Manuel T. Fragante, Plaintiff-appellant, v.

City
and County of Honolulu; Eileen Anderson; Peter
Leong;dennis Kamimura; George Kuwahara;
Kalanimccandless, Defendants-appellees, 888
F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)
Argued and Submitted Nov. 17, 1988. Decided March 6, 1989. Amended Oct. 23, 1989

William D. Hushijo and Mari J. Matsuda, Honolulu, Hawaii for plaintiff/appellant.

Gilbert C. Doles, Deputy Corporate Counsel, City & County of Honolulu, Hawaii, for
defendants/appellees.

Susan Buckingham Reilly, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Equal Opportunity Com'n, Washington,
D.C., and Jose Roberto Juarez, Jr., Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, for amici.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.

Before O'SCANNLAIN and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and KAY* , District Judge.

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

Manuel Fragante applied for a clerk's job with the City and County of Honolulu
(Defendants). Although he placed high enough on a civil service eligible list to be
chosen for the position, he was not selected because of a perceived deficiency in
relevant oral communication skills caused by his "heavy Filipino accent." Fragante
brought suit, alleging that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his
national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. At the conclusion of a trial,
the district court found that the oral ability to communicate effectively and clearly was a
legitimate occupational qualification for the job in question. This finding was based on
the court's understanding that an important aspect of defendant's business--for which a
clerk would be responsible--involved the providing of services and assistance to the
general public. The court also found that defendant's failure to hire Fragante was
explained by his deficiencies in the area of oral communication, not because of his
national origin. Finding no proof of a discriminatory intent or motive by the defendant,
the court dismissed Fragante's complaint, 699 F. Supp. 1429, and he appeals. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.

* FACTS
In April 1981, at the age of sixty, Fragante emigrated from the Philippines to Hawaii. In
response to a newspaper ad, he applied in November of 1981 for the job at issue in this
appeal--an entry level Civil Service Clerk SR-8 job for the City of Honolulu's Division of
Motor Vehicles and Licensing. The SR-8 clerk position involved such tasks as filing,
processing mail, cashiering, orally providing routine information to the "sometimes
contentious" public over the telephone and at an information counter, and obtaining
supplies. Fragante scored the highest of 721 test takers on the written SR-8 Civil
Service Examination which tested, among other things, word usage, grammar and
spelling. Accordingly, he was ranked first on a certified list of eligibles for two SR-8 clerk
positions, an achievement of which he is understandably quite proud.
Fragante then was interviewed in the normal course of the selection process--as were
other applicants--by George Kuwahara, the assistant licensing administrator, and Kalani
McCandless, the division secretary. Both Kuwahara and McCandless were personally
familiar with the demands of the position at issue, and both had extensive experience
interviewing applicants to the division. During the interview, Kuwahara stressed that the
position involved constant public contact and that the ability to speak clearly was one of
the most important skills required for the position.
Both Kuwahara and McCandless had difficulty understanding Fragante due to his
pronounced Filipino accent, and they determined on the basis of the oral interview that
he would be difficult to understand both at the information counter and over the
telephone. Accordingly, both interviewers gave Fragante a negative recommendation.
They noted he had a very pronounced accent and was difficult to understand. It was
their judgment that this would interfere with his performance of certain aspects of the
job. As a consequence, Mr. Fragante dropped from number one to number three on the
list of eligibles for the position.
Under the city's civil service rules, the Department of Motor Vehicles and Licensing, as
the appointing authority, is allowed discretion in selecting applicants for the clerk
vacancies. City Civil Service Rule 4.2(d) allows the defendants to select any of the top
five eligibles without regard to their rank order.1 The essence of this rule was clearly
stated in the employment announcement posted for the SR-8 position:

The names of the "top five" qualified applicants with the highest examination grades will
be referred to the employing agency in the order of their examination grade and
availability for employment according to Civil Service Rules. The employing agency may
select any one of the eligibles referred. Those not selected will remain on the list for at
least one year for future referrals.
In accord with this process, the two other applicants who were judged more qualified
than Fragante and who therefore placed higher than he on the final list got the two
available jobs, and he was so notified by mail.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Fragante filed a claim under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act against the City and County of Honolulu, alleging he was discriminated
against because of his accent. The district court relied on the results of the oral
interview and found that Fragante's oral skills were "hampered by his accent or manner
of speaking." The court found no evidence of unlawful discrimination in violation of Title
VII, concluding that Fragante lacked the "bona fide occupational requirement" 2 of being
able to communicate effectively with the public, and dismissed his claim.

II

DISCUSSION
The ultimate question of discrimination is generally considered a finding of fact subject
on review to the clearly erroneous standard. United States Postal Service v. Aiken, 460
U.S. 711, 715-16, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 1481-82, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1983); Alaniz v.
California Processors, Inc., 785 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1986). However, such
findings based on an erroneous application of law are reviewable as questions of law.
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66
(1982); Alaniz, 785 F.2d at 1416.
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion
and national origin. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1) (1982). A plaintiff may bring an action
against an employer under a disparate treatment and/or disparate impact theory.
Fragante's action was brought under the disparate treatment theory.
In disparate treatment cases, the employer is normally alleged to have "treat [ed] a
person less favorably than others because of the person's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin...." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335 n. 15, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1977). The plaintiff has the
initial burden in such a case of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima
facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93
S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must offer evidence
that "give [s] rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809
F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)).
Plaintiffs commonly prove a prima facie case by showing that the four factors set forth in
McDonnell Douglas are present. To accomplish this, a plaintiff such as Fragante must
show: (1) that he has an identifiable national origin; (2) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected
despite his qualifications; and (4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications. Id. "Title VII's nature and purpose require that the McDonnell Douglas test
be flexible." Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 700 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 511, 83 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1984). The burden of
establishing a prima facie case for disparate treatment is not onerous. Burdine, 450
U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093-94. A determination of whether a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case will depend on the facts of each case. Id.
Once the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by "articulating some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse action. Id. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. After
the employer presents legitimate reasons for plaintiff's non-selection, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff, and he must show--if he can--that the employer's purported reason for
non-selection was "a pretext for invidious discrimination". Id. at 252-53, 101 S. Ct. at
1093. To succeed in carrying the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination, a
plaintiff may establish a pretext either directly, by showing that the employer was more
likely motivated by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly, by showing the employer's
proffered reason is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095.
Defendants first argue Fragante failed to meet his burden of proving a prima facie case
because he failed to show he was actually qualified for the SR-8 clerk position, a
position which requires the applicant to be able to communicate clearly and effectively.
Fragante, on the other hand, contends he was qualified for the position. As proof he
points to his exceptional score on the objective written examination, and he argues that
his speech, though heavily accented, was deemed comprehensible by two expert
witnesses at trial. Fragante's position is supported by the approach taken by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission which submits that a plaintiff who proves he has
been discriminated against solely because of his accent does establish a prima facie
case of national origin discrimination. Bell v. Home Life Insurance Co., 596 F. Supp.
1549, 1554-55 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Carino v. University of Oklahoma, 25 FEP Cases 1332,
1336-37 (W.D. Okla. 1981), aff'd, 750 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1984). See also Berke v. Ohio
Dept. of Public Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (court upheld
determination that discrimination on the basis of foreign accent was a sufficient basis for
finding national origin discrimination). This contention is further supported by EEOC
guidelines which define discrimination to include "the denial of equal employment
opportunity ... because an individual has the ... linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1606.1 (1988). Furthermore, Fragante was never advised
that he was not qualified for the job: he was only told that he was less-qualified than his
competition.
Because we find that Fragante did not carry the ultimate burden of proving national
origin discrimination, however, the issue of whether Fragante established a prima facie
case of discrimination is not significant, and we assume without deciding that he did.
Preliminarily, we do well to remember that this country was founded and has been built
in large measure by people from other lands, many of whom came here--especially after
our early beginnings--with a limited knowledge of English. This flow of immigrants has
continued and has been encouraged over the years. From its inception, the United
States of America has been a dream to many around the world. We hold out promises
of freedom, equality, and economic opportunity to many who only know these words as
concepts. It would be more than ironic if we followed up our invitation to people such as
Manuel Fragante with a closed economic door based on national origin discrimination. It
is no surprise that Title VII speaks to this issue and clearly articulates the policy of our
nation: unlawful discrimination based on national origin shall not be permitted to exist in
the workplace. But, it is also true that there is another important aspect of Title VII: the
"preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of choice." Price Waterhouse v. Ann
B. Hopkins, --- U.S. ----, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989). In that regard, the
court said:
To begin with, the existence of the BFOQ exception shows Congress' unwillingness to
require employers to change the very nature of their operations in response to the
statute. And our emphasis on "business necessity" in disparate-impact cases, see
Watson and Griggs, and on "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [s]" in disparate-
treatment cases, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981), results from our awareness of Title
VII's balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives.

***
When an employer ignored the attributes enumerated in the statute, Congress hoped, it
naturally would focus on the qualifications of the applicant or employee. The intent to
drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national
origin is the theme of a good deal of the statute's legislative history.

***

Indeed, the very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job
qualifications,....
Id. 109 S. Ct. at 1786-87.
With this guidance in mind, and particularly its focus on employment qualifications, we
proceed to the task at hand.
C. Proof of an Ultimate Case of Discrimination
We turn our discussion to whether defendants articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Fragante's nonselection. We find that they did, but to this
finding we add a note of caution to the trial courts. Accent and national origin are
obviously inextricably intertwined in many cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in
this context for an employer unlawfully discriminating against someone based on
national origin to state falsely that it was not the person's national origin that caused the
employment or promotion problem, but the candidate's inability to measure up to the
communications skills demanded by the job. We encourage a very searching look by
the district courts at such a claim.3
An adverse employment decision may be predicated upon an individual's accent when--
but only when--it interferes materially with job performance. There is nothing improper
about an employer making an honest assessment of the oral communications skills of a
candidate for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job performance. EEOC
Compliance Manual (CCH) p 4035 at 3877-78 (1986); see also Mejia v. New York
Sheraton Hotel, 459 F. Supp. 375, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Dominican chambermaid
properly denied promotion to front desk because of her "inability to articulate clearly or
coherently and to make herself adequately understood in ... English"); Carino v.
University of Oklahoma Board of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff
with a "noticeable" Filipino accent was improperly denied a position as supervisor of a
dental laboratory where his accent did not interfere with his ability to perform
supervisory tasks); Berke, 628 F.2d at 981 (employee with "pronounced" Polish accent
whose command of English was "well above that of the average adult American" was
improperly denied two positions because of her accent).
The defendants advertised for applicants to fill SR-8 vacancies. The initial job
announcement listed the ability to "deal tactfully and effectively with the public" as one
of the areas to be tested. There is no doubt from the record that the oral ability to
communicate effectively in English is reasonably related to the normal operation of the
clerk's office. A clerk must be able to respond to the public's questions in a manner
which the public can understand. In this regard, the district court in its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order made the following significant observations:

The job is a difficult one because it involves dealing with a great number of disgruntled
members of the public. The clerk must deal with 200-300 people a day, many of whom
are angry or complaining and who do not want to hear what the clerk may have to
explain concerning their applications or an answer to their questions. It is a high
turnover position where people leave quickly because of the high stress involving daily
contact with contentious people.
(Clerk's Record 30 at 7).
What must next be determined is whether defendants established a factual basis for
believing that Fragante would be hampered in performing this requirement. Defendants
submit that because his accent made Fragante difficult to understand as determined by
the interview, he would be less able to perform the job than other applicants. Fragante,
on the other hand, contends he is able to communicate effectively in English as
established by two expert witnesses at trial and by his responses in open court. In
essence, he argues his non-selection was effectively based upon national origin
discrimination.
After the interview, Kuwahara and McCandless scored Fragante on a rating sheet that
was used for all applicants. Applicants were scored in the categories of appearance,
speech, self-confidence, emotional control, alertness, initiative, personality, attitude,
work experience, and overall fitness for the job. A scale of 1-10 was used. Kuwahara
gave Fragante a score of 3 for speech, and noted: "very pronounced accent, difficult to
understand." Although McCandless did not enter a score in the speech category, she
noted: "Heavy Filipino accent. Would be difficult to understand over the telephone."
After the interviews were scored, Kuwahara and McCandless reviewed the scores,
discussed the applicants, and decided on their hiring recommendation to finance
director Peter Leong. In making the recommendation, written examination scores were
given no consideration. Kuwahara prepared the written recommendation to Leong,
dated April 13, 1982, recommending two others for selection. Fragante in his position as
Number 3 on the final list was described as follows:

3. Manuel Fragante--Retired Phillippine (sic) army officer. Speaks with very pronounced
accent which is difficult to understand. He has 37 years of experience in management
administration and appears more qualified for professional rather than clerical work.
However, because of his accent, I would not recommend him for this position.
(P.Ex. A at 9; P.Ex. N).
McCandless then notified Fragante that he was not selected for either of the clerk
position vacancies. Pursuant to a request from Fragante, Kuwahara then reduced the
matter to writing. In a letter, dated June 28, 1982, the reasons why he was not selected
were articulated as follows:

As to the reason for your non-selection, we felt the two selected applicants were both
superior in their verbal communication ability. As we indicated in your interview, our
clerks are constantly dealing with the public and the ability to speak clearly is one of the
most important skills required for the position. Therefore, while we were impressed with
your educational and employment history, we felt the applicants selected would be
better able to work in our office because of their communication skills.
(P.Ex. A at 10; P.Ex. Q).
Thus, the interviewers' record discloses Fragante's third place ranking was based on his
"pronounced accent which is difficult to understand." Indeed, Fragante can point to no
facts which indicate that his ranking was based on factors other than his inability to
communicate effectively with the public. This view was shared by the district court.
Although the district court determined that the interview lacked some formality as to
standards, instructions, guidelines, or criteria for its conduct and that the rating sheet
was inadequate, the court also found that these "insufficiencies" were irrelevant with
respect to plaintiff's complaint of unlawful discrimination. A review of the record reveals
nothing that would impeach this assessment. Kuwahara and McCandless recorded their
evaluation of Fragante's problem in separate written remarks on their rating sheets. As
such, a legitimate factual basis for this conclusion that Fragante would be less able than
his competition to perform the required duties was established.
Fragante argues the district court erred in considering "listener prejudice" as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failure to hire. We find, however, that the district
court did not determine defendants refused to hire Fragante on the basis that some
listeners would "turn off" a Filipino accent. The district court after trial noted that:
"Fragante, in fact, has a difficult manner of pronunciation and the Court further finds as
a fact from his general testimony that he would often not respond directly to the
questions as propounded. He maintains much of his military bearing." We regard the
last sentence of the court's comment to be little more than a stray remark of no moment.
We do not find the court's conclusion clearly erroneous. We find support for our view in
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil., 653 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), where this court held
inability to communicate effectively to be one valid ground for finding a job applicant not
qualified.
Having established that defendants articulated a legitimate reason for Fragante's non-
selection, our next inquiry is whether the reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.
Fragante essentially argues that defendant's selection and evaluation procedures were
so deficient as to render the proffered reason for non-selection nothing more than a
pretext for national origin discrimination. The problem with this argument, however, is
that on examination it is only a charge without substance. The process may not have
been perfect, but it reveals no discriminatory motive or intent. Search as we have, we
have not been able to find even a hint of a mixed motive such as existed in Price
Waterhouse. Instead, it appears that defendants were motivated exclusively by
reasonable business necessity.
Fragante's counsel attempts to cast this case as one in which his client was denied a
job simply because he had a difficult accent. This materially alters what actually
happened. Fragante failed to get the job because two competitors had superior
qualifications with respect to a relevant task performed by a government clerk. Insofar
as this implicates "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees ...," Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1735, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), it is not
something we are permitted to ignore. Title VII does not stand for the proposition that a
person in a protected class--or a person with a foreign accent--shall enjoy a position of
advantage thereby when competing for a job against others not similarly protected. Cf.
Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285, 97 S. Ct. 568, 575, 50 L. Ed.
2d 471 (1977). And, the record does not show that the jobs went to persons less
qualified than Fragante: to the contrary.
Under our holding in Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., 651 F. 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1980),
" [a]n employer's decision may be justified by the hired employee's superior
qualifications unless the purported justification is a pretext for invidious discrimination."
Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276. In this case, there is simply no proof whatsoever of
pretext, and we do not find the district court's finding of "no discrimination" to be clearly
erroneous.
In sum, the record conclusively shows that Fragante was passed over because of the
deleterious effect of his Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not merely
because he had such an accent.
The district court is
AFFIRMED.
*

Honorable Alan C. Kay, United States District Judge, District of Hawaii, sitting by
designation
1

Obviously the "rule of five" does not confer upon defendant a license to discriminate
unlawfully against an applicant. We note that the validity of the "rule of five" per se was
not challenged by Fragante and is not an issue on this appeal
2

Although the district judge used the language of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1), it is clear
from the record that he did so only to describe the legitimacy of the defendant's reasons
for the adverse action, not to invoke the statute itself
3

The EEOC cautions that denying employment opportunities because of an individual's