BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v.

ROTARY CLUB

Syllabus

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ROTARY INTERNA-

TIONAL ET AL. v. ROTARY CLUB OF DUARTE ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 86-421. Argued March 30, 1987-Decided May 4, 1987

Rotary International is a nonprofit corporation composed of local Rotary
Clubs. Its purposes are to provide humanitarian service, to encourage
high ethical standards in all vocations, and to help build world peace and
good will. Individuals are admitted to local club membership according
to a "classification system" based on business, professional, and institu-
tional activity in the community. Although women are permitted to
attend meetings, give speeches, receive awards, and form auxiliary
organizations, the Rotary constitution excludes women from member-
ship. Because it had admitted women to active membership, the
Duarte, California, Rotary Club's membership in the international orga-
nization was terminated. That club and two of its women members filed a
suit alleging that the termination violated California's Unruh Act (Act),
which entitles all persons, regardless of sex, to full and equal accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, privileges, and services in all business
establishments in the State. The state trial court entered judgment for
Rotary International, concluding that neither it nor the Duarte Club is a
"business establishment" within the meaning of the Act. However, the
State Court of Appeal reversed on this point, and rejected the contention
that Rotary's policy of excluding women is protected by the First Amend-
ment. Accordingly, the court ordered the Duarte Club's reinstatement,
and enjoined the enforcement of the gender requirements against it.
Held:
1. The Unruh Act does not violate the First Amendment by requiring
California Rotary Clubs to admit women. Pp. 544-549.
(a) Application of the Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere
unduly with club members' freedom of private association. In determin-
ing whether a particular association is sufficiently intimate or private
to warrant constitutional protection, consideration must be given to fac-
tors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. Here, the relationship among
Rotary Club members does not warrant protection, in light of the poten-
tially large size of local clubs, the high turnover rate among club mem-
bers, the inclusive nature of each club's membership, the public purposes
behind clubs' service activities, and the fact that the clubs encourage the
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Syllabus 481 U. S.

participation of strangers in, and welcome media coverage of, many of

their central activities. Pp. 544-547.
(b) Application of the Act to California Rotary Clubs does not vio-
late the First Amendment right of expressive association. Although
clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the evidence fails to demonstrate that
admitting women will affect in any significant way the existing members'
ability to carry out those activities. Moreover, the Act does not require
clubs to abandon or alter their classification and admission systems, but, in
fact, will permit them to have an even more representative membership
with a broadened capacity for service. Even if the Act does work some
slight infringement of members' rights, that infringement is justified by
the State's compelling interests in eliminating discrimination against
women and in assuring them equal access to public accommodations.
The latter interest extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and
business contacts as well as tangible goods and services. Pp. 548-549.
2. The contentions that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad were not properly presented to the state courts, and therefore will
not be reviewed by this Court. Pp. 549-550.
178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, affirmed.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST,

C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
SCALIA, J., concurred in the judgment. BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

William P. Sutter argued the cause for appellants. With

him on the briefs were Peter F. Lovato III and Wm. John
Kennedy.
Judith Resnik argued the cause for appellees. On the
brief were Carol Agate, Sanford K. Smith, Blanche C.
Bersch, Paul Hoffman, and Fred Okrand.
MarianM. Johnston argued the cause for intervenor State
of California. With her on the brief were John K. Van
de Kamp, Attorney General, Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, and Beverly Tucker, Deputy
Attorney General.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Boy Scouts of
America by Ronald C. Redcay, George A. Davidson, and David K. Park;
for the Conference of Private Organizations by Thomas P. Ondeck; for the
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

We must decide whether a California statute that requires
California Rotary Clubs to admit women members violates
the First Amendment.
I
A
Rotary International (International) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion founded in 1905, with headquarters in Evanston, Illinois.
It is "an organization of business and professional men united
worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high
ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and
peace in the world." Rotary Manual of Procedure 7 (1981)
(hereinafter Manual), App. 35. Individual members belong
to a local Rotary Club rather than to International. In turn,
each local Rotary Club is a member of International. Ibid.
In August 1982, shortly before the trial in this case, Inter-

Legal Foundation of America by Jean F. Powers and David Crump; and

for Pilot Club International et al. by Stephen G. Seliger.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Min-
nesota et al. by Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota,
Richard S. Slowes, Assistant Solicitor General, and Peter M. Ackerberg,
Special Assistant Attorney General, and for the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Joseph I. Lieberman of Connecticut,
Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, William J. Guste of Louisiana, W. Cary Ed-
wards of New Jersey, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Dave Frohn-
mayer of Oregon, Jim Mattox of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, and
Donald S. Hanaway of Wisconsin; for the city of New York et al. by Doron
Gopstein and Leonard Koerner; for the American Jewish Congress et al.
by Marc D. Stern; for the Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith by
Abigail T. Kelman, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Steven M.
Freeman, and Meyer Eisenberg; for California Women Lawyers et al. by
Lorraine L. Loder and FredricD. Woocher; for the Kiwanis Club of Ridge-
wood, Inc., et al. by Marcia K. Baer; for the Lloyd Lyons Club by Marla
J. McGeorge and Allen T. Murphy, Jr.; and for the Rotary Club of Seattle
et al. by M. MargaretMcKeown and Eugene C. Chellis.
Joan M. Graff and Douglas R. Young filed a brief for the Employment
Law Center of the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco as amicus curiae.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

national comprised 19,788 Rotary Clubs in 157 countries, with

a total membership of about 907,750. Brief for Appellants 7.
Individuals are admitted to membership in a Rotary Club
according to a "classification system." The purpose of this
system is to ensure "that each Rotary Club includes a repre-
sentative of every worthy and recognized business, profes-
sional, or institutional activity in the community." 2 Rotary
Basic Library, Club Service 67-69 (1981), App. 86. Each ac-
tive member must work in a leadership capacity in his busi-
ness or profession. The general rule is that "one active
member is admitted for each classification, but he, in turn,
may propose an additional active member, who must be in
the same business or professional classification."' Id., at 7,
App. 86. Thus, each classification may be represented by
two active members. In addition, "senior active" and "past
service" members may represent the same classifications as
active members. See Standard Rotary Club Constitution,
Art. V, §§ 2-5, Record 97-98. There is no limit to the num-
ber of clergymen, journalists, or diplomats who may be ad-
mitted to membership. Manual 31, 33, App. 38-39.
Subject to these requirements, each local Rotary Club is
free to adopt its own rules and procedures for admitting new
members. Id., at 7, App. 35. International has promul-
gated Recommended Club By-laws providing that candidates
for membership will be considered by both a "classifications
committee" and a "membership committee." The classifica-
tions committee determines whether the candidate's business
or profession is described accurately and fits an "open" classi-
fication. The membership committee evaluates the candi-
date's "character, business and social standing, and general

' Rotary Clubs may establish separate classifications for subcategories of

a business or profession as long as the classification "describe[s] the mem-
ber's principal and recognized professional activity .... ." 2 Rotary Basic
Library, Club Service 8 (1981), App. 87. For example, a single Rotary
Club may admit categories and subcategories of lawyers: e. g., trial, corpo-
rate, tax, labor, and so on. Ibid.
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

eligibility." Brief for Appellants 7-8. If any member ob-

jects to the candidate's admission, the final decision is made
by the club's board of directors.
Membership in Rotary Clubs is open only to men. Stand-
ard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, § 2, Record 97. Her-
bert A. Pigman, the General Secretary of Rotary Interna-
tional, testified that the exclusion of women results in an
"aspect of fellowship ... that is enjoyed by the present male
membership," App. to Juris. Statement G-52, and also allows
Rotary to operate effectively in foreign countries with varied
cultures and social mores. Although women are not admit-
ted to membership, they are permitted to attend meetings,
give speeches, and receive awards. Women relatives of
Rotary members may form their own associations, and are
authorized to wear the Rotary lapel pin. Young women be-
tween 14 and 28 years of age may join Interact or Rotaract,
organizations sponsored by Rotary International.

B
In 1977 the Rotary Club of Duarte, California, admitted
Donna Bogart, Mary Lou Elliott, and Rosemary Freitag to
active membership. International notified the Duarte Club
that admitting women members is contrary to the Rotary
constitution. After an internal hearing, International's
board of directors revoked the charter of the Duarte Club
and terminated its membership in Rotary International.
The Duarte Club's appeal to the International Convention
was unsuccessful.
The Duarte Club and two of its women members filed a
complaint in the California Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that appel-
lants' actions violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §51 (West 1982).2 Appellees sought to enjoin
'The Unruh Civil Rights Act provides, in part:
"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and
no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

International from enforcing its restrictions against admit-

ting women members, revoking the Duarte Club's charter, or
compelling delivery of the charter to any representative of
International. Appellees also sought a declaration that ap-
pellants' actions had violated the Unruh Act. After a bench
trial, the court concluded that neither Rotary International
nor the Duarte Club is a "business establishment" within
the meaning of the Unruh Act. The court recognized that
"some individual Rotarians derive sufficient business advan-
tage from Rotary to warrant deduction of Rotarian expenses
in income tax calculations, or to warrant payment of those
expenses by their employers . . . ." App. to Juris. State-
ment B-3. But it found that "such business benefits are in-
cidental to the principal purposes of the association . . . to
promote fellowship . . . and . . . 'service' activities." Ibid.
The court also found that Rotary clubs do not provide their
members with goods, services, or facilities. On the basis of
these findings and conclusions, the court entered judgment
for International.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 178 Cal. App.
3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986). It held that both Rotary
International and the Duarte Rotary Club are business estab-
lishments subject to the provisions of the Unruh Act. For
purposes of the Act, a "'business' embraces everything about
which one can be employed," and an "establishment" includes
"not only a fixed location, . . . but also a permanent 'com-
mercial force or organization' or a 'permanent settled position
(as in life or business)."' O'Connorv. Village Green Owners
Assn., 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P. 2d 427, 430 (1983) (quoting
Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 468-469,
370 P. 2d 313, 316 (1962)). The Court of Appeal identified
several "businesslike attributes" of Rotary International, in-
cluding its complex structure, large staff and budget, and ex-

are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,

privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever." Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 51 (West 1982).
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

tensive publishing activities. The court held that the trial

court had erred in finding that the business advantages af-
forded by membership in a local Rotary Club are merely inci-
dental. It stated that testimony by members of the Duarte
Club "leaves no doubt that business concerns are a motivat-
ing factor in joining local clubs," and that "business benefits
[are] enjoyed and capitalized upon by Rotarians and their
businesses or employers." 178 Cal. App. 3d, at 1057, 224
Cal. Rptr., at 226. The Court of Appeal rejected the trial
court's finding that the Duarte Club does not provide goods,
services, or facilities to its members. In particular, the
court noted that members receive copies of the Rotary maga-
zine and numerous other Rotary publications, are entitled to
wear and display the Rotary emblem, and may attend confer-
ences that teach managerial and professional techniques.
The court also held that membership in Rotary Interna-
tional or the Duarte Club does not give rise to a "continuous,
personal, and social" relationship that "take[s] place more or
less outside public view." Ibid. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). The court further concluded that
admitting women to the Duarte Club would not seriously in-
terfere with the objectives of Rotary International. Finally,
the court rejected appellants' argument that their policy of
excluding women is protected by the First Amendment prin-
ciples set out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609 (1984). It observed that "[n]othing we have said pre-
vents, or can prevent, International from adopting or at-
tempting to enforce membership rules or restrictions outside
of this state." Id., at 1066, 224 Cal. Rptr., at 231. The
court ordered appellants to reinstate the Duarte Club as a
member of Rotary International, and permanently enjoined
them from enforcing or attempting to enforce the gender re-
quirement against the Duarte Club.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants' petition
for review. We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction
to the hearing on the merits. 479 U. S. 929 (1986). We
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction,' and affirm the

judgment of the Court of Appeal.

II
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, we upheld
against First Amendment challenge a Minnesota statute that
required the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members.
Roberts provides the framework for analyzing appellants'
constitutional claims. As we observed in Roberts, our cases
have afforded constitutional protection to freedom of associa-
tion in two distinct senses. First, the Court has held that
the Constitution protects against unjustified government in-
terference with an individual's choice to enter into and main-
tain certain intimate or private relationships. Second, the
Court has upheld the freedom of individuals to associate for
the purpose of engaging in protected speech or religious ac-
tivities. In many cases, government interference with one
form of protected association will also burden the other form
of association. In Roberts we determined the nature and de-
gree of constitutional protection by considering separately
the effect of the challenged state action on individuals' free-

'We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final judgment entered by

the highest court of a State in which decision could be had "where is drawn
in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity." 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). Appellants
squarely challenged the constitutionality of the Unruh Act, as applied, and
the Court of Appeal sustained the validity of the statute as applied. "We
have held consistently that a state statute is sustained within the meaning
of § 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of
facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal
grounds." Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 441
(1979) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 17-18 (1971); Warren
Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 686, and n. 1 (1965);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 61, n. 3 (1963); Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-290 (1921)).
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

dom of private association and their freedom of expressive

association. We follow the same course in this case.4
A
The Court has recognized that the freedom to enter into
and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fun-
damental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.
Such relationships may take various forms, including the
most intimate. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S.494,
503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion). We have not attempted
to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional
protection. The intimate relationships to which we have ac-
corded constitutional protection include marriage, Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 383-386 (1978); the begetting
and bearing of children, Carey v. PopulationServices Inter-
national, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); child rearing and
education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-
535 (1925); and cohabitation with relatives, Moore v. East
Cleveland, supra, at 503-504. Of course, we have not held
that constitutional protection is restricted to relationships
among family members. We have emphasized that the First
Amendment protects those relationships, including family
relationships, that presuppose "deep attachments and com-
mitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experi-
ences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of
one's life." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 619-
620. But in Roberts we observed that "[d]etermining the
limits of state authority over an individual's freedom to enter
into a particular association ... unavoidably entails a careful
'International, an association of thousands of local Rotary Clubs, can
claim no constitutionally protected right of private association. Moreover,
its expressive activities are quite limited. See infra, at 548-549. Be-
cause the Court of Appeal held that the Duarte Rotary Club also is a busi-
ness establishment subject to the provisions of the Unruh Act, we proceed
to consider whether application of the Unruh Act violates the rights of
members of local Rotary Clubs.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

assessment of where that relationship's objective characteris-

tics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the
most attenuated of personal attachments." 468 U. S., at 620
(citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 187-189 (1976)
(POWELL, J., concurring)). In determining whether a par-
ticular association is sufficiently personal or private to war-
rant constitutional protection, we consider factors such as
size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship. 468 U. S., at 620.
The evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or
private relation that warrants constitutional protection. The
size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from fewer than 20 to more
than 900. App. to Juris. Statement G-15 (deposition of Her-
bert A. Pigman, General Secretary of Rotary International).
There is no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary
Club. About 10 percent of the membership of a typical club
moves away or drops out during a typical year. 2 Rotary
Basic Library, Club Service 9-11 (1981), App. 88. The clubs
therefore are instructed to "keep a flow of prospects coming"
to make up for the attrition and gradually to enlarge the
membership. Ibid. The purpose of Rotary "is to produce
an inclusive, not exclusive, membership, making possible the
recognition of all useful local occupations, and enabling the
club to be a true cross section of the business and professional
life of the community." 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on
Rotary 60-61 (1981), App. 84. The membership undertakes
a variety of service projects designed to aid the community,
to raise the standards of the members' businesses and profes-
sions, and to improve international relations.5 Such an in-

'We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations,

perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to the
elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming program
for handicapped children, and international exchange programs, among
many other service activities. Record 217H-217J.
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

clusive "fellowship for service based on diversity of interest,"

ibid., however beneficial to the members and to those they
serve, does not suggest the kind of private or personal re-
lationship to which we have accorded protection under the
First Amendment. To be sure, membership in Rotary Clubs
is not open to the general public. But each club is instructed
to include in its membership "all fully qualified prospective
members located within its territory," to avoid "arbitrary
limits on the number of members in the club," and to "estab-
lish and maintain a membership growth pattern." Manual
139, App. 61-62.
Many of the Rotary Clubs' central activities are carried on
in the presence of strangers. Rotary Clubs are required to
admit any member of any other Rotary Club to their meet-
ings. Members are encouraged to invite business associates
and competitors to meetings. At some Rotary Clubs, the
visitors number "in the tens and twenties each week." App.
to Juris. Statement G-24 (deposition of Herbert A. Pigman,
General Secretary of Rotary International). Joint meetings
with the members of other organizations, and other joint ac-
tivities, are permitted. The clubs are encouraged to seek
coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers.
In sum, Rotary Clubs, rather than carrying on their activi-
ties in an atmosphere of privacy, seek to keep their "windows
and doors open to the whole world," 1 Rotary Basic Library,
Focus on Rotary 60-61 (1981), App. 85. We therefore con-
clude that application of the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs
does not interfere unduly with the members' freedom of pri-
6
vate association.
'Appellants assert that we "approved" a distinction between the Jay-
cees and the Kiwanis Club in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S.
609, 630 (1984). Brief for Appellants 21. Appellants misconstrue Rob-
erts. In that case we observed that the Minnesota court had suggested
Kiwanis Clubs were outside the scope of the State's public accommoda-
tions law. We concluded that this refuted the Jaycees' arguments that
the Minnesota statute was vague and overbroad. We did not consider
whether the relationship among members of the Kiwanis Club was suffi-
ciently intimate or private to warrant constitutional protection. Similarly,
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

B
The Court also has recognized that the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies "a cor-
responding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U. S., at 622. See NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co., 458
U. S. 886, 907-909, 932-933 (1982). For this reason, "[i]m-
pediments to the exercise of one's right to choose one's asso-
ciates can violate the right of association protected by the
First Amendment . . . ." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U. S. 69, 80, n. 4 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring) (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958)). In this case,
however, the evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting
women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes.
As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions
on "public questions," including political or international
issues. Manual 115, App. 58-59. To be sure, Rotary Clubs
engage in a variety of commendable service activities that
are protected by the First Amendment. But the Unruh Act
does not require the clubs to abandon or alter any of these
activities. It does not require them to abandon their basic
goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all
vocations, good will, and peace. Nor does it require them
to abandon their classification system or admit members who
do not reflect a cross section of the community. Indeed, by

we have no occasion in this case to consider the extent to which tile First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to associate in the many clubs
and other entities with selective membership that are found throughout
the country. Whether the "zone of privacy" established by the First
Amendment extends to a particular club or entity requires a careful in-
quiry into the objective characteristics of the particular relationships at
issue. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, supra, at 620. Cf. Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 179-180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
 BD. OF DIRS. OF ROTARY INT'L v. ROTARY CLUB

537 Opinion of the Court

opening membership to leading business and professional

women in the community, Rotary Clubs are likely to obtain a
more representative cross section of community leaders with
a broadened capacity for service.
Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight infringe-
ment on Rotary members' right of expressive association,
that infringement is justified because it serves the State's
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam) (right of association may be limited by state regu-
lations necessary to serve a compelling interest unrelated to
the suppression of ideas). On its face the Unruh Act, like the
Minnesota public accommodations law we considered in Rob-
erts, makes no distinctions on the basis of the organization's
viewpoint. Moreover, public accommodations laws "plainly
serv[e] compelling state interests of the highest order." 468
U. S., at 624. In Roberts we recognized that the State's com-
pelling interest in assuring equal access to women extends to
the acquisition of leadership skills and business contacts as
well as tangible goods and services. Id., at 626. The Unruh
Act plainly serves this interest. We therefore hold that
application of the Unruh Act to California Rotary Clubs does
not violate the right of expressive association afforded by
the First Amendment.
III
Finally, appellants contend that the Unruh Act is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. We conclude that these
contentions were not properly presented to the state courts.

7
In 1980 women were reported to make up 40.6 percent of the mana-
gerial and professional labor force in the United States. U. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 400 (1986).
'Appellants assert that admission of women will impair Rotary's effec-
tiveness as an international organization. This argument is undercut by
the fact that the legal effect of the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal is limited to the State of California. See supra, at 543. Appel-
lants' argument also is undermined by the fact that women already attend
the Rotary Clubs' meetings and participate in many of their activities.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1986

Opinion of the Court 481 U. S.

It is well settled that this Court will not review a final judg-
ment of a state court unless "the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented in the state system." Webb v.
Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 496-497 (1981). Appellants did not
present the issues squarely to the state courts until they filed
their petition for rehearing with the Court of Appeal. The
court denied the petition without opinion. When "'the
highest state court has failed to pass upon a federal ques-
tion, it will be assumed that the omission was due to want of
proper presentation in the state courts, unless the aggrieved
party in this Court can affirmatively show the contrary.""'
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983)
(quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U. S. 40, 50, n. 11 (1974) (in
turn quoting Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 582 (1969))).
Appellants have made no such showing in this case. 9

IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of California is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE SCALIA concurs in the judgment.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part
in the consideration or decision of this case.

'Appellants point toa passage in the brief they filed in the California
Court of Appeal that quotes this Court's opinion in NAACP v. Button, 371
U. S. 415, 435 (1963): "'It is enough [for unconstitutionality] that a vague
and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular
causes."' Brief for Respondents in B001663 (Cal. Ct. App.), p. 26 (brack-
ets in original) (quoted in Brief for Appellants 37-37). The quotation oc-
curs in the course of an argument that the Unruh Act should be applied
only to memberships in entities that are a vehicle for the public sale of
goods, services, or commercial advantages. This casual reference to a fed-
eral case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a
state court that it has been presented with a claim subject to our appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2).