3Republic of tbe flbilipptn

~upreme <!Court
.flllanila
FIRST DIVISION

ROLEN PENARANDA, G.R. No. 214426

Petitioner,
Present:

GESMUNDO, CJ., Chairperson,

CAGUIOA,
-versus- LAZARO-JAVIER,
M. LOPEZ, and
J. LOPEZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. DEC O2 2021
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Comi assailing the Decision2 dated September 26, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35279, which affirmed with
modification the Decision3 dated May 14, 2012 of Branch 21, Regional Trial
Court ofMalolos, Bulacan (RTC) in Criminal Case-No. 723-M-2006, finding
petitioner Rolen Pefiaranda (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder.

The Facts

In an Information dated March 9, 2006, pet1t10ner and four other

accused were charged with frustrated murder for the attack on private
complainant Reynaldo Gutierrez y Suacoco (Gutierrez), the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June 2005, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, armed with samurai and
lead pipe and with intent to kill one Reynaldo Gutierrez y Suacoco,

Rollo, pp. 3- 11 .
ld. at 13-30. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Fiorito S.
Macalino and Pedro B. Corales concurring.
J Id. at 31 -40A. Penned by Presiding Judge Efren B. Tienzo.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 214426

conspmng, confederating and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation, attack, assault, hack with a samurai and
hit with a lead pipe the said Reynaldo Gutierrez y Suacoco hitting the latter
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries, which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Reynaldo
Gutierrez y Suacoco, thus performing all acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not [produce] x x x it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Reynaldo
Gutierrez y Suacoco which prevented his death.

Contrary to law. 4

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on

the merits ensued. 5

The prosecution presented Gutierrez as its lone witness. On the other

hand, the defense presented petitioner as its witness.

The CA summarized the respective versions of the prosecution and

the defense as follows:

Version ofthe Prosecution

[Gutierrez] worked as a tricycle driver at Libtong, Meycauayan City,

Bulacan. Before June 5, 2005, he filed a complaint before the Sangguniang
Barangay against [petitioner], also a tricycle driver, for charging excessive
fare. On June 5, 2005, between 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he was
at the tricycle terminal when Ivan Villaranda (or "Ivan") summoned his
companions Rannie Cecilia (or "Rannie"), Raul Cecilia (or "Raul"),
[petitioner] and another one whose identity was not yet known to him at that
time. As these persons approached Gutierrez, [petitioner] threw a stone
hitting him on his left arm. Although Gutierrez was armed with a steel pipe,
he lowered his defense when Raul intervened and told him, "Hayaan mo na
Boyet, ako na ang bahala." Immediately thereafter, a tricycle arrived. Edwin
Celedonia ( or "Edwin"), the occupant of the tricycle, alighted and hacked
Gutierrez using a "samurai". Gutierrez was hit on his upper right biceps.
Afterwards, Ivan, Rannie and Raul hit Gutierrez with steel pipes while
[petitioner] hit him with a stone. Then, all the aggressors ran away leaving
him wounded. Wbile running away, Rannie threw a steel pipe, which
Gutierrez earlier held, hitting the latter on his stomach.

Gutierrez immediately went to the barangay hall to seek help.

Thereafter, he was brought to Sta. Maria Hospital and was later transferred
to Reyes Memorial Hospital where his wounds were treated. Medico Legal
Certificate and Clinical Abstract were issued, and photographs of his
injuries were taken. 6

4
id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
6 Id. at 15; citations omitted.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 214426

Version of the Defense

Prior to June 5, 2005, Gutierrez filed a complaint·against [petitioner]

before the barangay for over-pricing. of tricycle fare. He denied the
imputation. Then, Gutierrez cursed him, threw a stone at him and ·chased
him with a "panaksak." However, a barangay official intervened and.
prevented Gutierrez from chasing [petitioner]. · From that time on,
[petitioner], while aware that he was being followed by Gutierrez, never had
the occasion to actually confront or meet the latter.

Gutierrez merely wanted to get money from him. In fact, he was told
that instead of posting bail for his provisional liberty, [petitioner] should
have given the money spent therefor to Gutierrez. He also denied throwing
stones at Gutierrez on June 5, 2005, as he was not "Raul Kalbo" referred to
by Gutierrez as his assailant. 7

Ruling of the RTC

On May 14, 2012, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered by this Court finding the

accused ROLEN PENARANDA y CABALOS, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder.

Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of

imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prison (sic) correctional
(sic) as minimum to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as maximum.

Accused shall pay the offended party Reynaldo Gutierrez temperate

damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (Pl0,000.00); exemplary damages of Ten
Thousand Pesos (Pl0,000.00), and moral damages of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P 10,000.00).

SO ORDERED. 8

In holding that there was an intent to kill, the RTC explained that the
samurai and the steel pipe used by the perpetrators showed an intent to kill on
their part, coupled with petitioner's earlier threats to kill Gutierrez after the
latter reported their issue to the barangay. 9

Regarding the stage of execution of the crime, the RTC held that the
crime committed is attempted, not frustrated murder, since there is nothing in
the evidence that shows that the wound would have been fatal without medical
intervention. 10

Further, the RTC ruled out the attendance of evident premeditation. 11

However, the attempted killing was treacherous and attended with abuse of

7 Id. at 16; citations omitted.

Id. at 40; citation omitted.
9
Id. at 36.
" Id. at 37.
11 Id. at 38-39.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 214426

superior strength. For treachery, although Gutierrez was initially armed with
a steel pipe, Raul intervened, causing Gutierrez to lower his guard, at which
point he was hacked with a samurai. 12 For abuse of superior strength, after
laying down his weapon, Gutierrez was assaulted by five persons armed with
a samurai, a steel pipe, and a stone. 13

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, petitioner's conviction

in its Decision dated September 26, 2014. The dispositive part of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.

The Decision dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court ofMalolos,
Bulacan, Branch 21 finding accused-appellant Rolen Penaranda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder, is hereby_
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.ACCORDINGLY, appellant Rolen
Penaranda is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Further, appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify
complainant Reynaldo Gutierrez the following damages which shall bear
interest at the rate of six [percent] (6%) per annum until fully paid, namely:

1. Ten Thousand Pesos (Pl0,000.00) as Temperate Damages;

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (Pl 0,000.00) as Exemplary Damages; and
3. Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as Moral Damages.

SO ORDERED. 14

In affirming the RTC, the CA stated that Gutierrez's testimony showed

his spontaneity as he recounted his harrowing experience at the hands of his
malefactors. 15

Against the defense of denial, petitioner admitted that he could easily

travel from his house to the tricycle terminal where the incident occurred in a
short period oftime. 16

On the attendant circumstances, the CA affirmed that there was abuse

of superior strength. The CA, however, ruled that treachery did not attend the
commission of the crime because Gutierrez was already armed with a steel
pipe at the time of the commission of the crime. 17

As to the existence of conspiracy, the CA agreed with the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) that the act of Raul in purportedly mediating was
simply a decoy to disarm the victim and allow the other accused to

12 Id. at 37-38.
13 Id. at 38.
14
Id. at 29.
15 Id. at 23.
16 Id. at 23-25.
17 Id. at 25-26.
 Decision 5 G.R. No. 214426

simultaneously attack Gutierrez as soon as he let_ his guard down. The

concerted effort of petitioner and his companions in inflicting fatal injuries on
Gutierrez's person demonstrated their intent to kill him. 18

Hence, this Petition.

Issue

Whether petitioner is guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, the Court clarifies that questions of fact, as a rule, cannot
be entertained in a Rule 45 petition, where the Court's jurisdiction is limited
to reviewing and revising errors of law that might have been committed by
the lower courts. 19 Nevertheless, when it appears that the assailed judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts,2° as in this case, the Court may address
and resolve questions of fact in a Rule 45 proceeding.

The crime committed is serious

physical injuries only, not attempted
murder

In Palaganas v. People, 21 the Court discussed the distinctions between

a frustrated and an attempted homicide or murder, as well as physical injury:

[W]hen the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his

use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether
or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in
such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only
attempted murder or attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the
part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal,
the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury. 22

Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted

or frustrated homicide or murder, or only physical injuries, the crucial points
to consider are: a) whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal; and b)
whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused. 23

Guided by the foregoing, the Court holds that the crime committed by
petitioner is only serious physical injuries and not attempted murder.

18
Id. at 28.
19
Etino v. People, G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018, 855 SCRA 355,364.
zo Felonia v. People, G.R. No. 168997, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 207,219.
21
G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006, 501 SCRA 533.
22 Id. at 555-556; citations omitted.
23
Etino v. People, supra note 19, at 366.
 Decision 6 G.R. No. 214426

a) Whether the injury sustained by the victim was fatal

It is settled that "[w]hen nothing in the evidence shows that the wound
would be fatal without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters
the realm of doubt; under this situation, the doubt created by the lack of
evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner." 24

In the case under review, the prosecution failed to present evidence that
the wound inflicted on Gutierrez was fatal and would have caused his death
had medical help not been provided. Thus, the crime committed is attempted,
not frustrated murder, so long as there was intent to kill. However, as
hereunder discussed, the crime cannot be attempted murder.

b) Whether there was intent to kill on the part of petitioner

Going now to the issue of whether there was intent to kill, the Court
holds that there was none. Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide
or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the aggressor. 25

Moreover, intent to kill is a state of mind which courts can discern only
through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the
time of the assault and immediately thereafter. The factors to determine intent
to kill are: 1) the means used by the malefactors; 2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; 3) the conduct of the malefactors
before, during or immediately after the killing; and 4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. 26

Here, it must be emphasized that petitioner and his fellow malefactors

were armed with a samurai, steel pipes, and a stone, whereas Gutierrez was
rendered defenseless when he was asked to put down the steel pipe he was
initially holding. Clearly, petitioner and his companions possessed all the
necessary weapons to kill Gutierrez but chose not to do so. Rather, the facts
indicate that after ganging up on Gutierrez, and after seeing that he was down,
petitioner and his companions fled. They did not continue to beat Gutierrez
nor did they leave him for dead. If the aggressors intended to kill Gutierrez,
they could have easily done so, given that each of the five aggressors had
weapons in comparison to the lone defenseless victim. They did not, however,
kill him.

Worthy of mention, too, is that immediately after petitioner and his

companions left Gutierrez, the latter was able to pick himself up and then
immediately go to the barangay hall on his own. That Gutierrez was able to
go to the barangay hall and request an ambulance without being pursued by

24
Serrano v. People, G.R. No. 175023, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 322,339.
25
Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 85, 95.
26
Belleza v. People, G.R. No. 246358, July IO, 2019 (Unsigned Resolution).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 214426

his aggressors further establishes the lack of any intention on the part of
petitioner and his companions to kill him.

Nonetheless, petitioner is not without any criminal liability. When the

intent to kill is lacking, but wounds are shown to have been inflicted upon the
victim, as in this case, the crime is not frustrated or attempted murder but
physical injuries. 27 Based on the medical certificate, Gutierrez sustained
several hack wounds on the different parts of his body, which required more
than thirty (30) days to heal. 28 Hence, the crime committed is serious physical
injuries under Article 263, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Although the Information charged petitioner with frustrated murder, a

finding of guilt for the lesser offense of serious physical injuries may be made
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former. 29

The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part

of those constituting the felony of murder. Simply put, an accused may be
convicted of slight, less serious, or serious physical injuries in a prosecution
for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of physical injuries could
lead to any of the latter offenses when carried to its utmost degree despite the
fact that an essential requisite of the crime of homicide or murder - intent to
kill - is not required in a prosecution for physical injuries. 30

The elements of attempted murder

were not met

Even assuming that there was intent to kill, the crime would still not be
attempted murder, as found by the RTC and CA, because the elements of
attempted felony were not met.

The third paragraph, Article 6 of the RPC provides that:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission

of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

I. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt

acts;

27 Etino v. People, supra note 19, at 370.

28
Rollo, p. 27.
29 People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007, 539 SCRA 432, 459, citing Rule 120, Sec. 4 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof. - When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall
be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
30
Id. at 460.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 214426

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony;

3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

[and]

4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or

accident other than his spontaneous desistance. 31

Of particular significance to the instant case is the third requisite, that

is, the offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance. In the
leading case of US. v. Eduave, 32 the Court discussed the very essence of
attempted felony, thus:

The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact
that the defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in
the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime
cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by
some outside cause from performing all of the acts which should produce
the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the
offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of
the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is
his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should
result in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt. x x x33

If the malefactors do not perform all the acts of execution by reason of

their spontaneous desistance, they are not guilty of an attempted felony. The
law does not punish them for their attempt to commit a felony. 34 The rationale
of the law is explained as follows:

As aptly elaborated on by Wharton:

"First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is

voluntarily abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the
abandoned purpose could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law
requires that the offender, so long as he is capable of arresting an evil plan,
should be encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case of such
retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither
society, nor any private person, has been injured by his act. There is no
damage, therefore, to redress. To punish him after retreat and abandomnent
would be to destroy the motive for retreat and abandomnent."35

31
People v. Mahusay, G.R. No. 229085, November 29, 2017 (Unsigned Resolution).
32
36 Phil. 209 (1917).
33
Id. at211-212; italics in the original.
34
People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 96.
35
Id. at 96-97; citations omitted.
 Decision 9 G.R. No. 214426

Furthermore, in another case, 36 the Court held that there is no attempted

felony when the accused desists from continuing the commission of the felony
out of fear or remorse:

xx x "[W]hen the action of the felony starts and the accused, because
of fear or remorse desists from its continuance, there is no attempt. x x x If
the author of the attempt, after having commenced to execute the felony by
external acts, he stops by a free and spontaneous feeling, on the brink of the
abyss, he is saved. It is a call to repentance, to the conscience, a grace, a
pardon which the law grants to voluntary repentance." xx x 37

Verily, the desistance may be through fear or remorse. It is not

necessary that it be actuated by a good motive. The RPC requires only that the
discontinuance of the crime comes from the persons who have begun it, and
that they stop of their own free will. 38

To recall, Gutierrez was hit by a samurai and then ganged up on by the

rest of his aggressors, including petitioner. Although petitioner and his fellow
malefactors were able to hit Gutierrez on the different parts of his body, they
suddenly stopped and fled. Gutierrez testified:

Q: Now, after being hit by this Edwin, what happened next?

A: Ivan, Rannie, Raul, and Rolen all hit me and then afterwards,
they ran and while they were on their way, they threw to me the
lead pipe that I was holding and I was hit here, ma'am. (witness
pointing to the left portion of his stomach)

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened next?

A: After they left me, I went to the barangay and I asked for an
ambulance, ma'am. 39

As the Court sees it, the crime committed by petitioner cannot be

attempted murder, for he and his fellow malefactors spontaneously desisted
from performing further acts that would result in Gutierrez's death. It must be
noted that there were no other persons who came to the defense of Gutierrez,
which would have prompted them to stop inflicting injuries on him. Nothing
stood in the way of petitioner and his companions from continuing to kill
Gutierrez. The testimony of Gutierrez shows that after the attack, all the
aggressors ran away, leaving him wounded. In short, petitioner and his fellow
malefactors immediately ran away after ganging up on him.

Thus, the Court holds that the elements of attempted felony were not
present in this case because petitioner and his fellow malefactors voluntarily
and spontaneously stopped or desisted - an element that removed the crime
from the contemplation of attempted felony. Nevertheless, as discussed
36
Peoplev. Pelagio, No. L-16177, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 153.
37
Id. at 161; citation omitted.
38 Reyes, REVISED PENAL CODE, 19th Ed., Book I, p. I 03.
39
Rollo, p. 21; emphasis supplied.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 214426

above, petitioner remains liable for serious physical injuries. The spontaneous
desistance of malefactors exempts them from criminal liability for the
intended crime, but it does not exempt them from the crime committed by
them before their desistance. 40

Petitioner and his fellow malefactors

acted in conspiracy with one another
and with abuse ofsuperior strength

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. 41 It arises on
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this is established, each and every one
of the conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed
by any one ofthem. 42

In the present case, the following circumstances established the

existence of conspiracy. First, Ivan summoned petitioner and the others to
attack Gutierrez. 43 Second, petitioner threw a stone at Gutierrez, hitting the
latter in the left arm. 44 Third, when Gutierrez was about to retaliate, Raul
intervened and asked Gutierrez to put down the steel pipe he was holding.
Thereafter, Edwin alighted from the tricycle and hacked Gutierrez with a
samurai. 45 Fourth, petitioner and his companions successively ganged up on
Gutierrez, hitting him on the different parts of his body. Petitioner, in
particular, used a stone while his three companions used steel pipes. 46 Fifth,
they all fled the crime scene immediately after the incident. 47 Finally, while
fleeing, Rannie threw the steel pipe that Gutierrez had earlier held, striking
Gutierrez in the stomach. 48

Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his companions indicate a unity of

action for the common purpose or design to commit the crime. When it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment, a conspiracy could be inferred although no actual meeting
among them is proved. 49

The positive testimony of Gutierrez established beyond reasonable

doubt that petitioner and his companions were driven by a common objective

40
People V. Lizada. supra note 34, at 97, citing Reyes, REVISED PENAL CODE, 1981, Vol. I, p. 105.
41 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 8.
42
People v. Orias, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 417,433.
43
Rollo, p. 22.
44
ld.atl9.
15
Id. at I 9-20.
46
Id. at 21.
,1 ld.
48
Id.
49 Id.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 214426

of inflicting injuries on him. Indeed, the fact that petitioner conspired with his
fellow malefactors in inflicting injuries on Gutierrez renders him equally
-liable for the crime committed.

Anent the alleged aggravating circumstance of treachery, the Court

agrees with the CA that the crime was not attended with treachery.

The essence of treachery, which is the sudden, unexpected, and

unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the latter, 50 is lacking in the case at bar. The
elements of treachery are: (1) the means of execution employed gives the
person no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 51

Gutierrez had the opportunity to defend himself as he had a steel pipe

before he was attacked. He admitted that he had a steel pipe at the time
because he and Ivan had a fight before the incident. 52 Clearly, he was
obviously forewarned of the danger to his life. He was aware that Ivan would
summon persons to gang him up, 53 which is why he brought his own weapon.
The existence of an opportunity for Gutierrez to defend himself negated
treachery. That Raul intervened and asked Gutierrez to put down his steel pipe
does not mean that treachery attended the commission of the crime. Thus, in
one case, the Court held, "[t]here is no treachery when the assault is preceded
by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when
the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former." 54

On the other hand, abuse of superior strength is present. This

circumstance is appreciated whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and his aggressors, and the latter took advantage of such
inequality to facilitate the commission of the crime. 55

To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use

excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. Unlike in treachery, where the victim was not given the
opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of
superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless.
It is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of
the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment
of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. 56

50 People v. Se. G.R. No. 152966, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 725,732.
51 People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 128116, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 198,210.
52
Rollo, p. 22.
'' Id.
54 People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, September IO, 2003, 410 SCRA 463,480, citing People v. Reyes,
G.R. Nos. 137494-95, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 287.
55 Peoplev. Batu/an, G.R. No. 216936, July 29, 2019, 911 SCRA 1, 20, citingPeoplev. Evasco, G.R. No.
213415, September 26, 2018, 881 SCRA 79.
56 Id., citing People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148)45-46, July 5, 2004, 433 SCRA 389.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 214426

Here, petitioner and his fellow malefactors took advantage of their

number and weapons to put Gutierrez at a notorious disadvantage. That
Gutierrez had a steel pipe did not preclude the presence of abuse of superior
strength. It must be remembered that Gutierrez lowered his defense when Raul
asked him to put down the steel pipe he was holding. In contrast, petitioner and
his companions were armed with a samurai, steel pipes, and a stone. Obviously,
the force they used far exceeded the means of defense available to Gutierrez. 57

Finally, petitioner's alibi and denial have not been proven by positive,
clear and satisfactory evidence. It bears stressing that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses because it is facile to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and is
generally rejected. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the
defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must
likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time. 58

In this case, petitioner failed to prove such physical impossibility. In

fact, petitioner admitted that it is possible for him to travel from his house to
the tricycle terminal where the incident occurred, as the distance is only about
one and a half (1 ½) kilometers. 59

Proper penalty and damages

Under paragraph 4, Article 263 of the RPC, any person who shall
wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical
injuries if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or
incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty (30) days, and
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods if the offense shall have been committed with attendance of any of the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the

attendance of abuse of superior strength under Article 248 of the RPC, the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken within the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed, which is two (2) years, eleven ( 11)
months, and eleven (11) days to four (4) years and two (2) months. The
minimum term shall be taken within the range of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods or from two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. The period of petitioner's detention, 60 if any, shall be credited in full
for the purpose of service of his sentence.

Anent the civil liabilities, since petitioner was found guilty of an

offense resulting in physical injuries, moral damages should be awarded.
Under paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages maybe

57
See id. at 21.
58
People v. Malejana, G.R. No. 145002, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 610, 624.
59
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
60
Note: It is not clear from the rollo when petitioner was actually detained.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 214426

recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages

compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered
by the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act.
An award requires no proof of pecuniary loss. 61 Pursuant to jurisprudence,62
an award of Php25,000.00 as moral damages is appropriate.

The victim is likewise entitled to temperate damages, as it is clear that

the victim received medical treatment at the hospital, although no
documentary evidence was presented to prove the cost thereof. 63 In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, 64 the Court likewise awards
exemplary damages in the amount of Php50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on

Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated September 26, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35279, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that, petitioner Rolen Pefiaranda is found GIDLTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES
and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. The period of detention of
petitioner Rolen Pefiaranda, if any, shall be credited in full for the purpose of
service of his sentence.

He is further ORDERED to pay the victim Reynaldo Gutierrez y

Suacoco the amounts of Php25,000.00 as moral damages, Phpl 0,000.00 as
temperate damages, and Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

An interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

A IN S. CAGUIOA
V

61 Yap v. People, G.R. No. 234217, November 14, 2018, 885 SCRA 599,621.
62 Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 255490, June 30, 2021 (Unsigned Resolution), citing Etino v. People, supra
note 19.
63 Id.
64 People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, 788 SCRA 331.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 214426

WE CONCUR:

AL

Chairperson

JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ALE~~ G.GESMUNDO
/ ~ : f Justice