who commanded the USS Harlan County and was the decision maker on whether to
land the multinational troops in Haiti. The ground force commander, Colonel John Pulley, did not have operational
command until his troops were landed in Haiti. See Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,37.
60
The USS Harlan County incident left military planning in the dark. The coup regime was either unable or
unwilling to compel other agencies to comply with agreements the regime reached with the international
community. For the US, that meant military planning hoped for a permissive environment but planned for a non-
permissive one. Regardless, the FRAPH played the role of spoiler during the incident, clearly not interested in the
settlement reached by the coup regime and able to exercise its power to undermine that settlement.. Kretchik, 43.

242
return to power. The operational plan was changed several times, including an option that

oriented to support a quick hand-off of responsibilities to a follow-on UN force.

The apparent success of the diplomatic team of former president Jimmy Carter, Senator

Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell changed the operation once more. This time, the

planning was based on “an administration landing of US forces rather than a combat operation.61

This left operational planners and commanders in the dark as to what to expect, leading to the

term “intervasion” to describe the new mission.62

Conducted between 19 September 1994 and 31 March 1995, Operation Uphold

Democracy would become a special type of intervention. The last-minute change introduced a

significant degree of risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty into mission planning. A non-permissive

environment is always more dangerous, but risk can be compensated for by virtue of combat

skills and capabilities possessed by American forces. US military forces are more comfortable

and better trained for dynamic combat than static peacekeeping. An unconfirmed permissive

environment meant that American forces were forced to consider peace support operations,

which forced them into non-kinetic activities and capabilities rather than the activities for which

they were trained.

Not surprisingly, that shift into the unknown led to inconsistency in response to violent

encounters once on the ground. What should be clear is that the classification changes in the

Haitian environment meant that the planned campaign needed to be quickly reworked to “stress

that US forces must enter Haiti quickly, gain the trust of the Haitian people, and stabilize the

population, but not in a way that could be considered as overly aggressive.”63 The foundation for

61
Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,76.
62
Kretchik. See also Siegel, “Operation UPHOLD DEMCRACY.”
63
Not surprisingly, expectations of the American ‘intervasion’ were different for the two Haitian groups. Pro-
Aristide forces were expecting a version of the dechoukaj from the Americans, one which in which the Army and

243
successful stability operations like Operation Uphold Democracy is the creation of a safe and

stable environment. That end state requires the establishment of trust with the Haitian people.

Their trust is then built on managing expectations and ensuring they are realistic. Unfortunately

for the Aristide forces, their expectations would be quickly dashed.

Not only did the American forces avoid the recurrence of any form of dechoukaj, they

also began “negotiating and then collaborating with despised FAd’H [Forces Armées d'Haïti –

Haitian Armed Forces] in maintaining order in the capital.”64 Part of that behaviour was

grounded in the uncertainty forced upon them by virtue of the last minute mission change. Part

though was simple ignorance of the composition of Haitian society and the dysfunctional nature

of the relationship between the security forces and the peasantry. Neither factor, though,

explained why violent attacks by Haitian security and paramilitary forces on Haitian citizens

were merely observed by US troops, something captured on several occasions by the ever-

present international media.65

That failure of American troops to intervene was due to the apparent friendly stance of

the Haitian Army and police services as partners of the US in Haiti, plus unclear rules of

engagement (ROEs) which failed to address that type of violence perpetrated by supposed allies.

The initial ROEs would be quickly changed, but the damage was done: the ‘intervasion’ was too

FRAPH members would be disarmed and jailed, followed by justice through the legal system. Conversely, anti-
Aristide forces were expecting the American forces to prevent a dechoukaj and to re-establish the status quo as
quickly as possible. See Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 78.
64
Kretchik, 97.
65
One account of the American landing in Haiti stated “Late this afternoon, police and paramilitary troops armed
with semiautomatic weapons broke up one pro-Aristide rally at the port, beating participants with nightsticks and
planks of wood and chasing them for several blocks. Many demonstrators lost their shoes in their haste to escape
beatings, and when they returned to retrieve them, the police again chased them away. American troops nearby
watched but did not intervene, witnesses said.” A second account claimed that one person was beaten to death and
several others wounded “while combat-ready American troops looked on.” See Larry Rohter, “Mission to Haiti:
Overview; 3,000 US Troops Land without Opposition and Take Over Ports and Airfields in Haiti,” The New York
Times, 20 September 1994; and Kenneth Freed, “Haitian Police Attack Crowds as American Troops Look On:
Caribbean: At least one is killed, and dozens injured as local forces disperse demonstrators welcoming arriving
soldiers. US policy leaves issue of civil order to Haitian authorities,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1994.

244
little, too late.66 Four days after the initial landing, US Marines engaged in firefights with Haitian

police officers who had fired on pro-Aristide supporters in the capital. Marines would kill eight

Haitians including at least one Haitian police officer.67

The second outcome, related to peacebuilding, was the expectation on the part of Haitians

that the American military presence would spark the immediate flow of money and resources

into Haiti to resolve chronic social development issues. However, American operational

guidance to combat commanders on the ground focused on the need for safety and security rather

than engaging in state-building efforts. Major General George Fisher, Commander of the 25th

Infantry Division, noted, for example, that the “vague [mission] guidance” evolved into “…a

conscious decision by the United States not to engage in nation building and the mission

expansion and mission creep that accompanies nation building.”68

Yet even in those instances when peacebuilding work was undertaken, they resulted in

problems about expectations. For example, a senior US Army civil affairs officer noted in his

post-deployment report that while US troops were employed to restore basic services within

Haiti including power and water supplies, their employment rather than the hiring of locals to

solve those issues “may have contributed to the perception among Haitians that the US military

can ‘come and fix anything’.”69 He believed the deployed US forces had reinforced that

expectation and that US forces became the first point of call for problems encountered by the

population that should have been more properly dealt with by the civil government.

66
The issues over ROEs and US soldiers watching beatings by Haitian police were both identified in the after-action
review or AAR, completed by the US Army’s Judge Advocate General’s School. See Law and Military Operations
in Haiti, 1994-1995: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville: Centre for Law and Military
Operations, 11 December 1995).
67
Eris Schmitt, “8 Haitians Killed by Marine Patrol,” The New York Times, September 25, 1994. www.nytimes.com.
68
Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 122.
69
Kretchik, 123.

245
 Among American forces, differing operating standards would lead to different results.

Whereas the civil affairs officer noted the issues above, US Special Forces teams deployed

throughout Haiti instead sought, wherever possible, to “encourage and support” Haitians in

solving their own problems. This included sorting out distribution of food and water; community

security, particularly after the disbandment of the Haitian police force; and many of the other

missing services normally associated with civil government.70

The operation had two distinct strategic mission objectives: the first was the creation of a

safe and secure environment to which the deposed government of President Aristide could be

returned to complete its term of office; and the second was the successful disengagement of the

US and handoff to a UN peacekeeping mission.71 The concept of handing off the Haitian theatre

of operations to the UN was controversial. It was the first time the UN had authorized an armed

invasion for the “restoration of democracy.”72 Not surprisingly, that idea was not universally

welcomed within the international community. Within the Americas, Mexico and Cuba were

prominent among those nations that objected to the resolution. Brazil also opposed the

resolution, but the United States was able to convince Brazilian leaders to abstain from opposing

the resolution vote.

The complete Operation Uphold Democracy invasion plan was briefed to a Haiti

Interagency Working Group (IWG, an American multi-agency forum) on 11 September 1994,

literally hours before the invasion was scheduled to begin. A key piece of the occupation plan

70
Kretchik, 123-4.
71
See UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940, 31 July 1994; and Resolution 975, 30 January 1995. The
latter stated the transfer to UNMIH from MNF was to be complete by 31 March 1995.
72
UNSCR 940 (1994) was a Chapter VII mission and allowed “a multinational force under unified command and
control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership, consistent with the Governors’ Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President
and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure
and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors’ Island Agreement.”

246
was the development and training of a new Haitian police force; the current police force was

judged to be unsalvageable and thus scheduled for a Disarmament, Demobilization and

Reintegration (DDR) operation. Unlike the military, the Department of Justice (DOJ) stepped

away from the change in intervasion plans, making it quite clear that it was not ready to

undertake the police force reform portion of the mission on such short notice. The result was the

US Army took the lead on the police force development and training, and the associated DDR

operation.73 This would mark one of the first instances of mission creep surfacing prior to the

mission commencing!

Haiti and UN Efforts at Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The UN and Haiti have not turned the constant international attention the country has
received over the past eight years into sufficiently sustainable public institutions and
economic progress, even taking into account the huge damage from a series of natural
disasters.74
- Extract from International Crisis Group report

Since 1993, security sector reform (or SSR) in Haiti has focused exclusively on police

reform. Unfortunately for Haiti and the UN, SSR has continued to confound policing experts

since that time. In 2004, Canadian expert David Beer, then in charge of the UN’s SSR program

in Haiti, lamented “we’re essentially back to square one” following the forced exile of then-

President Aristide.75 He felt “the international effort in Haiti [was paying]… insufficient

attention to the links between politics and policing… [and instead concentrating] too narrowly on

73
The interim police force was planned to largely be composed largely of FAd'H members “who had no criminal
record and no reported record of human rights abuses.” Those chosen as part of the interim force were to receive six
days of police training and then begin work. See E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, “Operation Uphold
Democracy: Conflict and Cultures A summary of material from CNA's 1995 Annual Conference, "Military Support
to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy," Center for Naval Analysis Professional Paper
541, 10 June 1998, 27; and Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 71.
74
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition,” International Crisis Group, Latin
American/Caribbean Report No. 44 (02 Aug 2012): 13.
75
Timothy Donais, “Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti,” Civil Wars 7, no. 3 (2005): 271.

247
the technical aspects of policing.”76 The training programs conducted by the US, Canada and

France focused on the tactical aspects of policing, like search and seizures, and crowd or riot

control, with very little if any cultural training incorporated into the SSR curriculum.77

Part of the problem was that the UN’s SSR program did not identify any metrics until

2008. After program metrics were finally generated, they were developed internally by UN

experts and included consultation with Haitian stakeholders. UN metrics highlighted the

reduction of criminal gang influence, the reduction of criminal activity within the Port-au-Prince

area (largely Cité Soleil), and the purging of the National Police Service of former Duvalierist

and FRAPH members.78 Yet they did not tackle issues of local security requirements within the

Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods nor did they examine the lack of rural policing. Yet again,

Haitians were not consulted on the development of the program, leading to another program that

did not reflect Haitian interests or values. And once more, that lack of consultation would result

in tragedy, as will be demonstrated later in my thesis.

Other problems became quickly apparent. For example, the SSR program was heavily

biased against Aristide and his supporters. Both the UN and the US provided concessions to the

coup leaders as well as a sympathetic ear to their grievances. Aristide, on the other hand, was

quickly identified by the US administration, with sympathetic French and Canadian ears, as an

obstacle not just to the process for his return to power, but particularly to implementation of the

US’s idea of democracy in Haiti. Consequently, Haitian security services were not held

76
Donais, “Back to Square One,” 271.
77
Johanna Mendelson-Forman, for example, points out that initial police training included a mere nine hours of
human rights training and 16 hours in “human dignity” classes. See Johann Mendelson-Forman, “Security sector
reform in Haiti,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (Mar 2006): 20. Reporter Linda Diebel quoted an unnamed
RCMP officer who was involved in the training of the Haitian police as claiming that whereas the Canadian-run
training produced a civil police officer, the American training program was producing officers trained for military or
para-military operations rather than policing. See Linda Diebel, “Haiti: Canada’s Mission Impossible,” Ottawa
Citizen, February 23, 1997. www.ottawacitizen.com.
78
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2.

248
accountable by the international community. Instead, they focused solely on resolving the

impasse over Aristide’s return without dealing with more pressing issues like purging the

security forces of Duvalierist and other extreme right-wing elements. Nor was any real plan

developed that would map out the path by which the Haitian military would be conditioned to

subordination to civilian authority. That critical vulnerability was completely absent from

discussions and was not tackled properly in the SSR training eventually provided to the Army

and police services.

To understand why progress on international security sector reform work in Haiti has

been so poor, the Haitian UN missions will be examined to compare their stated with their

implementation; identify what was undertaken; and explore the issues which blocked progress

and prolonged the SSR programs that have now entered their second decade in Haiti.

Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti (MICIVIH), 1993-2001

…la Police Nationale a des devoirs envers tous les citoyens indistinctement en leur
garantissant les droits-sécurités, les droits-libertés. Cette garantie n’est cependant fondée
que si tous les citoyens, y compris les policiers eux-mêmes, jouent à fond la règle
démocratique, dans une projection en une unité effective et permanente.79
- 1996 Statement by Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Haïti

Of all the UN missions in Haiti, the joint 1993 OAS-UN International Civilian Mission in

Haiti (Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti or MICIVIH) has received the most acclaim and

generally has been judged the most successful.80 Interestingly, of all the missions, MICIVIH can

79
The National Police have the responsibility towards all citizens, without discrimination, of guaranteeing their
rights of security and freedom. This guarantee cannot be realized unless all citizens do their duty, including the
police themselves, playing their role in the creation of a democratic framework that is effective and permanent. [my
translation] Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Haïti, Recueil de textes et de réglementations applicables a la
police nationale, 1996, 6. Cited in Timothy J.G. Ho, “Ordering Disorder: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of
International Civilian Police Training in Haiti, 1994-2001,” (PhD diss., Royal Roads University, 2009).
80
MICIVIH was preceded by the OAS Civil Presence mission which ran from October 1992 until February 1993. It
was largely confined to the capital as the military considered its presence outside the capital as outside its mandate.

249
be seen as the most complex, blending the OAS and the UN into a hybrid or integrated mission,

complete with international and regional goals.

The initial progress made by the mission was largely at the grassroots level, facilitated by

a mandate considered flexible and adaptive.81 MICIVIH’s original mandate centered on

observation and verification of the human rights situation within Haiti, but this was an observer

mission on steroids. MICIVIH’s head of mission, Mr. Dante Caputo, noted the mission was

about “active observation,” which he defined as:

carrying out human rights investigations, making its reports public as a form of
deterrence, denouncing violations publicly through press releases, intervening with the
police and judiciary on behalf of victims when there were clear breaches of the rule of
law, providing, directly and indirectly, medical care for victims, and in certain urgent
situations facilitating the sheltering or evacuation of pro-democracy activists tracked by
the police, military and death squads.82

MICIVIH’s flexible and proactive culture led to its mission’s expanding to include SSR

and the establishment of the National Police Service; the creation of an independent judiciary;

and penal reform. The National Police Service was initiated without meaningful Haitian input, a

key point noted by the Aristide government, and was considered a “bastard child…created when

Haiti was, for all intents and purposes, under military occupation by the US.”83 The “US will to

Its role included shaping the conditions required for MICIVIH’s follow-on presence. OAS observers, who joined the
Civil Presence mission, were deployed into Haiti as early as September 1992.
81
See International Peace Academy, “Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti,” International Peace Academy
Seminar Report dated 23-24 January 2002 (Rapporteur: Lotta Hagman). Colin Granderson also described the
MICIVIH mandate as permitting “great flexibility in the activities and responsibilities that the mission undertook.”
Colin Granderson, “Notes from 21 September 2010 Speech at an Inter-American Peace Forum,” OAS HQ,
Washington D.C., 2010.
82
Dante Caputo, “The MICIVIH: Insights, Challenges and Results, Inter-American Peace Forum, OAS HQ,
Washington, D.C., 21 September 2010. www.oas.org. Caputo spoke about the Mission during an OAS-sponsored
Inter-American Peace forum held in Washington, D.C. 21 September 2010. In his remarks, Caputo claimed the
mission was “also a source of great irritation for the military regime.”
83
Patrick Elie. Cited in Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 162n65. Aristide’s fears came to pass. The US would fund
and equip two of the key police units which became the most powerful within the force and have been implicated in
the 2004 coup. They were also staffed almost entirely with ex-Army personnel. The first, ironically, was the 500-
strong Presidential Guard (Unité de Sécurité Générale du Palais National or USGPN) and the second was the quick
response unit, broken into two company-sized SWAT-style sub-units (the Groupe d’intervention de la police

250
create a police that would have replaced the Army as a tool to secure US interests in Haiti and

ultimately act as an arbiter of political life in Haiti” also antagonized Aristide.84 That perception

would poison the Haitian government’s relationship with its new police force, particularly as

conflict with the Lavalas movement increased.

Unfortunately, the long-term nature of the development work was undermined by the

short-term mandate of the MICIVIH and the demands made by the international community for

immediate and measurable results. The pressure for immediate and measurable progress led

directly to “the elimination of…the practical training [of police officers] and the education of a

supervisory force.”85 Their elimination meant accountability and responsibility accompanied by

oversight and transparency disappeared from the program. Instead, the program managers

focused pragmatically on easily achieved and measurable objectives, such as the number of

police officers patrolling the streets of Haiti.

While police reforms were underway, Haiti struggled with an increase in corruption as

well as drug smuggling involving senior government officials. In 2002, police officers were

implicated in the extra-judicial executions of suspected drug dealers.86 However, rather than

reorienting the SSR program to focus on such emerging issues, the long-term training and

mentoring program remained broad and unfocussed. Further complicating the process, the SSR

programs of the international partners were not harmonized. Instead, each nation employed

different training doctrine and methods, and enforced their own standards. MICIVIH did not

enforce harmonization. Rather, judicial vetting and reform within the SSR mandate was

nationale d’Haiti (GIPNH) and the Corps d’intervention et de maintien de l’ordre (CIMO)). See Hallward,
Damning the Flood, 67.
84
Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 163.
85
International Peace Academy, “Lessons Learned,” 7.
86
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2002 - Haiti, 28 May 2002.
www.refworld.org/docid/3cf4bc0e4.html.

251
conducted separately from the police training and reform program.87 The complete separation of

the various elements of the SSR program created problems of its own.

United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 1993-1997.

Of significance was the increase in the level of violence observed during this deployment.
An increase in the rate of violent crime and attacks, mainly against members of Haitian
National Police started in late April 96. The violence culminated with attacks around the
Presidential Palace and against three police stations on 19 Aug 96. The situation
remained tense but under control until mid-Sep 96 when it started to abate.
UNMIH/UNSMIH [UN Support Mission in Haiti] personnel and infrastructures however,
remained regular victim of thefts.88
- Extract from Canadian Army Lessons Learned Op STANDARD / STABLE Report

UNMIH was authorized by the UN on 23 September 1993, tasked with “modernizing”

the national army and creating a new and modern national police force separate from the military

chain of command. The police service was to include a disaster response and border security

component.89 However, on 11 October 1993, the deployment of the mission was prevented by

the presence of armed anti-Aristide attachés whose demonstration in the Port-au-Prince

dockyard led to the USS Harlan County incident. The UN de-activated the mission, pending the

resolution of the situation in Haiti. Almost a year later in October 1994, UNMIH recommenced,

but this time as a follow-on Chapter VI mission to the US-led UN Chapter VII Multinational

Force (MNF) mission.90 UNMIH would also end up overlapping with MICIVIH.91 Unlike

87
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2002 - Haiti.
88
Canadian Operation STANDARD / STABLE was the name given to the deployment of troops in support of
UNMIH from April through to October 1996, the tail end of the mission. Comments from Canadian Armed Forces
(CAF) 3452-034/134 (J3 Lessons Learned 2), “OP STANDARD/STABLE (APR-OCT 96) - DRAFT INTERIM
LESSONS LEARNED REPORT,” April 1997. Retrieved from the Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC)
database June 2015.
89
UNSCR 1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996.
90
See the previous discussion on Operation Uphold Democracy.
91
MICIVIH deployed into Haiti in February 1993, evacuated from October 1993 through to January 1994, and
would remain until March 2000. UNMIH, established by UNSCR 867 (1993), initially deployed an advance team
into Haiti on 23 September 1993 which ended in early October. The team included 53 military and 51 police
members. However, full deployment of UNMIH was prevented until September 1994: between October 1993 and
September 1994, the mission was considered to have been de-activated. UNMIH would remain in Haiti until
November 1996.

252
MICIVIH, which saw its mission expand to include SSR work, UNMIH was originally designed

to include that SSR mandate. The intransigence of the coup regime in Haiti forced the UN to

expand the mandate of UNMIH to include “sustaining the secure and stable environment

established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key

installations,” as well as the original mission of completing “the professionalization of the

Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.”92 To accomplish its revised

mandate, the UN increased the size of UNMIH to 6,000 military personnel.93

The importance of the creation of a safe and secure environment for institutional

development cannot be overstated, as noted in this observation from the US Center for Army

Lessons Learned (CALL):

When UNMIH published Force Operation Order 95-1, it refined its concept to read that
the strategic center of gravity was the maintenance of a secure and stable environment.
The operational centers of gravity are the two largest population centers, Port-au-Prince
and Cap Haïtien. Critical elements of the secure and stable environment included:
President Aristide's security, the security of political and economic centers, relations
between the new Haitian police force and the general populace, and lastly, the influence
of the national government. If UNMIH and the Government of Haiti could not "facilitate
positive development" in these areas, the collapse of the democratic process and violence
might result.94

The handover between the MNF and UNMIH took place as planned on 31 March 1995.95

The end of the MNF mandate coincided with a UN assessment that identified the overall

92
UNSCR 940 (1994), para 9.
93
United Nations Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), UNMIH Background,
2003. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html.
94
See US Army CALL report on the MNF, “CALL – Haiti Initial Impressions Vol III,” July 1995, 15/156.
95
The Haitian government had, by this time, turned its attention to reformation of the justice system. President
Aristide established the Commission nationale de vérité et de justice (CNVJ) on 28 March 1995 to begin public
consultations, with the mandate to “identify instigators, criminals, and accessories to the serious human rights
violations and the crimes against humanity that had been carried out during the coup d'état, from 29 September 1991
to 15 October1994, both inside and outside of the country…to establish the overall truth about the gravest violations
of human rights abuses during the specified dates, and to aid in the reconciliation of all Haitians, with the potential
for legal recourse.” Peter Hallward argues that the US obstructed the CNVJ’s attempts to prosecute crimes
committed by Cedras and his regime, and ensured the CNVJ “was restricted to the mere documentation of cases –
some 8,652 in total – of human rights undertaken between 1991 and 1994.” See Joanna R. Quinn, “Haiti’s Failed

253
situation in Haiti as “generally good” with “tremendous” improvements in the human rights

situation.96 This proved to be inaccurate and would impact badly on the UNMIH mission.

Further complicating the UNMIH mission were a number of issues that had not been understood

or dealt with during the handover, and for which the UNMIH was unprepared.97

The most critical issue which came to dominate UNMIH was the requirement to maintain

a safe and secure environment. While the MNF mission believed it handed over a safe and secure

environment to the UNMIH, maintaining that condition would expose the significant differences

in the capabilities and mandate of the two missions. Whereas the MNF had been authorized to

“use all necessary means” to implement the Governors’ Island Agreement, UNMIH was by

contrast a Chapter VI ‘peacekeeping’ mission which required Haitian concurrence for its

continued presence in the country and its operations. This meant that UNMIH was forced to gain

Haitian government concurrence for any operational activities in support of maintaining the safe

and secure environment, and could not act without Haitian agreement.

The other significant difference between the two missions was that whereas the MNF was

configured for combat, the UNMIH was instead a peace support mission oriented towards

policing rather than combat. It was also highly dependent upon Haitian security forces to provide

a significant portion of its capabilities. At the same time, the Haitian government proved loath to

surrender sovereignty over national law and order, and allowed UNMIH to enforce law and order

on Haiti’s own citizens by exception only.

Truth Commission: Lessons in Transitional Justice,” Journal of Human Rights 8, no.3 (2009), 265-281; and
Hallward, Damning the Flood, 66.
96
NDHQ ADM (Pol & Comm) DI Pol 4, “Briefing Note: UN Secretary General’s Report on Haiti,” dated 18
January 1995. Obtained through ATI 96/1101B.
97
A US Army CALL report on the MNF stated clearly “Not all of the agreed upon conditions for transition from the
MNF operation to UNMIH were met.” US Army CALL report on the MNF, “CALL – Haiti Initial Impressions Vol
III,”, 3/156.

254
 This translated into a major operational dilemma for UNMIH. While the mission’s police

elements were responsible for supervising and tutoring the fledgling Haitian police force, they

were also charged with sustaining an active security presence to maintain the safe and secure

environment bequeathed to them by the MNF. A safe and secure environment requires an active

policing role by a well-trained and robust police force, capabilities not yet present in the Haitian

security services.98 Complicating the security situation further was the 28 October 1994

presidential decree from President Aristide disbanding the rural chefs de sections.99 During the

previous six months of 1994, MICIVIH human rights observers reported "an alarming increase

in extrajudicial executions, suspect deaths, abductions, enforced disappearances and politically -

motivated rapes" within the capital as well as human rights abuses in the outlying regions,

creating “an unprecedented human rights crisis.”100

The chefs de sections had previously been incorporated into the military and had, for

better or worse, governance, judicial, and security responsibilities in many of the rural areas.

Their disbandment left major security voids in local rural towns and villages. The Haitian

government ran a hasty DDR program to ensure the chefs de sections were disarmed quickly and

their weapons and ammunition collected before they disappeared or joined anti-Aristide

98
In his 21 November 1994 report, the UN Secretary General identified the time requirement for the new Haitian
police force to “reach the strength necessary to enforce law and order effectively…” That assessment spoke only to
number targets: it did not address the quality and duration of training necessary to achieve the designation of well-
trained. Many of those who applied for employment as police officer, for example, were either former army or
former police, and therefore needed extensive vetting and re-training to ensure they were right for the new security
forces. See UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21
November 1994, 3.
99
In 1991, shortly after taking office, President Aristide send out a presidential decree ordering the dismantling of
the rural police or sheriffs’ program. His intent was to replace the system with a new rural system of governance, but
he was overthrown by a military coup. Once he was removed from Haiti, General Cedras, the coup leader, reversed
the presidential decree and reinstituted the rural police organization. When Aristide was reinstated as president in
1994, he once again passed a presidential decree ordering the end of the sheriff program. Hallward, Damning the
Flood, 18.
100
See United Nations Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), UNMIH
Background, 2003. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html.

255
paramilitary groups, but the program was flawed.101 At the same time, the Haitian police were

stretched further and were forced to scramble to fill the security gaps left by the departure of the

chefs de sections. MICIVIH observers, for example, reported a “marked increase in banditry and

criminality throughout the country,” attributed to the uncertain future of the chefs de sections,

especially following Aristide’s return to the presidency.102

As if that was not enough, UNMIH discovered that the media’s picture of a pacified and

calm Haiti was wrong. Despite its reporting, the US-led MNF did not control the “arms on the

ground” and the security situation in Haiti was volatile enough to present a clear and present

danger during the election period with legislative elections scheduled for June 1995 followed by

presidential elections in December 1995.103 The UN’s solution prioritized quantity over quality

and was based on the quick creation of an Interim Police Security Force (IPSF).104

As of 1 January 1995, the IPSF numbered about 3,000 Haitians and was sufficiently

trained that Canadian officials deemed it trained and operational.105 Once declared operational,

the force was deployed to 11 cities around the country. In support of the IPSF detachments were

around 800 International Police Monitors (IPMs) who were deployed to provide mentoring

101
See UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21
November 1994, 4. Around the same time as the chefs de sections DDR program, the Army was also dismantled,
initially by the US through confiscation of heavy weapons in 1994 and later by Aristide’s presidential decree on 6
December 1995, ordering complete disbandment. Peter Hallward claims that “much to Aristide’s horror…the US
adamantly refused to disarm remaining members of the FAdH and FRAPH, who took their weapons with them into
an embittered retirement.” The US had refused to participate in the disarmament of paramilitaries as early as 1994,
and by 1995, were refusing to conduct further disarmament beyond the heavy weapons already done. See Hallward,
Damning the Flood, 68; and Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 79-83.
102
UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21
November 1994, 4.
103
It is important to note UNMIH measured success by the conduct of free and fair elections for both parliament and
for the presidency. To conduct such elections, maintenance of the safe and secure environment was absolutely
critical. See US Army CALL report on the MNF, “CALL – Haiti Initial Impressions Vol III,” July 1995, 14/156.
104
The IPSF was initially manned by around 3,400 ex-Army soldiers who had been retained when the Army was
disbanded in 1994. Peter Hallward points out that many of the ex-soldiers who became members of either the IPSF
or the new National Police were approached by the CIA which was actively recruiting sympathetic informants as
well as potential sleeper agents. See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 66-7.
105
See NDHQ ADM (Pol & Comm) memorandum 3451-1 (DI Pol 4) 20 Jan 95. Obtained through ATI 96/1101B.

256
support. The force was due to increase to at least 4,000 members, as a further 1,000 police

officers were in training at that time, with 900 at the US Base in Guantanamo, Cuba and 100 in

Canada. The IPSF was intended to be replaced by the National Police Force once it was trained

and operational. Coinciding with the standing-up of the IPSF was the establishment of a

government committee charged with creating the terms and conditions under which the new

Haitian Army would be created.106

Despite being declared operational, the IPSF suffered from a number of operational

problems. It lacked critical capabilities, including communications gear and vehicle

transportation. Most Haitians perceived the new force as lacking moral authority as many of its

members were human rights abusers from the Army and police.107 It was also the recipient of a

hurried and low-quality training program only one weeklong. As the UN Secretary General

report to the Security Council made clear,

An added complication will be the sensitive issue of integrating 3,000 former FADH
soldiers who will have received one week’s training locally, 900 young people who have
had a three-week training programme in Guantanamo and 100 graduates from a three-
month course in Canada. Only in June 1995 will members of the National Police begin to
appear on the streets after graduating from the Police Academy at the expected rate of
375 police officers each month.108

106
The new Army organization was based on three battalions, each of some 500 personnel. It was unclear what role
the military would have when reconstituted.
107
The battle between the US and Aristide over the future of the Haitian Army would spill over onto the new IPSF.
In February 1995, the US mission instructing the IPSF on behalf of the UN announced that it was “starting a two-
week program to weed out several hundred members” of the force, claiming that “Aristide managed to
insert…several hundred really bad guys” into the IPSF. The Americans claimed that Aristide had appointed a large
number of officers to the IPSF without consulting them as required by the terms of their agreement. The American
announcement was the quid pro quo for Aristide having ‘retired’ all the generals in the Haitian Army and a
significant number of its senior officers, leading American diplomats to declare “today, Aristide buried it [the
Haitian Army].” See Kenneth Freed, “Aristide, US Split over Makeup of Haiti Army, Police: Caribbean: President
defies Washington, retires 43 officers. Some say move spells end to military.” LA Times, February 22, 1995.
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-22/news/mn-34692_1_police-force.
108
UNSC S/1995/46, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti,” 17 January 1995, para
85.

257
 The implications of this process are readily apparent. For UNMIH, there was an

expectation that it “may itself have to take coercive action from time to time, in the closest

consultation with the Government of Haiti and in accordance with the rules of engagement….”109

The UN assessment indicated that “an effective Haitian police force” would not be in place by

the time UNMIH took over and that the IPSF was “untested and lacks, besides basic equipment,

the experience and self-confidence that are indispensable to any police force….” That

assessment was particularly damning as it meant that UNMIH soldiers and those few police

monitors within its ranks would be responsible for the enforcement of law and order upon

deployment, including the very likely requirement of resorting to the use of force, including

lethal force, against Haitians.

By April 1995, the UN recognized that the IPSF and UNMIH were unable to adequately

deal with the security situation.110 A UN report stated that “crime remains at [a] high level by

Haitian standards and a sense of insecurity prevails…The violence, together with the

shortcomings of the IPSF, have led to [a] concern that UNMIH, operating without enforcement

authority, will not prove as effective as the MNF…Members of the IPSF…remain unmotivated

and many are regarded as lacking basic police skills.”111 Further undermining their morale and

work was the lack of a clear future for members of the IPSF. Not only were no plans being

drafted to provide them with an opportunity to continue in the new police force, after proper

109
UNSC S/1995/46, para 86.
110
Not only were there issues with training, morale and lack of equipment, there were reported instances of the local
people in various locations refusing to accept the presence of IPSF units, or their activities in locations having been
severely circumscribed by local elected officials. See, for example, Human Rights Watch March 1995 report on
Haiti, “Security Compromised: Recycled Haitian Soldiers on the Police Front Lines,” 7, no. 3 (March 1995).
www.hrw.org.
111
UN Security Council S/1995/305, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIH,” 13 April 1995, paras 12, 15,
19.

258
training and vetting, there were also no plans to provide them with any other employment after

the new police force was operational.

The Secretary-General’s report of July 1995 indicated that the post-IPSF question was

beginning to be considered. The DDR aspects of SSR were mentioned for the first time. As the

report made clear, as newly trained national police graduates were brought on line in Haiti, IPSF

members were being separated from the interim service in the same numbers, but were now

offered training by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in related speciality areas

like border or prison security.112 While promising, it was clear many IPSF members would or

could not be accommodated in new jobs within the security field and that most would require re-

integration into Haitian society, which in turn meant an appeal to the international community

for more funding for the next phase of SSR. Finally, the Secretary-General chose February 1996

as the target date for a “functioning security system” to be in place in Haiti.113

In June 1996, the Secretary-General reported that while the last training class had been

completed at the Police Academy and the National Police brought up to its nearly 6,000-person

strength, the force continued to be confronted with serious operational issues, not the least being

the absence of trained senior and middle level leaders.114 The most apparent pressing problem

was a force of 6,000 personnel responsible for policing a nation of over seven million persons!

This challenge was compounded by the dire lack of communications equipment to allow

outlying stations to communicate with the command element in the capital. Despite that,

112
The July 1995 report indicated a number of IPSF personnel were released from the interim force and
subsequently retrained, again “temporarily,” as prison guards. Between 29 May and 13 July, some 288 IPSF
personnel were retrained under the IOM program. UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIH,”
113
UNSC, para 59.
114
Training of mid and high-level leaders for the national force were begun around this time, with a projected
completion of all leader training sometime in the latter half of 1997. UNSC S/1996/416, “Report of the Secretary-
General on the UNMIH,” 05 June 1996, paras 17.

259
specialized training was continuing and appeared to be making good progress in such areas as

border security and VIP security.

These obstacles notwithstanding, the assessment by the UN leadership on the ground in

Haiti was realistic. The Haitian National Police were not yet capable of providing, on their own,

the safe and secure environment required for democratic development. In a key 5 June 1995

report on UNMIH, the UN Secretary General identified a continued UNMIH presence as critical

to the maintenance of forward momentum on security in Haiti.115 The UN Secretary General

recognized that “fundamental reform and professionalization of the country’s justice sector is

required for the new police force to operate effectively.”116

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 1996-1997

The IPSF, for the most part, did not have handguns…. Because of that, these guys were a
joke. Not so much that they looked stupid or incapable, but the people just didn’t respect
them.117
- US Special Forces Major Walter Pjetraj

In response to the June 1995 report, the UN established a follow-on mission to UNMIH,

one intended not only to continue the work of professionalizing the national police and military,

but to coordinate UN activities “to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and

economic rehabilitation in Haiti.” At the same time, the follow-on mission, designated the UN

115
A year later, the Secretary General again identified the national police remained unable to provide security on
their own, reinforcing the continued need for a UN presence: “the HNP has not reached the level of experience and
confidence required to control and defeat threats posed by subversive groups. It is clear, therefore, that UNSMIH's
military element, which is still the largest and best equipped security force in Haiti, is a key factor in the ability of
the Haitian authorities to contain the danger of destabilization by forces threatening democracy.” UNSC S/1996/813,
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti,” 01 October 1996.
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aecf28.html.
116
UNSC S/1996/416, para 21.
117
Statement by US Special Forces Major Walter Pjetraj. Cited in Kretchik et al, Invasion, Intervention,
‘Intervasion’, 141.

260
Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), was intended to be more robust and thus more capable of

maintaining the safe and secure environment so essential for development work. The UNSMIH

mandate was three-fold:

“Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National

Police; Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable
environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an
effective national police force; [and] Coordination of activities by the United Nations
system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic
rehabilitation in Haiti.”118

The mission dealt with a number of new issues. Undocumented Haitian workers within

the Haitian-Dominican border area were stirring up tensions between the two nations. The border

area had become quite volatile and the Dominicans vented their frustrations on Haiti’s border

police.119 A second problem highlighted by the UN Secretary General was the “recent gang

warfare in Cité Soleil.”120 This problem would remain unresolved and was part of a larger

security problem the UN and the government of Haiti faced. The UN missions were too small to

provide national coverage and policing was largely concentrated on the capital, Port-au-Prince.

Haitian municipalities created their own security forces, which were outside the national police

chain of command, and operated those forces outside national control. In addition, private

security forces multiplied, with major commercial entities employing foreign firms for

security.121 The state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within Haiti was challenged

118
UNSCR 1063 (1996).
119
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on UNSMIH, S/1997/244, 24 March 1997, para 4.
120
UNSC S/1997/244, para 31; and UNSC S/1997/564, para. 13. The UN position on gangs at this time was heavily
prejudiced, arguing the majority of the armed gangs in the poor neighbourhoods were pro-Aristide “chimères” or
“zenglendos” who used their “neighborhood security mandates” to run “protection rackets, extorting ‘market sellers
and other businesses in exchange for protection.” The UN did concede that “sometimes…[they] became involved in
drug smuggling and other illicit activities.” No mention was made of the FRAPH ‘gangs’ or those of Duvalier
supporters, which had better weapons holdings than did pro-Aristide gangs. James Cockayne, “The Futility of
Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs,”
The Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 741.
121
Hallward points out that in the 1980s, the Haitian people were ruled by an army of around 7,000 troops, poorly
trained and armed. By the 2000s, “the violent pacification of post-Aristide Haiti would require some 9,000 or so
international soldiers armed with state-of-the-art equipment, reinforced by some 6,000 internationally trained police

261
and undermined by many of these initiatives and gaps. At the UN’s urging, the Haitian

government sent out a nation-wide statement re-affirming that the National Police was the only

force authorized to employ force in Haiti. Municipalities were specifically ordered to disband

private forces immediately.122

By 1997, UNSMIH reported the national police were not yet fully operational.123 Over 77

police officers were dismissed for various offenses, including 11 senior police leaders.124

Corruption aside, the force lacked key capabilities, including a criminal investigative unit and the

police judiciare, the unit charged with working with Haiti’s judicial service. The latter was

assessed by UN experts as “non-functional.”125 Overall, the police service was still not fully

operational and Haitian ideas on SSR diverged from the UN’s international standards.

On the plus side, UNSMIH created and declared operational “a National Penal Unit” to

support the handling of major human rights abuse cases. However, the justice system was unable

to support the Penal Unit because judicial reform was still awaiting UN attention. UNSMIH

reported that the existing justice system “impeded proper use of that support.”126 Progress on the

penal system likewise remained underwhelming. The training of prison guards conducted was

poor and the number of jails and guards well below desirable thresholds. Overall, the prognosis

for progress was not positive.

and an eclectic (and rapidly expanding) array of around 10,000 private security guards.” Hallward, Damning the
Flood, xxxi.
122
UNSC S/1997/244, para 10.
123
Interestingly, Peter Hallward states that the Haitian National Police in 1997 enjoyed a “public support rate of 70
percent – more than enjoyed by any other Haitian institution.” Hallward, Damning the Flood, 86.
124
UNSC S/1997/244, para 12.
125
UNSC S/1997/244, para 13.
126
UNSC S/1997/244, para 16.

262
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), July-November 1997

…the resources available to the Haitian National Police remain insufficient and the
countries contributing the majority of the civilian police element are not prepared to
deploy their personnel without appropriate security backing….127
- Extract from UN Security Council report on UNTMIH

As with UNSMIH, the core mission of UNTMIH, a four-month transitional mission,

remained professionalizing the Haitian National Police ability to manage crowd control, rapid

reaction and presidential/palace security. Most of the UNSMIH-deployed foreign police officers

were not involved in front-line, daily patrolling activities, but instead were deployed into the

administrative department-level Haitian Police HQ to provide “assistance at the supervisory

level.”128 The UN believed the Haitian police force was capable of operating without tactical

supervision and instead focused its attention on the police force’s middle and senior ranks.

In response to an increase of “banditry and drug trafficking” which elevated insecurity in

Haiti, the mission shifted in a new and troubling direction.129 The mission stood up a special

police unit responsible for ensuring UNSMIH security. Specifically, the unit was given

responsibility, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to provide on-call assistance to those members

of the mission deployed into the outlying areas of Haiti. Planning identified the unit as providing

security for mission essential equipment as well as for mission personnel. The unit had no patrol

or mentor responsibilities with the Haitian police force. The unit signalled a new UN trend

towards prioritizing the security of UN personnel and equipment over that of the mission.130

127
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on UNTMIH, S/1997/832/Add.1, 20 November 1997, para 7.
128
UNSC S/1997/832/Add.1, para. 5.
129
UNSC S/1997/832/Add.1, para 15.
130
An incident in Juba, South Sudan, illustrates the issue and provided a number of troubling lessons. In July 2016,
UN elements, deployed in Juba, South Sudan, failed to respond to Western aid workers who appealed for help
during a crisis involving fighting between government and opposition forces. A number of UN units refused to
deploy to assist, claiming to be fully occupied with defending the UN compound against the government forces
assault. The civilians included a number of American citizens. Most were assaulted and at least three were raped. A
local South Sudanese journalist at the scene was shot dead. This was perhaps one of the best and most recent

263
Mission de Police Civile des Nations Unies en Haïti (MIPONUH), [United Nations Civilian
Police Mission in Haiti], 1997-2000

…the visibility of the National Police in both the capital and the provinces has been
enhanced further through increased patrolling activities. This stronger presence of the
National Police in the day-to-day life of the Haitian citizenry is perceived as a positive
development by the population.131
- Extract from UN Security Council report on MIPONUH

On 30 November 1997, UNTMIH successfully transferred responsibilities to the United

Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). The key members of the UNTMIH were

rolled into the new mission, but what made MIPONUH different from its three predecessor

missions, as its name suggested, was the absence of a military component. As a mission, it was

composed of civilian police and focussed on the development of Haiti’s police force. One of

areas discussed with Aristide’s successor, President René Préval, was the creation of a rural

police. However, despite fruitful discussions with President Préval, the UN decided not to pursue

the project, having concerns that “these [rural] policemen would be less well qualified and less

well paid than regular members of the National Police and at the risks of political pressure on

such a force, in the initial selection of which the local government authorities (collectivités

territoriales) would be involved.”132 Préval’s proposal would eventually be dropped due to

examples of the UN trend that has shifted UN personnel and equipment security to a higher priority than the mission
of protecting civilians. See, for example, the executive summary of the report by retired Dutch general Patrick
Cammaert,
https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/Public_Executive_Summary_on_the_Special_Investigation_Report_1_
Nov_2016.pdf; or “UN peacekeepers in South Sudan ‘ignored rape and assault of aid workers’,” Associated Press,
15 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/south-sudan-aid-worker-rape-attack-united-
nations-un.
131
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/1998/434, 28 May 1998, para 19.
132
President Préval and the Director-General of the Haitian National Police announced their plans to establish rural
police force and brought the plan to UN officials to develop the details on the implementation of the force. The UN
proved less than interested and in addition to claiming the program would run into more political interference in
rural areas than in the major urban centres, they also declined to take resources away from the SSR programming for
the Haitian National Police. UN officials insisted the rural police be integrated into the structure of the National
Police but declined to divert resources for the new force component, effectively killing the proposal. Thus, despite
the Haitian government recognizing a security concern and providing a proposed solution, the UN declined to
implement it. See UNSC S/1998/434, para 16; and UNSC S/1998/144, 20 February 1998, para 21.

264
political and financial issues, but once again, the episode pointed to a UN mission out of touch

with Haitian interests.

The UNTMIH mission was able to point to some indicators of success. In May 1999, the

tenth class of Haitian police cadets graduated from the Haitian Police Academy. What made this

milestone important was that the class was the first taught and run entirely by Haitian

personnel.133 A second indicator was the conduct of a number of successful small-scale

operations to counter “delinquency” and drug trafficking.134 Judicial reform, while remaining

“impeded by a lack of political will,” did show some peripheral success with the graduation of

the first class of 60 Haitians judges from the “École de la Magistrature… after a 24-week

training programme.”135

Overall, the mission showed limited albeit incremental progress, and remained hampered

by a deteriorating political and security situation within Haiti. The mission would also begin

feeling the effects of the suspension of aid by the US and its associated donors in 2000.136 The

National Police continued to hemorrhage police officers, with the Inspector General reporting

that 673 Haitian police officers were dismissed from the service between 1995 and 1999 for

various offenses.137 The state of respect for human rights among National Police members is

133
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/1999/579, 18 May 1999, para 24.
134
UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/2000/150, 25 February 2000, para 25.
135
UNSC S/2000/150, 23.
136
Following the return of Aristide to the presidency in 1995, President Clinton restored American US aid to Haiti.
The passage of the Dole-Helms Amendment in 1996 put pressure on Aristide to conform to and implement the IMF
and World Bank economic policies or face aid being cut off. By 2000, Clinton had moved to suspend American aid
over concerns about the legitimacy of parliamentary elections. President George W Bush would continue the aid
embargo, including blocking those multinational donors who had already committed funding to Haiti. Aid would not
be fully restored until July 2004 with the forced departure of Aristide. See Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz,
“Where has All the Money Gone?,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 29-30.
137
Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2000,” www.hrw.org. Under Haitian law, the Haitian National Police
leadership can only dismiss officers for corruption or human rights abuses. See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH
Haiti,” 2n11.

265
reflected in the fact that MICIVIH identified 130 violations of human rights cases under

investigation.138

Mission Internationale Civile d’Appui en Haïti, (MICAH) [International Civilian Support

Mission in Haiti], 2000-2001

[The UN General Assembly] Affirms the will of the United Nations to continue to
accompany Haiti in its democratic, economic and social development, in particular
during the next crucial period.139
- UN General Assembly Resolution 54/193

The International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) was a peacebuilding

mission with the mandate:

to support the democratization process and assist the Haitian authorities with the
development of democratic institutions; assist the Haitian authorities in the reform
and the strengthening of the Haitian system of justice, including its penal institutions,
and to promote the Office of the Ombudsman; support the efforts of the Government of
Haiti to professionalize the Haitian National Police through a special training and
technical assistance programme and help the Government to coordinate bilateral and
multilateral aid in this area; support the efforts of the Government of Haiti aimed at the
full observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and provide technical
assistance for the organization of democratic elections and to collaborate with the
Government of Haiti in the coordination of bilateral and multilateral assistance.140

The MICAH mission not only undertook to work on institutional processes which

required many years, if not decades to succeed, it was also forced to work in the aftermath of the

turbulent November to December 2000 presidential elections.141 The elections triggered the

138
Human Rights Watch. The report indicated a rise in police killings in 1999 to 66, up from 31 reported the year
prior.
139
UN General Assembly Resolution 54/193, International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 18 February 2000.
140
UNGAR 54/193.
141
The Haitian government held legislative, municipal and local elections on May 21, 2000, and the presidential
election on November 26, 2000. Haiti had been without a working parliament since January 1999 and international
aid money was being held up as a result. The May elections saw voter electoral cards for the first time, which
provided picture identification. The OAS monitors noted that “[t]he electoral card was well received by the majority
of Haitian society and understood as an acquisition, in particular by those Haitians in rural areas who found
themselves for the first time with a picture identification. “Over 90 percent of eligible voters were registered
successfully, and the elections were, in the opinion of the OAS observers, “the high point of the electoral process.”
They further stated: “An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the polls. Very few incidents of violence
were reported. The Haitian National Police responded efficiently and professionally to situations that could have
deteriorated into violence. Party poll watchers and national observers were present at almost every polling station

266
beginning of an increasingly violent crisis and undermining of the ‘safe and secure’ environment

into which the mission had deployed. Members of MICAH were unarmed, a change from

previous missions.

As a mission, MICAH suffered for some time from budget uncertainty with the UN

contributing just over US$9million of the mission’s US$24million budget, and donor nations

contributing the remainder. The US decided to suspend aid funding to Haiti starting in 2000

because of what it termed election irregularities.142 It also terminated the International Criminal

observed by the OAS and performed their jobs for the most part in an objective manner. Despite long lines, voters
were able to cast their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most voters were able to find their polling stations
with relative ease.” Unfortunately, the methodology for calculating percentages which then allowed for the
allocation of senate seats, was applied in a flawed manner and led the OAS monitoring team to conclude “the senate
results were flawed.” The material on the 2000 elections is drawn from the Organization of American States (OAS)
Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, SG/UPD-1194/00, “The Election Observation Mission for the Legislative,
Municipal and Local Elections in Haiti February to July, 2000,” 12 December 2000.
142
The flawed results stemmed from a failure to run a second round of voting in some races and from a
miscalculation of voting results percentages. For example, the OAS outlined the results in the Las Cahobas district
where the Lavalas candidate was elected and credited with 51.84, whereas the OAS calculated the vote percentage
lower at 46.9 percent. In all races, the Lavalas candidate was far ahead in votes of the other candidates. Ironically,
the team noted that similar problems had plagued the last four Haitian elections. One issue was the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) was constituted when required for elections and was not a permanent body. Despite a
voting process being certified by the OAS monitoring team as free and fair, the head of the OAS Electoral Mission
to Haiti, Orlando Marville, claimed that the CEP had committed a “serious error affecting the number of
parliamentary races won in the first round.” The CEP president, Léon Manus, countered that the system used to
calculate the voting percentages for each candidate had not been invented just for this election, but had been in
effect for the last four and was therefore an accepted international standard method. Manus would later reverse his
opinion on the elections, and refuse to certify the legislative and local election results, leading to him crossing into
the Dominican Republic to fly to Miami for asylum in the US, claiming he feared for his life. Peter Hallward has
documented Manus’ claims about coercion by Aristide and Preval to certify the elections as free and fair with minor
irregularities. Hallward points out that two and a half years later, Manus was the frontman for the newly created
‘Group of 184’ launch. The US government seized on the alleged problems to denounce the elections, claiming that
Aristide’s intransigence in refusing to deal with contested election results had created a crisis. A 2008 US
Congressional Research Service report would claim the elections were boycotted by opposition groups and that as a
result the “turnout was very low, with estimates ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating,” this
despite OAS monitoring noting over 93 percent of eligible voter having registered and 60 percent of those registered
actually voting. Thus, despite winning the presidency with over 90 percent of the vote and his party Fanmi Lavalas
emerging with uncontested control over parliament, Aristide’s administration was in trouble before it began
governing. In fact, the 21 May 2000 elections saw a high voter turnout running around 60 percent of registered
voters. However, the second round held in July 2000, for rural seats, saw a very low turnout, partially because the
opposition parties, which had been devastated in the first round, concluded cleverly that a boycott would allow the
elections to be cast in doubt. The third round held in November 2000 was likewise subject to low voter turnout and,
again, an opposition boycott. The third round also included controversy because of irregularities in vote counts. See
OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, SG/UPD-1194/00, “The Election Observation Mission for the
Legislative, Municipal and Local Elections in Haiti February to July, 2000,” 12 December 2000. See also “Haitians
Rise Up against OAS ‘Impertinence,” Haitian Progres 18, no. 12 (June 7-13, 2000), reproduced at
www.faculty.webster.edu; and Hallward, Damning The Flood, 79-81.

267
Investigative Assistance Program in May 2000, again because of concerns over the conduct of

the Haitian congressional elections. The aid suspensions placed MICAH’s development program

in danger and in 2001, the UN Development Program (UNDP) ceased funding police reform

projects in Haiti.143 The UNDP would not re-engage in Haiti until 2003.144

Once again, judicial reform remained undeveloped and appeared to be dead in the water.

The UN Secretary General’s report of August 2000 included the comment: “I cannot but deplore

once again the delays in implementing the judicial reform process.” The same report noted the

prisoner population in Haiti had grown from 1,500 in 1995, to over 4000 by 2000 with most

prisoners held in pre-trial detention at the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince.145 One of the

areas provoking significant interest was that of so-called “deportees,” Haitians who had

committed serious crimes in the US or Canada. They had been tried, convicted, and served

sentences in US or Canadian jails, and then were deported back to Haiti upon completion of their

sentences. The Haitian authorities received these felons and promptly jailed them in the name of

public security. That arbitrary jailing was illegal and, in the eyes of the UN, required resolution

between Haiti, the US, and Canada.146 One of the reasons that particular problem surfaced and

was brought to the Secretary General’s attention was the visits of members of MICAH to

detention centres and jails in Haiti.

143
Note that the World Bank had halted development assistance in 1997 when President Préval had suspended
Parliament and ruled by decree: the suspension of assistance continued through 2000.
144
Terry F. Buss and Adam Gardner, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid has Failed and What We can do About
it (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 76-77.
145
UN General Assembly Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of
human rights in Haiti, 28 August 2000, 11.
146
The problem was that most if not all of those transferred back to Haiti were involved in violent crimes, often
within the drug trade, and were thus a danger to Haitian society once transferred back to Haiti. However, Haiti’s
ability to deal with these violent criminals was limited. Jail became the means of effecting that control. UN General
Assembly Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in
Haiti, 28 August 2000, 16.

268
 With the end of the MICAH mission in 2001, the UN would disappear from Haiti until

2004. During this hiatus, the limited gains which had been made in the SSR sector were almost

completely reversed.

La Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH), 2004-2017

…we are not only going to help stabilize the current situation, but assist the Haitians over
the long haul and really help them pick up the pieces and build a stable country.147
- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

We try on the margins of the mandate to do what we can, to do simple things for people
to meet emergency needs…but we don’t have a development mandate and never will. 148
- UN Special Representative Hedi Annabi

The UN would re-launch into Haiti with the Mission des Nations Unies pour la

stabilisation en Haïti [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti] or MINUSTAH on 1 June

2004, following the Multinational Interim Force or MIF.149 The MIF was deployed in response to

the departure of President Aristide following an apparent coup.150 Established by UN Security

Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1542 (2004) as a Chapter VII mission, MINUSTAH’s central

mandate was focussed on three development areas: the creation of a secure and stable

147
Quote attributed to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. “Security Council Authorizes Three-Month Multinational
Interim Force for Haiti,” UN News, 29 February 2004. Cited in Brian W. Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti: A
Progress Report,” DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2009-007, January 2009, 3. http://cradpdf.drdc-
rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc84/p531532.pdf.
148
Quote attributed to UN Special Representative Hedi Annabi. “UN Force in Haiti Likely to be Renewed,”
International Herald Tribune, 8 October 2008. Cited in Greene, 18.
149
The MIF, acting under a UN Chapter VII mandate, ran from 29 February to 31 July 2004. Its mission under
UNSCR 1529 (2004) was to “[t]o contribute to a secure and stable environment in Haiti, facilitate the provision of
humanitarian assistance, assist the Haitian police and Coast Guard, and to coordinate their efforts with the OAS
Special Mission to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation.” Haiti’s Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Boniface Alexandre, had been sworn in as Haiti’s interim president upon Aristide’s departure, and Alexandre
immediately requested UN assistance.
150
Without exploring whether Aristide resigned under duress or to save his own life, his removal was clearly part of
a coup. Interestingly, an article by Michael Wines mentioned “Mr. Aristide was ‘under protection’ and
incommunicado in Bangui [in the Central African Republic or CAR].” Wines goes on to say that the CAR a
“destitute republic, like Haiti once a French colony, depends heavily on foreign aid. Its decision to accommodate
Mr. Aristide is at once a favor to France and the United States, which supported his resignation, and a potential
black mark in view of Mr. Aristide’s critics.” See Michael Wines, “The Aristide Resignation: Exile; The Host of
Aristide is Uneasy,” The New York Times, 3 March 2004.

269
environment; the creation of a stable political process that would allow the extension of the state

authority throughout Haiti and support good governance practices at the local levels; and the

promotion and protection of human rights.151

For the first few years, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) tasks

involved “all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups,”

“neutralization of urban gangs and their incorporation into appropriate DDR programs…curbs on

crime…[and] a purge of the Haitian National Police.”152 The mission was also responsible for

laying the foundation for the February 2006 elections – municipal, parliamentary and

presidential. It successfully completed its tasks. Few electoral irregularities were reported and

over 60 percent of the Haitian population voted.

Haiti’s human rights picture was quite poor during first few years of MINUSTAH, due to

the dechoukaj directed against pro-Aristide supporters.153 Initially, MINUSTAH paid no heed to

human rights investigations. During an October 2004 interview with MINUSTAH military

commander, Brazilian General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, human rights experts affiliated

151
The mission was a mixed civilian-military stabilization mission with a strong emphasis on security sector reform.
The mission was capped with the Resolution specifically identifying the civilian component at no more than 1,622
civilian police; and the military component at 6,700 troops. The Resolution specifically identified that MINUSTAH
would “cooperate and coordinate with the OAS and CARICOM…” By 2008, the MINUSTAH manning levels had
in fact increased to 7,060 military and 2,091 civilians. See UN Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004), 30 April
2004.
http://www.un.org/fr/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1542(2004)&TYPE=&referer=http://www.un.org/fr/
peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml&Lang=E.
152
Despite the Haitian Army having been disbanded in December 1995, MINUSTAH still required DDR programs
for former Fad’H members and their insurgent partners (e.g. FRAPH). See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2.
153
Hallward provides a graphic account of how the pro-coup leaders fashioned a COIN campaign against the pro-
Lavalas forces, having learned through their American teachers that “it is much easier to split and control a
revolutionary movement [like Lavalas] if you can first force it onto the paramilitary terrain.” Key, of course, had
been the active complicity of the Americans, Canadians and French in decapitating the movement by removing
Aristide not just from the presidency, but from the country; and detaining him incommunicado to prevent him from
making the siren call to arms. See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 253-58.

270
with Harvard University learned that “the commanders of the mission did not see such [human

rights] investigations as part of MINUSTAH’s mandate.”154

General Augusto Heleno’s perspective can be linked to the deliberate US strategy of

containment employed against Haiti. While the strategy of containment had its origins in the

Cold War and was previously aimed at communism, it was now focussed on the repression of

Haiti’s disruptive peasant and urban poor democracy, which threatened the status quo and

contained their revolutionary intent. That was deemed necessary to prevent mass migration from

Haiti, a likely phenomenon if the country was allowed to descend into civil war.

The American tools for containment remained almost entirely the same, namely the army

and the paramilitaries, as well as the press.155 Two new tools were now added to the containment

tool chest. The United Nations was conscripted into the US strategy, and that will be explored

later. The other tool was the international and national media which was carrying the narratives

of containment to the world. A sophisticated public relations campaign was undertaken by the

Haitian elites in conjunction with the United States with two objectives in mind.156 The first was

an international campaign to undermine UN and OAS support for Aristide and permit the use of

international forces to destroy the democratic movement in Haiti.157 The second was the creation

154
Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012), 79.
155
The US enabled the army, as well as the army’s paramilitary proxies, to contain peasant democracy through
money and equipment transfers, as well as specialized training.
156
The media campaign undertaken by the ‘Group of 184,’ and led by Haitian businessman Andy Apaid, was
carefully orchestrated to ensure the Group appeared to occupy the non-violent middle road and therefore a
reasonable compromise to the extremist, violence of the far right, then making its assault in the north in the area of
Gonaives, and Aristide’s supporters, who were portrayed as revolutionary and equally as violent. An example of the
ostensibly reasonable, and therefore attractive, alternative, can be found here:
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4326037/ns/world_news/t/no-peace-sight-haiti. For more detail on Andy Apaid and his
opposition role to Aristide and his supporters, see Thomas M. Griffin, “Haiti Human Rights Investigation:
November 11-21, 2004,” University of Miami School of Law, Center for the Study of Human Rights, January 14,
2005. http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf.
157
Peter Hallward provides the example of the international NGO, Christian Aid, using aid monies to finance, on
behalf of the Group of 184, and to feed into the narrative emerging about Aristide being an obstacle to peace and
security. Aristide himself spoke about the diversion of aid monies destined for Haiti and suspended in the aftermath

271
of a national campaign that would create doubt in the minds of Aristide’s supporters by

obscuring the reality behind Aristide’s removal from power.158 The overall campaign aimed to

make subsequent UN combat operations more acceptable within the international community.

MINUSTAH combat operations against armed gangs began in 2005 and continued to

2007 until the public backlash against the “collateral damage” forced the UN to implement a

different strategy.159 The UN’s Operation Iron Fist, for example, was conducted on 6 July 2005,

with the intent of capturing a gang leader in Cité Soleil. The operation led to “numerous civilian

deaths” after the UN forces expended over 20,000 rounds of small arms fire, numerous grenades

and mortar rounds, as well as aerial machine gun fire from UN helicopters.160 Reports estimated

that civilian casualties numbered from 10 to a high reported “in the dozens.”

of 2000 elections, into a “a propaganda and destabilization campaign waged against our [Aristide’s] government and
against Famni Lavalas.” See Hallward, Damming the Flood, 182-3, 331.
158
Photos of Aristide on arrival at the Bangui M’Poko airport in the Central African Republic were shot as part of
the campaign to trigger comparisons with other Haitian leaders who departed Haiti for exile, like Jean-Claude
Duvalier. The intent was to undermine Aristide’s narrative of a forced exile and instead present him and his family
as having fled voluntarily. That counter-narrative spread the message that Aristide had abandoned Haiti and his
followers and was quite successful in creating divisions within the Lavalas movement. The abandonment narrative
was carefully crafted around Aristide’s post-1994 return to power. At that time, his return to power had been
preconditioned based on American pressure for a structural adjustment programme (SAP) that the IMF and World
Bank wanted implemented. The SAP, as will be explored later, was disastrous and harmed many of Aristide’s
supporters, some of whom saw this as a dangerous compromise by Aristide. See, for example, Jason Podur, “Kofi
Annan’s Haiti,” New Left Review 37 (January-February 2006): 151-159; and Clara James, “The Raboteau Revolt,” Z
Magazine Online 15, no. 12 (December 2002), www.zmag.org.
159
Initially, the MINUSTAH made no effort at differentiating the gangs operating in Haiti, categorizing them all as
armed and criminal, without further differentiation based on motives, background, or political affiliation. In 2006, a
better taxonomy was provided by a consultant to MINUSTAH: “Popular Militias: they often act in a semi-official
capacity with the connivance of the local authorities, control entire neighbourhoods and, in this capacity, are the
most dangerous of all the armed groups. Women participate in them and carry weapons; Vigilant Brigades: they
patrol in the more defined territory of their immediate neighbourhoods. Women participate in them and do not
usually use weapons; Popular Organisations; they have a political basis and do not target women; [and] The
Chimères or criminal gangs: they control neighbourhoods which are not their own through intimidation and
racketeering and instil a generalised sense of fear and insecurity. Women are involved in them, both as members or
partners of the male members, and are also victims of their violence, especially sexual violence.” See Wiza Loutis,
“Evaluation de la situation des femmes dans le cadre de la violence armée en Haïti,” June 2006, cited in Eirin
Mobekk and Anne M. Street, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: What role should the EU play in
Haiti? Recommendations for change,” act!onaid international, October 2006, 9.
160
US Embassy in Port-au-Prince cable. Cited in A. Walter Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (2006-
07): 812. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903320410.

272
 The assault also coincided with the start of the UN’s disarmament campaign. By January

2006, that campaign was credited with collecting only 30 weapons161 Overall, between 2004 and

2007, MINUSTAH launched at least 15 combat operations against Port-au-Prince gangs. The

largest was launched on 9 February 2007, and involved over 700 UN combat soldiers plus

Haitian national police and UN Civil Police (UNPOL).162 Dubbed Operation Jauru

Sudamericana, it was the largest combat operation conducted by the mission. General Dos

Santos Cruz, the Brazilian commander of the operation pledged to “…cleanse these areas of the

gangs who are robbing the people of their security.”163 His troops took a page from the US

Marine occupation, broadcasting the following message in Creole to the citizens within the

Boston neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince:

BANDITS! LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS AND SURRENDER. WE WILL NOT

HESITATE TO USE THE NECESSARY FORCE TO PLACE YOU UNDER ARREST.
TURN YOURSELVES IN NOW. IF YOU DO NOT SURRENDER, YOU WILL
CERTAINLY BE TAKEN BY FORCE. LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS, PUT YOUR
HANDS ON YOUR HEAD, GET OUT OF THE HOUSE QUIETLY. YOU BANDITS:
IT IS NOT OUR INTENT, BUT WE WILL SHOOT IF IT IS NECESSARY. TURN
YOURSELVES IN NOW.164

MINUSTAH began to shift its focus mid-2006, towards governance and developing state

institutions, particularly the judiciary.165 The shift did not mean that security within Haiti was in

good order, but rather, reflected the election of René Préval to the presidency (2006 to 2011) for

a second time. Not satisfied with MINUSTAH’s DDR program and responding to domestic and

161
The disarmament campaign was implemented in a selective fashion, mainly targeting the capital’s slum
neighbourhoods and therefore mainly pro-Aristide groups. Not surprisingly, especially after the dechoukaj following
Aristide’s overthrow, his supporters were ‘reluctant’ to hand over their only protection.
Hallward, Damning the Flood, 270.
162
Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 815-16.
163
“Haiti: UN peacekeepers launch large-scale operation against criminal gangs,” UN News, 09 February 2007.
www.news.un.org.
164
Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 817.
165
Sean Blaschke, Andrew Lucas Cramer, Marcy Hersh, Carina Lakovits, Leila Makarechi, Alejandro and Gomez
Palma, “Haiti: A Future beyond Peacekeeping,” Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs,
2009, 19.

273
international criticism over the draconian measures undertaken by MINUSTAH, Préval formed a

National Disarmament Commission (NDC) to provide better options for a national DDR

campaign.

The campaign developed and accepted by Préval and the UN was built on five pillars: the

disarmament and reinsertion of armed gangs; the reinsertion of youth; the reinsertion of women;

a legislative framework to control arms; and community disarmament.166 The new program

shifted away from a national level campaign and instead focussed on community-based DDR to

develop safe and secure neighbourhoods. It retained a national nexus, however, through a

renewed commitment by MINUSTAH officials to re-emphasize the building of the national

institutions necessary to support the local level work.

Between 2007 and 2009, MINUSTAH’s mission shifted away from “targeting localised

armed gang violence” which had seen the use of heavy combat, towards a “more regionalized

[approach to] crime such as arms and drug trafficking, as well as… [crimes and] wrongdoing

affecting government revenue.”167 The latter was the beginning of a shift towards rebuilding

Haiti’s state institutions and re-instilling confidence in their capabilities. However,

MINUSTAH’s mandate was too large based on the resources provided and the tasks were too

complex.168 The mission suffered from a shortage of personnel, both military and the civilian.169

166
Mobekk and Street, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” 14.
167
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2.
168
Brian Greene points out that while “there is broad agreement on what needs to be done in Haiti, it is increasingly
clear UNMUSTAH’s current configuration and mandate are no longer suitable to the task at hand.” He believes that
the international community will never abandon Haiti, but that its commitment will drop dramatically, well below
what is required for true peacebuilding in Haiti. See Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 18.
169
Interestingly, MINUSTAH was assessed as costing close to US$575 million annually. Development money,
however, was proving much harder to gain commitment from the international community. See Jonathan M. Katz,
“UN force in Haiti likely to be renewed,” USA Today, 08 October 2008.
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2008-10-08-183591997_x.htm.

274
 Haiti’s state institutions also remained weak. Despite being essential for good governance

and the protection of human rights, the judicial system remained “largely dysfunctional,”

plagued by chronic prison overcrowding, “prolonged pre-trial detention” and little cooperation

between the police and the courts.170 Corruption remained rampant and the application of the rule

of law was usually biased and showed partiality towards the wealthy, as well as the economic

and political elite.

The new DDR campaign began with the 2006 establishment of the community violence

reduction (CVR) program. The program targeted the members and potential recruits of the gangs

within the slum areas by working to “create economic and social opportunities with a view to

extracting former gang members and at-risk youth…from violence.”171 The program tried, with

some success, to bridge the divide between rival gangs by focussing on shared economic and

social conditions.172 Projects were designed to cater to gang members from both sides (pro-

Aristide and pro-coup) by tackling their shared grievances within a shared setting. Joint projects

also avoided the CVR program being accused of favouring one side over the other.

In the case of the CVR program, MINUSTAH’s DDR section determined that the aim of

the program was to develop grassroots level strategies for youth designed to provide alternatives

to armed gangs. The alternatives needed to be empowering and more appealing than gang

170
“Report of the Secretary General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” S/2006/1003, 19 December 2006,
7/18. Brian Greene points out that in February 2004, some 3800 prisoners in the jails were released during the
uprisings to oust President Aristide and most of the criminal record system was destroyed. See Greene,
“Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 9.
171
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,”, 8. See also Moritz Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration in unconventional settings: the case of MINUSTAH’s community violence reduction,” International
Peacekeeping, Vol. 24, No. 3 (June 2017): 410-33.
172
A 2013 interview with a member of MINUSTAH’s DDR section included a complaint about the scope of their
work within the new mandate that was unintentionally ironic: “…money is injected into community through ‘soft’
projects. You give training to elements at risk, you work with women, you create revenue-generating activities, you
repair roads, you finance some festivals, and so on. But the resources are spread too thin, there’s no logic.” As
Schuberth points out, that shift from DDR programs based on individuals, to the programs like CVR and based on
geography, showed promise as a progressive way forward. See Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration in unconventional settings,” 426.

275
membership, as well as provide a source of income to youth within the urban slums.173 The

program as implemented was designed as a bottom-up peacebuilding effort rather than top-down

state-building, and was intended to be linked with national institutional development. That nexus

was not well understood and led to the CVR being criticized for bypassing traditional

government services, a not unfamiliar complaint about externally constituted programs.174

International work continued on the Haitian national police. MINUSTAH adopted a

three-prong approach, based on policing, border security and prison construction.175 Policing

between 2006 and 2011 saw the force increase by over 3,000 trained officers.176 Yet the force

was adding new and specialized capabilities including border control, corrections work and

firefighting.177

The additional tasks required additional personnel. In addition to the 14,000 required for

regular policing duties, the force required an additional 18,000 to 20,000 uniformed personnel

trained for the new specialities. Recruiting suitable personnel and training them was a lengthy

process. By August 2008, the force included only 8,546 officers and, of that number, about 1,000

were “assigned non-policing duties.”178 By 2011, the police force was around 10,000 strong.179

173
Schuberth, 422. Moritz Schuberth identified “the ultimate goal of CVR is to cut the stream of new recruits from
the community to UAGs [urban armed gangs] by replacing the income-generating function” provided by the UAGs.
174
Schuberth, 424. One of the success stories from the CVR experience was the Haitianization of over 70% of the
CVR staff, giving Haiti a well-trained capability, as of 2012, that could continue and expand the program as desired.
See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 8.
175
Kevin Walby and Jeffrey Monoghan, “’Haitian Paradox’ or Dark Side of the Security-Development Nexus?
Canada’s Role in the Securitization of Haiti, 2004-2009,” Alternates: Global, Local, Political 36, no. 4 (2011): 275.
www.alt.sagepub.com.
176
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 7n58. The 18th through 22nd classes of the Haitian Police Academy
graduated during that period.
177
Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in unconventional settings,” 424. MINUSTAH’s
mandate identified arms control and border security as new tasks requiring the mission provide “technical support
for comprehensive border management” to the Haitians.
178
Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” iii.
179
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 7. Growing the police force was complicated by the force’s high attrition
rate. Reasons for the high attrition featured a high dismissal rate for corruption and human rights abuses. Vetting of
new officers at this time was badly in arrears as many of the new candidates were either ex-Army or were former
police in some capacity.

276
 According to a 2009 Government of Canada assessment, MINUSTAH had its greatest

impact on security, marked by political crime nosediving as a result of MINUSTAH’s work.180

Yet the assessment did not take into consideration the rising commitment of “common crime” in

Haiti involving drugs, gang violence and kidnappings. MINUSTAH operations shifted away

from an emphasis on ‘armed gangs’ and instead prioritized combatting regional crimes like arms

smuggling and drugs.181

Despite this shift in focus between 2012 and 2015, MINUSTAH was still confronted by

‘common crime,’ including an epidemic of lynchings.182 The high incidence of actual and

attempted lynchings reflected “a lack of confidence in police and justice…” revealing that

lynching was “implicitly an accepted practice.”183 Ironically, UN investigations of the practice

found that the lynchings took place in urban areas which had the highest number of police per

capita! Further, any claim of progress was damned by MINUSTAH’s statement that:

[w]hile Haiti is far more stable today than it was prior to MINUSTAH’s deployment in
2004, it is apparent that the peacebuilding campaign has not produced the kind of results
that the mission’s backers had hoped for when they embarked on this most recent
intervention.184

MINUSTAH viewed Haiti through rose-coloured glasses. Not surprisingly, progress in

political stability led to the UN expanding the mandate of the mission yet again in 2009. The UN

Security Council added the promotion of political dialogue and reconciliation to MINUSTAH’s

180
Greene, iii.
181
Because Haiti has been a major transshipment point for narcotics, the Americans have given significant aid to
Haiti to develop a counter-narcotic capability, which they have continued to fund. That continued funding explains
why drugs are always a Haitian priority for crime prevention activities. Outside of cannabis use, Haitian drug use is
considered quite low due to poverty. See “Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State,” International Crisis
Group, Policy Briefing no. 12, 30 October 2006, 6. www.crisisgroup.org
182
MINUSTAF Human Rights Section Report dated January 2017.
https://minustah.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170117_exec_summary_haiti_-
_taking_justice_into_ones_own_hands_-_en.pdf. The period in question saw 483 lynchings (or attempted lynchings)
take place largely in the vicinity of the capital, with only one solitary conviction.
183
MINUSTAF HR Section Report.
184
MINUSTAF HR Section Report, iv.

277
tasks “in anticipation of presidential and parliamentary elections the following year.”185 At the

same time, the mission implemented “consolidation” measures directed by the UN Security

Council. They included the reconfiguration of the military forces coupled to “a small force

reduction.”186

The 2010 earthquake led MINUSTAH to shelve its consolidation plan while the mission

dealt with the crisis. Rather than the force reduction called for under the consolidation plan,

MINUSTAH’s “force levels [were]… increased to boost security and support recovery and

reconstruction.”187 By 2012, the NGO International Crisis Group or ICG identified Haiti as being

in the midst of four significant transitions:

…from armed violence to reconciliation and peace; from a non-democratic culture to a

democratic society; from a failed to a modern nation-state; and from a situation of
chronic and pervasive poverty and social injustice to a more thriving and equitable
economy….188

The year 2012 also saw MINUSTAH confront a remobilization by former Haitian Army

members. A number of former soldiers as well as young men who were interested in becoming

soldiers, began to take over public spaces all over the country. Many were armed. Their activities

included occupying government buildings and establishing illegal checkpoints. They demanded

President Michel Martelly, elected in May 2011, honour his pledge to reconstitute the Haitian

Army and that the government pay military pensions to demobilized soldiers and police.189

As of March 2017, and despite the plan to wrap-up the larger MINUSTAH mission and

replace it with a substantially smaller mission, UN Secretary General António Gutierrez stated

185
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2.
186
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.”
187
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.”
188
ICG also claimed that “the earthquake [added] a fifth transition: from a destroyed country to one not only rebuilt
but ideally transformed.” This last transition was not defined and was clearly defined by the interests of the NGO.
See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 4.
189
“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.”

278
publicly that the national police service “has yet to build adequate capacity to address all

instability threats inside the country, independently of an international uniformed presence and in

line with human rights standards.”190 The police per capita ratio remained low at 1.3 police

officers per 1,000 Haitians.191 The Secretary General also damned MINUSTAH with faint praise,

noting, on the eve of the mission’s withdrawal from Haiti, that the overall security situation,

despite “[g]rowing tensions linked to socioeconomic grievances notwithstanding, key indicators,

including crime and civil protests, remained within historically established statistical

parameters.”192 His assessment of judicial institutional reform progress was not much better,

noting that “prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding” remained significant human

rights challenges.193

Summary

[I]t was the first time for the United Nations to intervene in a country that was not in war,
but with an exceptional proliferation of arms, gangs, and political violence, and in the
urban context. The United Nations didn’t know how to deal with all of this. So in the end
Haiti served a bit like a laboratory to try to understand what to do.194
- Professor of Peace Studies Moritz Schuberth

Life after Jean-Claude Duvalier saw efforts to introduce democratic governance

undermined almost immediately. Despite the growth and maturity of the many democratic

grassroots peasant organizations which spearheaded the 1990 election of President Aristide,

190
The UN plan calls for the mission of over 2300 peacekeeping soldiers, police and civilians to be withdrawn
gradually and replaced with a smaller police presence of some 295. Charles, Jacqueline, Miami Herald, “U.N.
secretary general: Time for peacekeeping mission in Haiti to end,” March 17 2017.
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article139256983.html.
191
For comparison, Canada, considered as having one of the lowest rates in the West, possesses 1.88 police officers
per 1,000 Canadians. See Catharine Tunney, “Number of police officers per Canadian hits 13-year low, Goodale
told,” CBC News, June 27, 2018. www.cbc.ca.
192
UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-general on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2017/604, 12
July 2017. https://minustah.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1720836.pdf.
193
UNSCR S/2017/604.
194
Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in unconventional settings,”417.

279
many countries, including the United States, opposed his rule because they suspected his

‘socialist’ agenda. Under Jean-Claude’s regime, the international community was responsible for

reinvigorating the Haitian Army through training and equipment assistance, which allowed it to

resume its role as oppressor of popular movements that challenged the status quo. Its

invigoration culminated in the 1991 coup against President Aristide.

International efforts to negotiate a solution between Aristide and the Army stalled. The

imposition of an embargo against the coup regime in 1993 was undermined by the failure of the

international community (the US in particular) to respect the embargo.195 Despite the embargo,

over US$67 million worth of clothing sewn in Haiti was imported into the US and at least one oil

tanker from Texas delivered oil to Haiti during the embargo.196 The Bush Administration (1989

to 1993) suspended its foreign aid to Haiti, creating massive hardship, including starvation, for

the many Haitians.197

The 1994 ‘intervasion’ by the international community and the subsequent hand-off from

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the UNMIH began the occupation of Haiti by the UN.

The invasion marked the first time the UN had authorized forceful regime change, in this case,

from coup regime to a democratically elected leader. It also marked the shift towards Structural

Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the domination of Haitian fiscal policy by the IMF and World

Bank, as well as the ‘NGOization’ of Haiti and its attendant loss of sovereignty.198 With

195
Haitians were starving as a result of the embargo imposed on Haiti, so it is quite possible that transgressions
noted may have been in response to those dire conditions. If so, it raises the question of why a humanitarian
emergency was not declared, allowing humanitarian goods to be brought in legally.
196
Paul Farmer, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, and Patrice Nevil, “Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti,” The Lancet 361
(February 2003): 420-23. See also Kernaghan, “Skirting the Embargo.”
197
While the Bush administration did allow humanitarian aid to continue to flow into Haiti, Haiti not only lacked the
capacity to effectively distribute the aid, the country was also in considerable turmoil that aid was not reaching much
of Haiti’s rural areas.
198
The literature is unclear on SAPs. I am using SAPs as Structural Program Policies and SAP as the Structural
Adjustment Program. Each nation targeted by an IMF/World Bank SAP will have a number of SAPs to fulfill,
somewhat akin to the program’s objectives.

280
Aristide’s return to power, economic aid from the Clinton administration began to flow back into

Haiti. However, in 1995, when Aristide pushed back against the SAP requirements levied against

Haiti, the US quickly suspended direct aid money to Haiti, including previously promised aid

and instead began funnelling it through various international banking agencies, USAID and what

Peter Hallward has termed “a plethora of liberally funded technocrats and NGOs.199

The message was clear. Opposition to internationally mandated IMF and World Bank

reforms for fragile nations like Haiti would not be tolerated.200 Haiti’s loss of sovereignty did not

stop with its economic sector, however. It extended into Haiti’s security sector, driven by a

lengthy and unfruitful UN-led process to create a Haitian national police force, based on an

international community model and training not wanted by the majority of Haitians. UN

involvement in Haiti showed in limited gains during this period.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR)

programs were badly serviced and poorly understood. Most of the UN missions in Haiti

approached SSR as separate from the related fields of penal and judicial reform. The limited

duration of most missions (six months usually) worked against the ambitious program goals

identified and implemented.

Programming by the UN was often disjointed, uncoordinated and poorly planned. With

the coup of 2004, the UN’s progress on SSR was completely undone. Future progression on SSR

looks unlikely to produce the results desired. The employment of combat troops to deal with

199
Hallward, Damming the Flood, 60.
200
Withholding of aid monies became a frequent weapon wielded by the US to ensure compliance by Haitian
leaders. In 2000, for example, the US withheld foreign aid to Haiti following Haitian opposition groups’ complaints
about minor irregularities associated with the 2000 elections. The US was also able to prevail on its allies and other
agencies to follow suit. Tragically, the majority of the aid withheld was earmarked for education programming,
potable water, and health care. Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 382.

281
Haitian gangs also damaged the relationship between the UN and ordinary Haitians, leading to

suspicion and mistrust. Rebuilding that trust should be a priority for any future missions.

282
Chapter Ten – Understanding Foreign Dominance

Should we have learned by now that outsiders cannot solve Haiti’s problems? For a time
in the early twentieth century it was a US protectorate. Should it not now be left alone to
sort itself out? The proposition is attractive only in the abstract. Haiti is clearly unable to
sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos.
Our globalized world cannot afford a political vacuum, whether in the mountains of
Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the remaining superpower.1
- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

[T]he most effective interventions are not military.2

- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

There are two principal reasons for the almost total absence of examples of humanitarian,
military intervention. Firstly, because it had no reason to feature in the superpower
interplay and secondly, because humanitarian intervention has been perceived as
transgressing Article 2(7) [of the UN Charter], that well-established international tenet of
non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs.3
- Retired British Colonel Richard M. Connaughton

Before outlining lessons, a review of those elements of the core strategy undertaken by

the West to deter fundamental change in Haitian development is warranted.4 Indeed, the core

elements of Western interventions in Haiti are the building blocks of the West’s modus operandi

in Haiti. They lead to similar outcomes and are repeated over and over again. Recognizing the

West’s modus operandi and its effects will allow lessons to be derived. The three core elements

are criminalization, economic warfare and ‘deliberately’ missed opportunities.

1
Kofi Annan, ‘Helping Hand: Why We Had to Go into Haiti’, Wall Street Journal, March 15 2004,
A12. Cited in Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “Security sector reform in Haiti,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1
(March 2006): 14-27.
2
Remarks by Kofi Annan at the 35th Annual Ditchley Foundation lecture, United Kingston, 26 June 1998.
https://www.ditchley.com/past-events/past-programme/1990-1999/1998/lecture-xxxv.
3
Richard M. Connaughton, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, The Occasional No. 3 (Surrey, U.K.: The
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1992), 17. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states “Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”
4
Some key components of Western interventions are repeated consistently. These behaviours need to be anticipated
and countered when confronting an intervention, if positive change in Haiti is to be achieved

283
Criminalization
Qui veut noyer son chien l’accuse de la rage.5
- French proverb
Being called a barbarian means being consigned to a zone in which violence is permitted
or mandated – for now.6
- Professor of German literature, Jan Philipp Reemtsma

The first element comes from understanding that Western interventions are undertaken to

impose order and stability in Haiti, as order and stability are defined and judged by the West, not

Haiti.7 The West has historically identified Haitians as a threat, initially because of their

successful fight for freedom and later in their pursuit of peasant democracy. For the West, Haiti

is a menace not only to long-term regional stability, but also to international stability.8 In 1801,

the French, for example, identified the ‘colonie révoltée’ as “another Algiers [or piratical state]

in the seas of America.”9 Revolution was bad enough, but in the eyes of the international

community, the new state of Haiti committed worse acts of deviance, acts which would lead to

the ostracism and criminalization of Haiti by the West.

5
Translation: He who wants to drown his dog accuses it of rabies.
6
Jan Philipp Reemtsma, Trust and Violence: An Essay on A Modern Relationship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009), cited in Julia Borst, “Re-Thinking the Haitian Other ‘in Relation’ as ‘prochain’: A Reading
of Edouard Glissant and Lyonel Trouillot,” Journal of Haitian Studies 19, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 139-162.
7
Conflict theory identifies the interests and values of the US as being in conflict with those of Haiti, leading to the
US as the more powerful entity being able to disproportionately shape the nature of the conflict through the use and
abuse of the law. Threats to the more powerful entity, through resistance, are controlled through the development
and use of criminal law. The law is used to determine who and what is either deviant, criminal or delinquent. This
was the case when the powers of young US Marine officers were expanded during the Marine Occupation to allow
them to act not only as local police chiefs, but also to enforce trade measures within their local areas of
responsibility, while also acting as judges on civil and criminal cases. See Benjamin R. Beede, ed., The War of 1898
and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 198-99.
8
The Haitian revolution and the potential for its export abroad, for example, shaped the West’s perception of Haiti
as an international threat.
9
Cited in Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy, 100; and Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 503-
05.

284
 The first ‘deviant’ act Haiti committed was its successful revolution.10 As early as August

1799, US Vice President Thomas Jefferson showed his personal dismay over continued unrest

within Saint Domingue in a letter to Virginia Court Justice and gradual abolitionist, St. George

Tucker, originally from Bermuda and later resident in Williamsburg, Virginia.11 Jefferson wrote

that “if something is not done, and done soon, we shall be the murderers of our children,”

arguing for the need to implement gradual emancipation to avoid violent revolution by American

slaves and the massacre of their oppressors.12 He would again reiterate the need to pre-empt the

possibility of a violent rebellion by understanding what he saw to be the pernicious nature of the

Haitian revolution.

In 1801, in a letter to James Monroe, Jefferson made it clear that while he admired Saint

Domingue and the liberated slaves’ ability to establish a self-governing state subject to the rule

of law, he did not consider Saint Domingue to have the means to threaten the United States. He

was nonetheless concerned about certain “criminal” elements:

The most promising portion of them [the West Indian colonies] is the island of St.
Domingo, where the blacks are established into a sovereignty de facto, and have
organized themselves under regular law and government. I should conjecture that their
present ruler might be willing, on many considerations, to receive even that description
which would be exiled for acts deemed criminal by us, but meritorious perhaps by him.
The possibility that these exiles might stimulate and conduct vindictive or predatory
descents on our coasts, and facilitate concert with their brethren remaining here, looks to
a state of things between that island and us not probable on a contemplation of our
relative strength, and of the disproportion daily growing: and it is over-weighed by the

10
Deviance is defined as action or behaviour which violates established social norms, either formal or informal.
Colloquially, it can be understood as odd or unconventional, unacceptable behaviour which can be either criminal or
non-criminal.
11
Note that while Jefferson feared the black revolution and its repercussions for the US South, the Federalist
president, John Adams, supported Toussaint during his war with Rigaud. Jefferson would eventually succeed Adams
as president, and it is in this context that his earlier misgivings about the turmoil in Saint Domingue become
particularly relevant in the course of later US-Haiti relations.
12
Jefferson, writing to St. George Tucker in August 1799, was referring for the need for gradual, controlled
emancipation of the American slaves, otherwise one risked having them rise up in violent rebellion and massacring
their white oppressors. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0405.

285
 humanity of the measures proposed, and the advantages of disembarrassing ourselves of
such dangerous characters.13

The second act of deviance, the 1804 massacre of the Haiti’s remaining white colonists

was horrific and affected Haiti’s international relations. Officially, the Jefferson administration’s

position on trade with Haiti identified “San Domingo…. [as a] French colony….in state of

rebellions against the Mother Country [France].”14 But despite that presumed status, the US

continued to trade with the rebels as they struggled to maintain their freedom. But the 1804

killings of the remaining French in Haiti caused a shift in Jefferson’s relationship with Haiti.

Citing the massacres as cause, Tim Matthewson points out that the Jefferson administration

“abandon[ed]” its unofficial trading relationship with Haiti and began advocating for an embargo

against Haiti.15 On 3 March 1805, Jefferson signed a limited embargo into law, prohibiting the

sale of arms and ammunition to Haiti. While unarmed trade was still allowed, it too would be

fully boycotted in 1806.16

The arms embargo ran from 1806 to 1808. US Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin

wrote President John Quincy Adams on 26 September 1822, explaining his understanding of

why Jefferson had imposed the embargo on Haiti:

13
Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 November 1801, cited in Merrill Peterson, ed. Thomas Jefferson Writings
(New York: Literary Classics of the U.S., 1984), 1098.
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/st-domingue-haiti#footnote30_qt0o4c3
14
Matthewson, 31.
15
Matthewson, “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti,” 29.
16
While official sales were denied, American merchants trading in the Caribbean area would regularly deal with
Haiti. Indeed, during the Haitian civil war that began in 1806, Christophe would regularly seize men and supplies
from American ships in the area, which in turn would result in American government officials being dispatched to
deal with the issues. However, Christophe would refuse to deal with the American government officials because of
the lack of diplomatic recognition. That defiance prompted this prescient writing from a US commercial agent in
Port-au-Prince in 1823: “. . . the interest of the United States would be greatly promoted by a vessel of war looking
in here at least once in two months…” Cited in Johnhenry Gonzalez, “Defiant Haiti: Free-Soil Runaways, Ship
Seizures and the Politics of Diplomatic Non-Recognition in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Slavery & Abolition: A
Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 36, no. 1 (2015): 124-35. See also Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on
Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano of the Caribbean, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).

286
 [t]o the enquiry whether the United States had in any instance at the request of a foreign
nation, carried laws to restrict the commerce of their citizens…I said that it was true that
they had, on one occasion, passed a temporary law forbidding the trade with San
Domingo; but the act was much disapproved, had not been renewed, and would not be
admitted as a precedent, the less so, as one of the principal motives for passing it was the
apprehension of the danger which at the time (immediately after the last massacre of the
whites there) might on account of our numerous slaves, arise from the unrestricted
intercourse with the black population of that island. 17

The third act of deviance in the eyes of the international community was Dessalines’s

invasion of French-controlled Santo Domingo in 1805. Seeking to unite the entire island under

his rule while removing the threat of invasion from his flank, the invasion plan was clearly

justifiable from the perspective of the strategic threat that Dessalines faced. However, within the

international community, the signal the attack sent was that Dessalines had lied and was not to be

trusted.18 As such, Haiti was clearly marked as a state with expansionist aspirations. Worse, it

was seen as an expansionist state led by blacks; in the eyes of the Great Powers, the truly

unthinkable had come to pass.19

These three deviant acts marked Haiti as a rogue entity and effectively placed the country

under a state of siege.20 Western isolation of Haiti also exacted a huge toll on Haiti, forcing its

early leaders to devote resources more urgently needed for development to defence. An early

17
Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, 26 September 1822. Cited in Mathewson, 240.
18
Dessalines had pledged in his Constitution of 1805 that Haiti would not interfere in the affairs of other nations.
See Matthewson, 120.
19
Note that from the Haitian perspective and in line with Toussaint’s Constitution of 1801, the entirety of
Hispaniola including the Spanish portion of the island ceded to France in 1795, fell under Toussaint’s sovereignty.
With independence in 1804, Toussaint could legitimately make the claim to the Spanish portion of the island as
putatively belonging to Haiti, which then mean his actions in 1805 were not expansionist at all.
20
Julia Gaffield points out that after independence, the West’s relations with Haiti were largely commercial and
were built on “us[ing] Haiti to their own advantage in influencing the balance of power in European warfare.”
Foreign powers sought to divide the inextricably linked concepts of “independence and sovereignty (or liberty)”
expressed in the Haitian Declaration of Independence, leading to Western conceptualizations of relations with Haiti
becoming an exploitive nightmare for Haiti. “[F]oreign officials could imagine a situation in which they would
recognize Haitian independence but also assume a level of control over internal and external affairs that
compromised the Haitian government’s sovereignty.” See Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, 182-
3.

287
essay, written in 1819 by Baron de Vastey, a member of Henri Christophe’s court, existentially

reflected on Haiti’s fragile position in the global Atlantic should Haitians ever abandon their

arms and compromise their freedom:

So, there were men here before us! They no longer exist, here are their pitiable remains!
They were destroyed! What had they done to suffer such a calamitous fate! Did some
race of exterminating men happen upon them? Had they no weapons, those unhappy
souls? Could they not defend themselves? At this thought, I seize hold of my own
weapons and thank the heaven for having placed in our hands the instrument of our
deliverance and our preservation. O precious force of arms! Without you what would
have become of my country, my compatriots, my kinsfolk, my friends? From that
moment on, I looked upon those weapons of mine as the greatest of all
possessions…Sons of the mount, dwellers of the forests, cherish these weapons of yours,
these precious tools for preserving your rights. Never abandon them, pass them on to
your children along with the love of liberty and independence, and a hatred for tyrants, as
the finest legacy you can bequeath them.21

Tim Matthewson identified the deviant acts committed by Haiti as the stimulus which

opened the racist flood gates in the West and re-shaped the narrative of the Haitian revolution

with a vengeance. The new narrative portrayed Haiti as a rogue nation based on its deviant acts

and introduced the West’s ‘civilizing mission’ stereotype that required white mastery to restrain

natural black ‘savagery.’22 The deviant or ‘criminal’ label which France painted on Haiti’s back

also precluded the country from developing normal relations with neighbouring colonial states in

the Caribbean region. As already discussed, France insisted that Haiti pay crippling

compensation for its ‘criminal behaviour’ in the 1825 indemnity treaty.23 Thus, while the

21
Baron de Vastey in 1814 was writing about the decimation of the Taíno people on Hispaniola at the hands of the
Spanish, which in turn led to the slave trade for labour replacements. Baron de Vastey, The Colonial System
Unveiled, trans. and ed. Chris Bongie (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 86-7.
22
The stereotype was built on Western ‘whiteness’ and paternalism and was not unusual for the period in question.
Matthewson, 146-7.
23
Cleverly, the French foresaw Haiti being unable to make payments for the massive debt and needing to borrow
funds to make payments. They included provisions within the indemnity agreement requiring Haiti to use a French
bank for such borrowing. The French did allow re-negotiation of the original indemnity agreement in 1838, the key
result being the reduction of the indemnity by 30 thousand francs. See Gusti-Klara Gaillard, L’Experience Haitienne
de la Dette Exterieure, (Imprimerie HenriDeschamps, 1988), 18-19. See also Dalloz, Consultation de MM. Dalloz,

288
relationship that developed superficially appeared to be dominated by extreme Western animus,

conditioned through narratives of fear, bias, coercion and racism, the reality was the emerging

relationships with Haiti were conditioned, or perhaps, tempered, by economic pragmatism built

on commercial trade – both legal and illegal – and the profits derived therefrom.24

Just as the West refused, by withholding diplomatic recognition until well after 1825 in

some instances, to admit Haiti into the normative international community, Western

interventions likewise treated Haitians citizens collectively through a lens that labelled them as

criminals. Resistance to Western interventions and their ‘civilizing’ missions would become

intolerable, and, in the extreme, Haitian resistance was met with extra-judicial killings. As stated

earlier, the law is frequently used as a weapon to determine and define who and what behaviour

is deviant, criminal, or delinquent.

During the Marine Occupation of 1915-1934, the Marines used military courts quite

liberally and to great effect to suppress the opposition. Not only did the Marines employ the term

cacos broadly to encompass those who were actively resisting the occupation with force, but

they applied the term to the peaceful political opposition as well. This included, for example,

punishing journalists who criticized the occupation with imprisonment or exile as weapons.25

Delagrange, Hennequin, Dupin, Jeune, et al., pour les anciens colons de St. Domingue 16, 26-27 (Imprimerie Mme
Veuve Agasse, 1829), cited in Phillips, “Haiti, France and the Independence Debt of 1825,” 4.
24
Whereas Napoleon entertained genocide – the extermination of all black males on the island over the age of 12
and who wore an epaulette – as a solution to his rebellious colony, Western reactions to Haiti were more pragmatic,
considerably less extreme, and mixed. Julia Gaffield’s concept of multilayered sovereignty as implemented by the
West in its dealings with Haiti provides an excellent theory to understanding the complexity and varied nature of the
Western relationship with Haiti. See Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after
Revolution. On Napoleon’s plan for genocide, see Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 62. Farmer notes the idea of
exterminating all the black males over 12 years of age originated with General Leclerc and was based on a strategy
of desperation.
25
A number of journalists and editors were tried and sentenced in US military courts, some of whom were jailed,
and others exiled or forbidden to engage in journalism. Further, The American Brigade Commander, General John
Russell, forwarded a report to his superior, the Chief of Naval Operations, which argued “…the Haitian Government
should be forced to openly admit its inability to restrain the press and protect itself, the Occupation and the
Gendarmerie from its insulting and scurrilous remarks due to the inefficiency and inadequacy of the Judiciary

289
Reporting from the US Brigade commander, General John H. Russell, amply demonstrated the

free use of the law against cacos, their supporters and just about anyone who was critical of the

American occupation:

During the years 1919 and 1920 from five to six thousand bandits were operating in the
interior of Haiti while in the large coast cities certain groups were formed to assist the
bandits. As a result, the use of provost courts greatly increased. With the end of banditism
and the re-establishment of law and order in the country provost courts were used most
sparingly and solely as a means of maintaining tranquility. The mere fact that such courts
could be employed had, as a rule, the necessary effect. The power was there but lying
mostly dormant, to be employed only on special occasions.26

Russell eventually proscribed the use of the term caco and insisted that the term “bandit”

be used instead in all official correspondence and reporting. Marine Corps members writing

about their experience in Haiti regularly used the words caco and bandit interchangeably, in

addition to using the term vagabondage (vagrancy), as tools of repression as late as 1929.27 An

excellent example of such language is found in a Marine Corps article entitled, “Black Bandits of

Haiti,” which states:

There were the Cacos. These were native bandits, descendants of black slaves who had
run away from their French masters to live in the mountains. They were savage and
lawless, keeping the peaceful elements in a constant state of dread.28

System of Haiti…If so made, it would throw the onus of such work on the Military Occupation which could put in
operations laws similar to those now existing in the Dominican Republic relating to the press, freedom of speech,
etc.” John H. Russell, Brigade Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (18 January 1921), Box 1, Folder 13, John
H. Russell Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine
Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. See also Roberts, “Then and Now,” 241-268.
26
John H. Russell, High Commissioner to Secretary of State: report on use and need for Martial law and provost
courts to impose stability in Haiti (6 September 1922), Box 1, Folder 13, John H. Russell Collection, COLL/158,
[Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico,
VA.
27
In his 1923 annual report, Russell stated that the number of prisoners had decreased significantly, with vagrancy
and theft the chief offenses of those still being held. John H. Russell, Report of the American High Commissioner at
Port au Prince submitted to the Secretary of State, Haiti (1 January 1923), Box 1, Folder 14, John H. Russell
Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps
History Division, Quantico, VA. See also Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and
Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti.”
28
The state of marronage describes a fugitive slave still within the framework of slavery and the master-slave
relationship and was defined by specific legislation. The idea of being a caco was related to banditry, that is,

290
 Criminalization of dissenting Haitians likewise took place during the UN occupation of

Haiti.29 The terms used today in UN operations reports are “criminal gangs,” “urban armed

gangs” or simply “gangs.”30 The terms are often applied to residents of slum neighbourhoods in

Port-au-Prince like Cité Soleil. A 2008 US Institute of Peace report stated: “[a]lthough ostensibly

criminal in nature, the gangs of Port-au-Prince were an inherently political phenomenon.

Powerful elites from across the political spectrum exploited gangs as instruments of political

warfare, providing them with arms, funding, and protection from arrest.”31 That understanding

by MINUSTAH’s leaders and planners – that commercial and political elites were driving gang

activity – led them to decide in 2004 to commence urban combat operations against the gangs

operating in the urban slums of Port-au-Prince.

The MINUSTAH campaign continued off and on from December 2004 until well into

2007 and saw high intensity combat operations employed against ‘gang’ members residing in

neighbourhoods composed of housing constructed of wood, cardboard, and clapboard, and

covered with tin roofs.32 In short, the houses provided little to no protection from the projectiles

labelling someone as a means of treating them like a criminal. While there are similarities, the two concepts are
quite different from a legal perspective with the chief offenses of those still held being vagrancy and theft. Edwards
Bimberg Jr., “Black Bandits of Haiti,” The Leatherneck (August 1941): 6.
29
Robert Fatton Jr. points out that this process of criminalization originates not just with outside actors. He points
out that the “dominant class” in Haiti employed an ideological campaign built around the term “Chimères” and
succeeded in equating Lavalas to Chimères and, finally, to criminals. Fatton points to the deadly irony of “the great
majority of urban poor” now being subjected not only to the deadly ministrations of actual Chimères but also the
violence of the state (and the UN) which see them as outside the rule of law and subject to killing with impunity. See
Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 113-14.
30
It is true that a number of those were criminal gangs. Likewise, Aristide may indeed have tolerated gang
operations, and not been able or willing to control them. In either case, those gangs then became the responsibility of
the police force and should not have been the target of combat operations. UN operations, as shown, were based on
kill or capture operations against key gang leaders. Those operations involved considerable combat firepower and
usually degenerated into kill operations. They also violated the accepted UN concept on escalation of force and
minimizing civilian collateral damage or killings.
31
Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince,” US Institute of Peace
Special Report 208 (Summer 2008): 1.
32
Details in this section are drawn from a number of sources, including Dziedzic, “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of
Port-au-Prince,”; Gabriel Stargardter, “General behind deadly Haiti raid takes aim at Brazil’s gangs,” World News,
November 29, 2018; numerous Reuters accounts; the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (www.ijdh.org);

291
fired by either side. On the UN side, the Brazilian troops involved in the combat operations not

only fired small arms and heavy machine guns during these operations, they also employed

mortar fire and, as indicated by spent casings found after the attack, directed automatic weapons

fire from helicopter gun platforms. Likewise, UN armoured vehicles were employed to provide

stable machine gun platforms during the assault, further adding to the damage and collateral

deaths and injuries.

The application of force by UN troops during this period was generously described as

indiscriminate. Post-operational interviews and reporting indicated that UN soldiers, within the

Port-au-Prince area specifically, showed no signs of restraint or, indeed, any effort at minimizing

the use of force and the ensuing injuries to civilian bystanders.33 What was most damning were

the conclusions raised in a 2009 Centre for Operational Research and Analysis progress report on

peacebuilding in Haiti which found that the ‘gang’ issue remained unresolved:

While Haiti’s murder rate is thought to be well below that of many other countries in the
region (there are no official statistics), gangs remain a serious problem, particularly in the
slums of Port-au-Prince.34

Aggregating the various groups within the urban slum areas not only criminalized all the

groups so identified, it also led to the stigmatization of grass-roots security networks within the

and the Haitian Information Project (www.haitiaction.net); James Cockayne, “The Futility of Force? Strategic
Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs,” The Journal of
Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 736-739. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.901911.
33
The most controversial and potentially most egregious example of the indiscriminate nature of engaging gangs
within the urban slums was MINUSTAH’s July 2005 raid, dubbed Operation Iron Fist, into Cité Soleil, intended to
kill or capture Dread Wilme, a local leader identified and labelled by the US and UN as a gang leader. The
Brazilian-led assault saw MINUSTAH engaging indiscriminately using small arms, mortar, and aerial gun ships,
with over 22,000 rounds fired into the suburb. The attack not only killed Wilme, but at least another 20 persons
according, to Reuters reports, along with dozens wounded. Andrew Buncombe, “UN admits civilians may have died
in Haiti peacekeeping raid,” The Independent, January 10 2006. www.independent.co.uk
34
Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 8.

292
various Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods.35 The security networks played a constructive role, in

the aftermath of the 2004 coup not only to counter the actual criminal gangs involved in

narcotics and kidnapping schemes, but to provide security from the ineffective and corrupt

activities of the Haitian National Police.36 James Cockayne at the UN University recognized

MINUSTAH’s mistake in 2014, noting that when “confronted by non-conventional non-state

military forces enjoying high – but very localized – social legitimacy, MINUSTAH struggled to

embed the use of force in a larger strategy of state consolidation.”37 In effect, the UN

marginalized by labeling and then criminalizing groups established for self-defence, especially

after the state and the UN had abdicated their responsibility for providing security.

Economic Warfare
I do not like the idea of forcible intervention on purely business grounds.38
- US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan

In late 1931 and early 1932, the Senate Finance Committee investigated the extent to
which the practices of investment bankers had contributed to the defaults. Charges
against the bankers alleged that they had consistently failed to obtain accurate
information about the ability of foreign governments to repay loans, disregarded prior
records of poor repayment, ignored local political conditions, did not care whether or not
loans would be used productively, and were consumed with the lure of quick profits.39
- Professor of History William O. Walker III

35
Peter Hallward, for example, identified one of the key grass-roots security organizations within the various Port-
au-Prince neighbourhoods as comités de vigilance which dated back to the Duvalier era and countered the worst
excesses of the dictatorship. They were active during the UN occupation, confronting American elements of the
Multinational Force (MNF) in Spring 2004 who entered areas under their control, as well as attempting to counter
the actions of security services operating under the coup regime’s orders. See Hallward, Damning the Flood.
36
In 2007, the US State Department identified the alleged participation of Haitian National Police in the following
activities: “…unlawful killings and kidnappings; arbitrary arrest and detention; widespread violence and
discrimination against women; child abuse, including the internal trafficking of children and the use of child
domestic labour; and the ineffective enforcement of trade union organizing rights.” United States Department of
State, “Haiti,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, March 11 2008
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100643.htm). Cited in Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 11.
37
Cockayne, “The Futility of Force?” 737.
38
William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson, 1915. Cited in Jeffrey W. Sommers, “The US Power Elite
and the Political Economy of Haiti's Occupation: Investment, Race, and World Order,” Journal of Haitian Studies
21, no. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015): 52.
39
William O. Walker III, "Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin
America," Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 113.

293
 The second element of the core strategy undertaken by the West to deter fundamental

change in Haitian development was recognizing that the West has waged economic warfare

against Haiti ever since its founding.40 While Thomas Jefferson’s 1806 embargo may have stifled

Haiti’s full commercial relations with international powers, it was Haiti’s indemnity to France in

1825 that started Haiti down the road to ever greater foreign indebtedness and served to keep the

new nation insolvent throughout its history.

Exploitation of Haiti by foreign lending reached new heights during the nineteenth

century with the era of gunboat diplomacy.41 In addition to deploying gunboat diplomacy to

ensure by force the payment of Haitian fiscal obligations, the West also employed force in

violation of international law as well as Haitian domestic law. The previously cited HMS

Bulldog affair was just one such incident of this. Coercive use of raw gunboat power, ostensibly

a form of naval diplomacy, added further to Haiti’s economic woes. Over US $100 million was

extorted by threats of violence perpetrated by France, Britain, Germany, and the United States.

Even worse, the threats were directed at cities and towns rather than Haitian military targets.

By the time of the Occupation, Haiti was basically bankrupt. American officials found

the government of Haiti expending over three-quarters of its revenue to service its foreign debt

with another 20 percent going to the police and army.42 During the Occupation, little change

40
Generally, my use of the term economic warfare should be understood as economic measures deliberately
undertaken by an adversary to undermine a nation’s economy by denying access to international markets or to
required resources. It also includes measures forced on a nation that require it to re-shape its economic policy in a
direction not in its national interest: that direction may be in pursuit of an adversary’s economic, political, or
military aims.
41
US Professor Paul Douglas pointed out that gunboat loans made by German merchants between 1911 and 1914 to
finance the various revolutions were typically made with very high interest rates. He cites the example of one loan
“at a rate of 48” meaning that for every US$48 loaned, the revolutionary leader was expected to repay US$100!
Haiti as a nation was held responsible for the revolutionary loans made, whether repaid or not, and under the Marine
occupation, the outstanding ‘internal loans’ interest was repaid in 1922. See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 46-7.
42
Financial data in this section is taken from the US High Commissioner’s report. See BGen John H. Russell,
USMC, “The Development of Haiti during the Last Fiscal Year,” The Marine Corps Gazette XV, no. 2 (June 1980):
77-115.

294
occurred as most of the remaining revenues collected were diverted to support the office of the

American Financial Adviser-General Receiver.

Foreign loans to Haiti amounted to just over US$30 million in 1916. By 1929, General

Russell, the American High Commissioner in Haiti, reported that his efforts to ensure Haiti

serviced its foreign debt had resulted in Haitian debt being reduced to around US$18 million, this

despite new loans to Haiti in 1922, 1923, and 1924.43 At the same time, Haitian government

revenues began to shrink due to declining coffee revenues and the economic conditions leading

to the Great Depression. Imports declined significantly during 1928 and 1929 as the High

Commissioner moved to “effect economies in the various departments…. consistent with

efficiency,” including reducing expenditures to a minimum.44

Michel-Rolph Trouillot provides a summary of the economic effects of the Occupation,

emphasizing that “the tax burden on the peasantry and lower classes was heavier under the

occupation than had been leveled during the nineteenth century.”45 As Mats Lundahl points out,

President Hoover’s commission concluded that debt retirement had been undertaken too quickly,

leaving Haiti woefully short of development funding.46 Ironically, while Haiti was paying off its

43
Russell, 93. William Walker points out that President Hoover held the belief that “capital investment” had the
power to “maintain economic stability,” that “the sound disbursement of capital was a prerequisite for peace,
prosperity and security,” and accordingly, subscribed to a foreign policy which used Latin America as a “laboratory”
in which to confirm his theories. The problem was that while he believed in government oversight on foreign loans,
that concept came into conflict with his own “aversion” to greater state interference and led to only “nominal” loan
supervision. As Walker points out, Hoover, in his memoirs, lamented the “dubious quality” of many of the
American bankers peddling loans to Latin American leaders and, further, that their activities clearly showed they did
not understand US foreign policy interests whatsoever. See William O. Walker III, “Crucible for Peace: Herbert
Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin America,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 83-
117.
44
Russell, 80. Ironically, in the realm of public works, the construction of the new headquarters for the Garde
d’Haiti was the largest public building project completed by the Americans. Most other public works spending was
for vocational schools intended to shift Haitian education into the agricultural realm. Nor was the reform of the civil
service or the judiciary ever undertaken, and in fact in both cases, it was placed on indefinite hold
45
Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 103.
46
Lundahl, Peasant and Poverty, 372. American control over the BNRH was also manipulated by the Occupation
forces. For example, neither the 1910 nor the 1922 contracts put in place between the BNRH, controlled by
American interests, and the Haitian government included any provision for interest payments on Haitian government
deposits held in the bank. As US Professor Paul Douglas found out during his 1926 fact-finding visit, this was not an

295
foreign debt faster than needed, other Latin American nations had defaulted on their debts. Not

only did Haiti not receive any debt relief, the marketplace also did not reward Haiti’s stellar debt

repayment record with any interest rate relief.47

One of the more significant effects of the Occupation, described under the umbrella of

the centralization of power in Port-au-Prince, was the centralization of economic power in the

capital by the Marines, which led to the removal of the “feeble [economic] restraints remaining

from the nineteenth century” and spelled the collapse of regional economies.48 Trouillot points

out that the centralization of economic power in Port-au-Prince “contributed to the growth of

urban parasitic groups” within Haiti’s political sphere, each seeking to grab a piece of the action

in the “state apparatus.”49

Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal argue similarly, pointing out that centralization of

power in Port-au-Prince led to “differential customs policy making trade through Port-au-Prince

cheaper than elsewhere.”50 The collapse of the regional economies was yet another nail in the

coffin of Haitian development. With most of Haiti’s budget going to debt repayment anyway,

issue until the Occupation authorities were able to generate a surplus of over US$4 million. As Douglas points out,
the Haitian Ministers of Finance were under the “misapprehension…[that] the modern bank [was] analogous to a
safety deposit vault…by keeping their assets liquid…” Douglas criticized American financial officials, noting that a
“high standard of business ethics would….have led the bank to be unwilling to take advantage of the ignorance of
the Haitians.” This did not occur. Douglas noted that the American Financial Adviser did eventually transfer around
US$3 million in surplus Haitian government funds to the National City Bank in New York. Interest on the deposited
funds accrued at the rate of 2.5 percent annually. However, the National City Bank’s commercial rates at the time
were between 3 and 3.5 percent, meaning the New York bank was paying around US$80,000 less in interest
payments annually than should have been available from commercial rates! See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 49-51.
47
Lundahl points out that Haiti was able to negotiate the payment of interest charges and token amortization
payments to American bondholders in 1937 when the coffee market collapsed and destroyed Haiti’s main source of
revenue. The period 1937-41 would be the only period that Haiti failed to make payments on its foreign debt.
Lundahl, 372, 374.
48
Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 102.
49
Trouillot, 102, 104.
50
They identified the nature of the road construction undertaken during the Occupation as favouring goods
travelling to the capital over regional ports like St. Marc, Jérémie and Jacmel, making Port-au-Prince more
convenient and less expensive to use as a port. See Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural
Successes (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 29.

296
less than 20 percent of the national budget was allocated to public services like education and

health care with most of those meager funds expended in the capital.51

At the same time, the US remained the top exporter of products to Haiti, while, as an

importer of Haitian goods, the US ranked well behind France, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium

and Italy.52 With the American declaration of war in 1917, the US pressured Haiti to imprison or

deport German businessmen.53 The Americans also began to work actively to exclude Germans

from Haiti’s economy, as in the case of persuading HASCO to move its financial operations

from German banks to American ones instead. By September 1918, American diplomats were

reporting that “a number of Germans [had been] interred and about 20 firms sequestrated.”54 By

removing German economic competition, the US became the dominant player within Haiti’s

commercial space.

The end of the Occupation did not bring an end to American control over Haiti’s

economy. The US-appointed Financial Adviser-General Receiver remained in control of Haitian

finances and fiscal policy, including the customs houses, until 1941, with his primary objective

to ensure that Haiti met its foreign debt obligations, largely held by Americans. Continued US

control over the Haitian economy would prove to be disastrous. Problems in the 1930s,

including the coffee market crash and boll weevil infestation in the cotton industry — and, in

51
See, for example, Chapter 2 of Dorte Verner and Willy Egset, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti,”
World Bank Country Study 40927 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007).
52
Verner and Egset, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti,” 103.
53
Haiti would declare war against Germany in July 1918. By the end of the war in November 1918, those Germans
who either had been expelled or had their businesses sequestered wanted their property reinstated. The struggle by
the Germans for restitution continued well into 1921. Russell commented on the German situation: “The Germans
are doing all in their power to have the sequestered goods returned to them and it is even said that the Haitien
Government, or at least one or two prominent members of it are working very hard to that end with the ultimate
view of re-establishing the Germans in their former almost impregnable commercial position in Haiti.” Russell,
“The Development of Haiti during the Last Fiscal Year,” 113.
54
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 2, The World War, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1933), Document 124. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp02/d124.

297
1936, France’s rescinding of Haiti’s favorable tariff status — all led to the collapse of Haiti’s

economy. By 1937, Haiti defaulted on its existing loans and was looking for new foreign loans.

Despite President Dumarsais Estimé finally wiping out the interest from the 1825 French

indemnity debt in 1947, Western forces continued to dominate Haiti’s economic future.55

Predatory loans to Haiti after World War II put Haiti once more at the mercy of international

lenders.

As noted in Chapter Seven, US economic assistance to Haiti began in 1941 with the

US$4 million Export-Import Bank credit note to the SHADA Corporation.56 The risk represented

by the credit note was offset by a cost-plus contract awarded to the SHADA agricultural

development corporation, a trend which has continued into recent times.57 Later economic

assistance was considered technical in nature, focusing on the education and the rural sectors,

and was often in the form of payment for US experts to travel to Haiti and lecture before Haitian

audiences. Emergency aid was granted to deal with several humanitarian disasters such as

earthquakes and hurricanes. More often, though, Haitian governments were offered new

combinations of assistance loans and credits through small grants, with most of the money being

funneled through the UN and various US-controlled entities such as the World Bank, the

55
Mats Lundahl points out that while the indemnity loans were paid off during Lysius Salomon’s presidency,
repayment consumed all of Haiti’s economic energy, forcing the administration back into the predatory world of
foreign loans almost without pause. Hence, and notwithstanding the role played by Haitian government corruption,
Haiti’s foreign indebtedness attributable to the 1825 French indemnity would not be wiped out until 1947. See
Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 366-75.
56
American economic assistance and foreign aid under discussion is official government to government assistance,
rather than private aid. Private aid predates government assistance. Most private aid from the US (not including
remittances) has originated from church organizations. See Simon M. Fass, Political Economy in Haiti: The Drama
of Survival (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004): 22.
57
In return for allowing the import of materials necessary for export-bound clothing free of tariffs, US firms have
provided guaranteed contracts for the purchase of the assembled clothing at set prices and quantities.

298
International Development Bank (IDB) and, less frequently as time progressed, the Export-

Import Bank.58

United States interests, economic and otherwise, dictated the disbursement of American

foreign aid like that provided to SHADA. Between 1957 and 1963, the US provided US$60

million in aid to François Duvalier in support of its foreign policy of containment. Duvalier’s

stable anti-communist dictatorship was preferable to any socialist or communist alternatives

likely to emerge if he was removed from power.59 Even when the US suspended aid to the

regime from 1963 through to 1973, American money continued to flow into Haiti in the form of

numerous small programs that supported US regional interests, resulting in about 70 percent of

the government’s revenues coming from foreign aid.60 President Richard Nixon resumed aid to

Haiti in 1973, in part because of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s pledge to reform, but mainly to counter-

balance Fidel Castro and his communist regime.

Although the international community would turn the aid taps on and off whenever it

suited its policies, it was unable to resolve two major problems tied to providing aid to Haiti. The

first problem was the chronic corruption of Haitian governments, particularly those led by the

Duvaliers. Corrupt practices including embezzlement by authoritarian and military regimes,

coupled to predatory international lending practices, meant that the successor regimes inherited

58
Note that the IMF considered Haiti fourth in their ranking of countries which had the lengthiest “Prolonged Use of
Loans” index rating for the period from 1971 to 2000. See Terry F Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state
building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working
Paper No. 2013/104 (October 2013): 18.
59
Note that many foreign investors also paid bribes to both Duvalier regimes to do business in Haiti and that some
of the money may have been included in aid money totals. The figures for aid monies flowing into Haiti are
extracted from Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and
Martelly.”
60
Despite statements and legislation suspending aid to Haiti, it did not actually stop flowing into Haiti. Instead, aid
was provided through two smaller programs: the national anti-malarial program and assorted small surplus food
distribution programs. Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide,
Préval, and Martelly.”

299
massive debts. The second problem was Haiti’s low absorption capability for foreign aid. Haiti

was not able to properly exploit the aid monies it received. It had neither the bureaucratic

expertise nor the economic capacity to implement large scale projects costing huge sums.

Attempting to remediate both problems, the Kennedy administration directed most of its aid

money to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than the Haitian government. This

practice of using NGOs soon became the modus operandi of other donor nations including

Canada.

The issues caused by funneling aid through NGOs are now legendary.61 Two areas stand

out. The first is that without any real accountability or transparency about how and where NGO

resources including monies are being employed, the NGOs have become the de facto

government in those sectors abandoned by the real government. Not only are host government

sectors being supplanted by NGOs, the Haitian government has also abandoned specific sectors

to NGOs because of a chronic lack of resources.

The second issue is more troubling. NGOs are accountable to their foreign donors. This

includes not only foreign NGOs linked to charities, but more so those NGOs which rely upon

foreign governments for most of their funding. Often, that NGO funding from foreign

governments is linked to specific foreign government policy expectations that are not in the

interest of the Haitian majority. Further, NGO funding was linked to the international

community’s draconian Structural Adjustment Program, or SAP. The impact of these two related

issues are key instruments of the economic warfare the international community waged against

Haiti since independence.

61
For details, see, for example, Mark Schuller, “Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti,” PoLAR:
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 12, no. 1 (2009): 84-104. DOI: 10.1111/j.1555-2934.2009.01025.x.

300
Economic Warfare: Haiti and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs)

The I.M.F. and the World Bank are the purveyors of the new orthodoxy. They come in to
bail out a country that is bankrupt. They do so by drawing up a "structural adjustment
program," a tight package of economic prescriptions designed to bring about free market
enterprise and minimize governmental interference…Because the package is tied to
millions of dollars in aid from Western donor countries, it is an offer that can't be refused.
And so the I.M.F. and the bank end up calling the shots on a broad range of issues —
even political matters like calling multiparty elections — that affect the lives of
millions.62
- The New York Times journalist John Darnton

The employment of the SAP grew out of the Carter administration’s economic tactics

initially aimed at its major trading partners like Japan and Germany, but later expanded to the

developing world.63 The 1986 Tokyo Summit Conference issued an Economic Declaration based

on the Reagan administration’s aim of ensuring that the financial collapse of the 1980s, brought

about by a global economic downturn and a spike in US interest rates, did not lead to loan

defaults by the developing nations.64

The SAPs sought to re-orient developing nations’ economies towards ensuring the

repayment of debt while creating an economic climate within the developing nation that was

favourable to foreign investment and export market production. The SAPs were the quid pro quo

for foreign aid and were overseen by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World

62
John Darnton, “In Poor, Decolonized Africa, Bankers Are New Overlords,” New York Times, June 20, 1994.
www.nytimes.com.
63
The New York Times identified the approach as follows: “the United States is asking that its trading partners phase
out subsidies to inefficient industries and accept the free play of world market forces. In time, the theory is, these
changes should allow American businesses to take more advantage of the competitive edge the dollar's recent fall
has given their products in foreign markets, increasing their export sales and narrowing the United States trade gap.”
The idea was that markets would not be ‘shielded’ from market adjustments and would instead be open to more
competitively produced goods from the US, for example. See Paul Lewis, “U.S. Seeks Partners’ Trade Help,” The
New York Times, May 14, 1979. www.nytimes.com.
64
The spike in US interest rates in 1979 brought into play by US Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, was an
internal US policy intended to curb runaway inflation. Unfortunately, because international loans to developing
nations like Haiti were largely in US dollars, the so-called Volcker Shock also increased quite dramatically the cost
of their borrowing, leading to default issues.

301
Bank (WB), both agencies largely controlled by the US.65 They were seen as opportunistic

mechanisms by Reagan’s economic team:

[T]o the U.S. Treasury staff…the debt crisis afforded an unparalleled opportunity to
achieve, in the debtor countries, the structural reforms favored by the Reagan
administration. The core of these reforms was a commitment on the part of the debtor
countries to reduce the role of the public sector as a vehicle for economic and social
development and rely more on market forces and private enterprise, domestic and
foreign.66

SAPs implemented in Haiti have been directly linked to the decline of Haiti’s domestic

rice supply.67 Until the 1980s, the Haitian domestic foodstuffs industry was protected from the

outside world with import tariffs as high, in some cases, as 150 percent. As an SAP adjunct,

Haiti began dismantling its protectionist trade system around 1986-87, making it, by the 1990s

according to the International Monetary Fund, “among the most open economies worldwide.”68

Despite this, the IMF highlighted Haiti’s “slow pace of structural reforms in other crucial areas,

65
Article 10 of the 1986 Tokyo Economic Declaration outlined the new relationship for debtor nations: “We
reaffirm the continued importance of the case-by-case approach to international debt problems. We welcome the
progress made in developing the cooperative debt strategy, in particular building on the United States initiative. The
role of the international financial institutions, including the multilateral development banks, will continue to be
central, and we welcome moves for closer cooperation among these institutions, and particularly between the I.M.F.
and the World Bank. Sound adjustment programs will also need resumed commercial bank lending, flexibility in
rescheduling debt and appropriate access to export credits.” See “SUMMIT IN TOKYO: THE CURTAIN COMES
DOWN; TEXT OF ECONOMIC DECLARATION ISSUED AT END OF TOKYO SUMMIT CONFERENCE,”
The New York Times, 7 May 1986. www.nytimes.com.
66
Former Inter-American Development Bank official Jerome Levinson, cited in Doug Henwood, “Impeccable Logic
Trade, Development and Free Markets in the Clinton Era,” Report on the Americas 26, no. 5 (May 1993): 25. DOI:
10.1080/10714839.1993.11723044.
67
Note that while SAPs were a major contributing factor to the decline of Haiti’s domestic rice industry, there were
other factors which contributed as well. Mats Lundahl has credibly refuted the oft-cited narrative linking SAPs
opening the Haitian economy and related reductions in import tariffs as being solely responsible for the destruction
of the domestic Haitian rice industry. Instead, he states “To argue that the decline of Haitian agriculture began with
the reduction of the rice tariff in the mid-1990s amounts to sheer ignorance of conditions in the countryside.”
Instead, he claims rice tariffs were the result of population growth, coupled to rice shifting from a luxury item to a
daily staple. Those tariffs, coupled to soil erosion and a falling domestic rice production, combined to make tariff
reductions on foreign rice imports logical and necessary. See Mats Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,”
Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies XLIV, no. 1-2 (2014): 47-72.
68
IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/41, Jan 2001, 41. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0104.pdf.

302
in particular the privatization of public enterprises” which the IMF then identified as “thereby

depriving the population of some of the benefits of the liberal trade policy.”69

The tariffs on imported rice were reduced in 1995, dropping from 50 percent to a mere

three percent.70 Between 1998 and 2008, Haiti’s domestically produced rice declined from 47

percent of Haiti’s total rice supply to 15 percent. By 2010, even US President Bill Clinton was

apologizing for the American role in speeding up the destruction of Haiti’s domestic rice

industry:

Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, until the last year or so when we
started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should sell it to poor
countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank
goodness, they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not worked. It may have
been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing the finger at anybody. I did that. I
have to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in
Haiti to feed those people, because of what I did. Nobody else.71

At the same time that Haiti was being forced to open its economy, the US was heavily

subsidizing its own rice farmers, according to Mats Lundahl, pointing to direct subsidies to US

rice farmers amounting to roughly US$1 billion annually.72 Those subsidies allowed exported

rice to be sold at a discount of around five percent, not a huge discount, but enough to attract

Haitian consumers considering that rice consumption, formerly a foodstuff found mainly on the

69
IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/41. President Aristide delayed as much as he could the sale of the nine state-
owned enterprises targeted by the IMF for privatization. The enterprises include the telephone company, the
electrical company, the flour mill, the cement mill, the Port-au-Prince port facilities, the Port-au-Prince airport, two
banks, and an animal feed firm. The IMF claimed the privatization philosophy was based on the following: “The
point of selling state enterprises is to improve company efficiency and performance, and thereby make governments,
consumers, employees and investors better off.” See Tatiana Wah, “Rethinking Privatization in Haiti: Implications
from the Initial Experience,” Journal of Haitian Studies 3/4 (1997-1998): 15-29.
70
Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 48, note 4.
71
Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 1 April 2010 speech, recorded by Democracy Now!
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/clinton_rice.
72
Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 53.

303
table of the wealthy, had been steadily increasing in Haiti from at least the mid-1990s.73 Whereas

the early 1980s saw negligible amounts of imported rice, by the early 2000s, imported rice had

risen to over 300,000 metric tons.74 For the US, Haiti is an important rice market: the USDA

identified Haiti as the second or third largest market for US rice generally and the largest market

globally for the US long-grained variants.75

SAPs ignored Haitian culture as well as Haiti’s specific societal circumstances, and

instead sought to force policy reform focused on “privatization, deregulation and liberalization of

goods and financial markets.”76 Ironically, Haiti’s financial market has been described as

“informationally and operationally inefficient, illiquid, and volatile,” whereas the IMF and

World Bank reforms require “liberalized and competitive financial markets.”77

Another area seriously damaged by SAPs was Haiti’s civil service. SAPs required Haiti

to downsize its civil service, which was a ludicrous requirement given Haiti’s dysfunctional and

all too small civil service. Camille Chalmers, President Aristide’s former Chief of Staff, claimed

in a 1997 interview that Haiti’s civil service, at the time of the coup, numbered just shy of 48,000

state employees, including those in education, health care and the police.78 The majority of those

73
The USDA identified Haiti’s rice intake as beginning noticeable increases from 1986 onwards and tied the
increased consumption to the opening of Haiti’s economy by the SAPs. See Nancy Cochrane, Nathan Childs and
Stacey Rosen, “Haiti’s U.S. Rice Imports,” USDA Economic Research Service Report RCS-16A-01, February
2016,1.
74
Lundahl points out that a number of factors were responsible for the increased rice consumption (and therefore
increased imported rice to make up the difference) including a population which nearly doubled between 1980 and
2013, increasing from 5.7 million to over 10 million. See Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 56.
75
Choice of rice as a source of food was not just about cost. Ease of cooking and taste also entered into decisions
regarding the choice of foreign rice over domestic. Haitians are reported to prefer American rice because of its
cooking properties and have, for example, eschewed Vietnamese rice because of its taste and cooking texture,
despite it being considerably cheaper than the American varieties sold in Haiti. See Cochrane, “Haiti’s U.S. Rice
Imports,” 9.
76
Eirin Mobekk and Spyros I. Spyrou, "Re‐evaluating IMF involvement in low‐income countries: the case of Haiti",
International Journal of Social Economics 29, no.7 (2002): 531.
77
Mobekk and Spyrou,” 531.
78
Chalmers also headed up the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif or PAPDA,
described as “un regroupement de mouvements sociaux et d’organisations de la société civile haïtienne qui travaille
sur les politiques publiques par le biais de l’information, la formation, l’analyse critique et l’élaboration de
propositions alternatives.” See “Haiti's Latest Coup: Structural Adjustment and the Struggle for Democracy. An

304
employees were located within the major cities, while the rural countryside and smaller urban

centers had next to no government services or employees whatsoever.79

Chalmers also pointed out that SAPs had undermined Haitian sovereignty. During the

Aristide administration prior to the 1991 coup, the government sought to implement policy

according to the interests of the Haitian majority, but after the coup, Aristide’s policy was driven

by the requirements of SAPs, representing international banking interests. The attempt by Prime

Minister Claudette Werleigh to push for changes to the SAPs in 1995 saw an international

response that was as swift as it was “brutal.” USAID specifically withheld funds allocated for

food aid, causing a political crisis in Haiti. Other international agencies also followed suit by

withholding aid previously committed.80

Chalmers further pointed out that SAPs were focused on the creation of a favourable

business climate in Haiti for foreign investment, as well as to direct investment away from

agricultural production and instead into the light assembly manufacturing sector.81 That sector

produced negligible benefits for Haiti. In 1991, US$150 million worth of items were produced

interview with Camille Chalmers,” The Multinational Monitor 18, no. 5 (May 1997): 20. https://search-ebscohost-
com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9708045540&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
79
One example of the undesired effects of downsizing the civil service was witnessed in the 2000 elections. Rural
voters were required to have ID cards with photos: those were unavailable as there were not enough registration
offices nor material to produce them. The areas mainly affected were the poor slum areas in the capital and the rural
areas, supporting allegations that this was a deliberate tactic to undermine more progressive left-wing candidates
from those areas. See Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” Democratization 8, no. 3 (2001): 183.
80
“Haiti's Latest Coup.”
81
Marylynn Steckley and Yasmine Shamsie argue that “[t]he neoliberal restructuring of agriculture, which hinged
on the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), was a final blow to Caribbean food systems.
SAPs enforced state cut-backs, market and trade liberalisation, land privatisation and currency devaluation, with the
reasoning that increased export revenues would service debt, that market liberalisation would enable the cheaper
production and the global flows of goods, and that these would maximise productivity and reduce poverty and food
security. Instead, neoliberal globalisation has entailed chronic declining terms of trade, de-peasantisation, greater
rural poverty, increased unemployment, and an inability to diversify economically or agriculturally. Across the
region food import dependence has worsened: from 1975 to 1989 food imports rose from 8% to 16% in Trinidad,
from 11% to 40% in Guyana, and from 21% to 36% in Haiti. The Caribbean is now the most food-import dependent
region in the world and most Caribbean nations have a food deficit. Haiti, for example, imports 60% of the food it
needs, including as much as 80% of the rice it consumes.” See Marylynn Steckley and Yasmine Shamsie,
“Manufacturing corporate landscapes: the case of agrarian displacement and food (in)security in Haiti,” Third World
Quarterly 36, no. 1 (January 2015): 183-4.

305
for export, yet the cost of the materials imported for assembly into the final exported products

cost US$134 million, meaning the sector generated less than US$20 million in profits. In

Chambers’ opinion, the foreign ‘guidance’ that shifted investment into light assembly rather than

agricultural production helped to create “the economic apartheid that we now have in Haiti.”82

Economic Warfare: NGOs and Haiti

NGOs give the impression that they are filling a vacuum created by a retreating state.
And they are, but in a materially inconsequential way. Their real contribution is that they
defuse political anger and dole out as aid and contribution what people ought to have by
right. NGOs alter the public psyche. They turn people into dependent victims and blunt
political resistance.83
- Political activist and novelist Arundhati Roy

Closely related to SAPs was the locust-like rush of non-government organizations

(NGOs) into Haiti such that by 2006, Haiti had been nicknamed the “Republic of NGOs.”84

Because SAPs were recognized as affecting the poor of the target nations most severely, the

World Bank and IMF had put additional aid into social development, the intent being to mitigate

the social costs of SAPs while simultaneously seeking to strengthen societal resistance to

authoritarianism.85 Because NGOs were involved in grassroots social programs in a fragile state

like Haiti, and because they provided what amounted to replacement government services within

an inexpensive framework, aid donors believed funding social development programs would

peacefully bridge the SAP rollout period.

82
“Haiti's Latest Coup.”
83
Arundhati Roy, “The NGO-ization of resistance,” Invetig’Action, 25 July 2018,
https://www.investigaction.net/en/the-ngo-ization-of-resistance/. Suzanna Arundhati Roy, a renowned Indian writer,
was awarded the Man Booker Prize for fiction in 1997.
84
The term ‘Republic of NGOs’ appears to have been coined initially by the Haitian poet and historian Robert
Maguire, speaking at a 2006 US Institute of Peace meeting. That speaking engagement was summarized and
published in 2008. See Robert Maguire “Toward the End of Poverty in Haiti,” USIPEACE BRIEFING, 1 December
2008. www.usip.org.
85
Mark Schuller, Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2012), 24.

306
 For Haiti, the NGO explosion began with the resistance shown by the democratic election

of non-US-supported candidates, beginning with Aristide. From 1990 onwards, most if not all of

US aid money was directed to NGOs operating in Haiti rather than directly to the Haitian

government, as had been the case, for example, with the Duvalier regimes.86 Aristide’s social

reform program, announced prior to the 1991 coup, was not generally popular with the

international community and the US specifically. It is therefore not surprising that American

support for his return to the presidency was predicated on his agreement to the SAPs identified

above.

The NGO explosion and the shift in American policy (among others) to funnelling the

majority of foreign aid through NGOs has another effect within the targeted country. Foreign aid

is provided in one of three forms: direct money transfers, which have become rarer as time

progresses, other than in the form of foreign loans; materials; and services.87 The cost of

deploying troops on UN peacekeeping missions, for example, is included in foreign aid totals.

Ironically and sickeningly, the 20,0000 rounds of ammunition used during the July 2005 assault

on the neighbourhood of Cité Soleil by UNMISTAH troops would have been included in the

foreign aid totals provided to Haiti!

86
An extreme example of the domination of NGOs in receiving foreign aid was a 2012 UN report explaining that
“[o]f the $2.4 billion in humanitarian funding [received in response to the 2010 earthquake], 34 percent was
provided back to the donor’s own civil and military entities for disaster response, 28 percent was given to UN
agencies and non-governmental agencies (NGOs) for specific UN projects, 26 percent was given to private
contractors and other NGOs, 6 percent was provided as in-kind services to recipients, 5 percent to the international
and national societies, 1 percent was provided to the government of Haiti, four tenths of one percent of the
funds went to Haitian NGOs.”[emphasis added]. See Oliver Cunningham, “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the
Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of ‘Building Back Better',” The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International
Studies 4 (Summer 2012): 116-17.
87
Direct money transfers involve government to government money transfers, rather than money being funnelled
through foreign GOs or NGOs as has become the normal process for most Western foreign aid. Note that while
remittances from the Haitian diaspora could be considered as a form of direct money transfer, they are excluded
from the discussion at this point and instead this section focusses only on aid money from foreign governments like
Canada or the US. Remittances and their importance are discussed in Chapter Eleven in the section entitled “Haiti’s
Development Options.”

307
 At the same time, most Western countries have tied their foreign aid to specific

conditions, including a requirement to use those funds to procure goods and services only from

the donor country.88 The Second World War US Marshall Plan and its benefits for the American

post-war economy are typically cited as responsible for foreign aid policy becoming a major

component of American foreign policy.89 Contrary to American Government practices in Haiti,

the Marshall Plan included the following statement intended to guide the program development:

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further
in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to
recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the
requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to
give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would
be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally
a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. [emphasis added] The role of
this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of
later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program
should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.90

The altruistic sentiment expressed in the Marshall Plan was noticeably absent from the

NGO industry’s involvement in Haiti. Moreover, American foreign policy has embraced NGOs

88
As of 2006, the US required about three-quarters of its foreign aid to be tied to American goods and services,
while Canada required about 40 percent. For example, the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA)
allowed Haitian assembled apparel to be imported into the US at lower-than-normal tariff rates, if the apparel was
assembled or “knit-to-shape” using American materials. The 2006 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through
Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE I) allowed for duty-free status on Haitian assembled goods and also
loosened up on material sourcing requirements. See R. Riddell, “Does foreign aid really work?” Background paper
to keynote address to the Australasian Aid and International Development Workshop, Canberra, February 2014, in
Clair Apodaca, “Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, April 2017.
www.oxfordre.com. See also J.F. Hornbeck, “The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act,” US Congressional Review
Service (24 June 2010): 15-16. www.crs.gov.
89
The Marshall Plan increased US exports into Europe, provided employment to American post-war workers and
proved to be a great stimulus for the post-war economy. Likewise, tying modern foreign aid to the provision of
donor country goods and services is intended to provide similar benefits, despite the effects on the targeted country’s
economy. There are arguments that foreign aid pre-dates the Marshall Plan. See, for example, Daniel Markovits,
Austin Strange and Dustin Tingley, “Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid,” 2018.
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/foreignaidhistory.pdf.
90
Transcript version of the June 1947 Marshall Plan speech, George C. Marshall Foundation,
https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/.

308
as an effective foreign policy tool. The US funnels its foreign aid almost exclusively through

NGOs, allowing it considerable leverage over the organizations and making them an excellent

tool for manipulating Haitian attempts at governing. The US has most recently used NGOs to

gain influence within the left-wing sphere of Haiti’s political world, an exclusive community

with which it is normally excluded from direct interaction.

But the US has targeted both right-wing opposition groups as well as those on the left

through the funding of NGOs affiliated with both sides of the political spectrum.91 At first

glance, spreading foreign aid across the political spectrum gives the appearance of supporting the

establishment of democracy. Funding NGOs across the political divide also allows all factions in

theory to have a voice in the future of Haitian governance and to participate in the election

process. In practice, however, the American government’s intent was to marginalize the left-

wing voice and reduce the influence of its messiah, Aristide. Not surprisingly, funding of the

left-wing has proven very selective and has been identified by Amy Wilentz as a tactic employed

by the US to create divisions within the left-wing.92

In the period following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, the left-wing Lavalas

popular movement, which was largely responsible for the end of the Duvalier presidency,

attracted the support of the moderate middle-class elements within Haitian society. At the same

time, elements of the middle-class were becoming more dependent upon NGOs for their

91
This division of a fragile nation’s political understanding into either left or right leaning is a Western construct
and reflects its bias and lack of understanding when dealing with nations like Haiti.
92
Hallward, Damming the Flood, 57-8. Farmer cites Amy Wilentz who claimed USAID’s approach to Haiti and
Aristide was “specifically designed to fund those sectors of the Haitian political spectrum where opposition to the
Aristide government could be encouraged.” Farmer points out the USAID operation in Haiti was remarkably similar
to those which were undertaken in Nicaragua after Somoza’s overthrow, the intent there being to suppress a similar
worker-peasant left-wing movement led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN. Farmer, The
Uses of Haiti, 144.

309
employment and improvement of their well-being.93 The US saw this as a vulnerability and

decided to exploit it to reduce Aristide’s hold on power by enforcing the SAP.

The tactic employed was quite simple. USAID told those NGOs that did not support

structural adjustments that they would be defunded. Clearly, those Haitians who were involved

in an NGO that did not support the SAP for Haiti would lose their employment.94 The US

specifically targeted those of the Haitian “donor-dependent class” to create a rift within the

Lavalas movement, using structural adjustments as the mechanism.95 The American plan worked

with a rift quickly emerging. The coercive tactic contributed to the desired split within the

Lavalas movement in 1995.

Peter Hallward identified the Lavalas split as centered on the neo-liberal demands of the

SAP (also known as the Paris Plan) of August 1994, which returned Aristide to power in

exchange for acceptance of the IMF and World Banks’s SAP.96 Elements within the Lavalas

movement viewed compliance with the SAP as a means of continuing to receive foreign aid

which they considered essential to Haiti’s economy. Yet Aristide viewed the SAP demands as

93
Mark Schuller points out NGOs provide one-third of all jobs within Haiti’s formal economy, creating what he
identified as a “klas ONG” [NGO class]. They are also responsible for regular poaching of well-trained professionals
from the public sector. Christian Vannier examines those members of this middle class who “engage local [rural]
populations on behalf of international aid and development organizations [NGOs].” He identifies these “indigenous
professional development workers” as an important interface for the peasant to re-engage with “global governance
institutions.” See Schuller, "Gluing Globalization," 90-2; and Christian Neil Vannier, “Indigenous Professional
Development Workers in Haiti,” Michigan Academician 41 (2013): 332-54.
94
While the Haitian cohort that benefited from working for an NGO included many Haitians with professional and
advanced education, NGO employment also linked a number of other Haitians providing support services who were
likewise vulnerable to NGO funding manipulations. Mark Schuller highlights one such individual, Jean-Baptiste,
who was employed by an NGO as a chauffeur. See Schuller, "Gluing Globalization,” 92.
95
Schuller, 93. The split accomplished two goals. The first was to create divisions within the peasant movement that
would sow uncertainty as to Aristide’s mandate and support base. The second was to allow the creation of doubt
regarding Aristide’s legitimacy by pointing to this left-wing opposition seemingly from within his core base of
support.
96
Hallward, 55-7. Hallward outlines that the devil is in the detail regarding the Paris Plan. Many of the terms of the
SAP were intended to be implemented gradually. For example, voluntary reductions in personnel coupled to
generous severance packages was called for within the fine print. Selling off of the state-owned industries was to “be
implemented in a way that will prevent increased concentration of wealth within the country…[by] transfer[ing] part
of the ownership to traditionally excluded segments of society…”

310
restricting his freedom of action economically and adopted a pragmatic approach that conceded

that while compliance with the SAP may have been necessary for continued receipt of foreign

aid, the program was to be fought through “a combination of compliance and compensation.”97

That difference in philosophies led Aristide to form his own political party, known as

Fanmi Lavalas or FL, in 1995 with the majority of the Lavalas. The remaining Lavalas members

in favour of SAP compliance created their own party under the banner of Organization politique

Lavalas, or OPL.98 The American administration exploited the rift, using it as an opportunity to

withhold the further distribution of aid monies, arguing the privatization plan had stalled as a

result.99 This began what journalist Jane Regan argued was “a more permanent, less reversible

invasion” by USAID and its supported NGOs.100 The administration of OPL president, René

Préval, would receive over US$1.8 billion in foreign aid from the US during the fiscal years

1995 to 1999, but the vast majority of that money flowed into Haiti through NGOs rather than

through the Préval government ministries.101

Worse, the split allowed the US to divert the conversation away from democratic

development and instead manufactured a conversation about Aristide and his resemblance to the

97
Hallward.
98
In 2003, well after the Lavalas split, Peter Daily wrote that Aristide and his OPL brethren were responsible for
retarding the development of democracy in Haiti: “The principal indictment against Aristide’s supporters was that
by promoting a personality cult they were severely undermining attempts to consolidate and institutionalize Haiti’s
fragile democracy and to establish the concepts of pluralism and power-sharing integral to a modern political
system.” See Peter Daily, “Haiti: The Fall of the House of Aristide,” The New York Review of Books, March 12,
2003, www.nybooks.com.
99
Hallward, 58. Hallward claims that when Aristide dragged his heels on the sale of state-owned companies and
threatened to jail any official who worked to facilitate the sale, the Americans promptly suspended foreign aid
transfers to Haiti.
100
Cited in Hallward, 60. See also Schuller, Killing with Kindness, 22-23. This also echoes Nikolas Barry-Shaw and
Dru Oja Jay who wrote that “NGO funding fragmented the popular movement along class lines, co-opting many of
the middle-class activists and intellectuals while marginalizing most of Haiti’s poor and their popular
organizations.” Nikolas Barry-Shaw and Dru Oja Jay, Paved with Good Intentions: Canada’s development NGOs
from idealism to imperialism (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2012), 120-25.
101
Schuller, Killing with Kindness, 22.

311
dictator, François Duvalier.102 For example, during a media interview, Leslie M Alexander, the

American Deputy Chief of Mission in Port-au-Prince from 1991 to 1993, implicitly identified

Aristide’s behaviour as Duvalierist in orientation:

After months and months and months of provocations, of inflammatory speeches, no

puns intended, of actions that suggested that he [Aristide] was moving in an anti-
democratic direction, taking on or using the Duvalier’s playbook, creating his own
personal gang of thugs, his political opposition, the military and the elites, began to
become increasingly concerned about where this was going to end up if unchecked.103

In the same interview, Alexander also spoke about the national interests of the Untied

States and its civilizing mission, stating:

We in the embassy, in the meantime, were caught in this nasty Washington game of
“what do we do?” On the one hand everything we knew about Aristide, from every
source – from intelligence we gathered, from conversations, from his own speeches –
indicated that he was not a good president and that his policies were not going to be
beneficial to us. It wasn’t in our national interest to have this man as the president of
Haiti. Yet on the other hand we had others, and I think legitimately so, saying, be that as
it may, this man was democratically elected, and we have to support the principle of
democracy. This was our policy dilemma and I’m sure Haiti was not the first, nor the last
country where we had this problem. How do you support a person who was
democratically elected, but doesn’t rule as a democrat? Who is the antithesis of the
democratic leader?104

102
The authoritarian comparison has likewise infiltrated academic circles. Henry F. Carey, for example, identified
“Sultanism” as a shared characteristic of the Duvalier and Artistide “regimes,” creating an intrinsic link between the
two. Robert Fatton Jr. similarly argues that Aristide and Duvalier are linked albeit by the inevitability of
authoritarian habitus (see the next footnote for explanation). See Henry F. Carey, “The Third U.S. Intervention and
Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament,” Journal of Haitian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 108; and Fatton, The Roots of
Haitian Despotism.
103
“The Overthrow of Haiti’s Aristide,” Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History, Association for Diplomatic Studies
and Training, https://adst.org/2016/11/overthrow-haitis-aristide/. Alexander’s comments on Aristide can be
understood as providing affirmation of Robert Fatton’s concept of Haiti and Aristide being under the influence of
“authoritarian habitus.” Yet even his infamous September 27, 1991, “Père Lebrun” speech contains a warning to the
“bourgeoisie in Haiti” that, structurally, Haiti must change. While Aristide calls for peaceful change, his speech
indicates his unwillingness to wait forever. Further, he was well aware that the rule of law in Haiti was being
undermined and ignored by the commercial and political elite, which, from a political philosophy perspective, raises
the question about the morality of employing law-making violence. Given foreign interference in his rule, it is
remarkable that Aristide was as restrained as he was, working under the near impossible standards to which he was
being held, which in itself is a regularized tactic employed to de-legitimize revolutionaries. For authoritarian
habitus, see Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism, viii-x. A English translation of Aristide’s “Pere Lebrun” speech
can be found at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/009.html.
104
“The Overthrow of Haiti’s Aristide,” Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History.

312
 Yet rather than allowing a conversation on the difficulties in transitioning to democracy

and away from the large-scale and often horrifying human rights abuses and killings under the

former dictatorships, the US Embassy steered the conversation towards human rights violations

and violence under Aristide’s 1991 administration.105 Opposition from both left and right-wing

elements allowed Aristide’s party to be portrayed as lacking legitimacy based on its failure to

swiftly resolve Haiti’s problems. That in turn, legitimized the foreign community’s view of his

removal from power and eventual exile. By 2001, reporting had shifted from the false narrative

of Aristide being mentally unstable and instead now identified Aristide as being linked to the so-

called Chimères para-military groups. The new narrative claimed the Chimères were created by

Aristide to eliminate his political enemies, including hostile members of the media106

The information campaign employed against Aristide reached full maturity by 2004,

culminating in Aristide’s removal by the US, assisted by its Canadian and French allies. Even as

armed opposition groups marching on the capital and laying waste to the towns as they

proceeded, the discussion within international circles revolved around how quickly Aristide

could be forced to depart Haiti.107 Key to the success of the information campaign was control of

105
Philippe Girard, for example, argued Aristide had begun encouraging his political allies to form “popular gangs”
as a counter to the military. Girard believes the gangs were intended to function as Aristide’s private army, or more
likely, as a presidential guard, a move he equated with Francois Duvalier’s creation of his own loyal force, the
Makoutes. Media reporting likewise picked up on the narrative that Aristide was depicted in CIA briefings as both
psychotic and a psychopathic, a “mentally unstable leader who fomented mob violence against those who opposed
him.” Those reports would later be branded as false. Jeb Sprague confirms that Aristide did indeed begin the work to
create a presidential guard, but notes that the work was through Swiss police trainers to create a US “Secret Service-
style force” for Aristide’s close protection. Attacks against Aristide claiming he was creating military forces loyal to
him personally continued throughout his presidential administrations. See Chapter 11 of Girard, Haiti; and Sprague,
Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 55-6. For the CIA reporting and debunking, see Catherine S.
Manegold, “Innocent Abroad: Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” The New York Times, May 1, 1994, www.nytimes.com.
106
Even accepting Aristide and the Chimeres were aligned, Peter Hallward placed the alleged human rights abuses
linked to Aristide and the Chimeres in context, pointing out that at most, 30 political killings could be laid at
Aristide’s feet through possible links to the Famni Lavalas. See Chapters 6 of Girard, Haiti; and Hallward, Damning
the Flood, 155-6.
107
Jeb Sprague provides an excellent overview of the West’s activities in the creation of the “Civil Society
Initiative” or ISC, a Haitian “oppositionist civil society front,” which worked to provide coherence and organization
to the various and diverse opposition groups in Haiti. Funded largely by the US State Department through proxies,
the ISC would help establish the “Group of 184,” a Haitian coalition of business and commercial interests that

313
the media in Haiti. By 2003, Peter Hallward points out that the Group of 184, a Haitian coalition

of business and commercial interests united in opposition to Aristide’s continued rule, controlled

most of Haiti’s independent media including radio and newspapers.108

Even Aristide’s removal in 2004 was carefully orchestrated by the Group of 184 and its

international supporters. The oppositional information campaign ruthlessly exploited the

symbology of historic Haitian coups, ensuring that photo coverage of Aristide appeared to show

a willing president leaving Haiti for exile, in advance of the armed groups advancing from the

north on the capital and laying waste to the towns as they proceeded. As in the past, Western

governments would then step in to halt the pillaging armies and re-establish the conditions for

the status quo in Haiti. The key to this historical re-enactment was American money for those

parties who played a part in regime change. In the end, and in addition to obstructing Haitian

democratic development, SAPs and NGOs became the means by which the West waged

economic warfare against Haiti while the information campaign conducted against Aristide

became the ways through which Haitian democracy was tragically undermined.109

represented themselves as a peaceful, democratic alternative to Aristide. See Chapter 5 of Sprague, Paramilitarism
and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti. See also Hallward, Damning the Flood, 101-3, 106-8.
108
Hallward, 108-9. As Hallward points out, the campaign by “the bitterly partisan” National Association of Haitian
Media or ANMH had begun prior to Aristide’s re-election in 2000, the aim being to not only “demonize Famni
Lavalas” but also to give the appearance of a larger and stronger opposition than reality.
109
NGOs and SAPs created what grassroots Haitians have termed “second-hand democracy or pèpè democracy.”
There are two reasons behind this judgment. First, despite democratic free and fair elections, NGOs established
sovereignty over entire sectors of Haitian society which have been abandoned by a government unable or unwilling
to service. Examples abound including the failure to provide a funded and resourced education system within rural
Haiti. Much of the work done by NGOs is imposed on the population, without their consent or knowledge.
Anthropologist Timothy Schwartz provides a vivid and personal account of his work with various NGOs which
illustrate the lack of accountability. He identifies a major part of the NGO problem as the top-down approach they
adopt, which leads to a lack of understanding about local needs or grievances and consequently leads to a lock of
local interest or ownership. In the most extreme, he points to the NGOs losing control over their people, resulting in
corruption and a complete lack of accountability. Second, the imposition of SAPs was partially responsible for
creating the conditions leading to the coup against Aristide in 2004. By 2002, the damage from the SAPs including
the significant downsizing of the Haitian civil service in 2000 and wage freezes were significantly undermining the
grassroots support for Aristide and FL. As early as 2001, the impact of subsidized American rice imports was
beginning to draw sharp criticisms from pro-Aristide peasant groups including Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen. For all
intents and purposes, Haiti was bankrupt under Aristide. The US suspended US$650 million of aid because of
opposition complaints about irregularities with the 2000 elections. Overall, however, support for Aristide remained

314
 While the question of how democratic Aristide’s rule was at this stage can and should be

examined, the question is immaterial to understanding the effects of Western interference in

Haitian domestic politics. Whether or not Aristide was indeed turning to increasingly autocratic

means to rule Haiti including the use of the Cité Soleil masses to demonstrate in support of his

administration, does not de-legitimize his term as president. What it does raise are questions

about which mechanisms are necessary and can be adopted in Haiti to curb and limit such

autocratic tendencies in the future. Democratic governments ideally include checks and balances

which are decided upon by their citizenry and enshrined in their legislation.

A host of Haitians, largely from the political and commercial elite, supported Aristide’s

removal from power because of the threat he represented to the structural integrity of the

predatory system then in place. Yet their support did not make his removal either legal or

morally right.110 And the support and involvement of the foreign community during the 2004

coup clearly amounted to a flagrant violation of international law. International interference in

Haiti at this critical juncture, in fact, undermined democratic governance more than the violent

actions of radical and violent domestic opposition groups.

Democracy in fragile states like Haiti is largely embodied in the rule of law as exercised

through free and fair elections. Yet, despite claiming to be building democracy in Haiti, Western

extremely high. However, the effects of the SAPs emboldened the opposition and in 2003, paramilitaries began
launching armed attacks on various police stations. By April 2003, when the austerity measures implemented to deal
with SAPs were causing serious damage to Haitians, Aristide raised the question of reparations from France in the
amount of some US$21 billion as reimbursement for the 1825 indemnity (plus interest). By February 2004,
Aristide’s fate was sealed when he was removed from Haiti and taken into exile. See Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement
of Democracy in Haiti,” 180; Timothy Schwartz, Travesty in Haiti: A true account of Christian missions,
orphanages, food aid, fraud and drug trafficking, 2nd ed. (North Carolina, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2010); Jane
Powell Leadbeater, “Structural Adjustment Programs: Mortgaging Haitian Sovereignty,” Undercurrent Journal 6,
no. 2 (2009): 48-55; Hallward, Damning the Flood, 152, 226-7; and Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 25.
110
Aristide was subject to legitimate opposition from politically active middle-class rivals, who were upset with his
preferred strategy and were more willing to make accommodations through negotiations to change the predatory
system, rather than revolution as appeared to be Aristide’s preferred route to change. The previously discussed
divisions within his supporters over the role of foreign aid, for example, was one such example. It is critical to note,
however, that such opposition does not legitimize the illegal removal of Aristide from his office as president.

315
activities aimed at regime change demonstrate a willingness to abandon democracy when it no

longer suits Western interests. Haiti ceased to be a democratic state when Aristide was removed

illegally from power through gross interference on the part of the US, France, and Canada as the

main perpetrators of the unrest which resulted in his exile.

Setting aside the hands-on role played by the West in orchestrating the 2004 coup, there

remains an unanswered question on Haiti. How are Haitians to deal with leaders who are

demagogues, employing authoritarian means to hold onto power, without having to worry about

the international community interfering whenever it wishes? Once again, Haiti has not been

allowed, like every other ‘normal’ nation, to govern itself. In the eyes of the West, and for those

Haitians who are striving for democratic constitutionalism and the rule of law, Haitian

sovereignty remains illusory.

Missed Opportunities: Development of a Civil Service

Time alone will tell whether what the Commission has done in the way of restoring the
legislative branch of the government and what we have recommended in the way of
accelerated "Haitianization" of the public services will redound to the good of the greatest
number of Haitians and to the ultimate benefit of the country. The foundations of
democratic and truly representative government do not now exist in Haiti. It will be a
long time before they can be created. Once the guiding hand of the United States is
withdrawn, I believe the "Haitianization" of Haiti will be accelerated. It may be that
twenty years was all too short a time for the task of regeneration and the establishment
there of stable government on a lasting basis.111
- American Diplomat Henry Prather Fletcher

The third element of the core strategy undertaken by the West to deter fundamental

change in Haitian development is the failure of the international community to seize

opportunities to create a merit-based civil service with the capacity, competency and capabilities

111
In February 1930, a Presidential Commission was created by President Hoover and dispatched to Haiti to study
the conditions of the occupation and report on the best means by which the US could extract itself from Haiti.
Fletcher, a lawyer by trade and former diplomat, was appointed to the Commission and subsequently wrote about his
experiences while in Haiti on Hoover’s mission. See Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” 533-548.

316
required to provide effective governance and services to the Haitian majority.112 When the

international community intervened in Haiti and engaged in state-building aimed at developing

specific sectors within Haiti, those efforts were largely undertaken to shape Haitian society for

the benefit of the intervening nation and have largely failed. This discussion focuses upon the

missed opportunities which arose when intervening nations could have developed Haiti’s civil

service and chose not to, or worse, chose to shape the civil service in ways which harmed or

were unsuitable to Haiti.

After achieving independence, Haiti saw the development of a coterie of military leaders

who cooperated in the defence of the nation, but competed with each other for favour and for

promotion. The civilian bureaucracies which developed to support the military leaders and their

strategies incorporated friends and allies, and took the form of what Max Weber would have

understood in his definition of “a totalitarian organization resulting from the institutionalization

of charisma in a bureaucratic direction,” which saw bureaucracy as “an end in itself.”113 In other

words, the bureaucracies that developed were loyal and responsive to the leader rather than the

nation-state. The leader’s will and direction could override principles such as fairness, human

rights, and the public good. Sociologist Helen Constas amplified that idea, stating that the

charismatic or traditional bureaucracies which developed in support of the military leaders are

112
By civil service, I am referring to those public servants responsible for providing public goods and services in a
variety of sectors, including the security (military, police, judiciary and penal), education, infrastructure, public
transit, health care and government sectors.
113
Weber understood legitimacy to be based on one of three foundations: the legal-rational basis under which
normative rules identified the right to govern and issue commands based on a rules-based order; traditional
legitimacy, based on customs or beliefs, usually within a hereditary and authoritarian system of governance; and
legitimacy based on charisma, which “rests on the devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity or heroism of an
individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” Weber saw an inevitable
progression from traditional or charisma-based legitimacy, to the legal-rational model, and with that progression, the
professionalization of the staff managing or administering government departments as part of a bureaucracy.
However, as Helen Constas points out, that progression was not obvious and if legitimacy was based on the
charismatic model, the resulting charismatic bureaucracy would not be rational, meaning that evolution into the
legal-rational model would not happen without revolution. See Helen Constas, “Max Weber's Two Conceptions of
Bureaucracy,” American Journal of Sociology 63, no. 4 (Jan. 1958): 401.

317
“basically totalitarian structures and ends unto themselves, and therefore incapable of

responsibility to anything outside themselves (except under duress).” She believed that “[o]nly if

a bureaucracy is rooted in a legal-rational order can it remain entirely a technical instrument and,

hence, a responsible bureaucracy.”114

With the Marine Occupation came a putative opportunity to create a legal-rational

bureaucracy. Yet Marine officials opposed such development throughout almost the entirety of

the Occupation, begrudgingly allowing that development only late in the Occupation and only

after drawing considerable and negative attention from Washington. Dantès Bellegarde pointed

out his own experience, having been brought into President Dartiguenave’s administration in

1918 as Minister of agriculture and public education. He recounted that “[c]e cabinet entra en

fonction le 24 juin 1918, et tout de suite il se trouva en butte à la plus farouche hostilité des

autorités américaines.”115

As Minister, Dantès Bellegarde also sought to implement “une Caisse autonome de

l'Agriculture” based on what was termed additional, light taxation. The program was based on

“l'organisation du petit et du moyen crédit rural,” the intent being to provide the funds necessary

for

la construction des routes, chemins et sentiers, pour les travaux d'arrosage, de drainage et
d'assèchement, pour l'achat et la fourniture à bon marché aux paysans d'outils, machines
et appareils perfectionnés, pour le développement et la conservation du bétail, pour la
constitution ou la restauration des forêts domaniales, pour la lutte contre les animaux
nuisibles et les maladies cryptogamiques, etc.116

114
Constas, “Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy,” 400-409.
115
Bellegarde proposed a fundamental overhaul of Haitian agriculture, to include the creation of a national
economic council to oversee agriculture at the national level but informed by local “sections rurales.” Agricultural
education was to be achieved through a combination “des professeurs-inspecteurs d'agriculture départementaux
(agronomes diplômés haïtiens ou étrangers) et communaux (ceux-ci formés en Haïti).” His proposal was presented
to the US Legation for approval, but two years later, President Dartiguenave messaged President Harding to
complain that no response had been made to a proposal he considered “la plus grande importance pour l'agriculture
haïtienne.” See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 58-64.
116
Bellegarde, 64-5.

318
 As with his earlier education proposal, the project was likewise denied funding and

ignored. Unlike the earlier project, Bellegarde believed this project would not only have

contributed to Haitian growth and prosperity, but more importantly, “elle aurait empêché la

guerre de destruction et de massacre qui désola les régions du Nord et du Plateau Central et

causa la mort de plus de 3.000 Haïtiens.”117

Even as late as 1930, domestic Haitian bureaucratic development had not taken place.

The American diplomat Henry Fletcher, part of the 1930 American Presidential Commission

looking into the conditions in Haiti and whether the Marines could be withdrawn, observed that:

The lack of foresight as far as "Haitianization" is concerned is more conspicuous in

regard to the Garde than any other service. The policy of the Marine Corps in this respect
is, in my opinion, open to criticism. After fourteen years only five Haitians have attained
the rank of captain in the Garde, and the treaty has only six more years to run. We found
that the Marine Corps – which is in actual control of the Garde through its commandant,
always a marine officer - had, with or without good reason, filled up all the higher grades
from its own commissioned personnel. Most of the lower grades are filled with its non-
commissioned officers, all of whom have rendered excellent service, some for as much as
fourteen years. None of the latter have ever been promoted above the grade of captain.
The result has been that a dam has been erected which holds back the American non-
commissioned officers at the grade of captain and consequently holds back the Haitian
lieutenants as well. There may be some satisfactory explanation of this but, if so, I never
heard it. It must be corrected before any real progress toward "Haitianization" of the
Garde can be made.118

Indeed, even John Russell, former Commandant of the Marine Brigade and High

Commissioner in Haiti, testified before the Commission that “a long-range program designed to

build a middle class and thus bridge the gap between the ‘elite’ and the masses should be

adopted….[a task which] would take years.”119 He felt that Haitians would likely be ready by

117
Bellegarde, 65.
118
Fletcher was speaking specifically about the Garde, but his comments were equally applicable to government
services generally. Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” 547.
119
Magdaline W. Shannon, “The U. S. Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti and Its
Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American Policy,” Caribbean Studies 15, no. 4 (Jan. 1976): 63.

319
1936 at the earliest to take over positions of responsibility within the Haitian bureaucracy, the

sole exception being the role and department of the General Receiver which he saw as needing to

remain under American control.120 Ironically, however, much of the Commission’s time in Haiti

was devoted to resolving the political impasse over the holding of elections.

In the end, Haitianization would be completed two years earlier than projected. By 1934,

Haiti had control over its bureaucracy including the Garde’s functions, but was still shut out of

owning its fiscal and economic policy by virtue of the American retention of the Receiver

General’s office until 1941. Given the criticality of Haiti being able to determine its own

economic policies, American control would continue to retard the creation of a professional civil

service.

In the period between the Marine Occupation and the first Duvalier regime, the civil

service saw little to no reform, save that begun by Dumarsais Estimé, who sought to make the

service more representative of Haitian society through the inclusion of more middle- and lower-

class blacks.121 However, with the election of François Duvalier as president in 1957, the civil

service returned to a charisma-based model, and it evolved into a traditional legitimacy model

that would eventually embody and promote Duvalier’s politically racialist ideology.122

120
The Hoover Commission would adopt this as one of its recommendations, namely “Rapid Haitianization of the
services by 1936” and “Selection of racially unbiased employees for the Haitian service.” Hoover would accept the
recommendations regarding Haitianization without change. Russell, when informed, saw the rapid process as
leading to the appointment of “incompetent” Haitians. Shannon, “The U. S. Commission for the Study and Review
of Conditions in Haiti and Its Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American Policy,” 66.
121
Stenio Vincent and Élie Lescot, who preceded Estimé, sought to bend the civil service, such as it was, to their
interests, as did Paul Magloire who followed Estimé. Of the rest, Joseph Pierre-Louis, Franck Sylvain and Daniel
Fignolé were not in power long enough to have a significant impact on the civil service.
122
Here, I am seizing on the excellent work and analysis of Anselme Remy who defines the Duvalier phenomenon
as “a racialist ideology in which the basic problem of the society was explained as the natural historical opposition
of blacks to mulattoes, an antagonistic situation which would only be solved when a black man seized power and a
black bourgeoise evolved to replace the mulatto bourgeoisie.” Remy points to Duvalier as representative of “an
ambitious middle class.” See Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 38-65.

320
 The civil service operating in support of Duvalier was forced to confront the realities of a

state without economic promise. As Anselme Remy points out, economic realities forced

Duvalier to resort to a policy that returned Haiti to begging for foreign aid. For the civil service,

this meant developing plans that offered up concessions to the US government as incentives to

attract foreign aid, including, for example, providing the US with a naval base to replace

Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, as well as significant mining and oil prospecting concessions.

The United States, however, rejected the incentives that Haiti offered and did not provide

the desired aid. Moreover, the Kennedy administration changed its foreign policy and began

actively seeking regime change in Haiti, forcing Duvalier to change his own foreign policy in

response. By 1963, Duvalier had moved away from actively seeking foreign aid, instead stating:

“[i]f aid or foreign assistance is offered the Haitian nation, she will accept it respectfully and in a

spirit of fraternity, as long as this aid or this assistance shall not be accompanied with conditions

incompatible with her dignity and liberty.”123

Duvalier achieved a détente with the administration of Lyndon Johnson by 1964,.

Anselme Remy believed that “the failure of America’s [Kennedy’s] policy toward Haiti

convinced the mulatto bourgeoisie of the futility of their opposition to Duvalier.”124 To ensure

his regime’s survival, Duvalier reached an accommodation, but this time with “a younger, and

more trustworthy, group of [largely black] politicians…members of a new [political] elite whose

life was not marked by deprivations and color prejudice.”125 To ensure their continued loyalty

and because economic realities precluded an independent black bourgeoisie, Duvalier modified

123
François Duvalier, “Œuvres essentielles. La Révolution au pouvoir (1962-1966), ” vol. IV, (Port-au-Prince,
Presses Nationales d’Haïti, 1967), in Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 60.
124
Remy, 61.
125
Remy.

321
his ideology to allow for the introduction of blacks into “the formerly mulatto-dominated

bourgeoisie.”126 He wound up with what has been termed “a middle class of parasites,” aided and

abetted by a civil service under his personal management.127

By 1969, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment on Haiti summed up the

dilemma of trying to replace Duvalier, including the absence of an effective civil service capable

of providing governance:

Stability is a special problem in Haiti because the sudden termination of President

Duvalier’s brutal dictatorship would leave the country with no effective institutions or
trained personnel to provide government services and continuity. During the past decade
Duvalier has personally handled all major administrative matters. Through intrigue and
manipulation, he has monopolized channels of communication and subjugated all
government organizations to his personal whim.128

From 1974 onwards, the Duvalier regime of Jean-Claude attempted civil service reform,

constituting an Administration Commission charged with “improvement of public sector

organizational structures and procedures; development and standardization of personnel

administration; training and skill development; and decentralization and development of regional

public sector capacity.”129 Unfortunately, the Commission was repeatedly reorganized with

changes of leadership and personnel, leading to “a significant amount of wasted effort

[implementing and understanding internal organizational change] …. rather than concentrating

on the substance of the administration reform mandate.”130 It would have no lasting effect on the

126
Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 63.
127
Remy.
128
FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents On American Republics, 1969–1972, eds. Douglas Kraft and
James Siekmeier (Washington: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2009),
Document 380. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d380.
129
David W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, “The Challenge of administrative reform in post-Duvalier Haiti:
efficiency, equity and the prospects for systemic change,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 54,
(1988): 92-3.
130
Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 93.

322
desired reform of the public service. Instead, reorganizations and turmoil would continue well

into the 1980s, long after the departure of Baby Doc.

Public sector reform after the Duvalier era has been carried out mainly by NGOs.

Unfortunately, the NGOs have set the priorities rather than the Haitian government. While

various sectors have been targeted, the main focus for reform has been security sector reform, led

primarily by the UN, albeit with limited success. The education sector has also received

significant Western attention, with most reform efforts seeking to shape it to provide suitably

trained workers for low-technology assembly manufacturing. While other sectors have, from

time to time, received attention, the NGOs involved have usually had limited objectives and

funding.

Overall, public sector development has remained immature. In 2009, a Canadian Defence

Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report provided an evaluation of peacebuilding in

Haiti since 2004, with specific emphasis on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH). It judged the Haitian government incapable of providing essential government

services, leaving Haiti dependent upon international assistance, and predicted that the NGO

network would remain engaged in the provision of many government services for “the

foreseeable future.”131

Summary

Haiti’s democracy remains fragile, its new security structures inexperienced and untested,
and economic renewal is at best tentative. A year-and-a-half after the American-led
intervention, and the political and security situation in Haiti has dramatically improved.
These improvements have advanced to a point which permits a more modest onwards

131
Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” i.

323
 international presence in Haiti, one to ensure a smooth and sure transfer of key functions
enabling Haitians to assume responsibility for their own future.132
- Statement by US Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Alexander F. Watson, 1996

Haiti has come a long way to achieve the relative political and security stability it is now
enjoying, but persistent economic uncertainties, which can result in social exclusion,
particularly of youth and the most vulnerable, may undermine this progress.133
- Statement by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,
Jean-Pierre Lacroix, 2018

Peter Hallward argues there is a connection between Haitian poverty and criminalization.

He points to the spiral of poverty leading to despair, which in turn leads to armed gangs and

eventually criminalization of those gangs followed by combat operations intended to eliminate

the criminal threat entirely.134 That same connection was present during the Marine Occupation

and is present now during the UN occupation. Breaking the cycle that ends in criminalization and

targeted combat operations must be the priority going forward. The first step lies in

acknowledging the connection and the cycle.

The government of Haiti has lost control. Part of that loss can be attributed to Western

interventions designed around strategic objectives focussed on containment—the prevention of

‘illegal’ migration, for example—while Haiti has lost sovereignty and ceded government

capacity to NGOs. The government of Haiti no longer controls the provision of government

services for much of the country. An ineffective public service is a symptom of Haiti’s economic

132
Alexander F. Watson, “Statement before the US House Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C.” (21
March 1996), in US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Dispatch 7, No. 14 (1 April 1996): 172.
133
“UN eyes transition of Haiti role from peacekeeping to development,” UN News, 3 April 2018,
www.news.un.org.
134
See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 309. In the same vein, Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner & Linda Peake
explore “racialized discourses” employed to create associations between Haitian aid recipients and black criminality.
They point to the “increased securitization” of humanitarian interventions, leading to aid donating nations as
embracing narratives which speak to the need to ‘protect’ aid workers and aid shipments from the local black
criminal elements. See Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner & Linda Peake, “Fear and Loathing in Haiti: Race and
Politics of Humanitarian Dispossession,” ACME: An international E-Journal for Critical Geography 9, No. 3
(2010): 282-300.

324
mal-development and, moreover, symptomatic of the elite’s lack of interest and commitment to

the structural overhaul necessary to build a viable constitutional democracy. The West has

become risk adverse in Haiti, refusing to invest directly in the country or its people.

Further, the West has likewise conditioned Haiti’s commercial and political elite,

including its better educated members, to behave in their own class interests. Peasants protesting

their condition of extreme poverty have been met by force, approved and employed by external

powers. Even force and killings perpetrated by Haiti’s homegrown dictators have sparked little to

no outside interference. Only in instances where Haiti flirted with social revolution did the West

stir itself to force regime change. Consequently, elites within Haiti seek to exploit their control

over the government to their own benefit while others able to emigrate do so, exacerbating

Haiti’s ‘brain drain.’

The result is simple. Haiti, in the rest of the world’s eyes, is considered exceptional.135

While this is partially attributable to its fragile status, outside observers see Haiti as a pariah not

worthy of being entrusted with its own sovereignty. The Western strategy employed against

Haiti—economic warfare, discouraging opportunity, and criminalization of opposition—is

merely the implementation of this viewpoint. The continued interference in Haitian sovereignty

through repeated and lengthy occupations confirms that identification. Changing this viewpoint

is critical for Haiti to have any chance at leaving the status quo behind. The next chapter will

135
Note the argument is not that Haiti is exceptional, other than being the only black slave nation to achieve freedom
and independence through a successful armed revolution. Rather the argument is that the West has perceived Haiti
as exceptional and accordingly has treated Haiti as if it were exceptional. Haitian American historian Millery Polyné
identified this phenomenon when he spoke about “how easily intelligent people (including myself) fall into the trap
of using Haiti as an embodiment of alterity – exceptionally chaotic and incomprehensible.” As he points out, Haiti is
too often used as the “exceptional case in the Americas.” He raises a critical question (and an equally important
corollary) which should be considered by those who favour intervention: “Can the black republic ever be seen as
postexceptional, and is that state of postexceptionality a mere mimic of the West?” See Introduction from Millery
Polyné, ed, The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Crisis and Development (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press,
2013), 203 of 6746, 243-263 of 6746 (Kindle version).

325
explore the lessons—learned and unlearned—that have contributed to this view of Haiti and

what needs to change on the part of the West.

326
Chapter Eleven – Lessons from Interventions

There is a sense of déjà-vu in the process that disposed of Aristide….Once more, Haiti
will have to try again, try to re-invent itself. But will it be permitted to do so with the
dearth of allowable models of development under hegemonic globalization?1
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus, Patrick Bellegarde-Smith,

MINUSTAH’s greatest deficiency at present is a strategic planning capability which

would unite the disparate components of the mission and develop a multidisciplinary plan
to disengage from Haiti.2
- Colonel Stephen Cadden, Canadian Task Force Commander, 2013-14

This chapter discusses the historical lessons of past Western interventions that should

inform future peacebuilding and, ideally, encourage Western acknowledgement of past errors in

Haiti. This section is deliberately visionary, rather than purely pragmatic. It does not tackle the

issue of whether interventions ought to be, or ought not to be, undertaken.3 Rather, this section

approaches the issue of interventions and lessons with the objective of determining how best to

minimize harm to Haiti and Haitian citizens during future interventions.

Recent humanitarian interventions, including those undertaken in Haiti, have involved

“coercive democratization,” or the imposition of democracy on an undemocratic society by

external forces.4 Marina Ottaway claimed that coercive democratization requires that a societal

1
Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 265.
2
Col Steve M. Cadden, “Task Force Port au Prince End of Tour Report for Period 01 July 2013-22 June 2014,”
Canadian Army Lessons Learned,
140702-UU-3350_OP_HAMLET_TFCOMD_END_TOUR_REPORT_JUL_13_JUN_14_KMS_VERSION, July
2014.
3
The use of the term ‘ought’ is deliberate and makes the connection with ‘Hume’s Law, from the Scottish
philosopher David Hume, as derived from his ‘Is-Ought’ problem interpretation. Accordingly, this section does not
seek to examine Haiti and interventions as being justified, morally or otherwise, or not, but instead approaches
interventions in Haiti as a historical fact and an unfortunate reality of Haitian life going forward, unlikely to end any
time in the foreseeable future.
4
The label ‘coercive democracy’ is contested. Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, for example, point out that
“there is nothing ‘coercive’ about a process that gives to people the basic political freedoms and rights that they
purportedly already want and seek to enjoy.” Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, “Intervention and the
Nation –Building Debate,” in Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 684.

327
platform necessary to sustain democracy is mature and in place prior to its imposition.5

Otherwise, in her words, “dependent, Potemkin democracies, that coercive democratization

produces, risk becoming more part of the problem of renewed confrontation than a solution to

lingering conflicts.”6 Lakhdar Brahimi made similar comments in 2004 when he argued that:

The only prudent starting point...is to try and understand as best you can why there was a
conflict in the first place and to ask 'what is the context in which you find
yourself?’...That requires time to talk to a lot of people, over and over again;
unfortunately the most important decisions end up having to be taken...before we are
knowledgeable enough to anticipate what their implications might be…7

Therein lies the problem. How do we gain an understanding of the local societal interests

and grievances necessary to inform the direction that development should take to be effective

and lasting? We need to remember that “democracy…is a political system that recognizes there

can never be unanimity of interests and views in a society and therefore creates mechanisms to

institutionalize conflict and manage it.”8 The development not only of the necessary framework

for democracy, but the necessary political culture to sustain it, entails a lengthy and complicated

process.

Unfortunately, as Ottaway points out, the West assumes democracy can be installed

without pre-conditions and within a society that features divisive societal issues which we, too,

often do not understand or recognize. When a complex nation like Haiti is involved, this

becomes even more critical before long-term change can take hold and flourish.9

5
Marina Ottaway, “Is Democracy the Answer?” in Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 603.
6
Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 615.
7
Cited in Sultan Barakat, Margaret Chard and Richard Jones, “Attributing Value: Evaluating Success and Failure in
Post-War Reconstruction,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4/5, Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: A Quixotic
Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' (2005), 831.
8
Ottaway, “Is Democracy the Answer?” From Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 604.
9
Suzy Castor identified a number of Haitian systemic obstacles to democratization which need to be overcome
including “problems of production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth,” all the while dealing with an

328
 Instead of democratizing coercively, Ottaway makes the case for the international

community to “consider more seriously interim political solutions for post-conflict countries”

with democracy as a strategic long-term goal that is “impossible in most post-conflict countries

in the short and even medium terms,” and can only be implemented once the post-conflict state

has developed the necessary capacity to support it.10 Ottaway’s recommendations contradict the

premise of past interventions activities, namely that “elections and other measures for re-

establishing political institutions cannot be delayed to wait for the emergence of appropriate

social and economic conditions for democratic reform.”11

Ottaway’s lesson requires security and development to be pursued synergistically in a

synchronized framework. Building state capacity for governance and the provision of essential

services, while simultaneously meeting the need for an effective public administration and

overcoming the challenges of creating a safe and secure environment are the key challenges

going forward.12 Long term investment is also required in Haiti to create sustainable

development opportunities and to ensure sustainable gains in security.

Finally, the international community must learn to view Haiti as a country worthy of

sovereignty. Applying the idea that Haiti deserves only limited or restricted sovereignty has

“oligarchy” supported by the military, the principle aim of which being “to survive, to retain power, and to protect
their privileges” at all costs. As Castor points out, while the Haitian masses had “taken over the government” they
had not yet “taken power.” See Castor, “Democracy and Society in Haiti,” 126-37.
10
Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 615.
11
Ho-Won Jeongi, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process (London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2005), 31.
12
Dantès Bellegarde had much earlier advocated for a Haitian ‘solution,’ built on a safe and secure environment,
which saw the development of a Haitian economic and political system that was “equitable to all, favoring personal
autonomy, individual initiative, and the full expansion of social energies.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “The
Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity,” Phylon (1940-1956) 1, no. 4 (4th Quarter, 1940), 327-335.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/272301.

329
made it into a faux or “apparent state.” 13 It is not surprising then that Haitian elites show no

willingness to abandon their predatory state model and embrace the nationhood envisioned by

Trouillot and other like-minded Haitian scholars.

Lesson One – Understanding Confirmation Bias

[W]e must not lose sight of the fact that there may be no aspect of Haitian society that is
not in crisis. Haiti may be the quintessential example of what we call the ‘fragile state.14
- RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer

[S]ince independence in 1804, Haiti has been ruled by a succession of authoritarian and
dictatorial regimes and a culture of democracy and human rights has struggled to make
any lasting impact on political and social practices. Hence the inadequacy, not to say total
lack, of a real “State culture” among many political leaders and top government officials.
In the long run, this recurring deficiency may well undermine the very principle of the
continuity of the State.15
- Extract from 2002 UN Economic and Social Council Report

The first lesson of Haiti’s Western interventions is the nature of confirmation bias and its

impact on rehabilitation and development work in Haiti.16 International narratives about Haiti are

a primary means by which this bias is manifest.17 Unfortunately, Haiti only ever seems to be

mentioned in the international press during military coups, food riots, earthquakes, or hurricanes.

Linking Haiti’s crises to perennial bad luck leads confirmation bias full circle to Haiti’s Vodou

culture. Western culture, through movies and books, links Vodou to devil worship. Ignorance of

13
Limited or restricted sovereignty which in turn leads to the identification of “apparent states” is based on
“structures of government that have a distinctive set of institutions and political procedures but have little or no
actual power to meet the needs of the population.” See Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron. Georges Woke Up
Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 27.
14
Statement by RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer, former UN Police Commissioner with the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Cited at FAAE, Evidence, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, 13.
15
UN Economic and Social Council Report E/CN.4/2003/116, “SITUATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI,”
23 December 2002, paras 53-54.
16
Confirmation bias involves the favouring of that information which reinforces previously held positions, beliefs
and/or biases.
17
Benedict Anderson explores the development of national narrative and its role in nationalism. See Chapter 11 –
Memory and Forgetting of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, rev. ed. (Verso: London, 2006).

330
Haiti’s traditional syncretic religion reinforces the idea of God cursing Haiti. Anthropologist Ira

Lowenthal highlighted this particular bias, pointing out: “The best thing that ever happened to

racism is Vodou. They made up their stories about it and their stories confirmed every prejudice

of every white person in the world.”18

The most recent example of this trope still having currency was recently seen in response

to the devastating January 2010 earthquake. In an opinion piece for The New York Times,

columnist David Brooks wrote:

As Lawrence E. Harrison explained in his book “The Central Liberal Truth,” Haiti, like
most of the world’s poorest nations, suffers from a complex web of progress-resistant
cultural influences. There is the influence of the voodoo [sic] religion, which spreads the
message that life is capricious and planning futile. There are high levels of social
mistrust. Responsibility is often not internalized. Child-rearing practices often involve
neglect in the early years and harsh retribution when kids hit 9 or 10. We’re all supposed
to politely respect each other’s cultures. But some cultures are more progress-resistant
than others, and a horrible tragedy was just exacerbated by one of them.19

By way of contrast, Brooks lauds the work of the horde of NGOs, claiming that the

“more than 10,000 organizations” in Haiti are “doing the Lord’s work, especially these days…”

Yet, despite their efforts, Brooks claims the Haitian culture is not capable of, and not interested

in salvation, noting that “even a blizzard of these [NGO] efforts does not seem to add up to

comprehensive change.”20

Confirmation bias maintains that Haiti is not capable of planning and undertaking civil

sector reform. Foreign aid monies flowing into Haiti, and other fragile nations, are not directed

primarily towards the fragile government, but rather are sent to the myriad of NGOs or through

18
Ira Lowenthal, cited in Kim Wall and Caterina Clerici, “Vodou is elusive and endangered, but it remains the soul
of Haitian people,” The Guardian, November 07, 2015. www.guardian.com
19
David Brooks, “The Underlying Tragedy,” The New York Times, January 14, 2010.
20
Brooks, “The Underlying Tragedy.”

331
international organizations like the UN or OAS. There is an implicit belief that fragile nation

governments cannot and should not be trusted with aid monies because of corruption and

incompetence. An example is the previously mentioned January 2009 Canadian Defence

Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report which provided an evaluation of

peacebuilding in Haiti since 2004, the conclusion of which judged the Haitian government

incapable of providing essential government services to its people.21

Yet, despite the allocation of billions of dollars to Haiti, foreign attempts to stabilize and

improve Haiti have failed. Despite seven peace support operations in Haiti since 1993, Haiti still

does not have a proper and functioning security sector (justice, police and penal). And because of

confirmation bias, Haiti must wait until the international community through agencies like the

UN or the OAS determine the way ahead and allocate monies accordingly.

At the same time, Haitians also suffer from the influence of confirmation bias. The long

shadow cast by the US Occupation has worked against the presence of the UN, whether we are

discussing the US Marines who deployed as part of the Multinational Interim Force or IMF, or

the more recent deployment of Nepalese soldiers as part of MINUSTAH, the latter causing the

devastating cholera outbreak which ravaged the nation.22 With each disaster afflicting the UN

missions, whether cholera, the use of combat troops to battle gangs in civilian neighbourhoods,

or the initial UN response to the 2010 earthquake focussed on preventing looters rather than

21
Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti.”
22
UNSCR Resolution 940, for example, was the first time that the UN authorized a military invasion (the MIF) of a
sovereign nation to “restore democracy,” making Haiti the basis for an experiment. Because the crisis did not
threaten international peace and security, the rationale for the invasion was quite controversial and very
discriminating in its application and appeared to be more about the UN having been thwarted by the de facto regime.

332
assisting with rescue efforts, that confirmation bias has grown stronger and deeper roots in

Haitian society.23

While it cuts both ways when dealing with Haiti and the international community, the

most shocking result of confirmation bias has been its influence on Haiti’s position within the

international community. Throughout its troubled history, Haitian sovereignty has been regularly

disregarded and violated both physically and otherwise, meaning Haiti’s ability to exercise its

sovereignty fully has been, and continues to be, compromised.24 The Marine Occupation was

perhaps the most shocking example, the US narrative centring on selling the idea of Haitians not

being worthy of holding sovereignty over their own people or their land, when the real motive

for intervention was debt repayment to the US.

That history of disregard and violation has continued with recent UN peacekeeping

interventions. It can likewise be found within an international community which tolerates and

indeed, signals a preference for international NGOs occupying areas which should be serviced by

Haitian domestic governance and policy determination. That preference and support for NGOs

likewise signals a blatant disregard for Haitian sovereignty, reinforcing the perception that the

West does not see Haiti worthy of being considered a sovereign nation.

23
A Reuters report from February 2010 identified the UN peacekeepers focussing their efforts for days after the
earthquake on tracking down and capturing the more than 3,000 escaped inmates from the destroyed national prison.
Guatemalan diplomat Edmond Mulet, the acting SRSG of the MINUSTAH mission at the time of the earthquake,
was quoted as saying: “I still have to patrol, I still have to go after all these criminals and bandits that escaped from
the national penitentiary, the gang leaders, the criminals, the killers, the kidnappers. I cannot really distract myself
from doing that.” Tom Brown, “Haiti aid effort marred by slow U.N. response,” Reuters, February 26 2010.
www.reuters.com
24
Haitian sovereignty in this instance includes both international sovereignty, associated with international
recognition by other sovereign states; and domestic sovereignty, centered on state authority and control over its own
internal affairs. For a discussion of sovereignty and its various elements, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Problematic
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

333
Lesson Two – Haiti is a Study of Duality
Bourik swe pou chwal dekore ak dentel.
[The donkey sweats so the horse can be decorated with lace.]25
- Haitian proverb
Related to confirmation bias is the need to recognize that Haitian capacity building must

be undertaken within the framework of recognizing Haiti’s chronic societal duality.26 That

duality is based more often than not on conflict and has, in the past, been an obstacle to

democratic development. This requires understanding and recognizing the dialectic struggle of

rural peasants versus the urban based masses; peasant grievances versus elite privilege and

control via the predatory state; Creole versus French; Vodou versus the Catholic Church; civilian

versus military; the diaspora versus the homeland; state versus nation, etc.

Haiti’s duality has created a historically bound social framework that has been

manipulated to justify and rationalize social inequality and favouritism. Cultural awareness on

the part of international partners is paramount and requires an education that explores the

detailed issues that have created this duality. Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s masterful thesis is an

excellent start to creating such an awareness.27

Resolving issues related to Haiti’s duality requires an effective strategy, one which

provides for a grievance process that allows participation by all affected stakeholders without

25
Proverbs and translation taken from Prof. Bob Corbett’s Haiti website,
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/haiti.html.
26
The idea of Haitian duality has unfortunate connotations of simplistic Western understanding of Haiti within a
binary framework. Witness, for example, the early work of James G. Leyburn (The Haitian People). However,
Haitian writers often speak about ‘the two Haitis’ and examine various dualities specific to Haiti. Haitian-American
anthropologist Gina Athena Ulysse, for example, embraced the idea of two Haitis, one centred on her Haitian
identity within a diaspora community; and the other being the Haiti of memory, a memory built around colour and
class “and urban and rural referents…” Trouillot likewise speaks about Haitian duality throughout his works, the
most relevant being his analysis of the Haitian conflict built on state versus nation (but even here, the separation of
state and nation is never absolute). See Gina Athena Ulysse, Why Haiti Needs New Narratives: A Post-Quake
Chronicle (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2015); and Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation.
27
Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation.

334
having to resort to violence or being subjected to violence. Ideally, the conflict resolution

strategy should be collaboratively created within the parameters of a shared responsibility

partnership rather than imposed from outside. The strategy should be developed by Haitians, on

behalf of Haitians, using foreign expertise as appropriate to guide its development.

Lesson Three – Democracy and Elections

The foundations of democratic and truly representative government do not now exist in
Haiti. It will be a long time before they can be created…It may be that twenty years was
all too short a time for the task of regeneration and the establishment there of stable
government on a lasting basis.28
- American diplomat Henry Fletcher

When discussing democracy in Haiti, the international community focusses on the

conduct of free and fair elections, and nothing else. Development of democratic institutions and

governance mechanisms involves a lengthy process that necessarily takes place following

elections. It is also a process that takes place organically at the grassroots level, often while the

necessary state-building is taking place at the national level. Unfortunately, the literature shows

democratic movements built in Haiti at the grassroots levels have been either dismissed or

marginalized.29

Discussed earlier, in Chapter Five, the cacos uprisings were an example of a popular

movement that was later highjacked and re-directed into what has been termed “social

28
American diplomat Henry Fletcher, part of the 1930 American Presidential Commission looking into the
conditions in Haiti and whether the Marines could be withdrawn. Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?,” 548.
29
Paul Dejean, Haitian priest, activist and former Ministre des Haïtiens vivant à l'étranger under President Aristide,
highlighted this problem. Writing about his 1992 experiences with UN Development Program and its operations in
Haiti, he warned: “Je me méfie comme de la peste de ce terme «consensus» tellement galvaudé ces derniers mois, en
Haïti, qu'on l'applique sans gêne aucune à toute sorte d'accords ou ententes relevant beaucoup plus de la
combinaison, imposés, contre son gré, à une immense majorité, par une infime minorité ayant le monopole de la
force et des armes. Je me pose donc la question: «large consensus» entre qui? De plus, les «autres interventions de
l'extérieur» ne semblent laisser aucune place aux seules initiatives qui comptent véritablement, celles qui
proviennent de la population elle-même.” See Paul Dejean, Haïti: alerte, on tue! (Montréal: Les Éditions du
CIDIHCA, 1993), 86-7.

335
banditry.”30 That led of course to the term cacos, during the Marine Occupation, coming to

embody criminality, shifting the narrative away from the unjust nature of the occupation and its

illegal acts, and instead towards the cacos as bandits preying on society and blocking ‘progress’.

In addition, the Marine leadership gradually expanded the use of the term until it encompassed

anyone who objected to the Occupation including, as will be explored later, the opposition

media. While this was one of the worst examples of criminalization of dissent, there have been

other egregious examples since that time.31

For example, during the regime of Henri Namphy, which had replaced Jean-Claude

Duvalier’s, anti-government protests and general strikes became common as Haitians demanded

elections to install a representative government.32 Yet despite Namphy heading a dictatorial

governing council which was known to have committed significant human rights abuses and had

no real plan for making progress towards democratic rule, the Reagan government believed

Namphy and his cronies were worth granting US$100 million in aid, a considerable portion of

which was for military equipment including riot gear that was quickly put to use to suppress the

masses seeking democracy!33

30
An argument can be made that much of the social banditry nature of the cacos emerges around the time that
foreign interests (largely German) began to provide money to various strongmen interested in overthrowing the
government of the day. This is an area that requires more study as there are few academics who have looked at the
cacos and their history in any depth. See Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 36.
31
A February 2009 example saw the Haitian CEP constituted for April senatorial elections refuse to recognize
Fanmi Lavalas candidates, claiming the candidates list was missing the signature of the party’s leader, former
President Aristide then in forced exile in Africa and unable to return to Haiti following the 2004 coup. See Jeb
Sprague, “Haiti: Fanmi Lavalas Banned, Voter Apprehension Widespread,” Inter Press Service News Agency,, 17
April 20090. www.ipsnews.net.
32
Grievances against the Namphy regime were inspired by a number of problems, mainly economic, including
ongoing discontent over African Swine Flu (ASF) programs which carried over from the Duvalier regime period,
but also included anger at a dechoukaj cut short without completing the cleansing of Duvalierists. That would come
to haunt Namphy, given the earlier April 1986 massacre at Fort Dimanche when Duvalierists infiltrated a large
crowd of protestors, panicking government forces into firing on the crowds. See Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and
Their Legacy, 336-7.
33
Joseph B. Treaster, “US Won’t Halt Military Aid to Haiti,” The New York Times, September 06 1987.
www.nytimes.com

336
 Indeed, US State Department officials remained committed to Namphy despite the July

1987 massacre of at least 35 Haitians peacefully protesting his regime’s anti-democratic

measures.34 An anonymous American source claimed: “What we're trying to do is get one step

further toward getting a legitimate government with greater control, greater moral authority in

position to clean out some of the bad apples.''35 Similarly, with the Duvalier regimes, the policy

objective of ensuring communism did not gain a foothold in Haiti outweighed any desire for

advancing democratic reform. That mindset led, not surprisingly, to US foreign aid to both

Duvaliers continuing on and off throughout their terms in office.

Ending the practice of dismissing or marginalizing grassroots democratic development in

Haiti must be linked to grafting grassroots democratic interests onto national level objectives and

recognizing that localized development interests vary across the country and even within specific

regions. This is a process with which the international community has considerable experience

and expertise; it should be leveraged to create a collaborative working relationship between the

UN and Haiti that advances cooperation between them.

Returning to ‘development cooperation’ and a working partnership between the UN and

Haiti, political scientist Stefano Recchia has developed an excellent model for such a partnership

based on tackling the ethical questions of postwar reconstruction and how much external

interference or intervention can be justified. He argues for “transitory shared responsibility”

whereby “international officials…are deployed inside domestic agencies, ministerial bodies, and

34
Gérard Pierre-Charles, Haïti Jamais Plus! Les Violations de droits de l’homme à l’époque des Duvaliers (Port-au-
Prince: Editions du Cresfed, 2000), 143.
35
Pierre-Charles, 143.

337
judicial institutions of the postwar society, not merely as technical advisors, but with explicit co-

decisional authority.”36

Transitory shared responsibility recognizes that the non-democratic element of the model

is tempered most effectively when the aim of the program is built around creating local,

grassroots level capacity for peaceful self-government. To be successful and lasting, the work

undertaken within this model is aimed at building or repairing local domestic sovereignty.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the program is identification of key local stakeholders who

have the necessary influence and standing within local communities to provide local credibility

to the program.

There is a danger in advocating this model, coming as it does from post-conflict

development, and having the appearance of yet another imposed paternalistic experiment that

superficially at least appears highly prescriptive.37 Yet, if the negotiations with the Haitians on

the implementation of a system like this are conducted in good faith, the prescriptive danger is

lessened, and development cooperation is strengthened. Negotiations would also allow a

36
Recchia points out that a limited form of this transitory shared responsibility has most recently been undertaken
successfully in post-war Liberia in 2005. Stefano Recchia, “Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How Much
External Interference Can Be Justified?” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 178, 180.
37
Recchia points out that the model is intended for those countries he identifies as “burdened,” a term coined by
John Rawls, meaning a state which “lacks the necessary institutions, economic resources, and political culture to be
effectively self-governing.” That differs from the idea of being an “outlaw” state, one in which “basic human
rights…are systemically violated on a large scale.” Working with Recchia’s concept of “proportionate interference,”
the violence endemic in an outlaw state would justify “coercive interference,” up to and including military
intervention to halt the human rights violations as well as the possible imposition of a trusteeship to remove internal
obstacles to political order and effective self-governing. That trusteeship could eventually shift to the transitory
shared responsibility model. In the case of Haiti, life under Francois Duvalier would have earned the regime the
label of outlaw state, whereas the current situation in Haiti falls within the definition of burdened state. See Recchia,
“Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction,” 172-3.

338
timetable based on metrics to determine a drawdown of the shared responsibility and an eventual

transition to complete domestic sovereignty.38

The adjunct lesson of this issue is recognition of the dangers of imposing a development

model on Haiti which has worked elsewhere. While lessons drawn from other development

models can and should guide the creation of one for Haiti, imposing a foreign model on Haiti as

if one size fits all is a recipe for disaster. Haitian social and political structures demand a

distinctly Haitian solution. At the same time, there are lessons that can be drawn from other

nations which are applicable to Haiti and should influence the way forward. Likewise, the

Marbial Valley experiment, discussed in Chapter Seven, provides useful experiences that can be

cultivated for careful incorporation within a new model for collaborative implementation. This

issue will be addressed later in ‘Lesson Five – National Ownership of Development’.

Leaving the issue of national ownership for the moment, two other factors should be

considered for development modelling going forward. First, those areas which have been

abdicated by the state and are now dominated by NGOs should be targets for incorporation into

this model’s implementation. This would include, for example, the development of much of rural

Haiti wherein Haitian government services have historically been lacking and NGOs have carved

out niche areas, often without any Haitian supervision.

Second, those areas of Haiti’s state institutions where domestic expertise is lacking,

should be chosen to receive international expertise and assistance. Building “according to a logic

of sliding interference,” a UN-Haitian bilateral determination would identify which agencies and

38
The restoration of complete domestic sovereignty can be managed to both parties’ satisfaction by benchmarking
the creation of Haitian capabilities in those areas of lacking Haitian capabilities or which have been under-
developed. Throughout, Haitian control over governance policy would be absolute.

339
government departments would benefit from the program and which positions should be reserved

for international experts who would be granted the essential co-decisional authority to influence

the development necessary. At the same time, local expertise must be developed to take over

responsibility as quickly and practically as possible.39 Priorities should be determined by Haitian

authorities, but would likely include an examination of the ministries responsible for education,

health care, internal security, finance, and others involved in shaping social policy.

One of the more interesting areas for shared responsibility, particularly relevant and

timely for Haiti, is Recchia’s advocacy of hybrid courts, a well-developed transitional justice

concept. A recent positive example can be seen in Rwanda in its experiment with gacaca courts,

which began in 1999. An innovative and still controversial grassroots-level initiative, the hybrid

gacaca courts were provided with the resources and time necessary to allow them to achieve

legitimacy through a national-international hybrid partnership.40

An important effect identified from the partnership was the “cross-fertilization of norms.”
41
Without local collaboration in the design of the program, legitimacy would have been missing

and that ‘cross-fertilization’ through formal and informal interactions would have been

39
Recchia, “Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction,” 179.
40
One of the keys to the gacaca system flourishing in Rwanda was the training provided by the international NGO,
Juristes sans Frontieres. Their training of domestic investigators, lawyers and judges brought them to an
internationally accepted level of competence and thus provided the revised legal process with a legitimacy not only
from the locals impacted by the system but also from international and national leaders. Widner points out the
Rwandan government ruled out the introduction of international judges and lawyers to assist with the process like
other areas, viewing that from a neo-colonial point of view and deciding their ‘intervention’ was a non-starter. Nor
was there any provision within Rwandan national law that would have permitted foreign lawyers to practice in
Rwanda or for foreign judges to adjudicate the cases in question. Instead, Rwandan authorities made the decision to
deal with legal sector development through NGOs. Jennifer Widner, “Courts and Democracy in Postconflict
Transitions: A Social Scientist‘s Perspective on the African Case,” American Journal of International Law 95
(2001): 64-75.
41
Laura A. Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (April
2003): 304.

340
impossible.42 Examining Haiti’s rural justice system in a similar light could spur the

development of a Haitian hybrid model parallel to Rwanda’s gacaca courts.

As the development of stable state institutional governance capabilities progress and gain

strength, the model would incorporate mutually agreed upon mechanisms to allow for that shared

responsibility to be “re-negotiated” and allow for the reduction in the international presence

within specific ministries, etc. Benefits of this program are that it not only fosters a strong

working relationship, but shifts Haiti away from its unhealthy dependency on NGOs, while

moving Haiti towards a model based on the progressive and complete Haitianization of

government.43 Finally, with metrics developed collaboratively, the question of when the

international community would exit under this model becomes more open and transparent to

all.44

Lesson Four – Democratic Capacity Building

The long-awaited departure of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier was greeted with
elation among Haitians both in Haiti and abroad. The first few weeks after the overthrow
saw a tremendous surge of relief and hope for a brighter future. People visiting the
country reported seeing Haitians sweeping the sidewalks, disposing of long-accumulated
garbage that defaced city streets and painting tree trunks with bright colors.
Neighborhood community councils were spontaneously created to channel the ideas,
needs, and suggestions of the people. All Haitians seemed willing to work together to
defend their newly won freedom and to participate in the creation of a truly democratic
system. Exiled journalists, politicians, political activists, opponents of the former regime,
and other nationals who, in protest, had chosen to reside abroad flooded back into the
country on short visits or to re-establish residency. This euphoria was short-lived,

42
Concerns over the gacaca system have been raised. For example, Andrea Purdeková argued that the local police
or regional military commander had more sway over the results of the gacaca courts than the local judge in many
instances. See Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in
Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 475-97.
43
Ironically, this was the ostensible aim of the Marine Occupation, yet one which Marine leaders refused to
undertake until compelled by American investigations. Even when finally undertaken, the initiatives were
ineffective.
44
Spoilers will need to be identified as they can be expected to interfere with the model, particularly as the shared
responsibility results in capability development within state sectors formerly controlled by others. This can include
NGOs as well, for example, as opposition political groups.

341
 however, for it soon became evident that twenty-nine years of absolute power had left the
country with a burdensome political legacy that would impede the establishment of a
democratic system.45
- Sociologist Yolaine Armand

Western nations have advocated the development of “self-sustaining democratic political

institutions and robust market-oriented economies” as the means by which good government and

democracy are developed.46 Those objectives, though, may not align with Haitian interests and

will need to be tempered, perhaps quite drastically. Objectives will need to be developed with

Haitians and should be based upon shared values to ensure the interveners can support the

measures required.

What this means in practical terms for the international community is that in addition to

recognizing and implementing Haitian plurality, democratic capacity building will require an

integrated systems approach to development. Security sector reform (SSR), for example, long the

focus of attention for UN missions, has been undertaken by the UN primarily through the

governments of Canada, France, and the US, with the development of a Haitian national police

as its sole raison d’être, while ignoring the long overdue reforms to Haiti’s judicial and penal

systems.

International development in Haiti has been plagued by governance work undertaken

without the synchronous development of a stable and productive economy. The fundamental

education (FE) program initiated in the Marbial Valley was typical of this problem. While it

began with foreign assistance funds, the short timelines of the program coupled to an assumption

45
Yolaine Armand, “Democracy in Haiti: The Legacy of Anti-Democratic Political and Social Traditions,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2, no. 4 (Summer 1989), 539.
46
Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” The Atlantic Monthly 293, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2004): 159-162.

342
that the Haitian government would maintain the same funding commitment, was erroneous and

led to the program’s eventual collapse.

On the other hand, international emphasis on economic reform has also had deleterious

effects on democratic capacity building. For example, the SAPs demanded by the World Bank

and IMF failed to recognize that demanding a downsizing of the Haitian civil service

undermined attempts to remedy the almost complete lack of government services outside of the

capital and other urban centres. Further, when coupled with the increased role of NGOs in the

provision of services, SAPs and NGOs have diminished Haitian sovereignty and retarded

development of Haitian democracy.

A useful model for developing a comprehensive development plan built on the idea of a

systems approach is the proposed plan for the 1948 UN Mission of Technical Assistance. The

plan was flawed in a number of its conclusions, the most flagrant being its encouragement of

Haitian emigration. Where the plan did show promise was in its systemic and integrated

approach to Haiti from a holistic government perspective, leading, at the time, to an ambitious

national plan founded on the idea of effective and efficient use of Haiti’s national means.47

Coupled to that development plan was the idea of a comprehensive approach to the mission that

would draw expertise from different social sectors. That approach, shifting away from the

standard military-heavy UN missions, has the potential to recognize adverse effects before they

emerge, allowing them to be tackled in a timely manner.

47
The UN Mission report included emigration as a “hopeful” solution to Haiti’s economic plight, which it
determined was based on a combination of primitive farming methods and soil which was “depleted.” The answer
was to encourage “large-scale [Haitian] emigration to other Caribbean areas…” See Logan, “Mission to Haiti,” 243.

343
 Consider the requirements to implement a comprehensive and universal education system

in Haiti. Desperately needed to educate the next generations of Haitians to allow them to

compete within the international community, creating that school system requires a host of large-

scale projects within Haiti that may be beyond the current capabilities of the government.

Education requires both a physical infrastructure and an investment in human capital. This

includes improvements to the road system to allow children to reach schools, a widespread

construction program to provide the schools required to support universal education, and the

development of a national energy grid to provide the power necessary for the high speed

networks to ensure access to Internet, computing and technical education, as well as qualified

teachers and educational resources such as books, paper, computers, etc.

Alternately, and until that work is complete, upgrading Haiti’s cell tower network can

permit distant learning and open the way ahead. But again, the cell network also depends upon a

reliable power system. In the end, and regardless of the approach taken, democratic capacity

building should be based on a synchronized, systems approach and an understanding of inter-

related elements of Haiti’s infrastructure and social framework.

Lesson Five – National Ownership of Development

Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development

policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions.
Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development
strategies, institutions and procedures48
- Extract from The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005), 3.
48

www.oecd.org.

344
 A sovereignty imperative is particularly important in Haiti given the record of

organizations like the OAS and the UN, as well as interventions by the United States.

Development requires a framework that identifies the long-term goal of national ownership,

meaning program sovereignty, by and for Haitians. This necessarily mandates an approach to

development which is sustainable, devoid of expensive high-tech solutions, and avoids the

unfortunate tendency in Haiti to introduce patronage into programming. Shifting to a sustainable,

merit-based system is critical. As noted earlier, Haitian social and political structures demand a

Haitian model. Haitian ownership of the model is an absolute and non-negotiable requirement for

success, and, as noted above, has been recognized and embedded as one of the cornerstones of

the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, for example.

One of the most important institutions from an international perspective has been the

Haitian National Police service. Yet the training for the national service has emphasized border

security, judicial police support and crowd or riot control.49 The establishment of community

policing and training was a low priority for the international community. The importance of this

particular role for Haitian police has been floating around for quite some time. Local

communities in Haiti have never enjoyed a close relationship with the Haitian police. Building

relationships between local police and local community leaders begins by police experts building

training programs which are based on local community conditions and needs – something major

49
By 2004, the National Police was reported to have a number of specialized units which had received additional
training: they included a crisis response unit (SWAT); a crowd control unit (CIMOs) each for Port-au-Prince and
Haiti’s nine Departments; and a Coast Guard unit. See United States Department of State, US Department of State
Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 - Haiti, 25 February 2004. www.refworld.org.

345
cities in the US still have not been able or willing to do until recent events have made this

imperative!50

Lesson Six – NGO Accountability51

In Haiti, it is not enough to heal wounds, for every day another wound opens up. It is not
enough to give the poor food for one day, to buy them antibiotics one day, to teach them
a few sentences or to write a few words. Hypocrisy. The next day they will be starving
again, feverish again, and they will never be able to buy books that hold the words that
might deliver them.52
- Former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide

Although NGOs were discussed earlier in the context of SAPs, the omnipresence of

NGOs throughout Haiti is not likely to remedy itself in the short term. The international

community must begin to rein in NGOs now and force them to orient programming towards

Haitian interests within a consultative framework that emphasizes a shift to developing, hiring

and mentoring Haitian expertise, rather than maintaining operations which are clearly oriented

and directed by foreign interests.53 Given the high percentage of NGO financing coming from

national governments, this is achievable only if the national and international will is present.54

Lesson Seven – The Haitian Army

50
The May 2020 killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis, the latest in a long line of police killings of
young black men in their own neighbourhoods, was the impetus for renewed mass protests over racial inequality and
included the urgent requirement for police reform.
51
One accountability mechanism that has been implemented by the international community is the International Aid
Transparency Initiative which is a published database which outlines information on aid and how it is being
employed within targeted nations. See Ramachandran and Walz, “Haiti: Where has all the Money Gone?,” 32.
52
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, In the Parish of the Poor: Writings from Haiti (New York: Orbis, 1990), cited in Farmer,
The Uses of Haiti, 306.
53
Vijay Ramachandran and Julie Walz studied the almost US$6 billion pledged to Haiti in the wake of the
devastating 2010 earthquake: they found that the Government of Haiti received around one percent of the
humanitarian aid provided from all donors. The monies instead went to the donor country’s military or civilians
deployed into Haiti, and international NGOs including the UN. The Red Cross received more at five percent. Even
Haitian NGOs were largely if not completely excluded: out of a US$5.4 million request for funding (0.4 percent of
the total aid funding requested by NGOs), ten Haitian NGOs were eventually provided with funding in the amount
of US$800 thousand. See Ramachandran and Walz, Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?,” 9.
54
Clearly, this is a big ‘if’.

346
 Since Aristide said that he could not abolish the army without the support of the Haitian
people, the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress commissioned an
independent polling firm to gauge popular support for the idea. The results were
stunning: 62 percent of Haitians were strongly in favor of abolition and only 12 percent
were against.55
- Former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias

On the one hand, the Haitian Army is historically a source of national pride. On the other

hand, the Haitian Army has traditionally been a tool of repression.56 That condition does not

appear likely to change in the near future, until more robust democratic institutions have taken

root in Haiti. Practically, Haitian security needs can be met with a robust border security service

and a coast guard with a broad counter-narcotics mandate.

Because of that history of repression, and because security force capacity building in

Haiti has failed to develop a military subordinate to the national government, military foreign aid

to Haiti should be limited to the training of a police and border force as well as a coast guard for

counter-narcotics operations. Arms controls should be employed to ensure that Haitian police

cannot acquire weaponry inappropriate for police operations.

International police and border patrol training in Haiti was conducted by three different

nations, France, Canada, and the US, under three different models and around three different sets

of values and police cultures. That must be changed. A training plan should be developed

55
Oscar Arias, Washington Post, in Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 397.
56
Any discussion of the Haitian military will stray dangerously close to becoming prescriptive and move away from
the central idea of seeking to assist Haitians in solving their own problems by dictating the way ahead. My thoughts,
nonetheless, are that the Haitian Army in particular has proven to be a beast which has been largely outside the
control of the civilian authority and leans towards self-enrichment. Further, a national army is an unnecessary
expense at this stage in Haiti’s development, and more than likely to be destabilizing. It may prove unaffordable
over the long term as well. There are alternatives Haiti could explore, including moving away from a regular Army
and embracing a national guard-style gendarmerie organization to provide for Haiti’s national security. The Costa
Rican Fuerza Pública [Public Force] is one such regional model worth considering. But without any real threat, a
quick analysis of Haiti’s security requirements show rural and urban security concerns are more aptly embodied in a
robust police force that includes a paramilitary capability.

347
collaboratively with Haitians to reflect Haitian values and the type of security force Haitians

want. Otherwise, Haiti runs the risk of inheriting security forces based on the status quo of

repression.

Lesson Eight – Foreign Loans

Liberia and Haiti, the most thoroughly controlled countries [in terms of fiscal
management], were nearly the only nations in the capitalist world that maintained
payments on international debts throughout the Great Depression…These, of course were
the dollar diplomacy dependencies where US influence had been most overwhelming.
The social costs of putting payments ahead of other social and economic priorities were
borne…only because of the constabularies that the Unites States had trained…. 57
- Historian Emily S Rosenberg

To effect positive and real change to Haiti’s economic situation, the international

community should consider a total loan forgiveness programme.58 Foreign lending practices

should be re-examined and reformed. In 2005, when the cancellation of Haiti’s foreign debt was

broached in connection with the “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)” initiative, Haiti

owed around US$1.3 billion. By December 2017, that debt had more than doubled to US$2.762

billion!59 Much of that debt is created by the government deficit financing necessary to maintain

the public sector. That deficit can be reduced by Haitianizing the bureaucracy and eliminating

foreign NGO civil service activities. A risk adverse international community must learn to give

foreign aid directly to the Haitian government, not international NGOs.

How to avoid making the Same Mistakes.

Development actors need to re-orient their approach towards genuine partnerships based
on improved risk-sharing within the framework of national state-building strategies and

57
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 48/61.
58
Given the concentration of wealth in the West and the past abuses of Haiti by Western nations, total loan
forgiveness would be the least that should be done to acknowledge past harm.
59
CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov.

348
 frameworks. The degree, scope and timing of their engagement should match actual
requirements to engender true national ownership and responsibility.60
- Extract from 2005 UN Development Program Workshop Report

Starting with what does not work is strangely apropos as well as being an improbable

point of departure for the historical study of Western interference through peacebuilding in Haiti.

First, imposed solutions do not work. The Marine Occupation imposed various social and

economic ‘improvements’ upon Haiti. None worked except for Haiti’s continued servicing of its

foreign debt, the result of the presence of the American Financial Advisor. Education reform was

quickly abandoned, and infrastructure was allowed to fall into disrepair.

Consider a more recent example. As part of its work to develop a sustainable market-

based economy in Haiti, the USAID underwrote and planned the development of the Caracol

Industrial Park (CIP) in northeast Haiti, all without engaging the locals in the project’s

development.61 That failure to engage led the Caracol mayor, Landry Colas, to express his

“surprise” when informed of the project, observing ironically: “I would have chosen another site,

given that this one was already occupied by people earning a living. But I’m no expert.”62

The development of the 246-hectare light manufacturing facility displaced 366 Haitian

farmers from an area of fertile agricultural land. Despite promises, compensation for the

displaced farmers never materialized, and less than half of the 20,000 jobs promised between

2012 and 2018 ever materialized. Worse, the tax exempt, duty-free zone was constructed with

60
“Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from a Decade of Global Experience,” UN Development Program
Workshop Report, New York, 19-21 September 2005, 3.
61
Background information on the Caracol Industrial Park is drawn from Deborah Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where
Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” The New York Times, 5 July 2012, www.nytimes.com.; and Claire Lauterbach, “Caracol
Industrial Park: Social and Gender Impacts of Year One of Haiti’s newest IFI-funded Industrial Park,” Gender
Action, 2013. Sontag’s article also relates the claim by historian Laurent Dubois that the land appropriated for the
eventual manufacturing site was the former site of an infamous US Marine Occupation-era prison labour camp.
Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.”
62
Sontag.

349
US$224 million in reconstruction money that had been earmarked for the replacement of housing

destroyed as a result of the 2010 earthquake.63

The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) built the facility on the “fragile

ecosystem of Caracol Bay, which contains the country’s most extensive mangrove reserve and a

large strip of coral reef.”64 Not only was an environmental study not completed, but the IADB

rushed the project through without completing the normal planning process. The CIP

development project echoed many of the same practices that had plagued the earlier SHADA

rubber experiment, including over-estimating the market for products from the facility and the

negative social and economic impact of diverting land use to benefit the new project. The

IADB’s Haiti department manager, José Agustín Aguerre, typified the company’s scorn for the

detailed planning this project should have received:

If one had to do this in the normal process of planning and then funding and then
decision-making, and only then start looking for clients and only then start construction,
we would have gone 10 years without having an industrial park.65

Rapid construction of industrial parks like Caracol are understood by the West as a

technique for quick job creation.66 Yet, as historian Laurent Dubois has pointed out, the Caracol

industrial park project is a continuation of an endless cycle of “tired” ideas to which Haiti has

been subjected with the aim of ‘modernizing’ the country as well as typifying the thinking

behind returning Haiti to the status quo.67

63
Lauterbach, “Caracol Industrial Park,” 5-6.
64
Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.”
65
Quoted in Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.”
66
Ken Ellingwood, “Uncovering jobs a major challenge since Haiti earthquake,” Los Angeles Times, 12 August
2010. www.latimes.com
67
Ironically, the Caracol development was built almost next door to a similar industrial park, Codevi. Codevi was
distinguished as the only unionized clothing manufacturing operation in Haiti, whereas the prime tenant in the

350
 This is a critical concept to grasp. Historically, the limited peacebuilding undertaken in

Haiti has been planned with the aim of re-establishing the Western concept of the Haitian status

quo as quickly as possible. The chronic issues which underlie Haitian unrest and peasant

grievances are rarely if ever tackled and remain undisturbed. Instead of overhauling the system

and reforming, for example, the dynamic of a state centered around elite control of the political

and economic spheres in Haiti, the West intervenes over regional security issues like mass

migration and democratic unrest leaking beyond Haiti’s porous borders.

Democratic governance remains in the background, largely limited, in the eyes of the

international community, to aspirations for ‘free and fair’ elections. This was the cri de cœur

from President Préval. In his 2011 statement to the UN, he lamented the failure of the UN to

transition beyond the status quo from military occupation to a police and development mission:

I would suggest some thinking on the effectiveness of (the council’s) interventions which
have effectively led to 11 years military presence in a country that has no war…The
danger of violent confrontation, once it had passed, peacekeeping operations did not
quickly enough adapt to the new situation. Instability in Haiti is basically due to
underdevelopment — in other words, unsatisfied elementary socioeconomic rights.68

Initiatives at the grassroots level have shown success, more so than those imposed from

the national level or by outside agencies. International or national level initiatives are typically

constrained by time and resources. They lead to triage of the current system rather than building

capacity for democratic practice. What is really needed are systemic overhauls based upon an

agreed local framework backstopped by adequate time and resources. By co-opting the process,

Caracol facility is the South Korean clothing company, Sae-A, which is known for using violence in support of its
antiunion activities in other company locations. Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.”
68
Louis Charbonneau, “Haiti’s Preval to U.N.: We need bulldozers, not tanks,” Reuters World News, 6 April 2011,
www.reuters.com.

351
national authorities disenfranchise the locals and raise questions about the legitimacy of the

transformation underway.

One critical and oft over-looked requirement of grassroots initiatives is planning the

linkage between local and national-level programs. This requires a willingness at both levels to

demonstrate flexibility and compromise to nest community level activities within the national

planning framework. Likewise, national level planning cannot be formulaic; it must empower

local communities to make their own decisions while respecting the bounds of national

programming.

A second important consideration is that the majority of Haitians reject invasions of their

country, good intentions or not. Historically, interventions in Haiti produced high numbers of

Haitian casualties and triggered opposition. Haitians are a proud people who have shown a

remarkable aptitude for resistance. Disparate Haitian groups uniting to resist outside interference

in Haiti form a constant theme in Haiti’s history. The Marines fought two major counter-

insurgency campaigns in Haiti to quell resistance and killed large numbers of Haitians to ‘pacify’

the people. Likewise, the UN conducted a series of mini wars against armed gangs inside the

Port-au-Prince urban neighbourhoods before it established control of the capital. It conducted

major combat operations from 2004 to 2006. By 2018, media reporting showed armed gangs

once more confronting and outgunning the Haitian police, a remarkable resurgence of their

capabilities.

Conflict continues despite the UN’s presence because, as pointed out earlier, the

underlying causes of societal unrest are not addressed. Nor are those roots of conflict well

understood or carefully considered by the UN agencies. For example, the US Multi-National

Force (MNF) reported that in early January 1995, “a safe and secure environment had been

352
attained. Although dissident elements and Aristide opponents still existed, there was a lack of a

credible threat to the mission.”69 In other words, because the violence from anti-Aristide

elements was not directed against the MNF, its leaders certified that they had achieved the safe

and secure environment necessary for the hand-off to UNMIH control. They ignored the intra-

societal conflict between pro- and anti-Aristide supporters simmering beneath the surface.

Disregarding why the intra-societal violence was conveniently in hiatus came back to

haunt UNMIH. Two months after it assumed responsibility for Haiti, the Human Rights Watch

organization reported that violence had escalated and crime rates were soaring.70 As the June

1995 elections approached, observers concluded the safe and secure environment supposedly

created by the MNF was finished. UNMIH simply lacked the understanding and the capabilities

necessary to create a safe and secure environment.71

Human Rights Watch, for example, noted that while UNMIH took responsibility for

national safety and security, they failed to consider the close proximity of adversarial parties

within local Port-au-Prince urban neighbourhoods. Consequently, when their national security

planning failed to establish local neighbourhood security, Haitians took it upon themselves to

create their own neighbourhood security. Those local security forces, known as “brigades de

vigilance,” would foreshadow the rise of armed gangs.72

69
“Haiti Initial Impressions, Volume III,” US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), July 1995, 26/156.
70
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Conditions Prior to the June 1995 Elections, 1 June 1995, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7f14.html [accessed 9 August 2019].
71
The mission also failed to understand the spoilers involved, including their goals and the means available to them.
The concept of the “spoiler” comes from Stephen John Stedman who defined them as “leaders and parties who
believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to
undermine attempts to achieve it.” Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International
Security 22, no. 2 (Autumn 1997), 5.
72
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Conditions Prior to the June 1995 Elections.

353
 Third, military forces do not make good development agents. The peacebuilding model

needs to be built on an understanding of the complexity behind creating or buttressing a state and

its constituent institutions which in turns allows the development of ‘nation’. Yet UN missions

remain heavily oriented towards combat troops who are not trained to create state institutions nor

in the cultural changes required to move beyond the conflict prone status quo which required the

intervention.73 Even when deployed to provide security, the troops are often drawn into the role

of armed humanitarian work. Even if there is some merit to the concept of armed humanitarians

drawn from highly disciplined and capable Western armies, they are not readily available nor are

many Western nations willing to commit to missions like Haiti which demand time commitments

that require decades for success, as Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have amply

demonstrated.

Even on a mission like security sector reform, the UN missions in Haiti struggled for over

15 years and through the deployment of six different missions to create a viable, sustainable, and

non-corrupt police force capable of enforcing law and order in Haiti. Despite that commitment,

the UN still managed to fail at that task.74 Add in the failure to overhaul the penal sector and

73
As an aside, there is no such thing as ‘peacekeeping’ soldiers. Western armies do not train specifically for
peacekeeping duties. Rather, they train to conduct combat operations and supplement that training with what has
been termed stability operations. Additionally, they do mission theatre specific training which is usually cultural
training on the people and the target country. The troops that deploy on UN missions, however, are combat troops,
trained in combat as the means by which they resolve problems. Not surprisingly then, the solution MINUSTAH
decided upon to deal with the armed gangs’ problem reflected their training and focussed on a violent assault into an
urban neighbourhood, complete with aerial machine gun fire and the use of high explosive mortar rounds.
74
In his ‘End of Tour Report’, the Canadian Commander Task Force Port au Prince, Colonel Stephen M. Cadden,
wrote: “the objectives and progress of MINUSTAH remain as opaque and vague as described by my predecessor...
The mission remains dysfunctional with a lack of clear objectives, implementation plans or a coherent exit strategy
which will permit the eventual disengagement of UN agencies, particularly MINUSTAH, from the country. Instead,
stove piped planning and a lack of centralized oversight have resulted in significant expenditure of resources with
undeniable, but not optimal, progress. Pressures on the UN Peacekeeping budget have caused the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to express concern over the long presence of MINUSTAH, and seek a
rationalization which will allow resources to be diverted to other, more pressing, missions.” See Cadden, “Task
Force Port au Prince End of Tour Report for Period 01 July 2013-22 June 2014.”

354
court system, and it quickly becomes clear that UN military-dominated missions are not

particularly good at development.

Further, the necessary specialized civilian components that should be guiding

development are often notoriously absent or are too few in number. Consequently, much of the

essential development work is ceded to NGOs who, ironically, likewise suffer from resource and

expertise constraints. They often also have specific and narrow mandates which mitigate against

a strategic, holistic approach to development, and instead encourage stove-piping and

development squatting.75

Interventions cannot succeed without overcoming obstacles such as international

interventions embodying international values that are incompatible with Haitian interests,

including an interventionist ‘tradition’ rooted in a history of neo-colonialism and aspirations

which do not represent the interests of the majority of Haitians. There are intervention models

like the transitory shared responsibility model which can potentially bridge those obstacles while

minimizing the impact from neo-colonialism.

The onus for change should be on the international community for it has damaged Haiti

the most historically. An obvious first step is to change the philosophical basis of any

intervention and to bring it in line with Johan Galtung’s concept of a “positive peace” based on

“the integration of human society” while abandoning the current emphasis on restoration of the

status quo built around “negative peace” or the “absence of violence, the absence of war.”76 Too

often, international interventions in Haiti have done just enough to rehabilitate the fragile state,

75
Development squatting refers to the tactic whereby an NGO will stake out an area of development and then resist
or refuse to cooperate with other NGOs or international agencies which likewise seek to work in that area of
development.
76
"An Editorial," Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (1964): 2; and Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace
Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.

355
but not enough to prevent backsliding, supporting Robert Rotberg’s idea that the “failure and

collapse of nation-states… [is] a dynamic process.”77

The critical second step is for the West to cease viewing Haiti as unique. Haiti is unique

as the only slave state to achieve independence and freedom through a successful armed revolt.78

Beyond that uniqueness, Haiti is a member state within the international community and should

be treated as such. Her fragility is a separate matter and not something that should be used as an

excuse to violate Haitian sovereignty. Rather, Haiti’s fragile state should require not only

changes within Haiti, but a more measured and collaborative dialogue between Haiti and the

international community on changes going forward while acknowledging the West’s historic role

in creating the conditions for Haiti’s continued fragility.

This is not to suggest that all Haiti’s problems are externally created. Haiti has

responsibility for its own development. Unfortunately, it remains a pre-industrial nation, the light

assembly industry notwithstanding. In addition to recognizing what has not worked, Haiti also

suffers from a number of chronic problems which it must overcome before state-building and

development success are possible.

The first step towards development is the requirement for a sustainable economy.79 This

in turn is dependent upon an economic model which is less subject to the vagaries of the current

77
Robert Rotberg, “The Challenges of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Ostler
Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington,
D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 91.
78
Haiti is unique for at least two other reasons. It is the only former slave colony to have paid its former colonial
master an indemnity in return for formal international recognition, thus removing its ‘illegal’ status. And Haiti is
universally recognized as the first decolonized republic to have banned slavery “universally and immediately.” As a
fragile state, however, Haiti should not be considered or treated as unique. See Nick Nesbitt, “Haiti, the Monstrous
Anomaly,” in Polyné, ed., The Idea of Haiti, 3.
79
Key to a sustainable economy is building an economy which meets the people’s needs while avoiding harm to the
environment. Inclusive and sustainable economic growth is in fact one of the UN’s sustainable development goals, a
goal which links decent work, employment and economic growth. See
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/economic-growth/.

356
export economy model, built largely around low skilled labour and intensive light industry.

While light industry is a useful tool for rapid economic growth, too rapid growth leads capitalists

to shift capital to other developing sectors as Haitian wages improve and workers’ demands

multiply. The history of states moving a developing state to a developed state under the light

industry model shows it to be difficult, precarious, and slow.

A second step is to break the current predatory business-state relationship, ending the

unrestrained ability of the ruling elites to abuse state power for personal gain. This problem is

complex and resistant to a quick fix; it requires Haiti to develop a sustainable economic model

that broadens economic participation and produces a cultural shift within Haiti’s elite.80 The

latter means adoption of shared societal responsibilities and investment in the Haitian economy

to benefit Haitian community development. Such a cultural shift, virtually unprecedented, could

drive the nation-building phase of Haitian development, for the ‘greater Haitian good.’ The War

of 1812 functioned to drive American capital to invest in textile manufacturing in New England

using the most modern equipment designs. Isolating Haitian capital to encourage domestic

investment is another option.81

Related to this step is the need to develop a joint venture relationship between the state

and the ruling party, or parties, which emphasizes the development of investment in priority

areas while concurrently keeping corruption at bay. Haitian development leaders must prioritize

anti-corruption measures to minimize graft and corruption, allowing state revenues to flow into

80
This was in fact what Jean Price-Mars sought to accomplish and was outlined in his work, Ainsi parla l’Oncle,
within his campaign of “moral re-establishment.” See Magdaline W. Shannon, Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite
and the American Occupation, 1915-1935 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 33.
81
Preventing British cloth imports from 1812 to 1815 opened the door to New England cloth manufacturers. The
war acted as a 100% tariff on British cloth. See Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States,
1790-1860, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), 1961.

357
development. Corruption is an indicator of a lack of faith in the current system. Other models

encourage formation of public interest companies to deliver vital government services.82 Such an

approach works to maximize individual citizen involvement and discourage corruption and

graft.83

With the establishment of a sustainable economy comes the expansion of the national

civil service, with new bureaucratic capacity and democratic institutionalization pushed into

previously neglected areas of Haiti. These steps depend on a sustainable economic model for

Haiti that generates reliable sources of state revenue and a prioritized state plan for institutional

development. At the same time, the expanded bureaucracy must overcome the patronage issue

which has afflicted prior attempts to enlarge bureaucratic capacity. Professionalizing the civil

service requires creating arm’s length hiring practices backstopped by objective standards of

merit. Transparent hiring practices, with associated grievance mechanisms, will minimize the

potential for corrupt patronage hiring.

82
Public interest companies (PICs) are a type of public-private partnership, characterized as not usually having
shareholders; operating independently from the state; and having been mandated to provide a state service. In
Canada, for example, NAV Canada is organized as a PIC with responsibility for providing all of Canada’s air traffic
control capabilities. For more detail on PICs, see Paul Maltby, “Public Interest Companies: Fad or permanent
fixture?” New Economy, https://www.ippr.org/files/uploadedFiles/projects/New%20economy%20final.pdf.
83
This is not to suggest that anti-corruption mechanisms, domestic and international, are not required. Rather, that
the approach is in line with the idea of the World Bank’s ‘power to the people’ as a means of increasing open and
transparent government, leading to fewer opportunities for covert corruption and graft.

358
Conclusion

Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be
understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development,
social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for
human rights and rule of law.84
- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan

Aopeau ou ou vini, aopeau ou oupralle.85

[You come into this world with your skin and that is what you will have when you leave
it.]
- Haitian proverb

My aim in this thesis was to answer the question, “How do we help Haitians help

themselves?” That simple question, as I discovered, is quite a bit more complicated than

expected. It is made up of many parts. How do we learn to collaborate with Haitians to determine

a suitable way forward on development based on their interests and needs; implement that

development without enabling the Haitian state to become ‘addicted’ to foreign aid or predatory

loans yet again; assist Haitians in making their development plan a reality despite obstacles like

land registry issues, massive deforestation and environmental damage, and the class and colour

issues which have precluded development of a national consensus on the way forward, to just

name a few; and all the while resist paternalism and racism or the temptation to change direction

when we disagree with Haitian desires?

As an aside, while I am sticking to my original research question, my co-advisor,

Professor Carolyn Fick, raised what could be a more critical research question: “How do

84
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “Towards a Culture of Peace,” 15. From Mayor, Federico, Letters to future
generations (Paris, France: UNESCO Publishing, 1999). www.unesco.org.
85
This nineteenth century Creole proverb is roughly similar in sentiment to the French saying, “Plus ca change, plus
c’est la même chose” when discussing the idea of accommodation, particularly on the part of the Haitian peasant and
his or her perceived position within Haiti. Too often, Western observers have understood this proverb to mean that
only by dramatic, grand change will the Haitian peasant be moved to change…in the modern vernacular, change
comes only when the peasant has his world rocked.

359
Haitians help the West to provide its collaborative aid?” Collaboration requires an understanding

of the Haitian stakeholders who have an interest in foreign aid and creating mechanisms to

reconcile their disparate interests and aims within a collaborative process, a not inconsiderable

task! Just reconciling the competing priorities and objectives of two similar, yet different peasant

organizations, the Mouvman Peyizan Papay [Papaye Peasant Movement] or MPP, which is the

largest peasant movement in Haiti, and the Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small

Producers of Haiti], the other Haitian peasant farmer organization, which is most concerned with

the interests of landless peasants who sell their labour or share-crop, would represent a

formidable accomplishment.

Research Question

To answer the initial question, my research determined what historical lessons, positive

or negative, could be gleaned from past Western interventions in Haiti that are applicable to the

future goal of rehabilitating and moving Haiti from fragile state status to that of a functioning

and stable state within the international community of nations.

Findings and Contributions to the Research Field

At the core of that problem is the need to determine how to restrain the impulses of

foreign nations who obstruct or divert Haiti’s chosen path forward.86 My research and analysis

has shown that the West conducted a deliberate campaign against Haiti which created a fragile

state by undermining national security and the development of political processes and

institutions, Haiti’s economy, and the provision of social services to the Haitian citizenry. The

86
While external nations must shift their cultural approach to Haiti towards Galtung’s positive peace, they also must
respect that restraint on their destructive interventionist behaviour should come from Haitians who must tell outside
experts what to do, what not to do and what has and has not worked in the past. Again, respect for Haitian
stakeholders, and not simply finding Haitian front men for the appearance of consultation or collaboration, is an
imperative for positive change.

360
West’s strategy employed three distinctive elements: criminalization of opposition to

interventions; economic warfare employing NGOs and SAP policies aimed at maintaining

Haiti’s attractiveness as a source of cheap, plentiful labour; and a deliberate failure to encourage

opportunities for fundamental, positive change in Haitian development.

My analysis of Western interference in Haiti during the Latin American and Caribbean

post-independence period has exposed a number of trends in Western policies including the use

of force to extort money from the Haitian government; the deliberate undermining of Haitian

sovereignty through constant interference in Haitian elections, despite free and fair elections

being considered the bedrock of Western democracy; a preference for stability and the status quo

in Haiti over any support for social revolutionary trends; and, of course, the targeted funding of

Haitian security forces, both army and police, the principal instruments of repression employed

against peasant democracy.

As a metanarrative, my thesis brings together various micro-narratives which highlight

Western impact on specific areas of Haitian culture, including colour and class, militarism, land,

and the state. Set within a chronological framework, this thesis contributes to Haitian

historiography as well as providing historical insight into practices which have had a significant

influence on peacebuilding generally. In this area, my analysis and the lessons derived will be

useful to experts designing future development models for fragile states.

Challenges

I encountered a number of challenges along the way. The first was that much of the

current material on interventions in the UN-era is still classified. Canadian material on Cabinet

level decisions require declassification. My ‘Access to Information’ (ATI) requests for

information on 1990s Canadian peace support missions with the UN in Haiti were returned with

361
90 percent of the material redacted. Further, ATI requests took well over a year to process and

involved substantial delays as my requests were narrowed until the ATI coordinator felt they

were reasonable to process. In one ATI I requested, for example, documents that outlined the

RCMP training programs employed in Haiti for a period of five years. That request was

eventually reduced to a request for a specific six-month window, but returned with most of the

material redacted.

I ran into similar issues at the Canadian National Archives with much of the material

involving Haiti, even from the 1950s, 60s and 70s, still classified. Requests to declassify some of

the material I was interested in had already been submitted years earlier and were still

outstanding. I was able to exploit the Canadian and American Army lessons learned

organizations, but much of the material, while providing information on tactical operations,

provided little to no information about command decisions. The sole exception was a number of

useful post-command letters written by various senior Canadian commanders.

A second challenge was undertaking this research while a serving member of the

Canadian Armed Forces. Numerous deployments have made planning research trips less than

ideal and precluded a number of my planned trips. For example, rather than being able to exploit

the US Department of State (FRUS) archives in person, I had to rely on the online archives for

much of my research. While the FRUS online archive is quite good, in-person research would

have been optimal as not all documents are online.

Areas for Future Research

Much research remains to be accomplished in the future. The relationship between the

state and nation-building – key components of peacebuilding – is an emerging research field that

requires deeper examination and greater clarity. As well, the evolution of Haiti’s authentic

362
national and collective identity – the very foundation of its engagement with the international

community – requires further study.87 The national identity of Haitians is deeply rooted in its

past and its present – from the colonial period to today – and it must be thoroughly

deconstructed.88 Cultural and social rifts have fractured Haitian society and impeded the

formation of national unity, simultaneously consigning most Haitians to membership in an

oppressed underclass. Recognizing that these fault lines preclude Haitians from achieving

national unity, international intervenors in Haiti have consistently exploited these divisions,

converting what should have been an internal problem into an excuse for international

intervention in Haiti’s domestic affairs. While it is clear that the international community

possesses state-building expertise, it is likewise clear that it lacks the authentic knowledge and

the legitimacy essential to nation-building and shaping the national identity of Haitians– it

should stay out of the process! How Haiti can effectively block international interference in its

nation-building process is a question that cries out for more research.89

The paths that fragile states may productively follow to become stable democracies is

another area for further research. Most of the exemplars of fragile states moving towards

87
The seminal work in the area of national identity and nationalism is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” By imagined, he points out that “the members
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
88
See, for example, Gérarde Magloire, “Haitian-ness, Frenchness and History: Deconstructing the History of the
French Component of Haitian National Identity,” Journal of Haitian Studies 5, no. 6 (1999-2000): 30-43.
89
Concordia University historian, Dr. Max Bergholz, has reappraised the legacy of Benedict Anderson and the
continued importance of his seminal work, Imagined Communities, in a recent 2018 article where he points out that
the study of “human cognition in relation to nationalism, or “how and why people in the past came to think – or not
think – of themselves as belonging to a national community,” is an under-researched field. That idea of examining
Haitians’ cognition as it relates to their concept of national identity and nation reflects a shift away from the Western
deconstruction of nation in relation to ideology, elites, and socioeconomic modelling. The idea of examining
Haitians’ human cognition in relation to national identity and nationhood would necessitate the recognition and
embracing by Western scholars, of long-standing and deeply rooted Haitian cultural, literary, artistic, and linguistic
traditions and other sources of expression, in order begin to understand how Haitians view national identity – and to
understand what Haitians mean by the ‘imaginaire’ in conceiving the nation. See Max Bergholz, “Thinking the
Nation: Reappraising Benedict Anderson’s Contribution to the Study of Nationalism,” American Historical Review
123, no. 2 (April 2018): 518-528.

363
developed status have emerged only recently and the hidden flaws of a number of them have

produced setbacks. What lessons can be derived from the history of fragile states that reveal a

path along which Haiti can forge ahead despite the threat of interventions?

Historically, one area which should be revisited is that of gunboat diplomacy and its

impact on state development. Many of the histories of this phenomenon are dated and largely

examine gunboat diplomacy within the foreign policy of the time. A deeper exploration of how it

affected Latin American and Caribbean state development would be useful.

An economic history of the various predatory loan programs within the Latin American

and Caribbean regions would also be useful, as would exploring their impact on state

development and understanding them within the specific foreign policies of the lending nations.

Research on the Marine counter-insurgency campaign during the Occupation period is

another area that should be explored. Further research would help us understand exactly how

destructive they were to Haitian lives and property, as well as its impact on national unity.90

Recommendations

Recommendations from my analysis are based on Western treatment of Haiti and the

attitudes which spawned it. My model is pragmatic and recognizes these practices will continue.

There are avenues, however, for lessening exploitation and neo-colonialism, leading to genuine

collaboration, but only if Western governments embrace four tenets as guides for their

development work. The first tenet is a recognition of the commitment of time and resources

required for implementing a successful development strategy on the part of both the international

90
In the short term, ironically, as the Marine Occupation progressed, Haitian stakeholders became more unified in
their opposition to the Occupation. In the long term, the Occupation cemented Haitian opposition to any form of
armed intervention. Unfortunately, and despite Haitian intellectuals like Jean Price-Mars seeking long-term cultural
shifts that allowed for progressive democratic participation by all Haitians, the Occupation did more damage to the
development of a unified Haitian national identity, something that should be explored and acknoweldged.

364
community and the Haitian people. The second is understanding that security and development

are linked, and that security is more than just security sector reform. Human security includes

freedom from poverty.

The third is understanding that Haiti will not become a democracy solely as a result of

successful economic development. Conversely, the international community must understand

that successful economic development does not necessarily lead to antipathy towards or rejection

of authoritarianism. The fourth tenet is the most obvious. Education is the most critical tool for

sustainable development in Haiti. Ideally, embracing those four tenets begins the process of

ending predatory practices and giving Haitian development a fighting chance to succeed.

Finally, the West must step away from its mistaken belief that Haiti is unworthy of being

a sovereign nation. Haitian society is not something to be ‘fixed.’ The West must revise its view

of Haiti, cease its meddling, and accept it as a peer country within the international community

of nations. Regime change by the West, such as toppling and deporting a democratically elected

president was criminal and immoral. It must not become normative behaviour going forward.

Western leaders need to stop seeing Haiti as clay to be molded and treat it within the boundaries

of international legal conventions.

The last word goes to a Haitian who wrote to Professor Emily Balch and her investigative

team during their 1926 visit, towards the later period of the Marine Occupation. Unfortunately,

the original letter is only available within Professor Balch’s report in its translated form and the

eloquent writer remains unnamed. He stated:

Efforts to help the masses have been made again and again and in many ways, but the
poverty of our budgets and the instability due to the causes mentioned made progress
difficult and slow. Nevertheless a Haitian civilization was in process of development.
That is what the men of your country do not understand. They came and interrupted it.

365
 They act like barbarians, for they have established nothing but a coarse materialism, the
religion of money, the worship of force and success.91

Afterword – A Brief Foray into the Field of Development Strategy

Democracy clearly needs to be rooted in basic institutions and practices that preserve
democratic values. Not only do Haitians, at all levels, lack these institutions but the only
system of government the vast majority of the population has known is Duvalierism, a
particularly violent manifestation of state power. Having brought down this absolutist
state in the name of democratic freedoms, Haiti is left with little or no central control and
without the means of creating an alternative to the absolutist state.92
- Professor of Francophone (Haitian and French Caribbean) Literature J. Michael Dash

When discussing the way forward for Haiti based on the adoption of a viable

development model, both J. Michael Dash and Michel-Rolph Trouillot provide valuable wisdom.

They each identified the need to develop the institutions and practices that underlie sustainable

democracy. Dash, in the introductory quote to this section, made this case while likewise

acknowledging that democracy cannot successfully overcome the continuing influence of

Duvalierism.

Trouillot likewise echoes this position, pointing to Haitian democratic movements that

have repeatedly sought to emerge or transition from Duvalierism. In 1994, Trouillot wrote that

“[i]f Duvalierism impedes the advent of the rule of law, the weakness of democratic institutions,

in turn, keep Duvalierism alive.”93 His position was that “neither changes in the state apparatus

nor institutional reform are enough to compel real change in Haiti.”94 Instead, Trouillot felt the

only way to solve Haiti’s systemic problems were by tackling those weak institutions which

91
Balch, Occupied Haiti, 178-9.
92
J. Michael Dash, “Why can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?” The Sunday Gleaner, 22 February 2004, G2.
93
Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” NACLA Report on the Americas 27, No.
4 (1994), 51.
94
Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History.”

366
allow Duvalierism to continue to thrive, namely the “class structure of the country…the military

organization of a society at war with itself…a fiscal system that discourages production and

investment, and finally…sociocultural elitism.”95 For Trouillot, accomplishing that level of

societal reform meant embracing an understanding that “Haitian democracy will happen in the

deep hinterland or it will not exist at all.”96

Suzy Castor reflected on foreign interference and domination in Haitian affairs, both

internal and external, and how both have served to reinforce systemic vulnerabilities. In a vicious

circle, the continued “structural weakness of the [Haitian] productive system…accentuated

outside domination and dependence.”97 Even when internal or external stakeholders push for

changes to Haiti, Castor believes the system in place forces them to align their activities with the

weak structures and agencies within Haiti which have no interest in changing the dysfunctional

status quo. Her conclusion is that “democratization in Haiti is necessarily contingent upon

solving the problems of production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth.”98

Castor recognized the need for assistance from the international community, pointing out

that democratizing Haiti requires “international relations based on dignity and respect.”99 Central

to that dignity and respect, of course, is the international community getting over what Castor

95
Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” 51. In 2004, J. Michael Dash’s writing, unfortunately
but unsurprisingly, still echoed with Trouillot’s earlier thoughts. Dash lamented the insidiousness of Duvalierism
and the need to develop the sustainable institutions necessary to create that alternative to ‘the absolutist state.’ See J.
Michael Dash, “Why can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?” The Sunday Gleaner, 22 February 2004, G2.
96
Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” 51. Haitian sociologist Jean Casimir recently expressed
similar sentiments, pointing out that Haitians have traditionally been able to “annuler ou réduire sensiblement leur
pouvoir de destruction, pour nous prodiguer des soins, de l'affection et du bonheur au cœur des relations
communautaires que, dès notre débarquement, nous nous sommes mis à tisser.” See Jean Casimir, La nation
haïtienne et l’État (Montréal : Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 10.
97
According to Castor, that domination takes the form of “continuous decapitation through trade deficits, profit
remittances by foreign investors, payment of foreign-debt obligations, transfer of holdings by the Haitian oligarchy
to foreign banks, and acquisition of land outside the country.” Castor, “Democracy and Society in Haiti,” 129.
98
Castor, 136.
99
Castor.

367
terms “fear of popular participation.” Dash likewise identifies the international community as a

source of assistance for the “radical restructuring of Haitian society” which, in his estimation,

“can be helped…by external forces who are committed to long-term nation- building…”100

At the same time, Dash is quite clear that external assistance does not equal ‘saving’

Haiti. He is quite blunt on this point:

Haiti cannot be saved by those on the outside if only for the simple reason that a modem
democratic society can neither be imposed by the well-armed nor inserted by the well-
meaning. Haitians will have to find the capacity for patience and compromise in order to
extricate themselves from their predicament.101

He elaborated upon this in a 2012 interview in which he pointed out that the challenge in the

aftermath of the Duvalier era was construction of a “non-authoritarian Haitian state.”102 Clearly,

one imposed on Haiti from outside by an international authoritarian force would, regardless of

the intent, be lacking any legitimacy and merely prolong agitation for social change in Haiti. At

the same time, absent foreign assistance, that the social change needed and the emergence of a

strong Haitian state do not appear likely. This is Haiti’s and the international community’s

shared dilemma.

The Haitian sociologist, Jean Casimir, likewise raised serious reservations over the

question of Western interference in Haiti:

[L]orsque nous pensons développement, nous nous mettons des menottes et rêvons de
colonisation ou, au bas mot, de tutelle étrangère. Je confesse ne pas connaître de pays
moderne, qui ne soit capitaliste et raciste. Je ne suis donc pas intéressé au développement
moderne, capitaliste et raciste d’Haïti, ni à savoir si un développement dans cette
direction, en le supposant désirable, est possible ou pas. J'essaie de trouver comment nous

100
Dash does demand that such assistance avoid “sending contradictory signals, wittingly or unwittingly, to political
elements in Haiti.” He points out that Aristide’s restoration to power in 1994 was followed by the international
community’s departure from Haiti “before any real institutional change was established in Haiti.” See Dash, “Why
can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?”
101
Dash.
102
“Detours and Distance: An Interview with J. Michael Dash,” The Public Archive, March 4, 2012,
www.thepublicarchive.com.

368
 nous sommes débrouillés dans ce milieu que nous n'avons pas choisi et ne pouvons ni
changer ni éviter.103

He then concluded:
Sur cette base, je déduis que l'État-nation est une souricière. Les concepts clés que
l'Occident nous offre pour penser notre façon de nous gouverner – c’est-à-dire l'État-
bureaucratie-administration-fonction publique - sont piégés et ne peuvent pas nous sortir
de la pauvreté abjecte. Nous devons élaborer d'autres instruments de pensée qui
traduisent notre pouvoir d'agir et notre joie de vivre. Dans ces périmètres réduits que nous
contrôlons encore, il est possible de travailler à renforcer notre efficacité, c'est-à-dire
notre État, - l'état où nous sommes -, celui dont nous ne sommes pas exclus et dont nous
ne pouvons pas être exclus. Si nous avons pu nous construire un passé sans l'aide de
l'Occident moderne, capitaliste et raciste, j'ai peine à croire que les États amis, qui ne sont
pas responsables de notre existence, et n'ont fait ni notre joie, ni notre bonheur, soient si
importants pour notre futur.104

Casimir’s reservations over the idea of the West leading Haitian state-building once again

raises questions around legitimacy, but also begs the question: if not the West, then who?105 As

Dash and Trouillot have pointed out, Haiti will require external assistance to overcome the

systemic roadblocks to democratic development.

Tenets of Development Assistance

[T]he goal of nation building should not be to impose common identities on deeply
divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow
people to live together despite differences. And if organizing such a state within the old
internationally recognized borders does not seem possible, the international community
should admit that nation building may require the disintegration of old states and the
formation of new ones.106
- Political scientist Marina S. Ottaway

103
Jean Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État (Montréal : Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 8-9.
104
Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État, 10.
105
My co-advisor, Professor Carolyn Fick, raised an interesting idea which is unfortunately outside the scope of my
thesis. What about asking progressive Latin American nations like Mexico or Cuba to assist with state-building?
Perhaps in a role akin more so to a mentor, providing their advice and feedback based on their own experiences?
106
Marina S. Ottaway, “Nation Building,” Foreign Policy 132 (September-October 2002), 17.

369
 Proceeding from the position of external assistance being a requirement for Haitian

democratic development, this section identifies several basic tenets which should inform that

assistance in the future. These are based not only on the works of Trouillot, Dash and Castor, but

also upon the lessons from past interventions undertaken in Haiti. The first tenet of development

work is commitment. Not only must the international community and the Haitian people commit

to a development plan, they both need to find to the time and the resources needed to fully

implement that plan. Development of fragile nations must be measured in decades, not months or

years.107 UN missions in Haiti measure their mandates in years. Mandates and related task

priorities have changed too fast for development to take root. Not surprisingly, UN missions in

Haiti have failed to achieve their lofty goals.

UN missions have also lacked legitimacy in the eyes of most Haitians, failed to consult

Haitians or align with their interests and cultural values. Key to achieving legitimacy and

fostering domestic ownership of a development plan is creating them through a strong and

collaborative consultation process. Such a process would also lead to commitment to a UN

strategy from Haitians. Ideally mediated by an impartial third party, consultations can integrate

Haitian expectations from the development stage to the completion of a multi-decade plan.

The outcome of the process should be a national consensus, cutting across colour and

class strata, incorporating national objectives and the means necessary to achieve the agreed

upon national development plan.108 Put simply, this requires that Haitians define a national

107
Most countries with democratic government find sustaining a development vision over the decades required is
often stymied by short-term political horizons shaped by elections typically three to five years apart. While a
flexible development framework helps alleviate some of this problem, the key is the continuity provided by a
professional civil service which can help successive governments stay on track by catering to short-term political
goals while retaining a focus on long-term strategic planning objectives.
108
The follow-up to the development of such a national plan is selling the plan to international donors, presuming
Haiti will continue to require international aid for the foreseeable future. Of course, the development plan proposed

370
vision for the country and agree on the steps necessary to achieve it. Without a national

consensus going forward, a national development plan will continue to be handicapped by

resistance and will ultimately fail.

The second tenet of development work is that development is linked to security and must

be tackled as part of a systems approach to strategic planning. Past UN missions have also seen

security as consisting solely of security sector reform (SSR) work, an approach which has not

worked based on evidence from past interventions.109 In fragile states, SSR as carried out by the

UN is flawed and contributes to instability.110 Fragile regimes usually employ their security

forces, police and military, as agents of repression and violence against their citizenry.

To undertake SSR work as a priority objective within a foreign intervention, without

tackling the requirement to change the underlying repressive culture, merely ensures the

repressive security forces become more capable of the same repressive tactics they previously

employed. SSR usually tackles only technical issues of policing and security, and fails to explore

those issues resulting from or responsible for Haitian instability and fragility. The result is a

police force that is technically proficient at various police functions – crowd or riot control is the

main task taught – but lacking the proper cultural foundation in concepts like community

policing, public accountability, adherence and respect for the rule of law, and respect for human

rights and human dignity. That failure to align police practices with local community

requirements and expectations is a chronic shortcoming.

should include a weaning from foreign aid and onto a flight path which leads to a sustainable economy and away
from dependence on aid.
109
The earlier discussion of the need to embrace Johan Galtung’s concept of ‘positive peace’ is critical to
understanding this point. For Haiti, the numerous UN missions which have emphasized security through the re-
creation of police and military forces, despite chronic poverty and unrest resulting from focusing solely on security,
point to failure when security is disconnected from development.
110
SSR is understood to include security force capacity building, whether police or military.

371
 Military aid transfers to Haiti embodied the failure to understand Haiti’s cultural

foundation. Since the 1960s, the US has provided Haitian dictators and repressive regimes with

crowd control equipment as part of military aid transfers. The most blatant example was the

Reagan administration’s 1985 transfer of crowd control equipment to Haiti as part of a US$3.2

million military aid package, despite the violent repression already launched by the dying regime

of Jean-Claude Duvalier.111 Similarly, in the early 1990s, following the coup against President

Aristide, the US again shipped riot control gear to Haiti, this time to the coup regime, through the

US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

In each case, the UN SSR work has included training to integrate and effectively use the

newly acquired equipment. Yet, in each instance, the Haitian security forces have routinely

employed the new equipment against Haitians seeking democratic reform, including those who

protested Aristide’s overthrow. Engaging in SSR while knowing that such abuses were taking

place within Haiti was and is clearly counter-productive. Yet it continues to happen.

For development in a chronic fragile state to take root, the presence and maintenance of a

safe and secure environment is a non-negotiable prerequisite. Unfortunately, the employment of

the Haitian security forces to create such an environment has not worked. Haiti has proven to be

highly susceptible to coups, most often undertaken by or with the connivance of security forces.

For the international community, this is a dilemma. How can that safe and secure environment be

provided without capable Haitian security forces while knowing that the securitization of

previous UN missions in Haiti had degenerated into abuse and had failed to accomplish that aim?

111
See Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 38.

372
 The third tenet of development work is the recognition that economic development does

not “breed” a democracy, and that the belief that “rapid growth destabilizes [authoritarian]

regimes is false.”112 Political science professors Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi

studied the relationship between economic development and democracy, and found that

economic development becomes critical once democracy is established.113 Emerging

democracies, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to economic and social shocks, but can

achieve lasting stability.114 Przeworski and Limongi’s findings point to fragile states like Haiti as

requiring international interference to assist in achieving the democratic success its people seek.

That solution reeks of neo-colonialism. However, there are models like the transitory shared

responsibility suggested by Stefano Recchia which allow for proportionate interference in Haiti’s

domestic affairs. In other words, models are available for international interference which permit

Haiti to choose the ‘best’ worst models.

The fourth and last tenet of development work is that education is the most critical tool

for sustainable development.115 Yet simply implementing an education system is not enough.

112
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2
(January 1997), 167, 176.
113
However, their findings also suggest that authoritarianism was better suited to encouraging economic
development because of the single-mindedness of the authoritarian regime if it is not engaged in self-enrichment or
other corrupt practices. While clearly not advocating for such repression, the two political scientists argue that
authoritarian regimes possess more repressive measures with which to suppress citizen’s grievances caused by
controversial development. The previously discussed Caracol industrial park case study is an example of this. Adam
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997),
167, 176.
114
Democratic stability should be understood as a function of the distribution of wealth and the presence of a
thriving middle class. According to Przeworski and Limongi in 1997, “[t]he probability that a democracy will die
during any particular year in a country with an annual per capital income above [US]$4,000 is practically zero.” The
level of per capita income remains a useful metric for democratic stability, albeit one which needs to be regularly
updated and placed in context of the prevailing socio-economic realities of any given country. See Przeworski and
Limongi, 166.
115
The Brookings Institute’s Center for Universal Education issued a 2013 report on education in fragile states
which identified four outcomes from investing in education in a fragile state, namely that it “advanced economic
development, it strengthened humanitarian action, it contributed to security and state building, and it mitigated the
impacts of disasters.” Of the three, and not to discount the importance of the other three reasons for investing in
education, I am focusing on economic development. See Rebecca Winthrop and Elena Matsui, “A New Agenda for

373
The education system needs to be universal and accessible to all elements of society.116 To

achieve universality, the system must be ‘indigenized’. For Haiti, this means an education system

that embraces the Creole and French language and cultural norms within a bilingual system.117

Achieving Haitian indigenization, however, requires a revolutionary shift of attitude by

the societal elite and the international community. Without ascribing motive, successive Haitian

governments have ignored and underfunded the education system, with the rural areas resigned

to NGOs providing much of the existing education. Ghanaian elites, for example, much like

Haiti’s elites, remain wedded to the colonial education system, which emphasized and prioritized

Western colonial attitudes and behaviours. But in Ghana’s case, English remained the lingua

franca of education, which made it more accessible than it was in Haiti.

Undertaking a reform of Ghana’s system was complicated further by the rivalry between

the state and the educated elite, both of which competed for control of education, as well as the

involvement of the Catholic Church. Haiti shares a similar situation to that which confronted

Ghana. The island nation of Mauritius likewise had similar issues when undertaking to

Education in Fragile States,” Center for Universal Education at Brookings Working Paper 10, August 2013.
www.brookings.edu.
116
This was one of the key findings of the US Moton Commission, created by President Hoover to investigate the
education system implemented by the US during the Marine Occupation. The Commission concluded a grave error
had been made when “a distinct and separate [primary] system of [vocational-style] schools” was established.
Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 142.
117
Indigenizing an education system can be difficult. Not the least problem can be the requirement to develop,
within the local language, the means to communicate the concepts central to various academic courses. This was the
case with Ghana, for example, when “Africanizing” maths and sciences was further complicated by the lack of a
single suitable language to allow the conversion and teaching of those courses. Ghana has multiple languages. The
same issues will surface with Creole. Note this does not mean these are insurmountable obstacles, rather that
overhauling the education system will require serious strategic planning. See Hubert O. Quist, “Secondary
Education – A ‘Tool’ for National Development in Ghana. A Critical Appraisal of the Post-Colonial Context,”
African Development / Afrique et Développement 28, no. 3/4 (2003): 186-210, www.jstor/stable/24482700

374
indigenize its education system. However, its solution prioritized the link between universal, free

education and “social unity.”118

The incorporation of a process for indigenization and centralization notwithstanding, the

Haitian education system must be designed to provide a universal education which allows the

nation to move beyond the status quo and into the ranks of middle-class status. At the same time,

Haitian education must help advance democracy at the same time.119 This requires a robust and

well-developed secondary education system, the aim of which is to allow progress through

scientific and technological development. Otherwise, Haiti as a fragile state risks remaining

trapped in low-technology, labour-intensive industries like mining, agriculture, and assembly

industries such as clothing or footwear. In addition to providing a critical base in science and

technology, higher education programming also improves a society’s ability to deal with shocks

to the state, economic or otherwise. Economic shocks leave developing states highly vulnerable

to collapse and encourage a return to more authoritarian rule to deal with unhappy citizens living

with the aftermath of the shock.

Development Assistance and Its Impact on Sovereignty

S'agit-il des esclaves de Saint-Domingue ou des employés de la sous-traitance actuelle,

l'intégration au monde moderne coûte justement l'exclusion des masses. Les majorités -
ce qui fait le poids parce que substantif et réel - sont converties, dans ce projet moderne,
en une bizarrerie à remodeler. L'assimilation des Haïtiens à la modernité implique une
formule ou une autre d'occupation par les étrangers, ou - si l'on tient à être optimiste - une

118
Joseph Stiglitz, “The Mauritius miracle, or how to make a big success of a small economy,” The Guardian, 7
March 2011, www.theguardian.com. See also UNESCO for more material on Mauritius and education, including the
country’s education and human resources strategy, https://uil.unesco.org/i/doc/lifelong-learning/policies/mauritius-
education-and-human-resources-strategy-plan-2008-2020.pdf.
119
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi who concluded, at noted earlier, that democracies become stable when
per capita income levels average over US$4,000 annually. While not guaranteeing that the democracy will not fail,
they concluded the likelihood is high that a state will remain stable when incomes are at or above that level. That
suggests that while the annual US$4,000 income may be an arbitrary figure, we may nonetheless be able to
determine what per capita income for Haitians is required to sustain middle-class status and therefore support an
enduring democracy.

375
 formule de gouvernement chargé de détruire toute possibilité de conserver notre
spécificité afin de nous introduire au monde moderne, occidental, capitaliste et raciste.
Les Haïtiens ne peuvent pas appartenir à la modernité et devenir occidentaux, capitalistes
et racistes sans cesser d'être ce qu'ils ont construit historiquement.120
- Haitian Sociologist Jean Casimir

Development assistance should be viewed as a spectrum with the strategy of ‘doing

nothing’ other than ‘containing’ instability at the one end and the imposition of neo-colonial

trusteeship at the other end. However, before examining the range of development policies

available and exploring their positive and negative elements, I will explore the option of non-

interference or, more precisely, the idea of zero foreign interference in Haiti. Is such an option

possible to avoid creating Casimir’s souricière or mousetrap? Is such an option feasible? Can –or

should– Haiti be left on its own to create its own version of democracy?121

Alternately, can –or should– the West embrace non-intervention when addressing Haiti?

Non-intervention would include both normative diplomacy and economic relations with other

nations both in the region and globally, but it would preclude interference in Haitian internal

affairs which can be expected to get bloody as the various internal factions fight for power.

Foreign aid would be withheld save for humanitarian purposes. Non-interference is an attractive

option. It centres on a Haiti that is able, through its various stakeholders, to work its way towards

a state solution that heralds a future democratic solution.

120
Jean Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État (Montréal: Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 7.
121
I am relying on the definition of non-intervention as provided by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). They identified non-intervention as:
“a sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial
borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in its internal affairs.” Note that non-
intervention is related conceptually to sovereignty. See Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility
to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, No. 6 (2002): 99-110.

376
 Yet as Trouillot, Dash and Castor, among others, have pointed out, this type of thinking

is quite impractical.122 Without assistance in overcoming the chronic and systemic deficiencies

of Haiti, the status quo will remain, barring violent revolution. Averting that violence, which also

disrupts vested foreign interests in the country, reinforces the inevitability of foreign assistance.

That unfortunate conviction underlies the essence of this section. If Western interference in Haiti

is inevitable, development modelling should be approached with the goal of minimizing the

damage such interference will do to Haitians.

Assistance to a fragile state spans a range of options that have and continue to be

exercised. This includes the ‘no assistance’ option during which the international community

tolerates instability and violence within the fragile state, only intervening for the purpose of

containment. In a fragile state like Haiti, nascent democratic movements are forced to confront

and overcome, without outside assistance, institutional conditions which preclude change. Too

often, and to keep the instability contained within the fragile state, Western states enact measures

that seek to quarantine the state.

Containment is accompanied by Western governments issuing a biased narrative,

vilifying the fragile nation. Ignoring development issues and democratic movements, both of

which raise awareness and foster questions concerning the responsibility to assist on the part of

the international community, the typically unsympathetic narrative labels the fragile state as a

122
During my thesis defense in 2019, Professor Bellegarde-Smith, speaking as my external examiner, mentioned
that should the West decide to adopt a hands-off policy with Haiti and instead waited for Haitians to request their
aid, he felt that a dechoukaj [cleansing] was inevitable. That then raised the question of whether the West – and the
US in particular – would stand by while former allies and proxies were slaughtered during the dechoukaj. Indeed, it
became quite apparent from our discussion that the West would certainly intervene in such a case and would likely
intervene prior to such an event to preclude it from occurring—and with deleterious consequences for Haiti in the
long run.

377
haven of chaos rooted in drugs, crime, terrorism, or all three.123 The narrative which emerges

regularly for Haiti during periods of instability characterizes it as an exceptional entity, grounded

in inveterate misery and poverty, interspersed with rare images of individual resiliency.124

Moving beyond the ‘no assistance’ or containment model are various levels of assistance.

At the bottom is assistance designed solely with the minimalist goal of restoring security. While

sharing much in common with containment, this model often includes military or security

assistance. For Haiti, this has meant the provision of older weaponry, uniforms and equipment

including aircraft and armoured vehicles. Further, whereas containment seeks to restrict chaos

and instability within the fragile state, securitized assistance often seeks to resolve the chaotic

situation using quick and violent suppression. This involves designating a local strongman to

receive security aid, allowing him to control the fragile state as quickly as possible. Democratic

development is sacrificed on the altar of stability, and revolution is controlled.

Ideally, development assistance beyond the minimum or that focusing on security only,

should be undertaken within a synchronized and comprehensive framework which tackles

security issues and democratic institutions holistically.125 Input from various levels of Haitian

123
Witness, for example, the over-generalizing within Sir Robert Cooper’s The Breaking of Nations: Order and
Chaos in the 21st Century, which examines the idea of a new security order within Europe. Cooper, a former
diplomat, and writer, who believes outside of Europe, save for rare exceptions, there is only chaos and disorder. That
idea of only encountering chaos and disorder necessarily pre-establishes a discordant and adversarial relationship
with any non-European nation, something which has been seen regularly when the world deals with Haiti.
124
The West’s response to the 2010 earthquake, which devastated Haiti, was largely based initially on “securitizing”
the response, including deployment of naval elements to ensure Haitians did not seek to flee the devastation by sea.
That response was quickly followed by a wave of NGOs invading Haiti, all professing to do good works, but often
in a competition for Western aid monies as they carved up the humanitarian response. Little to no reference was
made to Haitian local interests, and the humanitarian aid monies pledged in massive quantities were quick to dry up
or disappear, Haiti itself being blamed for their disappearance. See Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner and Linda
Peake, “Fear and Loathing in Haiti: Race and Politics of Humanitarian Dispossession,” ACME: An international E-
Journal for Critical Geography 9, No. 3 (2010): 282-300; and Nadège T. Clitandre, “Haitian Exceptionalism in the
Caribbean and the Project of Rebuilding Haiti,” Journal of Haitian Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 146-53.
www.jstor.org/stable/41715438.
125
Law professor Saira Mohamed has argued that the UN’s shift from security issues to those of peacebuilding more
broadly have shifted such issues away from being within the mandate of Security Council and “fall instead within

378
society with the grassroots level seen as the most important, is the second critical element. While

there are various means of ensuring that a partnership is developed between the assisting nations

and Haiti, the transitory shared responsibility model identified by Stefano Recchia, and discussed

earlier in Chapter Eleven – Lessons from Interventions – offers an innovative approach with

minimal impact on Haitian sovereignty.126 A significant problem with the model is that the

partnership arrangements would be made with the government in power and could undermine the

legitimacy of such a partnership in the future.

Further along the assistance spectrum and involving a significant impact on sovereignty,

is revival of the UN’s Trusteeship Council and assignment to it of some oversight

responsibilities.127 Berkeley professor of law Saira Mohamed has proposed clear boundaries

between securitization through UN Security Council management of the military and police

facets of peacekeeping, and Trusteeship Council supervision of the peacebuilding parts of

governance. Some legal scholars would require the Trusteeship Council to obtain consent from

the former government prior to it claiming a legitimate right to oversee reform of a fragile

state.128 At the same time, even hinting at a trusteeship in Haiti would be a major blow to

the much broader province of the Trusteeship Council.” She argues that the Trusteeship Council “possesses special
competence in these matters and has been equipped since its creation with mechanisms that provide for legitimacy
and protect accountability in governance…[and, accordingly the Council] is a better UN organ to manage the
governance tasks of contemporary peacebuilding.” See Saira Mohamed, “From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A
Proposal for a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council,” Columbia Law Review 105, no. 3 (Apr. 2005), 822-
3. www.jstor.org/stable/4099479.
126
There is no question that Haiti is a sovereign nation, but its sovereignty is regularly subject to interference.
Because Haiti does not provide political goods and services to all its citizens, the state has effectively ceded
elements of its sovereignty to other foreign nations through extensive and pervasive NGO operations.
127
Anyone who understands the vehemence of Haitian reactions to part Western interventions know how strongly
Haitians would oppose such a move. Yet a huge civil war, a massive government-sponsored bloodbath killing large
numbers of unarmed civilians, or the total disintegration of the Haitian government, could trigger the ‘unthinkable.’
The UN ruled East Timor and Kosovo for several years and came close to ruling Liberia and other collapsing states
in the 1990s. Under certain circumstances, it could be called upon to do so again. In such circumstances,
128
See, for example, Tom Parker, The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalizing the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21 st
Century, (Sandvika, Norway: Centre for European and Asian Studies at the Norwegian School of Management,
2003). The proposals to revive the Trusteeship Council point to greater transparency and accountability for results

379
national pride, and would be virulently resisted just as the Haitian resisted the Marine invasion

and occupation.

Rwanda: The Good and the Bad

How do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to become?
How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity? What are the
transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic
situation? These are the main questions Rwanda Vision 2020 addresses.129
- Rwandan Vision 2020

Before discussing specific development options for Haiti, the case of Rwanda and its

development under President Paul Kagame is worth exploring as it yields positive ideas as well

as warning of what to avoid. Kagame began his nation’s strategic development planning with “a

national consultative process” in 1998-99, from which emerged the adoption of the national goal

to “fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020.”130 That

national goal promoted six primary pillars and three cross-cutting areas of commonality that

reflected Rwandan concerns and interests that had emerged through the national consultations.

The result was a national development plan, “Rwanda Vision 2020,” outlined in Figure 2 below.

than past UN missions. They require serious consideration and debate before any efforts are made to implement
them.
129
Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Rwanda Vision 2020,” Kigali, July 200, 6.
130
Vision 2020 identified specific objectives related to middle-income country status including an annual per capita
income of US$900; a decrease in poverty by 30 percent; and an increase in life expectancy from 49 years to 55. See
Vision 2020, 11 and Annex 1.

380
 Figure 2: Rwandan Vision 2020 Development Strategy

Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s regime offers a cautionary tale while highlighting

Przeworski and Limongi’s theories on authoritarianism within a developing nation.131 Kagame

has taken a leaf out of François Duvalier’s playbook, creating a state system which “indirectly

controlled” the people through a system, of “widespread and locally embedded webs of

administration” which “coopted multiple people into its ranks.”132 Like Duvalierism, Kagame’s

system allowed the “dispossessed and disempowered just a little authority over the rest” which

131
Kagame has been linked to the April 1994 downing of the aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvénal
Habyarimana and the Burundian President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, killing both men, although this allegation is still
unproven. Recently, Human Rights Watch claims to have documented at least 37 extrajudicial killings by Rwandan
security forces between July 2016 and March 2017. See “ ‘All Thieves Must Be Killed’: Extrajudicial Executions in
Western Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch, 13 July 2017, www.hrw.org.
132
Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda,”
The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 477-8.

381
then lowered the likelihood of discontent and rebellion.133 Andrea Purdeková claims the result

has been a state system which “effectively dispatches rather than decentralizes control.”134

Despite criticisms levelled at his authoritarian rule, Kagame’s economic development

program, based on his national strategy, “Vision 2020,” has been hailed as “impressive” and

“spectacular.”135 In 1998, the Government of National Unity under Kagame made the decision to

break the cycle of Hutu/Tutsi violence epitomized by the 1994 Rwandan genocide and

determine, through collaboration with its citizens, “what kind of Nation we [Rwandans] want in

the future.”136

The Rwandan case under Kagame points to the requirement to include external assistance

and expertise in any development strategy. His regime has embraced an education policy that

emphasized not only technology and engineering, but also the oft-neglected management field,

which is required to produce the civil service management expertise necessary to guide policy

development during crisis periods. Rwanda clearly understands the requirement for robust

secondary education system.

133
Purdeková, 483.
134
For example, Kagame rewrote the Rwandan Constitution to legalize one party rule, held elections in which he has
received almost 100% of the electoral vote, and stands accused of grievous human rights abuses including the
sanctioning of extra-judicial killings. He also employed his authority to pass legislation that contribute to his
development model. For example, he outlawed plastic bags in Rwanda, leading to a “zero tolerance” policy on bags
which has seen those caught with plastic bags face fines of up to US$19,000, up to four years in jail, and the
requirement that they publicly confess to their ‘crime.’ For more detail, see Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not
here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49,
no. 3 (September 2011): 475-97. See also Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Public Shaming and Even Prison for Plastic
Bag Use in Rwanda,” The New York Times, October 28, 2017, www.nytimes.com.
135
The Vision 2020 plan has been rebranded Vision 2050. See George B. N. Ayittey, “The Non-Sustainability of
Rwanda’s Economic Miracle,” Journal of Management and Sustainability 7, no. 2 (2017): 88-104.
http://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v7n2p88. Likewise, various articles in The New York Times have used “miracle” when
reporting on Rwanda and its economic status under Kagame. See, for example, Murithi Mutiga, “Rwanda’s
Unfinished Miracle,” The New York Times, July 30, 2014, www.nytimes.com.
136
Vision 2020, 2.

382
 Yet, as noted earlier, Kagame’s regime in Rwanda is moving down the path to

authoritarianism to ensure his vision is implemented. While Kagame claims to handle state funds

honestly and to always act in the national interest, he is an authoritarian who has no compunction

about human rights violations.

Haiti’s Development Options

Promotion of Haiti’s tourist industry was made the responsibility of a five-man council
today. The council members represent private enterprise interested in tourism and the
body is to be free of political control. The Ministry of Tourism was abolished.137
- The New York Times, 1958

Having identified historic lessons and development tenets that might guide strategic

development, Haiti has two options that warrant discussion at this juncture. Key to both is the

direction Haitian leaders decide upon for economic development.

Development Model 1: The Status quo. Haiti is a nation heavily dependent upon foreign

aid, which provides over 20 percent of its annual operating budget. Coupled to foreign aid is the

provision of services by NGOs rather than from the national government. Remittances from

Haitians abroad currently account for about a quarter of Haiti’s GDP.138 The growth in

remittances represents the loss of precious skilled Haitians to the foreign labour markets, as those

who are skilled enough to be competitive in foreign job markets are leaving Haiti. Remittances to

137
“Haiti Sets Up Tourism Council,” The New York Times, 2 October 1958, www.nytimes.com.
138
In 1994, remittances from abroad amounted to around US$50 million. By 2001, that amount had risen to US$600
million and in 2010, the IADB estimated remittances were worth US$1.5 billion to the Haitian economy. Linked to
remittances is, of course, the lost monies from expensive fees incurred to transfer the money to Haiti, fees running as
high as 20% of the amount being sent. One bright spot is that cell phone technology is beginning to make those
money transfers easier and more competitive. See Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto, Remittances and
Development: Lessons from Latin America (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2008), 5. See also P.C. Acosta, C.
Calderón, P. Fajnzylber and H. Lopez, “Remittances and Development in Latin America,” World Economy 29, no.7
(2006): 957–987.

383
Haiti flow mostly from the US, followed by Canada and France.139 While numerous studies on

developing countries have shown that families invest much of the remittance money flowing into

countries like Haiti in education, dependence on remittances represents a failed economic

development strategy.140

Under the status quo option, Haiti continues to exploit its main competitive advantage –

cheap unskilled labour – to supply workers to labour intensive, light industries like clothing

assembly plants. By offering tax incentives, Haiti will continue to entice clothing manufacturers

to Haiti, provided it can maintain low wages and prevent unionization. Haiti also has a fledgling

tourism industry that, assuming stability reigns, could also be developed – under this status quo

model – to provide employment.141

An excellent example of this low wage development model is the 2017 “cluster

development” plan built by Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School.142 Cluster

139
In 2005, the average remittance from Haitians in the US averaged around US$180 monthly, not a huge sum, but
as of 2000, there were just under 420,000 Haitians in the US, meaning over US$75 million monthly was being sent
to Haiti from the US alone. Note that remittances were not always money either. A significant portion of remittances
were “non-cash” due to Haiti’s high cost of living and shortages of household items including clothing and
foodstuffs. In the case of non-cash remittances, middlemen ‘transfer’ agencies established bulk commercial shipping
facilities to service large numbers of expatriate shipping requirements. Non-cash remittances became particularly
critical during humanitarian crises and at holidays. Commercial firms and some NGOs have also sold space in their
own commercial shipping containers to service expatriate remittance requests, although how prevalent this service
has been is unknown. See Patricia Fagen, Remittances in crisis: A Haiti case study (London, U.K.: Humanitarian
Policy Group Background Paper, April 2006).
140
See, for example, Maria Cristina Zhunio, Sharmila Vishwasrao, and Eric P. Chiang, “The influence of
remittances on education and health outcomes: a cross country study,” Applied Economics 44, no. 35 (2011): 4605-
4616. DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.593499; or A. Cox Edwards, and M. Ureta, “International migration,
remittances and schooling: evidence from El Salvador,” Journal of Development Economics 72, no. 2 (2003): 429-
61.
141
Tourism in 2012 provided Haiti with US$200 million, largely from one million visitors arriving on cruise ships.
However, in 2013 and the political issues related to the Martelly government, tourism revenue declined to US$160
million. Trenton Daniel, "Haiti hopes push to woo tourists pays off," The Burlington Free Press (July 8, 2013), 5A.
142
The plan is contained in an online PowerPoint presentation titled “A Strategy for Haitian Prosperity” (dated 22
September 2017) https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170922-A-Strategy-for-Haitian-Prosperity-
Michael-E-Porter_d961c43a-f86f-42bc-8e64-7377ba0c360e.pdf. Professor Porter is affiliated with a consulting
business known as FSG (https://www.fsg.org/about) and the Harvard Business School’s Institute for Strategy and
Competitiveness (https://www.isc.hbs.edu).

384
development is defined as creating a “geographically proximate group of interconnected

companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and

complementarities (external economies).”143

The key is the development of education institutions, for example, in proximity to

industry. For tourism, as an example, post-secondary institutions offer specific tourism-related

curricula including hotel management, finances, food services, catering, and other related

subjects. Ideally, the training institutes and the local tourism trade would work to create work

placement programs to provide on-the-job training as part of the school program.

The involvement of the diaspora and of course, the implementation of anti-corruption

measures are critical to success under the status quo model.144 The diaspora represents those with

skills required by the Haitian government in the future as well as potential investment money.

The implementation of anti-corruption measures to ensure money and resources are not diverted

from the development framework, should also inspire and retain Western confidence as the

economic strategy progresses.

The downside of the model is twofold. First, this is an expensive model, requiring

substantial investment in education to succeed and development of the right skills for Haitians to

move forward. Substantial investment in infrastructure is also required but will generate a low

rate of return on the investment, meaning continued reliance on foreign aid and loans.

143
Cluster development represents a systems approach to economic development and can be understood within a
Whole of Government approach when optimized and if adopted more completely than has been the case so far
(witness the limited employment of the concept in Haiti’s clothing assembly industry). See Porter, “A Strategy for
Haitian Prosperity,” slide 19.
144
For an excellent overview of Haiti’s diaspora including historical background, see Professor Tatiana Wah,
“Engaging the Haitian Diaspora,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 9 (Spring 2013): 56-69.

385
 Second, a further shortcoming of this model is that it is unlikely to generate the income

levels necessary to move Haiti into middle-class status as defined earlier. Moving from a

developing nation to a developed nation and attaining a per capita income that stabilizes Haiti as

a developed democracy is a lengthy, expensive, and difficult process. There are no fragile state

antecedents to provide a pathway to success.

During its development, Haiti remains vulnerable to economic shocks such as natural

disasters that cause humanitarian crises like the 2010 earthquake which killed 300,000 Haitians,

and severe tropical storms. The status quo development model does not build the resiliency

necessary for Haitians to weather such catastrophic problems in the future. Because of these

issues, perpetuating the status quo model is not recommended; it is unlikely to produce success.

Development Model 2: Quantum Leap. At the other end of the development scale is a

revolutionary approach to development that shows some signs of succeeding in at least one

pioneering nation, Rwanda, which Haiti might well consider replicating. Kagame made it his

short-term goal to wean Rwanda from dependence on foreign aid and implement a sustainable

development model based on a knowledge-based economy rather than its agrarian-based

economy.145 For the long-term, Rwanda has recognized the criticality of a “productive” middle

class “and has linked it to the “fostering [of] entrepreneurship,” the centrepiece of the economic

strategy underway.146

145
Kagame appears to be making strides in this direction. For example, the Rwandan central bank was recently
identified as examining cryptocurrency applications, after studying a number of Western nations’ experiences with
digital currencies. See Saul Butera, “Rwandan Central Bank Studying Ways of Issuing Digital Currency,” BNN
Bloomberg, August 22, 2019. www.bnnbloomberg.ca. See also Nicholas Kulish, “Rwanda Reaches for New
Economic Model,” The New York Times, March 23, 2014. www.nytimes.com.
146
VISION 2020, 13.

386
 That Rwanda and Haiti share a number of similarities makes Rwandan development a

useful model for Haiti to consider, albeit subject to the cautionary caveats regarding

authoritarianism identified previously.147 Broadly, both countries are close in population and

area. They are similar in GDP, Haiti at US$9.6 million in 2018 and Rwanda at US$9.5 million;

have similar levels of indebtedness; and are remarkably similar in the value of their exports,

US$980 million for Haiti in 2017 and US$1.2 billion for Rwanda. Life expectancy differs a bit,

with Haiti at 63.5 years while Rwanda sits at 67.5 years. Both are also largely agrarian

economies.

Keeping Rwanda’s Vision 2020 in mind, and ensuring the tenets and lessons previously

elaborated upon are used to guide Haitian development, the ‘Quantum Leap’ model approaches

development as a decades-long process that prioritizes the development of a national education

system available universally to all deserving Haitians which in turn shifts Haiti to a knowledge-

based economic model. In the short term, development of the education system would prioritize

investment in the elementary and secondary levels, with a long-term goal being the development

of a robust and world-class post-secondary system built on high technology research and

development.148

147
Statistics in this section are drawn from the World Bank, IMF and Eurostat sites. Major differences are revealed
when the government budgets are compared, and Rwanda moves into a significant lead. While government deficits
are not too different, Rwanda spends almost 50 percent again as much as Haiti on education. UNESCO data show
Rwanda holding a lead in overall literacy at 73 percent as of 2018, while Haiti in 2016 was languishing at 61
percent. In both countries, males hold a significant literate advantage over females. Defence is another major
difference with Rwanda spending around US$10 per citizen versus Haiti’s spending nothing. Haitian imports are
about 50 percent more than Rwanda’s. Haitian remittance dependence is also a major source of revenue whereas
Rwanda relies on much less at around US$180 million. However, Rwanda sends around US$300 million abroad
whereas Haiti sends less than US$96 million abroad. One critical difference, of course, is that while Haiti is part of
an island, Rwanda is completely landlocked.
148
Note that Haiti has three prestigious universities, the Université d'État d'Haïti, the Université Quisqueya and the
Université Notre Dame d’Haiti. Most of the remaining universities and colleges in Haiti have been called “the
Haitian equivalent of Career Quest — private vocational schools with no libraries, no labs and uncertified teachers.”
See Catherine Porter, “Haitian universities are a lesson in hard knocks,” The Star, December 30, 2010,
www.thestar.com.

387
 Haitians face specific problems that have historically contributed to Haitian instability,

including experiencing more natural disasters than most Caribbean countries. Those natural

disasters were amplified by a number of factors that include most Haitians living in coastal areas;

substandard infrastructure and housing; and subsistence agriculture weakened by severe

environmental damage. Yet those problem areas can, through a radical vision, be turned to

Haiti’s competitive advantage.

The key to the success of the quantum leap approach is a post-secondary research and

development goal that focusses on solving several problems for the benefit of Haitians.149

Employing the cluster model, Haiti would develop integrated clusters to deal with Haiti’s

problem areas. Developing earthquake and hurricane-proof building designs and materials, for

example, would not only raise Haiti’s probability of surviving its natural disasters, but would

also generate commercial opportunities.150 Likewise, in the field of agriculture, encouraging the

development of post-secondary education facilities specializing in hydroponics and aquaponics

would not only encourage the development of sustainable domestic food production, but also

gradual reforestation as agricultural land is reclaimed.

Last but not least, Haiti should consider renewable energy like solar, wind and tidal

power projects as a research and development objective, given its climate, location, and fossil

fuel dependency. A national focus in this area would help Haiti deal with its fossil fuel

149
The American Association for the Advancement of Science produced an interesting plan for Haiti that provided
for the development of a “robust science sector” that would “support future development.” See American
Association for the Advancement of Science. "Science and science education critical for Haiti's future, says
international team." ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/09/110915131647.htm.
150
This goal clearly should be developed within a systems approach. For example, a key first step, of course, would
be to develop building and construction standards to be applied construction going forward. Tied to development of
standards should be the development of standardized building inspection regimes, which in turn would be linked to
the development and implementation of anti-corruption measures specific to this field. None of the goals identified
should be understood as stand-alone, but rather as inter-related. Otherwise, as with the UN’s experience of police
force development in Haiti, dysfunctional development will become the result.

388
dependency, all of which is imported at considerable cost in hard currency. Likewise, Haiti’s

weak and unstable electrical grid could be substantially improved through investments in

technology and alternate energy sources allowing Haitians to abandon wood for fuel, and thereby

reducing deforestation and other environmental damage.

The last area for Haiti to focus on in the short- to mid-term is the development of its civil

service. In the short-term, this requires pouring money into scholarships to send Haitians abroad

to study civil service management and bring those skills back to Haiti’s government institutions.

A short-term remediation of this problem would include consideration of the transitory shared

responsibility model discussed earlier in this chapter.

Long-term considerations include whether to continue to seek expertise from abroad, or

instead develop and exploit Haitian expertise. Likewise, building in anti-corruption measures

into Haiti’s breakthrough plan would foster a civil service culture fighting this problem through

merit-based promotion standards, greater accountability for results and higher salaries.

Making the Case for Western Reparations

The peculiarity of Haiti’s demand for reparations is the fact that it has absolutely nothing
to do with restorative justice with regards to enslavement. The reparative demand is
solely concerned with the siphoning of one national treasury to another through coercion.
Haitians are asking the French government to return stolen money. The debt France owes
Haiti is not just moral, but also deeply financial and political.151
- Haitian American academic Westenley Alcenat

When development planning is bantered about, the question that always arises is how to

fund it without relying on either foreign aid or foreign loans. This is the time to examine the case

for Western reparations for Haiti as compensation for the damage done by decades of abuse. The

151
Westenley Alcenat, “The Case for Haitian Reparations,” The Jacobin, 14 January 2017. www.jacobinmag.com

389
two key perpetrators are first, France, responsible for having engaged in and profited from the

horrific slave trade to Saint Domingue, and for coercing Haiti to pay indemnity payments in

return for recognizing Haiti’s independence; and second, the United States, for its abuse and

killing of Haitians during the Marine Occupation period as well as the chronic problems which

continue to plague Haiti as a result of Occupation policies. The case for French reparations has

been made by a number of individuals, most recently in April 2003 by President Aristide.152 The

case for reparations in response to the abuse and killings during the Marine Occupation, and the

more insidious and less obvious damage caused by predatory loans and the ‘Dollar Diplomacy’

foreign policy, has yet to be made.

Reparations payments for both the French colonial and US neocolonial abuse of Haitians

and Haiti is not without precedent. While the German post-Second World War reparations to

Holocaust victims, and to Israel, are the most obvious precedent for the payment of reparations,

post-colonial reparations have also been paid as well. For example, the United Kingdom paid

over 5,000 Kenyans more than US$25 million in compensation for the violence British forces

and their allies inflicted to repress the 1950s Mau Mau uprising to end colonial rule. The

Caribbean Community created the CARICOM Reparations Commission in 2013 with the goal of

establishing “the moral, ethical and legal case for the payment of Reparations by the

Governments of all the former colonial powers and the relevant institutions of those countries, to

152
As noted earlier, Aristide made the case for repayment of the indemnity only, but calculated as of 2003 to be
US$21 billion. I am not aware of any reparation dollar value attached to the slave trade. In 2013, French Justice
Minister Christiane Taubira called on the French government of President François Hollande to explore land
redistribution within former French colonies including her region of birth, French Guiana. “In the overseas
territories there was a land grab, the general result was that the descendants of slaves were left without access to
land. Therefore we should think about – without sparking a civil war – regrouping properties that were divided and
about land reform.” Taubira’s proposal was rejected. See Joseph Bamat, “French minister wants land for slaves’
descendants,” France24, December 5th, 2013, https://www.france24.com/en/20130512-france-minister-taubira-land-
reform-slavery-caribbean-reparations-hollande.

390
the nations and people of the Caribbean Community for the Crimes against Humanity of Native

Genocide, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and a racialized system of chattel Slavery.” The Italian

government of Prime Minster Silvio Berlusconi signed a treaty with the Muammar Ghaddafi

government in 2008 that provided for the payment of reparations for the colonial past in the

amount of US$5 billion over 20 years.153

There are also numerous case studies of specific nations paying their own citizens

reparations for ill treatment, including South Africa for apartheid crimes, the US for its treatment

of Japanese Americans, and Peru for violence it used against its citizens during its lengthy war to

defeat the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The US is currently in the midst of considering

reparations for the criminal slave trade and its impact on African Americans.154 The Herero and

Nama people recently launched a lawsuit against the German government, demanding

reparations for the genocide perpetrated against their ancestors during the Kaiser Reich.

Reparations should be considered as a means for resolving some of Haiti’s problems.

Rather than reparations payments to individual Haitians, reparations funds could be used to

create programs geared towards Haitian development.155 Take the example of West Germany

which provided reparation payments to the State of Israel, as well as to individual Holocaust

153
The treaty and reparations were suspended in August 2011 as a result of the Libyan civil war. The Treaty was
reactivated in December 2011 and around US$670 million were unfrozen and dispersed to the new Libyan
government. See “ITALY-LIBYA: Reactivation of the Treaty of Friendship,” Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Cooperation Press Release 15 December 2011,
https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/12/20111215_italialibiatrattatoamic
izia.html?LANG=EN.
154
Reparation demands against the US are diverse and encompass claims not only for American slavery, but also for
American involvement in, and profits from, the Atlantic slave trade. A further link has also been made to African
underdevelopment and its relationship to the West, slavery and the slave trade. For an introduction to the issues
involved in reparations, see Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, “Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent
Persons,” Cahiers d’Études africaines 173-174 (2004): 81-97, http://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/4543.
See also Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014, www.theatlantic.com.
155
This statement should not be taken to mean that individual Haitians will not or should not receive payments from
repatriation funds, but rather that such payments should solely be within the purview of the Haitian government.

391
victims. The money provided to the State of Israel during the period from 1953 to 1963 “funded

about a third of the total investment in Israel’s electrical system…and nearly half the total

investment in the railways.”156

For Haiti, a similar program would clearly benefit development programs, including, for

example, the post-secondary education program identified as a key component of the Quantum

Leap option above. The potential money would be sufficient, for example, to allow high

technology research and development centres to be quickly developed in Haiti, speeding up

Haitian development from many decades to a relatively few years. With reparation packages

from both nations, Haiti would be able to leap solidly into the information age.

Yet a reparations package to Haiti should not be only cash money. Part of the French

indemnity imposed on Haiti compelled a tariff reduction which crippled Haitian commercial

development. It would be apropos to have a reparations package requiring the foreign

community to pass national legislation obliging the acceptance of Haitian goods into key

Western national markets without low quantity caps and high tariff obligations. The intent of this

part of the reparations proposal is twofold. First, reparations to Haiti would include an

appropriate and meaningful component that goes beyond mere cash transfers; and second,

Haitian commercial development would receive a desperately needed stimulus that would allow

it to become sustainable. Ideally, the domestic industries that result would permit the eventual

shift of the Haitian workforce away from the labour-intensive light industry into areas with

higher profits and a greater multiplier effect.

156
Israeli historian Tom Segev, in Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014.

392
 A third component of any reparation package would also include debt relief for Haiti.

Given the history of the West’s predatory loan programs, this, too, would be apropos and the

morally right course of action. Debt relief for Haiti has been provided in the past, but has never

been adequate and has never been provided at a time when Haiti is economically stable enough

to move forward without falling back onto foreign loans. As part of a reparations package, Haiti

would be able to fully exploit the cash component of the package and, as Rwanda demonstrated,

replace its dependency on foreign aid and loans with a sustainable development model. A final

note is that any reparations package should be provided directly to Haiti and for Haitians, not

funnelled through NGOs, for example, for their salaries and other expenses. Haitians must decide

for themselves, if reparations are paid, how the money will be used and controlled.

393
Bibliography
Government Documents and Sources

Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, Kingston, Ontario, Canada.

Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, Canada.

Code Rural d’Haiti. 1863. https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00004195/00001/38j

Harry S Truman Library and Museum. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/

The Rural Code of Haiti in French and English. (London: McMillan, 1827.
https://books.google.ca/books.

Comptroller General of the United States.

United States Army Judge Advocate General’s School, Law and Military Operations in Haiti,
1994-1995: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates, Charlottesville: Centre for Law and Military
Operations, 11 December 1995.

United States Center for Army Lessons Learned.

United States Code. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text.

United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Haiti and Santa Domingo, Inquiry into
Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo by the United States Senate Select
Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th Cong., 1st sess., 1921, S. Doc. 112,
https://archive.org/details/inquiryintooccu00conggoog/page/n7.

United States Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Finance: Sale of Foreign
Bonds or Securities in the US, 72nd Cong, Part 4, January 27 and February 10, 1932, S. Res. 19.

United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State Dispatch
series. https://1997-2001.state.gov/publications/dispatch/index.html.

United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Foreign Relations of the United
States” series [cited as FRUS throughout]. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-
76ve10/ch12.

United States Geological Survey. http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/navassa.

United States Marine Corps Archives, Quantico, Virginia.

United States National Archives, Washington D.C. https://www.archives.gov/

394
United States Naval History and Heritage Command. https://www.history.navy.mil/.

International Organizations

Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Conditions Prior to the June 1995 Elections, 1 June 1995.
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7f14.html.

International Monetary Fund. https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm.

Organization of American States (OAS) Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, SG/UPD-
1194/00, “The Election Observation Mission for the Legislative, Municipal and Local Elections
in Haiti February to July, 2000,” 12 December 2000.
www.oas.org/sap/docs/permanent_council/2000/cp_doc_3383_00_eng.pdf.

United Nations (UN) Archives and Records Management Section (online), New York.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), “United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” 2008.

UN Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti,
New York, July 1949. http://ufdc.ufl.edu.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Working Paper on
the Definition of Fundamental Education, UNESCO/2, Paris, 15 June 1956.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001797/179727eb.pdf.

UNESCO Paper entitled “Fundamental Education Project in Haiti: Working Plan,” Paris, 26 Feb
1948.

The World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/

Manuscript Collections

Digital Library of the Caribbean. www.dloc.com

Memoirs and Collected Papers

Balch, Emily Greene, ed. Occupied Haiti: Being the report of a Committee of Six disinterested
American representing organizations exclusively American, who, having personally studied
conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor the restoration of the Independence of the Negro Republic.
New York: The Writers Publishing Company, Inc., 1927.

De la Rue, Sidney. Haiti: Annual Report of the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the
Fiscal Year October 1930 – September 1931. Port-au-Prince: Service National de
l‘Enseignement Professional, 1931. http://ufdc.ufl.edu.

395
de Vastey, Baron. The Colonial System Unveiled. Translated and edited by Chris Bongie.
Liverpool: Liverpool, University Press, 2014.

Dubois, Laurent, Julia Gaffield and Michel Acacia, eds. Documents constitutionaels d’Haiti
1790-1860 / Constitutional Documents of Haiti, 1790-1860. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013.

Hunt, Gaillard, ed. The Writings of James Madison, vol.3 (1787: The Journal of the
Constitutional Convention, Part 1). New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1902.
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-3-1787.

Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen. The Rural Police: An Institution that Deserves to be Uprooted.
Translated by Max Blanchet and edited by Bryant C Freeman. University of Kansas Occasional
Paper no. 18, 1998.

Raimond, Julien. Preuves complettes et matérielles du projet des colons pour mener les colonies
a l'indépendance, tirées de leurs propres écrits; ouvrage présenté à la Commission des colonies.
Paris: l'Imprimerie de l'Union, 1795.
https://archive.org/details/preuvescomplette2763raim/page/1.

Vincent, Sténio. Sur La Route de la Seconde Independence: En Compagnie du Soldat et du

Citoyen Haïtiens. Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l’Etat, 1934.
http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00081277/00001.

Wilberforce, William, Robert Wilberforce and Samuel Wilberforce, eds. The Correspondence of
William Wilberforce, Volume 1. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1840: repr., Cambridge
University Press Edition, 2011.

Williamson, Charles T. The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 1999.

Newspapers and Magazines

AlterPresse, http://www.alterpresse.org

Associated Press. https://www.ap.org/.

BNN Bloomberg. https://bnnbloomberg.ca.

Democracy Now! https://www.democracynow.org/

Haiti Liberté. https://haitiliberte.com/

Haitian Sun. https://www.ufdc.ufl.edu

Jacobian. https://www.jacobinmag.com.

396
Jamaica Gleaner. http://jamaica-gleaner.com.

Le Nouvelliste. https://lenouvelliste.com/.

Montana Standard. https://mtstandard.com/.

Reuters. https://www.reuters.com.

The Burlington Free Press. https://www.burlingtonfreepress.com.

The Guardian. www.theguardian.com

The Haitian Times. https://haitiantimes.com/.

The Independent. www.independent.co.uk

The Indianapolis News. www.newspapers.library.in.gov.

The Leatherneck. https://mca-marines.org/magazines/leatherneck.

The Marine Corps Gazette. https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette.

The Multinational Monitor. www.multinationalmonitor.org.

The New York Times. www.timesmachine.nytimes.com.

The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com.

Time. https://time.com/.
Time

UNESCO The Courier. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco-courier.

Secondary Sources – Books and Articles

Abbott, Elizabeth. Haiti: Shattered Nation. New York: Overlook/Duckworth, 2011.

——. Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988.

Albert, Bill, and Adrian Graves. The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression, 1914-40.
London: Routledge, 1988.

Averill, Gage. A Day for the Hunter, a Day for the Prey: Popular Music and Power in Haiti.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Avril, Prosper. From Glory to Disgrace: The Haitian Army 1804-1994. Universal
Publishers/uPUBLISH.com, 1999.

397
Barry-Shaw, Nikolas, and Dru Oja Jay. Paved with Good Intentions: Canada’s development
NGOs from idealism to imperialism. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2012.

Beede, Benjamin, ed. The War of 1898 and US Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia. New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994.

Bell, Beverly. Fault Lines: Views across Haiti’s Divide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013.

Bellegarde-Smith, Patrick. ''Class Struggle in Contemporary Haitian Politics: An Interpretive

Study of the Campaign of 1957.'' Journal of Caribbean Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 109-27.

——. Haiti: The Breached Citadel. 2d ed. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2004.

——. In the Shadow of Powers: Dantès Bellegarde in Haitian Social Thought. 2nd ed. Nashville,
TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2019.

Blancpain, François. Un siècle de relations financières entre Haïti et la France: 1825-1922.

Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001.

Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York:
Basic Books, 2002.

Buck-Morss, Susan. Hegel, Haiti, and General History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2009.

Buss, Terry F., and Adam Gardner. Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid has failed and what
we can do about it. Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, 2008.

Casimir, Jean. La nation haïtienne et l’État. Montréal : Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018.

Chalk, Frank. “The US and the International Struggle for Rubber:1914-1941.” PhD diss.,
University of Wisconsin (Madison), 1970.

Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case
Studies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990.

Chetail, Vincent, ed. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009.

Chomsky, Noam. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. New York:
Holt Paperbacks, 2006.

Connaughton, Richard M. Peacekeeping and Military Intervention. The Occasional No. 3.

Surrey, U.K.: The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1992.

398
Crocker, Chester, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Leashing the Dogs of War:
Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2007.

Davis, Harold P. Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti. New York: Lincoln MacVeigh – The
Dial Press, 1928.

Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. Evaluating Peace Operations. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2010.

Dorman, Andrew M., and Thomas G. Otte, eds. Military intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy
to Humanitarian Intervention. Dartmouth, 1995.

Dubois, Laurent. Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution. Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004.

——. Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt &
Company, 2012.

Dubois, Laurent, and John Garrigus. Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804: A Brief
History with Documents. New York: Bedford/St. Martins Press, 2006.

Dupuy, Alex. The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community,
and Haiti. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007.

Fajnzylber, Pablo and J. Humberto. Remittances and Development: Lessons from Latin America.
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2008.

Farmer, Paul. Aids and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2006.

——. The Uses of Haiti. Monroe, ME: Common Courtesy Press, 2006.

Fass, Simon M. Political Economy in Haiti: The Drama of Survival. New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers, 2004.

Fatton Jr., Robert. The Roots of Haitian Despotism. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

Fennell, Thomas A. “Rubber from Haiti – A Battle against Time.” A Journal of Geography 43,
no. 4 (April 1944): 153-58.

Fick, Carolyn E. Making Haiti: Saint Domingue Revolution From Below. Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1990.

Fischer, Sibylle. Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of
Revolution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2004.

399
Fletcher, Henry Prather. “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Jul. 1930), 533-548.

Freeman, Bryant, ed. “Dosye Chèf Seksyon,” University of Kansas Occasional Paper No. 10,
1995.

Frostin, Charles. Les révoltes blanches de Saint-Domingue aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Haiti
avant 1789). Paris: L’École, 1975.

Gaffield, Julia. Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Gaillard, Gusti-Klara. L’Expérience Haitienne de la Dette Extérieure ou une production caféière

pillée : 1875-1915. Imprimerie Henri Deschamps, 1990.

Gaillard, Roger. Les Blancs débarquent tome VI: 1918-1919: Charlemagne Péralte, le Caco.
Éditions Roger Gaillard, 1930.

Galambos, Louis, and Daun Van Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The
Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol 19. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

García Mu�íz, Humberto. 2010. Sugar and power in the Caribbean: The South Porto Rico Sugar
Company in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, 1900-1921. San Juan, La Editorial
Universidad de Puerto Rico, 2010.

Garrigus, John D. Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Geggus, David, ed. Haitian Revolutionary Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

Ghachem, Malick W. The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012.

Girard, Philippe. Paradise Lost: Haiti’s Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to
Third World Hotspot. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

——. Haiti: The Tumultuous History - From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

——. The Slaves Who Defeated Napoleon. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2011.

Gonzalez, Johnhenry. Maroon Nation: A History of Revolutionary Haiti. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2019.

Goodman, Amy, ed. Getting Haiti Right This Time: The US and the Coup. Monroe, ME:
Common Courage Press, 2004.

400
Greene, Anne. The Catholic Church in Haiti: Political and Social Change. East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press, 1993.

Griggs, Earl Leslie, and Clifford H. Prator, eds. Henry Christophe and Thomas Clarkson: A
Correspondence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952.

Hallward, Peter. “An Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide.” London Review of Books 29, no. 4
(February 2007): 9-13.

——. Damming the Flood: Haiti and the Politics of Containment. London: Verso, 2007.

Healy, David. Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The US Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916.
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1976.

Heine, Jorge, and Andrew Thompson, eds. Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond. New York:
UN University Press, 2011.

Heinl, Jr., Robert D., and Nancy G. Heinl. Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People,
1492-1971. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978.

Herwig, Holger H. Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-
1941. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976.

Hobsbawm, Eric. Bandits. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1969.

Hunt, Alfred N. Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano of the

Caribbean. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988.

James, Cyril L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution.
3rd ed. New York: Random House, Inc., 1989.

Jeongi, Ho-Won. Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process. London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Kelsey, Carl. “The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.” The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (March 1922): 109-202.

King, Stewart R. Blue Coat or Powdered Wig: Free People of Color in Pre-Revolutionary Saint
Domingue. Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2001.

Laguerre, Michel G. The Military and Society in Haiti. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee
Press, 1993.

Largey, Michael. Vodou Nation: Haitian Art, Music and Cultural Nationalism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2006.

401
Lentz, Harris M. Heads of States and Governments since 1945. London: Routledge, 1996.

Leyburn, James G. The Haitian People. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

Lundahl, Mats. Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti. New York: Routledge Revivals, 2015.

MacKenzie, Charles. Notes on Haiti Made during a Residence in that Republic. London: Henry
Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830.

Marcella, Gabriel. Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and
Exit. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1994.

Martínez, Samuel. Peripheral Migrants: Haitians and Dominican Republic Sugar Plantations.
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1995.

Matthewson, Tim. A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations During the Early
Republic. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003.

Mazzel, Julie. Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How paramilitary groups emerge and
challenge democracy in Latin America. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

McCrocklin, James H. Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training
by the United States Marine Corps. Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Company, Inc., 1956.

Métraux, Alfred. Voodoo in Haiti. New York: Pantheon, 1989.

Millspaugh, Arthur C. Haiti under American Control. Westport, Connecticut: Negro University
Press, 1931.

Mintz, Steven, ed. African American Voices: A Documentary Reader, 1619-1877. Oxford:
Brandywine Press, 2009.

Morilla, Antonio, Kyoung-Jin Yoon, and Jeffrey J. Zimmerman, eds. Trends in Emerging Viral
Infections of Swine. Ames: Iowa State Press, 2002.

Munro, Dana G. The five republics of Central America: their political and economic
development and their relations to the US New York: Oxford University Press, 1918

——. . “The American Withdrawal from Haiti, 1929-1934.” The Hispanic American Historical
Review 49, no. 1 (Feb. 1969): 1-26.

Murphy, Craig N. The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Nicholls, David. “Politics and Religion in Haiti.” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue
canadienne de science politique 3, no. 3 (Sep,1970): 400-414.

402
——. Haiti in Caribbean Context: Ethnicity, Economy and Revolt. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1985.

——. From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti. New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1996.

North, Douglass C. The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1961.

Pamphile, Leon D. Haitians and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy and Hope.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001.

——. Clash of Cultures: America’s Educational Strategies in Occupied Haiti, 1915-1934.

Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2008.

Pachoński, Jan, and Reuel K. Wilson. Poland's Caribbean Tragedy: A Study of Polish Legions in
the Haitian War of Independence 1802-1803. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Perusse, Roland I. Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991-1995. Lanham: University Press of

America, Inc., 1995.

Pezzullo, Ralph. Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy. Jackson:
University Press of Mississippi, 2010.

Pierre, Guy. Histoire de la banque en Haïti. Montreal: CIDIHCA Publishing, 2019.

Pierre, Hyppolite. Haiti, Rising Flames from Burning Bushes: Haiti the Phoenix. Lanham:
University Press of America, 2006.

Plummer, Brenda Gayle. Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1988.

——. Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment. Athens: The University of
Georgia Press, 1992.

Podur, Justin. Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Polyné, Millery, ed. The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Crisis and Development. Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis Press, 2013.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics
49, no. 2 (January 1997): 155-83.

403
Quinn, Kate and Paul Sutton, eds. Politics and Power in Haiti. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013.

René, Jean-Alix. “Le Culte de l'égalité : une exploration du processus de formation de l'État et de
la politique populaire en Haïti au cours de la première moitié du dix-neuvième siècle (1804-
1846)." PhD diss., Concordia University, 2014.

——. Haiti après l’esclavage : formation de l’État et culture politique populaire (1804-1846),
(Port-au-Prince, Imp. Le Natal, 2019).

Renda, Mary A. Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-
1940. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Ridgeway, James. The Haiti Files: Decoding the Crisis. Washington D.C: Essential Books,
1994.

Robins, Nicholas, and Adam Jones, eds. Genocide by the Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in
Theory and Practice. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Röder, Anne Friederike, Misha Pinkhasov, Laura Boutin, and Phyllis Flick,
eds. “Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States.” (Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation and Development Publishing, 2006), 17.

Schiller, Nina Glick, and Georges Fouron. Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-Distance
Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001.

Schmidt, Hans. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1995.

Schwartz, Timothy T. Travesty in Haiti: A true account of Christian missions, orphanages, food
aid, fraud and drug trafficking. BookSurge Publishing, 2010.

Sepinwall, Alyssa Goldstein, ed. Haitian History: New Perspectives. New York: Routledge,
2013.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics
of Nationalism. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977.

Shannon, Magdaline W. Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite and the American Occupation, 1915-
1935. New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996.

Sheller, Mimi. Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti and
Jamaica. Gainesville, FL: The University of Florida Press, 2000.

Smith, Matthew J. Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934-
1957. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

404
Sprague, Jeb. Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti. New York: Monthly
Review Press, 2012.

Stavrianakis, Anna, and Jan Selby, eds. Militarism and International Relations: political
economy, security and theory. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Stedman, Stephen J. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security 22, no. 2
(Autumn 1997), 5-53.

Stotzky, Irwin P. Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promise of Deliberative Democracy.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Svinth, Joseph R. Martial Arts in the Modern World. Westport: Praeger, 2003.

Swindells, Felicia. “U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction under Article 41 and 55 of the U.N.
Charter,” Fordham International Law Journal 20, no. 5 (1996): 1880-1960.

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

Thorpe, George C. “American Achievements in Santo Domingue, Haiti, and Virgin Islands.” The
Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (Jul 1920): 63-86.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism.
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990.

Ulysse, Gina Athena. Why Haiti Needs New Narratives: A Post-Quake Chronicle. Middletown,
Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2015.

Weinstein, Brian, and Aaron Segal. Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural Successes. New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1984.

Widner, Jennifer. “Courts and Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s

Perspective on the African Case.” American Journal of International Law 95, no. 1 (January
2001), 64-75.

Wirkus, Faustin E., and Taney K. Dudley. The White King of La Gonave. Garden City, N.Y:
Doubleday, Doran & Coy Inc., 1931.

Secondary Sources – Online Books and Articles

Alcenat, Westenley. “The Case for Haitian Reparations.” Jacobin, January 14, 2017.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/haiti-reparations-france-slavery-colonialism-debt/.

Alexis, Yveline. “Nationalism and the Politics of Historical Memory: Charlemagne Paratle’s
Rebellion against US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1986.” PhD diss., University of Massachusetts
Amherst, May 2011. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations/AAI3461973.

405
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. Verso: London, 1983. Reprinted by Verso: 2006. Available online,
https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/SOC571E/um/Anderson_B_-
_Imagined_Communities.pdf.

Anderson, Eric. “Black Émigrés: The Emergence of Nineteenth-Century United States Black
Nationalism in Response to Haitian Emigration and Colonization, 1816-1840.” 49th Parallel 1.
http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue1/anderson.htm.

"An Editorial." Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (1964), 1-4.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/422802.

Angulo, A.J. “Education during the American Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934.” Historical
Studies in Education 22, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 1-17. www.historicalstudiesineducation.ca.

Anonymous. “The Chronicle of the Marines.” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 3 (Sep 1922): 315.
https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette.

Anonymous. "The Haitien Gendarmerie.” Marine Corps Gazette 11, no. 2 (June 1926): 75-6.
https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette.

“Another Blow for Haiti: A Sugar Mill Closes.,” The New York Times, April 12 1987.
www.nytimes.com.

“Aristide says US deposed him in “coup d’etat.” CNN International, March 2, 2004.
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/03/01/aristide.claim/.

Arthus, Wien Weibert. “The Omnipresence of Communism in the US-Haitian Relations under
Eisenhower and Duvalier.” George Washington University 23 April 2010.
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/Arthus_cwc.pdf.

——. “De l'affrontement à la reconciliation: François Duvalier et l'Église catholique (1957-

1971),” Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses 1, no. 29 (2014): 61-82
https://www.cairn.info/revue-histoire-monde-et-cultures-religieuses-2014-1-page-61.htm.

——. “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War: Kennedy Facing the
Duvalier Dilemma.” Diplomatic History 39, no. 3 (2015): 504-31.
https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu001.

Averill, Gage. “Haitian Dance Bands, 1915-1970: Class, Race, and Authenticity.” Latin
American Music Review 10, no. 2 (Autumn - Winter, 1989): 203-35.
https://openmusiclibrary.org/article/72304/.
Ayittey, George B. N. “The Non-Sustainability of Rwanda’s Economic Miracle,” Journal of
Management and Sustainability 7, no. 2 (2017): 88-104. http://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v7n2p88.

406
Barakat, Sultan, Margaret Chard, and Richard Jones. "Attributing Value: Evaluating Success and
Failure in Post-War Reconstruction." Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4/5 (2005): 831-52.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500128063.

Baur, John E. “International Repercussions of the Haitian Revolution.” The Americas 26, no. 4
(Apr 1970): 394-418. https://www.jstor.org/stable/980183.

Beams, Nick. “IMF "mistakes" part of a long-developed program.” World Socialist Web Site,
International Committee of the Fourth International, January 22, 1999.
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/1999/01/imf-j22.html.

Beard, John Reilly. Toussaint L’Ouverture: A Biography and Autobiography. Boston: James
Redpath, 1863. https://books.google.ca/books.

Bell, Beverly. “In Haiti, Land Reform as a Pillar of Reconstruction.” World Pulse, 03 March
2011. https://www.worldpulse.com/community/users/beverly-bell/posts/15169.

Bellegarde, Dantès. L’occupation américaine d’Haïti: Ses conséquences morales et

économiques. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1929. Reprint, Les Editions Fardin, 2019.
http://classiques.uqac.ca.

——. La résistance haïtienne (L'occupation américaine d'Haïti): Recit d'histoire contemporaine.

Montréal: Les Éditions Beauchemin, 1937. http://classiques.uqac.ca.

——. “The Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity.” Phylon (1940-1956) 1, no. 4

(4th Quarter, 1940): 327-335. https://www.jstor.org/stable/272301.

——. “Alexandre Petion: The Founder of Rural Democracy in Haiti.” Caribbean Quarterly 3,
no. 3 (December 1953): 167-73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40652580.

Bellegarde, Serge. “Navassa Island: Haiti and the US, A Matter of History and Geography.” Oct.
1998. http://windowsonhaiti.com/windowsonhaiti/navassa.shtml.

Belton, Fred. “History and Development of Haitian Fire Department.,” The Leatherneck 14, no.
7 (July 1931): 9-11. https://mca-marines.org/magazines/leatherneck.

Benomar, Jamal. 2001. “Rule of Law Technical Assistance in Haiti: Lessons Learned.” In
Empowerment, Security And Opportunity Through Law And Justice, A World Bank Conference,
July 8-12, Saint Petersburg, Russia.
http://haiticci.undg.org/uploads/Lessons%20Learned%20Justice_2001.pdf.

Bergholz, Max. “Thinking the Nation: Reappraising Benedict Anderson’s Contribution to the
Study of Nationalism.” American Historical Review 123, no. 2 (April 2018): 518-528.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhy002.

407
Bimberg Jr., Edwards. “Black Bandits of Haiti,” The Leatherneck, August 1941. https://mca-
marines.org/magazines/leatherneck/.

Blackburn, Robin. “Haiti, Slavery, and the Age of the Democratic Revolution.” The William and
Mary Quarterly 53, no. 4 (Oct 06): 643-74. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4491574.

Blaschke, Sean, Andrew Lucas Cramer, Marcy Hersh, Carina Lakovits, Leila Makarechi,
Alejandro, and Gomez Palma. “Haiti: A Future beyond Peacekeeping.” Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs, 2009.
http://new.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/UNSP_Haiti.pdf.

Blassingame, John W. "The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican
Republic, 1904-1920." Caribbean Studies 9, no. 2 (1969): 27-43. http://www.jstor.org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/25612127.

Blomqvist, Hans C., and Mats Lundahl. The Distorted Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781403914347.

Borst, Julia. “Re-Thinking the Haitian Other ‘in Relation’ as ‘prochain’: A Reading of Édourard
Glissant and Lyonel Trouillot.” Journal of Haitian Studies 19, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 139-162.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/24344215.

Breathett, George. “Catholic Missionary Activity and the Negro Slave in Haiti.” Phylon 23, no. 3
(Third Quarter, 1962): 278-285. https://www.jstor.org/stable/273808.

Brinkerhoff, David W., and Arthur A. Goldsmith. “The Challenge of administrative reform in
post-Duvalier Haiti: efficiency, equity and the prospects for systemic change.” International
Review of Administrative Sciences 54, (1988): 89-114.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002085238805400104.

Brodine, Charles E. Jr. “The Navy’s Campaign against the West Indian Pirates.” US Navy Naval
History and Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil.

Buss, Terry F. “Foreign Aid and The Failure of State Building In Haiti Under The Duvaliers,
Aristide, Préval, And Martelly.” WIDER Working Paper 2013/104 Helsinki: UNU-WIDER,
2013. https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/foreign-aid-and-failure-state-building-haiti-under-
duvaliers-aristide-pr%C3%A9val-and.

Campbell, Carl. “Education and Society in Haiti 1804-1843.” Caribbean Quarterly 50, no. 4
Haiti – Essays in honour of the Bicentenary of Independence 1804-2004 (Dec. 2004): 14-24.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40654476.

Carey, Henry F. “The Third US Intervention and Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament.” Journal of
Haitian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 88-111. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41715292.

408
Casey, Matthew. “’Haitian Habits’ or Occupation Policies? Harris Lifschitz and the unevenness
of State Building in Haiti, 1898-1921.” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 121-51.
https://doi.org/10.1353/jhs.2016.0008.

Castor, Suzy. L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 3e éd. Port-au-Prince, Haïti: CRESFED, 1988.
http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/Castor_Suzy/Occupation_americaine_Haiti/Occupation_
americaine_Haiti.html.

——. “Democracy and Society in Haiti: Structures of Domination and Resistance to Change.”
Social Justice 19, No. 4 (50), Latin America Faces the 21st Century (Winter 1992): 126-37.
www.jstor.org/stable/29766719.

Chalk, Frank. "The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia." Canadian
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 1, no. 1 (1967): 12-32.
doi:10.2307/483972.

——. "Du Bois and Garvey Confront Liberia: Two Incidents of the Coolidge Years." Canadian
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 1, no. 2 (1967): 135-42.
doi:10.2307/483527.

Chenet, Jean-Baptiste. ʺMouvements populaires et Partis politiques (1986-1996) : la

restructuration manquée de l'ordre politique agonisant.ʺ PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne
Nouvelle, Paris, 2011. https://www.theses.fr/2011PA030079.

Chochotte, Marvin. “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the
Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti.” PhD Diss., University of Michigan, 2017.
http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/137077.

Chomsky, Noam, “Democracy Restored,” Z Magazine, November 1994.

http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199411--.htm.

Clark, George P. “The Role of the Haitian Volunteers at Savannah in 1779: An Attempt at an
Objective View.” Phylon 41, no. 4 (1980): 356-366. https://www.jstor.org/stable/274860.

Clément, Job B. “History of Education in Haiti: 1804-1915 (First Part).” Revista de Historia de
América, no. 87 (Jan-Jun 1979): 141-181. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20139316.

Clitandre, Nadège T. “Haitian Exceptionalism in the Caribbean and the Project of Rebuilding
Haiti.” Journal of Haitian Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 146-53. www.jstor.org/stable/41715438.

Cloutier, Jean-Pierre. “HASCO Closes its Doors.” The Haitian Times, May 1987.
http://www.cyberie.qc.ca/jpc/haiti/hasco.html.

Cockayne, James. “The Futility of Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional
Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 5
(2014): 736-739. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.901911.

409
Cochrane, Nancy, Nathan Childs, and Stacey Rosen. “Haiti’s US Rice Imports.” USDA
Economic Research Service Report RCS-16A-01, February 2016. www.ers.usda.gov.

Corbett, Bob. “1820-1843: The rule of Jean-Pierre Boyer.” July 1995.

http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/boyer.htm.

——. “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.”

http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/leftover/rubber.htm.

Conerly, Jennifer Y. “’Your Majesty’s Friend’: Foreign alliances in the Reign of Henri
Christophe.” University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations, 1625, 2013.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1625.

Constable, Pamela. “Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate.” Foreign Policy, No. 89 (Winter,
1992-1993): 175-190. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1149080.

Constas, Helen. “Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy.” American Journal of

Sociology 63, no. 4 (Jan. 1958): 400-409. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2774140.

Cook, Mercer. Education in Haiti. US Office of Education (Bulletin 1948, no. 1): 1-90.
https://www.dloc.com/UF00078360/00001/.

Cope, Robyn. ""We Are Your Neighbors": Edwidge Danticat's New Narrative for Haiti." Journal
of Haitian Studies 23, no. 1 (2017): 98-118. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44478374.

Cunningham, Oliver. “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of
‘Building Back Better'.” The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 4 (Summer
2012): 101-26.
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=advancedintlstudies.

Dash, J. Michael. “Marvellous Realism – The Way out of Negritude.” Caribbean Studies 13, no.
4 (Jan 1974): 57-70. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25612571.

Davis, H.P. Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti. New York: Lincoln MacVeigh – The Dial
Press, 1928. https://archive.org/details/blackdemocracyth008705mbp/page/n7.

Debien, Gabriel. “Le Marronage aux Antilles Françaises au XVIIIe siècle.” Caribbean Studies 6,
no. 3 (Oct 1966) : 3-43. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25611959.

Dejean, Paul. Haïti: alerte, on tue! Montréal: Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 1993.
http://classiques.uqac.ca.

Derby, Lauren. “Haitians, Magic, and Money: Raza and Society in the Haitian-Dominican
Borderlands, 1900 to1937.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 36, no. 3 (July 1994):
488-526. https://www.jstor.org/stable/179294.

410
De Young, Maurice. "Class Parameters in Haitian Society." Journal of Inter-American Studies 1,
no. 4 (1959): 449-58. doi:10.2307/165119.

Diamond, Larry. "The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State." Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 2 (2008): 36-48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032579.

Dickinson, Laura A. “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” American Journal of International Law
97, no. 2 (April 2003), 295-310. https://doi.org/10.2307/3100105.

Donais, Timothy. “Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti,” Civil Wars, Vol.
7, No. 3 (Autumn 2005), 270-87. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698280500424112.

Dorn, A. Walter. “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in

Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07.” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (2006-07): 805-835,
DOI: 10.1080/02684520903320410.

Douglas, Paul H. “The American Occupation of Haiti II.” Political Science Quarterly 42, no. 3
(Sep., 1927: 368-396. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2143127.

Doyle, Mark. “Haiti cholera victims threaten to sue the UN.” BBC News, 08 May 2013.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22458006.

Dubois, Laurent, “’Our Three Colors:’ The King, the Republic and the Political Culture of Slave
Revolution in Saint-Domingue.” Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 29, no. 1 Slavery
and Citizenship in the Age of the Atlantic Revolutions (Spring 2003): 83-102.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41299261.

Dziedzic, Michael and Robert M. Perito. “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince.” US
Institute of Peace Special Report 208, Summer 2008.
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr208.pdf.

Edmond, Yanique M., Suzanne M. Randolph, and Guylaine L. Richard. “The Lakou System: A
Cultural, Ecological Analysis of Mothering in Rural Haiti.” The Journal of Pan African Studies
2, no. 1 (November 2007): 19-32.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242689840_The_Lakou_System_A_Cultural_Ecologic
al_Analysis_of_Mothering_in_Rural_Haiti.

Efron, Edith. “The ‘New Movement’ in Haiti.” Caribbean Quarterly 4, no. 1 (Jan 1955): 14-31.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40652613.

Etienne, Henry F. “Land Rights, Land Tenure, and Urban Recovery: Rebuilding post-earthquake
Port-au-Prince and Léogâne.” Oxfam America Research Backgrounder series, 2012.
www.oxfamamerica.org.

411
Farmer, Paul, Mary Smith Fawzi C., and Patrice Nevil. "Unjust Embargo of Aid for Haiti." The
Lancet 361, no. 9355 (Feb 01, 2003): 420-3. doi:http://dx.doi.org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1016/S0140-6736(03)12380-X.

Fatton Jr., Robert. "The Haitian Authoritarian "Habitus" and the Contradictory Legacy of
1804." Journal of Haitian Studies 10, no. 1 (2004): 22-43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41715234.

——. “Killing Haitian Democracy.” Jacobin, Issue 17 (2015). https://www.jacobinmag.com.

Fabien Gaveau. “De la sûreté des campagnes. Police rurale et demandes d'ordre en France dans
la première moitié du XIXe siècle.” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 4,
no. 2 (2000): 53-76. http://journals.openedition.org/chs/824.

Fick, Carolyn E. “Emancipation in Haiti: From plantation labour to peasant proprietorship.”

Slavery and Abolition 2, no. 2 (Aug 2000): 11-40. https://doi.org/10.1080/01440390008575304.

Fistein, David. “Theory and the Social Revolution in Haiti.” Journal of Haitian Studies 15, no.
1/2 (Spring/Fall 09): 180-202. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41715159.

Freeman, Bryant C., ed. “Strategy of Aristide Government for Social and Economic
Reconstruction,” University of Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies Occasional Paper No. 4,
August 1994
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6b10/29c824f69dfc35617b81e83e80b2cd275d5c.pdf.

“From Thomas Jefferson to St. George Tucker, 28 August 1797.” Founders Online, National
Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-
0405.

Gaertner, Phillip. “Whether Pigs have Wings: African Swine Fever Eradication and Pig
Repopulation in Haiti.” Stretch, (Fall 1990).
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/misctopic/pigs/gaertner.htm.

Gaffield, Julia. “Complexities of Imagining Haiti: A Study of National Constitutions, 1801-

1807.” Journal of Social History 41, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 81-103.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25096441.

Gaffield, Julia. “Race and the Haitian Constitution of 1805.” Unique at penn.
https://uniqueatpenn.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/race-and-the-haitian-constitution-of-1805.

Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3
(1969): 167-191. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422690.

Garraway, Dorris. "Race, Reproduction and Family Romance in Moreau De Saint-MÉry's

Description...de La Partie Française De L'isle Saint-Domingue." Eighteenth-Century Studies 38,
no. 2 (2005): 227-46. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30053766.

412
Garrigus, John D. “Catalyst or Catastrophe? Saint-Domingue's Free Men of Color and the Battle
of Savannah, 1779-1782.” Revista/Review Interamericana 22, nos. 1 & 2 (1992): 109-25.
https://www.academia.edu/22450901/Catalyst_or_Catastrophe_Saint-
Domingue_s_Free_Men_of_Color_and_the_Savannah_Expedition_1779-1782.

Gerlus, Jean-Claude. "The Effects of the Cold War on US-Haiti's Relations." Journal of Haitian
Studies 1, no. 1 (1995): 34-56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41715031.

Girard, Philippe. “Caribbean genocide: racial war in Haiti, 1802-4.” Patterns of Prejudice 39, no.
2 (2005): 138-161 https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220500106196.

Gonzalez, Johnhenry. “Defiant Haiti: Free-Soil Runaways, Ship Seizures and the Politics of
Diplomatic Non-Recognition in the Early Nineteenth Century.” Slavery & Abolition: A Journal
of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 36, no. 1 (2015): 124-35.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2014.895508.

Greene, Brian W. “Peacebuilding in Haiti: A Progress Report.” DRDC CORA Technical

Memorandum 2009-007, January 2009. http://cradpdf.drdc-
rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc84/p531532.pdf.

Gros, Jean-Germain. “Indigestible Recipe: Rice, Chicken Wings, and International Financial
Institutions, or Hunger Politics in Haiti.” Journal of Black Studies 40, no. 5 (May 2010): 974-
986. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40648617.
Haggerty, Richard A. ed., Haiti: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1989. http://countrystudies.us/haiti/.

“Haiti France and the $40B Elephant” France24, April 9, 2010 at

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIcJWlcKKEg

“Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State.” International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing
no. 12, 30 October 2006. www.crisisgroup.org

“Haiti's Latest Coup: Structural Adjustment and the Struggle for Democracy. An interview with
Camille Chalmers.” The Multinational Monitor 18, no. 5 (May 1997): 20.
https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-19679954/haiti-s-latest-coup-structural-adjustment-and-
the.

“Haiti’s Soldier Chief: Antonio Thrasybule Kebreau.” The New York Times, Sep 28, 1957.
https://www.nytimes.com/1957/09/28/archives/haitis-soldier-chief-antonio-thrasybule-
kebreau.html.

Hall, Thomas I. and Columbus Gordon. The Navassa Island Plot: Illustrated. 1st ed. Baltimore:
The American Job Office, 1889. https://archive.org/details/navassaislandrio00gali/page/n3.

Hector, Michel. Crises et mouvements populaires en Haïti. Montréal: Les Éditions du CIDIHCA,
2000.

413
http://classiques.uqac.ca/contemporains/HECTOR_Michel/Crises_et_mouvements_pop_en_Hait
i/Crises_et_mouvements_pop_en_Haiti.html.

Henlon, Sheree Alicia. “The Black Pariah: Representation of Haiti and Haitians in nineteenth
Century Literature of the Hispanic Caribbean.” PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2007.

Henwood, Doug. “Impeccable Logic Trade, Development and Free Markets in the Clinton Era.”
Report on the Americas 26, no. 5 (May 1993): 23-28. DOI: 10.1080/10714839.1993.11723044

Ho, Timothy J.G. “Ordering Disorder: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of International

Civilian Police Training in Haiti, 1994-2001.” MA thesis. Royal Roads University, 2009.
https://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/thesescanada/vol2/002/MR50407.PDF.

Holly. Alonzo Potter Burgess. "Our Future Relations with Haiti." The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 156 (1931): 110-15.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1018245.

Howe, Frederic C. "Dollar Diplomacy and Financial Imperialism under the Wilson
Administration." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 68
(1916): 312-20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1013101.

Ivy, James W. "THE WISDOM OF THE HAITIAN PEASANT: OR SOME HAITIAN

PROVERBS CONSIDERED." Negro History Bulletin 4, no. 9 (1941): 197-210.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/44246119.

James, Jennifer C. ""Buried in Guano": Race, Labor, and Sustainability." American Literary
History 24, no. 1 (2012): 115-42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41329630.

Janvier, Louis-Joseph. Les Constitutions d'Haïti. Paris, Marpon et Flammarion, 1886.

http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ht1805.htm#9.

Jefferies, Judson. “The United States and Haiti: An Exercise in Intervention.” Caribbean
Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 2001): 71-94. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40654238.

Jenkins, Karen. “Traumatized Societies: Social Cubism and the Predatory State of Haiti.” ILSA
Journal of International and Comparative Law 8, no.3 (Summer 2002): 901-918.
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/51092312.pdf.

Johnson, James Weldon. Self-Determining Haiti: Four articles reprinted from The Nation
embodying a report of an investigation made for the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (New York: University of Miami’s The Nation, 1920; Project Gutenberg,
2011), http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/35025.

414
Kennedy, Paul. “Freed Politician to run in Haiti.” New York Times, Dec. 17, 1956.
https://www.nytimes.com/.

Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1936.
https://cas2.umkc.edu/economics/people/facultypages/kregel/courses/econ645/winter2011/gener
altheory.pdf.

Klare, Michael T. "Militarism: The Issues Today." Bulletin of Peace Proposals 9, no. 2 (1978):
121-28. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44480629.

Kovats-Bernat, J. Christopher. "Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The
View from Port-au-Prince, 1994-2004." Anthropologica 48, no. 1 (2006): 117-39.
doi:10.2307/25605301.

Krebs, Albin. “Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty.”
The New York Times, 25 April 1971. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/23/archives/papa-doc-a-
ruthless-dictator-kept-the-haitians-in-illiteracy-and.html.

Lacerte, Robert K. "The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution, 1791-
1820." The Americas 34, no. 4 (1978): 449-59. doi:10.2307/981159.

——. "Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843." The Americas 37, no.
4 (1981): 499-515. doi:10.2307/980837.

Lahav, Pnina. "The Division of legal labour in Rual [sic] Haiti." Verfassung Und Recht in
Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 8, no. 3/4 (1975): 465-81.
www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/43108482.

Leadbeater, Jane Powell. “Structural Adjustment Programs: Mortgaging Haitian

Sovereignty.” Undercurrent 6, no. 2 (June 2009): 48–55. https://search-ebscohost-com.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=48650770&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.

Leger, J.N. Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors. New York: The Neale Publishing Company,
1907. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Haiti:_Her_History_and_Her_Detractors.

Lewis, Paul. “US Seeks Partners’ Trade Help.” The New York Times, May 14, 1979.
www.nytimes.com.

Lobb, John. "Caste and Class in Haiti." American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 1 (1940): 23-34.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2769747.

Lobeck, Elmire M. “Haiti: A Brief Survey of its Past and Present Agricultural Problems.” The
Journal of Geography 53, no. 7 (Oct 1954): 277-90.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00221345408982592.

415
Logan, Rayford W. “Education in Haiti.” The Journal of Negro History 15, no. 4 (Oct., 1930),
401-460. https://doi.org/10.2307/2714206.

—. “Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of

Haiti.” The Hispanic American Historical Review 30, no. 2 (May 1950): 242-44.
Doi:10.2307/2509516

Lundahl, Mats. “Papa Doc: Innovator in the Predatory State.” Scandia 50, no. 1 (1984): 39-78.
https://journals.lub.lu.se/index.php/scandia/article/view/907.

——. “Toussaint L’Ouverture and the War Economy of Saint-Domingue, 1796-1802.” Slavery
and Abolition 6, no. 2 (1985): 122-138. https://doi.org/10.1080/01440398508574883.

——. “Defense and distribution: Agricultural policy in Haiti during the reign of Jean-Jacques
Dessalines,1804–1806.” Scandinavian Economic History Review 32, no. 2 (2011): 77-103.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1984.10408024.

——. “The Haitian Rice Tariff.” Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and
Caribbean Studies 44, no. 1-2 (2014): 47-72. DOI: 10.16993/ibero.10

MacCorkle, William A. "The Monroe Doctrine and Its Application to Haiti." The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 54 (1914): 28-56.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1012569.

Macdonald, Isabel. “France’s debt of dishonour to Haiti.” The Guardian, August 16, 2010.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/aug/16/haiti-france.

Magloire, Gérarde. “Haitian-ness, Frenchness and History: Deconstructing the History of the
French Component of Haitian National Identity.” Journal of Haitian Studies 5, no. 6 (1999-
2000): 30-43. http://journals.openedition.org/plc/686.

Maguire, Robert. “Toward the End of Poverty in Haiti.” USIPEACE BRIEFING, 01 December
2008. www.usip.org.

Maingot, Anthony P. “Haiti: Problems of a Transition to Democracy in an Authoritarian Soft

State.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28, no. 4 (Winter 1986-1987): 75-
102. http://www.jstor.org/stable/165747

Matthewson, Tim. "Abraham Bishop, "The Rights of Black Men," and the American Reaction to
the Haitian Revolution." The Journal of Negro History 67, no. 2 (1982): 148-54.
doi:10.2307/2717572.

——. "Jefferson and Haiti." The Journal of Southern History 61, no. 2 (1995): 209-48.
doi:10.2307/2211576.

416
——. "Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti." Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 140, no. 1 (1996): 22-48. http://www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/987274.

Mayor, Federico. Letters to future generations. Paris, France: UNESCO Publishing, 1999.
www.unesco.org.

McGowan, Lisa. Democracy Undermines, Economic Justice Denied: Structural Adjustment and
the Aid Juggernaut in Haiti. Washington, D.C.: Development Group for Alternative Policies,
1997. http://www.developmentgap.org/uploads/2/1/3/7/21375820/democracy_undermined.pdf.

McGuigan, Claire. “Agricultural liberalization in Haiti.” Christian Aid, March 2006.

https://www.christianaid.ie/sites/default/files/2017-08/agricultural-liberalisation-haiti-january-
2006.pdf.

Mende, Tibor. "Marbial Valley Project." Caribbean Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1951): 18-21.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40652531.

Mendelson-Forman, Johanna. “Security sector reform in Haiti.” International Peacekeeping 13,

no. 1 (March 2006): 14-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500424629.

Merilus, Jean-Yves. “Rural Development: The Economic Potentials of Haiti’s ‘Lakou’ System.”
Focus on Geography 58, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 36-45. https://doi.org/10.1111/foge.12047.

Métraux, Alfred, Edouard Berrouet, Suzanne Comhaire-Sylvain, and Jean Comhaire-Sylvain.

1951. “Making A Living In The Marbial Valley, Haiti.” Occasional Papers In Education. Paris:
UNESCO. https://ehrafworldcultures.yale.edu/document?id=sv03-011.

Michel, Claudine. "Of Worlds Seen and Unseen: The Educational Character of Haitian
Vodou." Comparative Education Review 40, no. 3 (1996): 280-94.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1189105.

Miller, LtCol Charles J., USMC. "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experience in Santo Domingo, part 1,”
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Feb 1935), 43-50. https://mca-
marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette/.

Mitchell, Christopher. “US Policy toward Haitian Boat People, 1972-93,” The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534, no. 1 (Jul 1994): 69-80. https://doi-
org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1177%2F0002716294534001006

Mobekk, Eirin. “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti.” Democratization 8, no. 3 (Sep 2010):

173-188. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000212.

Mobekk, Eirin, and Anne M. Street. “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: What
role should the EU play in Haiti? Recommendations for change,” act!onaid international,
October 2006.

417
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A2BEE0BF248937FBC12571FC0036E2A
3-actionaid-hti-03oct.pdf

Mobekk, Eirin, and Spyros I. Spyrou. "Re‐evaluating IMF involvement in low‐income countries:
the case of Haiti." International Journal of Social Economics 29, no. 7 (2002): 527-37.
https://doi.org/10.1108/03068290210431551.

Mohamed, Saira. “From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A Proposal for a Revitalized United
Nations Trusteeship Council.” Columbia Law Review 105, no. 3 (Apr. 2005): 809-40.
www.jstor.org/stable/4099479.

Moreau de Saint-Méry, M.L.E. Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et

historique de la partie française de l’Isle Saint-Domingue. Philadelphia, 1789.
https://archive.org/details/descriptiontopog00more/page/n5.

Morley, Morris, and Chris McGillion. ""Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of
Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti." Political Science Quarterly 112, no.
3 (1997): 363-84. doi:10.2307/2657562.

Mullings, Beverly, Marion Werner, and Linda Peake. “Fear and Loathing in Haiti: Race and
Politics of Humanitarian Dispossession.” ACME: An international E-Journal for Critical
Geography 9, No. 3 (2010): 282-300.

Nesbitt, Nick. "The Idea of 1804." Yale French Studies, no. 107 (2005): 6-38.
doi:10.2307/4149310.

Nicholls, David. "Politics and Religion in Haiti." Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue
Canadienne De Science Politique 3, no. 3 (1970): 400-14. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3231868

——. "Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-46." Journal of Contemporary History 9, no.
4 (1974): 3-26. http://www.jstor.org/stable/260289.

——. "The Wisdom of Salomon: Myth or Reality?" Journal of Interamerican Studies and World
Affairs 20, no. 4 (1978): 377-92. doi:10.2307/165442.

——. ."Haiti: The Rise and Fall of Duvalierism." Third World Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 1239-
252. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991713.

Nicholls, David, and Ch. Carlier. "Idéologie Et Mouvements Politiques En Haïti, 1915-
1946." Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 30, no. 4 (1975): 654-79.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27579526.
Ocampo, Alex. “Paul Farmer on Working With, Not For, Developing Nations,” The Disease
Daily, July 13, 2012. www.diseassedaily.org.

Ǿsterud, Ǿyvind. “The Class Quality of Peasantry: A Conceptual Exploration.” Scandinavian

Political Studies 11, no. A11 (January 1976): 35-50. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9477.1976.tb00444.x.
418
Ottaway, Marina. “Nation Building,” Foreign Policy 132 (September-October 2002).
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183443.

Owen, David. "The United Nations Program of Technical Assistance." The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 270 (1950): 109-17.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1028004.

Parker, Tom. The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalizing the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st
Century. Sandvika, Norway: Centre for European and Asian Studies at the Norwegian School of
Management, 2003. https://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/centre-for-european-and-asian-
studies/pdf/03-03the_ultimate_intervention.pdf.

Pauléus Sannon, Horace. Histoire de Toussaint-Louverture, Tome III. Port-au-Prince: A.A.

Héraux, 1933. http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00008866/00003.

Paulino, Edward. Dividing Hispaniola: The Dominican Republic's Border Campaign against
Haiti, 1930-1961. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19rmcbb.

Payton, Claire A. “The City and the State: Construction and the Politics of Dictatorship in Haiti
(1957-1986).” PhD diss. Duke University, 2018. https://hdl.handle.net/10161/16865.

——. “Building Corruption in Haiti.” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 2, (2019): 184-
187. https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2019.1617488.

Peterson, Merrill, ed. Thomas Jefferson Writings (New York: Literary Classics of the US, 1984),
1098.
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/st-domingue-haiti#footnote30_qt0o4c3

Phillips, Anthony. “Haiti, France and the Independence Debt of 1825.” The Canada-Haiti
Information Project, 4. https://canada-
haiti.ca/sites/default/files/Haiti,percent20Francepercent20andpercenttwentiethepercent20Indepen
dencepercent20Debtpercent20ofpercent201825_0.pdf.

Pierre, Michaelle. “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island: a case study.” World Maritime University
Dissertation 474, 2014.
https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1473&context=all_dissertations.

Plummer, Brenda Gayle. "Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean: The Syrians in Haiti,
1903-1934." The International History Review 3, no. 4 (1981): 517-39.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40105175.

——. "The Metropolitan Connection: Foreign and Semiforeign Elites in Haiti, 1900-1915." Latin
American Research Review 19, no. 2 (1984): 119-42. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2503341.

419
Posner, Walter H. "American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922." The Americas 20, no. 3 (1964): 231-
66. doi:10.2307/979070.

Pressley-Sanon, Toni. “Haitian (Pre)Occupations: Ideological and Discursive Repetitions: 1915-

1934 and 2004 to Present,” Caribbean Studies 42, no. 2 (July-December 2014): 115-153.

Price-Mars, Jean. Ainsi Parla l’Oncle: Essais d’Ethnographie. New York: Parapsychology
Foundation, Inc., 1928. Nouvelle édition, 1954.
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/price_mars_jean/ainsi_parla_oncle/ainsi_parla_oncle.pdf.

Purdeková, Andrea. “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State
Reach in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 475-97.
www.jstor.org/stable/23018902.

Quist, Hubert O. “Secondary Education – A ‘Tool’ for National Development in Ghana. A

Critical Appraisal of the Post-Colonial Context,” African Development / Afrique et
Développement 28, no. 3/4 (2003): 186-210. https://www.jstor/stable/24482700.

Ramachandran, Vijaya, and Julie Walz. "Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?" Journal of
Haitian Studies 21, no. 1 (2015): 26-65. https://muse.jhu.edu/.

Redpath, James ed. Guide to Hayti. New York: G. Woolworth Colton, 1861.
https://archive.org/details/guidetohayti00inredp.

Remy, Anselme. "The Duvalier Phenomenon." Caribbean Studies 14, no. 2 (1974): 38-65.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25612610.

Richman, Karen E. "Peasants, Migrants and the Discovery of African Traditions: Ritual and
Social Change in Lowland Haiti." Journal of Religion in Africa 37, no. 3 (2007): 371-97.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27594423.

Roberts, Shearon. "Then and Now: Haitian Journalism as Resistance to US Occupation and US-
Led Reconstruction." Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (2015): 241-68.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43741129.

Rosenberg, Emily S. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural
Expansion, 1890-1945 New York City: Hill and Wang, 1982. Kindle

——. Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-
1930. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Kobo

——. “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to US Empire.” Diplomatic History 38, no.4
(2014): 852-63. https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu034.

Roy, Arundhati. “Help that hinders.” Le Monde diplomatique, Nov 2004.

https://mondediplo.com/2004/11/16roy.

420
Schmitt, John F. “Peacetime landing operations: Lessons from Haiti, 1915.” Marine Corps
Gazette 78, no. 3 (March 1994): 71-75. https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-
gazette/.

Schofield, Julian and Micah Zenko. “Designing a Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription,” Third
World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004), 677-87.

Schuller, Mark. “Haiti’s 200-Year Ménage-a-Trois: Globalization, the State, and Civil Society.”
Caribbean Studies 35, no. 1 (Jan-Jun 2007): 141-179. https://web.a.ebscohost.com/.

——. "Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti." Political and Legal

Anthropology Review 32, no. 1 (2009): 84-104. http://www.jstor.org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/24497527.

——. Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs. New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5hjfmg.

Shanin, Teodor ed. Peasant and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

Shannon, Magdaline W. "The U. S. Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti
and Its Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American Policy." Caribbean Studies 15, no. 4
(1976): 53-71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25612723.

Sheller, Mimi. “The Army of Sufferers: Peasant Democracy in the Early Republic of Haiti.”
NWIG: New West Indian Guide / Nieuwe West-Indische Gids 74, no. 1/2 (2000): 33-55.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41850025.

Sluga, Glenda. "UNESCO and the (One) World of Julian Huxley." Journal of World History 21,
no. 3 (2010): 393-418. http://www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/40985023.

Small, Melvin. "The United States and the German "Threat" to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914." The
Americas 28, no. 3 (1972): 252-70. doi:10.2307/979944.

Smith, Matthew J. "VIVE 1804!: The Haitian Revolution and the Revolutionary Generation of
1946." Caribbean Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2004): 25-41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40654477.

——. “Capture Land: Jamaica, Haiti, and the United States Occupation.” Journal of Haitian
Studies 21, No. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015), 181-206.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43741126.

Smucker, Glenn R., T. Anderson White, and Michael Bannister. “Land tenure and the adoption
of agricultural technology within Haiti.” CAPRi Working Paper 0006, Washington DC: IFPRI,
2000. http://www.capri.cgiar.org/wp/capriwp06.asp.

421
Snyder, H.W. “Butler at Fort Riviere,” Marine Corps Gazette 64, no. 11 (November 1980): 83-7.
https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette/.

Sommers, Jeffrey W. "The US Power Elite and the Political Economy of Haiti’s Occupation:
Investment, Race, and World Order." Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (2016): 46-67.
https://muse.jhu.edu/.

Stargardter, Gabriel. “General behind deadly Haiti raid takes aim at Brazil’s gangs.” World
News, November 29, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-violence-insight/general-
behind-deadly-haiti-raid-takes-aim-at-brazils-gangs-idUSKCN1NY0GM.

Steckley, Marylynn, and Yasmine Shamsi. “Manufacturing Corporate Landscapes: The Case of
Agrarian Displacement and Food (in)security in Haiti.” Third World Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2015):
179-197. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.976042.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L. "Class Conflict and Diplomacy: Haitian Isolation in the 19th-Century
World System." Sociological Perspectives 37, no. 1 (1994): 1-23. doi:10.2307/1389407.

Tegg, Thomas, ed. The London Encyclopedia: Or, Universal Dictionary of Science, Art,
Literature, and Practical Mechanics, Comprising a Popular View of the Present State of
Knowledge. Illustrated by Numerous Engravings, a General Atlas, and Appropriate Diagrams,
Volume 7, London, Thomas Tegg:1829.
https://books.google.ca/books/about/The_London_Encyclopaedia.html?id=o4FMAAAAMAAJ&
redir_esc=y

The Who. “Won’t Get Fooled Again.” 1971.

https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/who/wontgetfooledagain.html.

Théosmy, Karenine Francesca. “Haïti / États-Unis : L’histoire de Shada, reflet d’une réalité
immédiate de dépendance.” AlterPresse, 27 April 2012.
http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article12767.

Thrasher Jr., Major Thomas E. “The Taking of Fort Riviere.” Marine Corps Gazette 15, no. 4
(February 1931): 31-33, 64. https://mca-marines.org/magazines/marine-corps-gazette/.

"Tonton Makout/Tonton Makout." Callaloo 15, no. 3 (1992): 673-74. doi:10.2307/2931996.

“Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition,” International Crisis

Group, Latin American/Caribbean Report No. 44 (02 Aug 2012).
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/towards-post-minustah-haiti-making-
effective-transition.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. “The Odd and the Ordinary: Haiti, the Caribbean, and the World.”
Cimarrón: New Perspectives on the Caribbean 2, no. 3 (1990): 3–12.
https://www.zotero.org/lcyarrington/items/itemKey/MG7HUWT9.

422
——. “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” NACLA Report on the Americas 27, No. 4
(1994): 46-51. DOI: 10.1080/10714839.1994.11724636.

Turits, Richard Lee. "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the
Dominican Republic." Hispanic American Historical Review 82, no. 3 (2002): 589-635.
https://muse.jhu.edu/.

Vagts, Alfred. A History of Militarism Civilian and Military. New York: Free Press, 1959.
http://ktp.isam.org.tr/pdficn/071936ic.pdf.

Verna, Chantalle. “Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in
Fundamental Education, 1948-1953.” Diplomatic History 40, no.2. (Advance Access published
27 February 2015): 269-295 doi:10.1093/dh/dhu075.

Verner, Dorte, and Willy Egset. “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti.” World Bank
Country Study 40927, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/880861468035037608/Social-resilience-and-state-
fragility-in-Haiti

Wah, Tatiana. "Rethinking Privatization in Haiti: Implications from the Initial

Experience." Journal of Haitian Studies 3/4 (1997): 15-29. http://www.jstor.org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/41715039.

——. “Engaging the Haitian Diaspora,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 9 (Spring 2013): 56-
69. https://www.thecairoreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CR9-Wah.pdf.

Walby, Kevin, and Jeffrey Monoghan. “’Haitian Paradox’ or Dark Side of the Security-
Development Nexus? Canada’s Role in the Securitization of Haiti, 2004-2009.” Alternates:
Global, Local, Political 36, no. 4 (2011): 273-87. www.alt.sagepub.com.

Walker, III, William O. “Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic
Growth in Latin America.” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1, (January 2006): 83–117.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00539.x.

Wendt, Paul. "The Control of Rubber in World War II." Southern Economic Journal 13, no. 3
(1947): 203-27. doi:10.2307/1053336.

Wesley, Charles H. "The Struggle for the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent
Republics." The Journal of Negro History 2, no. 4 (1917): 369-83. doi:10.2307/2713395.

Whitney, Kathleen Marie. "Sin, FRAPH, and the CIA: US Covert Action in Haiti." Southwestern
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 3, no. 2 (1996): 303-331.
https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/sjlta3&div=15&id=&page=.

Whitten, Dolphus. "The Don Pacifico Affair." The Historian 48, no. 2 (1986): 255-67.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24446618.

423
Wingfield, Roland, and Vernon J. Parenton. "Class Structure and Class Conflict in Haitian
Society." Social Forces 43, no. 3 (1965): 338-47. doi:10.2307/2574763.

Winthrop, Rebecca and Elena Matsui. “A New Agenda for Education in Fragile States,” Center
for Universal Education at Brookings Working Paper 10, August 2013. www.brookings.edu.

Wirzbicki, Peter. “’The Light of Knowledge Follows the Impulse of Revolutions’: Prince
Saunders, Baron de Vastey and the Haitian Influence on Antebellum Black Ideas of Elevation
and Education.” Slavery and Abolition 36, no. 2 (Jul 2014): 275-97.
https://doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2014.941184.

424