MUHAMMAD MUSA

QUICK FACTS
Intro Pakistani general
Countries Pakistan
Occupations Autobiographer
Type Literature
Gender Male
Birth 20 October 1908 (Quetta)
Death 12 March 1991 (Quetta)

 BIOGRAPHY
General Muhammad Musa Khan Hazara (Urdu:‫ ;محمد موسى خان‬October 20, 1908– March 12,
1991), HPk, HQA, HI, HJ, MBE, was a four-star rank army general, politician, and the
Commander in Chief of Pakistan Army, serving under President Ayub Khan from 1958 until
1966.Gaining commission as an officer in the British Indian Army, he served with distinction in
the World War II on the side of United Kingdom and opted for Pakistan as an aftermath of
partition of British India in 1947. He served to command the combat brigades in war with India
over Kashmir in 1947 and eventually ascended as the Commander in Chief after the military
martial law enforced in 1958. He earned notability and public fame when he commanded the
Pakistan Army after the second war with India in 1965.Musa Khan shortly retired after the war
and embarked his career in national politics when he was appointed to serve as Governor of
West-Pakistan from 1966 until 1969. In 1985, he was appointed as Governor of Balochistan and
remained in office until he died in 1991.
  Background, early life and career
Muhammad Musa Khan was born on 20 October 1908 in Quetta, Baluchistan, British India into
a tribal Hazara family. He was of the Persian-speaking Mongol descent who belonged to a
Hazara tribal tradition. His family roots have been said to be descendants of Genghis Khan.:35–
36 His family was Sardar (lit. Chief) of Hazara Tribe and was the eldest son of Sardar Yazdan
Khan who the local Tribal chief.
After his schooling, he was recruited to the British Indian Army as a Jawan in 1926 and
eventually joined the 4th Hazara Pioneers after being promoted as the Naik– a non-
commissioned officer in the British Indian Army. He was selected to join the Indian Military
Academy at Dehra Dun as a cadet in October 1932. In 1935, he graduated from the Indian
Military Academy and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in 1935. He was said to be an
excellent sportsman and had played Hockey as a Defender.:35
In 1936, he was posted to the 6th Royal Battalion of the 13th Frontier Force Rifles as a Platoon
Commander and saw actions in the violent Waziristan campaign in 1936 till 1938. He
participated well in the World War II on the side of the United Kingdom and served well in the
Burma Campaign and North African theatre as part of the Norfolk Regiment of the British
Indian Army. In Middle East, he led the company and was listed in mentioned in despatches for
"distinguished services in the Middle East during the period February to July 1941" and in the
London Gazette 30 December 1941 as a Lieutenant and acting Major.
In 1942, his heroic action for valor won him the praise and was appointed as Member of the
Order of the British Empire (MBE) for "gallant and distinguished services in the Middle East.
In 1945, he was promoted as army captain and major in 1946 and was serving with the Machine
Gun battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles by October 1942.
After the partition of British India that followed the establishment of Pakistan in 1947, he opted
for Pakistan and joined the Pakistan Army as a staff officer. In 1947, he, as Brigadier,
commanded the 103rd Infantry Brigade based in Sialkot brigade in Kashmir and served as
commander of military units in the first war with India. In 1948, he went on to command the
52nd Infantry Brigade positioned in Quetta.
After the war in 1948, General Musa studied and graduated from the Command and Staff
College in Quetta and proceeded to attend the Imperial Defence College in United Kingdom
prior to his graduation.

 Commander-in-Chief and 1965 war

In 1950s, Musa Khan earned reputation as being respected in the officer corps for professional
competence, commanding the military formations throughout the country as officer
commanding. His commanding assignments included his role as the Chief of Staff of the East-
Pakistan Army, and also having served as GOC of 14th Infantry Division in Dhaka, East
Pakistan, in 1951. In 1952, he last field assignment included his role as commander of 8th
Infantry Division positioned in Quetta before stationed at the GHQ. In 1957, he served as the
Deputy Chief of Staff and later Chief of Staff at the Army GHQ. His career progressed well in
the army and was ascended as Commander-in-Chief by President Ayub Khan in 1958 when the
latter disposed President Iskander Mirza who imposed martial law in 1958.
Major-General Musa Khan never achieved the three-star appointment nor promotion as
Lieutenant-General was approved at the time of his nomination towards appointed as the army
chief of staff. His promotion to the four-star appointment came with controversy in the country
as many saw that his appointment was based on "dependability rather than merit." There were
three staff officers in line who were senior to Major-General Musa Khan that included: Major
General Sher Ali Pataudi, Major General Latif Khan and Major General Adam Khan– all
Sandhurst graduates of 1933.
In October 1958, Musa Khan elevated as four-star general and appointed as Commander in
Chief with Ayub Khan promoting himself as Field Marshal. President Ayub delegated the
military affairs to General Musa Khan when heading the civic government.:152 In 1960, he was
appointed to serve as the President of the Pakistan Hockey Federation which he remained in the
post until being retired in 1966. It was during his stint as president when the Hockey Team won
its first Gold Medal against the Indian Hockey Team in the Summer Olympics in Rome in
1960.:146
In 1964, he became aware of covert operation studied by the Foreign ministry led by Foreign
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and presented views against the operation due to no linkage
between the covert actions and the conventional backup. General Musa Khan also had the
support from President Ayub Khan on his views; however, the war began in 1965. General
Musa Khan did not order the Pakistan Army without the confirmation by President Ayub Khan
despite Foreign Minister Bhutto's urging.:182–183 After the Indian Army moved to the Rann of
Kutch, General Musa Khan ordered Army GHQ to responds back to Indian Army by moving
the 12th Division.:183 After viewing the aerial view of the area, General Musa controversially
relieved the GOC Akhtar Hussain Malik and handed over the command of the 12th Division to
Major-General Yahya Khan, which resulted in time delays of troop movements and eventual
failure of the operation.:25–27
About the failure due to command change, General Musa Khan justified his actions that he had
not had time to select a commander or staff despite the authority was given to him. He led and
commanded the Pakistan Army in the largest tank battle, which earned him the public fame and
nobility. His strategy based on classical trench method supported by armory, artillery and
airpower was tactically powerful and successful due it had stopped the advancing Indian Army
but politically unsuccessful due to the country being party of peace treaty brokered by the
USSR in 1965.
General Musa's military service is unique due to the fact that he had received two extension as a
Commander-in-chief from the period of 1958 till 1966. Upon his retirement, General Musa did
not recommend Yahya Khan's nomination as Commander-in-chief and Yahya's name was not
included in the list of nomination sent to President Ayub Khan; nonetheless, General Musa was
succeeded by General Yahya Khan as Commander in Chief.:725
About the war with India in 1965, General Musa provided his views and testimonies in two
books written on military history of Pakistan Army: first being the "My Version" and the
second being the "Jawan to General".

 Politics, governorship and death

At the time of his retirement in 1966, General Musa Khan was a famed and popular military
figure which led President Ayub Khan appointed him as the Governor of West Pakistan.:50–51
Such news of appointment was met with great triumph and enthusiasm by the West Pakistani
people.:50 In 1967, he became Governor of West Pakistan until submitting his resignation on 2
March 1969 when General Yahya Khan imposed martial law to takeover the presidency.:136
From 1969–84, he remained quiet and settled in Karachi while receiving military pension. In
1985, he became active in national politics on Pakistan Muslim League platform led by Prime
Minister M. K. Junejo. He was appointed as Governor of Balochistan by the President Zia-ul-
Haq after the general elections held in 1985. After the general elections held in 1988, Governor
Musa Khan controversially dissolved the provincial assembly on the then-Chief Minister
Zafarullah Khan Jamali's advice.:xxxiv
However, the Balochistan High Court restored the provincial assembly amid public
condemnation of Governor's move.:xxxiv The step towards dissolving the assembly was
believed to have been taken with the consent of the President and Prime Minister.:xxxiv
On 12 March 1991, General Musa Khan died while in office and per accordance to his wishes,
he was buried in buried in Mashhad, Razavi Khorasan, Iran. In his honor, the provincial
Balochistan government established a vocational school, the General Muhammad Musa Inter-
College (GMMIC), in Quetta, Pakistan in 1987.

Post-1965 war and views

About the war with India in 1965, General Musa provided his views and testimonies in two
books written on military history of Pakistan Army: first being the "My Version" and the second
being the "Jawan to General". General Mohammad Musa, who commanded the Army in the '65
War, gave his account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the C-in-C and the Supreme
Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on 6 September 1965. Narrates Musa in his book "My
Version":
India started the war at about 0330 hours on 6 September. The Supreme Commander was
informed about the invasion by Air Commodore Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who was on
duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi on night of 5–6 September. Indian troop
movements cross the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts of the PAF Wireless
Observer wing. The President then rang me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received
any information about the Indian attack and the whereabouts of the field army that morning.
General Musa describes the genesis of the surprise Indian attack on 6 September in his own
words: The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz
Ahmed spurred on by Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our troops
in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disturbed situation in the
valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir for conducting guerrilla
activities there and to help, on a long term basis, the locals in organizing a movement with a
view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.
Continues the former C-in-C in his book, the sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last
succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict
with India' .......
The concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir, code named Gibraltar was the
brain-child of the ministry of Foreign Affairs but General Musa assumed full responsibility for
the development of the concept, its planning and co-ordination of the entire operation. He says:
After the Government finally decided that deep raids should be launched in Indian-held
Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare
a draft plan for the operation, code-named 'Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ and within the
broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it after making certain changes in it. With the
help of sand model, he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into effect on 7
August 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme Commander and his Military Secretary
were present. He also agreed with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher
Bahadur) and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence Brigadiers Gul Hasan and
Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively. No civil official attended this briefing.
Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of military targets, disruptions of
communications, etc. and, as a long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of
occupied Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view to starting an
uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was
considered as one of the likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our
activities would have an escalating effect.
Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in
Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by
threatening Akhnur through the Chamb valley to release the pressure in the north.
The simple truth emerging from the preceding statement of General Musa is clear in that, while
the concept of 'Gibraltar' did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa,
whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half heartedly and non serious
manner leading to the downfall of President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan via Tashkent
Agreement.
The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly by General K.M. Arif in an
analysis carried by "Daily Dawn", 6 September 1990. How and why Pakistan blundered into
war .......... At that time, the policy making in the country was highly personalized. The
institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the
Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had
miscalculated that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain confined inside
the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that
India was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for inexplicable reasons the
 General Headquarters based its operational plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced
ego, the high ambition and the naive approach of a selected few, plunged Pakistan into an
armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it, eclipsed Ayub Khan's position.
At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar in the presence of two
senior officers, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now
retired and the brilliant Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Later Major General E. H.
Dar) the Air Force Chief was told that only a pre-emptive operation like the Israeli crippling
raids against the front line Arab states' air bases as in 1956 Arab-Israel War, could have
probability of success. To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive
operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government (meaning President Ayub
Khan). Technically the observation made was correct but in that case the operation should have
been based on the hypothesis of pre-emptive alone. There was also objection by the Military
Operations experts to the dropping of para commandos in Kashmir with no equivalent of French
Maquis to hide, feed and organise their escape and was tantamount to suicide.
General Musa Khan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan's C-in-C, was the archetype of the loyal
commander. But after him Ayub appointed another favourite, Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
set up a 'Liberation Cell', which included people like:

 Mr Aziz Ahmed
 Mr Nazir Ahmed
 Mr Ayub Buksh Awan
 Mr NA Farooqi
 Mr Ahmed
 Mr Altaf Goher (although the latter did not attend any of the meetings)

General Musa, Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time, confirms the existence
of this 'Cell', which was set up in August 1964. The majority of the members of this 'Cell' were
from the 'Qadiani sect’, he pointed out.
When this ambitious plan was first sent to the GHQ, General Musa opposed it and wrote the
following points to the President Ayub Khan:

 Guerrilla war in Kashmir can only be successful if the people of Kashmir take part in it, and in
my opinion we need more time to prepare people for this.
 During the guerrilla war if India realised that it is losing the war in Kashmir, she will attack
Pakistan.
 As long as Pakistan is not in a position to defeat India militarily, we should not venture such
operation in Kashmir.
 To defeat India we need more army, better arms and better training.

General Musa asked for money to set up two more army divisions to face the challenge. General
Ayub in principle agreed with this idea, but the Finance Minister Mr Shoaib persuaded him
against this by saying that the Pakistan economy cannot afford it. And this idea was dropped. It
is ironic that no such army was raised before the start of the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ or during its
operations, but after the war, in the same month, two divisions were set up.
According to Brigadier (R) Farooq, General Musa was a simple man. He gave his opinion about
the 'Operation' and then did not make it a matter of pride and remained quiet. If he and General
Sher Bahadur who also opposed the idea, had resigned then there would have been no
'Operation Gibraltar'.
A top level meeting was held at the Headquarters of the 12th Division in May 1965. Once
again, General Musa opposed the plan, and to this President Ayub Khan said: "Musa I have
been assured by the Foreign Office that India would not be involved in a full scale war". When
both General Musa and General Sher Bahadur said that if we are to start a guerrilla war at that
level, it is very likely that India would react and attack Pakistan. President Ayub Khan reacted
by saying: "We will have to take heart sometime".
Apart from the assurance to which President Ayub Khan made reference that India would not
attack Pakistan, Pakistani planners of this ‘Operation’ were led to believe that India is not in a
position to launch attack against Pakistan until 1966 or 1967. It was emphasised that we do not
waste any more time, and start our action as soon as possible.
Musa says in his book, 'My Version' that the Kashmiris of the Valley were not taken into
confidence about the ‘Operation’ that was to be started to liberate them. He wrote:
We had not even consulted the public leaders across the cease fire line about our aims and
intentions, let alone associating them with our planning for the clandestine war...
The people of the area to be 'liberated' must have to be taken into confidence, if the people
organising this gigantic task really meant business. Without the help of the local people outside
army cannot win a war or even survive. Not only the people of Kashmir living on the other side
of the cease fire line were not taken into confidence, also the people of Azad Kashmir, even the
Azad Kashmir Government was not taken into confidence. When the ‘Operation’ was put into
practice then the planners realised the need to have some Kashmiri support. They already had
set up a Liberation Council, and compelled by circumstances they announced that Choudhry
Ghulam Abbass was leading this Liberation Council.
Choudhry Ghulam Abbass was already very annoyed with this, he immediately rejected that in
a news statement in the Daily Nawa E Waqat the following day:
"I have nothing to do with all this, and I did not know anything about an 'Operation'."
General Musa confirms the above position, he said:
"Because of the haste with which the ‘Operation’ was launched, even Azad Kashmir leaders
were not taken into confidence by the advocates of Guerrilla raids. Helplessly they remained in
the background. Their co-operation was also very necessary and would have been very helpful.
They could have assisted the mujahideen in various ways by themselves."
K H Khurshid, who was the secretary to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and also Prime
Minister of Azad Kashmir Government commented:
"I firmly believe that Ayub Khan was not fully aware of the reasons for the war of 1965.
Foreign Office, Home Ministry and some senior officers from the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
which included A B Awan, Nazir Ahmed, Aziz Ahmed and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prevailed on
him and assured him that it is only a small programme which would not lead to a war with
India. Ayub Khan who offered India ‘joint defence’ would not have agreed to a full-scale war
with India.... These men wanted to weaken Ayub’s hold on the government, and this is the real
reason why he was so angry with them after the war."
Ayub Khan was assured by his advisors and the Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, that India would
not cross the international boundary to attack Pakistan. The Indian leaders and ministers were
clearly saying that if Pakistan did not stop its adventure in Kashmir, then the conflict could
spread to other areas. But Pakistani leaders did not take these threats seriously until the direct
Indian attack on the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot to release the pressure on the
retreating Indian forces in Kashmir.
Some critics say that the operation was "deliberately miss-planned to topple or weaken Ayub
Khan". This has been very controversial, but whatever its real motives, it resulted in a full-scale
war between India and Pakistan. The Security Council arranged a cease fire on 23 September
1965.

REFERENCES
YOUTUBE
HISTORYPAK.COM
WIKIPIDYA