BELGICA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OCHOA c.

Principle of Checks and Balances

G.R. No. 208566 November 29, 2013 One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the
power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
FACTS: may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel system has been which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The given power of the President useless.”
allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the d. Local Autonomy
allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manner: manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
Presidential Pork Barrel own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by
the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since the LDC and later on claim it as his own.
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
about 1983. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
ISSUES: because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
a. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel Constitution which provides:
system is constitutional.
b. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
constitutional. Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general
RULING: appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is

unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates
the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the
GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system,
what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which
projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. This is also
highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of
referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
 FULGENCIO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA

the dates showing when they received notice of the NLRC’s
June 16, 1998 decision, and the date when they filed a
motion for reconsideration therefrom, in violation of
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition
the required explanation under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
same Rules as to why personal service upon the
respondents was not resorted to; hence, the dismissal
thereof by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the

application of the provisions of the Rules of Court impede
the cause of justice.

RULING:

Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense

override substantial justice. It is a far better and more
prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain
the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.
 VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002 G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005

FACTS: FACTS:

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly filed to annul the employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the
forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on
receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for
hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica,
NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-
Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees:
her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia prior James Alueta and Eden Kiamco and (3) oppression against
to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of
allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was
after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows due for release. Fact-finding investigation was conducted
Orly’s affection and care towards her. by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was
referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee
ISSUE: of Peers which initially recommended that the
investigation be converted into one solely for purposes of
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied
case at bar. by the Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand
of the Office of the Ombudsman that the Deputy
RULING: Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not
removable through impeachment.
The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and
intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that Orly ISSUES:
is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have a. Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are
the pending appealed bigamy case to be dismissed. On the impeachable.
merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not b. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be
concretely established. He was not able to prove that there held criminally and/or administratively liable.
was a reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear to be
created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done RULING:
against him by Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard
who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat Criminal and administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman
he so described done against him is not sufficient enough as to whether or not the private respondent, then Deputy
to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in
an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible favor of the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable
and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same
the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment
half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia’s presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment
contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the he is no longer in office because of his removal,
marriage. resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to
his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement
bar an administrative investigation from proceeding
against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out
by the petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have
been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections
12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
 YAO KEE v. SY GONZALES URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988 G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

FACTS: FACTS:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec.
leaving behind properties here in the Philippines. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085 otherwise known
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of
grant of letters of administration alleging that they are the Davao City which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly
children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law
Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had personal matters to
China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name
opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a “Oscar Perez” when he was requested to sign. However,
decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was
Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in able to know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not
accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the Deputy
moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be
granted. accordingly charged. Petitioner comes for review of his
conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid
in accordance with Philippine laws. Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be
acquitted on the ground that he was charged under the
RULING: wrong law.

Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that RULING:

Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime
To establish the validity of marriage, the existence of charged. Time and again the SC has decreed that the
foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. For be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied. Thus in
failure to prove the foreign law or custom and construing a statute the reason for its enactment should
consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with
Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court
jurisdiction of Philippine courts. may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law
makers.
 LLORENTE v. COURT OF APPEALS VAN DORN v. ROMILLO
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS: FACTS:

Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines who
enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines married Richard Upton, a citizen of the United States in
Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Hongkong. After 10 years of marriage and two children,
Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the they got divorced in Nevada, United States of America,
conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American where the petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van
citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Dorn. One year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with
Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to the Regional Trial Court Branch 115 in Pasay City praying to
visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula for the accounting of the business, the Galleon Shop, and
was living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December to be given the right to manage the business, on the
1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth ground that the business is conjugal property. He further
certificate saying that the child was illegitimate, and the contends that the divorce is not valid and binding in the
father’s name was left blank. Philippines, as it is contrary to local law and public policy,
therefore he has legal standing to claim said property. On
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written her part, the petitioner filed for dismissal of the civil case
agreement, dissolving their marital union, suspending his contending that the private respondent is estopped from
support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because in
of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and the divorce proceedings, by which the alien spouse is
filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On bound, the private respondent agreed that they had no
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the community property. The RTC denied the motion to
Philippines; after which, they bore three children: Raul, dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the
Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, Philippines so the divorce decree has no bearing in the
bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. case. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died
in 1985. ISSUE:

ISSUE: Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from the

Filipina spouse, has legal standing on the alleged conjugal
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from assets, in the Philippines?
the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.
RULING:
RULING:
No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the Philippines
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from as it is against morals, good customs and public policy.
the case are governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which the
called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was Philippines may recognize, provided they are valid
referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the Nevada, USA is valid, thus, in the spirit of comity, it is
domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when recognized as also valid in the Philippines. Hence, the
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. The case was private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his
remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
of the will of the deceased. over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he
has no legal standing in the Philippine court as husband of
the petitioner as the divorce legally dissolved their
marriage. He is further estopped by his own
representation before the foreign Court in the divorce
proceedings, from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. To maintain the petitioner to still be
legally obligated to the divorced husband is a
discrimination against her in her own country. Hence, it is
only just that the petition be granted. The civil case against
petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.
 AZNAR v. GARCIA BELLIS v. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS: FACTS:

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the
to California where he resided for a period of 9 years. In United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had
1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived
domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an him, he had three legitimate children, and three
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills,
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of one disposing of his Texas properties and the other
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 illegitimate children were not given anything. The
of the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that
under California law, the matter is referred back to the law they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they
of the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
averred that the national law of the deceased must apply,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under ISSUE:
California law.
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should
ISSUE: determine the successional rights of the illegitimate
children.
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be
applied in determining the successional rights of his heirs. RULING:

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not
entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The
rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
California on the matter; the internal law which applies to citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
Californians domiciled in California and the conflict rule for laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
court for further proceedings – the determination of the legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
successional rights under Philippine law only. Bellis.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.

.
 PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES
CORPORATION v. V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC. INC (IPAMS) v. DE VERA
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004 G.R. No. 205703 March 27. 2016

FACTS: FACTS:

The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services,
Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the Inc. (IPAMS) is a local placement agency duly organized
construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy-Medical and existing under Philippine laws. Arriola was then hired
Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS,
Contracting Company for a total contract price of about and his overseas employment contract was processed with
$18M. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In a
Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, letter of understanding, dated June 5, 2008, SNC-Lavalin
entered into a joint venture agreement with Ayjal wherein confirmed Arriola's assignment in the Ambatovy Project.
the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, According to Arriola, he signed the contract of
while the latter would be entitled to a commission of 4%. employment in the Philippines. On June 9, 2008, Arriola
3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola
Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its received a notice of pre-termination of employment, dated
rights and interests to VPECI. September 9, 2009, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his
employment would be pre-terminated effective
ISSUE: September 11, 2009 due to diminishing workload in the
area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative
What law should be applied in determining whether the assignments. Consequently, on September 15, 2009,
respondent contractor has defaulted in the performance of Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited in Arriola's
its obligations under the service contract? bank account his pay amounting to Two Thousand Six
Hundred Thirty Six Dollars and Eight Centavos
RULING: (CA$2,636.80), based on Canadian labor law. Aggrieved,
Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal
No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation
expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
most legal systems, however, is that the intrinsic validity of
a contract must be governed by the lex contractus or ISSUE:
“proper law of the contract.” Lex contractus may either be
the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci Whether or not respondent Arriola was validly dismissed
voluntatis-expressly provided) or the law intended by them pursuant to the employment contract and when should an
either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis- overseas labor contract be governed by a foreign law?
impliedly).
RULING:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were in unison
that the respondent contractor cannot be considered to The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to
have defaulted in its obligations because the cause of the overseas employment contracts. This rule is rooted in the
delay was not primarily attributable to it. The delay or the constitutional provision of Section 3, Article XIII that the
non -completion of the Project was caused by factors not State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or
imputable to the respondent contractor. It was rather overseas. Hence, even if the OFW has his employment
due mainly to the persistent violations by SOB of the terms abroad, it does not strip him of his rights to security of
and conditions of the contract, particularly its failure to tenure, humane conditions of work and a living wage
pay 75% of the accomplished work in US Dollars. Indeed, under our Constitution.
where one of the parties to a contract does not perform in
a proper manner the prestation which he is bound to Further, it was shown that the overseas labor contract was
perform under the contract, he is not entitled to demand executed by Arriola at his residence in Batangas and it was
the performance of the other party. A party does not incur processed at the POEA on May 26, 2008. Considering that
in delay if the other party fails to perform the obligation no foreign law was specified in the contract and the same
incumbent upon him. was executed in the Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci
celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern
the overseas employment of Arriola.
 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

Facts:

Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-

19988. During his last year, 1st semester, he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he
was given an incomplete grade remarks. He filed an
application for removal of the incomplete grade given by
Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after the payment
of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and
on May 30, 1988 the professor gave him a grade of 5.The
commencement exercise of UE College of law was held
April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared.
In preparation for the bar exam, he took a leave of
absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had
his pre-bar class review in FEU. Upon learning of such
deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able
to take the bar exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting
to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations due to UE’s negligence.

Issue:

Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student

into believing JADER satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral
damages?

Ruling:

Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of

negligence and this liable to respondent for the latter’s
actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to
inform the students of their academic status and not wait
for the latter to inquire from the former. However,
respondent should not have been awarded moral damages
though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he
was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations as what Court of
Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify
for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a
senior law student, he should have been responsible in
ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation
with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking
the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are other
prerequisites such as documentation and submission of
requirements which prospective examinee must meet.
Wherefore, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint
until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit.
The award of moral damages is deleted.
HEIRS OF NALA v. CABANSAG
G.R. No. 161188 June 13, 2008

FACTS:

Respondent Artemio Cabansag filed a case for damages in

October 1991. According to respondent, he bought a 50-
square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr.
and Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990. Said property is
part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of
the Gomez spouses. In October 1991, he received a
demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prad, in behalf of
Purisima Nala, asking for the payment of rentals from 1987
to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is
owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will
be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent on
May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent
suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in

good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his
client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of
ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an
800-square meter property owned by her late husband,
Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two
parts. The 400-square meter property was conveyed to
spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for
the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of
spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only
renting the property which he occupies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages.

RULING:

Article 19 of the Civil code states that, “Every person must,

in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” The foregoing provision sets the
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. A person should be protected only when he
acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he
acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts
with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when
it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established,
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be
no intention to injure another. In order to be liable for
damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or
 GO v. CORDERO the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010 After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers
from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson,
FACTS: an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is
the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of (AFFA).
Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent a. Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal
Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator personality to sue the respondents for breach of
of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; contract; and
Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two b. Whether the respondents may be held liable for
(2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties and termination of his exclusive distributorship
executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high- appointment by the principal, AFFA.
speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and
Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling RULING:
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the
sale of each vessel. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference
with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more
than the amount for which the party who was inducted to
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in break the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go,
favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable
Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January for the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from
29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside the US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson
trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship
before the Supreme Court is a consolidation of the agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents
(G.R. No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747). having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be
recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
 VILLANUEVA v. ROSQUETA RTC’s decision, holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010 refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order
issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the
FACTS: right to recover moral damages from him.

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly ISSUE:

Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner
tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on Villanueva liable in damages to respondent Rosqueta for
January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal- ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, issued in the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539),
2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy
enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized
against her will on orders of her superior. as such public officer.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil RULING:

Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosqueta’s position.
Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the
for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right
petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.
Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner Villanueva, Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the
Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury
injunction order before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.
G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its
own TRO, enjoining the implementation of the RTC’s But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged
injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government official
CA eventually dismissed the petition before it. of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since
But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent
stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong and Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That
incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad
RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally replaced faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the
her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner.
Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the
 CUSTODIO v. COURT OF APPEALS EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION v. CALDERON
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996 G.R. No. 156168 December 14, 2004

FACTS: FACTS:

Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several
apartment was erected. Said property was surrounded by business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity
other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio as president or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a
and spouses Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from stockholder of PLDT and a member of Manila Polo Club,
the subject property, there are two possible passageways. among others. He is a seasoned traveller, who travels at
The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. On
is about 20 meters distant from Mabasa’s residence to P. the other hand, Equitable Banking Corporation is one of
Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the the leading commercial banking institutions in the
previously mentioned row of houses. The second Philippines, engaged in commercial banking. Sometime in
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an
plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about Equitable International Visa card. The said Visa card can be
26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a used for both peso and dollar transactions within and
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso
meters in length, has to be traversed. Petitioners transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar
it narrower in width. account with a minimum deposit of $3,000, the balance of
dollar account shall serve as the credit limit. In April 1986,
ISSUE: Calderon together with some reputable business friends
and associates went to Hong Kong for business pleasure
Whether or not the award of damages is proper? trips. Specifically on April 30, 1986, Calderon accompanied
by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store
RULING: located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel HongKong.
There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items.
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00,
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the he used his Visa card to effect payment on the credit. He
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without who promptly referred it to the store cashier for
wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, informed him
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calder sought the
injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or threatened to cut it into pieces with a pair of scissors.
harm which results from the injury, and damages are the Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, Calderon paid cash
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage for the purchases.
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the ISSUE:
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted HELD:
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. loss or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for the damages resulting from
an act which does not amount to a legal injury. In other
words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for
damages, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty with the defendant owed to the
plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.
 NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. ROBERTO PE ET AL v. PE
REYES G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
FACTS:
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an
One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married
held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The party was man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that
being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in
in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who was also the love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents
executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, learned about this they prohibited defendant from going
she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known as Amay to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April
Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house
first tried to find out who invited Reyes to the party. When where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the
she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador. The present
Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told the latter, in a action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The
discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.
however made a scene and began shouting at Lim. Later, a
policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party. ISSUE:
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for
damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's
another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party Code.
immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart
however when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter HELD:
ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a
common criminal. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than
ISSUES: that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights. with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from
this chain of events than that defendant not only
HELD: deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused
credible. She has been employed by the hotel for more her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the
than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed
at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a scene in the and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,
party she was managing. That would only make her look good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
bad. 21 of the New Civil Code.

Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon

himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, by
coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the
risk of being turned away, and thus being embarrassed.
The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even
shows that Dr. Filart herself denied inviting Reyes into the
party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not
even present any supporting evidence to support any of
his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither
Lim nor Nikko Hotel can be held liable for damages.

 GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. COURT OF APPEALS NATIVIDAD v. TUNAC
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000

FACTS: FACTS:

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac
City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met grew up together in Barangay Quiling, Talisay, Batangas
Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and
from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio and Elisa Tunac,
got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One
said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding
the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in
parents where they expressed their intention to get connection with his application for employment. Upon
married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there.
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and, once
animals to slaughter for the occasion. Meanwhile, Marilou inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making
started living with Gashem in his apartment where they love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of her virginity, but
had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting
eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her,
told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod again promising her marriage. True enough, on October
City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several
damages. The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and
awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals asked her parents for the hand of their daughter. The two
affirmed the decision of the trial court. families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed Elsa's sister had gotten married that year, and they
marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family
have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, within the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with
being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for
and traditions. the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19,
1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after
ISSUES: five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from
the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct. back to her parents so her mother could take care of her
during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald
HELD: occasionally slept in Elsa's house. It seems that after Elsa's
miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards
Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of the former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads
Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed
marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Any act Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her.
contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Hence, this case. Petitioners succinctly contend they are
Code. The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 suing respondents not merely because Elsa became
was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his promise to
delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case marry her after their agreement had already been much
where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by publicized in their town.
existing laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human ISSUES:
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages.
the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries HELD:
that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by
be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), the Court of Appeals, our laws do not provide for a right to
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's
because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then promise to marry another, the chapter on breach of
actual damages may be recovered. promise to marry proposed by the Code Commission
having been deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code
apparently because of lessons from other countries,
particularly the United States and England, that the action
readily lends itself to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men.
 BEUMER v. AMORES VALENZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012 G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988

FACTS: FACTS:

Petitioner, a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA Carlos Telosa who is a fisherman and farmer with very
which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros Oriental. limited education acquired a loan from the Rural Bank of
Petitioner and Filipina respondent’s marriage was nullified Lucena. In exchange for the granted loan, his property
by basis of the former’s psychological incapacity. Petitioner located at Brgy. Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon, with an area
thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying of fifty thousand square metres was mortgaged. Several
for distribution of the properties acquired during their months after the said transaction, the Rural Bank of
marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired through Lucena became a distressed bank. The Monetary Board
purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled that all later decided to liquidate the Rural Bank of Lucena. Among
parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools and the assets inventoried was the mortgaged property of
equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two houses Carlos Telosa. In the document shown in the records of the
on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties. bank, it specified that the principal amount owed to them
by Carlos Telosa was P5,000.00. Carlos Telosa fully aware
ISSUE: of the fact that the obliged amount was only P300.00 not
P500.00 submitted an affidavit in protest of the demand
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC letter submitted to him. Claiming that payments did not
and CA? satisfied the whole balance of P9,032.22, the Central Bank
extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and sell
HELD: it in a public auction. To restrain the auction of
the mortgaged property, a complaint was filed by the
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own widow and children of Carlos Telosa before the Court of
lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions First Instance of Quezon seeking that the mortgage
to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of executed by Carlos Telosa is null and void.
foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142 are
considered co-owned by the parties. ISSUE:

Whether the extra judicial foreclosure of the property

should continue?

HELD:

The court has ruled that the heirs of Carlos Telosa are
entitled to the appeals they have submitted. Due to the
fact that the contract entered upon by Carlos Telosa was
anomalous in nature. This was proved by a receipt which
served as evidence showing that the receive amount was
on P300.00, and a testimony of Ponciano Mendoza who
was present during the transaction stating that Carlos
Telosa was made to sign blank forms by the Rural Bank of
Lucena. This then proves that the said bank has taken
advantage of the limited education of Carlos Telosa.
 RODRIGO CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. GEORGE MANANTAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000
FACTS:
FACTS:
In the evening of September 25, 1982, at the National
Sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Highway of Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, George Manantan
Nicolas resided at Pasig City, in an apartment leased to was driving a Toyota car going home. At that time, he was
them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also with Fiscal Ambrocio, Miguel Tabangin and Ruben Nicolas.
resided in the same compound where the apartment was Suddenly, a jeepney, coming from the opposite direction
located. Nestor Nicolas was then engaged in the business hit the driver side of the car, driven by Manantan.
of supplying government agencies and private entities with Consequently, Manantan, Ambrocio and Tabangin were
office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence injured while Nicolas died. Trial followed. The lower court
Concepcion joined this venture. Sometime in the second acquitted the accused of the crime of reckless imprudence
week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the resulting to homicide. The respondents filed their notice of
deceased husband of Florence, angrily accosted Nestor at appeal on the civil aspect of the lower court’s judgment.
the latter’s apartment and accused him of conducting an Even if the accused was acquitted from his criminal
adulterous relationship with Florence. liability, the Appellate Court held him civilly liable and
ordered him to indemnify the aggrieved party for the
Rodrigo threatened Florence over the telephone that death of Nicolas.
should something happen to his sick mother; in case the
latter learned about the affair, he would kill Florence. As a ISSUE:
result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme
embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no Whether or not the acquittal of petitioner extinguished his
longer face his neighbors. Consequently, he was forced to civil liability.
write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for
which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against RULING:
him for damages. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
Nestor Nicolas, hence this case. The acquittal was based on reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. Article 29 of the Civil Code provides that a
ISSUE: civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases.
Therefore, the accused cannot be exempted from paying
Whether or not the CA erred in granting damages to civil damages which may only be proven by preponderance
Nestor Nicolas and his spouse. of evidence. Manantan claimed that he was placed on
double jeopardy but the courts did not give merit to
RULING: this contention. The following elements must be present
for double jeopardy to exist: (1) A first jeopardy must have
The Court reject petitioner’s posture that no attached prior to the second; (2) The first jeopardy must
legal provision supports such award, the incident have terminated; and (3) the third jeopardy must be for
complained of neither falling under Art. 22, 19, nor Art. 26 the same offense as the first .In the case at bar, the initially
of the Civil Code. Damages therefore are allowable for put into jeopardy but he it was terminated by his
actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane, discharge. When the case was elevated to the Court of
insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. As Appeals, the issue was about the civil aspect of the
stated in the Civil Code, moral damages which include criminal case. Thus, there could be no double jeopardy.
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission. There is no question that private respondent
Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and
insulting language. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
therefore affirmed.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO CALANG v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014 G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010

FACTS: FACTS:

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of Petitioner Calang was driving a bus owned by Philtranco
this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao
Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the
awarded by the Government, through the Department of collision, the jeep’s driver, lost control of the vehicle, and
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine bumped and killed a bystander who was standing along
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, the highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3)
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III point of impact. Two of the jeep’s passengers were
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of serious physical injuries. The prosecution charged Calang
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries
violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of the RTC. RTC found Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC of reckless imprudence resulting [in] multiple homicide,
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of RTC.
to the government. On September 16, 2004, the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause ISSUE:
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Whether or not Philtranco may be held jointly and
severally liable with Calang.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and decided
a question of substance in a matter not in accordance with No. The RTC and the CA both erred in holding
law. Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang. He was
charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly,
HELD: Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the
cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under
in the Information and, as such, prosecution against Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and
respondent may not prosper. It is true that by reason of 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an
Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil
of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the liability arising from delict.
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not
mean that there was no public officer who allegedly
violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should
have been charged.
 HEIRS OF GUARING v. COURT OF APPEALS COJUANGCO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 108395 March 7, 1997 G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

FACTS: FACTS:

On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman
Jr. collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo owing several racehorses which he entered in the
Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18,
Enriquez, along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates,
Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring died. The landing first, second or third places, respectively, and
trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in winning prizes together with the 30% due for trainer and
the Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld
based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good
out that the deceased was the one who acted negligently. Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz. The Chairman
The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O.
civil case filed against him be extinguished since the Carrascoso, offered to give back the winnings but it was
extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is
the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil already in court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had
liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners no authority to withhold the winnings since there was no
disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG.
should pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Carrascoso feared that if he did not withhold the winning
Court. he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso
maintained that bad faith did not attend his acts therefore
ISSUE: he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that
he returned the principal amount of the winning
Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.
extinguished due to his acquittal.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus violation of his constitutional rights to due process.
driver was based on reasonable doubt, which means that
the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause RULING:
of action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict. Even if
damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi- The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for
delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery damages in accordance with Article 32 of the Civil Code.
of damages because the acquittal was based not on a Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
doubt. Thus, it has been held that the judgment of or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner
acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages,
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil in this case the right against deprivation of property
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal without due process of law. Carrascoso's decision to
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court as arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or
expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a
criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the clarification of the extent and coverage of the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed sequestration order issued against the properties of
by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not
and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts
based upon the criminal act of which the accused was done in the performance of official duties, the Court
acquitted. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the nevertheless states that bad faith is not necessary in
proceedings for the civil case of the said incident must praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs.
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the
civil liability of the accused.
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. CASTILLO BELTRAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013 G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

FACTS: FACTS:

Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16,
manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having four children,
cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground
style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the of psychological incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand
afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a
permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric meter. warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner
Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of filed for the suspension of the criminal case on
Permanent Light, proceeded to check the electric meter. concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification
Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the of their marriage is a prejudicial question.
electric meter was tampered and right there and then took
down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter ISSUE:
has been tampered with. Permanent Light agreed to pay
the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter. Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under
The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the
unusually high readings. The petitioners are now criminal case of concubinage.
requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since
it shows a more accurate reading. The respondents also RULING:
pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly
removed without following the required procedure. The The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to
RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
petitioner abused its rights when it disconnected the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the
electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
issue of damages to the Supreme Court. proceed. In the present case, the accused need not
present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he
ISSUE: can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment.
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be
violation of the constitutional rights of the respondent. allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as
RULING: there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being
exemplary damages for the violation of their constitutional prosecuted for concubinage.
rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4
of Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of
tampered electric meter should be personally witnessed
and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.
MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of
ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the
meter is tampered and they have no right to disconnect
the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima facie
evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 7832 provides that even if flagrante delicto, there
must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of
the house or the establishment concerned. In light or the
following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages
to Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured
rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for awards of
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including
the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law are violated.
 MERCED v. DIEZ PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960 G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010

FACTS: FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private
to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that he married Elizabeth by respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against
reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial
by Elizabeth’s relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a Court of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner
criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil
petition for the suspension of the criminal case on grounds case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration
of prejudicial question. of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February
ISSUE: 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a the existence of a prejudicial question.
prejudicial question.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the
bigamy, the subsequent marriage must have all the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the against petitioner.
subsistence of the first marriage. One of the essential
elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of RULING:
the contracting parties must be freely given. Without the
element of consent, a marriage would be illegal and void. No. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage
Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, under Article 36 is whether petitioner is psychologically
subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused
not lie unless all the elements concur, it is necessary then killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged
that a decision in a civil action must first be secured. with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of
their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We
cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that
the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned. First, the issue in
Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that
a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
 QUIMIGUING v. ICAO CATALAN v. BASA
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

FACTS: FACTS:

The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due
and confidential relations. Defendant Icao, although to his psychological incapacity of schizophrenia on October
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949.
plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and On June 1951 he donated a parcel of land to his sister
without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his
plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein
at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s
Accordingly, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause guardian filed an action or declaration of nullity od
of action since the complaint did not allege that the child documents and recovery of possession and ownership
had been born. The trial judge dismissed the complaint. alleging that the donation to Mercedes was void ab initio
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the
allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later donation, ipso facto, the sale to herein respondents are
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining void ab initio.
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of ISSUE:
action.
Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of
ISSUE: consent due to incapacity.

Whether or not the child is entitled to support? RULING:

RULING: In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to

give consent at the time of the donation is existing. There
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable given. However, the burden of proving such incapacity
to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof
the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to to this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant- evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient to
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent
purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is when he donated the property in question. A study of the
only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still
even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed be presumed capable of attending to his rights.
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by
the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary
heir, even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
 DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS MENDEZONA v. OZAMIZ
G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001 G.R. No. 143370 February 2, 2002

FACTS: FACTS:

Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on
sold them to spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan who their said respective titles caused by the inscription
claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They
claim to be her closest surviving relatives allegedly took ultimately trace their ownership to a deed of sale executed
possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the
sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking deed of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was
consideration. incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale.

ISSUE: ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale was void. Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the
incapacity of the seller.
RULING:
RULING:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract,
Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements
She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person which failed to show the true state of mind of Carmen
is not incompetent to contract merely because of Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. document. It has been held that a person is not
However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced
mental faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, years or by reason of physical infirmity. Only when such
intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then age or infirmity impairs her mental faculties to such extent
she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony as to prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly
shows that at the time of the execution of the deed, protecting her property rights is she considered
Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show
She played with her waste and urinated in bed. Given adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28,
these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her
doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for mental faculties.
her parcels of land.
 JOAQUIN v. NAVARRO BERNABE v. ALEJO
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953 G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

FACTS: FACTS:

On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and secretary Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September
Angela Joaquin, together with their children, Pilar, 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994,
Concepcion, Natividad, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to
latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
floor of the German Club. During their stay, the building Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate.
was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, Petitioners are challenging the petition on grounds that
and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code
started shooting at the people inside the building. The has retroactive application and hence, the manner of
three daughters were hit and fell of the ground thereafter proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the status of a legitimate child” must have been brought
building. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who within the lifetime of the putative parent.
refused to join them but Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, and
the latter's wife, and a friend and former neighbor, ISSUE:
Francisco Lopez, rushed out of the burning structure. As
they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head. Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive
The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club application in the case.
premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later after the
incident, the German Club collapsed, trapping many RULING:
people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Adela Conde, and Francisco Lopez The right to an action for recognition which was granted by
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and stayed Article 285 of the Civil Code has already vested to Adrian
there until February 10, 1915. They fled toward the St. prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is
Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but one which is absolute, complete and unconditional to the
unfortunately were killed by Japanese Patrols, who fired at exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
the refugees. immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. Certainly the retroactive effect of the family
ISSUE: code finds no application in this case.

Whether or not section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of

Court, has repealed article 43 of the New Civil Code
applicable in the case.

RULING:

It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and

that on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence,
as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to
have died at the same time. The point is not of much if any
relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when
absolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant
because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is
applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth. It is
manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123
and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of
the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can
be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
 ANCHETA v. ANCHETA ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004 A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

FACTS: FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of
They had eight children. On December 1992, respondent herein respondent Judge. Respondent stands charged with
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption
children. On January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case unbecoming of a Judge. It is alleged that he has
for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan
separation of property with a plea for support and during the existence of a previous marriage, represented
pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties executed a himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He
compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry also caused the registration of his three illegitimate
again filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with children as legitimate.
petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
was never served the summons because of ISSUE:
misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the
marriage declared void and null. Petitioner now seeks a Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.
new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the
marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction. RULING:

ISSUE: Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having

scandalously and openly cohabited with said Priscilla
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial. Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with
Teresita Tabiliran. It makes mockery of the inviolability and
RULING: sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not
only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
never gained jurisdiction of her, hence the decision null Consequently, every intendment of the law leans towards
and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases legalizing matrimony. Respondent Judge is dismissed from
of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage service.
the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that there can be no
defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal
separation. The court just did the opposite as mandated by
the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is
committed to the basic policy of strengthening the family
as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
motion for a new trial is granted.
 DELA ROSA v. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN BALOGBOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006 G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

FACTS: FACTS:

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
intestate, but they died without descendants. Guillermo Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate. They had an older
outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their
respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights parents. Private respondents on the other hand are the
to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such
of her half and fullblood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s are entitled to inherit from the estate of their
side, his sisters, nephews and nieces, illegitimate child and grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not marry
de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.
administration stated that Guillermo and Rustia were
never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her ISSUE:
natural siblings. Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one
Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit Whether or not there the presumption of marriage
of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon between Gavino and Catalino was successfully overcome.
Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa’s
estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is RULING:
barred from inheriting from Josefa by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man
illegitimate families. and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by
ISSUE: cogent proof of which the petitioners failed to do so.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof
Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon. that no marriage took place. Private respondents proved
through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina
RULING: were married and that their children were recognized as
legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing marriage because the State is interested in the
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a matter
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper of constitutional concern.
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.
Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that
no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of
marriage arises other evidences may be presented just as
herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa
Rustia, the declaration under oath of Guilermo that he was
married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the
existence of marriage. Guillermo and Josefa are married.
Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and
evidence presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can inherit
from Josefa.
 CALIMAG v. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ TE v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 191936 June 1, 2016 G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS: FACTS:

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex
subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz reassignment surgery, sought to have his first name
(Silvestra). Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from male to
Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. female. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual,
Poblete Vda. De Macapaz (Fidela). The subject property that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and female" and that he had always identified himself with
Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. girls since childhood.
183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No.
02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal
asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG,
property measuring 49.5 sq. m. reversed the trial court decision, holding that there is no
law allowing the change of entries of either name or sex in
ISSUE: the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

Whether or not Anastasio, Sr. and Fidela were married, ISSUE:

therefore, respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed
RULING: on the ground of sex reassignment.

Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be HELD:

proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage sex reassignment. The State has an interest in the names
between his parents. Thus, in order to prove their borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the NSO Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
where Fidela signed as the informant. A perusal of said
documents shows that the respondents were apparently
born to the same parents their father’s name is Anastacio
Nator Macapaz, while their mother’s maiden name is
Fidela Overa Poblete. The respondents’ certificates of live
birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had
openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of
years, as a result of which they had two children the
second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three
years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is
admissible proof to establish the validity of marriage.

Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that,

persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage.”
 REPUBLIC v. CAGANDAHAN gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008 has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
FACTS: Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her development and maturation. In the absence of evidence
Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of
suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
likewise has no breasts, nor menstruation. Subsequently, protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as
she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted personal judgment of being a male.
possess secondary male characteristics because of too
much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to
her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a
petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male
and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the correction of entries in her birth

certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the

term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us say a
disorder that respondent is undergoing. Intersexuality
applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either
male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia,
and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be
neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics
of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing,
the highest tribunal of the land considers the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to
outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes
apparently compels that a person be classified either as a
male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by
mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts
must render judgment based on law and the evidence
presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that
evidence points that respondent is male. In determining
respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in
the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court
held that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a
female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold
of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
 REPUBLIC v. ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

FACTS:

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and

Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage on December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. Fringer did not file his
answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to
set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After
the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel, and prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC

opined that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum $2,000.00. However, she did
not pay Fringer the amount because the latter never
processed her petition for citizenship. The OSG filed an
appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lack in.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole

purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?

HELD:

The marriage between parties is valid. Albios claims that

the marriage was made in jest however a marriage in jest
is defined as a pretended marriage, legal in form but
entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
parties involved in this case were fully aware of their
intentions to marry in order for Albios to acquire an
American citizenship. Although the ideal cause of marriage
is that of love, other reasons like that of convenience are
not prohibited as a reason for marriage. As long as all the
essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law; it shall be declared valid. Although fraud
is a ground for declaring a marriage void, this situation is
not one of the reasons allowed listed under Article 46 of
the Family Code. The court refuses to allow the individuals
to use marriage for their fraudulent schemes for their
convenience and also allow them to get out of it easily due
to the inconvenient situation.
 BESO v. JUDGE DAGUMAN
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28,

1997 by herein respondent Judge. They got married in
Judge Daguman residence, which is outside the Judge
Daguman jurisdiction. After the wedding herein petitioner
was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to
check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the
marriage contract to which it was found out that the
marriage was no registered. She now filed this
administrative complaint against herein respondent Judge
alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the

marriage.

HELD:

No, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8

of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized
by a judge outside his chambers or at a place other than
his sala, to wit: (1) when either or both of the contracting
parties is at the point of death; (2) when the residence of
either party is located in a remote place; (3) where both of
the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect. The spouses are not one of the instances provided
for by the provision, making judge Daguman not authorize
to solemnized the marriage due to lack of jurisdiction.

Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can

solemnize a marriage within the court jurisdiction.
Considering that the respondent Judge‘s jurisdiction covers
the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan
Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize the marriage in the City of Calabayog where
herein marriage was solemnized.
 ARANES v. OCCIANO ALCANTARA v. ALCANTARA
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002 G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

FACTS: FACTS:

On 17 February, 2000, respondent judge solemnized On December 8, 1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and
petitioner‘s marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Restituto Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial arrange a marriage for them. They met a person ―fixer
jurisdiction. They lived together as husband and wife on who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
the strength of this marriage until her husband passed Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
petitioner‘s right to inherit the ―vast properties left by securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the
Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel.
receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of However, there was a marriage license obtained in
the Philippine Navy. Carmona, Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of
Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said place to
ISSUE: apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony
Whether or not the respondent judge should be at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on
sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with lack of marriage March 26, 1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The
license and beyond his jurisdiction? marriage license number ―7054133 is not identical with
the marriage license number which appears in their
RULING: marriage contract. There is also a case filed by the
respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, Mandaluyong for concubinage.
the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to ISSUE:
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, respondent is void.
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is RULING:
contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for The marriage involved herein having been solemnized
he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human prior to the effectivity of Family Code, the applicable law
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
violating the law on marriage. The respondent Judge time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a
Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more same Code. The law requires that the absence of such
severely. marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. Moreover, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued further
validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties
herein. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage.
 CARIÑO v. CARIÑO
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
FACTS:
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a contracted two marriages; the first was on June 20, 1969,
civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had
immediately live together and it was only upon Castro two children. And the second was on November 10, 1992,
found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no
together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave back in 1982. In November 23, 1992, SPO4 Santiago Cariño
birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castro‘s his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her government agencies. On December 14, 1993, respondent
marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to
marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
Registrar of Pasig. thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum
of money, respondent contended that the marriage of
ISSUE: petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the
same was solemnized without the required marriage
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the
resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage
marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the license number and a certification dated March 9, 1994,
solemnization of their marriage? from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating
that they have no record of marriage license of the
RULING: spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who
allegedly married in the said municipality on June 20, 1969.
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that
the certification issued by the Civil Registrar ISSUE:
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion
sufficiently proves that the office did not issue a marriage Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the
license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are valid in determining
testimony of Castro is not supported by any other the beneficiary of his death benefits?
witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of
the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, RULING:
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the
case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
absence of the subject marriage license. of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased does not fall within the marriages
exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license
was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and
the deceased bears no marriage license number and as
certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
The certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data to the issuance of a
marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the said
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. The declaration
in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without ISSUES:
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, and private respondent is void from the beginning
likewise, void ab initio. for lack of marriage license at the time of the
ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is
psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of
its absolute nullity?

RULING:

A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence

renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence
presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case,
plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The
marriage contract also shows that the marriage license
number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in
Carmona.

From the documents she presented, the marriage license

was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place.
FILIPINA SY v. COURT OF APPEALS Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case,
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000 there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated
in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
FACTS: petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that
contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio
of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was
years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On solemnized.
September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling.
Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November
children were in the custody of their mother. On February 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private
11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio
the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
amended to a petition for separation of property.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation
of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement
executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a
criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser
crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20
days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando
on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4,
1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of
the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license
at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage
license and marriage certificate is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached in her petition for
absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage
certificate and marriage license are different and
incongruous.
 SEVILLA v. CARDENAS
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

FACTS:

On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and

intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas
and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the
Armed forces of the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went
to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of
the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita
caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime,
he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed
marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O.

Sevilla before the RTC. In its Decision dated January 25,
2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the
parties for lack of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed
with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of
Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005. This
denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in

accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the
celebration of the marriages in question?

RULING:

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the

effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar
in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive

proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It
can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that
the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook,
we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein. Finally,
the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact
leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight. Therefore, the instant petition is denied.
 ABBAS v. ABBAS
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

FACTS:

Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a

Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married
on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January
9, 1993, at around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-law‘s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St.,
Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed
a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to
apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided
in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number
could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and

setting aside the decision of the RTC granting the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage?

RULING:

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where

the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly
issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that
the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A
certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and
indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the
document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage

to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than
pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it
may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license,
given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The
lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to
him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same.
The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal
requisite is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
is void ab initio. The petition is therefore granted.
 GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR. KHO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013 G.R. No. 187462 June 1, 2016

FACTS: FACTS:

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married In May 31, 1972, Raquel Kho’s parents called a clerk in the
Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the office of the municipal treasurer to instruct him to arrange
Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship the necessary papers for the intended marriage of their
with Sally Go. Sally’s father was against this. In order to son, Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho. In June 1, 1972, the
appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a two were married at 3 in the morning at a church. Claiming
purported marriage contract in March 1982. that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for a marriage license and had not seen
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin nor signed any papers in connection to the procurement of
soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin. a marriage license, and considering the ONE DAY
Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his difference between the time the clerk was told to obtain
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the the papers to the actual moment of the marriage, no
existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage marriage license could have been validly issued, Raquel
license allegedly issued to Benjamin. Kho filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage.
ISSUE:
The RTC ruled that the marriage was void due to the lack
Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin of the require site marriage license and ruled in favor of
is bigamous. Raquel Kho. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the RTC and ruled in favor of Veronica Kho.
RULING: Raquel Kho filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married. ISSUES:
2. That the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is a. Whether the issues presented by the
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be petitioner in the petition for review on certiorari
presumed dead according to the Civil Code. are factual in nature and whether it is proper for
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent the Supreme Court to delve into these issues;
marriage. b. Whether the certification issued by the local
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all civil registrar who attests to the absence in its
the essential requisites for validity. records of a marriage license, must categorically
state that the document does not exist in the said
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The office despite diligent search;
marriage license presented by Sally was not authentic as in c. Whether the CA erred in disregarding the
fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in petitioner’s documentary evidences of the lack of
view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them a marriage license and giving weight to
was merely in jest and never complied with the essential unsupported presumptions in favor of the
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous respondent; and
marriage to speak of. d. Whether the CA erred in setting aside or
reversing the lower courts judgment declaring the
marriage a nullity for the absence of the requisite
marriage license.

RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in disregarding the petitioner’s

documentary evidences of the lack of a marriage licence
and giving weight to unsupported presumptions in favor of
the respondent because the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar coupled with the testimony of the former Civil
Registrar at the time of the wedding is sufficient to prove
the absence of the subject marriage license. Article 58 of
the Civil Code (Note: at the time of the marriage, the
Family Code was not effective yet) makes explicit that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a license first issued
by the local civil registrar. In addition, Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without a marriage license is void.
 REPUBLIC v. DAYOT HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v. JUDGE ROQUE R.
G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008 SANCHEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
FACTS:
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall
on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful
executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born
of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose husband contracted another marriage with one
and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting
was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud. parties were “separated.” For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
ISSUE: gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid 1999.
considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of
the marriage license requirement. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment,
the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
RULING: Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
lived together for five years at the time they executed their more severely.
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea
months before the celebration of their marriage on for the dismissal of the complaint.
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding in the Supreme Court. ISSUE:

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross
clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. ignorance of the law?
Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s RULING:
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as
an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s
prescribe and may be raised any time. SC held that an subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
action for nullifying a marriage is imprescriptible. It may be stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
raised anytime. Jose and Felisa’s marriage was celebrated and sworn to before him.
without a marriage license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance
of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no
one” has special application to judges, who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles. And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know
it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
 NIÑAL v. BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on

September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months
thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the second marriage is

covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?
b. Whether or not the petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their
father‘s marriage void after his death?

RULING:

The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by

the exception to the requirement of a marriage license; it
is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In
this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage,
it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed.

Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any

proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void
marriages have no legal effects except those declared by
law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to
Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment is legitimate.
 COSCA v. PALAYPAYON EUGENIO v. VELEZ
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994 G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

FACTS: FACTS:

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the
Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from
the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the
of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence
for cash bond received; in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

ISSUE: The respondent court in an order dated 28 September

1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the
court were responsible of the complaints charged? body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
RULING: subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according
to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the legal custody of her body.
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His ISSUE:
conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the
suspicion. Every employee should be an example of deceased.
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial
office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, HELD:
without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge
to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters. Section
a Court of justice. 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin;
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases the deceased.
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages.
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the many years as husband and wife, who represent
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
administratively liable. The Court hereby imposes a FINE of they live may be considered legally married in common law
P20, 000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or
similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the
dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby fact that such relationships are present in our society, and
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all that they produce a community of properties and interests
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the
including government-owned or controlled corporations. man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.
 simply means that there was no marriage to begin with;
MORIGO v. PEOPLE and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
FACTS: first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the the eyes of the law, never married." The records show that
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become
After school year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a crime
lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo was requires that the accused must have been legally married.
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to
letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
While in Canada, they maintained constant "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married
in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, charge.
1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October
4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City,
Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for

judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of
accused‘s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19,
1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in the
Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City,
with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol
rendered a decision finding Lucio Morigo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23,
1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the
criminal case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage

ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
 MORENO v. BERNABE
A.M. NO. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were

married before respondent Judge Bernabe. Marilou avers
that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage
contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4,
1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out
that she could not get the marriage contract because the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage
license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with
the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. In his
comment, Respondent denied that he conspired with the
relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for
the purpose of deceiving the complainant. The Respondent
Judge contends that he did not violate the law nor did he
have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in
good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved
only by a desire to help a begging and pleading
complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or
security due to her pregnant condition. In order to pacify
complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform
the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that
"the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the
necessary documents were complete. In its Memorandum
dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that Respondent be held
liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license and that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave

misconduct and gross ignorance of the law by solemnizing
the marriage without the required marriage license?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his

own admission that he solemnized the marriage between
complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required
marriage license, has dismally failed to live up to his
commitment to be the “embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence” and to his promise to be
“faithful to the law.” Respondent cannot hide behind his
claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most,
would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate
him completely. Good intentions could never justify
violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a
fine of P10, 000.00 and is sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
 NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY to be more circumspect in applying the law and to
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996 cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.

FACTS:

On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the

wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga,
despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife. It is also alleged that he performed a
marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. Municipal Mayor
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a
complaint respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross

misconduct, as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law?

RULING:

The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in

gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable
in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated; prompting us to conclude that
respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of
comprehension of the law. The judiciary should be
composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than
the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors
committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for
which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an
area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons. The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida
Peñaranda. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted
in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other
lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised
 VDA. DE JACOB v. COURT OF APPEALS estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole-surviving
G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999 heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage
between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father
FACTS: Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for
Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of
of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Alfredo. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by favor of Pedro Pilapil and against Tomasa Guison. Such
virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In ISSUES:
support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July
1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, a) Whether or not the marriage between the
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the Alfredo E. Jacob were valid?
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the
deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee Pedro sought to legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased‘s
RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid

marriage is established. It has been established that Dr.
Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was
executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.The
Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned
marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the
effectivity of the Family Code. On the second issue some
considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The
alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his
Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not
dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he
made in open court were criminal cases, in which the
accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted
that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information. Furthermore,
Pilapil‘s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his
own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he
signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the
same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had
treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau
of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued
Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil
had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption
is upon the person claiming such relationship. This
Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is
a sham.
 REPUBLIC v. IYOY The only substantial evidence presented by respondent
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005 Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be
easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
FACTS: absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr.,
legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot- husband‘s surname. Even consideringthe admissions made
tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely left the by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus‘s
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental
only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely illness that prevented her from assuming the essential
a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus obligations of marriage.
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the
to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the
Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino
he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely
the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime
their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for married her American husband in 1985. In the same
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
using the surname of her American husband in the Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained
alleged in his Complaint that Fely‘s acts brought danger a divorce from respondent Crasus.
and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment

declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null
and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the trial court‘s declaration of the nullity
of the marriage of the parties.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented

during trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to the
case at bar?

RULING:
 REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano‘s wife left for the United States bringing along
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cipriano Orbecido III can remarry under

Article 26 of the Family Code?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper,

respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no
evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are
unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations
that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen,
had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor.
 LAVADIA v. HEIRS OF LUNA
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
RULING:
FACTS:
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married time of his death. The Supreme Court: The divorce
Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children, between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the time
including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10,
Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
wife, and executed an Agreement for Separation and spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The
Property Settlement” whereby they agreed to live non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On remained even under the Family Code, even if either or
January 2, 1076, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only
his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
On the same day, he married Soledad. been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the
other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained annulment of the marriage.”
a condominium unit which they bought on an installment
basis. After full payment, the condominium title was No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and
registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio Property Settlement: “Considering that
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
condominium title was still registered in the names of the conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
owners, with Atty. Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at
his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the the time of the marriage.
condominium was also rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz v
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:
the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties “Article 119. The future spouses may in the
were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property relative community of property, or upon
became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and complete separation of property, or upon any
the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and other regime. In the absence of marriage
testament of Atty. Luna. settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to partnership of gains as established in this Code,
the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for shall govern the property relations between
the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to husband and wife.”
her. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and
all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of void from the very beginning, hence, their property
Atty. Luna from the first marriage. relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership: “In the
Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly
that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement For states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the country where they were performed, and valid there as
conjugal property was not dissolved. such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by Philippine law.
way of determining whether the divorce decree between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
among the contending parties were entitled to the second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
properties left behind by Atty. Luna. has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a
ISSUE: judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second
Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
marriage following the nationality rule laid down by Art 15. acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by
the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of
the Civil Code, viz: Article 144. When a man and a woman
live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of

ownership of the properties subject of the case, the
subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of
Atty. Luna from the first marriage. Petition denied.
 VAN DORN v. ROMILLO
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

FACTS:

The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private

respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were
married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage,
they established their residence in the Philippines; that
they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, private
respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay
City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
"no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case
on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property

regime of the parties?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law,

private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved
through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from
their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. To maintain,
as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.
 SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in
the case.
FACTS: b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of administration?
Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the former governor of the
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo RULING:
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Regional Trial Court of Makati City. On the second issue,
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as
U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence
death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets validity of the divorce and Felicisimo‘s capacity to remarry,
and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the Code. This provision governs the property relations
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San between parties who live together as husband and wife
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
Manila; that the decedent‘s surviving heirs are respondent from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired
as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and by either or both of them through their work or industry or
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that
P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court
the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the
of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.
administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo‘s place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she was
only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of
his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On
February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September
12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of
the Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998.

ISSUES:
 CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
FACTS: divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien‘s national law have been duly proven
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. effect of foreign judgments.
Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the In Gerbert‘s case, since both the foreign divorce decree
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
granted Gerbert‘s petition for divorce on December 8, officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these
January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his
Daisylyn‘s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this
him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition
enforceable; the foreign divorce decree must first be for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign the Canadian divorce law. The petition was granted and
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the case is remanded to the trial court for further
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any proceedings.
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no
opposition to Gerbert‘s petition and, in fact, alleged her
desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested
that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert‘s. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the
RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree?

RULING:

The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert‘s petition before the RTC. In other words,
 quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
GARCIA-RECIO v. RECIO necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien
FACTS: and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an laws. On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's
became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian before this Court shows that only the following exhibits
government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help (a) Exhibit "A"– Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B"– Certificate of
Church in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian)
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
"Filipino." Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C"– Certificate of
respondent lived separately without prior judicial Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon,
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D"– Office of the City Registrar
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the Samson was in its records; and (e) Exhibit “E"– Certificate
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he respondent: (Exhibit “1”) – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she "S"– Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;(c) Exhibit "3"–
November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia Recio;(d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; and
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an Exhibit "5"– Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the Supreme
its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to
was no more martial union to nullify or annual. marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees
with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
ISSUES: finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
Editha Samson was proven? Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
capacitated to marry petitioner? marriage. The case is thus remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between

respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that
it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the
 contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry. The provision reads: “Art. 26. All
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.” Where a
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
G.R. No. 215723 July 27, 2016 validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
FACTS: her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Under the
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction
and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
who was born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who marriage.
was born on April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for
before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be
Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the
the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the
the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial
Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and requires that both the divorce decree and the national law
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code before the RTC,
docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13-72692. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree
between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence
documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant
Acceptance of Divorce" and "Family Register of Michiyuki appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
Koike" both issued by the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Well entrenched is
duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" findings on these matters are received with respect and
issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this
Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or
Foreign Affairs, as well as a Certification issued by the City final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original
Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals
Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
and their corresponding English translation, as well as two Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule
(2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may refer the
Civil Code of Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as proof case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of
of the existence of Japan's law on divorce. the Rules of Court, which provides: “Since the said Rules
denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss
ISSUE: the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact
involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce. further appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that
procedural rules were intended to ensure proper
RULING: administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be
grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence
a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to of the courts.”
 ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995 retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent
made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
FACTS: employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman,who
beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of
De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw profession. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
children and even alienated the affection of his children for duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual.
him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
and liabilities. For his part, respondent alleges that judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
complainant was not married to De Castro and that the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.
filing of the administrative action was related to These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat
been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five in the judiciary.
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko
went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request
of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through
another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their
children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil
rites in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he
believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to

respondent considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991
and governed by the Family Code.

RULING:

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial

declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40
of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right
that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
 JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO & HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. living together as common-law spouses. They also
SALGADO v. LUIS G. ANSON mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they
G.R. No. 204494 July 27, 2016 owned in common. Hence, Luis already received his share
in the properties and is estopped from denying the same.
FACTS: After the termination of their cohabitation in 1980, Luis
went to United States of America (USA), married one
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa
docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz- was left under the guardianship and custody of Severina. It
Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed
Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale dated January 23, Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No
2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Record of Marriage (between Luis and Severina) from the
the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse Office.
of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to ISSUE:
the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to
their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Whether or not the Spouses Salgado’s marriage is valid.
Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship.
RULING:
According to Luis, because there was no marriage
settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis
properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed based on the Marriage Contract presented by Luis which
three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, has adequately established its absence. Contrary to Luis'
2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos. contention, the present petition raises a question of law,
20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be
new certificates of title over the said properties. When proven on the basis of a marriage contract which states
Severina died on September 21, 2002, Maria Luisa that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of officer on account of the marriage being of an exceptional
Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002, character.
adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured
new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases
44637 and 8003. Luis claimed that because of the brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general
preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the rule, limited to reviewing errors of law, there are
conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory exceptions recognized by the Court, such as when the CA
heir of Severina. manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, which a different conclusion.
the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband,
Gerard, Jo-Ann countered that she was unaware of any Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was
marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
however that Luis and Severina had a common-law applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code,
relationship which they both acknowledged and formally the law in effect at the time of its celebration on December
terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in 28, 1966. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
November 1980. This was implemented through another under Article 53 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof,
Partition Agreement executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had save for marriages of exceptional character, renders the
already received the properties apportioned to him by marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3).
virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject
of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the
by Severina. The TCTs covering Severina's properties were marriage contract itself that no marriage license was
under Severina's name only and she was described therein exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage
as single without reference to any husband. owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the
said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the
Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses burden of Luis to prove that they secured the required
Salgado's stance in their Answer, stating that Maria Luisa is marriage license.
also not aware that Luis and Severina were married. She is
cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together However, instead of proving that a marriage license was
as common-law husband and wife - a relationship which indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis
was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. relied mainly on the presumption of validity of marriage.
In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis a prima
described as single and they acknowledged that they were facie evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has
established that no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued
to Luis and Severina, its absence on the marriage contract
was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of
the marriage license was presented. No other witness also
testified to prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best
witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that
he did not apply for one, and is uncertain about the
documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal
Hall.
 VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012 having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
FACTS: by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States authenticated by the seal of his office. Compliance with
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is
marriage with petitioner herein. On November 18, 2004, not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by
Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Thereafter, Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
petitioner filed a Petition for the issuance of letters of citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
the intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
subsequently consolidated. On the other hand, respondent Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters Philippine personal laws. Thus, it is imperative for the trial
of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
bigamy was filed against petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it
took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by
Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. On
June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. The CA held that petitioner undertook
the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her
motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce is valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of

comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
wherein we said: It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best
evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
 QUITA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 124862 December 22, 1998 FACTS:

FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private

complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro and
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were Ancajas lived together continuously and without
married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner
Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third
opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro,
private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the that his marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact
trial court for further proceedings. there being no record of such. He further argued that his
second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab
ISSUE: initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be
a. Should the case be remanded to the lower court? charged for bigamy.
b. Who between the petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent? ISSUE:

RULING: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the RULING:

lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally
ordinary cases. No dispute exists as to the right of the six liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because second marriage as void ab initio on the ground of
there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged psychological incapacity. Would the absolute nullity of
by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as either first or second marriage prior to its judicial
heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a
shares. Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage
can inherit from him as this status presupposes a on account of psychological incapacity—void marriages are
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree
bigamous marriage considered void ab initio under Articles is required to establish their nullity. The complete nullity of
80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and
spouse. The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the legally inexistent can out rightly be a defense in an
remand of the case is affirmed. indictment for bigamy.

JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
FACTS: mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Victoria Jarillo, petitioner, and Rafael Alocillo were married
in a civil wedding ceremony in Taguig, Rizal in 1974. Both
newlyweds celebrated a second wedding, this time a
church ceremony, in1975 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan.
Out of the union, the spouses bore a daughter. Jarillo,
however, contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy celebrated through a civil
ceremony. Thereafter, Jarillo and Uy exchanged marital
vows in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Uy filed acivil
case for annulment against Jarillo. On the basis of the
foregoing, Jarillo was charged with Bigamy before the RTC.
Parenthetically, Jarillo filed a civil case for declaration of
nullity of marriage against Alocillo in 2000. The trial court
rendered the assailed decision, holding Jarillo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. Jarillo
posits, as defenses, that her marriage to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, that her marriages to Alocillo and Uy were
both null and void for lack of a marriage license, and that
the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo. On Appeal, the CA confirmed the
ruling of the trial court. In the meantime, the RTC where
Jarillo filed a civil case against Alocillo rendered judgement
declaring Jarillo’s marriage to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity.
Jarillo, in her motion for reconsideration, invoked the
ruling of the trial court as a ground for the reversal of her
conviction. In a Resolution by the CA, the latter denied
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jarillo can be convicted of the crime of

bigamy

RULING:

Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be

affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered
a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment
petitioner contracted a second marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent second
marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not
yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither
would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s
marriage to jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting.
Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of
petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference. As held in
Tenebro, since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain
reading of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the
 WEIGEL v. SEMPIO DIY
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

FACTS:

Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia

was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl
then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia
on the ground of latter’s former marriage. Having been
allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends
that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise
alleged that Karl was married to another woman before
their marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether Karl’s marriage with Lilia is void.

RULING:

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first

marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void
but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that
when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her
first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.
Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the
prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void
still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.
Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void
under the law.
 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. AZOTE
G.R. No. 209741 April 15, 2015

FACTS:

In 1994, Edgardo submitted his SSS Form E-4 with his wife
Edna and their children as beneficiaries. When he died in
2005, Edna tried to claim the death benefits as the wife of
a deceased member but it was denied. It appears from the
SSS records that Edgardo had another set of SSS Form E-4
in 1982 where his former wife Rosemarie and their child
were designated as beneficiaries. Edna did not know that
Edgardo was previously married to another woman. She
then filed for a petition before the SSS, and notice was
sent to Rosemarie but she made no answer. The SSC
dismissed Edna’s petition because the SSS Form E-4
designating Rosemarie and her child was not revoked by
Edgardo, and that she was still presumed to be the legal
wife as Edna could not prove that Edgardo’s previous
marriage was annulled or divorced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edna is entitled to the SSS benefits as the

wife of a deceased member.

RULING:

No. The law in force at the time of Edgardo’s death was RA

8282. Applying Section 8(e) and (k) thereof, only the legal
spouse of the deceased-member is qualified to be the
beneficiary of the latter’s SS benefits. Here, there is a
concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier
marriage with another individual as evidenced by their
marriage contract. Since the second marriage of Edgardo
with Edna was celebrated when the Family Code was
already in force. Edna, pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code, failed to establish that there was no impediment or
that the impediment was already removed at the time of
the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Edna could
not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of
Edgardo was either annulled or dissolved or whether there
was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive death
before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that
Edna was the second wife of Edgardo. Considering that
Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of
a deceased-member, she would not qualify under the law
to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo.
Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to
determine the validity of marriages, it is required by
Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 828229 to examine available
statistical and economic data to ensure that the benefits
fall into the rightful beneficiaries.
 REPUBLIC v. NOLASCO Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993 unspecified circumstances.

FACTS:

Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of

Antique a petition for the declaration of the presumptive
death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41
of the Family Code. The Republic of the Philippines
opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor
General in the case. During trial, Nolasco testified that he
was seaman and that he had first met Parker, a British
subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship’s port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Parker lived with
Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to
Nolasco’s hometown of San Jose, Antique in 1980 after his
seaman’s contract expired. On January 1982, Nolasco
married Parker in San Jose, Antique. After the marriage
celebration, Nolasco obtained another employment as a
seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique.
Sometime in 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco
received a letter from his mother informing him that
Parker had left Antique. Nolasco claimed he asked
permission to leave the ship and return home to look for
his wife. He testified that his efforts to look for her
whenever their ship docked in England were fruitless, that
the letters he sent to Parker’s address in England were all
returned to him, and that their friends received no news
from Parker. He testified that he had no knowledge of her
family background even after the marriage and did not
report the disappearance to the authorities. The petition
was granted by lower court and was also affirmed by the
appellate court. As such, the republic appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his

wife is already dead.

RULING:

The respondent failed to establish that he had the well-

founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court
order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the
investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is
too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-
founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived
in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's
departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities
or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's
contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions
of inhabitants, to look for her there. The Court also views
respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she
had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the
loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife
which respondent claims were all returned to him.
 REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
477 SCRA 277

FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in

January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and
Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will
be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left after
that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house
but was not there and even inquired to her friends. He
went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that
Lea had been to their house but left without notice. He
then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For some
time, Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and
during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In
June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local
police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also
reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed
a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is

already dead.

RULING:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-
founded belief, before he filed his petition with RTC, that
his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other
than the Barangay Captain. He even failed to present those
friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his
testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his
parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing
his petition in the RTC. It could have enhanced his
credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law
about Lea's whereabouts considering that Lea's father was
the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of
the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did
so only after the OSG file its notice to dismiss his petition
in RTC.
 BIENVENIDO v. COURT OF APPEALS marriage of the abandoned spouse and not the remarriage
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994 of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years
had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this case
FACTS: in order to sustain the validity of Aurelio’s marriage to
Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who had left his
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he
October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his and Luisita had already been living together as husband
marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. and wife for five years. In fact the couple begot a child, in
Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent 1961, even before their marriage in 1962.
Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent 2. There is no basis for holding that the property in
Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, question was property of the conjugal partnership of
1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Luisita and the late Aurelio because there was no such
Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958. There were partnership in the first place. The sale to petitioner must
instances during Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage when, be presumed. Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced by a
because of their quarrels, one or the other left the deed of absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of
dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, 326681 issued in due course in her name. Indeed, the
Hongkong or Japan. In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long
T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, period of cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for
Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June 1968 until twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in 1976,
time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented
Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976. On himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned,
April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Chito could have been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his
Delgado Street in which they were staying from the wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of
owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of
In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. the property because she ought to have known that
288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in Aurelio was married to Luisita.
his name, Aurelio was described as single. On November
26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property
in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of
P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on January 11,
1985. On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito
brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to
petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita
alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife
of Aurelio. In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she
and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in
question using their joint funds which they had
accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that
the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with
respondent Luisita’s consent and that she was a purchaser
in good faith.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is

valid.
b. Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and
Nenita is valid.

RULING:

1. The burden of proof was on respondents to show that

Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage falls under any of these
exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has
been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent
 MANUEL v. PHILIPPINES
G.R No. 165842 November 29, 2005 RULING:
1. No. The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the
FACTS: Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been
On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. absent for seven years, is created by law and arises
Manuel, respondent, contracted a second marriage with without necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article
Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio 41, of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules
City. It so appeared in the marriage contract that Manuel on presumptive death, provides that for the purpose of
was “single”. Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding
married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage having paragraph), the spouse present must institute a summary
been legally dissolved before the second marriage. Tina proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of
Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
marriage of the respondent to Rubylus Gana. On July 28, the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby. On January
1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, 2. No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The
Eduardo went to Baguio to visit her and he proposed petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral
assuring her that he was single. Starting 1999, Manuel damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20,
started making himself scarce and went to their house only and 21 of the Civil Code. The Court thus declares that the
twice or thrice a year. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped undermine, and subvert the family as a social institution,
giving financial support. Sometime in August 2001, Tina good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of
learned that Eduardo had been previously married. society. Because the private complainant was an innocent
Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred from
because he believed in good faith that his marriage was claiming moral damages. Even considerations of public
invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court policy would not prevent her from recovery as held in
to seek for nullification of his first marriage before Jekshewitz v. Groswald.
marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from
her for more than 20 years. On July 2, 2002, RTC found
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under
Article 349 of the RPC, and sentenced him an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10)
months, as minimum to ten (10) years, as maximum, and
directed to indemnify the private complainant, Tina
Gandalera, the amount of P200,000 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit. Manuel appealed the decision
to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the
RPC, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable
for a felony. He posited that the RTC should have taken
into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the

decision of the RTC with modification to indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision coreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all other
respect, as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of
the Family Code should apply.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error

of law when it ruled that petitioner’s first wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article
390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for
under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
b. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error
of law when it affirmed the award of P200,000 as
moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in
law.
 CALISTERIO v. CALISTERIO
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the

respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several
parcel of land estimated value of P604, 750.00. He was the
second husband of Marietta who was previously married
with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter
disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years
later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and
Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta
securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico
filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the
latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother
being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She
prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased
and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been settled.

ISSUE:

Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due

to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death.

RULING:

The marriage between the respondent and the deceased

was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that
time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which
only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases
where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of
presumptive death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of
the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage
with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can
claim portion of the estate.
 REPUBLIC v. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012

FACTS:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida

Electric Company, got married in 1993. In May 1994, when
Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from
that time, she did not receive any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her
brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After 9
years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead with the RTC Lipa City. On
February 7, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring
Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, OSG,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda
had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already
dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the
case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41
of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory
and, thus, not appealable.. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for

the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal.

RULING:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is final and

immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting
the petition, such order can no longer be assailed. .
 REPUBLIC v. NARCEDA Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
G.R. No. 182760 April 10, 2013 jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with
the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
FACTS: concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of
The present case stems from a Petition for Review filed by Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review
the Republic of the Philippines praying for the reversal of on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
filed by the petitioner for lack of jurisdiction to decide on may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
the matter. The subject matter of the appeal was the errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
decision of the RTC of La Union declaring the presumptive appeal. When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule
death of respondent’s wife final and executory. Robert P. 42, it availed itself of the wrong remedy. As a result, the
Narceda married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the running of the period for filing of a Petition for Certiorari
Marriage Contract he presented will reveal that at the time continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that
of their wedding, Marina was only 17 years and 4 months period, the Decision of the RTC could no longer be
old. According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore questioned. Consequently, petitioner's contention that
sometime in 1994 and never returned since. There was respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief
never any communication between them. He tried to look that his absentee spouse is dead may no longer be
for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she entertained by this.
left, one of their town mates in Luna, La Union came home
from Singapore and told him that the last time she saw his
wife; the latter was already living with a Singaporean
husband. In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,
respondent filed with the RTC on 16 May 2002 a Petition
for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or
absence of Marina. The RTC granted respondent’s Petition
in a Decision dated 5 May 2005. Petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed the foregoing
Decision to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent
failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the
diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a
"well-founded" belief that she was dead. The CA dismissed
the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding
under the Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI
thereof. Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the
judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings
shall be immediately final and executory. The OSG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied
through the CA’s 29 April 2008 Resolution.

ISSUES:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the

Petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
b. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded
belief that his absentee spouse is dead.

RULING:

As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing

party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal,
but a petition for certiorari, to wit: By express provision of
law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
 REPUBLIC v. CANTOR
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

FACTS:

Sometime in January 1998, Jerry F. Cantor left his wife

Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor after a violent quarrel. After
more than four years of not seeing or hearing from Jerry,
Maria Fe filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of her husband. She alleged that she conducted a
diligent search for her husband and exerted earnest efforts
to find him. The RTC granted her petition. Dissatisfied with
the ruling, the OSG filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did Maria Fe have a well-founded belief that Jerry was

dead in pursuant with Article 41 of the Family Code?

RULING:

Whether or not one has a “well-founded belief” that his or

her spouse is dead depends on the unique circumstance of
each case and that there is no set standard or procedure in
determining the same. Maria Fe’s alleged “well-founded”
belief arose when: 1) Jerry’s relatives and friends could not
give her any information on his whereabouts; and 2) she
did not find Jerry’s name in the patient’s directory
whenever she went to a hospital. It appears that Maria Fe
did not actively look for her husband in hospitals and it
may be sensed that her search was not intentional or
planned. Her search for Jerry was far from diligent. Were it
not for the finality of the RTC ruling, the declaration of
presumptive death should have been recalled and set
aside for utter lack of factual basis.
 SANTOS v. SANTOS However, a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith,
G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014 even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
FACTS: founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first
marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a
declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith
T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of is protected by law. The party who contracted the
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from
remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
September 17, 2008. In his petition for declaration of being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during
absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan,
Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18,
1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were
engaged in the buy and sell business. Ricardo claimed that
their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong. She allegedly applied in an employment
agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac
two months after and was never heard from again. Ricardo
further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate
Celerina.He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon
City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date
of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away. On November 17,
2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was
deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. Celerina
claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never
left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did
she go to an employment agency in February 1995.21 She
also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent
for 12 years. Celerina also argued that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper. She added that the
Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent marriage entered into by

Ricardo Santos is valid.

RULING:

No, the subsequent marriage entered into by Ricardo

Santos is not valid. A bigamous subsequent marriage may
be considered valid when the following are present: 1)The
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2)The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead; 3)There must be a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and 4)There is a court
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
 REPUBLIC v. ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 210929 July 29, 2015

FACTS:

Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in

Iligan City. In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in
Singapore while her husband worked as a mechanic in
Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the news
from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home
without reason or information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to
the country to look for Romeo. She inquired from her
parents-in-law and common friends in Iligan City. Still, she
found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence. She
also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental,
and inquired from his relatives. On August 6, 2009, Edna
filed before the RTC a petition to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In
its October 8, 2009 Order, the RTC granted the petition on
the basis of her well founded belief of Romeo's death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision

granting the petition of Edna to have her husband be
declared presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family
Code.

RULING:

Yes, Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a

judicial declaration of presumptive death may be granted,
the present spouse must prove that he/she has a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead. In this case, Edna
failed. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate
the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion
of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of
the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack
of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere
failure to communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.
 REPUBLIC v. SARENOGON, JR. Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4)
G.R. No. 199194 February 10, 2016 essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four
FACTS: (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He testified that Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
they got married and lived together as husband and wife (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
for a month only because he left to work as a seaman the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files
while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
3 months, he did not receive any communication from death of the absentee. The "well-founded belief in the
Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. While absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove
still abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
failed. He returned home after his contract expired, then efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
whereabouts. They also did not know where she was. circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As
was already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so such, the mere absence of the spouse for such periods
he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such
of the Family Code. Jose’s testimony was corroborated by absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or
his older brother, and by Netchie’s aunt. These two general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as would not suffice. In this case, Nilda testified that after
husband and wife only for one month prior to their leaving Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making
the Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added inquiries with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
that they had no information regarding Netchie’s location. whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know
The RTC found that Netchie had disappeared for more where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
than four years, reason enough for Jose to conclude that however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
his wife was indeed already dead. The OSG questioned the husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in headquarters to request information about her husband,
its misappreciation of evidence. The CA saw no error in but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
wrong recourse in elevating a declaration of presumptive own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a
death judgment from the RTC. combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on
ISSUES: the status of the said mission, or from the members of the
AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind,
a. Whether or not Rule 65 is the proper recourse to therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
question the RTC ruling husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
b. Whether or not Dante should be declared asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
presumptively dead the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief of his death.
RULING:

1. Yes. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper

remedy to question the RTC’s decision in a summary
proceeding for declaration of presumptive death. Under
Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTC’s decision on a
petition pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code is
immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no
jurisdiction to entertain a notice of appeal pertaining
to such judgment. However, an aggrieved party may file a
certiorari under Rule 65 to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of
Hierarchy of Courts. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to SC via a petition
for review under Rule 45.

2. No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death

can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior
spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family
 where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her
husband. She could have called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her husband,
but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the
REPUBLIC v. TAMPUS authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
G.R. No. 214243 March 16, 2016 own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a
combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his
FACTS: disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on
the status of the said mission, or from the members of the
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind,
Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days thereafter, or therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing
on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by
respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. asking Dante's parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy
The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no the strict standard and degree of diligence required to
news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but create a well-founded belief of his death.
her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed
before the RTC a petition to declare Dante as
presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging
that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years without any
kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that
he is already dead.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dante should be declared presumptively

dead.

RULING:

No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can

be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4) essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1)
that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4)
consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry;
(3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires

the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion
of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under
the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still
alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.

In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's

disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries
with his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his
whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know
 DOMINGO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

FACTS:

Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while

being married with Emerlina dela Paz. He has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who
has been working in Saudi Arabia, for support and
subsistence. Delia only found out about the prior marriage
when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983. In 1989, she
found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another
woman and he was disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge and consent. In May 1991, Delia
filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void

marriage is necessary. If in affirmative, whether the same
should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING:

Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is

now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purpose of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law for the said projected marriage be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. The requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again.
With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for
purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of other
instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an
action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation
of property between the spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the
delivery of the latter’s' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, however, one is required by law to show proof that
the previous one was an absolute nullity. Marriage is an
“inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State. As a
matter of policy, there should be a final judgment
declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare
for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
 ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES FACTS:
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted
FACTS: a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. With said
marriage not yet annulled, nullified or terminated, on
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality January 25, 1996, he contracted a second marriage with
and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and a third marriage with
Brillantes, Jr. Complainant alleged that he has two children a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. On February 25, 1998,
with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was Imelda Bobis filed bigamy. Sometime thereafter,
cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
went through a marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
lack of a marriage license. Upon request of the parents of marriage before entering into the second marriage. After
Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent
ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied filed a declaration of absolute nullity.
for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he
married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in ISSUE:
1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes that he was single because his first marriage Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for
was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place
in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the RULING:
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991
and governed by the Family Code. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
ISSUE: involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
to the case at bar. accused. Its two essential elements are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
RULING: raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into proceed In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent,
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 without first having obtained the judicial declaration of
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given entered into the second marriage. In the current
“retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity,
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case
application of Article 40 to his case. at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not
essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question Parties to a marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage
then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
 TY v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with

Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in
Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August
1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio
for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.
Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued,
Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and
had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The
decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991,
Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with
petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with
Anna must first be secured before a subsequent marriage
could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice
the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

RULING:

The Court is in the opinion of the lower courts that no

damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless
complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her
parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her
marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from
conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws
do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation. Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage
between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and
the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as
long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto.
 CASTILLO v. DE LEON CASTILLO
G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016 FACTS:

FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi were married in 1988.
After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual
married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, intercourse between them during their first night and
respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort
(Renato). On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a to have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there
his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting was no sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Lea opposed the chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989
Petition, and contended among others that her marriage they slept together in the same bed but no attempt of
to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they
license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the submitted themselves for medical examination to a
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged. urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of
On 3 January 2002, she filed an action to declare her first the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that
marriage to Bautista void. On 22 January 2003, the of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi
rendered its Decision declaring that Lea's first marriage to Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status
Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Renato here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with
countered that whether or not the first marriage of Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on
respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand,
had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his
into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid part and is physically and psychologically capable and since
and subsisting. their relationship is still young, they can still overcome
their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to
ISSUE: another physical examination and the result was there is
no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
Whether or not the marriage between Lea and Renato is
valid. ISSUE:

RULING: Whether or not Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual

intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
Yes, the Court thus concludes that the subsequent incapacity.
marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity
of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of RULING:
a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration
that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly
subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give
declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to meaning and significance to the marriage within the
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. If a spouse,
Renato is valid. although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children
thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

CHI MING TSOI v. COURT OF APPEALS AND LAO

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
 SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R No. 112019 January 4, 1995

FACTS:
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
Leouel and Julia were married on September 20, 1986. G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
They were first married before the MTC in Iloilo. Shortly,
they married in a church. They lived with Julia’s parents. FACTS:
Soon, she gave birth to their first child. Some
disagreements of the couple had been the issue of living Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private
independently from Julia’s parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married and three
finally left for USA to work as a nurse. Julia, via phone call, children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner
promised to return home upon the expiration of her filed before the Regional Trial Court, a petition seeking the
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the
chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
training program of AFP, he desperately tried to locate, or claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to come home, Leouel illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
filed with the RTC a complaint for voiding their marriage women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC dismissed respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
the complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that
petition. for having abandoned the family, private respondent be
ordered to give support to their three children in the total
ISSUE: amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded
the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as
a. Whether or not Julia’s failure to return home or at the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.
the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
show her being psychologically incapacitated. dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by
b. Whether their marriage can be considered void petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
under Article 36 of the Family Code. which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming
the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
ISSUE:
1. No. Justice Sempio-Diy opined that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be respondent should be annulled on the ground of private
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of respondent's psychological incapacity.
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the HELD:
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of "Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
the party involved. The intendment of the law has been to mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
meaning and significance to the marriage. The case at bar 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
can, in no measure at all, come close to the standards live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
required to decree a nullity of marriage. help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
2. The intendment of the law has been to confine the "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
denied. "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind
or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If YAMBAO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 FACTS:
of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E.
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree Yambao married on December 21, 1968. On July 11, 2003,
and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into
incapacity. adulthood, petitioner filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be declared
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity
established, every circumstance that may have some pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner claims
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and recrimination because of the respondent’s difficulty to find
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of change children’s diapers while petitioner was still
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in recovering from her Caesarean operation, insecurity and
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and
desirable. sleeping all day, gambling, and threats to kill her. She then
consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the
The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling respondent suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder.
of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court dismissed
affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non- the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court
existence of private respondent's psychological incapacity of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision;
at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court.
and even finality.
ISSUE:
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for
us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence
permanent custody of children, the amount for their establishes the respondent’s psychological incapacity to
respective support, and the declaration of exclusive perform the essential obligations of marriage.
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate HELD:
proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions,
bring. predilections, or generalizations, this case must be treated
uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to
be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be
proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested mental,
not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The spouse
must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is
and becomes unaware of his marital and familial
obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged
according to:
(a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.

Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take

cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations as
totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill
will in the performance of marital obligations. Incapacity is
defined as:
(a) true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering
 of mutual help, the procreation and education of of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad was
offspring; and psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
(c) the inability must be tantamount to a marital obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced
psychological abnormality. to marry her barely 3 months into their courtship in light of
her accidental pregnancy. He was 21, she was 18.
All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and Natividad left their conjugal abode and sold their house
recrimination” and rough patches. In this case, the without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain
respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s Engineer Terez. After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted
exacting standards but they have gone through 35 years of a second marriage with another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that
marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
“without any major parenting problems”. Moreover, incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from
respondent never committed infidelity or physically “utter emotional immaturity”.
abused the petitioner or their children. These facts do not
prove psychological incapacity. ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding

of psychological incapacity?

HELD:

The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual

or legal basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity,
can be equated with psychological incapacity. The RTC
relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony which does not
explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted and
incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is, therefore,
granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and

MOLINA
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:
REPUBLIC v. DE GRACIA
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014 On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent
was married to Reynaldo Molina at the Church of Saint
FACTS: Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child
named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a year of
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity
at a church in Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, and irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time
1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for the declaration with the company of his friends and peers on whom he
squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid (6) The essential marital obligations must be
and assistance; and he was never honest with the family those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
between the petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel Code in regard to parents and their children.
the sole breadwinner. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
On October 1986, they were both estranged from each Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
other. In February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio should be given great respect by our courts.
with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
abandoned Roridel and left Albert in her custody. Reynaldo attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together appear as counsel for the state.
as husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior
and insistence to leave his group of friends eve after their
marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital
duties like cooking meals, and Roridel’s failure to run the
household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and
declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed
in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is

equivalent to psychological incapacity.

HELD:

No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to:

(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In
this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological
incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal,
neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities which do not constitute psychological
incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they
are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the
couple could not get along or are incompatible with each
other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the
psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence
nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
BARCELONA v. COURT OF APPEALS
The following guidelines must be proved in invoking G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003
psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the FACTS:
marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon,
must be respondent were legally married at Holy Cross Parish after
a. Medically or clinically identified, a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at
b. Alleged in the complaint, Quezon City and begot five children. The couple had
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family,
d. Clearly explained in the decision. was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing the house playing tennis all day. During a family crisis
at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be sickness of a child, the petitioner would withdraw herself
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy,
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring she would insist the husband to offer her more freedom
about the disability of the party to assume the and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would
essential obligations of marriage. eventually leave and the both of them would eventually
become estranged from each other.
 were psychologically incapacitated from
On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a complying with the essential marital obligations of
Petition for Annulment of Marriage on the grounds of marriage at the time of the celebration of
psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. marriage even if such incapacity becomes
Barcelona. On July 21, 1995, respondent filed a second manifest only after its celebration.
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that No. The first petition was already dismissed without
the second petition fails to state a cause of action and that prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis pendentia since
it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to respondent has already withdrawn and caused the
state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed
marriage, its termination and status. the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because
the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a
On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge dismissal “without prejudice”.
Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred resolution of the Motion until
the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on
January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing Judge
Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order)
denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that
when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact
solely from the petition itself. According to Judge Pison, a
perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that
petitioner has violated respondent’s right, thus resulting to
a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s
claim that respondent was guilty of forum shopping
explaining that when respondent filed the second petition,
the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed
without prejudice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial

Court’s decision that the allegations in the second petition
state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid
judgment if proven true as well as the decision that the
respondent has not committed forum shopping.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment

sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the REPUBLIC v. QUINTERO- HAMANO
filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004
termination and status.
FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for

declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano,
HELD: a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
it states the legal right of respondent, the correlative month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed
obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November
petitioner in violation of the legal right. After Santos and 16, 1987.
Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor,
provided that expert opinions need not be alleged, to wit: Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two
of void marriages – x x x. months and after that he stopped giving financial
d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of support. She wrote him several times but never
the Family Code shall specifically allege the respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that
complete facts showing that either or both parties
Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of
nor their child. the influence of Filipinas’ parents, she regarded Orlando
with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus business, he was met with ridicule, instead of
summons issued to him remained encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk shop
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte business flourished and became profitable enough for
motion for leave to effect service of summons by Orlando to embark on a new business venture by putting
publication. The motion was granted and the summons, up a pharmaceutical company.
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to Filipinas became interested and began to interfere with
file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of the operation of the business; however, the employees of
60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to the company were aloof. She also resented that her
refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. husband was getting along with the employees and, as a
result, was the subject of their frequent and continued
ISSUE: quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the
income of his business to his relatives. The continued
Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to fighting persisted and affected their children. Filipinas, in
perform his marital obligation. her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was,
indeed, fruitless; however, this was the fault of Orlando’s
HELD: psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live
separately from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional
institution and marriage as the foundation of the Trial Court.
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his
sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia Villegas’
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile,
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind evidence for the respondent only consisted of her
of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical testimony.
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped
Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court
clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision in
done through an expert witness. It is essential that a toto.
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to
some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio ISSUE:
was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Whether or not respondent is psychologically
incapacitated.

HELD:

No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just

“difficulty”, “refusal” or “neglect”. Second, the personality
TONGOL v. TONGOL disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent
G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007 must be grave enough to bring about her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third, there
FACTS: was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is
incurable. Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of
respondent Filipinas M. Tongol were married. From their marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
marriage they begot four children. to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial household and the provision of support for the family.
Court, Makati a verified petition for the declaration of Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the
nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she spouse’s obligation to the spouse but also that to her
is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was
essential marital obligations. negligent in the rearing and care of her children as
enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although,
In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ the respondent exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder,
marriage was objected by the latter’s family. The there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the
continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying
attempts to break up their union and their influence on with the essential obligations of marriage.
 physical harm on her and her mother. The following day,
Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister’s
house. On October 19, 1994, she was diagnosed with
contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court
found respondent to be psychologically incapacitated. The
Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial Court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological

evaluation is a requirement for the declaration of
psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the
respondents determine psychological incapacity.

HELD:

No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require

that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be
“medically or clinically identified”. What is most important
is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
is not necessary.

No. Although the respondent failed to provide material

support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate
psychological incapacity. The evidence presented do not
zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on
psychological incapacity. The behaviors can be attributed
to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period of
more than six years. It was from this that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support and leave the family home. Therefore, his
psychological incapacity can be traced to this certain
MARCOS v. MARCOS period and not before the marriage nor during the
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000 inception of the marriage. Equally important, the condition
was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is
FACTS: again gainfully employed as a taxi driver.

Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. TE v. TE

Marcos married twice. First was on September 6, 1982, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the
marriage held at the Municipal Court of Pasig and second FACTS:
was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command
Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te
Malacañang Park, Manila. They were both military decided to court Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing
personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He
service in 1987 and started a business that did not prosper. decided to court Rowena after learning that her close
Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
trading and construction company. Their frequent quarrels towards their families and developed a closeness with
stemmed from the petitioner’s urges on respondent to be each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that
gainfully employed to convince their children that their they elope despite being bickering about being young and
father, as the breadwinner, is the head of the family and a jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans, left
good provider. Because of Wilson’s failure to provide for Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000
his family, he began beating the children for slight pension. He provided the traveling money and she
mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
wife. The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their
October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to stay in pension lasted for only a month. After Edward proceeded
their house anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him
and threatening him that she would commit suicide. has no goals and clear direction in life. Rowena’s affliction
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations.
On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to
court to get married. He was 25 years old and she was 20. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights
They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others
was being treated like a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations
independently but this request was angrily denied by his imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case,
father who insisted that Edward go home else, he would respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
house of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His blackmail and of committing suicide. Both parties being
family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on
Edward’s persistence that they live together, she decided April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and
that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, setting aside the decision of the appellate court.
Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with
Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor

submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties and
therefore, recommended trial on the merits. Upon the
findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and
Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder),
the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and
void. However, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside
the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely
banked on the testimony of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the

ground of psychological incapacity given the petitioner’s
totality of evidence.

HELD:

Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must

consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. AZCUETA v. REPUBLIC
The psychological assessment adequately, sufficiently and G.R. No. 180668 May 26, 2009
decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality
disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social FACTS:
personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed,
at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration
affliction of dependent personality disorder, he cannot of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo Azcueta
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta
observing love and respect and rendering help and support averred that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to
because he is unable to make everyday decisions without comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Marietta
advice from others, allows others to make most of his complained that despite her encouragement, Rodolfo
important decisions, tends to agree with people even never bothered to look for a job and always depended on
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing his mother for financial assistance and for his decisions. It
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, Azcueta home and paid the monthly rental. Rodolfo also
feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner which actually came from Rodolfo’s mother. When
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his told her his parents could support their needs. They had
identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed.
When they discussed this, Rodolfo told Marietta that sex Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her
was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos v.
also told her he was not ready for a child. When Marietta Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that
asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did the respondent spouse should be personally examined by
not agree and she was forced to leave and see if he would a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
follow her. He did not. the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony
was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close
given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony
the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological
Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature, incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a
independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of
ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because
Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self- indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises,
decisions and dependency on other people. The there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert witness.
was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was
the dominant figure in the family considering that The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was
Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified,
She added that the problem began during the early stages sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with
of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. more than 40 years’ experience in the field of psychology
She stated that the problem was severe, because he would and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the
not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and trial court’s decision. As held in Te v. Te (G.R. No. 161793,
incurable, because it began in early development and had 13 February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36,
been deeply ingrained in his personality. She, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
incapacitated to perform his marital duties and consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
responsibilities. psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to
of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in
presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s
declared the marriage void ab initio. irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and
abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality
that the psychiatric report was based solely on the Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage
information given by Marietta, and there was no showing being rooted in his early development and a by-product of
that the alleged psychological disorder was present at the his upbringing and family life.
start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent
and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been
decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume
Court on a petition for review on certiorari. the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’
opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance
ISSUE: from his mother might have been due to embarrassment
for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to motive for not wanting a child was a “responsible”
justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void ab realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. the High Court for being speculative and unsupported by
evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the
HELD: Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and
overdependence on his mother could be attributed to
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage,
marital duties because of his Dependent Personality Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert
Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
initio. for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality
Disorder.
 worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make respondent married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s
others to make most of his importantdecisions (such as family was apprehensive because of the nature of the
where to live), tends to agree with people even when he respondent’s work and that she came from a broken
believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001,
own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the
to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible immature and
being abandoned. (Te v. Te, supra) whimsical, and refused to do household chores like
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal
one who cannot independently make decisions regarding dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a
even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a
and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to
and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique
incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him
the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male
tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with even caught them inside his room several times.
Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital
psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to
obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted
by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to
disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She
nullity of a marriage under Article 36. added that she was the one who took care of their son at
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court
incurable, having been deeply ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties.
ingrained in his system since his early years. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then
allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence as well as a certified true copy of their marriage
contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan
Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted
with mixed personality disorder. The Appellate Court,
however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s
decision on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation
report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was
serious, grave and permanent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the

respondent’s psychological incapacity.

HELD:

No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”,

“refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it did not reveal utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report
only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects but
failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be
AGRAVIADOR v. AGRAVIADOR judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010 and (c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set
stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:
FACTS: (1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the
marriage lies in the plaintiff;
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a beerhouse where Erlinda must be
 a. Medically or clinically identified, five children. However, after years of being together, they
b. Alleged in the complaint, started to fight verbally and even physically more
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and frequently. This was aggravated when they encountered
d. Clearly explained in the decision. problems with their daughter who was transferred from
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the one school to another because of misbehavior and then
incapacity must be psychological, not physical. later on became pregnant untimely. Rosalino’s way of
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing spoiling their children also was a cause of quarrels
at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. between him and his spouse, Myrna. Rosalino, who is
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be beginning to get worn out by their unhealthy relationship,
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. had an affair with another woman. When Myrna
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring discovered it, Rosalino immediately ended the relationship
about the disability of the party to assume the with his mistress. The quarrels between them
essential obligations of marriage. unfortunately worsened and this led to Rosalino’s
(6) The essential marital obligations must be departure from their home, leaving his wife and children.
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the After some time, he converted to Islam after going out
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as with many women. Rosalino decided to legally end his
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same marriage with Myrna so he filed a petition for absolute
Code in regard to parents and their children. nullity of marriage on the ground of his psychological
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the He went to a clinical psychologist to be examined for the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, purpose of presenting evidence in court. Dr. Tayag, the
should be given great respect by our courts. clinical psychologist who examined him, concluded that
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting Rosalino is suffering from “Anti-Social Personality
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to Disorder” which manifests a pervasive pattern of social
appear as counsel for the state. deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness, and lack of remorse. It was said to be rooted
from Rosalino’s childhood hardships due to a dysfunctional
family, deep feelings of rejection, and constant need for
attention. Because of this finding, Dr. Tayag concluded that
Rosalino was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
rendered judgment annulling the marriage of the Marable
spouses. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC upon granting the appeal of the Office
of the Solicitor General which declared the marriage as still
valid and subsisting. The Court of Appeals held that the
evidence submitted was insufficient to prove psychological
incapacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the annulment of marriage of the Marable
spouses based on the evidence of Rosalino’s psychological
incapacity is tenable.

RULING:
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, the psychological illness and its root
cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the
marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the
report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of
Rosalino’s alleged psychological incapacity. The evaluation
of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that
MARABLE v. MARABLE petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality
G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011 Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the
finding that Rosalino is a socially deviant person,
FACTS: rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful. For sure,
the spouses’ frequent marital squabbles and differences in
Rosalino L. Marable and Myrna F. Marable were handling finances and managing their business affairs, as
sweethearts since they were still students at Arellano well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are
University. Later on in their relationship, they eloped from not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may
their homes and married through civil rites before the be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Rosalino
mayor of Tanay, Rizal. Within the same month after the even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they
civil wedding, a church wedding was celebrated. They had had happy moments together. Also, the records would
show that the Rosalino acted responsibly during their
marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs FACTS:
of his family, most especially his children. Their personal
differences do not reflect a personality disorder Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio filed a petition for the
tantamount to psychological incapacity. Rosalino tried to annulment of her marriage to Danilo Aurelio. “The said
make it appear that his family history of having a petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are
womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he psychologically incapable of performing and complying
engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological
However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the
as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested
rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of
history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working
tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and
psychological nature that is grave, permanent and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated
incurable. In fact, the records show that when respondent between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to
learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot
short, Rosalino’s marital infidelity does not appear to be the household bills and provide for his family's needs. He
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his
obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual wife even in the presence of their children. Vida Ma.
infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is Corazon Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings
that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to
disordered personality which make Rosalino completely despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally
That not being the case with Rosalino, his claim of immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment.
psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when
psychologically incapacity must be more than just a she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her
“difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other
some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and
concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to some fulfil the essential obligations of marital life led to the
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent
of the marriage. In the intention of the law is to confine manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up
serious cases of personality disorders clearly of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist,
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give who found that the psychological incapacity of both
meaning and significance to the marriage. husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is
grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent
suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from
passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that
renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the
normal obligations of a marriage.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio on the

ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

Clearly, although not necessarily required, having an

expert opinion of a Psychologist to show the disorder or
abnormality suffered by the party. In this case, the
husband opposed the petition and questioned the
substance of the petition and alleged that there is no cause
of action. The Court ruled in the following manner: A
review of the petition shows that it observed the
requirements in Republic v. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA
198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was
allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity
AURELIO v. AURELIO of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in
G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011 paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of
juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of FACTS:
the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Santos-De Quintos
l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in paragraph were married in civil rites on March 16, 1967. However,
10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of the couple was not blessed with a child because Catalina
incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.
There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the
nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
Code. Whether or not the allegations are meritorious marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground. He
depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. alleged that Catalina always left the house without his
This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which consent; that she engaged in petty arguments with him;
can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs;
If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors
evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she
petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker;
evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her
merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant paramour. As support to his claim of psychological
nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity the Court incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-
denied the opposition of the husband since the Petition psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle
complied with the requirements of the law. All in all, respondents stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a
except from having the proper grounds of nullity, it is borderline personality disorder that was no longer
likewise important that the Petition to be submitted in the treatable.
court be properly pleaded with all the requirements of law.
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her
psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with different
men and abandoning the conjugal home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated

to fulfill marital duties.

HELD:

No. Marriage remains valid. Psychological incapacity is an

incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume
basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations.

In Republic v CA (Molina), the Supreme Court has

established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage
based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These
were not met in the instant case since the gravity, root
cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological
incapacity were not sufficiently established.

Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the

house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household
chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not
established. Eduardo presented no other witness to
corroborate these allegations.

Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. respondents'

evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this
claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity
and incurability of the incapacity. Even the testimony of
Dr. respondents stated a general description of borderline
personality disorder which did not explain the root cause
as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS specify the acts or omissions or the gravity which
G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012 constituted the disorder. What was established was that
Catalina was childish and immature. Furthermore, Dr.
Respondents had only one interview with Catalina. This filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
lacks the depth and objectivity of an expert assessment. on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn
From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply
Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
marital obligations do not constitute psychological celebration of their marriage. He alleged that 1) She leaves
incapacity alone. It must be shown that such immature the children without proper care and attention as she
acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that played mahjong all day and all night; 2) She leaves the
made the spouse completely unable to discharge the house to party with male friends and returned in the early
essential obligations of marriage. hours of the following day; and 3) She committed adultery
on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he
saw half-naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a
psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic
canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to
testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates
explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personalityu
Disorder and that it “may have been evident even prior to
her marriage” because it is rooted in her family
background and upbringing. Fr. Healy concluded that
Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital duties. He explained that her psychological
incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her
family. This role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point
that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and
husband’s needs became secondary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn

suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert

witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior
of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No
proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to
beauty salons or her frequent partying with
friends. Malyn’s sexual infidelity was also not proven
because she was only dating other men. Even assuming
that she had an extramarital affair with another man,
sexual infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a
ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.

KALAW v. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

FACTS:
VINAS v. PAREL-VINAS
Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone had an affair with
Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal FACTS:
home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile,
Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23
more children. In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States years old, respectively, got married incivil rites held in Lipa
(US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994, nine City, Batangas.4 Mary Grace was already pregnant then.
years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and
malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was relationship he tried to break up with Olivia because he
caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from
her pregnancy. The couple lived together under one roof. reaching his personal and family goals but she refused.
Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a Olivia insisted on staying with Reghis making the former’s
production engineer. conclude that they have eloped so they made plans to get
them married even if Reghis objected.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous
which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found marriage. They become more distant when Reghis secured
out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time a job as medical representative and become engrossed in
the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned his career and focused on supporting his parents and
yet. siblings. Then on June 16, 1998 Reghis filed for declaration
of nullity of marriage alleging that he is psychologically
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition5 for the incapacitated and unable to comply with his essential
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. To marital obligations.
ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional One Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio submitted that Reghis
guidance and submitted himself to a psychological was suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Personality
evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Disorder (OCPD) which is the cause of his behavioural
Dr. Tayag found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” disorder of having a strong obsession for whatever
and “capable of maintaining a mature and healthy endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to the exclusion
heterosexual relationship.” of other responsibilities such as his role as a husband or a
father.

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s ISSUE:

personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn
and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Whether or not Reghis is suffering from Obssessive
Grace way back in college. Compulsive Personality Disorder which constitutes as
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the
RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary The Supreme Court was not convinced of the Reghis’
Grace. allegations because the requirements of psychological
incapacity were not satisfied. Based on Reghis’ testimony,
RULING: it shows that he was able to comply with his marital
obligation which therefore, negates the existence of a
The lack of personal examination or assessment of the grave and serious psychological incapacity. He has also
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as
necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity he categorically stated that he loves their children and that
of marriage. “If the totality of evidence presented is he was a good provider to them. Moreover, the
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, psychological examination lacked juridical antecedence.
then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. In the present case,
the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never
proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x
Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another
woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically
be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when
no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a
trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In
fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was
caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a
time after their marriage; their problems only came in
later.
DEL ROSARIO v. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 222541 February 15, 2017
REPUBLIC v. ROMERO
G.R. No. 209180 February 24, 2016 FACTS:

FACTS: Rachel was 15 years old and Jose was 17 when they met in
1983. In 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a
Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972. Reghis at domestic helper and had allegedly supported Jose for his
that time was still a student and less than a year into their college tuition. They eventually got married on December
28, 1989. Rachel went back to Hongkong again in 1998 to incapacity. During trial, Cesar testified on Lolita’s alleged
be a caregiver and has worked there ever since. On psychological incapacity and abandonment; and narrated
September 2011, she filed for a petition for declaration of that he continued to support Lolita and their children even
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological after he learned of her infidelity. Lolita denied begin
incapacity of Jose. She alleged that Jose was hot tempered psychologically incapacitated, and averred that her break
and violent, he punched her in the shoulder a few days up with Cesar was due to irreconcilable differences. To
before their wedding when she refused to pay for the support his allegation of psychological incapacity on the
transportation of his parents, he hit his own father with a part of Lolita, Cesar presented Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of
pipe, locked her out of the house in the middle of the night the National Center for Mental Health who testified that
sometime in December 2007, and he represented himself “Lolita was “not suffering from any form of major
as single and flirted openly, and refued to have sexual psychiatric illness[,]” but had been “unable to provide the
intimacy with her. expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship”; her “transferring from one job to the other
Dr. Nedy Tayag submitted a psychological report stating depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as
that Jose has Anti-Social Personality Disorder (APD) well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions”; and
because he lacks empathy and concern towards Rachel, his “her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that reluctance to work out a good marital and family
catered only to his fancies and his comfort, his selfishness relationship.”
marked by his lack of depth when it come s to his marital
commitment, and lack of remorse of his wrongs. After trial, the RTC granted Cesar’s petition and declared
the marriage between them null and void on the basis of
ISSUE: Lolita’s psychological incapacity. The Office of the Solicitor
Whether or not Jose is psychologically incapacitated. General seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which initially granted OSG’s appeal, but later on reversed
RULING: itself and affirmed the RTC ruling, on the basis of two
The Curt denied the petition, The totality of evidence circumstances:(1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform
presented there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s wilfull and
conclude that Jose’s acts constitutes psychological deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
incapacity. The psychological report does not explain in
detail how Jose’s APD could be characterized as grave, The OSG appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that Dr.
deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not disclose
jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness
incapacity. It failed to show that Jose’s behaviour justifies nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and
for the nullification of marriage. incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal
separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient basis exists to nullify Cesar’s

marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

RULING:

No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the

Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability
to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
REPUBLIC v. ENCELAN much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013 plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
FACTS: celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates
Cesar and Lolita Encelan married each other on August 25, when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her
1979. Out of their union, two children were born, Maricar subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in continued financial support to her and their children even
Saudi Arabia. While there, he learned that Lolita had been after he learned of the affair, but he merely mentioned in
having an affair with a certain Alvin. Lolita eventually left passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her
the conjugal home and went to live with Alvin. On June abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.Sexual infidelity
16, 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration of nullity of and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true,
his marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity;
simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute started sleeping in separate rooms. In November 1995,
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the Dominic gave her a car as a birthday present only to find
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her
disordered personality that completely prevented the father-in-law for the payment of the car. Dominic
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital eventually got fired from his job because of he ran away
obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He was charged
allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were with estafa. Petitioner also found out that he swindled
manifestations of any psychological illness. many of his clients some of them threatening her and their
family. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the
Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for “time and
with co-workers does not suffice as a consideration for the space to think things over.” A month later, she refused his
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union commit suicide. She and her family immediately left the
with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife’s house to live in another place concealed from him. On
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for
with her professional/work relationship; workplace the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
marital counterparts. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to of psychological incapacity which are gravity, antecedence
work out a good marital relationship is a mere and incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s
generalization unsupported by facts. psychological incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA,
arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted psychological
incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of
the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code;
that the testimony of the expert witness was not
conclusive upon the court, and that the real reason for the
parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic. CA reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of
Dominic was established

RULING:

No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-

serving and uncorroborated because only Arabelle was
evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a
need to verify her findings concerning Dominic’s
psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-
feelings toward him during her evaluation. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets
the guidelines for psychological incapacity as characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." These guidelines do not necessarily require
MENDOZA v. REPUBLIC the root cause to be “medically or clinically identified” by a
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 physician or a psychologist. What is important is that
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
FACTS: finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution
was eight months pregnant. They lived together but in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered appeals by the OSG no
depended on their parents for financial support. Arabelle longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
had different jobs to support the needs of the family. requires the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the
When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati proceedings as seen in its provisions.
in 1994, he spent his first salary celebrating with his
friends. September of the same year, Arabelle found out of
Dominic’s illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee.
Communication between them became rare and they
 to her; (d) stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted
to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a
check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money
from their relatives; and (g) indulged in
gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from
“mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted
discernment and total lack of care, love and affection
towards him and their child.” He posited that Juvy’s
incapacity was “extremely serious” and “appears to be
incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally
manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no
evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the
case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The
respondent presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to substantiate his allegations.

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented

Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she
conducted a psychological test on the respondent.
According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an
interview, but the latter did not respond.

On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’

marriage. On November 25, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of
responsibility coupled with her gambling and swindling
undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S.
Guiang characterized Juvy’s condition as permanent,
incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her
marriage with respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established the

respondent’s psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated

REPUBLIC v. GALANG incidents, not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must
G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011 be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of complying
FACTS: with the responsibility and duty as a married person
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
married in Pampanga. They lived in Nestor’s father’s house factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the
in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
an artistillustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, person from really accepting and thereby complying with
earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home as a the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown.
housewife. Christopher is their only child. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided;
therefore, biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the
On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for psychologist did not identify the types of psychological
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under tests to determine the root cause of Juvy’s psychological
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that condition. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or
Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the severity of Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to
essential obligations of marriage because she was a prove incurability. The psychologist’s testimony was totally
kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s early life
showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare and associations, how she acted before and at the time of
breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered
when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed
amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to trace the history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to
relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden
celebration of the marriage. and confronted Bona. During their confrontation, Bona
admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went
to Basilan. In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live
with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs
of Ramona. Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC
of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage
to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged sexual infidelity of Bona is a

ground for declarationof nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The Court sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of

the evidence presentedin this case, that Bona had been, on
several occasions with several other men,sexually disloyal
to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, Court was persuaded that
Bona hadindeed abandoned Jose. However, Court cannot
apply the same conviction to Jose’sthesis that the totality
of Bona’s acts constituted psychological incapacity
asdetermined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is
inadequate credible evidencethat her “defects” were
already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. Inother words, her alleged psychological
incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudentialrequisite of
“juridical antecedence.” Bona’s alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., hersexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period oftime after her
marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
marriage.

OCHOSA v. ALANO
G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011

FACTS:
CAMACHO-REYES v. REYES
Jose respondentnaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP
while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college FACTS:
drop-out. They were married on 27 October 1973 before
the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. Their Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent
union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP),
an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years
they later registered as their daughter, naming her old. They were simply classmates then in one university
Ramona Celeste Alano-Ochosa. Sometime in 1985, Jose subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los
was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Baños campus. Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed
Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were respondent’s style of courtship which included dining out,
given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a
they resided with their military aides. In 1987, Jose was university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held
charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame. On Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not
one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a diminished by the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even
security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies,
the military community. When Jose could no longer bear obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974,
respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, testimonies of Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno and Dr.
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
graduation and her father’s death, petitioner and evidence. The clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was assessment were not based solely on the narration or
already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants
Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and
lived with the respondent’s family in Mandaluyong City. All sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents, observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions
and the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. Dr.
their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a Natividad A. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent
monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. In 1989, should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the
due to financial reverses, respondent’s fishpond business finding that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
stopped operations. Although, without any means to incurable. In sum, we find points of convergence &
support his family, respondent refused to go back to work consistency in all three reports and the respective
for the family business. respondent came up with another testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1)
business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems
trading. As with all of respondent’s business ventures, this include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now work towards providing the needs of his family; several
hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated. unpaid money obligations. It is true that a clinical
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has
was having an extra-marital affair. One of the last episodes personality disorder is not automatically believed by the
that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst where Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of
respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity. In the
wheeled into the operating room. case at bar, however, even without the experts’
conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events)
As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s alleged in the petition and established during trial, all
siblings and asked them to intervene, Adolfo Reyes, point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
members of a marriage encounter group, invited, marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s
sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
parties’ relationship as respondent remained obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support;
uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment; business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
however, respondent resisted and did not continue with inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
the clinical psychologist’s recommendation to undergo businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. In view of
psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological
knowledge of respondent’s siblings, told respondent to incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said
relationship with his children.. Petitioner filed before the marriage.
RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological
incapacity to fullfill the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the totality of evidence established

psychological incapacity therefore rendering the marriage
null and void.

RULING: TORING v. TORING

G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with FACTS:
personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in1978 at his aunt’s suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Other than
house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons
Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt’s intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends
house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
the younger Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the
and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that
became sweethearts after three months of courtship. They trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another time of marriage. Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son,
girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her. would not have been a reliable witness as he could not
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 have been expected to know what happened between his
before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. parents until long after his birth. He merely recounted
They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not
Ric Jayson. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years just the manifestations during the marriage described as
after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.
before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and
subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Before
the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage
contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his
expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his
and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies.

Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a

squanderer – that she was very extravagant, materialistic,
controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman,
and he regularly sent money to his wife to cover the
family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition.
However, not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities
and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts from
other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales
agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company. Also,
during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that
Teresita’s stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince
her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her
miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his
worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not
have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with
Teresita were characterized by “withdrawals”; other than
these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired, as
he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of
living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of
rumors that his wife represented herself to others as
single, and went out on dates with other men when he was
not around. Thereafter, Teresita was diagnosed with
Narcissistic Personality Disorder by Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred for disregarding the

factual findings of the trial court, particularly the
expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the
trial court – in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully
complied with Molina.

RULING: LIGERALDE v. PATALINGHUG

G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2010
Yes. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied
on Ricardo and Richardson’s testimonies. The mere FACTS:
narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson,
coupled with the results of the psychological tests Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They
administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not were blessed with four children. Silvino claimed that,
constitute sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita during their marriage, he observed that May had several
manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three
described her as immature, irresponsible and careless. Her days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
infidelity, negligence and nocturnal activities, he claimed, finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon
characterized their marital relations. May confessed that thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage was arranged
she had no more love for him. They then lived separately. and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony
With May’s irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, officiated by the Mayor of Biñan. Without any means to
Silvino came to believe that she is psychologically support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of Angelito’s parents after their marriage. They had by this
marriage. RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
null and void. Its findings were based on the Psychological for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the
Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio. The Court of other hand, refused to work and was most of the time
Appeals reversed the RTC decision. drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn’s efforts.
ISSUE: Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito
thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to lived. They now have children. Ten years after their
comply with the essential marital obligations. separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
RULING: Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply
No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the with the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, the RTC
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the annulled their marriage and CA affirmed it.
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by ISSUE:
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to
the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must comply with the essential marital obligations.
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable; and (5) such illness must be grave enough to HELD:
bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (Republic v. Court of No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the
Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity psychological report did not conclusively show the root
must be identified as a psychological illness, its cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by psychological condition. The psychologist derived all her
the totality of the evidence presented during trial. An conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose
adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness,
be able to establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes beatings she received from him – all of which occurred
her completely unable to discharge the essential after the marriage.
obligations of the marital state.
Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito
showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship
stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him.
She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the
marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings
exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of
celebration of the marriage or months or years after. This
is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause,
as the law and its related jurisprudence require that the
psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness,
gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of
SUAZO v. SUAZO psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010 psychological incapacity. Standing alone, physical violence
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
FACTS:
ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
in June 1985; they were residents of Laguna at that time.
After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with FACTS:
 incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and
Aurora Apon and Rodolfo Aspillaga got married in year wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will
1980. They begot two children, but after the couple have hamper their performance of their marital obligations does
already lived together, Rodolfo claimed their marriage was not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as
“tumultuous.” He described Aurora as domineering and contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere
frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. It must be
complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than
the family budget and made crucial family decisions just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA).
tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
(concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological the marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October
incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora 19, 2007).Psychological disorders do not manifest that
failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic
Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows
Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility and
assume her teaching position in a university for a period of irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with
three months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, psychological incapacity as understood juristically. As to
she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the
brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. same likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on
Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects
cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory,
their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. In
Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children. disagreements regarding money matters are a common,
and even normal, occurrence between husbands and
A Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed wives.
that both parties suffered psychological handicaps traced
from unhealthy maturational development. Both had
strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models. However,
respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships
resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the
obligation of marriage. RTC found the parties
psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the

parties’ psychological Incapacity

RULING:

No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R.

No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has been categorically
ruled that: Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved. In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to
reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or
serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was
able to establish the parties’ personality disorder;
however, he failed to link the parties’ psychological ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
 Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s
FACTS: testimonies, merely established that respondent left
petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi
Herein petitioner, Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a
her Complaint that she was married to respondent Rey C. year and a half later, he directly went to live with his
Alcazar on 11 October 200. After their wedding, Veronica parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with
and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did
Mindoro, and the hometown of respondent's parents. not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter's respondent’s psychological state. Tayag, in evaluating
abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on
On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom information provided by petitioner.
of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a
furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did
not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter.
Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but He
never answered. About a year and a half after respondent
left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that He
was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was
surprised why she was not advised by her husband of his
arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when

respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner. Instead, He proceeded to his parents'
house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner asserted
that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines,
he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for
annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation
between petitioner and respondent.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy
L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed
the respondent to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for annulment of
her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

RULING:

No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an

annulment of marriage on the ground ofincapacity to
consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability
on the spouses to perform and complete the act of sexual
intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the NAJERA v. NAJERA
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009.
36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless, Article 36should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) FACTS:
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be Petitioner Digna Najera and respondent Eduardo Najera
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. are married on January 31, 1988 as evidenced by their
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) marriage contract. Petitioner claimed that at the time of
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. the celebration of their marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential G.R. No. 147824 August 2, 2007
marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage. At the time of their FACTS:
marriage, respondent was jobless, while petitioner was
employed as Clerk at the Special Services Division of the On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent
Provincial Government of Pangasinan with a monthly Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four
salary of ₱5,000.00. It was petitioner’s brother who helped (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose
respondent find a job as a seaman at the Intercrew (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine years
Shipping Agency in Manila. On July 30, 1988, respondent thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the
was employed as a seaman, and he gave petitioner a Regional Trial Court a complaint for annulment of her
monthly allotment of ₱1,600.00. After ten months at work, marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code,
he went home in 1989 and then returned to work after docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student
three months. Every time respondent was home, he of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her,
quarreled with petitioner and accused her of having an frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in
affair with another man. Petitioner noticed that 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry
respondent also smoked marijuana and every time he him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most
went out of the house and returned home, he was drunk. celebrated" marriages in Bindoy.
However, there was no record in their barangay that
respondent was involved in drugs. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted
with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her
Psychologist Cristina Gates testified that the chances of medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted
curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He
Its curability depended on whether the established organic did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest
damage was minimal -- referring to the malfunction of the house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop.
composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking To cope with the death of the children, the entire family
and marijuana, which possibly afflicted respondent with went to the United States. However, after three months,
borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon
impulses. her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her
"Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt and he
ISSUE: disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At
other times, he permitted the municipal government to
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. His act
able to prove that respondent is psychologically of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child
incapacitated. was the last straw that prompted her to file the present
case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in
HELD: 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation
resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously
In Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity
named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter
must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
Cindy Rose Paras.
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a
conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed
In this case, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s
that the totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner
authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the
failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was
United States. For his part, he was granted only three (3)
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
obligations of marriage. The root cause of respondent’s
immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them
proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
because he was just starting his law practice and besides,
permanent or incurable.
their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide
As found by the Court of Appeals, Psychologist Cristina for their needs. He admitted though that there were times
Gates’ conclusion that respondent was psychologically he failed to give them financial support because of his lack
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by of income. What caused the inevitable family break-out
petitioner and was not based on her personal knowledge was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday
and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding is celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the
unscientific and unreliable.Moreover, the trial court guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has
correctly found that petitioner failed to prove with nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her
certainty that the alleged personality disorder of lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she
respondent was incurable as may be gleaned from denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke
Psychologist Cristina Gates’ testimony. down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As to the
charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not
PARAS v. PARAS. his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was
impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness.
Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a

Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. On
December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of
the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by
law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s
alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this
Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment are
conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also,
she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime
in May, 1993

ISSUE:

Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows

psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.

HELD:

A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she

has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court
even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded
that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged
abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are
at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal
husband and father. However, by themselves, these
grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due
to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds,
we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must
assume and discharge as a married person. While they may
manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological
incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such
that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they
do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably
hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents
him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in
the future.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity

must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological --
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
 ZAMORA v. COURT OF APPEALS marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a
G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007 similar predilection even before or at the inception of the
marriage.
FACTS:
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court finds no
Petitioner and private respondent were married on June 4, reason to disturb the findings and conclusions reached by
1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage, they lived together the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
at No. 50-A Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not
produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the PEREZ-FERRARIS v. FERRARIS
United States to work as a nurse. She returned to the G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Philippines for a few months, then left again in 1974.
Thereafter, she made periodic visits to Cebu City until FACTS:
1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
Petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision denying the petition
marriage anchored on the alleged "psychological for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix
incapacity" of private respondent, as provided for under Ferraris. It held that epilepsy does not constitute as
Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position, he psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code
alleged that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought and that the evidence on record were insufficient to prove
of having children as evidenced by the fact that she had infidelity.
not borne petitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged
that private respondent abandoned him by living in the Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
United States and had in fact become an American citizen; in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the
and that throughout their marriage they lived together for evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
not more than three years. On the other hand, private respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or
respondent denied that she refused to have a child. She that his "defects" were incurable and already present at
portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a the inception of the marriage. The Court of Appeals also
nurse by profession and that she would from time to time found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that
them. She also faulted her husband for the breakup of she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that
their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful to her. the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she
He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or
begot at least three children with them. supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral
element in respondent's character that effectively
ISSUE: incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
RTC’s decision dismissing the declaration of nullity of the ISSUE:
marriage.
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists.
HELD:
HELD:
Under Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the
Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that: resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish respondent's
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that
Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the
showing that either or both parties were psychologically evidence on record did not convincingly establish that
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity.
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
after its celebration. those are incurable.

The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at
and the evidence presented, considered in totality, should her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality
be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent
incapacity of the party concerned. Petitioner, however, and avoidant type."
failed to substantiate his allegation that private
respondent is psychologically incapacitated. His allegations The Court finds respondent's alleged mixed
relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
child was strongly disputed, as the records undeniably bear whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during
out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
respondent that petitioner cited occurred during the and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted
on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
 ANTONIO v. REYES respect. Sixth, the marriage of the parties was annulled by
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006 the Catholic Church. Seventh, the totality of evidence
presented by the petitioner shows that respondent’s
FACTS: psychological incapacity is incurable.

Petitioner Leonilo and respondent Marie met in August Thus, the Court concluded that petitioner has
1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church court.
weddingat the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a
child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.

Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to

respondent declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still
subsists up to present. Petitioner claims that respondent
persistently lied about herself as she concealed about her
illegitimate child as the adopted child of her family.
Moreover, respondent also lied about the people around
her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can impose Article 36 of the

Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and
void.

HELD:

In Republic vs. CA, the Court laid down standards for the
declaration of a nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In this case the Court finds that it sufficiently
satisfied the Molina Guideline. First, Petitioner had
sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own
testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations.

Second, the root cause of respondent’s psychological

incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. Third,
respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made
up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Fourth, the gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Whatever
such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so
grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was
dubitable. Fifth, Respondent is evidently unable to comply
with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological
liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
 CARATING-SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents
G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004 are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
FACTS: Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that
On 25 September 1997, or after 24 years of married life they are incurable.
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of
its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of
petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their
marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her
extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and
anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the
staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the
physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his
office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no
respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of
his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she
would yell and scream at him and throw objects around
the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she
cared even less about his professional advancement as she
did not even give him moral support and encouragement;
that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness
for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation
from her own parents since childhood and that such
incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and
expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the
parties; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22)
years.

The Regional Trial Court issued it resolution denying

Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed its decision relying
on Dr. Garcia’s psychiatric evaluation that finding both
petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not psychologically incapacity exist.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding

that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.
The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent
Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid admissions of
petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge
whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital
obligations of marriage. What emerges from the
psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the
only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel
was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. On the other hand, respondent Manuel failed
to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her
jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts
and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his
 VILLALON v. VILLALON
G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the

annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N.
Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City as he BUENAVENTURA v. COURT OF APPEALS
claimed that he is psychologically incapacitated. According G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological FACTS:
incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain
harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in Petitioner Noel filed for a petition of the declaration of
having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and nullity of marriage, on the ground of the alleged
irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh
obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his Buenaventura, herein respondent. Thereafter, petitioner
desire for other women and a life unchained from any amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife
spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium essential obligations of marriage.
towards respondent.
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical decision declaring the marriage between petitioner Noel
psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological and respondent Isabel null and void ab initio.
disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder"
with "Casanova Complex". Dr. Dayan described the said ISSUE:
disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of
Whether or not there is psychological incapacity under
interpersonal and occupational functioning" with main
Article 36 of the Family Code.
symptoms of "grand ideation about oneself, self-
centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always HELD:
be the one followed, the I personality."
As articulated by the Court of Appeals, the lower court
ISSUE: found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-
appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated
of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
pressure to marry and that because of pride he married
HELD: defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into
marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to
finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy,
fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is as a father; that he had no inclination to make the
evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the
respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their easiest way out, that of leaving defendant–appellee and
separation, a loving father to their children and a good their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-
provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and
infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer
disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless
spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a nights not only in those years the parties were together
general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a but also after and throughout their separation.
psychological disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal
history. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the
acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality incapacity or inability to comply with the essential
Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage obligations of marriage.
and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such
conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete
evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several
affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Moreover, the
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that petitioner
failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged
psychological disorder. it appears that petitioner has
simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently
refused to stay married to her.
 state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity.

DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

FACTS: REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
Petitioner David met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel
while he was working in the advertising business of his FACTS:
father. Subsequently, they got married and begot four
children. However, on April 1, 1997 petitioner filed a Respondent Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Parangan
petition seeking for the declaration of of nullity of his Dagdag were married on September 7 1975 at the Iglesia
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity as Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. A
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code. week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family
without explanation. He would disappear for months,
Petitioner present Dr. Dayan which declared that Sharon suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again.
was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder During the times when he was with his family, he indulged
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she in drinking sprees with friends and would return home
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
remorse, even bringing with her the two children of intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity injuries on her.
and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court
are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
essential obligations of marriage. under Article 36 of the Family Code. She presented her
sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, who testified that Erlinda
After trial, judgment was rendered declaring the marriage and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never
between petitioner and respondent null and void. stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that
Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she
ISSUE: pitied Erlinda and the children.
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is ISSUE:
enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated. Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly declared the marriage as null and void under
HELD: Article 36 of the Family Code.
In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly HELD:
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that she could not have known the obligations she was In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, the Court laid
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid down the following guidelines in the interpretation and
assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident
blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in that Erlinda failed to comply with with guideline No. 2
church rites, and which produced four children. which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or
abandonment do not by themselves constitute medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was
must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise
disordered personality which make respondent completely not given an opportunity to present controverting
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely
rendered.
 PESCA v. PESCA
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in 1975, Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and

respondent Zosimo A. Pesca met on board an inter-island
vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship,
they got married. However, in 1988, petitioner said that
she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant.
His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and
irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and
violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock
in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least,
minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and
kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the
children. The children themselves were not spared from
physical violence. Subsequently, petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking
psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the

decision of the trial court declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting.

HELD:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her

allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make
out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the
contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.

The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an

inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital
relationship with respondent, totally terminating that
relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting
denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite
given up, neither should we.
 BOLOS v. BOLOS demarcation line between marriages covered by the
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010 Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.

FACTS: The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s

interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to than to the word "marriages."
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006. A copy of
said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006.
He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11,
2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due

course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its
August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting
the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.Not in
conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed

and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate
court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February
14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on
the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988."

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the
case at bench.

HELD:

Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit
in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and MALLION v. ALCANTARA
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
the Philippines.
FACTS:
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves
no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of
Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.The rule sets a
his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground had three kids. While her husband was studying and
of psychological incapacity. working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce case
dismissed in the Court of Appeals. against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage
was void for absence of valid marriage certificate. The
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for Swiss Court held in favour of the private respondent.
declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for
court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the
and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied
valid marriage license. Petitioner’s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the
same. She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to
ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
assail the validity of CA’s decision.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the
HELD: marriage null and void?

No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains HELD:

as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,” which
Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s
is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of
contention is untenable. The Court explained that the Rule
the second action upon the same claim, demand or cause
only applies to cases concerning typographical or other
of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to
clerical errors in the marriage contract. It does not apply to
res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment”
cases where the status of the parties and their children
or the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that
shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
petitioner contending that “A void judgment for want of
again be raised in any future case between the same
jurisdiction is no judgment at all.”
parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore,
having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of
their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to
have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that
the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The
petition is denied for lack of merit.

ERIC U. YU v. REYES-CARPIO
LEONOR v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011
G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996
FACTS:
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC of Pasig. Judge Suarez
validity of the judgment of the lower court. It was shown on May 30, 2006 issued an order stating that Eric’s partial
that she was married to the private respondent and they offer of evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be submitted
for resolution after certain exhibits have been remarked. It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did not disallow
But the exhibits were only relative to the issue of the the presentation of evidence on the incidents on custody,
nullity of the marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September support, and property relations. It is clear in the assailed
12, 2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for orders that the trial court judge merely deferred the
resolution, considering that the incidents on custody, reception of evidence relating to custody, support, and
support, and property relations (incidental issues) were property relations. And the trial judge’s decision was not
mere consequences of the declaration of nullity of the without basis. Judge Reyes-Carpio finds support in the
parties’ marriage. Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
Eric opposed this motion saying that the incident on and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Particularly, Secs.
declaration of nullity cannot be resolved without 19 and 21 of the Rule clearly allow the reception of
presentation of evidence for the incidents on custody, evidence on custody, support, and property relations after
support, and property relations. Eric added that the the trial court renders a decision granting the petition, or
incidental issues and the issue on declaration of nullity upon entry of judgment granting the petition:
can both proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Eric’s opposition. Section 19. Decision. – (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez, so that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
case was re-raffled to another branch presided by Judge issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50
Reyes-Carpio. While the case was being tried by Judge and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule
Reyes-Carpio, Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
the strict observation by the said judge of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage as Section 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody,
codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and that the case on the support of common children and delivery of their
declaration on nullity be already submitted for resolution presumptive legitimes. – Upon entry of the judgment
ahead of the incidental issues, and not simultaneously. Eric granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt
opposed this motion. of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting
the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus Motion, saying shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
that the main cause of action is the declaration of nullity of distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
the marriage and the incidental issues are merely ancillary custody, support of common children and delivery of their
incidents thereto. Eric moved for reconsideration, which presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of
was denied by Judge Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated
certiorari with the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the in previous judicial proceedings.
judgment of the trial court.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the reception
ISSUE: of evidence on custody, support, and property relations
but merely deferred it, based on the existing rules issued
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage must be by this Court, to a time when a decision granting the
submitted for resolution first before the reception of petition is already at hand and before a final decree is
evidence on custody, support, and property relations issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more particularly the
(incidental issues) family court, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition
and distribution, custody, support of common children,
HELD:
and delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon entry of
It appears in the records that the Orders in question, or judgment granting the petition. And following the
what are alleged to have been exercised with grave abuse pertinent provisions of the Court En Banc Resolution in
of discretion, are interlocutory orders. An interlocutory A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this act is undoubtedly consistent
order is one which “does not finally dispose of the case, with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to
and does not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the what petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51 of the
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and Family Code state:
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall provide
that other things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
to prove that the assailed orders were issued with grave
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
abuse of discretion and that those were patently
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive
erroneous. Considering that the requisites that would
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
justify certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an
previous judicial proceedings.
interlocutory order have not been complied with, the
proper recourse for petitioner should have been an appeal Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive
in due course of the judgment of the trial court on the legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date
merits, incorporating the grounds for assailing the of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in
interlocutory orders. cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.

Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the deferment of

the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations. Conversely, the trial court may receive
evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of nullity or
annulment of marriage is issued. And this is what Judge
Reyes-Carpio sought to comply with in issuing the assailed
orders. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yu’s
assertion that ruling the main issue without receiving
evidence on the subject incidents would result in an
ambiguous and fragmentary judgment is certainly
speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption
that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge Reyes-Carpio

acted in a capricious and whimsical manner, much less in a
way that is patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
the assailed orders deferring the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations. To reiterate, this
decision is left to the trial court’s wisdom and legal
soundness. Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot
likewise be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge Reyes-Carpio
and in ultimately finding an absence of grave abuse of
discretion on her part.
 YU v. YU-LIM served. Philip’s contention that the second mode of
GR No. 200072 June 20, 2016 extraterritorial service of summons mentioned above was
sufficiently complied with, cannot be deemed compliant
FACTS: with the requirements of the rules and is even tantamount
to deception warranting the annulment of the Batangas
Philip Yu and Viveca Lim Yu were married on 1984. court's judgment.
However, in 1993, Viveca left their home together with
their children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance to the fact that
against her husband for repeated physical violence, grossly Viveca had already intentionally abandoned their conjugal
abusive conduct, sexual infidelity, and attempt on her life. abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at,
Philip denied the accusations and prayed in his their conjugal home is her least recent address. In fact, it
Counterclaim for the declaration of nullity of their may very well be considered as the address she is least
marriage. likely to be found considering the circumstances in which
she left the same. There is, therefore, no reason for Philip
However, in 2007, Philip moved for the dismissal of his to assume, in good faith, that said address is in fact
counterclaim for nullity of marriage in the Legal Separation Viveca's "last known address.” As a result, Viveca never
case and was granted by the Pasig RTC. The same court, in had knowledge Declaration of Nullity of Marriage suit, only
2009, rendered a decision dismissing the Petition for Legal finding out when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its
Separation on the ground that the same became moot, decision on the Legal Separation case. Because of the
with the decision of the RTC of Balayan, Batangas declaring service of summons at the erroneous address, Viveca was
the nullity of the parties’ marriage. effectively prevented from participating in the
proceedings.
Viveca was unaware of the proceedings before the
Batangas RTC. Thus, she filed before the CA, a Petition for The SC deems as proper the annulment of the Batangas
Annulment of Judgment of the said RTC’s decision. court's judgment issued without proper service of
According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not summons.
properly vest since she was not duly served with
Summons. She alleged that she was deprived of her right
to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that her
address was still at their conjugal home, when he clearly
knew that she was in the USA.

Philip contends that Viveca was duly served summons by

publication and by sending a copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Batangas RTC validly acquired

jurisdiction when Summons was duly served to the
respondent by publication

HELD:

Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of

the action brought against him. Through its service, the
court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Under Section
15 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a defendant who is a
non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service when the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff. In such
case, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of
the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by
registered mail to the defendant's last known address, also
with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge
may consider sufficient.

It is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects
his personal status, Viveca was already residing in the
United States of America. Thus, extraterritorial service of
summons is the proper mode by which summons may be
 JULIAJVO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

FACTS:

About 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanao married

Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their
marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s
wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri

Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the
rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged
that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when
he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.

Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late

Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD
1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is
void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda

was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim
rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was
the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior

marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to
“marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims,
or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties
were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
 ENRICO v. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

FACTS:

Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani

were married on June 14 1962. They had seven children,
herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on
august 26 2004, Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on
february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and
Lolita on two grounds: that the marriage was entered into
without the requisite marriage license and; lack of a
marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.

Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for
21 years hence exempt from getting a marriage license
under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she
sought the dismissal of his action on the ground that it is
only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to
AM 02- 11-10 SC which provides in sec. 2 (a) that the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void
marriage may be filled solely by the husband or the wife.
The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs.
Bayadong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico

is exempt from securing marriage license.

HELD:

Petition is dismissed. Under Art. 34 of the family code, a

man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediments are exempt
from securing a marriage license. The said exemption
cannot possibly apply because the second marriage
contracted by Eulogio with Enrico took place barely 3
months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent
heirs have no standing to assail the validity of the second
marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.

While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs

therein to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of the
Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that
the same rule cannot be applied for the reason that the
impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.Nonetheless, the heirs are
not left without remedy. They can still protect their
successional rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of
Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage
with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
deceased father filed in the regular courts.
 NIÑAL v. BAYADOG a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
G.R. No. 133778 March14, 2000 absence of such element.

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on

September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April
24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed

a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void
for lack of a marriage license.

ISSUE:

What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article

76 of the Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to
warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license.

HELD:

The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is

counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5- year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime

of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to
the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage,

it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting
marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his
lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was

actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this

case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
 CARLOS v. SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

FACTS:

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were

brothers who each have three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by respondents Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were
registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action against respondents
before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted
that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad
was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriages.

HELD:

The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage

must be proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor
summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should
have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on
the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided. Whether it is based
on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the
CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on
the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in
cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and
even in annulment of marriage

A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02- 11-10- SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by
the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 ABLAZA v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
FACTS:
FACTS:
In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen,
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the
Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married another Japanese
contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay
brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. and Maekara later went to Japan.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on Japanese judgment declaring Marinay’s marriage with
January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Said decree was
initio for having been solemnized without a marriage granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went
license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of back home to the Philippines together.
Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him
to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a
before his death, thereby making him a real party in petition entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
interest; and that any person, himself included, could Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)“. He
impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano filed the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry).
Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. Basically, Fujiki wanted the following to be done:
1. the Japanese Family Court judgment be
ISSUE:
recognized;
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration 2. that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
brother Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines; and
HELD: 3. for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at such annotation to the Office of the
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as National Statistics Office (NSO).
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what
absolutely no application to the petitioner. Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the or the “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages”, a
children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like petition for such may only be filed by the husband or
the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased's estate. wife or in this case either Maekara or Marinay only.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring
the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether ISSUE:
Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner Whether or not it is proper for Minoru Fujiki to be the one
was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir. The petition is to file for a declaration of nullity of marriage of Marinay
returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case. and Maekara.

RULING:

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. What’s

applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Fujiki needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARINAY Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through
(1) an official publication or respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has the private respondent and her paramour were convicted
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an
in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be imprisonment ranging from one(1) year, eight (8) months,
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days,
the seal of office. medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution
and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as
Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on
the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private

respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement. The
said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur
by the respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On
Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated
January 2, 2002.

ISSUE:

Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made

by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.

HELD:

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of

reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in
case such fact is disputed. Where a subsequent marriage is
terminated because of the reappearance of an absent
spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree
of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding
where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared
under the ground of psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable.

The Compromise Agreement partially divided the
properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between
the parties and does not deal with the validity of a
marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are
expressly prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the
contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount
to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse
MAQUILAN v. MAQUILAN
from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced.
G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007
Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such
disqualification.
FACTS:
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are
property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned
which were blessed to have a son. However, their once
Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual
law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for
affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the
the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary
separation of property is subject to the rights of all
creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other
persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of
the Family.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CUISON-MELGAR
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

FACTS:

On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married

before the Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union
begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of
Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. According to Norma the
manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his
immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, laziness, and abandonment of his family
since December 27, 1985.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of

respondent is in the nature contemplated by Article 36.

HELD:

The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of

the Court of Appeals. The marriage between Norma and
Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
laziness, jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The Court ruled that it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In
other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. A
cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations
of the psychological incapacity.
 MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

FACTS:

On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a

Portuguese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic
Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994,
Florence filed with the RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for
“declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial
ensued and the parties presented their respective
evidences.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a

prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

HELD:

Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of

annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps
to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial
court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may
be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case
thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
 TUASON v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

FACTS:

Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on

June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the time of the
marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations that
became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in
violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited
drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to
the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of
his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating
some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts
for reconciliation failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform.
In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she
further prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance,
Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial
ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including
documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of
Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension
for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church
annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case,
reception for Emilio’s evidence was scheduled. It was
postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The
court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to
present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring the nullity of Victoria’s marriage to Emilio and
awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed
a petition for relief from judgment but was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is

warranted under the circumstance of the case where
petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance
during the hearing.

HELD:

Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a

petition for relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final
and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must
assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and
meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is
granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted
therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his
client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter
to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable.
Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform
the trial court of his client’s confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from
judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or
adequate remedy.
 MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS v. JUDGE WILFREDO G.
OCHOTORENA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

FACTS:

Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent

judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is
more glaring and conclusive from the records is that the
respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure.
For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes
that the Court should sanction him.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals'

Decision which states that the respondent judge totally
disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case
completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss,
which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period,
was still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of

Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
which states that: "After the last pleading has been served
and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly
move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial."
Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion
to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved
the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set
the case for pre-trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found

guilty of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

HELD:

Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the

Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a
serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal
from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension
from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six months or a fine of more than Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this,
Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby
FINED the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the
OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent
judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) from the aforesaid retained amount, unless
there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
 PACETE v. CARRIAGA for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994 action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
FACTS: attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her submitted is not fabricated.
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her SEVILLA CASTRO v. CASTRO
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She G.R. No. 140484 January 28, 2008
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete
on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that FACTS:
Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such Lamberto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of his
marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her marriage to Isabelita due to psychological Incapacity. The
and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to sheriff’s return of the service of summons showed that it
continue living with Clarita. was received by Isabelita’s nephew, but the petitioner did
not file and answer, hence the trial court allowed
The defendants were each served with summons. They Lamberto to present his evidence ex-parte. Thereupon,
filed an extension within which to file an answer, which Lamberto presented his evidence, and on August 19, 1998,
the court partly granted. Due to unwanted the RTC rendered judgment declaring Isabelita
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the psychologically incapacitated and annulling her marriage
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the to Lamberto. Isabelita, however, moved to set aside to
court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the declare the judgement null and void, contending that no
defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. valid service of summons was made upon her as no
The court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings nephew resided with her. She also alleged that the
held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the allegations in the petition were false, and only intended to
court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March free Lamberto to marry his concubine. Lamberto opposed
17, 1980. the motion. The RTC partially granted the petition by
allowing Isabelita to present his contrary evidence. On the
ISSUE: first setting, her counsel moved for resetting which the
court allowed. However, she again moved for
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
postponement, to the vehement objection of Lamberto’s
denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file
counsel. Thus the trial court issued its order affirming the
their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in
Decision in earlier rendered. Isabelita moved for
rendering its decision.
reconsideration upon receipt of the order, which the trial
HELD: court denied. The trial court affirmed its earlier decision,
and entry of judgment made on October 29, 1999.
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation
shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by Isabelita filed her petition for review on certiorari with the
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the Supreme Court, averring that no valid service of summons
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney was made upon her. She also assailed the finding of
to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. psychological incapacity as devoid of merit; as well as the
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall fact that the trial court did not set the case for pre-trial
intervene for the State in order to take care that the and allowed Lamberto to present evidence ex parte.
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
ISSUE:
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of
the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for Whether or not the RTC erred in devlaring Isabelita’s
legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under marriage to Lamberto void on the ground of psychological
Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a incapacity.
mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58
of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for HELD:
legal separation must “in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” The petition fails. This Court finds no reason to set aside
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling- off” the findings of the trial court. The records show that
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward petitioner was personally informed of the petition for
getting the parties to reconcile. annulment, and as stated by the trial court, petitioner
received the summons and the petition on July 15, 1998.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the She “acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her
law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a signature on the original copy of said summons dated July
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides 13, 1998.” Petition neither denied nor refuted this.
that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
Petitioner’s claim that she was never informed of the FACTS:
proceedings in unbelievable because she even submitted
herself to a series of psychological examination performed Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971
by public respondent’s expert witness, Regine Marmee C. and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for
Cosico, a clinical psychologist. a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage
Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
acquired jurisdiction over her person. Even assuming that incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the
petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free
to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial to choose which they prefer.
court when she filed a motion to set aside or declare
judgment null and void. After the trial court granted her Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision
motion and she was given the opportunity to present regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing
the scheduled hearings for this purpose. Finally, the trial on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
court’s decision had already become final and executory, desire to stay with their father.
and judgment was entered on October 29, 1000. For this
reason and on account of private respondent’s death on ISSUE:
January 14, 2004, the judgement binding on both parties.
Whether or not the property regime should be based on
co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family.

DINO v. DINO
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

FACTS:

January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On

May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
VALDES v. RTC Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996 psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged
that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was
to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him. and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
to” A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of
be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by agreement
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code” between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is
not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
ISSUE: the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a

decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:

The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC,

Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless
of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following

elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry

each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void

All these elements are present in this case and there is no

question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent. ANAYA v. PALAROAN
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under FACTS:
Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50
of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are On 7 January 1954, after one month of marriage to Aurora
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, Anaya, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint to annul it on
which should be declared void without waiting for the the ground that his consent was obtained through force
liquidation of the properties of the parties. and intimidation. The court dismissed the complaint and
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the
are governed by absolute community of property or counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had
partition and distribute the properties before a decree of pre-marital relationships with a close relative of his. Anaya
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code damages.
because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership. Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with
a close relative and having committed any fraud against
Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the complaint Hence, this appeal. Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida
but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral Mangonon (Defendant) got married on November 26,
damages." Aurora replied stating that Fernando had no 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20,
intention of performing his marital duties and obligations 1939 Godofredo filedfor annulment of marriage before the
since the marriage was contracted as a means for him to CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that shewas a
escape marrying the close relative that was intimated virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so
above. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding Godofredo appealed.
that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient
to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed. ISSUE:

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent

of Plaintiff to the marriage?
Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another HELD:
woman a ground for annulment of marriage?
There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states
HELD: that: “We see no reason to overturn the ruling
appealed.” It is unlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with not suspected that the defendant, Luida, was pregnant. (As
another woman is not one of the enumerated she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married,
circumstances that would constitute a ground for she must have looked very pregnant even before they
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph were married.) Since Godofredo must have known that she
of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation was not a virgin, the marriage cannot be annulled. The
or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on
to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non- which society rests. To cancel it, reliable evidence is
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been necessary.
thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees
with the rule or not.

ALMELOR v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008

FACTS:
BUCCAT v. BUCCAT DE MANGONON
GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941 Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical
practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11 years later,
FACTS: Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel
claiming that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to
It was established before the trial court that the Plaintiff perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified
met the defendant in March 1938. After several that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his policy
interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that towards their children are often unconventional and was
year. On November 26 the same year, the cause of their frequent fight. Manuel has an
the plaintiff married the defendant in a Catholic Cathedral unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their
in Baguio. They, then, cohabited for about eighty- children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He
nine days. Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
on February 23, 1939. Following this event, Plaintiff and which is unreasonable for Leonida.
Defendant separated. On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed
an action for annulment of marriage before the CFI of Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a
Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented to the homosexual as evidenced by his unusual closeness to his
marriage because the defendant assured him that she was male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality
virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint. from Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught
Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone and
she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry
man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not her. On the other hand Lilia denied Orlando’s allegations
because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after
Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45 of the the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE: ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between the two can be Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the
declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of ground of vitiated consent under Article 45 of the Family
Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality. Code; and

HELD: HELD:

The Supreme Court emphasized that homosexuality per se The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in
is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the concealment this case. Therefore, the petition for annulment, which is
of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his
is not proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower consent, should be dismissed.
court should not have taken the public’s perception
against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and
ruled by the lower court as an indication of his intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious that
homosexuality for those are not conclusive and are not Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so
sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is as to have the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against
indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was
consent had been vitiated by such. not concretely established. The Court is not convinced that
appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that
at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the
very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s
way.

For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to

bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never
sought the assistance of the security personnel of his
VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS school nor the police regarding the activities of those who
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006 were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge
about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
FACTS: Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation
that he never had an erection during their sexual
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel
Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In also conceded before the lower court that his client had a
November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a sexual relationship with Lilia. Thus, the petition for
petition for annulment of his marriage. He claimed that annulment was granted, but the award of moral and
threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia exemplary damages is deleted for lack of basis.
who was then pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for
the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did
not freely consent to be married to Lilia.

He cited several incidents that created on his mind a

reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and
grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing
phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the
unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed
member of the New People’s Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied
 time instructor in a University. Respondent likewise took
an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement was

duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present
colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to
and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic
Church. He was also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Records further revealed that respondent had already
settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by
complainant. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the Court’s directive.

While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and

even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty
to show compassion to those who have reformed their
ways, as in this case.

After 8 years, he was reinstated to the practice of law.

ALCAZAR v. ALCAZAR
G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
MACARRUBO v. MACARRUBO
ADM. CASE NO. 6148 January 22, 2013 FACTS:

FACTS: In August 2000, Rey Alcazar and Veronica Cabacungan

married each other. They lived together for three weeks
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) thereafter, Rey went to Saudi Arabia to work. In Saudi, Rey
filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarrubo who seeks to never communicated with Veronica despite Veronica’s
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. efforts to reach him. In March 2002, Rey returned to the
Philippines but instead of going home to Veronica, he went
The Court disbarred him for having contracted a bigamous straight to his parents. He did not even tell Veronica that
marriage with the complainant and a third marriage with he was coming home. Veronica had to learn of his
another while his first marriage was still subsisting, which husband’s return from someone else. Veronica went to
acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Rey’s parents but Rey cannot be found there (hiding).
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of In August 2002, Veronica filed an annulment case against
Professional Responsibility. Rey. Initially, the ground for annulment was based on
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code or Rey’s failure
ISSUE: to consummate the marriage. But later, the ground was
changed to psychological incapacity (Article 36).
Whether or not Edmundo Macarrubo should be reinstated
in the Roll of Attorneys During trial, Veronica presented Dr. Nedy Tayag as expert
witness who testified that Rey is suffering from Narcissistic
HELD: Personality Disorder (NPD). Rey was found by Tayag to be
having a grandiose sense of self. He thinks he is too
Respondent had sufficiently shown his remorse and important, too unique, and too special.
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and
in his personal life. He had asked forgiveness from his Also alleged in the complaint for annulment was Rey’s
children by complainant and maintained a cordial alleged sexual infidelity because when he came home from
relationship with them as shown by the herein attached abroad, it was said that he lived with a certain “Sally” in his
pictures. Records also showed that after his disbarment, parent’s hometown.
respondent returned to his hometown and devoted his
time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing ISSUE:
mother until her death. He was appointed as Private
Secretary to the Mayor and thereafter, assumed the Whether or not the marriage between Veronica and Rey
position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office- should be annulled.
In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he
continues to serve to date. Moreover, he became a part- HELD:
No. First, the Supreme Court noted that it is correct that
Veronica abandoned her cause under paragraph 5, Article
45. The said provision states:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the

following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: x x x
x (5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to
copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of sexual intercourse. Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the
husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or
structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it JIMENEZ v. CANIZARES
may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions.
It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such FACTS:
mental block or disturbance has the result of making the
spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage Joel and Remedios are husband and wife. Joel later filed
act. No evidence was presented in the case at bar to for annulment on grounds that Remedios is impotent
establish that Rey was in any way physically incapable to because her genitals were too small for copulation and
consummate his marriage with Veronica. In fact, Veronica such was already existing at the time of the marriage.
admitted that she and Rey had sex before and after the Remedios was summoned to answer the complaint of Joel
wedding. Thus, incapacity to consummate does not exist but she refused to do so. It was found that there was no
int his case. collusion between the parties notwithstanding the non-
cooperation of Remedios in the case. Remedios was
Second, psychological incapacity was not proven. Tayag’s ordered to have herself be submitted to an expert to
testimony on Rey’s NPD was not sufficient to establish determine if her genitals are indeed too small for
psychological incapacity. The case between Veronica and copulation. Remedios again refused to do as ordered. The
Rey is merely a simple case of a married couple being apart trial was heard solely on Joel’s complaint. The marriage
too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the was later annulled.
husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife. To be tired and ISSUE:
give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been
out of love be so labeled. established.

Lastly, the allegation of sexual infidelity on the part of Rey HELD:

is a poor attempt to bolster the claim against Rey. Sexual
infidelity per se is not psychological incapacity. Veronica In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in
failed to establish that Rey’s unfaithfulness is a question was decreed upon the sole testimony of Joel who
manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
him completely unable to discharge the essential securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
obligations of the marital state. seeks. Whether Remedios is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because
from the commencement of the proceedings until the
entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to
appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from
such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred,
because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority. Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of
Joel that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
 The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is
for her family to take control of the conjugal properties is
absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were
brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established.
He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the
financial interests of her family at the expense of her
marriage of 20 years and the companionship of
her husband and children. The assessment of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great
respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and
label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of
ONG ENG KIAM v. ONG credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006 detailed and straightforward testimonies the court finds
that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
FACTS:
The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code. such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her the said provision
husband William subjected her to physical violence
like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her
head against the concrete wall.and been violent towards
their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them.

One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit Lucita

on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her
and asked her to leave the house which she did. Lucita’s
statements about William’s abusive behavior were
corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan
whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal
home also testified about her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation

which the Court of Appeals affirmed. William then filed
this petition for review on certiorari on the decision
denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never
inflicted physical harm on her or their children. He also
argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in
filing the complaint is to deprive him of his control and
ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita. That
the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant
an exception to the general rule that questions of fact
cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The CA erred in relying on the testimonies
of Lucita her sister and their parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano
since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and
fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she has
also given a ground for legal separation and therefore
should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of
The family code – Where both parties have given ground
for legal separation

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on

legal separation

HELD:
 GAUDIONCO v. PENARANDA
GR No. 72984 November 27, 1987 FACTS:

FACTS: The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose

Jo, herein private respondent. The latter admitted to have
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint cohabited with 3 women and fathered 15 children. Prima
against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal filed a complaint against the husband for judicial
separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier
case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of action for support which was consolidated. RTC decision
concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an was a definite disposition of the complaint for support but
application for the provisional remedy of support pendent none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal
elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed
judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the separation
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as of property was dismissed for lack of cause of action on
the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case the ground that separation by agreement was not covered
for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the
civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the agreement between her and Jose was for her to
criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal temporarily live with her parents during the initial period
separation will have to be suspended and await the of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support
conviction or acquittal of the criminal case. her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She
even returned to him but the latter refused to accept her.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can
proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for Whether or not there is abandonment on the part of Jose
concubinage. Jo to warrant judicial separation of conjugal property.

HELD: HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner The Supreme Court is in the position that respondent court
were incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the should have made the necessary modification instead of
ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or dismissing the filed case. For abandonment to exist, there
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties
because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The
liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From
offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support
right to live separately, with the legal consequences to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the parties,
thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon their conjugal property.
proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary. Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the
petitioner and that the court ordered the conjugal
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can property of the spouses be divided between them, share
be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted and share alike. The division will be implemented after the
at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too conjugal partnership including those that may have been
onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce illegally registered in the name of the persons.
the same.

ARROYO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991
PARTOSA-JO v. CA
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
FACTS: sisters of the husband, before the latter left to report back
to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila
A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by Dr. Neri would stay with Benjamin’s sisters.
(husband) against Ruby (wife) and Arroyo (petitioner).
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she
and the wife, based, among others on the wife's admission informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
to her husband that she sex with petitioner Arroyo. This reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951,
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco
later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial that her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity.
contending that a pardon had been extended by her Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife
husband. The husband filed a manifestation praying for the whom he met in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They
dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of
wife's infidelity. Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the
second day, he tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
ISSUES: information he received but instead of answering, Leonila
packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a
1. Whether the admission of adulterous conduct confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to
by the wife to her husband without the locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte.
presence of her counsel is admissible in evidence. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer
2. Whether the husband is a competent witness vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.
against his wife
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of
1. YES. The husband's testimony relating to the allegations of the commission of acts of infidelity
admission of adulterous conduct made by the wife to her amounting to adultery have been condoned by the
husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was plaintiff-husband.
neither a peace officer nor an investigating officer
conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said HELD:
testimony rendered inadmissible by the constitutional
provision on the right to remain silent and the right to Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were
counsel of a "person under investigation for the commited by the wife, the act of the husband in
commission of an offense." persuading her to come along with him and the fact that
she went with him and together they slept as husband and
The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to action for legal separation against the offending wife
ask questions to elicit information and/or confession or because his said conduct comes within the restriction of
admissions from respondent-accused. Article 100 of Civil Code.

2. Yes. The husband is not precluded under the

Rules of Court from testifying against his wife in criminal
cases for a crime committed by one against the other
(Section 22, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court). In short, the
trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in admitting
Dr. Neri's testimony as he was a competent witness.

PEOPLE v. ZAPATA
G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

FACTS:
BUGAYONG v. GINEZ
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956 In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for
adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe
FACTS: Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during
Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was the period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of
married to defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his
on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife
entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was
months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the committed, if the defendants, after their provincional
same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband release during the pendency of the case in which they
filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon
his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).
September 1948, the date of the filing of the second
complaint. On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants The order appealed from, which quashed the second
filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside,
they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the
same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the
defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the appellees.
other sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has
appealed.

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the
first and second complains must be deemed one
continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints
being the same and identical persons and the two sets of
unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the
years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or
two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery
complained of in both cases constitute one and the same
offense, within the scope and meaning of the
constitutional provision that "No person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants’ cohabitation should be

deemed as one continuous offense.

HELD:

Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the

Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it
is a instantaneous crime which is consummated and
exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal
union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of
adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True,
two or more adulterous acts committed by the same
defendants are against the same person — the offended
husband, the same status — the union of the husband and
wife by their marriage, and the same community
represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and
preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status society does not argue against the DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
commission of the crime of adultery as many times as G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960
there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status
remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, FACTS:
an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes
a crime. Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in
1938. They begot several children who are not living with
There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several
filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study
already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again
sexual intercourse and they need not to another or other plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last acts of several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the
adultery had been committed as charged in the first wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then
complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised
acts not included in the first complaint and for which the his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson
second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for
legal separation to which defendant manifested the community. Alleging abandonment and concubinage,
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed with the CFI of Camarines
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for Sur a complaint for legal separation and changed of
legal separation in 1955. surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.

ISSUE: ISSUE:

Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes Whether or not there is standing on the legal separation
the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code. case filed by petitioners.

HELD: HELD:
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides that "an action
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she for legal separation cannot filed except within one year
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the
of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family date when cause occurred." The complaint was filed
Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January,
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956.
the decree of separation should be granted since it would It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this
not be based on the confession but upon the evidence matter in her brief.
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal
confession. The petition should be granted based on the separation may be claimed only by the Innocent spouse,
second adultery, which has not yet prescribed. provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage.

The agreement between the spouses is divided in two

parts. The first part having to do with the act of living
separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part
—that which becomes a license to commit the ground for
legal separation which is admittedly illegal. The
condonation and consent here are not only implied but
expressed. Having condoned and/or consented in writing,
the plaintiff now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

MATUBIS v. PRAXEDES PEOPLE v. SCHNECKENBURGER

G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960 G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941

FACTS: FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were legally married in 1943 at Accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez
Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they Cartagena. After 7 years (due to incompatibility of
should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live characters) they agreed to live separately from each other.
separately from each other, which status remained Accused without leaving the Philippines secured a divorce
unchanged until the present. In 1948, plaintiff and decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of
defendant entered into an agreement, stating the Chihuahua Mexico. He contracted another marriage with
following: (a) that both of us relinquish our right over the co-accused Julia Medel before the justice of the peace of
other as legal husband and wife; ( b) That both without any Malabon. Because of the nullity of the divorce decree,
interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute complainant herein instituted two actions against the
the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage.
or suit arising from the separation. Charge for bigamy culminated in the conviction of accused.
Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of concubinage
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one commenced, accused interposed the plea of double
Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth to a child, who was jeopardy and the case was initially dismissed; upon appeal,
recorded as the child of said defendant. It was shown also the CA held the dismissal before trial to be premature and
that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves as without deciding the question of double jeopardy,
husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits.
Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless
imprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage

in view of the agreement executed by Rodolfo and Elena
upon their separation

HELD:

The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to

Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be acquitted. Judgment is
reversed. There is no double jeopardy. The defense of
bigamy for which he was convicted and that of
concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two
distinct offenses in the law Upon the other hand, the
accused should have been acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the
accused and the complainant in which they agreed , while
illegal for the purpose for which it was executed ,
constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC. By
such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the
illicit acts of the other

Previously, the court held that the consent which bars the
offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in
cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape
and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given
expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. PEOPLE v. SENSANO
However, in this case, the Court sees this to be a narrow G.R. No. 48183 November 10, 1941
view. As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the
offense after its commission, "consent" must have been FACTS:
intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the
offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on
indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent April 29, 1919. Shortly after, the husband left his wife to go
consent, for in both instances as the offended party has to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three
chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she years without writing to his wife or sending her anything
becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate,
the vindication of the wrong Prior consent is as effective without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled
as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day
prosecuting the offense when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her
and the child to live with him. On the return of the
An agreement of the tenor entered into between the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and
parties herein, operates, within the plain language and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to
manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from four months and one day of arresto mayor.
prosecuting the offense
Article 344 of the RPC provides: The offended party cannot In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has
institute criminal prosecution without including both the been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife, having
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence,
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. the accused left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to
the municipal president and the justice of the peace to
send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and
beg him to take her back. At the house of the president
she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if
he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live
with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do
as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and
her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this
was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever
since.
The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her co-
defendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their
relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly
thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where he
remained for seven years completely abandoning his said
wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented
the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole
purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce
under the provisions of Act No. 2710.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the husband has a proper action against

the accused.

HELD:
BENEDICTO v. DE LA RAMA
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution G.R. No. 1056 March 13, 1907
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or FACTS:
pardoned the offenders. Apart from the fact that the
husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province
signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have of Iloilo entered a final judgment in this case, decreeing a
come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's
his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adultery, as well as the payment of 81,042.76 pesos due
adulterous relations existing between the accused and her as her unpaid share of the property belonging to the
therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this conjugal partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as
criminal proceeding. The Court cannot accept the an allowance for their support since the date on which the
argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of action was instituted.
acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court,
which period it was impossible for him to take any action which, on December 8, 1903, reversed the decree of the
against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that Court of First Instance, incorporated in its opinion certain
it was impossible for the husband to take any action findings of fact, and ordered judgment absolute that the
against the accused during the said seven years. complaint be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is mutual guilt on both of the parties

which mitigates the action for legal separation.

HELD:

Under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure the filing

of a bill of exceptions as a stay of execution. In this case,
therefore, the order made by the trial court in the
judgment for the payment of alimony for the period from
the institution of the action to the date of such judgment
was suspended by the filing of the defendant's bill of
exceptions. The trial court might undoubtedly, under
section 144, have provided that execution should not be
stayed as to the order for the payment of alimony, but it
did not do so. The whole matter rested in the discretion of
the trial court. We have no jurisdiction to take any action
in the premises.

Nor we have any jurisdiction to grant alimony pending the

appeal. The trial court might have made an order in such
terms as to cover the entire period till final judgment, but
did not do so. We cannot revise its action, except as far as
it is brought before us for revision in the ordinary manner,
by bill of exceptions.
The right of a wife to the payment of alimony from her
husband stands upon no different footing from any other
right created by the law or arising from contract or
otherwise, and is to be enforced by appropriate
proceedings commenced in the court having original
jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction in such cases is appellate
merely. The motion must be denied.

BROWN v. YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

FACTS:
DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a
religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived
FACTS: thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several
children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951,
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
1938. They begot several children who are not living with betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for
out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said
beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again city defendant was going out with several other men, aside
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the defendant had finished studying her course, she left
wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised
his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for having illicit relations with another man by the name of
legal separation to which defendant manifested Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a petition for legal separation, to which defendant
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for manifested her conformity provided she is not charged
legal separation in 1955. with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff
filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes
the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code. Whether or not the filing of legal separation had already
prescribed
HELD:
HELD:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of The husband's right to legal separation on account of the
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession defendant's adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed,
of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family because his action was not filed within one year from
Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity.
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband upon
the decree of separation should be granted since it would discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file
not be based on the confession but upon the evidence a petition for legal separation and defendant readily
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her
confession. The petition should be granted based on the conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted
second adultery, which has not yet prescribed. having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame.
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of
judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art.
101, legal separation could not be decreed.
 CONTRERAS v. MACARAIG
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

FACTS:
DE OCAMPO v. FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960 Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in
the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Defendant was
FACTS: employed as manager of the printing establishment owned
by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala,
1938. They begot several children who are not living with who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda
plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña, who was then a Vice-
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961,
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent
out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come
beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again home very late.
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with
several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car,
wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with
they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October,
his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson returned to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from
Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to
legal separation to which defendant manifested anger nor drive defendant away. All this while, defendant,
conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period
legal separation in 1955. of about a month. After plaintiff received reports that Lily
Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs.
ISSUE: Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the
reports. The latter saw defendant was carrying a baby in
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes his arms.
the confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of
HELD: defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the
latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said
committed adultery, in the existence of evidence of she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire
adultery other than such confession, is not the confession to be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused
of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family to break relationship with her. In December, 1963,
Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, went to talk to
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where defendant at his place of work on España Extension in
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with defendant
the decree of separation should be granted since it would to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal
not be based on the confession but upon the evidence home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him.
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
confession. The petition should be granted based on the
second adultery, which has not yet prescribed. ISSUE:

Whether the prescription should start on 1962 or in 1963.

HELD:

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded

that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant
really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband
was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting
from the appealed decision, the following happened — In
the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied
by her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs.
Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the
work on España Extension in front of Quezon Institute. dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the
They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala respondent’s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in
and to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she favor of the common children; the payment to petitioner’s
was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorney’s fees to be
that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to taken from petitioner’s share in the net assets; and the
return to his legitimate family. surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a
Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner
occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her and the common children within 15 days from receipt of
husband admitted to her that he was living with and would the decision.
no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family
that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of
and it was only then that the legal period of one year must Appeal.
be deemed to have commenced.
The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez’ urgent ex-
parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by
approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22,
1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorney’s fees the
equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondent’s ideal
share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the
administrator to pay petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Adelino B.
Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorney’s fees
chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4]

In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida

Bañez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as
litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion
for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Bañez
filed a consolidated written opposition to the two motions,
and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1,
1996 order.

After several exchanges of petitions and motions, the CA

rendered a decision setting aside the October 1, 1996
decision and further denying the motions for
reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, she filed the instant
case before the SC alleging that the CA erred in setting
aside the questioned order. She further alleged that an
action for legal separation is among the cases where
multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing
of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. However,
since respondent failed to file the record on appeal within
the reglementary period as provided under the Rules of
court (Sec 1-b, Rule 50), the same should be dismissed

ISSUE:

Whether or not multiple appeals may be allowed in an

action for legal separation?

HELD:
AIDA P. BAÑEZ v. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ
G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002 Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in
actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions
FACTS: for partition of property with accounting, in the special
civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation
resolved by the court and held to be final. against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were
married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner after nine days. They had lived together as husband and
that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose wife continuously without any children until 1943 when
from the same cause of action, and the subject matter her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties
pertains to the same lessor-lessee relationship between during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok
only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree
The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The of legal separation, which among others, would order that
issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
same marital relationship between the parties. The effects the conjugal partnership profits.
of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately,
dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
follow from the decree of legal separation.[19] They are subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the
not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by parties adduced their respective evidence. However,
the court and become final prior to or apart from the before the trial could be completed, respondent already
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died
of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly
multiple appeals. notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss
the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
Petitioner’s alternative prayers that in case we do not grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-
dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
return the records to the trial court and retain only the separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the
pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying
that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final
which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action
applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.
135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing
support therefor in law or jurisprudence. HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the

plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights
are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do
not come into existence, so that before the finality of a
decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no
decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more
radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot

and academic and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically
dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and
determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

LAPUZ-SY vs. EUFEMIO

43 SCRA 177

FACTS: ARANETA v. CONCEPCION

G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
FACTS: evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the
actual custody of the children, the means conducive to
Petitioner filed an action against his wife for legal their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the
separation on the ground of adultery. Defendant filed a case. These should be allowed so that the court may
petition to secure the custody of their three minor determine which is best for their custody.
children, a monthly support of five thousand pesos for
herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to
enjoin plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing
and molesting her, and to have the plaintiff therein pay for
the fees of her attorney in the action.

Plaintiff opposed the petition denying the misconduct

imputed to him, alleging that defendant abandoned the
children, committed adultery, unable to give the children
the love, respect and care of a true mother and without
the means to educate them.

The respondent Judge resolved the petition, granting

custody of the children to the defendant and a monthly
allowance of two thousand and three hundred pesos for
support for her and the children, three hundred pesos for
the house and two thousand pesos as attorney’s fees.

Upon refusal of the Judge to reconsider the order,

petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari against
the said order and for mandamus to compel the
respondent Judge to require the parties to submit
evidence before deciding on the petition. The main reason
of the Judge for refusing the plaintiff’s request that
evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues is the
prohibition contained in Article 58 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the determination of the custody and

alimony should be given effect?

RULING:

Article 58 of the Family Code provides that “An action for

legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”

It should be noted that since more than six months have

elapsed since the filing of the petition, the question
offered may not be allowed. It is, however, believed that
the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction should
be given the scope of the article cited may be explained.

It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein

Article 58 of the Family Code is evidently intended as a
cooling off period to make a possible reconciliation
between the spouses. The recital of their grievances
against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the
period to give them opportunity for dispassionate
reflection.

The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined

by the courts according to the circumstances. The rule is
that all provisions of the law even if apparently
contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect
by reconciling them if necessary. Thus the determination
of the custody and alimony should be given force and
effect provided that it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is,
 SOMOSA-RAMOS v. VAMENTA, JR.
G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972
FACTS: PACETE v. CARRIAGA
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the
sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente FACTS:
Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the
respondent's part and an attempt by him against her life In October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for
being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of the declaration of nullity of marriage between her husband
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, for legal
what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive separation between her and Pacete, and accounting and
property, then under the administration and management separation of property.
of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition The defendants were each served with summons. They
to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based filed an extension within which to file an answer, which
on Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the
the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the
become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the defendants in default, which the court granted.
parties to submit their respective memoranda on the
matter. Then on September 3, 1971, petitioner received an ISSUE:
order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting
the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion in
of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary denying the defendants’ motion for extension of time to
injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition file their answer, and in declaring defendants in default?
for certiorari. Respondents were required to answer
according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer RULING:
was filed December 2 of that year. Then on January 12,
1972 came a manifestation from parties in the case Yes, there was a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
submitting the matter without further arguments. defendants’ motion for extension of time to file their
answer, and in declaring defendants in default.
ISSUE:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation
Whether or not Article 103 the Civil Code is not an shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period. defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
RULING:
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
A suit for legal separation, however, is something else intervene for the State in order to take care that the
again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”
best reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That
there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family
ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances, Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or must “in no case be tried before six months shall have
both of the spouses. There may be constant bickering. The elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order
loss affection on the part of one or both may be to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow parties to reconcile.
them to go their respective ways. Even then, the hope that
the parties may settle their differences is not all together
abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the
process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her
ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit
magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month
period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
 SABALONES v COURT OF APPEALS denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994 complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal
separation), the private respondent has a right to a share
(if not the whole) of the conjugal estate. There is also, in
FACTS: our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that
entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. He children.
filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building
and belonging to the conjugal partnership.

The private respondent opposed the authorization and

filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that
the house in was being occupied by her and their six
children and that they were depending for their support on
the rentals from another conjugal property. She also
informed the court that despite her husband he had not
returned to his legitimate family and was instead
maintaining a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng
and their three children.

After trial, it was found that the petitioner had indeed

contracted a bigamous marriage on with Thelma
Cumareng. The court thus decreed the legal separation of
the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in
the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not
entitled to support from his respondent wife.

This decision was appealed to the respondent court.

Pendente lite, the respondent wife alleged inter alia that
he had harassed the tenant of the property by informing
him that his lease would not be renewed. The petitioner
opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent
his wife from entering into a new contract of lease over
the Forbes Park property with its present tenant, or with
future tenants, without his consent. After hearing, the
Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted
the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pending appointment of an

administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the
respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to
continue with her administration.

RULING:

Article 61 states that after a petition for legal separation

has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one
of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of
the administrator has been made, such designation was
implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the
petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus
also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That
designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the

existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be
 ESPIRITU AND LAYUG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

FACTS:

Reynaldo and Teresita began to a common-law

relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986,
their daughter, was born. When they went on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, their second child was born on January 12, 1988,
thereafter.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they
decided to separate sometime in 1990. Reynaldo brought
his children home to the Philippines and Pittsburgh. He
had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her
children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy
against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita
filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein
two petitioners to gain custody over the children.

The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It

suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and
Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
authority over them but with rights of visitation to be
agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court. The Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's
decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the

factual findings of the trial court.

RULING:

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial

court. The children are now both over seven years old.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is
clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit
person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the
first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no
longer applies as the children are over seven years.
Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive
value for children only one or two years beyond the age of
seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody
to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in
their emotional growth by her behavior.
 LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
G.R. No. L-30977. January 31, 1972 the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely
rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
FACTS: pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation and the expected consequential rights and claims would
against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they necessarily remain unborn.
were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically
on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as
husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her
husband abandoned her; and that she discovered her
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman. She prayed for
the issuance of a decree of legal separation and would
ordered that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special

defenses, and, along with several other claims involving
money and other properties, counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok.

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties

adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial
could be completed (the respondent was already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18
June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a
vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner
duly notified the court of her death and issued the order
under review, dismissing the case.

ISSUE:-

Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an

action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will
abatement also apply if the action involves property
rights?

RULING:

It is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the

conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending
spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit
by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the
revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights
and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code
article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the
spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim
that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under
Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant
continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is

abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree
 LAPERAL v REPUBLIC
G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

FACTS:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First

Instance of Baguio alleging that on March 24, 1939, she
married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that she naturally
used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L.
Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation which
became final, she has also ceased to live with him for many
years now, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her
name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name.

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio

on the ground that the same violates the provisions of
Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the

petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code
requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally
separated from her husband, to continue using the name
and surname she employed before the legal separation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can use her maiden name again.

RULING:

There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of

these proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed.
But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of
these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change
of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from
her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for
many years.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered

the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive
business interests, the continued used of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and
the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding
is however without basis. In the first place, these were not
the causes upon which the petition was based; hence,
obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.
Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal
separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between
petitioner and her husband had automatically been
dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod).
Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
 SIOCHI v GOZON
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010

FACTS:

On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite RTC a

petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo.
On 2 January 1992, Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens,
which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.

On 31 august 1993, while the legal separation case was still

pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an
agreement involving the property for the price of P18
million. On 29 June 1994, the Cavite RTC rendered a
decision which granted legal separation case.

On 22 August 1994, Alfredo executed a deed of donation

over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred
Gozon without annotating the agreement and the notice
of lis pendens on TCT No. M-10508.

On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a special power

of attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the
property to Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18
million. IDRI paid Alfredo P18 million, representing full
payment for the property. Subsequently, the register of
deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT no. M-10508 and issued
TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI.

Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for

specific performance and damages, annulment of donation
and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

The Malabon RTC rendered its decision which the Court of

Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the agreement should be treated as a

continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is
withdrawn.

RULING:

Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that

the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and
the offending spouse would have no right to any share of
the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is
only Alfredos share in the net profits which is forfeited in
favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family Code
provides that [f]or purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly,
what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share
in the conjugal partnership property but merely in the net
profits of the conjugal partnership property.
 PELAYO v LAURON Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-
G.R. No. L-4089 January 12, 1909 law are strangers with respect to the obligation that
devolves upon the husband to provide support, among
which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his wife at
FACTS: the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician defendants and the plaintiff physician, for which reason it
residing in Cebu, filed a complaint against Marcelo Lauron is obvious that the former cannot be compelled to pay fees
and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of which they are under no liability to pay because it does not
October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to appear that they consented to bind themselves
the house of the defendants, situated in San Nicolas, and
that upon arrival he was requested by them to render
medical assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about
to give birth to a child; that therefore, and after
consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, it
was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to
remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was
performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the
afterbirth, in which services he was occupied until the
following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day,
he visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500,
which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any
good reason therefor; that for said reason he prayed that
the judgment be entered in his favor as against the
defendants, or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs,
together with any other relief that might be deemed
proper.

As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties,

judgment was entered by the court below on the 5th of
April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from
the former complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient
evidence to establish a right of action against the
defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted
to the said judgment and in addition moved for a new trial
on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judgment was correct.

RULING:

It is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees

due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during
her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her
father and mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact
that it was not the husband who called the plaintiff and
requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the
fulfillment of the said obligation, as the defendants, in
view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the
patient was at that moment exposed, considered that
medical assistance was urgently needed, and the
obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the
indispensable services of a physician at such critical
moments is specially established by the law, as has been
seen, and compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore,
the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled to recover his GO v. COURT OF APPEALS
fees, must direct his action against the husband who is G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997
under obligation to furnish medical assistance to his lawful
wife in such an emergency. FACTS:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981,
in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was
provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1, 650.00.
Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the
video tape of their wedding and thrice they failed because
the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties
then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private
respondents' return.

When private respondents came home from their

honeymoon, however, they found out that the tape had
been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer
be delivered. Respondents filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court which granted the damages.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993,
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not

appreciating the evidence presented.

RULING:

Petitioners and private respondents entered into a

contract whereby, for a fee, the former undertook to cover
the latter's wedding and deliver to them a video copy of
said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to
provide private respondents with their tape. Clearly,
petitioners are guilty of contravening their obligation to
said private respondents and are thus liable for damages.

Considering the attendant wanton negligence committed

by petitioners in the case at bar, the award of exemplary
damages by the trial court is justified to serve as a warning
to all entities engaged in the same business to observe due
diligence in the conduct of their affairs.

Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the

Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession,
occupation or engage in business without the consent of
the husband. In the instant case, we are convinced that it
was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the
contract with private respondent. Consequently, we rule
that she is solely liable to private respondents for the
damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that
contracts produce effect only as between the parties who
execute them.
 ARROYO v. VASQUEZ-ARROYO become impossible and separation necessary from the
G.R. No. 17014 August 11, 1921 fault of the husband.

FACTS: ILUSORIO v BILDNER-ILUSORIO

G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were FACTS:
united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year
1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, filed a petition with
separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of
the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of
away from their common home with the intention of living Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition.
thenceforth separate from her husband. An action was Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the
initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire
home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This
answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had case was consolidated with another case filed by
left her husband's home without his consent; but she Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and
averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation
had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see
part of her husband, which was granted. her. On May 12, 2000, petition for habeas corpus was
dismissed for lack of merit and granted the petition to
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to
him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to Erlinda K. Ilusorio. On November 29, 2000, the Court noted
blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of the manifestation and compliance of the parties with the
her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment resolution of October 11, 2000. On January 31, 2001, the
of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of Court denied Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion
marital relations with him. The evidence shows that the praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced before the
wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her Court and be medically examined by a team of medical
husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are experts appointed by the Court. On March 27, 2001, we
chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that denied with finality Erlinda's motion to reconsider the
have attended their married life. The tales of cruelty on Court's order of January 31 , 2001.
the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the
basis of the cross-action, are no more than highly colored ISSUE:
versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have
Whether or not the propriety of a physical and medical
allowed themselves from time to time to become involved
examination of petitioner is relevant.
and would have little significance apart from the morbid
condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must
therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the
marital home was without sufficient justification in fact. RULING:

ISSUE: Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered

from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
Whether or not Mariano B. Arroyo is entitled to the have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence,
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the
to the marital domicile. Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental
state. The Court was not convinced that Potenciano
RULING: Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to
see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has
The obligation which the law imposes on the husband to been decided in the Court of Appeals. As to whether the
maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil children were in fact taking control of the corporation,
society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate
the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the
procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the
existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been
determined that where the wife is forced to leave the
matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she
can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for
her separate maintenance and he may be required to pay
the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily
incurred in enforcing such obligation. From this
consideration it follows that provision should not be made
for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it
appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has
 GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA separate support is not an impeachment of that public
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916 policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
FACTS: inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy
overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent
allegations of the complaint are as follows:

That the defendant, one month after he had contracted

marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs;
that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal
and valid cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date
had continually on other successive dates, made similar
lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff,
who always spurned them, which just refusals of the
plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to
maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her
lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as
the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease
from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the
conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can claim support against her

husband outside of the conjugal domicile.

RULING:

At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the

court says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal
prevail, it would allow married persons to disregard the
marriage bond and separate from each other of their own
free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme
court of Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein
enunciated would not be controlling in cases where one of
the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode by
the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such
abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support.

The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part

of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of
the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of
the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of
such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A
judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable
either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the
strict legal sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling
for the performance of a duty made specific by the
mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and
with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of
the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her.
The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
 IMBONG v OCHOA, JR. 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
FACTS:
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
The Reproductive Health Law violates the right to life of same time posed several questions for their clarification on
the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding some contentions of the parties.
its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of
the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal ISSUE:
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which
are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Whether or not the RH Law violates the provision on the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life family?
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
RULING:
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual
protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
other spouse from participating in the decision would drive
causes cancer and other health problems.
a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This
the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health would be a marked departure from the policy of the State
education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.
their children in accordance with their beliefs.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just
person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect
the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the their future as a family because the size of the family or
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually the number of their children significantly matters. The
decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it
child should use contraceptives. prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling
interest, the State should see to it that they chart their
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file destiny together as one family. At any rate, in case of
their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
the constitutionality of the RH Law.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive

arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the

enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and

arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of
the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference

with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or
identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the
sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in
the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August
 VALINO v ADRIANO door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014 his Creator.

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano Adriano, married respondent Rosario

Adriano on November 15, 1955. The marriage of Atty.
Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live
together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement,
he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and
their children.

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that

time, Rosario was in the United States spending Christmas
with her children. Valino took it upon herself to shoulder
the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When
Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she
requested Valino to delay the interment for a few days but
her request was not heeded. Claiming that they were
deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried. In her defense, Valino
countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been
separated for more than 20 years before he courted her.
Valino claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife. Although they were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to
support the respondents. She contended that, unlike
Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for
all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also
claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a
coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States.
According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his
remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park.

ISSUES:

Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains

of Atty. Adriano.

RULING:

It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and

duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the
family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. It is
clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife
of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately
from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario
had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly,
her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of
her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not
be considered as having been waived or renounced, except
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent to that end. While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their
children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes
that human compassion, more often than not, opens the
 PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR. to enjoy rights of ownership over their separate
G.R. No. 164201 December 10, 2012 properties. Consequently, to automatically change the
marriage settlements of couples who got married under
FACTS: the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988
when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their
Efren Pana, his wife Melecia, and another person, were acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
charged with murder before the RTC of Surigao City. On
July 9, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case
of the charge but finding Melecia and another person imposed on Melecia may be enforced against their
guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
death. The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered. Article
indemnity and damages to the heirs of the victim. The 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed
conviction was affirmed of both accused but modified the on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even
penalty. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, indemnities.
resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia. Efren and his wife Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that
the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage
with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership
of gains, given that they were married prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and that they did not
execute any prenuptial agreement. On the other hand, the
heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of
property governs the marriage of Efren and Melecia since
the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its
provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights
are impaired, and that the property relation between the
couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in
1988.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren

and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?

HELD:

While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in

their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and,
therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired
vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256
of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and
automatically convert into absolute community of
property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial
agreements.

The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage

settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that
governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who
were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except
before the celebration of that marriage. What is more,
under the conjugal partnership of gains established by
Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife
place only the fruits of their separate property and
incomes from their work or industry in the common fund.
This means that they continue under such property regime
 ARCABA vs TABANCURA VDA DE BATOCAEL no longer be interested in sex at the very least;
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001 cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such. Hence, the
FACTS: deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void
under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became
the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at
Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.

Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law

executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not
have any children to take care of him after his retirement,
he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and
Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and
took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since

they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda
Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the
latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.

Cirila defen ded herself that she was a mere helper who
could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked
her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied
having sexual intercourse with Francisco.

Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income

was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he

executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded
a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together
with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger
portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was
made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of
the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was
later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot

received by Cirila had a market value of P57, 105 and
assessed value of P28, 550. The decedent’s nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed

by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid?

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of

common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura
and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila
Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary
permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the
fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication
that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,

especially when one of the parties is already old and may
 MATABUENA v. CERVANTES
G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971
FACTS:

Felix cohabitated with, donated to a parcel of land and

married the respondent.

After the Felix’s death, his sister, the petitioner, sought the
nullification of the donation, citing Article 133 of the Civil
Code that “Every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations

between live-in partners?

RULING:

Yes, the prohibition applies to donations between live-in

partners. It is a fundamental principle in statutory
construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the
marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence
and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the
other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not
apply also to common-law relationships. The court,
however, said that the lack of the donation made by
the deceased to the respondent does not necessarily
mean that the petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix
and the respondent was legitimated by marriage.
HARDING v. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY G.R. No. 143286 April 14, 2004
G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918
FACTS:
FACTS:
Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the
for a Studebaker she received as a gift from her husband. latter on October 7, 1926. They begot 5 children. Spouses
She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial marriage they acquired real properties and all
Union Assurance Company in the Philippines. The car’s improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion,
value was estimated with the help of an experienced Cebu.
mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was
bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of
considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his
at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed parents. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived
by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant,
that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva,
(which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co). is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. who received the income of the properties. Defendant,
Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union from the time she started living in concubinage with
denied it as it insisted that the representations and Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her
averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and own from which she could derive income. In 1985, Nicolas
that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union suffered a stroke. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical
also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding condition of her father because they visited him at the
because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the hospital. She told defendant, Procopio that their father
Civil Code. was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over
and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk
ISSUE: about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the
Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance settlement was reached.
claim.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Whether the court of appeals erred in sustaining the
declaration of the trial court that the properties listed in
Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the
paragraph 2 of the complaint are conjugal properties of
validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife.
Nicolas Retuya and Eusebia Retuya although this was not
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the
one of the causes of action in Eusebias complaint.
car is not a warranty. The evidence does not prove that the
statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost RULING:
of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car
was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Petitioners contention that Eusebias complaint failed to
Garage made some repairs and body paints which state that the subject properties are conjugal is absolutely
amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is without basis. A cursory reading of the complaint readily
as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. shows that the complaint maintains that the subject
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. properties are conjugal. The same claim is restated and
Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by its repleaded throughout the complaint. Petitioners should
examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is know better than to clutter their appeal with useless
bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part arguments such as this. The other issues petitioners raise
of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to contest in essence the finding that the subject properties
a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be are conjugal in nature. Apart from this, the only other issue
outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies raised is whether prescription or laches bars Eusebias
must depend upon the absolute correctness of such complaint. We shall resolve first the issue of prescription
estimated value. and laches.

VILLANUEVA v. COURT OF APPEALS

 TAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120594 June 10, 1997

FACTS:

The petitioner Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto

Princesa, secured a cashier’s check from Philippine
Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIB) to P30, 000.00 payable
to his order to avoid carrying cash while en route to
Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in its Binondo
Branch. Relying on common knowledge that the check was
as good as cash, he issued two (2) personal checks in the
name of Go Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation
a month after the deposit, both of which bounced due to
“insufficiency of funds.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a cashier’s check is as good as cash, so as

to have funded the two (2) checks.

RULING:

Reliance on the layman’s perception that a cashier’s check

is as good as cash is not entirely misplaced, as it is rooted
in practice, tradition and principle. A cashier’s check is a
primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in
advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, it is a
bank’s order to pay what is drawn upon itself, committing
in effect its total resources, integrity and honor beyond the
check. Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an
unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank.
 CHING v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004

FACTS:

On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan from the

ABC. The PBMCI, executed a promissory note for the said
amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an
interest rate of 14% per annum and executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and
severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing the ABC. On December 28, 1979, the
ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of
payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As
in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing
on June 29, 1981. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of
all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against the PBMCI. On August 26,
1981, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABC’s
application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching
jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the
SEC, at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s rehabilitation.
On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce
the amount of his preliminary attachment bond. On March
2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion
of the ABC. On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching,
filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. On
December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their
Reply/Opposition to the motion to expunge records. The
trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order lifting
the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks
and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the

motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000
shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines.

RULING:

The petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy

on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name
of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of
stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the
account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and
suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife
had the right to file the motion for said relief.
 MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009 prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in
the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be
the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said
FACTS: property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true
even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot. The sale was allegedly property was part of the conjugal/community property of
financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or
latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and personality to question the subsequent lease of the
eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a
permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a
favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
with third parties with respect to their Boracay property. disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip permit him to have.
Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease
(Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of
25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before
a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of
the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden
Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void
since it was entered into by Joselyn without his
(Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin
claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with
the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any transaction
involving said property required his consent.

The RTC considered the Boracay property as community

party of Benjamin and Joselyn, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Benjamin was the actual owner of the

property since he provided the funds used in purchasing
the same?

RULING:

It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property

in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale
with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared
for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn
leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the
nullification of the contract o n two grounds: first, that he
was the actual owner of the property since he provided
the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that
Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the
subject property without his consent.

The Court finds and so hold that Benjamin has no right to

nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
 IN RE: MULLER v. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent

Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a
house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992.
Respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his
parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the
purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and the
construction of a house. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of petitioner. Due to
incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing,
drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated. On August 12, 1996, the trial court terminated
the regime of absolute community of property between
the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the
equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during
the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the
court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of
the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which

rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’s
Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in
trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court
of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution
which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is entitled to reimbursement

of the funds used for the acquisition for the property of
the Antipolo property?

RULING:

Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of

equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
the finding that his wife had used her own money to
purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of
the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it
were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make
the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate,
on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and
holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife
any share of the money used for the purchase or charge
her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of
conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in
the premises, a purely academic exercise.
 NAVARRO v. ESCOBIDO
G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009

FACTS:

On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two

complaints, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first
complaint) and 98-598 (second complaint), before the RTC
for replevin and/or sum of money with damages against
Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of 2 motor
vehicles in Navarro’s possession. On October 12, 1998 and
October 14, 1998, the RTC issued writs of replevin for both
cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and
delivered them to the possession of Karen Go.mIn his
Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense
that the two complaints stated no cause of action. In its
May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the
ground that the complaints did not state a cause of action.
On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarros petition and
affirmed the RTCs order. The CA also denied Navarros
motion for reconsideration in its resolution of May 29,
2002, leading to the filing of the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to

an action for a writ of replevin.

RULING:

Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal

partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements. In other words, the property
relations of the husband and wife shall be governed
primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of
the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses marriage
settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil
Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage
settlement between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil
Code provision on partnership for guidance. Glenn and
Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises
and the properties registered under this name; hence,
both have an equal right to seek possession of these
properties. Applying Article 484 of the Civil Code, which
states that in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title, we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil
Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in
ejectment with respect to the co-owned property. In this
case, one spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit,
a personal property considered conjugal property, without
including the other spouse in the action.
 IMANI v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour

of Metrobank with 6 other co-sureties binding themselves
to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc.
(CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding P6, 000, 000.00. CPDTI
incurred an indebtedness around P164,000 to which it
defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank
to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties.
Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned
by Imani and filed to consolidate the title to its name.

Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal

property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani, reasoning that
the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the
family of Imani. RTC annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank
appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC.

HELD:

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal.

However, for this presumption to apply, the party who
invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua nonto the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
the time when the property was acquired is material.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was
registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married
to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired
during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed
to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that
the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis
 DELA PENA v. AVILA first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
G.R. No. 187490 February 8, 2012 during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The
FACTS: party who asserts this presumption must first prove said
time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers
Antonia obtained from Aguila a loan with interest pegged only to the property acquired during the marriage and
at 5% per month. Antonia executed a promissory note and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, situated in property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover,
Marikina City and previously registered in the name of this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
petitioner Antonia, “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there
(Antegono). Antonia executed another notarized Deed of must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma, for the spouses.
stated consideration of P600, 000.00. As such Gemma
caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the
Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over same Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the
property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility subject property was acquired during the marriage
with a credit limit of P1, 200, 000.00. Antonia filed with between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare
the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit and uncorroborated assertion that the property was
of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful owner purchased when she was already married, the record is
of the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
The Register of Deeds inscribed the adverse claim. FEBTC-
BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage constituted over the property due to Gemma’s
failure to pay the loan. Antonia and her son, petitioner
Alvin, filed against Gemma the complaint
for annulment of deed of sale as the subject realty was
conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not
consented to by Antegono who was already dead by that
time.

The Regional Trial Court held that the subject property was
conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute
Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a
disposition without the liquidation required under Article
130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC decision,
stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for
failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same was
acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono.
Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Avila and the subsequent sale on auction of the subject
property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding

the house and lot conjugal property of the spouses
Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña.

HELD:

Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary
to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MANUEL DAVID
vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the party who
SR.
invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must
 G.R. No. 16954 March 15, 2010
Property Relations Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the
FACTS: registered owner of four parcels of which she mortgaged
to one Simon Diu, who foreclosed on the same. When the
Manuel A. David, Sr. (Manuel) and Martha S. David redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the
(Martha) were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the assistance of Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject
spouses acquired a lot located at White Plains, Quezon properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and
City. In 1976, the spouses separated, and no longer her son, Proceso as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
communicated with each other. March 1995, Manuel Proceso executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding to Bobby
discovered that Martha had previously sold the property to his interests over the properties. The Deed of Assignment
Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) with which the was signed by Henry, one of Rosario’s sons, asinstrumental
previous title registered in the Register of Deeds was witness. Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject
replaced. March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaintfor properties to Proceso, giving the latter until 7:00 in the
Annulment of Contract against Titan CC. Manuel alleged evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the properties for the
that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was sum of P310,000. When Proceso failed to purchase them,
without his knowledge therefore void. He prayed that the Bobby consolidated his ownership over the properties, and
Deed of Sale be invalidated, that the property be returned the TCTs were issued in his name.
to the spouses with a new title be issued in their names.
On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, including Proceso
Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and for and Henry, filed acomplaint for reconveyance and
value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney annulment of deeds and damages against Bobby before
(SPA) by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the RTC. They alleged that the initial transaction between
the property on behalf of the spouses. Manuel claimed Rosario and Bobby was actually an equitable mortgage
that the SPA was spurious, and that the signature which was entered into to secure Rosario’s indebtedness
purporting to be his was a forgery; hence, Martha was with Bobby. They also claimed that since the subject
wholly without authority to sell the property. properties were inherited by them from their father, the
Subsequently, Manuel filed a Motion for Leave to File subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus,
Amended Complaintwhich was granted by the trial court. Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares.
Thus, on October 15, 1996, Manuel filed an Amended The RTC dimissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA upheld
Complaint. Martha failed to file an answer so she was the trial court’s ruling.
declared in default.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether the properties belong to the conjugal partnership
Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void. of Rosario and her late husband and co-owned by her and
her children
RULING:
HELD:
Yes, since the property was undoubtedly part of the
conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan required the NO, Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is
consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code Article 160 of the Civil Code38 which states that "[a]ll
expressly provides that ―the husband is the administrator property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
of the conjugal partnership‖. Likewise, Article 172 of the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
Civil Code ordains that ―the wife cannot bind the conjugal exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this
partnership without the husband‘s consent, except in presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must,
cases provided by law‖. Similarly, Article 124 of the Family however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed
Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: x x
conjugal property must have the written consent of the x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article
other spouse, otherwise, such disposition is void. 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove that the property
was acquired during the marriage

MICHEAL A. ONSTTOT v.UPPER NEIGHBORHOOD

TAN v. ANDRADE ASSOCIATION, INC.
GR No. 171904 and 172017 August 7, 2013 GR No. 22104 September 14, 2016

FACTS: FACTS:
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a FACTS:
parcel of land with an approximate area of 18,589 square
meters, covered by OCT No. (-2645-) M-5565 situated in Petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
the Province of Rizal (subject property). Due to non- (AIDC) granted a loan to Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)
payment of realty taxes, the Provincial Government of amounting P50,300,000.00 loan. Respondent Alfredo
Rizal sold the subject property at public auction to one Ching, Exec. Vice President PBM, executed security
Amelita A. De Sena (De Sena), the highest bidder, as agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004. him jointly and severally liable with PBM‘s indebtedness to
Respondent UTNAI, an association representing the actual AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan with that, AIDC filed a
occupants of the subject property, subsequently redeemed complaint against PBM and Ching.
the same from De Sena.
In the RTC‘s decision it ordered PBM and Ching to jointly
Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint and severally pay AIDC the principal amount plus the
for cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 and for the interests. RTC issued a writ of execution of pending appeal.
issuance of a new title in its name before the RTC against Then, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service
Albert and Federico M. Cas (Cas), upon respondents- Ching spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
on three of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a
The RTC found that UTNAI •was able to prove, by a case of injunction against petitioner alleging that
preponderance of evidence, that it is the owner of the petitioner cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal
subject property after having legally redeemed the same partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did
from De Sena not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the
CA found UTNAI's appeal meritorious. Although it found RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to
that the March 30, 2009 Decision of the RTC did not attain prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of
finality the writ of execution and with the sale of the said
properties at public auction.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in directing the issuance of a
title in favor of UTNAI notwithstanding the failure to Whether or not the loan acquired by PBM from Ayala
implead his mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
RULING:
RULING:
That the RTC Decision was null and void for failure to
implead an indispensable party, Josephine, on the premise The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement
that the subject property is conjugal in nature, is likewise and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal
specious. partnership of Ching. AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property partnership of gains. PBM as a corporation has a
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching
partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of
to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate
invokes this presumption must first prove that the debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. extent of his corporate ownership.
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of The contract of loan between AIDC and PMB guaranteed
the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this by Ching was clearly for the benefit of PMB and not for the
presumption must first prove the said time element. Ching with his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the
Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a
property acquired during the marriage and does not surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or
operate when there is no showing as to when the property profession. With that, the conjugal partnership should not
alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only for the benefit of PBM.
with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be
a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.\

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. COURT

OF APPEALS DEWARA V. LAMELA
G.R. No. 1185305 February 12, 1998 GR No. 17901 April 11, 2011
 sale was essentially a donation and was therefore
FACTS: gratuitous in character. Having declared that the property
was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that
Spouses Dewara were married before the enactment of the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him,
the Family Code. Elenita worked in California while could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
Eduardo stayed in Bacolod. While driving a private jeepney
registered in the name of Elenita, Eduardo hit Ronnie. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA
Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the price alone
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo. The lower does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may
court found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really
him to suffer thepenalty of imprisonment, and to pay civil intended a donation or some other act or contract. The CA
indemnity. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by
lower court and it became final and executory. The writ of onerous title during their marriage through their common
execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains
it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent adjudged against Eduardo.
Alvero, to levy on a lot in the name of Elenita, Eduardo’s
wife, to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of ISSUE:
Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on
the title of the lot and subsequently sold the lot in a public Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive
auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses
buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a Elenita and Eduardo
certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to
satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo. HELD:
Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a Cadastral
Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is
of the TCT in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses. The be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
above incidents happened while Elenita was working in the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the
California. Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The
Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife
and for damages against Spouses Lamela and ex-officio without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
sheriff Alvero. Elenita claimed that the levy on execution of partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover,
the subject lot was illegal because the said property was the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when
her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be the manner in which the property was acquired does not
made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she requirement for the presumption to arise.
received no notice of the execution sale.

On the other hand, the Spouses averred that the subject

lot was the conjugal property of Elenita and Eduardo. They
asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during
her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired
with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife;
that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the
name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any
objection pending the levy on execution of the property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Elenita. The RTC
declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It
arrived at this conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired
the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence
submitted, Elenita’s grandfather, Exequiel, originally
owned the lot. Upon his death, his children Jesus, Elenita’s
father, Salud and Concepcion, inherited the property, and
subsequently a new title on their favor was issued. As to
how Elenita acquired the lot, the RTC gave credence to the
testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the
sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her father
and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot.
Second, the minimal and inadequate consideration for the
1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her
expand her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. v. ESTER L. SERVACIO
 G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011

FACTS: JOE A. ROS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG

BRANCH
Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011
Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, FACTS:
whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased Joe Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag
the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan,
died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. petitioner, Ros, executed a real estate mortgage involving
Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio a parcel of land with all the. Upon maturity, the loan
(Servacio). remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of property. After the extrajudicial sale, a Certificate of Sale
the property, but Servacio did not follow their demand in was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder.
which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being
to the petitioners, they contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered
renunciation, the property became conjugal property of in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.
the spouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the Estrella Agueta, wife of Joe Ros claims that she has no
sale of the property to Servacio without the prior knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she
liquidation of the community property between spouses consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal
Go Sr. and his Marta was null and void. property. On January 13, 1983, spouses Ros and Agueta
filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage,
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the sale and consolidation of the property – interposing the
property was the conjugal property of Protacio Sr. and defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were
Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of
the sale includes the children of Marta, that the the family. PNB seeks for the dismissal of the complaint for
participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the lack of cause of action, and insists that it was petitioners‘
late Marta- that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The own acts of omission that bar them from recovering the
law states that when the property all property acquired by subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches,
either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there abandonment and prescription.
is a proof that the property thus acquired pertained
exclusively. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioners declaring
deed of real estate mortgage Null and Void and ordered
ISSUE: the Register of Deeds to rename the title of the lot to the
petitioners. Upon PNB‘s appeal, the Appellate Court
Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his reversed the decision of the Trial Court and dismissed the
children to Servacio was void because it was made without complaint of the petitioners. The Petitioner‘s then
prior liquidation. petitioned for review to the Supreme Court.

RULING: ISSUE:

No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the Whether or not the debt/loan was chargeable to the
affectivity of the Family Code. Their property relation was conjugal property.
properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by
the Civil Code. With Marta‘s death, the conjugal RULING:
partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued Yes. At the time of the mortgage the Civil Code was the
among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with applicable law. Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerated
respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal the instances of which the spouses-conjugal partnership
partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. shall be liable and paragraph (1) one of the said provision
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his states ―all debts and obligations contracted by the
children in respect of Marta‘s share in the conjugal husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
partnership, could not claim title to any specific portion of those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in
Marta‘s share without an actual partition of the property the cases where she may legally bind the partnership‖. The
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. loan was used for additional working capital for their
Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in family business hence, it is considered that such loan was
Marta‘s share and as a co-owner he could sell his acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and
undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose not merely for the benefit of Ros.
of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
owners.
 without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was
not a buyer in good faith.

MARIO SIOCHI v. ALFREDO GOZON

March 18, 2010 G.R. No. 169900 SPOUSES AGGABAO v. PARULAN, JR.
G.R. No. 165803 September 1, 2010
FACTS:
FACTS:
A parcel of land was registered TCT No. 5357 in the name
of AlfredoGozon.On23December1991,Elvira Gozon, Real estate broker Marta Atanacio offered 2 lots to the
Alfredo‘s wife, fileda petition for legal separation against spouses Aggabao on January 1991. On February 2, 1991,
her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed a notice of the petitioners met up with Elena Parulan at the site of the
lis pendens, which was then annotated on the title of the property and showed them the following documents: (a.)
land. While the legal separation case of the spouses was Owner‘s original copy of the TCT of the 2 lots; (b.) tax
still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an declarations; (c.) a copy of the special power of attorney
Agreement to Buy and Sell which was also annotated on dated January 7, 1991 executed by Dionisio Parulan
the title of the land. After granting the decree of legal authorizing Elena to sell the property. On March 18, 1991,
separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of Donation over the the petitioners delivered the final amount of their balance
property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their
Register of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and favor. However, Elena did not turn over the owner‘s
issued TCT No. M-10508 in the name of Winifred, without duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in
annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendis on the possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong.
TCT No.M-10508. She assured them that the owner‘s duplicate copy of TCT
would be turned over after a week.
October 26, 1994 when Alfredo sold the property to Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc (IDRI). Through a Special Power of On March 19, 1991, TCT was cancelled and a new one was
Attorney executed in favor of Winifred. Subsequently, the issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn
Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M-10508 over the duplicate owner‘s copy of TCT as promised. Thus,
and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then filed a on April 15, 1991, Dionisio commenced an action vs Elena
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages, Parulan and the Aggabao spouses praying for the
Annulment of Donation and Sale with Preliminary declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title
Restraining Order. issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the
petitioners, Aggabao spouses and Elena Parulan, filed on
ISSUES: July 12, 1991 their own action for specific performance
with damages against the respondent. On July 26, 2000,
a) Whether or not Mario can invoke his right over the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, in Makati City
the property due to the Agreement to Buy and Sell annulled the deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
he entered with Alfredo. petitioners.

b) Whether or not IDRI can invoke right over the ISSUE:

property due to the Sale entered with Alfredo.
Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article
RULING: 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the
conjugal property executed without the consent of
No. Alfredo was the sole administrator of the conjugal Dionisio
property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated
in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of RULING:
the conjugal property. Still, Alfredo can‘t sell said property
without the written consent of Elvira or given authority of The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3,
the court. Without consent or authority, the agreement is 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to
void. apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
No. IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
knowledge of facts regarding the property hence it should governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
seek further inquiries about the vendor‘s title to the
property. Besides, had IDRI been more prudent before Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The
buying the property, it would have discovered that administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
Alfredo‘s donation of the property to Winifred was without property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
the consent of Elvira. Under Article 125 of the Family Code, disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject
a conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision. In the event that MANUEL FUENTES v. CONRADO ROCA
one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of FACTS:
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar, Zamboanga City
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such and she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses) and eventually they
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding entered into an agreement. After 6 months, a new title
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or was issued in the name of the spouses who immediately
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter Tarciano
either or both offerors. Next, according to Article 256 of passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine
the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may months afterwards.
apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and
right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that Rosario, namely, respondents (collectively, the Rocas),
exempted their situation from the retroactive application filed an action for annulment of sale and re-conveyance of
of the Family Code. Also, the petitioners failed to the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC. The
substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
the administration over the property, had delegated to his Tarciano‘s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged.
considering that they did not present in court the SPA They thus prayed that the property be reconvened to them
granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses
administration. paid Tarciano.The spouses denied the Rocas‘ allegations.
They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he
personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence.
All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario
andshealonecouldinvokeit.Besides,thefour-
yearprescriptiveperiodfornullifyingthe sale on ground of
fraud had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the signature of Rosario representing

her consent was forged.

b) Whether or not the Rocas‘ action for the declaration of

nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed
c) WhetherornotonlyRosario,the wife whose consent was
not had, could bring the action to annul that sale

RULING:

Yes it was forged as the Supreme Court ruled. A defective

notarization will merely strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument that
falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in
the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario‘s
consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses
honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosario‘s consent does not matter. The sale is still void
without an authentic consent.

No. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,

Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. The Family Code applied for
this case. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly
superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in
Code provisions were also made to apply to already with an apartment standing thereon. On year 1994,
existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage
rights. Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of
period within which the wife who gave no consent may Nelson under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC declared
assail her husband‘s sale of the real property. It simply the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution
provides that without the other spouse‘s written consent and liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of
or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. gains. The spouses weren‘t able to liquidate their conjugal
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses partnership even after the declaration of their legal
in 1997 for annulment of sale and re- conveyance of the separation.
real property that Tarciano sold without their mother‘s (his
wife‘s) written consent. The passage of time did not erode Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira
the right to bring such an action. Oliveros obtained a loan from petitioner, Metrobank
secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM)
Yes. As stated above, that sale was void from the on their properties including one involving the lot bought
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of
of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-
died, they passed on the ownership of the property to husband, but did not incidentally include the lot in
their heirs. question (bought from Sering).

When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan

due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings and
caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the
REM‘s. Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of
the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the
property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his
consent. Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot
registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia.
Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in
good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to
file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared
the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith
on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s
decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage

between the respondents dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.

b) Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered

the REM over the lot invalid.

RULING:

No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without

more, does not automatically result in a regime of
complete separation when it is shown that there was no
liquidation of the conjugal assets.While the declared nullity
of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the
character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties
until and after the liquidation and partition of the
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. v. NICHOLSON partnership.
PASCUAL
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008 No. Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property
relationship between the former spouses, where: Each co-
FACTS: owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
married on 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora,
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership. Melecio
him in the division upon the termination of the co- claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the
ownership. Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that
her 1⁄2 undivided interests in the disputed party even Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have validly sold
without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of the interest over the subject property without Flora’s
Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency
mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 of the case and were substituted by their adopted son,
undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not Cornelio Molina.
having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.
The RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to
establish his claim that Anastacio did not sell the property
to the spouses Molina. the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in
toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the

spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal

HELD:

In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna, we

held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership
fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse until final
liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however,
has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the
properties, which does not consist of determinate and
segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the
conjugal partnership.

An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s

surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s
share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and
partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of
the original conjugal partnership properties as his share,
but this is an undivided interest.

Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any

specific portion of the conjugal properties without an
actual partition being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to
freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the
subject property.
DOMINGO v. MOLINA
GR No. 200274 April 20, 2016
BRIGIDO QUIOA v. RITA QUIAO
FACTS: G.R. No. 176556 July 4, 2012

In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo FACTS:
bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, The sale was
annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. Respondent Rita Quiao, the offended spouse, filed a legal
16354 covering the subject property. Anastacio borrowed separation against the petitioner Brigido Quiao on October
money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena 26, 2000 before the RTC. The decision of the court dated
Molina. In 1986, Anastacio died. In May 19, 1995, the sale October 10, 2005 declared the legal separation, custody of
of Anastacio’s interest was registered under Transfer children to Rita, equal partition on the personal and real
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967 and transferred the properties, and forfeiture on the part of Brigido the net
entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the profits earned from the conjugal properties in favor of the
spouses Molina. common children. Neither party filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and appealed within the required period
for legal separation. December 12, 2005, Rita filed a
Motion for Execution and was later on granted.

Brigido file a Motion for Clarification on the ―net profit

earned‖. The Court defined it asthe remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate
properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts basing on
Articles 63 and 43 of the Family Code. Brigido filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on September 8, 2006. Though
the petition was after the required prescriptive period, the
court granted the petition since its purpose was to clarify
the meaning of the ―net profit earned‖. With that on
November 8, 2006 the court ordered that the ―net profit
earned‖ be based on the Article 102 of the family Code.
November 21, 2006, the respondent, Rita, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration (MR) praying for the reversal of the
Nov. 8, 2006 court order. The Court then granted the MR.
Brigido then filed a Petition for Review questioning the
following: dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties, meaning of the ―net profit earned‖, and the
law governing the property relation between him and Rita.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can question decision by the

RTC dated October 10, 2005.

RULING:

No. Brigido wasn‘t able to timely appeal the decision of the

court dated October 10, 2005, thus, the decision on that
date is deemed final and executory hence, he had slept on
his right to question.The respondent tied the marital knot
on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the exchange of
marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a YAO v. PERELLO
marriage settlement, the property relations between the G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003
petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gain. And under this FACTS:
property relation, "the husband and the wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
income from their work or industry." The husband and issued a writ of execution for the satisfaction of its
wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal judgment in favor of petitioner and against PR Builders,
partnership of gains. the time of the dissolution of the Inc. and its managers, which included Pablito Villarin,
petitioner and the respondent's marriage the operative private respondent’s husband. Pursuant to the writ, the
law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the
instant case and the applicable law in so far as the names of spouses Villarin and the property was scheduled
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities for public auction. Private respondent filed a petition for
is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to prohibition alleging that the subject property could not be
Article 63(2) of the Family Code. The latter provision is levied on to answer for the separate liability of her
applicable because according to Article 256 of the Family husband. The trial court granted the petition and
Code "this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it exempted the subject property from execution. Hence, the
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in scheduled auction sale did not materialize. Consequently,
accordance with the Civil Code or other law." petitioner filed a motion for intervention, but the same
was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not lower Court grave abuse of discretion in

denying petitioner’s motion for intervention on the ground
that the same was filed late.

HELD:
 No. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those
Petitioner’s claim that he had the right to intervene is declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
without basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the property relations of the parties during the period of
inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code
must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and
the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
consideration must be given as to whether the whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case. Article
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be 147 of the Family Code provides: xxx In the absence of
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
requirements must concur as the first is not more joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
important than the second. in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who
did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he must in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
the period prescribed therefor. household.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for xxx This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
judgment by the trial court, in this case Petitioner filed his marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and
motion way beyond the period set forth in the rules. wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to
operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated
to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the
instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph
of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been
shown to have existed on the part of either Virginia or
OCAMPO v. OCAMPO Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as
GR No. 198908 August 3, 2015 husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
FACTS: of psychological incapacity. From the foregoing, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry
On September 10, 1990, petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-
(Virginia) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
Marriage with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, on the joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and the appellate court
ground of psychological incapacity. The decision became correctly held that the parties will share on equal shares
final, since no party appealed the judgment annulling the considering that Virginia failed to prove that the properties
marriage. On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the were acquired solely on her own efforts.
parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried
properties, and if they failed to do so, a hearing will be We note that the former spouses both substantially agree
held on the factual issues with regard to said properties. that they acquired the subject properties during the
Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their subsistence of their marriage.
conjugal properties, hearing ensued where the parties The certificates of titles and tax declarations are not
adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. On sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under
January 13, 2004, the trial court rendered the assailed Article 116 of the Family Code. All properties acquired by
Order stating that the properties declared by the parties the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing. name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not rebutted
ISSUE: by the mere fact that the certificate of title of the property
or the tax declaration is in the name of one of the spouses
Whether respondent should be deprived of his share in the only. Article 116 expressly provides that the presumption
conjugal partnership of gains by reason of bad faith and remains even if the property is "registered in the name of
psychological perversity. one or both of the spouses."

RULING: Thus, the failure of Virginia to rebut this presumption, said

properties were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in
equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the former
spouses' properties on the basis of co-ownership, as Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in
ordered by the RTC and the appellate court, should be holding that article 129 of the family code has no
affirmed, and not on the regime of conjugal partnership of application in the present case, on the assumption
gains
HELD:

The records reveal that Nonatoand Barrido’s marriage had

been declared void for psychological incapacity under
Article 3610 of the Family Code. During their marriage,
however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their
property relations. Although Article 12911 provides for the
procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers the
effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property
relations. Article 147 reads:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated

to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties

acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
tohave been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall beowned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in
the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
BARRIDO v. NONATO deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
GR No. 176492 October 20, 2014 thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
FACTS:
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos
Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage was dissolved by reson of his or her share in the property acquired during
of psychological incapacity in 1996, hence Leanardo filed a cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
complaint for partition over their co-ownership. In her of the other, until after the termination of their
defense, Marrieta claimed that the property had been sold cohabitation.
to their children Joseph Raymod and Joseph Leo. She also
moved for the dismissal of the action for lack of Here, the former spouses both agree that they acquired
jurisdictionof the part of the MTCC Bacolod City, the action the subject property during the subsistence of their
for partition being an action incapable of pecuniary marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been
estimation. Per decision of the MTXX, it ruled in favour of obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
Marrietta and adjudicated the land to her, being the be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Barrido,
spouse with shom the majority of the common children however, claims that the ownership over the property in
choose to remain. It also awarded moral damages in question is already vested on their children, by virtue of a
favour of Marrieta. Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still
being registered in the names of the former spouses, said
Leonardo appelad the ruling to the RTC, which reversed document of safe does not bear a notarization of a notary
the MTCC ruling and ordered the partition of the property, public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a
hence Marrietta appealed the RTC decision to the CA by document remains to be private and cannot be converted
petition for review. The appellate court denied MArrietta’s into a public document,21 making it inadmissible in
appeal, ruling that since the assessed value of the property evidence unless properly authenticated.22 Unfortunately,
is only PHP8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTXX Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity.
jurisdiction. Though the RTC applied ART. 129 instead of In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her
ART 147 thereof, it still correctly ordered the partition of position paper. Therefore, the subject property remains to
the property. be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which
should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-
Marrieta elevated her case to the Supreme Court. ownership.

ISSUE:
 Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following
elements must be present: 1. The man and the woman
must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3.
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void. All these elements are present in this case
and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between Alian and
Caridad. The Court agrees with Alain that the trial court
erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition
and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article
147 of theFamily Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Section19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19.

MARGARET MAXEY v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS
ALAIN DIÑO v. MA CARIDAD DIÑO G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
G.R. No. 17804 January 19, 2011
FACTS:
FACTS:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living
Petitioner Alain M. Diño and respondent Caridad L. Diño together in 1903. They were united in 1903 in a marriage
have beenchildhood friends and s weethearts. They lived performed "in the military fashion". During the period of
together for ten years thenseparated. After two years, their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, or in 1911 and
they reunited and later on decided to get married. 1912, respectively, the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the
However, Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of parcels of land before their 1919 church marriage. Regina
marriage based on the psychological incapacity (Article 36 Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
of the Family Code) of Caridad. wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his second
wife Julia Pamatluan, using a power of attorney, sold the
He alleged that Caridad failed to give him love and support properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato
throughout their marriage and was irresponsible, C. Macayra.
unfaithful, and prodigal. He also alleged that Caridad tends
to be violent toward him. Extrajudicial service of summons Plaintiffs, children of Maxey and Morales, instituted the
was sent to Caridad who was living in the United Stated at present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First
that time. She did file any answer within the reglementary Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the
period. It was also learned that she already filed a divorce documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and
in the United States, which was granted by the Superior to recover possession thereof with damages from the
Court of California, and is now married to another man. herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that
The prosecutor of Las Piñas declared that there was no the aforesaid realties were common properties of their
collusion between the two parties. parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and
A psychological report was submitted stating that Caridad through their joint effort and capital.
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which
rooted from her early formative years and which was The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which
founded to be long-lasting and incurable. provide ―When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
ISSUE: marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued co-ownership.‖ Thus, the property in question is owned
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ both by Maxey and Morales in which the sale of the
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. property by Maxey alone was invalid.

RULING: The Court of Appeals adjudged that the property was

exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey thus the sale was
valid making the buyer, Spouses Macayra, the absolute
owner of the land.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the military fashion marriage of Maxey

and Morales was recognized as valid.

b) Whether or not the property in question is co-owned by

Maxey and Morales applying Article 144 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

No. Maxey and Morales were legally married at a church

wedding solemnized on February 16, 1919. Since Act No. SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO
3613 was approved on December 4, 1929 and took effect GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
six months thereafter, it could not have applied to a
relationship commenced in 1903 and legitimized in 1919
through a marriage performed according to law. The FACTS:
marriage law in 1903 was General Order No. 70. There is
no provision in General Order No. 68 as amended nor in SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on
Act No. 3613 which would recognize as an exception to the June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and
general rule on valid marriages, a so called "Military Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married
fashion" ceremony or arrangement. respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became
bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on
Yes. As far as there was no vested right that would be November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who
impaired or prejudiced by applying Article 144 then it shall spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans
be applied retroactively. The properties were sold in 1953 filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
when the new Civil Code was already in full force and from various government agencies pertaining to the
effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI,
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
questioned properties are concerned as this was still open received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial
to controversy on account of the legitimate claim of Regina insurance.
Morales to a share under the applicable law. The disputed On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money
properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return
and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had
were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should collected. For failing to file her answer, NIcdao was
return one-half of the purchase price of the land while the declared in default.
private respondents should pay some form of rentals for
their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
considerations, however, lead us to rule out rentals on one during the subsistence of and without first obtaining a
hand and return on the other. judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between
Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed good faith, having no
knowledge of the previous marriage until at the funeral
where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. Yee submitted that Cariño‘s marriage to
Nicdao was void because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and

void.

b) Whether or not the wife of the deceased is entitled to

collect the death benefits from government agencies
despite the nullity of their marriage.

RULING:

No. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy ANTONIO VALDES v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after FACTS:
the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions, incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody
renders the marriage void ab initio. of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
No. It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision
Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common
benefits would now be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under property in ―unions without marriage‖. During the
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a expressing desire to stay with their father.
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage ISSUE:
would also be void. One of the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the Whether or not the property regime should be based on
spouses according to the applicable property regime. co-ownership.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the
applicable property regime would be not absolute RULING:
community nor conjugal partnership of property, but
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,
Family Code, on Property Regime of Unions Without regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
Marriage. the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party‘s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family.
 NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the
G.R. Nos. 127358 & G.R. Nos. 127449 March 31, 2005 Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919
until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated
FACTS: & have not lived together as man & wife, they had 4 minor
children together. After negotiations, both parties
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of mutually agreed to allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for
nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife her & her children‘s support of P500 (five hundred pesos)
were psychologically incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity &
declared the marriage entered into between petitioner illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her
and respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation name.
of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered
petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion
minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the CA. dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went
While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondent‘s through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen
motion issued a resolution increasing the support as well & had 3children with her. When Gonzales left the
pendants. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner monthly for the support of Manuela Barreto & her children
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
petition. alimony. Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August
1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the
ISSUE: CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9 of
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to
marriage. the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have
been due to their children as their legal portion from
RULING: respective estates had their parents died intestate on
November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
Yes. Since the present case does not involve the existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared dissolved
annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month,
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses incurred in
Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children
community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case also filed as intervenors in the case.
maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies,
which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in
property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned favor of the plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the
and distributed is that of equal co- ownership. attorney‘s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs
of the action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their
a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have decision.
been acquired during the union of the parties, the same
would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a ISSUE:
separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution. Whether or not any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of
the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this
jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions
for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a
divorce.

RULING:

No. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed

for on granting the divorce, because: The court said that
securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize &
approve the divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done
according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the
question of divorce. It‘s clear in Act No. 2710 & court
BARRETO GONZALES vs. GONZALES decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda that
G.R. No. 159521 March 7, 1933 the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their
separation until the case was submitted praying the
FACTS: ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a
circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will be done
under conditions not authorized by our laws. The subsequently ordered the liquidation of theirconjugal
matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the partnership. The court found Suite 204 to be exclusive
Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in property of Bruno because it was purchased on installment
Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & did not confer also divided into 3 (1/3-Elna;1/3-Bruno; 1/3-2 children).
jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the
matrimonial bonds in which he had entered in 1919. ISSUE:

Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Whether or not Suite 204 is Bruno‘s exclusive property
Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of
foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot RULING:
compel the courts to approve of their own actions or ……………………………………………………
permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the No. The Family Code, Article 147 applies in this case
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign because 1) both of them were capacitated tomarry each
courts in manner which out government believes is other; 2) they lived exclusively as husband and wife; and 3)
contrary to public order & good morals. theirunion is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void. Evidenceshows that the property was
acquired during their cohabitation and in applyingFC 147,
the rules on co-ownership should govern. Suite 204 must
be consideredas common property of Elna and Bruno. 3-
way partition of properties does not apply also. Property
regime should be divided in accordance with the law on
co-ownership

SALAS v. AGUILA
GR No. 202370, September 23, 2013

FACTS:

On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden

Villena Aguila were married. Aguila gave birth to their
daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their
MERCADO-FEHR v. FEHR conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer communicated
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003 with Aguila or their child. On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing
FACTS: psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal
In March 1983, after 2 years of long-distance courtship, properties whatsoever”. On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their
Elna left Cebuand moved in with Bruno in Manila. They had marriage and further provides the dissolution of their
their first child in December thesame year. They purchased conjugal property, if any. On September 10, 2007, Aguila
a condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGCcondominium by a filed a manifestation and motion stating that she
contract TO sell dated July 26, 1983. They got married discovered 3 properties registered to Juan S. Salas, married
inMarch 1985. In 1998, trial court declared the marriage to Rubina C. Salas.
between Elna and Bruno,void ab initio under FC 36 and
However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed
Discovered Properties in consideration of other properties three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23,
waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that 2002 transferring the properties covered by TCT Nos.
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. RTC 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann
directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper
instruments of conveyance the discovered properties. CA On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was valid. On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered
ISSUE: another Decision44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT,
VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE
Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
during the marriage of Salas and Aguila, thus a conjugal Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis. The RTC also
property and subject for partition between them. ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of
the said Deeds.
RULING:
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple
Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and
acquired by Salas during the validity of their marriage. The formally offer any testimonial and documentary evidence
phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the to controvert the evidence presented by Luis.
civil status of the registered owner, Salas. Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are ISSUE:
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Under this property the RTC decision which declared the marriage between
regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal
presumed to have been obtained through the couple’s properties.
joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.
Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on HELD:
the basis of co-ownership.
As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were
incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their
cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void
from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license,
Article 144 of the Civil Code,89 in relation to Article 147 of
the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law
governing their property relations. Article 147 of the
Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO AND HUSBAND DR. GERARD C. other reasons, like absence of a marriage license."90
SALGADO V "Under this property regime, property acquired by both
LUIS G. ANSON spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
G.R. No. 20449 July 27, 2016 by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
FACTS: obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint5 considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said
docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz- party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses the family household."'
Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa)
and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-
2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of owned by Luis and Severina. It is stated under Article 1079
the Deceased Severina De Asis dated October 25, 2002. of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg common among those to whom it may belong. The thing
spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may
were married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that
Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave "partition may be made by agreement between the parties
birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a
while Jo-Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence,
relationship. According to Luis, because there was no even without the same, the partition was validly done by
marriage settlement between him and Severina But
Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced
Agreement. herself as the wife of the deceased. Yee submitted that
Cariño‘s marriage to Nicdao was void because it was
Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and solemnized without the required marriage license.
authenticity of the Partition Agreement. It also remains
uncontroverted that he already received his share as ISSUES:
stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court
finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null a) Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and
and void or annulled, in the absence of any circumstance void;
which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.
b) Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife of the
deceased is entitled to collect the death
benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of
their marriage.

RULING:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a

previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial

action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
SUSAN NICDAO-CARINO v. SUSAN YEE CARINO essential to the determination of the case.
GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the
FACTS: marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
SPO4 Santiago CAriño married petitioner Susan Nicdao on and the absence therof, subject to certain exceptions,
June 20, 1969, with whom he had two children, Sahlee and renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow,
Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cariño also married however, that since the marriage of Nicdao and the
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now
bedridden due to diabetes and tuberculosis, and died on be awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both Susans prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
from various government agencies pertaining to the second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would
deceased. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, also be void.
PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage
insurance. is the separation of the property.
On December 14, 1993, Yee filed for collection of money
against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had
collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and Cariño. But she claimed
good faith, having no knowledge of the previous marriage
 ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Guillerma Tumlos is the co-

owner of the property by virtue of cohabiting with Mario
Fernandez who is legally married to Lourdez Fernandez.

RULING:

In the present case Article 148 of the family Code shall

apply. Article 148 states that ―In cases of cohabitation not
falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage.‖
Guillerma Tumlos fail to present an evidence of her actual
contribution to the purchase of the property. In Article 148
did not include also administration of the property as
contribution, it is unsubstantiated.

GUILLERMA TUMLOS v. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and

LOURDES FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 137650 April 12, 2000 JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO v. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005
FACTS:
FACTS:
On July 5, 1996, the said spouses alleged that they are the
absolute owners of an apartment building located at ARTE On January 15, 1983, Eduardo and Josefina Francisco got
SUBDIVISION III, Lawang Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila; married. On August 31, 1984, Josefina purchased two
that through tolerance they had allowed Guillerma, parcels of lands. The Registry of Deeds issued Transfer
petitioner, Toto and Gina Tumlos to occupy the apartment Certificate of title in the name of ―Josefina Castillo
building for the last seven (7) years, since 1989, without Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco‖. On January 13,
the payment of any rent; that it was agreed upon that 1986, Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila
after a few months, defendant Guillerma Tumlos will pay Cando. It appears that Eduardo affixed his marital
P1,600.00 a month while the other promised to pay conformity to the deed.
P1,000.00 a month, both as rental, which agreement was
not complied with by the said defendants. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement
from Master Iron Works and Construction Corporation
She averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. The court issued writ
cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner of the of execution levying the two parcel of land as for payment
subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell to MIWCC.
wherein it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the
property in question together with Mario Fernandez. On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third
Party Claim over the two parcel of land in which she
Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had an amorous claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that
relationship, and that they acquired the property in her husband had no proprietary right or interest over them
question as their love nest. It was further alleged that they as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she
lived together in the said apartment building with their attached to her affidavit.
two (2) children for around ten (10) years, and that
Guillerma administered the property by collecting rentals Before she could commence presenting her evidence
from the lessees of the other apartments, until she against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her
discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, on the
his marriage. ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983,
Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita Carpio.
 earnings which are, under the Civil Code, conjugal funds.
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered Petitioner’s argument that she has contributed in the
judgment, declaring the marriage between Josefina and purchase of the property lacks proof that she was gainfully
Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous. employed and be financially capacitated on her own.

ISSUE: Moreover, the registration of the property in petitioner’s

name is an act of donation by Rodolfo but Article 87 of the
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal Family Code also prohibits donations between persons
property of Josefina and cannot be held liable for the living together as husband and wife without a valid
Eduardo‘s personal obligations. marriage hence, the property is conjugal even if acquired
in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a
RULING: valid marriage.

No. The subject properties are not the paraphernal Under Article 1456, a constructive trust is created because
property of Josefina and can be held to answer the the registration of the property was under petitioner’s
liabilities of Eduardo. name that she cannot be because it is a deprivation of
right ownership of the legal spouse and heirs. Milagros is
Even though Eduardo and Josefina‘s marriage is bigamous, deemed to hold the property in trust for them.
the properties cannot be held conjugal, Josefina failed to
adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such.
Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the
property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay
for it. Her claim that the funds for the property were
provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was
just an afterthought.

MILAGROS JOAQUINO A.KA. MILAGROS J. REYES v.

LOURDES REYES ET. AL
G.R. No. 154645 July 13, 2004 JACINTO SAGUID v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003
FACTS:
FACTS:
Before Rodolfo died, he was he was employed at Warner
and Barnes Company wherein he received a sizeable Gina S. Rey was previously married when she met
amount of income and retirement benefits. Lourdes was petitioner. They cohabited and built a house on a lot
his widow yet he was also cohabiting with Milagros. A owned by the latter’s father. Jacinto was a patron of their
Deed of Sale of Property, a house and lot, was executed in fishing vessel while Gina worked as a fish dealer and later
favor of Milagros where respondent alleges that the funds decided to work in Japan as an entertainer. Soon they
used to purchase the said property came from the conjugal decided to end their relationship. Gina filed for Partition of
funds and earnings of her late husband. Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership because
she claimed that because of her work as an entertainer,
Petitioner contends that she has also contributed in the she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of
purchase of the property using her own funds as it was the house. Furthermore, she also said that she has
only for convenience that Rodolfo has facilitated the same acquired personal properties such as appliances and
through mortgage. household effects from her earnings as a fish dealer with a
value of P111, 375.00; she prayed for reimbursement of
ISSUE: these amounts.

Whether or not the disputed property belongs to the Petitioner argued that the expenses for the construction of
conjugal ownership of Lourdes and Rodolfo or it is their house were solely borne through his income and that
exclusively owned by Milagros, or co-owned by Rodolfo Gina did not work continuously in Japan but only for six
and Milagros. months each year. He alleged that she did not contribute
in the expenses.
HELD:
ISSUE:
The Court ruled that because the property was bought
during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, it is therefore Whether or not respondent is correct in claiming for
conjugal. The loans obtained were used to pay for the partitions over the contributions she claimed to have made
property, and the same were paid from his salaries and
in the building of their house and in the total amount of incapacitated to marry. However, in the case at bar,
the said personal properties. respondent is legally married to Socorro hence he and
Rosalia are incapacitated to contract marriage. Rosalia,
HELD: here also cannot be held liable for damages because she
cannot be deemed as co-owner of the passenger jeepney
The Supreme Court held the case at bar according to such belongs to the conjugal property of Eugenio and
Article 148 of the Family Code, wherein it states that Socorro.
properties acquired by both parties through actual joint
contribution of property … shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
However, in the case at bar, Gina failed to prove how
much was the exact amount she has contributed hence, it
shall be presumed to be equal. The disputed properties
aggregates to P111, 375.00 and which half is equivalent to
P55, 687.50. Private respondent’s extent of ownership of
the house only amounts to P11,413.00 based on the
receipts she presented as evidence. She is the declared as
co-owner of the house and Jacinto is ordered to reimburse
the former in the amount of P11,413 and P55,687.50
totalling to P67,100.50. Furthermore, the house is subject
to public auction.

ADRIANO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

FACTS:
VICTOR JUANIZA v. EUGENIO JOSE Lucio Adriano was previously married to Gliceria Dorado
G.R. No. L-50127-28 March 30, 1979 and has soon separated. Gliceria then died, and five
months after her death Lucio contracted a subsequent
marriage with Vicenta Villa. He executed a last will and
FACTS:
testament wherein he assigned all his properties to
Eugenio Jose is married to Socorro Ramos and is cohabiting Vicenta and to all his children in both first and second
with Rosalia Arroyo. Eugenio, also the registered owner of marriages.
a passenger jeepney, was involved in an accident of
Petitioners argue that the last will and testament be
collision with a freight train of the Philippine National
annulled because it disposes the entire rightful share of
Railways. The accident caused the death of seven persons
Vicenta. They also alleged that before the marriage of
and physical injuries of five of the passengers.
Lucio and Vicenta, the latter had acquired properties and
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered a decision are part of their conjugal partnership.
stating that Eugenio and Rosalia to jointly and severally
But the respondents presented evidence which indicated
pay Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest,
that the purchase money of the disputed properties came
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Josefa P. Leus.
from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership during
Fausto Retrita, Nestor del Rosario Anonuevo, and Arceli de
the subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria. It was obtained
la Cueva in the sum of P12,000.00.
from the conjugal fund of his first marriage.
ISSUE:
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena City rendered the
Whether or not Rosalia Arroyo be deemed as co-owner of decision that the last will and testament be declared as
the passenger jeepney and should also be held liable for valid and effective. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
the damages with Eugenio. decision in toto.

HELD: ISSUE:

The Court said under Article 144 of the Civil Code that the Whether or not the property covered in the last will and
man and woman living together must not in any way be testament constitutes the co-ownership of Vicenta Villa.
HELD: due to their execution and genuineness. The marriage was
a bigamous marriage hence it is declared null and void as
Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of provided for under Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
conjugality because respondents presented sufficient Philippines.
evidence to support their claim. The disputed properties
were purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal
fund of the first marriage. There was no evidence
presented to support that Vicenta actually contributed to
the acquisition of the property in question. The Court held
that the property acquired by a man while living with a
common-law wife during the subsistence of his marriage is
conjugal property, even when the property was titled in
the name of the common-law wife. According to Article
1456 of the Civil Code, a constructive trust is deemed to
have been created over the property which lawfully
pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting
marriage.

GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN, JR.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

FACTS:
Benjamin Bangayan Jr. filed for decalaration of nullity of
YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN marriage between him and Sally Go-Bangayan because it
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013 was a bigamous one. Benjamin was previously married to
Azucena Alegre and had cohabited with Sally. Petitioner’s
FACTS: father was against the relationship, so to please her father,
she made Benjamin sign a simulated marriage contract.
Yasuo Iwasawa is a Japanese national and has married
Felisa Gangan. After getting married they went to reside in During their cohabitation, they acquired properties. Sally
Japan. On July 2009, respondent confessed to petitioner then file for a criminal case against Benjamin alleging that
that her husband has previously died which the former he falsified a public document and for contracting a
found out that Felisa was previously married to one bigamous marriage, using the simulated marriage contract.
Raymond Arambulo. Petitioner filed for a declaration of On the other hand, Benjamin alleged that their marriage
nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. was bigamous because it lacked formal requisites of a valid
marriage and that he should be the owner of the
Petitioner presented to the Court a certificate of marriage
properties acquired therein.
between him and respondent, a certificate of marriage
between respondent and Raymond Arambulo, certificate
of death of Raymond, and a certification from the National
ISSUES:
Statistics Office (NSO) that two marriages of respondent
has been recorded. 1. Whether or not Benjamin and Sallly’s marriage
is bigamous.
ISSUE:
2. Whether or not the properties be solely owned
Whether or not the NSO certification is admissible as by Benjamin or that Sally is also entitled a part of the
evidence and should be accorded with evidentiary weight. partition of the properties.

HELD:
HELD:
The Court ruled in accordance with Article 410 of the Civil
Code which provides that, books making up the civil The marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous
register and all documents relating thereto shall be rather it is void ab initio.Their marriage was one made in
considered public documents and shall be prima facie jest or a simulated one, and it lacked a valid marriage
evidence of facts stated therein hence the NSO license hence there was no marriage to speak of in the first
certification is a public document and therefore admissible place.
The property relations of both parties are governed by properties of Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the
Article 148 of the Family Code. They cohabitated without decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
the benefit of marriage thus only properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, ISSUE:
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
proportion to their respective contributions. In the case at Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or
bar, Benjamin and his siblings own the 37 properties being interest over the subject properties
claimed by Sally, which were given by Benjamin’s father to
his children as advance inheritance. The other property HELD:
which was registered in their names as “spouses” is solely
owned by Benjamin because the words “married to” and According to the Family Code, in unions between a man
“spouses” are merely descriptive of the civil status of the and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other,
registered owner and do not prove co-ownership. Sally has the ownership over the properties acquired during the
no proof either that she had actual contributions to be subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the
entitled of co-ownership of the same. actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of.property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code,

which the CA applied in the assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are

incapacitated to marry each other, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
VENTURA vs. SPOUSES ABUDA contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013 owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
FACTS:
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora. Edilberto
credit.
Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner
Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro married Esteban
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan
even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban
properties can be considered common property if: (1)
on the other hand was also married before but the same
these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban
was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous wife.
and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties
Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline.
were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in
Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was purchased Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the
by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned
1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had small business by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer
establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
Property). When Esteban was diagnosed with colon several months after the parties were married; and (2) title
cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline. to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
married to Socorro Torres."
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro
on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by
discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is
for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner is
merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show
entitled to a right or interest over the properties
that Socorro co-owned the property.The evidence on
purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand,
record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over
argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin,
the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if
her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void.
the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of
Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system
interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and merely confirms, and does not vest title.
respondents.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents, purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently
ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and
Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan
property.

Under Art. 1238, it provides that payment made by a third

person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to
the creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her

father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property
would be owned by and registered under the name of
Esteban.

INING v. VEGA
G.R. No. 14727 August 12, 2013

FACTS:

GUERRERO v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a
229 SCRA 274 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in
FACT: Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon
was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and
Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in- Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both
law. Gaudencio filed a case against Pedro without alleging deceased. The first sibling, Romana was survived by her
that earnest efforts were resorted to settle the dispute daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein
before the case was filed. Pedro overlooked such fact and respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both
did not file a motion to dismiss, but during the pre-trial, deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes
the judge noticed their relationship, so, he gave five (5) and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
days for Gaudencio to file amend his complaint. When Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
Gaudencio failed to amend, the judge dismissed the case respondents. Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for
absence of an allegation of previous efforts towards Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
reconciliation. (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are
transferees of the said property.
ISSUE: In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
Whether or not there is a need for an earnest effort Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
toward a compromise in this case? Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against
Gregoria’s heirs.
HELD:

There is no need. It has been held in Gayon vs. Gayon, 36 In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs
SCRA 104, that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no
members of the same family, does not comprehend cause of action against them; that they have become the
brothers or sisters-in-law; hence, there is no need to exert sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr.
efforts towards a compromise before filing the present who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
case. Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from
Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
ISSUE:

Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate.

HELD:

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo
Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure
of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part
of Leon’s estate. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his
siblings Romana and Gregoria. Gregoria’s and Romana’s
heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against
the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes TAMBUYAT v. TAMBUYAT
the co-ownership. G.R. No. 202805 March 23, 2015

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by FACTS:

a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began to run
against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it Adriano Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda
has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has Balcom – Tambuyat were married on September
renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole 16, 1965.
ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that
the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real
years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period properties, including a 700 sq. m. parcel of land
prescribed under Article 1141. located at Brgy. Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
which was bought on November 17, 1991. The Deed of
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is Sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee.
not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law,
being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora. One who is One of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario
merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit Banguis – Tambuyat, who signed therein as “Rosario
from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the Tambuyat”. All this time petitioner Banguis remained
decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a married to Eduardo Nolasco.
repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was
formed among the decedent’s heirs. When TCT covering the subject property was issued, it
was made under the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat
married to Rosario E. Banguis. When Adriano died
intestate on June 7, 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for
Cancellation of the subject TCT. She alleged that she
was the surviving spouse of Adriano. That the TCT was
erroneously registered and made in the name of
“Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis.”
That per annexed marriage contract, Banguis was still
married to Nolasco. Wenifreda prayed that the TCT be
cancelled. That a new certificate of title be made out in
Adriano’s name, with her as the spouse indicated, and
that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT.

On her defense, Banguis claimed that she and Adriano

were married on Sept. 2, 1988, and thereafter lived
together as married couple; that their union produced a
son; and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
petition for cancellation, which is merely a summary
proceeding – considering that a thorough determination
will have to be made as to whether the property is
conjugal or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano
have a child whose rights will be adversely affected by any
judgment in the case

ISSUE:
Whether the cancellation of the TCT filed by Wenifreda be
granted by the court.

HELD:

Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the

erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title
may be resorted to in seven instances, included are (1)
when any error, omission or mistake was made in entering
a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate andwhen there is reasonable ground
for the amendment or alteration of title. The present case
falls under the two instances because the RD of Bulacan
committed and error in issuing the disputed TCT, in the
name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. HIYAS v. ACUNA
Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda
– and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful spouse. As correctly FACT:
ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of
evidence points to the fact that Wenifreda is the Alberto filed a case against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
legitimate spouse of Adriano. Thus, it cannot be said that Inc., his wife Remedios, and 3 more defendants. Hiyas filed
Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to
other; it cannot even be said that they have a common law comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is
relationship at all. provided that no suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for compromise have been made, but that the same have
many years as husband and wife, who represent failed.
themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are
reputed to be husband and wife in the community where ISSUE:
they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. While it is true that Whether or not Hiyas invoke the provisions of Article 151
our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such of the Family Code?
relationships are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and interests which is HELD:
governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect
that such form of co ownership requires that the man and Since the requirement under Article 151 of the Family
woman living together must not in any way be Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively
incapacitated to contract marriage. that the provisions of between or among members of the same family, it
the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a
in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a party who is a member of that same family.
lawfully wedded spouse.
 MANALO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129242 January 16, 2001
HONTIVEROS vs. RTC
FACTS:
GR No. 125465 June 29, 1999
Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992. He
FACTS:
was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven
(11) children who are all of legal age. At the time of his
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
death he left several real properties located in Manila and
complaint for damages against private respondents
in the province of Tarlac including a business under the
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners
name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop in Manila and QC.
alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Eight (8) of his children filed a petition with respondent
Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land
RTC for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the
father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
reply, private respondents denied that they were married
Manalo, as administrator thereof. RTC set the hearing.
and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora
Herein petitioners, the mother and three other children,
was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of
opposed the petition, contending that such petition is
possession of and income from the land. On the contrary,
actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the
according to the private respondents, the possession of
same family and that there was absence of earnest efforts
the property in question had already been transferred to
toward compromise among members of the same family.
petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court
Motion denied by RTC. Petition for certiorari
denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended
denied by CA. Motion for reconsideration likewise
complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
dismissed.
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in
Article 151.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial
Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the
court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal
complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a
of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
compromise as stated in Article 151.
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest
efforts toward a compromise involving members of the
HELD:
same family have been made prior to the filing of the
petition but that the same have failed.
The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of private
respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
RULING:
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of
Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase “members of
The Court denied petitioner’s claim. It must be emphasized
the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents
that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued
and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers
for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was
and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious
impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a
legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as
special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the
spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the
petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a
Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. In several
particular fact.Private respondents herein merely seek to
jurisprudence, the Court already decided that “whenever a
establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently
stranger is a party in the case involving the family
to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said
members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to
deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to
compromise is no longer mandatory”
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate
of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.

Art 151 of FC which prohibits suit between members of the

family absent a compromise, is not applicable in the case
at bar for such is only a special proceeding and not an
ordinary civil action.
 In the complaint, private respondent, Luisa De La Rosa
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS Mendoza averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza
475 SCRA 1 on 2 September 1953, that they lived together as husband
and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed
FACTS: for the United States to further his studies and practice his
profession. Since then, defendant Mendoza, without
Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and
Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by
to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails
both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo and and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support
eight of their siblings, executed a "Basic Agreement of of plaintiff, who is allegedly to be pregnant, sickly and
Partition" covering properties they inherited from their without any source of revenue, while defendant (now
parents. petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United States.

Two years later, Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein ISSUE:

respondent Andres Guerrero (collectively, the
"Guerreros"), filed suit with the then Court of First Whether or not the case at bar is covered under Article
Instance (CFI) of Rizal against petitioner Nicanor and two 151 where earnest efforts toward compromise should first
(2) other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. be made prior the filing of the petition, and invoking
Article 222 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court has no Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that
application before a suit between members of the same family (in this
case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it
RULING: must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, and the only way to make it so appear
A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect
bitterness than between strangers. Thus, the provision in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated
making honest efforts towards a settlement a condition filed or maintained unless such efforts at compromise
precedent for the maintenance of an action between appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is
members of the same family. As it were, a complaint in a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of
ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead
must contain an allegation that earnest efforts toward a that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a
compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222 of settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of
the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of
Code.Otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed under the case even on appeal.
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.Admittedly, the
complaint filed in this case contains no such allegation. But While the Supreme Court agree that petitioner's position
a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be represents a correct statement of the general rule on the
cured by the introduction of evidence effectively supplying matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the
the necessary averments of a defective complaint. Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed
no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its
face, the same involved a claim for future support that
under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore,
outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code
upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last
proviso of said Article 222, future support.

TRINIDAD-RAMOS v. PANGILINAN
MENDOZA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
19 SCRA 756 FACTS:
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against ARRIOLA v. ARRIOLA
E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. G.R. No. 177703 January 28, 2008
Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor FACTS:
arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the
respondents’ back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay
& service incentive leave pay. The decision became final The RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the
and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by
Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission Fidel S. Arriola to his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
(NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’ name Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of
situated in Pandacan. one-third each. John Nabor Arriola proposed to sell it
though public auction. Vilma and Anthony Ronald Arriola
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the
hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment house standing on the subject land. The respondent then
award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ filed a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed
of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family to push through with the auction of the subject land
home there being another one in Antipolo and that the including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition
Pandacan address is actually the business address. The and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot
motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion
the NLRC. for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.

ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was
valid. Whether or not the house built inside the land is
considered part of partition.
RULING:

Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, HELD:

distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be
No. Under Article 153 the family home continues to be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable. If the family home was constructed before the attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, extent of the value allowed by law. According to Article
then it must have been constituted either judicially or 159 the family home shall continue despite the death of
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a
governs extrajudicial constitution. minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is or constituted the family home.
no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154
actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have
been with consent of the other, and its value must not
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it
is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for
which the family home is made answerable must have
been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the
claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family

home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early
as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated
by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially MONDEQUILLO v. BREVA
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting GR. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy
upon the Pandacan property valid FACTS:
 FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at
Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered In Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, Petitioner Albino Josef was
in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of the defendant, which is a case for collection of sum of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who
Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that which he bought on credit from respondent on various
the residential land is where the family home is built since dates in 1994. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of
1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is Marikina City found petitioner liable to respondent.
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in affirmed the trial court’s decision in Toto. Petitioner filed
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it
enforced against the family home is not one of those was dismissed in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002.
enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is The Judgment became final and executory on May 21,
alleged that it is still part of the public land and the 2002.
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant
who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003 and
house in the present case became a family home by enforced on August 21, 2003. On August 29, 2003, certain
operation of law under Article 153. personal properties subjects of the writ of execution were
auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property located at
ISSUE: Marikina City was sold by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit.
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a
family home. On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, questioning the
HELD: sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and
real properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a properties did not belong to him but to his children; and
family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner that the real property was his family home thus exempt
and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 from execution.
of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this
Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as ISSUE:
said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that
Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such Whether or not the levy and sale of the personal
that all existing family residences are deemed to have belongings of the petitioner’s children as well as the
been constituted as family homes at the time of their attachment and sale on public auction of his family home
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and to satisfy the judgment award in favor of respondent is
are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations legal.
incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article
simply means that all existing family residences at the time RULING:
of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits The Supreme Court held that the family home is the
accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol
liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred of family love and repository of cherished memories that
prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall last during one’s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union
under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC. which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution;
and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that
the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral
petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed. fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is
just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a
basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or
given effect, the trial court’s failure to observe the proper
procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner’s
allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied

upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioner’s allegations
ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to
G.R. No. 165060 November 27, 2008 determine the nature of the same, whether the items were
exempt from execution or not, or whether they belonged
to petitioner or to someone else.
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA,
G.R. No. 172263 July 9, 2008
MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C.
GOMEZ-SALCEDO
FACTS: v. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and
HINAHON STA. INES
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired G.R. No. 132537 October 14, 2005
agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to
Auther’s failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action FACTS:
for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of Mary
decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. After Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-
being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta
Auther and his wife Doris A. Kelley filed a motion to dela Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for
dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC Makati an accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under
City on the ground that the subject property was their the management of Marietta and for the return of the
family home which was exempt from execution. Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) of the property.

ISSUE: Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and

ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT and pay
Whether or not the subject property is the family home of damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution
the petitioners. was issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva
Vizcaya registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public
RULING: auction wherein Josephine was the highest bidder.
Marietta’s husband, Hinahon together with their children,
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale before the
family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the ground that said house and
constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code lot sold during the public auction is their family residence
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of and is thus exempt from execution under Article 155 of the
law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are Family Code. Respondents assert that the house and lot
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family family home from the time they occupied it in 1972
Code.
ISSUE:
The exemption is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as Whether or not the property can be sold.
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable RULING:
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise
(that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of the
alleged family home must be shown to have been Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among
the Civil Code. other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home. While the respondent contends that the
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and
fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions: Marietta as their family home in 1972, it is not deemed
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from constituted as such at the time Marietta incurred her
execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non- debts.
payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the
constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted
mortgage on the premises before or after such as the family home only upon the effectivity of the Family
constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta
architects, builders, material men and others who have was instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as
rendered service or furnished material for the construction 1977, thus, her liability arose years before the levied
of the building. property was constituted as the family home in 1988. The
liability incurred by Marietta falls within the exception
provided for in Article 155 of the Family Code: debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
 FACTS:

MANACOP v. COURT OF APPEALS Two of the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy
GR No. 104875 November 13, 1992 the judgement amount of about P5,000. One was a parcel
of land located in Bario Igpit, Municipality of Opol Misamis
FACTS: Oriental and the other was the family home also located at
Igpit, Opol Misamis Oriental. On February 12, 1966, the
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on said properties were sold at a public auction to the private
March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in respondent as the highest bidder. The petitioners failed to
Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract redeem the same so a final deed of conveyance was
cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling,
petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF transferring and conveying said properties to the private
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery respondent. On November 5, 1985, the petitioner filed an
for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet
attachment against the former. Consequently, the title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued injunction. They argued that the property was acquired
which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in through free patent therefore it is inalienable and not
Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt,
President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. They further
attached property is a family home having been occupied alleged that the Sheriff’s Deed of Conveyance issued by
by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968 in
from attachment. favor of the private respondent over the subject
property including their family home was extrajudicially
ISSUE: constituted. Private respondent refuted the petitioner’s
contentions alleging that the lawfully acquired the subject
Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was
from attachment. a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale on February 12,
1966.Private respondent averred that the subject land was
HELD: originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo
Taneo on September 18, 1941, as evidenced by
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being aprivate land, Pablo
home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Taneo filed an application for free patent which was made
Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a final only in 1979.RTC ruled in favor of Gilig. The Court of
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their ISSUE:
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in HELD:
1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his
property is therefore not exempt form attachment. The house is not exempt from execution. A debt was
incurred before the house was deemed a family home.
Before the effectivity of the Family Code, a family home
must be constituted judicially (filing of petition) and extra-
judicially (registration). It turns out that the instrument
constituting the family home was registered only in JAN
24, 1966 while the money judgement was rendered on JAN
24 1964. The family home is not exempt from execution
since there was a debt incurred before the registration of
the house as a family home.

FORTALEZA v. LAPITAN
TANEO v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 178288 August 15, 2012
G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999
FACTS: constitution." In this case, there is no doubt that spouses
Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28, 1998 a deed
Spouses Charlie and Ofelia Fortaleza (spouses Fortaleza) of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
obtained a loan from spouses Rolando and Amparo Lapitan was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And
(creditors) in the amount of P1.2 million subject to 34% assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale,
interest per annum. As security, spouses Fortaleza spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff
executed on January 28, 1998 a Deed of Real Estate such exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the
Mortgage over their residential house and lot and public auction.
registered under TCT No. T-412512. ςrνll
As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the indebtedness
including the interests and penalties, the creditors applied While it is true that the family home is constituted on a
for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage . house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
The public auction sale was set on May 9, 2001. At the residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale
sale, the creditors son Dr. Raul Lapitan and his wife Rona under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for
(spouses Lapitan) emerged as the highest bidders with the exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
bid amount of P2.5 million. Then, they were issued a before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to
Certificate of Sale which was registered and annotated at do so would estop the party from later claiming the
the back of TCT No. T-412512. The one-year redemption exemption.
period expired without the spouses Fortaleza redeeming
the mortgage. Thus, spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
of consolidation of ownership on November 20, 2003 and
caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-412512 and the Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period
registration of the subject property in their names under within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
TCT No. T-535945 on February 4, 2004. Despite the nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a
foregoing, the spouses Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitan s personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as
formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the
subject property. debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a
reasonable period thereafter.
On August 27, 2004, spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte
petition for the issuance of writ of possession as new Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
registered owners of the subject property. In their exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of
opposition, spouses Fortaleza questioned the validity of the one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the
the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale. They property. ςrνll
argued that the mortgage was void because the creditors
bloated the principal amount by the imposition of
Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza s reliance on the
exorbitant interest. Spouses Fortaleza added that the
cases of Tolentino and De Los Reyes in praying for the
foreclosure proceeding was invalid for non-compliance
exercise of the right of redemption even after the
with the posting requirement. The RTC ordered the
expiration of the one-year period. In Tolentino, we held
issuance of a writ of possession explaining that it is a
that an action to redeem filed within the period of
ministerial duty of the court especially since the
redemption, with a simultaneous deposit of the
redemption period had expired and a new title had already
redemption money tendered to the sheriff, is equivalent to
been issued in the name of the spouses Lapitan, Spouses
an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the
Fortaleza moved for reconsideration, claiming that the
right to redemption for future enforcement even beyond
subject property is their family home and is exempt from
the one-year period. And in De Los Reyes, we allowed the
foreclosure sale. The RTC denied their motion. CA
mortgagor to redeem the disputed property after finding
affirmed.
that the tender of the redemption price to the sheriff was
made within the one-year period and for a sufficient
ISSUE: amount.

Whether or not the subject property is exempt from forced The circumstances in the present case are far different.
sale because it is a family home The spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a
formal offer to redeem the subject property accompanied
HELD: by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also
undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to lapse
The spouses Fortaleza’s argument that the subject from the registration of the certificate of sale without
property is exempt from forced sale because it is a family redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and purposes,
home deserves scant consideration. As a rule, the family spouses Fortaleza have waived or abandoned their right of
home is exempt from execution, forced sale or redemption.
attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code
explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts
secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding
the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its
foreclosure cannot be raised as a justification for opposing
the petition for the issuance of the writ of possession. The
said issues may be raised and determined only after the
issuance of the writ of possession. Indeed, "[t]he judge OLIVA-DE MESA v. ACERO
with whom an application for writ of possession is filed G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2010
need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure." The writ issues as a matter of FACTS:
course. "The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser
to have possession of the foreclosed property without Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They
delay, such possession being founded on the right of purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan,
ownership." To underscore this mandate, Section 8 of Act Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property,
No. 3135 gives the debtor-mortgagor the right to file a which became their family home. A year after, Arceli
petition for the setting aside of the foreclosure sale and for contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio
the cancellation of a writ of possession in the same Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel
proceedings where the writ was issued within 30 days of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment
after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. The of the loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank
court’s decision thereon may be appealed by either party, it was dishonored because the checking account was
but the order of possession shall continue in effect during already closed. Acero demanded payment. However,
the pendency of the appeal. Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint
for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the
"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus
question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the
the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial said property.
duty of the trial court. The same is true with its
implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero
paper judgment a result inimical to the mandate of Act No. was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to
3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately." Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years.
Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners
of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to

Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De
Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De
Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the
property. The MTC also stated that from the time a
Torrens title over the subject property was issued in
Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment
was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity of the
levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale
that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued

to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been
validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of
execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property, as a family home,

may be subject to execution in this case.

HELD:

YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to

execution.In general, the family home is exempt from
execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter.

For the family home to be exempt from

execution,distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what requirements
must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege.
JOANIE SURPOSA UY v. JOSE NGO, CHUA
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for G.R. No. 183965 September 18, 2009
purposes of exemption from execution, could be FACTS:
summarized as follows:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation against respondent. She alleged in her complaint
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit
of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be relationship with Irene Surposa and that the respondent
constituted as a family home either judicially or and Irene had two children namely, petitioner (Joanie) and
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil her brother, Allan. Respondent attended at the birth of the
Code in order to be exempt from execution; latter instructed that petitioner’s birth certificate be filled
out with the following names: “ALFREDO F. SURPOSA” as
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity father and “IRENE DUCAY” as mother. Alfredo F. Surposa
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically was the name of Irene’s father, and Ducay was the maiden
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from surname of Irene’s mother. However, respondent Chua
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as financially supported petitioner and Allan and even
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein; provided employment for her. He and Allan were
introduced to each other and became known in the
Third, family residences which were not judicially or Chinese community as respondent’s illegitimate children.
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the During petitioner’s wedding, respondent sent his brother
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative and
are considered as family homes by operation of law and Respondent’s relatives even attended the baptism of
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a petitioner’s daughter. Later, Respondent denied that he
family home under the Family Code. had an illicit relationship with Irene, and that petitioner
was his daughter.
Here, the subject property became a family residence
sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got Hearings then ensued and petitioner presented
married. There was no showing, however, that the same documentary evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family filiation. Petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for
home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against
Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, respondent. And latter filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the
the subject property became a family home by operation ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 barred
of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. by res judicata. A Compromise Agreement was made
The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the between the two parties prior where petitioner Joanie
subject property was a family home. declares, admits and acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship or filiation between petitioner and her brother
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home Allan on one hand and the respondent, in exchange the
and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, latter paid the Two Million Pesos each. The court ruled in
Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject favor of the respondent hence this appeal
property being a family home and its being exempted from
ISSUE:
execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to
exemption of the property from execution. judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on
cases enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines;

HELD:

Res judicata is based upon two grounds embodied in

various maxims of the common law, namely public policy
and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State
that there should be an end to litigation and that the
hardship of the individual that he should be vexed twice
for the same cause.
The requisites must also concur: (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.

The court rules held that res judicata does not exist in this
case. The compromise agreement is a contract whereby
the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. In
Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court
pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of DE ASIS v. COURT OF APPEALS
res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise GR NO. 127578 February 15, 1999
agreement is a judgment on the merits. A contract must
have requisites and no according to Article 2035 of the FACTS:
Civil Code, one of the requisites of such to be valid is that
the compromise must not pertain to the Civil Status of a Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de
person and the issue of Future Support and Future Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support
Legitime. The agreement in this case is intended to settle against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to
the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., provide support and maintenance despite repeated
whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. In demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989
exchange for petitioner and her brother Allan for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said
acknowledging that they are not the children of minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue
respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the
P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel
necessary consequence of said Compromise Agreement will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel
that petitioner also waived away her rights to future filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this
support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreement dated interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the
18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is case. He maintained that since the obligation to give
covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil support is based on existence of paternity between the
Code as espoused in the case of Advincula v. Advincula. It child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to
is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status claim support.
and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public
policy demands that there be no compromise on the status ISSUE:
and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of
the same, is a relationship that must be judicially Whether or not the minor is barred from action for
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence support.
or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the HELD:
Compromise Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between
petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement
effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial the nature of a compromise regarding future support
or full) of their respective prestations. which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s
contention for the lack of filial relationship between him
and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the
original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof
of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter
which the parties must decide but should be decided by
the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim
support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between
the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be
judicially established and declaration is vested in the
Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the
parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of
another action asking for the same relief (no force and
effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed
by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be
the subject of any compromise or waiver.
 AGUILAR v. SIASAT
G.R. 200169 January 28 2015

FERNANDEZ v. FERNANDEZ FACTS:

G.R. No. 143256 August 28, 2001
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the
Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on
FACTS: August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994,
respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of
Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia owns a land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer
parcel fo land located at Dagupan City which consists if 194 Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the
sq. meters and two-storey building constructed thereon. Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
They were childless but it was discovered that they bought titles).
a baby and was later identified as Rodolfo Fernandez. Jose
died and left the properties to his wife’s care. In June 1996, petitioner filed with the RTC of Bacolod a
civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
On August 31, 1989, a Deed of Extra-judicial partition
respondent and alleged that the former is the only son and
dividing and allocating to themselves the land and the
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that the
residential house. On the same day, she also executed a
petitioner discovered that the subject titles were missing,
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of appellant’s son.
and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan
But the nephews and nieces of the deceased of Jose could have stolen the same.
contested the Extra-judicial Partition of the estate and the
Deed of Absolute Sale because they alleged that it is In her Answer, respondent claimed that the petitioner is
motivated by greed and malicious acts to deprive plaintiffs, not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilars, but
and taking advantage of Generosa’s physical and mental mere stranger who has raised by the Aguilar spouses out
incapacity.The defendant conteded that he is their son and of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a
has been acknowledged during their lifetime. natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that
petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar
ISSUE: spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife,
Candelaria Siasat- Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
Whether or not Rodolfo is their legitmate child. share of the former; that upon the death of he latter, her
brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
RULING: issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen but
entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria who is her
First, the action filed was only to annul two documents and
aunt.
not to impugn one’s legitimacy. According to Article 166, it
is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the said
ISSUE:
child by; 1. It was physically impossible to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within 120 days of the 300 days, Whether the petitioner can not prove filiation to the
2. For biological and scientific reasons, he is not his child, Spouses Aguilar who is the owner of the land due to the
3. That if conceived through artificial insemination, the lost of his Certificate of Libe Birth and Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS
written authorization or ratification was made through Form E-1 is a mere proof of pen and continuous
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. possession.
The Court found that it is necessary to pass to the spouses HELD:
the relationship between them and Rodolfo for the
purpose of determining his legal right. Due to their The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
findings, Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing
Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission
the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa and Rodolfo is handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.puruant to concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved
Article 1105 of the New Civil Code. by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate
Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an although the mother may have declared against its
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”.
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in Having the best interest of the child in mind, the
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As
and no further court action is required. In fact, any a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then
recognition that does not require a separate action for impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.

CONCEPCION v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 123450 August 31, 2005 BELEN SAGAD ANGELES v. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
FACTS:
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa
Almonte, private respondent, was married in December Corazon Angeles-Maglaya, herein respondent, filed a
1989 and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in petition for letters of administrator and her appointment
December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a as administrator of the intestate estate of Francisco
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of Angeles. She claims that she is the sole legitimate heir of
bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, and together
sometime in December 1980, whom according to the with Belen Angeles, herein petitioner and 2nd wife of
husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Francisco, they are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and Franscisco died intestate in 1998 leaving behind 4 parcels
the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was of land and a building. Belen opposed this petition and
granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was prayed that she, instead of Corazon, be proclaimed the
nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the administrator of Francisco‘s estate. After establishing the
putative father of an illegitimate child”. She further circumstances of her marriage to Francisco(i.e. married
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from before a Judge and ratified two months later in religious
“Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an rites; Francisco presented himself to be single that time,
illegitimate child should use his mother’s surname. After Belen attacked the legitimacy of Corazon, saying that her
the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling birth certificate was not signed by Francisco. She has also
and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of failed to present the marriage contract between her
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa parents, Francisco and Genoveva. Furthermore, Belen
and Mario. averred that she and Francisco legally adopted Concesa
Yamat during their marriage. Trial court dismissed petition
ISSUE: for lack of proof of filiation as legitimate child, but the
Court of Appeals reversed this on the grounds that
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner‘s motion being a demurrer (under Sec 1, Rule
Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and not 33) thereby waived her right to present opposing evidence,
petitioner Gerardo. and that respondent has sufficiently established her
filiation.

HELD: ISSUE:
Considering that Theresa’s marriage with Gerardo was void Whether or not Corazon is a legitimate child of Francisco
ab initio, the latter never became the former’s husband and Genoveva.
and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
the child. Theresa’s contention was to have his son be HELD:
declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but
her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case, the The court ruled in the negative. Presumption of legitimacy
mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity may only be availed upon proof of the factual basis that
is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by law to child‘s parents were legally married and that his/her
question the son’s legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the conception of birth occurred during the marriage. In the
case at bar, there is no absolute proof of the decedent’s
marriage to respondent‘s mother Genoveva. No marriage
certificate or contract was offered in evidence. No
solemnizing officer was called to witness. Also, respondent
never questioned what would necessarily be a bigamous
marriage between Belen and Francisco. In fact, in her
petition, she alleged that petitioner is the ―surviving
spouse‖ of the decedent. Respondent also filed a petition
against the adoption of Consesa Yamat, alleging that as the
legitimate child of Francisco, she should have been notified
of the adoption proceedings. Since the lower court has
ruled with finality that she is not legitimate since no proof
has been given as to the marriage of her parents, this
petition has become moot and academic. On the matter of
administration, it should be noted that the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of decedent. Next
of kin refers to the heirs.

TEOFISTA BABIERA V. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL

G.R. NO.. 138693 June 15, 2000

FACTS:
JANICE MARIE JAO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PERICO Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court
JAO of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the
Civil Registry of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she
FACTS: is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26,
In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by her mother 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively. Presentacion alleged
Arlene filed a case for support against Perico Jao. It seems that a baby girl was delivered by a ‘hilot’ on September 20,
from evidence that Perico Jao was introduced to Arlene in 1996 on , in the house of the spouses, by their housemaid
a club. After which, they had sexual intercourse. Jao Flora Guinto, who without the knowledge of the parents of
accompanied Arlene to a hospital for a check-up, Jao paid the petitioner, caused the registration/recording of the
the rentals in the hospital. Arlene then gave birth to Janice facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
on August 16,1968. Arlene said that they had intercourse child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
on November 30, 1967 but Jao contested that they had Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena
consummated the act on January 18 1968. The NBI, upon Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature.
order by the court, conducted a blood grouping test which Presentacion, who was then fifteen, said that she
results say that Janice could not have been the offspring of witnessed the livebirth. The Regional Trial Court found the
Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado. petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Teofista
Guinto filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that 'the
ISSUE: petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses
Whether or not Perico Jao is the father of Janice Marie. Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant petition
HELD: pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance
The court ruled in the negative. There could only be with Article 170 of the Family Code.' The trial court denied
compulsory recognition when the child was conceived the motion to dismiss. The CA upheld the ruling of the RTC
during the time when the mother cohabited with the and held that Teofista is not the biological child of
supposed father. Janice should‘ve been conceived Hermogena Babiera.
between November 20, 1967 to December4, 1967
according to the court. However, Arlene herself said that ISSUE:
they only started to cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence, Whether or not the plaintiff has no legal capacity to file
Janice was NOT conceived during cohabitation. Moreover, instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code.
Arlene cohabited with 2 other men. Lastly, the blood
grouping test which showed that Janice could not have HELD:
been a child of Perico and Arlene is conclusive on non- The court ruled in the negative. The court held that
paternity. Hence, it cannot be said with certainty that respondent had the requisite standing to initiate the
Perico Jao is indeed the father. present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to
be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit, or the the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Article 171 of the for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close period limited by law. Furthermore, the court held that
reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances there was no clear, competent and positive evidence
in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child admitted or recognized his paternity.
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth
to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to
declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of
Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not
impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first p

JINKIE CHRISTIE DE JESUS ET. AL. v. THE ESTATE OF DIZON

G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001
WILLIAM LIYAO v. JUANITA TANHOTI- LIYAO ET. AL.
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002 FACTS:

FACTS: The case involves two illegitimate children who having

been born in a lawful wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as children of the decedent, Juan G.Dizon in order to enforce
represented by her mother Corazon, filed a petition their respective shares in the latter’s estate under the rules
ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a Jesus got married on August 23,1964 and during this
compulsory heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus
successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession andJinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a
and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his
the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased Subsequently in the following year, Juan Dizon died
were legally married but living separately for more than 10 intestate leaving behind a considerable amount of assets.
years and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment,
the deceased. On the other hand, one of the children of herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with
the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other
legally married and that her parents were not separated hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and
legally or in fact. legitimate children of the decedent Juan Dizon, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
ISSUE: sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for
Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
deceased. spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead
be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and
HELD: deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial court denied their
motion to dismiss as well as their motion for
The court ruled in the negative. Impugning the legitimacy reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to
of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in elevate the issue before the Court of Appeals but still the
exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the latter upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule that case be remanded for further proceedings.
which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be
the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or ISSUE:
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate off springs of the decedent.

HELD:

The court ruled in the negative. The filiation of illegitimate

children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2)an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no GERONIMO v. SANTOS
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does FACTS:
not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of consisting of one half of the parcel of land. Eugenio and
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the
establish the child’s acknowledgment. However, based on spouses and adjudicating to themselves the property. They
the records presented, they showed that petitioners were took possession and were able to transfer the tax
born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos,
of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
their father. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
filiation to the late Juan Dizon, petitioners would impugn document and recovery of possession against the
their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the
child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife could not bear a
child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was
Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972,
13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a
copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It had
irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen,
the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word
and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended
for the informant’s signature. Basing on the secondary
evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in
favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or

her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents,
even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid
adoption.

HELD:
No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of
respondent would show that it was tampered specifically
on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent
and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date
of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on
the document. The appellate court itself ruled that the
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the
date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the
signature of the informant are alterations on the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. To
be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any
evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth SPOUSES TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS
certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of
respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of FACTS:
regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the
evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August 1989 Angelita
sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent
respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both laundry job; she made Bienvenida wait while she went to
the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
child of her putative parents because she was allowed to the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and
bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October 1993, Bienvenida read
and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida went
estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal in 4years. She claims that her son was already named John
heirs. Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to
return the boy to her despite her demand. Bienvenida and
Of great significance to this controversy was the following Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus. Two
pronouncement: witnesses, Vasquez, who assisted in the delivery of
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez, brother of Tomas Lopez,
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not testified that his brother couldn‘t have possibly fathered
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile and that
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or an adopted son. Angelita claimed that she is the natural
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public mother of the child and at 42years old, she gave birth to
document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989. The birth of John
birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of Manila on
truthfulness of the statements made there by the August 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that since Angelita and
interested parties. her common-law husband couldn‘t have children, the
alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. The
minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity and
so the court granted petition for habeas corpus.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas Lopez

are one and the same person and is the son of the
petitioners.

HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative. Evidences purporting to paternal relationship between petitioner and private
the fact that John Thomas Lopez is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. were respondent was based on the testimony of the child’s
evident. Angelita could no longer bear children also, Tomas mother and the personal appearance of the child. The fact
Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. It was unusual that Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid
that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife 4 months after alleged presumption that a child born within that marriage is
birth. Additionally, the strong facial similarities between legitimate even though the mother may have declared
the child and Bienvenida also point out that they may well against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
be related. Lastly, clinical records presented by Vasquez adulterous. The trial court and CA should not have
were conclusive in proving such filiation. overlooked this fact.

CAMELO CABATANIA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CAMELO

REGODOS
G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004 ROSALINA B. ECETA v. MARIA THERESA VELL LAGURA
ECETA
FACTS: G.R. No. 157037 May 20, 2004

Controversy stems from a petition for recognition and FACTS:

support filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor
son, private respondent Camelo Regodos. Camelo Regodos Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac
was born on September 9,1982. Florencia testified that she Eceta sometime in 1926. During the subsistence of their
was the one supporting her child. Florencia recounted that marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired
after her husband left in 1981, he went to Escalante, several properties, among which is the disputed property.
Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as
hired as Camelo‘s household help. On January 2, 1982, his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his
Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate
at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Camelo daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory
promised to support her if she got pregnant. Florencia heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child,
claimed that she discovered she was carrying Camelo‘s Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before
child 27 days after their sexual encounter. On suspicion the RTC of Quezon City for "Partition and Accounting with
that Florencia was pregnant, Camelo‘s wife sent her home. Damages" against Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her
But Camelo instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-
where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, owner of the property. In her answer, Rosalina alleged that
assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to
City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent her exclusively.
Camelo Regodos. Camelo Cabatania alleges that the father
of the child is Florencia‘s husband and when they had sex, ISSUE:
she was already pregnant. Petitioner refused support,
denying the alleged paternity. He denied going to Bacolod Whether the certified photocopy from a photocopy of the
City with her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the
vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982 alleged filiation of the respondent as an "illegitimate
and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City. daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.

ISSUE: HELD:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its The court ruled in the negative. Notably, what was filed
application of Article 283 of the Civil Code on the and tried before the trial court and the Court of Appeals is
compulsory recognition and award of supporting favor of one for partition and accounting with damages only. The
respondent appellee Camelo Regodos. filiation, or compulsory recognition by Vicente Eceta of
Maria Theresa, was never put in issue. In fact, both parties
HELD: have already agreed and admitted, as duly noted in the
trial court’s pre-trial order, that Maria Theresa is Rosalina’s
The court ruled in the negative. Trial court and CA decided granddaughter. Notwithstanding, Maria Theresa
that the child was Camelo‘s. The trial courts finding of a successfully established her filiation with Vicente by
presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente
himself signed Maria Theresa’s birth certificate thereby Jane , however, is ineffectual, because under the law, the
acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, recognition must be made personally by the putative
Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.
over Maria Theresa.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SGT. MORENO BAYANI

G.R. No. 120894 October 3, 1996

FACTS:
RIVERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to
settle the case between them and private respondents,
but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint or
FACTS:
Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC
by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
In behalf of her minor child, Benedick Arevalo, her mother
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To
filed a complaint against defendants for compulsory
prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
recognition as the illegitimate child of their deceased
Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and
father. During trial, Mary Jane Dy-Chiao De Guzman, one of
the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes
the sister entered a compromised agreement with plaintiff
who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
whereby she is acknowledging the petitioner as the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
illegitimate son of her father and pay petitioner P6M as a
attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years
share in the estate of their deceased father. RTC granted
1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948were all
the compromised agreement. Meanwhile, the Dy Chiao
destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. After trial on the
Brothers represented by their uncle filed for annulment
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment on 11 July
of judgment and TRO for the writ of execution of judgment
1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to
and motion to dismiss. CA directed Mary Jane on the other
prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
hand to file a comment on the opposition of her uncle. In
Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates presented
her reply, she question assailed decision of RTC since the
have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’ inaction
illegitimate filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of
for a long period of time amounts to laches. Not satisfied,
a compromise agreement. She further alleged that the
petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which
parties thereunder did not recognize the validity of the
ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the
compromise agreement, as in fact she and the petitioners
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means
were exploring the possibility of modifying their
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," but
extrajudicial settlement. CA ruled in favor of the
affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring their right to
defendants, hence a petition.
recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise regarding filiation is
valid?
Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove
filiation.
HELD:
HELD:
The ruling of RTC based on the compromise agreement
executed by Mary Jane is null and void. Article 2035(1) of
The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the
the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the
petition and recognized and declared as children of the
civil status of persons shall be valid. As such, paternity and
late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to
filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must
Ignacia Cristobal. The Deed of Partition executed by
be judicially established, and it is for the court to
private respondents is declared not binding upon
determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in
will or agreement of the parties. Such recognition by Mary
the execution thereof. The subject property in the name of
private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar
distributed in accordance with the decision and is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of it appears that the accused is a married man. As
the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura. pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero," the rule
Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the as it is in accordance with law.
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:(1) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in
which the child’s name has been entered, common
reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL MANAHAN MA. THERESA ALBERTO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128157 September 29, 1999 G.R. No. 86639 June 2, 1994

FACTS: FACTS:

Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu On September 18, 1953, Maria Teresa R. Alberto was born
Canteen in Dagupan City. Manuel Manahan is the brother- to Aurora Reviva and Juan M. Albert, both were not
in-law of Josefina Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife married. Then sometime on September 18, 1967, the
Primadonna is the sister of Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and alleged father of Maria Teresita, Juan M. Alberto was
Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together assassinated and died intestate. His lawful wife, Yolanda R.
with the family of Josefina as Primadonna was then Alberto was appointed as administrator of his estate. After
pregnant. On 5 January 1995, at about two o’clock in the the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administrator’s
morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened Accounting approved, the proceedings were closed and
when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes terminated. On September 15, 1978, Maria Teresa R.
she saw accused Manuel Manahan as he immediately Alberto filed a motion to leave and to intervene as
placed himself on top of her. Manuel Manahan, by the use oppositor and to reopen the proceedings. The motion was
of force succeeded in having carnal knowledge over granted by the probate court. Upon presentation of
Teresita. Manuel then threatened Teresita’s life in case she evidences by both parties, the court was convinced that
will report such incident. Teresita went home to her Maria Teresa R. Alberto had been in continuous possession
parents in Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in of a natural child, thereby compelling the descendants’
her pregnancy. Afterwards, her parents learned about the heirs and estate to recognize her as such and allow her to
incident which led them to the filing of a criminal offense participate in the estate proceedings. However the Court
of rape against Manuel Manahan. On October 2 1995, she of Appeals reversed the probate court’s decision, finding
gave birth to a healthy baby girl and christened her no satisfaction in the degree of proof to establish Maria
Melanie Tibigar. Manuel was convicted by the RTC of Teresa R. Alberto as a child of the deceased.
Dagupan on the crime charged.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Maria Albert be legally be recognized
Whether or not the accused can be ordered to by the heirs of the estate of Juan Alberto as a natural child
acknowledge and provide support for Melanie Tibigar. of the latter.

HELD: HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. On the matter of The court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court
acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of recognized the intent and effort of Juan M. Alberto to
the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The introduce Maria to the family as one of his flesh and blood,
Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape by allowing Maria to use his family name and by giving her
shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, mother money to support her support and by openly
unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in introducing her to members of his family, relatives, and
every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, friends as his daughter. By the effect of the operation of
Article 285 of the Civil Code, Maria seeking a judicial petitioner not admitted filiation through
declaration shall be recognized as a natural child to enable contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
her to participate in the estate of her deceased father. The only other documentary evidence submitted by
Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no
probative value to establish
filiation to petitioner, the latter not having signed the
same. At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is
petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial
support to her which, without more, fails to establish her
claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best
interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful
of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits causeto
the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate
family.

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v. ARCHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Archbencel Ann Lopez, filed a complaint for CRUZ v. CRISTOBAL

recognition and support of filiation against petitioner Ben- G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
Hur Nepomuceno. She was represented by her mother,
Araceli Lopez. She assailed that she is the illegitimate FACTS:
daughter of Nepomuceno submitting as evidence the
handwritten note allegedly written and signed by Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
Nepomuceno. She also demanded for financial support deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat claim
along with filial recognition. On the other hand, that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Nepomuceno denied the assertions reasoning out that he Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On
was compelled to execute the handwritten note due to the the other hand, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose
threats of the National People’s Army. As the Regional Trial are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting
Court of Caloocan City ruled in favor of Archbencel, from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
Nepomuceno thereafter proceeded to file a demurrer to Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an
evidence which was granted by the trial court stating area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta.
insufficiency of evidence as the reason for dismissing the Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila. More than six decades
case against Nepomuceno. The case was elevated to the later, petitioners learned that private respondents had
Court of Appeals and the trial court’s decision was executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
reversed. and transferred its title to their names. A Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC
ISSUE: by petitioners against private respondents to recover their
alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To
Whether or not the filiation of Archbencel as illegitimate prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
daughter of Ben-Hur Nepomuceno is established by the Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and
handwritten note submitted as documentary evidence. the late Socorro were presented. In the case of Mercedes
who was born on January 31, 1909, she produced a
HELD: certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
attesting to the fact that records of
The court ruled in the affirmative. Arhbencel’s demand for birth were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear.
support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner The trial court rendered a judgment dismissing the case,
as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with
such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and
dependent on the determination of her filiation. birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the and that petitioners’ inaction for a long period of time
notarial agreement to support the child referred to in amounts to laches. Petitioners sought recourse in the
Herrera for it is not even notarized and Herrera instructs Court of Appeals which ruled that they were able to prove
that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal
putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable through "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has
special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court
barring their right to recover because of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not baptismal certificates are valid to prove

filiation.

HELD:

The court ruled in the affirmative. The Court granted the

petition and recognized and declared as children of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to
Ignacia Cristobal. The Deed of Partition executed by
private respondents is declared not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in
the execution thereof. The subject property in the name PERLA v. BARING
of private respondents is ordered to be partitioned and G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012
distributed in accordance with the decision and
appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of
the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides: “Art. 172. The FACTS:
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
Herein respondent Mirasol Baring and petitioner Antonio
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
Perla were neighbors. Eventually, they became
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of
sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However,
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
Antonio started to evade her.
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and Mirasol and her then minor son, Randy Perla (Randy), filed
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to
special laws. Any other means allowed by the Rules of support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys
Court and Special Laws, may consist of the child's Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in her and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified
which the child’s name has been entered, common that she and Antonio supplied the information in the said
reputation respecting the child's pedigree, admission by certificates. The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio
silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of to support Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.”

ISSUE

Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient proof

for the illegitimate filiation of Antonio

RULING:

Mirasol and Randys Complaint for support is based on

Randys alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for
Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be
established with sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled
that a high standard of proof is required to establish
paternity and filiation. An order for x xx support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be
issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, Mirasol and
Randy failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. The Certificate of Live Birth and baptismal
certificate of Randy have no probative value to establish
Randys filiation to Antonio since the latter had not signed
the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity RULING:
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records,
baptismal certificate may be considered a public presenting the proper and credible witnesses who assisted
document, it can only serve as evidence of the her in her child’s birth. Not to mention that it could be
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong
not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
paternity. Thus, x xx baptismal certificates are per se Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone
prove the same. ligation years before the alleged birth of the child and the
admission of Tomas’ own brother that Tomas was sterile
makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject
child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child
stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally
married which is false because even Angelita had admitted
she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt
the other data in said birth certificate.

TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001 test for identification and parentage testing. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
FACTS: establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes,
Petitioners are husband and wife with 6 children, the courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility.
youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. On August 1989 Angelita Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA
Diamante went to her house to fetch her for an urgent testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the
laundry job; she made Bienvenida wait while she went to prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
the market and left her 4-month-old son Edgardo, Jr. under
the care of Angelita. When she returned, both Angelita and
Edgardo Jr. were gone. On October 1993, Bienvenida read
in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan; Bienvenida went
to Bulacan and allegedly saw Edgardo, Jr. for the first time
in 4years. She claims that her son was already named John
Thomas Lopez. Bienvenida avers that Angelita refused to
return the boy to her despite her demand.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas

corpus. Two witnesses, Vasquez, who assisted inthe
delivery of Edgardo, Jr.; and Benjamin Lopez, brother of
Tomas Lopez, testified that his brother couldn‘t have
possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son. Angelita claimed that she
is the natural mother of the child and at 42years old, she
gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989. The
birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law
husband, Tomas Lopez, with the Local Civil Registry of
Manila on Aug. 4, 1989. The RTC concluded that since
Angelita and her common-law husband couldn‘t have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility. The minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity and so the court granted petition for
habeas corpus. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Who among the claimants is the true parent of the

subjected child?
 extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not incrimination but as part of object evidence
there is no violation of the right of self-incrimination in
DNA testing.

AGUSTIN v. COURT OF APPEALS

460 SCRA 315

FACTS: HERRERA v. ALBA

460 SCRA 197
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante
sued Martin‘s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. FACTS:
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo
November 10, 1999 The baby‘s birth certificate was Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later damages against petitioner (Rosendo Herrera) Rosendo
refused Fe‘s repeated requests for Martin‘s support Herrera denied that he is the biological father of
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also respondent‘s mother Respondent filed a motion to direct
denied having fathered the child Arnel is actually married the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the
and has a family of his own at the time he impregnated Fe testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who testified that
Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax the test is 99.99% accurate Petitioner opposed DNA
certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
of Martin‘s birth certificate were falsified. The CTC acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he testing violates his right against self-incrimination trial
was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 court and CA granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity
when it should have been 1964 July 23, 2002, Fe and testing.
Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing ISSUE:
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in
ISSUES: this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

Whether a complaint for support can be converted to a RULING:

petition for recognition; and whether DNA paternity
testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without The Court moved from the issue of according
violating petitioner‘s constitutional right to privacy and official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue
right against self-incrimination. of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis -
People v. Vallejo It all boils down to evidence and its
RULING: admissibility. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by statute
The petition is without merit. It is undisputed and even or the Rules of Court Evidence is relevant when it has such
admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130, which
question is whether such sexual relationship produced the governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides as
child, Martin. Being the first case where DNA testing was follows The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring
the focal issue the court examines the history of DNA special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
testing The court opened the possibility of admitting DNA shown to possess may be received in evidence This Rule
as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of
of Appeals In People where the rape and murder victim‘s DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on
DNA samples from the blood stained clothes of the collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any
accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the reasonable degree to establish the probability or
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an improbability of the fact in issue The court goes on to
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the discuss the Vallejo case on the caution with the method
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected employed in the actual testing DNA. In assessing the
to various chemical processes to establish their profile The probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
SC upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing consider, among other things, the following data: how the
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence samples were collected, how they were handled, the
since both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
Constitution is simply against the legal process of followed in analysing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed.

ESTATE OF ONG v. DIAZ

G.R. No. 171713 December 17, 2007
PEOPLE v. VALLEJO
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002 FACTS:

FACTS: This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and the
Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico Vallejo y Resolution of the same court dated March 1, 2006 denying
Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No.
heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil 70125. A Complaint for compulsory recognition with
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape- prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in Rosario, Joanne Rodjin Diaz, represented by her mother and
Cavite on July 10, 1999. The Information charging accused- guardian, Jinky Diaz, against Rogelio G. Ong before The
appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky
Homicide alleged: "That on or about the 10th day of July prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering defendant to
1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario, recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter,
Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of
of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-named accused, P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did support, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have fees in the sum of P100,000.00 and Granting plaintiff such
sexual intercourse with Daisy Diolola Y Ditalo, a nine-year other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the
old child against the latter's will and while raping the said premises. As alleged by Jinky in her complaint in November
victim, said accused strangled her to death." 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This
developed into friendship and later blossomed into love.
ISSUE: At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible on February 19, 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
as evidence. Panfilo V.Valdez.

RULING: ISSUE:

Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated remanded the case to the court a quo for DNA analysis
that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the
can still convict the accused considering that it death of Rogelio G. Ong.
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in
this rape-slay case. The Supreme Court also elucidated on RULING:
the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination
Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in
person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. favor of the said minor. Filiation proceedings are usually
Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a
distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship,
is collected from the scene of the crime or from the support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is
victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the biological father of the child. There are four significant
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative
association exists between the evidence sample and the defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to resemblance between the putative father and child. A child
various chemical processes to establish their profile. born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child
and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides: Article 167. The children shall be Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court
considered legitimate although the mother may have can issue a DNA testing order
declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
RULING:
Yes. Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
LUCAS v. LUCAS shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon
a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011 that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i)
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
FACTS:
testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
Herein petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This
certificate of live birth; (b) Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) commenced. This does not mean, however, that a DNA
his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the the hearing, the said conditions are established. In the case
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of of Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
several articles from different newspapers about proceduralaspects in a traditional paternity case which
petitioner, as a musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this and parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore called procedural aspects during trial, when the
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed parties have presented their respective evidence. They are
a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father. misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima faciecase, affirmative defences,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. This prompted
Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held
that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing
the instant petition is premature considering that a full-
blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met and held that
DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has
failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:
 inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which,
according to the petitioner, the latter do not have. The
court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine
the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is
for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters collateral and incidental to the
settlement of the estate, with the determination of the
capacity to be an heir included. As held in previous
decision, two causes of action may be brought together in
one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other
to claim inheritance.

GUY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

FACTS:
MARQUINO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of
G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-
respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died FACTS:
intestate. On June 13,1997 the minors were represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of
the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages
Makati City. Petitioner who is one of the children of the against Eutiquio. Bibiana was born on December 1926
deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single. It was
of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her
his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters since she was hired as domestic helper in their household
administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to at Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance
dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of
shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and
counsel. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has unequivocal acts of the father and his family. The
been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or Marquinos denied all these. Respondent was not able to
waiver stating that in exchange for financial and finish presenting her evidence since she died on March
educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done
her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent while Eustiquio was still alive. Her heirs were ordered to
from any and all liabilities.The lower court denied the joint substitute her as parties-plaintiffs.
motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed
ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of
of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue
waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the the action already filed by her to compel recognition and
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such
affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the
petition. said deceased parent.

ISSUE: ISSUES:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the a) Whether or not right of action for
inheritance. acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted
to the heirs and;
RULING: b) Whether or not Article 173 can be given
retroactive effect.
The Court ruled, no. Repudiation amounts to alienation of
property and parents and guardians must necessarily
obtain judicial approval. Repudiation of inheritance must RULING:
pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best
The Supreme Court ruled that right of action for the
interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the
acknowledgment as a natural child can never be
court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover,
transmitted because the law does not make any mention
the private-respondents could not have waived their
supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is
illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be purely a personal one to the natural child. The death of
putative father in an action for recognition of a natural
child cannot be continued by the heirs of the former since The appellate court held that the mere allegation that
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the respondent is an illegitimate child suffices. Rule 79 of the
putative parent himself. Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of
Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person. The Court, applying the provisions of the Family
retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it
will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since
Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the
to them at the time of death of their father. Hence, IAC
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e.,
decision was reversed and set aside. Complaint against
open and continuous possession of the status of an
Marquino is dismissed
illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the
death of the alleged father.

TAYAG v. TAYAG- GALLOR

G.R. No. 174680
GRANDE v. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
FACTS:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad A. Tayag-
Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of FACTS:
administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. The Herein respondent, Antonio filed a petition for judicial
respondent alleged that she is one of the illegitimate approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester Angeles. with the prayer for the correction or change of the
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a
behind two real properties both of which are in the public document acknowledged before a notary public
possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to
latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the establish the paternity of his children. Along with such
settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly petition, He also filed for a judicial conferment of parental
promised to give respondent and her brothers P100, authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of
000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. his children’s surname as Antonio.Respondent avers that
However, petitioner only gave each of them half the
amount she promised.
ISSUE:
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001, petitioner reiterated
Whether or not the respondent father could compel his
her sole ownership of the properties and presented the
illegitimate children to use his surname
transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also
averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was
acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his RULING:
illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot The Supreme Court ruled the father could not. the SC
be brought after the death of the putative father. To voided the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time, of Republic Act 9255 insofar as the IRR makes it mandatory
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative for the illegitimate child to use the recognizing father’s
defenses. The motion was denied. surname, since this was contrary to the express permissive
wording of Republic Act 9255 amending Art 176 which
states: Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname
ISSUE: and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Whether or not respondent’s petition for the issuance of
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of
of their father if their filiation has been expressly
action considering that respondent merely alleged therein
that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without recognized by the father through the record of birth
stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is
such by the latter.
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
RULING: filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation
a legitimate child. of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is

the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with
the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is

accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.

BRIONES v. MIGUEL
DELA CRUZ v. GRACIA GR. No. 156343 October 18, 2004
G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009

FACTS:

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a

FACTS:
Petition for Habeas Corpus to obtain custody of his minor
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth
child Michael Kevin Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the
because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography,"
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
did not include the signature of the deceased father,
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate.
and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father
The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.”
petitioner prays that the custody of his son Michael Kevin
Pineda be given to him as his biological father and has
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the ISSUE:
author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of Whether or not the natural father may be denied the
paternity. custody and parental care of his own child in the absence
of the mother who is away.

ISSUE: RULING:

Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is
the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent
as a recognition of paternity. Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines
explicitly provides that "illegitimate children shall use the
RULING: surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father
9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of admits paternity.
his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a Parental authority over recognized natural children who
pubic of private handwritten instrument. were under the age of majority was vested in the father or
the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it
there must be a signature by the putative father in the was awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both, the
private handwritten instrument. rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in
the latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing father and the mother.
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
 VERCELES v. POSADA
GR. No. 15978 April 27, 2007
FACTS:
REPUBLIC v. ABADILLA
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Verceles
GR. No. 133054 January 28, 1999
fetched Clarissa Posada from "My Brother‘s Place" where
the seminar was being held.Clarissa avers that he told her
FACTS: that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with their
companions who had gone ahead. When they reached the
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living place her companions were nowhere. After Verceles
together as husband and wife without the benefit of ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a
children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of comfort room where she stayed until someone knocked.
these two children, they were registered with the surname She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of
―Abadilla‖ and the name of their father was entered as the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as
―Herson‖ Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in the date and casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up
place of marriage of the children‘s parents appeared as barangay road and maintenance projects.
June 19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of Verceles, she went to
On February 5, 1997, Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay
Celestino and their two minor children, Emerson and projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to
Rafael,filed a petition for correction of the birth Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked
certificates.The petition was granted. The instant petition to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at
for review on certiorari is now being interposed by the the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he
Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper
court committed a reversible error when it allowed the floor.
deletion of the ―date and place of marriage of parents‖
from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla Instead, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in,
and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was
minors‘ surname from ―Abadilla‖ to ―Celestino.‖ unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime.
He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
ISSUE: development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
But again she kept the incident to herself.Sometime in
Whether or not the court committed an error in their January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said
ruling of the case. she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant.

RULING: ISSUE:

Yes. According to Article 176 "Illegitimate children shall use Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the
zthe surname and shall be under the parental authority of illegitimate child of petitioner was proven.
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each RULING:
illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of
a legitimate child.‖Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson The letters are private handwritten instruments of
and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother, petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s filiation under
Luzviminda Celestino. Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the arrays of
evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters,
pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and
irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s
illegitimate child.

Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented,

he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare
denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if every case to support the offspring. With the passage of
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged
negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and natural children and natural children by legal fiction was
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the eliminated and they now fall under the specie of
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by
matters. Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and
considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion
perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise
parental authority over his children, no ―further positive
act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for
the child‘s status.‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only
be ordered to indemnify and support the victim‘s child.
However, the amount and terms of support shall be
PEOPLE v. GLABO determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing
GR. No. 12924 December 7, 2001 in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

FACTS:
DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
One afternoon in October, 1991, 21-year old victim Mila G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002
Lobrico, a mental retardate, and her 11-year old sister,
Judith, were summoned by Justiniano Glabo, their FACTS:
maternal uncle, to his house. He told them to wash the
clothes of his wife. After the two sisters finished their Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
chore, accused-appellant ordered Judith to wash the illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
dishes in the nearby creek, about 200 meters away from cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and
his house. When Judith was gone, accused-appellant sister. A year after Dinah left for US where she found work
dragged Mila from the yard, where she was hanging the as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
washed clothes, into the house. He pushed her to the father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for
floor and made her lie down. He undressed the victim, and guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the
then he inserted his penis into her private organ and made petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah
push and pull motions. Mila was overpowered by accused- filed a petition for relief from judgment and the court set
appellant‘s brute strength. She shouted for help, but there aside the original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her
were no neighbors nearby. opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a
Suddenly, it started to rain hard, so Judith had to run back resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over
to the house for shelter. She went directly under the Gardin.
house, which was elevated 3 feet above the ground. While
underneath the house, she heard someone crying on the Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who
floor above. She looked up through the bamboo floor and modified their previous decision and granted Edgar
saw accused-appellant on top of her elder sister. Both custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to
were naked. Judith went to the kitchen, and she saw the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law.
accused-appellant‘s penis as he stood up and raised his As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
briefs. authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
The two girls went home silently. They did not say a word ISSUE:
about the incident. However, the victim became pregnant
as a result of the rape, and after six months her condition Whether or not Dinah is entitled to the custody of Gardin.
could no longer be concealed. Severino Lobrico, Mila‘s
father, confronted her, but she said nothing. It was her RULING:
sister, Judith, who told their father that accused-appellant
raped Mila. Severino brought Mila to the police and filed a No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
complaint for rape before the Municipal Trial Court. many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to
ISSUE: be for ―compelling reasons‖ for the good of the child. A
mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
Whether or not the offspring is illegitimate. below seven years of age for ―compelling reasons.
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
RULING: unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven
kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but
a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in exercise its discretion by disregarding the child‘s
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, illegitimate child using the alleged father‘s surname where
in which instance, custody may be given to the other the latter admitted paternity.
parent, or even to a third person.
RULING:
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did not No. Local Civil Registrar correctly refused. Illegitimate
err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime children must use the surname of their mother, regardless
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and fathers in their record of birth. Article 176 of the Family
thrust into a strange environment away from the people Code effectively repealed Article 366 of the Civil Code,
and places to which she had apparently formed an which gives a natural child the right to use the surname of
attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent his/her father where he/she has been acknowledged by
for her child is a question of fact to be properly both parents. Article 176 explicitly states that illegitimate
entertained in the special proceedings before the trial children shall use the surname of their mother, be under
court. her parental authority, and be entitled to support
inconformity with the provisions of the Family Code.

MOSSESGELD v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111455 December 23, 1998 SILVA v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 114742 July17, 1997

FACTS:
FACTS:
Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld , single, gave birth to a baby
boy on December 2, 1989. The presumed father is Eleazar Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T.
Siriban Calasan, a married lawyer. The father signed the Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without
birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating hat the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two
the child‘s name is Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. He also children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long
executed an affidavit admitting the paternity of the child. after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
The person in charge at the hospital refused to place the according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her
presumed father‘s surname as the child‘s surname in the acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion
certificated of live birth. Thus, petitioner himself submitted was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in
the certificate to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of fact, had never stopped working throughout their
Mandaluyong for registration. relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.

Again, the municipal treasurer, as officer in charge of the The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986,
local civil registrar‘s office, rejected the registration on the by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent
basis of the Civil Registrar General‘s Circular No. 4, which contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
provides that under Article 176 of the Family Code, children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988 shall for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
use the surname of their mother. Upon inquiring about the Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was
status of the status of the registration of his child, Calasan opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged
was furnished with a copy of the letter of the Civil in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
Registrar General denying the registration of the certificate affect the moral and social values of the children.
of live birth on the grounds that it is contrary to law.
Calasan, thereafter, filed a petition for mandamus with the ISSUE:
Pasig RTC to compel the local civil registrar to register the
Whether or not the Father can visit his children.
certificate of live birth of his illegitimate son using his
surname. His petition was denied. He filed a motion for RULING:
reconsideration and a motion to for leave to amend the
petition to substitute the child‘s mother as the petitioner. The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate
His motion to amen was granted, but motion for children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent
reconsideration was denied. He elevated the petition to and natural right of parents over their children. This right is
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC‘s decision personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents,
can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may have
ISSUE: won with the Supreme Court‘s upholding of his visitation
rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil
(the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from
Registrar to register thecertificate of live birth of an
immigrating to Holland with her two children.
 Rule 102, Sec. 1 makes no distinction between the case of
a mother who is separated from her husband and is
entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of
an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
of her child. The fact that Villar has recognized the
Christopher may be a ground for ordering him to give
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the
child. Under Article 213, FC, "no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 DE SANTOS v. ANGELES
FACTS: GR. No. 105619 December 12, 1995

Daisie David had an intimate relationship with her boss

Ramon Villar, who is married, and a father of 4 children, all FACTS:
grown-up. They first had a son, Christopher, who was
eventually followed by 2 more girls, Christine and Cathy On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia
Mae. The relationship became known to Villar‘s wife when Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein
Daisie took Christopher J, to his house and introduced him petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their
to Villar's wife. After this, Daisie‘s were freely brought by relationship became strained to the breaking point.
Villar to his house as they were even accepted by his legal Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
family. Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought
a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a
Then Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then 6 divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949. Antonio
years old, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private
but after the trip, Villar refused to give Christopher back respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his
and had enrolled him at the Holy Family Academy for the de factoseparation from Sofia. This union produced eleven
next school year. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less
on behalf of Christopher J. which the RTC granted, giving than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private
custody to Daisie and ordering Villar to give temporary respondent contracted a marriage in TagaytayCity
support of P3K a month to the 3 kids and to pay the costs celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981,
of suit. Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an
estimated value of P15, 000,000.00.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, hence this
petition. On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor in
ISSUE: connection with the settlement of her late husband's
estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent
Whether or not custody should be given to Daisie
was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself,
RULING: their ten surviving children, and petitioner. After six years
of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner
Yes. CA ruling reversed, custody granted to Daisie and decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime
Villar ordered to givetemporary support in the amount of in November 1987, she argued inter aliathat private
P3K, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an respondent's children were illegitimate. This was
appropriate action. Christopher J. is an illegitimate child challenged by private respondent although the latter
since at the time of his conception, his father Villar, was admitted during the hearing that all her children were born
married to another woman other than his mother. prior to Sofia's death in 1967.

As such, pursuant to Art. 176, FC, he is under the parental The court, declared private respondent's ten children
authority of his mother, who, as a consequence of such legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
authority, is entitled to have custody of him. And because along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs
she has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child of Antonio de Santos. Hence, she filed the instant petition
by Villar, Daisie is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only
corpus. natural children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and
sisters.
ISSUE:

Whether or not natural children by legal fiction be

legitimized.

RULING:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children

born outside wedlock of parents, who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, are natural. In other
words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified
to marry each other at the time of conception for him to
qualify as a "natural child."

In the case at bench, there is no question that all the ABADILLA v. TABILIRAN
children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio AM No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
de Santos were conceived and born when the latter's valid
marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That
private respondent and the decedent were married abroad FACTS:
after the latter obtained in Nevada,U.S.A. a decree of
divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint
for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this against Judge Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality,
jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge.
of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she
solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his
Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got
wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to
private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay, attention the charge on deceitful conduct, petitioner claims that the
must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with Priscilla be
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate
which now recognizes only two classes of children: affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to
legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight when in
fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction. fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as
legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already
elapsed since the disappearance of her wife in 1966 when
he married Priscilla hence the cohabitation was neither
bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970, based
on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 3 children can be considered

legitimate.

RULING:

The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be

considered legitimate since the time they were born, there
was an existing valid marriage between Tabiliran and
Teresita. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified
by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children

conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated. Reasons for this limitation: 1) The
rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would
be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional
rights; 3) There will be the problem of public scandal,
unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the
privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very
scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child.

REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS REPUBLIC v. TOLEDANO

GR. No. 100835 October 26, 1993 GR. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

FACTS: FACTS:

James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the UnitedStates of Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are
America, married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,who aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and
country.The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year
adopt theminor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2,
been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the 1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has
petition. The minors, aswell as their parents, gave consent been under the care and custody of private respondents.
to the adoption. The RTCrendered a decision granting the Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother,
petition. Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption
due to poverty and inability to support and educate her
ISSUE: son. The RTC granted the petition.

Whether or not the spouses can adopt the minors. ISSUE:

RULING: Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon.

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to RULING:

adopt under any of the exceptional cases, Lenita, however,
can qualify. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209,
185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines",
a condition that must be read alongtogether with Article private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred
184. Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184,
adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly
seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. As An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to
603 had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the
Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1) accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A.
or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant
of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot
jointly adaptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185
the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife.
spouses in accordance with this Code. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt,
except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks
to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185
requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a Whether or not the adoption is valid.
condition that must be read along together with Article
184. RULING:

Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Husband and wife

must adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate

child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of the other."

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and

Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's
child but her brother and sister. Accordingly, the law
should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain
rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be
REPUBLIC v. ALARCON VERGARA
applied with compassion, understanding and less severity
GR. No. 9555 March 20, 1997
in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes,
love, care and education for less fortunate children.
FACTS: Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating
Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
RegionalTrialCourtofAngelesCity to adopt Maricel R. Due however, that the law on the matter is amended, we
and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for
younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member adoption.
of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who
resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized
American. They have two children. Maricel and Alvin Due,
as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the
adoption.

The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure

question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not
qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. As
a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens.

Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore,

an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel
and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the
three afore quoted exceptions in the law. He is not a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's
legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife
her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a
Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized
American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding
him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does
not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino
citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general
rule that aliens may not adopt.

On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and

sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and
wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained
the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly
adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping
the optional character of joint adoption and making it now
mandatory.

ISSUE:
 IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC
LIM G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006
GR No. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

FACTS:
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural
married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children of Manuel Ramos, the former‘s brother, and
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The brother died, the children were left to their paternal
spouses registered the children making it appears as if they grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-
were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She married there and now has 2 children by her second
then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in marriage and no longer communicates from the time she
December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal
by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to grandmother passed away, the minors were being
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and gave their written consent for their adoption. A Social
Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending
old and already married and Michael was 18 years and for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological
seven months old. Michelle and her husband including mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
executed in an affidavit. voluntarily consented. However, petitioner failed to
present the said social worker as witness and offer in
ISSUE: evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any
Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adopt. adoption.
RULING: ISSUE:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, Whether or not a petition for adoption be granted without
petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall the written consent of the adoptee‘s biological mother
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present
in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall RULING:
jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word
―shall‖ signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is
parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological
spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by parents cannot be obtained. The general requirement of
Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to
that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must protect the natural parental relationship from
meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
requirements on residency and certification of the alien‘s opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant the manner of the proposed adoption. The written consent
to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of
effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
children for civic consciousness and efficiency and parent to his child requires that his consent must be
development of their moral mental and physical character obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
and well-being. terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to adopt. Moreover, abandonment means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the
child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others
is not such abandonment. To dispense with the Can minor children be legally adopted without the written
requirements of consent, the abandonment must be consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter
shown to have existed at the time of adoption. has abandoned them?

RULING:

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that
should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of
whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby
making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its
CANG v. COURT OF APPEALS ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries
trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban.‖
The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a
FACTS: thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence,
the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In reference to
were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on abandonment imports ―any conduct of the parent which
January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and
1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang relinquish all parental claims to the child.‖ It means
couple‘s relationship was undisturbed. Not long ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband‘s obligations of care and support which parents owe their
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend children.
of the Clavanos.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s
Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison, Anna conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic children as to constitute abandonment. Physical
Relations Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision estrangement alone, without financial and moral
approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While
providing that they agreed to ―live separately and apart admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. children. He maintained regular communication with his
Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole wife and children through letters and telephone. He used
custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t
reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times and abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution
places‖ to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
American wife and thus became a naturalized American Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby
citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and
remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse
petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This
filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private Decision is immediately executory.
respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were
financially capable of supporting the children while his
finances were ―too meager‖ compared to theirs, he could
not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority over his beloved children.‖

Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner

moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that
Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby
leaving custody of their children to private respondents.
On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
effect, relinquished custody over the children and,
therefore, such custody should be transferred to the
father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver
custody over the minors to petitioner.

ISSUE:
 submitted its report and recommendations on the matter
to the court hearing such petition. The Department of
Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it
finds, after such case study, that the petition should be
denied. Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was
issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of
adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the
aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the
DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its
natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively
directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases: (1) To
NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development,
thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the
pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
(2) To strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33
v. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN
of the aforesaid decree . . .
A.M. No. RTJ-96-136 July 18, 1997

FACTS: The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial

Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano,
Services and Development representatives in the
both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a
preparation and submittal of such case study. .The error on
verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor
the part of both respondent judge and social worker is
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. Respondent Judge Belen granted
thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the
the petition after finding that petitioner spouses were
proper course that respondent judge should have taken
highly qualified to adopt the child as their own, basing his
was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
decree primarily on the "findings and recommendation of
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that
the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and
the corresponding case study could have been accordingly
the adoptee on the other hand have already developed
conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the
love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have
necessary competence, more than that possessed by the
been demonstrated to the minor." On these
court social welfare officer, to make the proper
considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded
recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should
to dispense with trial custody. He asserted that the DSWD
never have merely presumed that it was routinely for the
findings and recommendations are contained in the
social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD
"Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report"
regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to
prepared by the local office of the DSWD through
exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination
respondent Elma P. Vedaña. However, when the minor
was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with
Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel
all the other requirements of the law.
clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive
parents in the United States, the DSWD found that it did By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have
not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and
that there was never any order from respondent judge for future of the child whose adoption was under
the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a
the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from legal device by which a better future may be accorded an
respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower unfortunate childlike Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case.
court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social
required reports for said minor's adoption. welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña,
arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively
ISSUE:
to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD
May a decree of adoption be granted on the basis of case in the preparation and submission of the relevant case
study reports made by a social welfare officer of the court? study reports, and not to make the same and recommend
by herself the facts on which the court was to act.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of
No. Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
provides in no uncertain terms that: No petition for more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M.
adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen,
Welfare, or the Social Work and Counseling Division, in Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of
case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No. 12 of this
a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare
as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for change of name being pleaded as two separate but related
violating Circular No. 12. causes of action in a single petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge erred in granting prayer

for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee
in a petition for adoption.

RULING:

No. Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the
legal effect of adoption: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters
and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and

obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee‘s surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of
REPUBLIC v. HERNANDEZ adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
GR No. 117209 February 9, 1996 the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the
first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
FACTS:
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer adopter a license to change the adoptee‘s registered
therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond
Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption. the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such
name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for
joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in
these petition should be conducted and pursued as two
the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change
separate proceedings.
in one‘s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
petition for change of name are two special proceedings requirements for a special proceeding for change of name
which, in substance and purpose, are different from and under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
are not related to each other, being respectively governed sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be
by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition for
contends that what the law allows is the change of the change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict
surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform compliance with all the requirements therefor is
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction
the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete
of the registered given or proper name, and since this special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own
would involve a substantial change of one‘s legal name, a set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of
petition for change of name under Rule 103 should any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or
accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate
remedy available under our remedial law system.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the
petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of
suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted
and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and
 expenses for them as well as for the Government and the
Courts."

ISSUE:

Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the present

case?

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the RTC correctly granted the
petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and
the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial
court, correctly did so. With regard to the second
assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the
Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in granting
private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name
of the child in the civil registry. Contrary to what the trial
court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to
this case and because its provision was not complied with,
the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the
correction of the name of the minor, is void and without
force or effect. The trial court was clearly in error in
holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS errors concerning the civil status of persons
G.R. No. 103695 March 15, 1996

FACTS:
IN RE: ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005
private respondents spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida
P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then
fifteen years old, who had been living with private FACTS:
respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old.
When private respondents were married on January 19, Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had
judgment be rendered: a) Declaring the child Michael C. been using her mother‘s middle name and surname; and
Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes; that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of parent. He prayed that Stephanie‘s middle name be
the child; and c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to Garcia, her mother‘s surname, and that her
changed to that of the petitioners and that the first name surname ―Garcia‖ be changed to ―Catindig‖ his surname.
this was mistakenly registered as ―MIDAEL‖ be corrected The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered
to ―MICHAEL." that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying
reiterating his contention that the correction of names that Stephanie be allowed to use the surname of her
cannot be effected in the same proceeding for adoption. natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower
As additional ground for his appeal, he argued that the RTC court denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for adoption holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
because in the notice published in the newspaper, the adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother
name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is as his middle name.
the name of the minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
ISSUE:
On January 23, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the decision of the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname
the case of Cruz v. Republic, invoked by the petitioner in of her mother as her middle name when she is
support of its plea that the trial court did not acquire subsequently adopted by her natural father.
jurisdiction over the case, was inapplicable because that
case involved a substantial error. Like the trial court, it held RULING:
that to require the petitioners to file a separate petition
for correction of name would entail "additional time and One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Whether or not oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to
Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557. intervene in this proceeding.

Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that RULING:

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
including the right to bear the surname of her father and interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or
her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein
fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of
mother should immediately precede the surname of the any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the
father. will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she
any claim against any portion of the estate because she is
not a co-owner thereof.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact

that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because
under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted
and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a
consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.

TEOTICO v. DEL VAL

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

FACTS: BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY

SYSTEM
Rene Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
Josefina Mortera. The testatrix Josefina Mortera as her
sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her FACTS:
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar
the CIF of Manila which was set for hearing after the Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
requisite publication and service to all parties concerned. government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of
was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried.
Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as
Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed an opposition
claim for death benefits.
to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition
alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was
intervene. The probate court, allowed the oppositor to no longer considered as the parent of John since the latter
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the petitioner.
share of Dr. Rene Teotico.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s
After the parties had presented their evidence, the minority.
probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to
probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. ISSUES:
Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to
be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's 1. Whether or not the death of
heirs by way of intestate succession. the adopter during the adoptee’s minority
results to the restoration of the parental
ISSUE:
authority to the biological parents of the latter.
 2. Whether or not Bernardina is considered
as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his
adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be
deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling
that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are
no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then
left to care for the minoradopted child if
the adopter passed away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the

restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law
on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological
parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental

authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is
still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such
a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological GERONIMO v. SANTOS

parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of G.R. No. 197099 September 28, 2015
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an FACTS:
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights consisting of one half of the parcel of land. Eugenio and
of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino
the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same executed a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the
relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the spouses and adjudicating to themselves the property. They
Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in took possession and were able to transfer the tax
the event of the untimely passing of declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos,
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. The Court held claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and
that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits document and recovery of possession against the
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since Emiliano denied the allegation that plaintiff was the only
the parent by adoption already died, then the death child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the
remaining beneficiary. child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth
certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document.
According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife could not bear a
child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was
Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972,
13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her
adoptive parents’ household. Eugenio was able to obtain a
copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It had
irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen,
the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the word
and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Daño was superimposed on the entry in the box intended
for the informant’s signature. Basing on the secondary
evidence of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child, both the RTC and CA ruled in
favor of respondent Karen

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or

her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents,
even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid
adoption.

HELD:

No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of

respondent would show that it was tampered specifically
on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent
and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date
of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on
the document. The appellate court itself ruled that the
irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the
date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable. The corroborating testimony of
Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the
signature of the informant are alterations on the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. To
be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any
evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth LAHOM vs. SIBULO
certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of
respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate. FACTS:
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary
evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to
respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial
the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she
child of her putative parents because she was allowed to averred. That despite the proddings and pleadings of said
bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from
and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for particularly her husband until the latter died, and even
and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the before his death he had made known his desire to revoke
estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an respondent's adoption, but was prevented by petitioner's
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal supplication, however with his further request upon
heirs. petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or
interest may pertain to respondent in the future.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following Respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the
pronouncement: utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her records with the Professional Regulation Commission
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and activities in connection with his practice of his profession,
even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in
birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts this city with only her household helps to attend to her,
contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son,
truthfulness of the statements made there by the but respondent remained indifferent and would only come
interested parties. to Naga to see her once a year. for the last three or four
years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila
became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those
were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner
which is not expected of a son.

That herein respondent has recently been jealous of

petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they would find
time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only
motivated by their desire for some material benefits from
petitioner.

That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in

a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him
and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings,
knowing that after all respondent's only motive to his
adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the
properties of herein petitioner and her late husband,
clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463
for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her
love and affection towards respondent, rendering the
decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child
of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for
which reason there is no more basis for its existence,
hence this petition for revocation,"

ISSUE:
SUSAN LIM-LUA v. DANILO Y. LUA
Can the adoption be rescinded? G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 05, 2013

RULING: FACTS:

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an On September 3, 2003, petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly respondent Danilo Y. Lua
turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed
two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00
lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in
the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, as monthly support, citing respondent's huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and
that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, Judge
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order granting support
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
pendente lite. From the evidence already adduced by the
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds
parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00)
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One
hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for
of his estate.
medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the
operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon
the conduct of such operation. The amounts already
extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable
act of defendant, should be continued by him considering
the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is
demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said
support but is payable only from the date of judicial
demand.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting
that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support
considering that she does not maintain for herself a
separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and
well-being in accordance with family's social and financial is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or
standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court other documentary evidence appearing in the record. In
as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it petitioner and her two children was determined after due
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the
not having considered the needs of the respondent. parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was
reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, nullified pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was
and set aside and instead a new one is entered to pay intended primarily for the sustenance of petitioner and her
private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house
P115,000.00 helpers, and other household expenses.
ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Petitioner's testimony also mentioned the cost of regular
PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of therapy for her scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears
of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond
children; doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence,
education, transportation, health/medical needs and
The appellate court said that the trial court should not recreational activities of his children, as well as those of
have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of housewife.
the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and
the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as
It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is
the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. no controversy as to its sufficiency and
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions
denied by the Court of Appeals. made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.

The amounts already extended to the two (2) children,

being a commendable act of petitioner, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources
ISSUES: at his disposal.

Whether or not the honorable court erred in ordering the

deduction of the amount of php2,482,348.16 plus
946,465.64, or a total of php3,428,813.80 from the current
total support in arrears of the respondent to the petitioner
and their children.
LAM v. CHUA
RULING:
G.R. No. 131286 March 18, 2004
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the FACTS:
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana
recipient. Such support comprises everything
Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
City (Branch 109). Adriana alleged in the petition that: she
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
and Jose were married on January 13, 1984; out of said
the financial capacity of the family.
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul Chua Lam; Jose
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of essential marital obligations of marriage but said
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time incapacity was not then apparent; such psychological
during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon incapacity of Jose became manifest only after the
verified application of any of the parties, guardian or celebration of the marriage when he frequently failed to
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support go home, indulged in womanizing and irresponsible
pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final activities, such as, mismanaging the conjugal partnership
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not of gains; in order to save what was left of the conjugal
need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can properties, she was forced to agree with Jose on the
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains and the
to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence which separation of present and future properties; said
may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It agreement was approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Branch 149) in a Decision dated February 28,
1994; they had long been separated in bed and board; they
have agreed that the custody of their child will be with her, ISSUE:
subject to visitation rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the
marriage between her and Jose be declared null and void Whether or not as the natural father, may be denied the
but she failed to claim and pray for the support of their custody and parental care of his own child in the absence
child, John Paul. of the mother who is away.

ISSUE: RULING:
Should Jose give the corresponding support? Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has
preferential right over their minor child. He insists,
RULING:
however, that custody should be awarded to him
The Pasay RTC should have been aware that in determining whenever she leaves for Japan and during the period that
the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should she stays there. In other words, he wants joint custody
be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver over the minor, such that the mother would have custody
and the necessities of the recipient, pursuant to Articles when she is in the country. But when she is abroad, he -- as
194, 201 and 202 of the Family Code. It is incumbent upon the biological father -- should have custody. According to
the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence petitioner, Loreta is not always in the country. When she is
presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity abroad, she cannot take care of their child. The undeniable
or resources of both parents who are jointly obliged to fact, he adds, is that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
support their children as provided for under Article 195 of evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated May 28,
the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for 2001, granting to her sister temporary custody over the
the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, minor. At present, however, the child is already with his
education and transportation of the child. mother in Japan, where he is studying,9 thus rendering
petitioner‘s argument moot. While the Petition for Habeas
Corpus was pending before the CA, petitioner filed on July
30, 2002, an "Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure Order,"
alleging therein that respondents were preparing the
travel papers of the minor so the child could join his
mother and her Japanese husband. The CA denied the
Motion for lack of merit. Having been born outside a valid
marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the
Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that
"illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code." This is
the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.
BRIONES v. MIGUEL
G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

FACTS: QUIMIGUING v. ICAO

G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel FACTS:
Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain
custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. On April Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close
include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
of the respondents. A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with
this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
produce before this Court the living body of the minor without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant
Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o‘clock in despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
the afternoon. The petitioner alleges that the minor consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with for support at P120 per month, damages and attorney‘s
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of
The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since
minor child be given to her and invokes Article 213, the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines ISSUE:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen‘s
complaint.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that a conceive child,

although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations
and be accepted by those persons who will legally
represent them if they were already born as prescribed in
Article 742. Lower court‘s theory on article 291 of the civil
code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.
Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being
a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his
lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen‘s
rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the
damage caused. Thus, the orders under appeal are
reversed and set aside., the case was remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this
decision. Costs against appellant Felix Icao.
 FRANCISCO v. ZANDUETA
G.R. No. 43794 August 9, 1935

FACTS:

Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and

curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for
support against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate
case, alleging that he is the latter‘s acknowledged son and
as such is entitled to support. Luis denied the allegation,
claimed that he never acknowledged Eugenio as his son
and was not present at his baptism and that he was
married at time of Eugenio‘s birth. Despite the denial of
paternity however, respondent judge Francisco Zandueta
issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension,
pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was
denied, hence the writ for certiorari. Praying to have the
trial transferred, counsel of herein petitioner, in
compromise, agreed that his client would pay the monthly
pension during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support

without first establishing his status as petitioner‘s son.

RULING:

No. The answer as to whether or not petitioner‘s counsel

really agreed to have him pay the pension during the
case‘s pendency is not necessary to the solution of the
case. As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil
status must be proven first before a right of support can be
derived. The Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to
prove, through his guardian ad litem, his civil status as the
petitioner‘s son. As such, no right of support can be given
because the very civil status of son ship, from which the
right is derived, is in question. It held that there is no law
or reason which authorizes the granting of support to a
person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a
person who establishes by legal proof that he is such son.
In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption
of law, while in the former there is no presumption, there
is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a
simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an
established right recognized by a final judgment.
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction
to order for the monthly support in light of herein private
respondent‘s absence of aforementioned status.
 SANTERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

FACTS:

Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and

Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa
namely, Princesita, Federico and Willie (herein petitioners).
He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely,
Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, and Miguel (herein private
respondents). These children are all natural children since
neither of their mothers was married to their father. In
1973, Pablo Santero died. During the pendency of the
administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving
the estate of the late Pablo Santero, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning
the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly
without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private
respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials
and subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of
the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision
on the ground that private respondents were no longer
studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that
all of them except for Miguel are gainfully employed, and
the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the
said expenses. Before the Supreme Court could act on
saod petition, the private respondents filed another
motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite which included
Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as
children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz,
praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the
seven children as their allowance from the estate of their
father. This was granted by the CFI-Cavite. Later on, the
CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma
Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a
clarification or explanation as to the additional three
children included in the said motion. She said in her
clarification that in her previous motions, only the last four
minor children were included for support and the three
children were then of age should have been included since
all her children have the right to receive allowance as
advance payment of their shares in the inheritance of
Pablo Santero. The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the
administrator to get back the allowance of the three
additional children based on the opposition of the
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?

RULING:

Yes, they are entitled. Being of age, gainfully employed, or

married should not be regarded as the determining factor
to their right to allowance under Articles 290 and 188 of
the New Civil Code. Records show that a hearing was
made. Moreover, what the said court did was just to follow
the precedent of the court which granted previous
allowance and that the petitioners and private
respondents only received Php 1,500.00 each depending
on the availability of funds.
 GOTARDO v. BULING Support consists of everything indispensable for
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
FACTS: capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased
support 460endent lite, claiming that the petitioner is the proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means
denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. For the parties‘ of the person obliged to support.
failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated
the pre-trial proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued. The
respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo
Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed
that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin,
Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as
accounting supervisor. The respondent responded by filing
a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for
breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner
and the respondent amicably settled the case. The
respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9,
1995. When the petitioner did not show up and failed to
provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a
letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and
support for their child. When the petitioner did not answer
the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for
compulsory recognition and support 460endent lite. The
petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself.
He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first had
sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for
twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was
informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. During
the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent‘s
motion, granted a P2, 000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should provide support.

RULING:

One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,

through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws. We have held that such other proof of
one‘s filiation may be a ―baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree,
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Since filiation is beyond question, support
follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
 MABUGAY-OTAMIAS v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 189516 June 8, 2016

FACTS:

Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Retired Colonel Francisco

Otamias were married in June16, 1978. They had 5
children. Due to the alleged Francisco’s infidelity they
decided to separate and their children were all in the
custody of their mother.Edna, then, filed a complaint
against Colonel Francisco before the Provost Marshall
Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. She
demanded that they be entitled to75% of the retirement
benefits of Col. Otamias as their monthly support since the
children were all living with her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Colonel Otamias' pension benefits can be

executed upon for the financial support of his legitimate
family

RULING:

The Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law

between the parties, and its provisions should be
respected in the absence of allegations that Colonel
Otamias was coerced or defrauded in executing it. The
general rule is that a contract is the law between parties
and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.The Deed of Assignment executed
by Colonel Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in
accordance with the provisions on support in the Family
Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not
to recognize its validity.Further, this Court notes that the
AFP PGMC granted the request for support of the wives of
other retired military personnel in a similar situation as
that of petitioner in this case. Attached to the Petition are
the affidavits of the wives of retired members of the
military, who have received a portion of their husbands'
pensions.Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638
provides Section 31. The benefits authorized under this
Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax
whatsoever;neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or
conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or
separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any
benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man
or his survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be
applied to settle such accountabilities.
 LACSON v. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 August 28, 2006

FACTS:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban

Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V.
Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born
on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a
year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner
left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing
mother and children to seek, apparently for financial
reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed
with Lea‘s mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her
(Lea‘s) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban.
After some time, they rented an apartment only to return
later to the house of Lea‘s mother. As the trial court aptly
observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994,
or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one
dwelling place to another not their own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give support.

RULING:

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide

support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is
his threshold submission, however, that he should not be
made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no
previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having
been made by the respondents. He invokes the following
provision of the Family Code to complete his point: Article
203 of the Family Code, provides that “The obligation to
give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date
of judicial or extrajudicial demand.” To petitioner, his
obligation to pay under the afore quoted provision starts
from the filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only
from that moment can it be said that an effective demand
for support was made upon him.
 LIM v. LIM
G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

FACTS:

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward

Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three
children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at
the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City,
together with Edward‘s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and
her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward‘s family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary of
P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income. On 14 October 1990, Cheryl
abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in
house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court
described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for
herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The
trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of
P6,000 pendente lite.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to

provide support to respondents.

RULING:

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of

ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is
beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they
limit their petition to the narrow question of when their
liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended,
on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their
liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the children‘s minority. Because at the
time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children,
petitioners submit that the obligation to support the
latter‘s offspring ends with them.
 VERCELES v. POSADA convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007 merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
FACTS: who testify on affirmative matters.
MANGONON v. COURT OF APPEALS
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), young lass G.R. No. 125041 June 30, 2006
from the barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in
1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. FACTS:
Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas
and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon
accepted petitioner‘s offer and worked as a casual filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a
employee in the mayor‘s office starting on September 1, Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with
1986. From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati.
Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly
seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in
Hotel. On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21
petitioner fetched Clarissa from "My Brother‘s Place" years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old.
where the seminar was being held. Clarissa avers that he As the marriage was solemnized without the required
told her that they would have lunch at Mayon Hotel with consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
their companions who had gone ahead. When they annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile
reached the place her companions were nowhere. After and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or
petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous within seven months after the annulment of their
advances on her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina.
inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her
knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica
following-up barangay road and maintenance projects. and Rina were about to enter college in the United States
of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her
ISSUE: daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally
settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Whether or not there is proof of filiation. Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the
Long Island University and Western New England College.
RULING: Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for education because of the following: i) The average annual
establishing filiation. They are as follows: Art. 172. The cost for college education in the US is about
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the US$22,000/year, broken down as follows: Tuition Fees
following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil US$13,000.00 Room & Board 5,000.00 Books 1,000.00
register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of Yearly Transportation & Meal Allowance 3,000.00 Total
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private US$ 22,000.00 Or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent both Rica and Rina
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and ISSUE:
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Whether or not Federico is obliged to provide support
special laws. Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same RULING:
evidence as legitimate children.The action must be
brought within the same period specified in Article 173, In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco
except when the action is based on the second paragraph could not avail himself of the second option. From the
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought records, we gleaned that prior to the commencement of
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The letters, one this action, the relationship between respondent
of which is quoted above, are private handwritten Francisco, on one hand, and petitioner and her twin
instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aiza‘s daughters, on the other, was indeed quite pleasant. The
filiation under Family Code. Further, the array of evidence correspondences exchanged among them expressed
presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one
testimonies, to us, is convincing, and irrefutable evidence another‘s well-being. The photographs presented by
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner‘s illegitimate child. petitioner as part of her exhibits presented a seemingly
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, however,
he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and
denials are telling. Thus, if unsubstantiated by clear and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the
relationships among the parties had certainly been
affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the
fact that those who they had considered and claimed as
family denied having any familial relationship with them.
Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving
back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them. Finally, as to the amount of support
pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of
the law mandating the amount of support to be
proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and
to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle,
we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount
of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount
given his various business endeavors.
 DE GUZMAN v. PEREZ abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
G.R. No. 156013 July 25, 2006 conditions prejudicial to the child‘s development including
those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 "but not covered by
FACTS: the Revised Penal Code." The "neglect of child" punished
under Article 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as
Petitioner and private respondent Shirley F. Aberde "indifference of parents") penalized under the second
became sweethearts while studying law in the University paragraph of Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence,
of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were interrupted when private it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
respondent became pregnant. She gave birth to
petitioner‘s child, Robby Aberde de Guzman, on October 2,
1987. Private respondent and petitioner never got
married. In 1991, petitioner married another woman with
whom he begot two children. Petitioner sent money for
Robby‘s schooling only twice the first in 1992 and the
second in 1993. In 1994, when Robby fell seriously ill,
petitioner gave private respondent P7,000 to help defray
the cost of the child‘s hospitalization and medical
expenses. Other than these instances, petitioner never
provided any other financial support for his son. In 1994, in
order to make ends meet and to provide for Robby‘s
needs, private respondent accepted a job as a factory
worker in Taiwan where she worked for two years. It was
only because of her short stint overseas that she was able
to support Robby and send him to school. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all her
savings to provide for her and Robby‘s needs. The child‘s
continued education thus became uncertain.

ISSUE:

May a parent who fails or refuses to do his part in

providing his child the education his station in life and
financial condition permit, be charged for neglect?

RULING:

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any

parent. Liability for the crime does not depend on whether
the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends
to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect
corresponds to the failure to give the child the education
which the family‘s station in life and financial condition
permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself
from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other
parent‘s faithful compliance with his or her own parental
duties. Petitioner‘s position goes against the intent of the
law. To allow the neglectful parent to shield himself from
criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all
questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. However, while petitioner can be indicted
for violation of Article 59(4) of PD 603, the charge against
him cannot be made in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 MABUGAY-OTAMIAS
which provides: SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, v. REPUBLIC
Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to G.R No. 189516 June 08, 2016
the Child’s Development. (a) Any person who shall commit
any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be FACTS:
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s
development including those covered by Article 59 of PD Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Colonel Francisco B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision married on June 16, 1978 and had five (5) children. On
mayor in its minimum period. The law expressly penalizes September 2000, Edna and Colonel Otamias separated due
any person who commits other acts of neglect, child to his alleged infidelity. Their children remained with Edna.
On August 2002, Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their
Colonel Otamias before the Provost Marshall Division of son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Edna demanded the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.
monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias' Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again
retirement benefits. On February 26, 2003, Colonel the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner
Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment where he waived also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
50% of his salary and pension benefits in favor of Edna and violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
their children. The Deed of Assignment was considered by support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court
the parties as a compromise agreement. The agreement dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
was honored until January 6, 2006 until AFP decided not to information do not constitute an offense with respect to
honor the agreement between Colonel Otamias and his the accused, he being an alien.
legitimate family. Edna, on behalf of herself and Jeffren M.
Otamias and Jemwel M. Otamias (Edna, et al.), filed before ISSUES:
the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro, Misamis
Oriental an action for support, docketed as F.C. Civil Case Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
No. 2006-039. minor child under the Philippine law?

ISSUES: HELD:

Whether or not Colonel Otamias’ legitimate family is Yes. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
entitled for support. Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law,
HELD: as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does
Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1638 provides that not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
the benefits authorized under this Decree, except as Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party
provided herein, shall not be subject to attachment, who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the
neither shall they be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national
third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
this Decree has unsettled money and/or property pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and
other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
survivors under this Decree may be withheld and be impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
applied to settle such accountabilities. Under Section 31, child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits are exempt from jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
execution. Retirement benefits are exempt from execution judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
so as to ensure that the retiree has enough funds to alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be
support himself and his family. applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law,
or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying
the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be
of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.

DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM

G.R No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS: LACSON v. LACSON

GR No. 150644 August 28, 2016
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named FACTS:
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V.
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson Not long after the
birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in FACTS:
Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to
seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his
else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter,
Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an granddaughters,On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.On
apartment only to return later to the house of Leas June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was
mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will
another not their own. and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea Ruiz.
did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying
initially on his commitment memorialized in a note ISSUES:
dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters.
As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his Whether the probate court, after admitting the will to
promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having probate but before payment of the estate’s debts and
him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance
occasionally gave their children meager amounts for from the funds of the estate for the support of the
school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the
part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all
small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St.
Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when RULING:
Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint
against Edward for support before the Regional Trial 1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s
graduate. Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to “widow and
averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully children” and does not extend it to the deceased’s
employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.
not provided them support since 1976. Edward alleged 2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet the obligations above-mentioned has been made or
their needs. Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a
1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial payment of said obligations within such time as the court
court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, directs.
ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a 3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the
specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, possession and management of the real and personal
of support in arrears. properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised “so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
ISSUE: debts and expenses of administration, He cannot
unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents’
Whether or not a third party may furnish a support. properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting
an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
HELD: properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the
Article 207 of the Family Code provides that when the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are
person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any propriety and justness.
third person may furnish support to the needy individual,
with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to
give support. Mention may also be made that,
contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between
the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract an
equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching
himself at the expense of another.

ESTATE OF RUIZ v. CA REYES v. INES-LUCIANO

G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996 GR No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
FACTS:
SILVA v. CA
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a
complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel FACTS:
J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the
defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff. The plaintiff Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the
asked for support pendente lite for her and her three benefit of marriage and they had two children. A rift
children. The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the surfaced and the two eventually separated. They agreed
application for support pendente lite on the ground that that Carlitos would have the children in his company on
his wife had committed adultery with her physician.The weekends. Claiming that Suzanne broke the
application for support pendente lite was set for hearing agreement, Carlitos filed a petition for custodial rights over
and submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings the children before the RTC. Suzanne opposed, alleging
and the documents attached thereto by the parties. The that Carlitos often engaged in "gambling and womanizing"
respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 which she feared could affect the moral and social values
granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente lite in the of the children.
amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June The RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights
1976.The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court
reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during however explicitly stated that in no case
the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she should Carlitos take the children out without the written
entitled, the amount awarded was excessive. The consent of Suzanne. Suzanne appealed. In the meantime,
respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to she got married to a Dutch national and eventually
P44,00.00 a month in an order dated June 17, 1977. immigrated to Holland with her children. The CA reversed
the ruling of the RTC and denied the Carlitos any visitorial
ISSUE: rights. Carlitos appealed.

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for support regardless ISSUE:

of a pending case.
Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?
HELD:
HELD:
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence
on the alleged adultery of his wife when the action for No. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of
legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. There
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough
noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents in recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents
their comment, the "private respondent was not asking over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code
support to be taken from petitioner's personal funds or expresses that family relations include those between
wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—which, was parents and children. Article 209, in relation to Article 220,
her documentary evidence. It is, therefore, doubtful of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
whether adultery will affect her right to alimony pendente parents and those exercising parental authority to, among
lite. The contention of the petitioner that the order of the other things, keep children in their company and to give
respondent Judge granting the private respondent support them love and affection, advice and counsel,
pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not companionship and understanding. The
supported by the allegations of the complaint for legal Constitution itself speaks in terms of the natural and
separation and by competent evidence has no merit. The primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. There
complaint or legal separation contains allegations showing is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions
that on at least two occasions the defendant, petitioner are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate
herein, had made attempts to kill the private respondent. relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due laws on support and successional rights, by way of
deliberation before fixing the amount of support pendente examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of
lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month. In determining the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate
the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in
not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that
being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the
amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to
enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the parents who are not given custody of their children. The
other, in view of the merely provisional character of the allegations of respondent against the character of
resolution to be entered. Mere affidavits may satisfy the petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
court to pass upon the application for support pendente sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father.
lite. It is enough the the facts be established by affidavits The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that
or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with Concerned citizens and the Catholic Church had petitioned
petitioner is but the product of respondent's for the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Bill.
unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral
persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble ISSUES:
and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of
seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the Whether or not right to privacy is impaired.
deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children
of tender ages. It seems unlikely that petitioner would HELD:
have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a
parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were Yes, Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which
only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the
case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal
precautionary measure, in no case can petitioner take out content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
the children without the written consent of the mother. goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as
the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a)
the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family.

TONOG v. CA
G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002

FACTS:

Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her

illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and
sister. A year after Dinah left for US where she found work
as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
IMBONG v. OCHOA, JR. father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the
petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian. Dinah
FACTS: filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set
aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had
resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over already filed a similar petition for guardianship. The trial
Gardin. Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove
who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian. The subsequent
custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to attempt for reconsideration was likewise dismissed. On
the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers RTC.
parental authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimate minor. ISSUE:

ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor

Vincent should be his guardian?
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
RULING:
HELD:
Article 211 of the Family Code provides that the father and
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn the persons of their common children. In case of
away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child. A there is a judicial order to the contrary. Indeed, being the
mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.” corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. The
Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, ruling in Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals is reiterated in
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, this case that of considerable importance is the rule long
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and accepted by the courts that ‘the right of parents to the
affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights
years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and
the court is not bound by that choice. The court may sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, derives from the nature of the parental relationship.
in which instance, custody may be given to the other Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only
parent, or even to a third person.Bearing in mind that the be realized by way of substitute parental authority
welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, SC find pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code which states
that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father that in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
to retain in the meantime parental custody over parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from the surviving grandparent. The ruling in Santos, Sr. v. Court
her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange of Appeals is reiterated herein that the law vests on the
environment away from the people and places to which father and mother joint parental authority over the
she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, persons of their common children. In case of absence or
whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question death of either parent, the parent present shall continue
of fact to be properly entertained in the special exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’
proceedings before the trial court. death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Hence, actual custody of and exercising parental authority
over minor Vincent is vested on the natural mother.

VANCIL v. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001
FOUZIY ALI BONDAGJY v. SABRINA ARTADI
FACTS: G.R. No. 140817 December 7, 2001

Petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy FACTS:

serviceman of the United States of America who died in
the said country on December 22, 1986. During his Petitioner Fouziy Ali Bondagjy and respondent Sabrina
lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Artadi were married according to Islamic Law.
Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Unfortunately, the marital union turned sour after a few
Petitioner commences before the RTC a guardianship years. On the ground of neglect or failure to provide
proceeding over the persons and properties of minors support for her and the family, the Artadi filed a complaint
Valerie, 6 years old and Vincent, 2 years old. She was for divorce by faskh before the Third Sharia Circuit Court at
appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and Isabela, Basilan which was dismissed since the grounds by
estate of said children. The natural mother of the minors, which she relied upon do not exist and that she does not
herein respondent, submitted an opposition to the subject reside in Zamboanga City. It was also counter argued he
does not neglect his wife and children, these are but bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed
allegations without evidence to support such claims. After upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, she
almost two years, the Artadi filed for declaration of nullity reasoned out that her son just died and to assuage her
of marriage, custody and support before the Regional Trial grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at
Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City. The petition least compensate for the loss of her late son. Maria
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the parties since got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to San
they were Muslims at the time of the marriage, hence, Francisco, California, USA, joining her new husband. Maria
regular courts cannot acquire jurisdiction and on basis of then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her
res judicata because of the previous dismissal by Sharia children and bring them to the United States; she then
Court. Subsequently, Artadi again filed for divorce by faskh informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of
before the Second Sharia Circuit Court at Marawi City Angelica and explained that her present husband
for neglect and failure of the Bondagjy to provide support expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and
and to perform his martial obligations which to provide for their support and education. However,
was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and failure to Teresita resisted the idea by way of explaining that the
comply with the rule on forum shopping. Artadi appealed child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
to the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Courtof Marawi City accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.
which ruled that res judicata does not apply in the case
at bar since the Artadi offered new evidences to prove that ISSUE:
she is indeed entitled to divorce, hence it remanded the
case to the Second Sharia Circuit Court for hearing on Whether or not the mother have the right to the custody
the merits. of her daughter.

ISSUE: HELD:

Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to The court reiterated its ruling in Santos, Sr. v. Court of
the case. Appeals, that parental authority is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the
HELD: purpose of the children’s physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
action, the following requisites must concur: (1) the former parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no
judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but
must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. Parental
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
parties; and (4) there must be, as between the first and transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by
second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely
of causes of action. The test of identity of causes of action personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
evidence would support and establish the former and children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
present causes of action. If the same evidence would entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
sustain both actions, they are considered the same and friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
a barto the subsequent action. It is with respect to the renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
presence of the fourth requisite that the Court finds no renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
such identity of causes of action. The causes of action are Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent
based on different periods during which Bondagjy allegedly entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner,
neglected or failed to support his family and perform his what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody
marital obligations. and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
SAGALA-ESLAO v. CA
G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997 Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by
the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their
FACTS: minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
of whom two children were begotten, namely, Leslie and by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from
Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and the nature of the parental relationship.
custody of Maria, while Angelica stayed with the husband’s
mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria intended to
 dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan.

Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but
given to someone who claimed to be their guardian.The
Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis
of petitioner‘s complaint, filed an information against the
spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor
before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Ty then
revealed that the child may be found in quezon city. When
Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named
Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child
to be hers even if she wasn‘t entirely sure that it was
Arabella.

On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the

issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial
Court. The court ruled in Sombong‘s favor and ordered the
respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took
cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent:
(1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis
the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of
said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of
the child in question, what the effect would proof of
abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and
(3) Will the question of the child‘s welfare be the
paramount consideration in this case which involves child
custody.

The RTC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy for

taking back Arabella?

RULING:

Yes but the requisites are not met. In general, the purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or
not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification
of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
SOMBONG v. COURT OF APPEALS actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral,
G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996 illegal restraint of liberty. ―The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
FACTS: relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus
was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of
Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and
Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a sufficient.
result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release
even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty, who had To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the
Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102,
Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that
against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being ―except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
The petition was denied due course and summarily
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be
of his liberty.‖ issued ordering that Simone be brought before said court.
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas CA granted Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor
Corpus may be resorted to in cases where ―the rightful child. Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled denied.
thereto.‖ Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought
not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held ISSUE:
time and again that the said writ is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of
child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person discretion when it granted joint custody in utter disregard
of her own free will. It may even be said that in custody of the provisions of the Family Code, as to minors seven (7)
cases involving minors, the question of illegal and years of age and below.
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; RULING:
rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the
purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. The court held that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ to both parents. The so-called "tender-age presumption"
in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the only by compelling evidence of the mother‘s unfitness. The
right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her
custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
not that of the respondent. insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. Here,
Petition is dismissed. the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child
from the mother‘s custody. Sole custody over Simone
Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother,
petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.

PABLO-GUALBERTO v. GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

GAMBOA-HIRSCH v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:

G.R. No. 174485 July 11, 2007
Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a
FACTS: petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took
to set aside the decision of the CA which granted private away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school
respondent Franklin joint custody with petitioner Agnes of when she left him.
their minor daughter Simone.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente
Spouses Franklin and Agnes started to have marital lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house
problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not
Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. When care for the child as she very often goes out of the house
Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness
for money and for Franklin‘s permission for her to bring testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife
their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation she has is having lesbian relations.
an intention not to come back to Boracay.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the order, and this time awarded the custody of the child to
CA for Agnes to produce Simone in court; CA issued a the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not
to be a compelling reason as provided in Art 213 of the custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents,
Family Code. Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order
to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30,
ISSUE: 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order.
Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be
awarded to the mother. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and
the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to
RULING: his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that
under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental
Article 213 of the Family Code provided: ―Art 213. In case authority of the grandparents is proper only when both
of separation of parents parental authority shall be parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's
exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
court shall take into account all relevant consideration, shown by private respondents.
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.No child under seven ISSUE:
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. This Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or Leouel Santos, Jr.
otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of RULING:
the Civil Code, which reads: ―Art 363. In all question on
the care, custody, education and property of children, the The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When
latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given
the court finds compelling reason for such measure. is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.

The court held the contentions of the grandparents are

insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority
and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for
the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents.
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time,
FACTS: petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody
released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he would help enhance the bond between parent and son.
had been in the care and custody of his maternal The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in
Ofelia Bedia. uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the country
in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery
brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody
that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner from him.
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to
his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody

and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990,
the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding
 RULING:

Yes. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the

appellate court's decision. Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of
Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is d eprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals
observed, that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the
parents, who are married to each other, are for some
reason separated from each other. It does not follow,
however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For
example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held that
the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even
though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her
free will because the parents were compelling her to marry
a man against her will.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child

since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to
Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner,
who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to
DAVID v. COURT OF APPEALS have custody of him. 2 Since, admittedly, petitioner has
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
FACTS: of habeas corpus.

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the
respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is
Private respondent is a married man and the father of four entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole
between petitioner and private respondent developed into parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
an intimate one, as a r esult of which a son, Christopher J., of her child.
was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christo pher J. was
followed by two more children, both girls, namely The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor
Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to
24, 1988. the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
Under Art.213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven
The relationship became known to private respondent's years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the
wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."
Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding
of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is
were eventually accepted by his legal family.In the summer justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six willingness to support the minor child. The order for
years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
agreed, but after th e trip, Villar refused to give back the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his
Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the
Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of court or by receiving and maintaining in the family
Christopher J. dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in
the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."
ISSUE:
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Whether or not Daisie is entitled to the custody of the Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at
child. the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken
from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over
seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this
have to be upheld because the child categorically Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over
213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen parental authority over them but with rights of visitation
is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by
in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, the Court.
ifprivate respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his ISSUE:
custody to him (private respondent).
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
gain custody over the children be granted.

RULING:

Supreme Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus

petition by the mother and retain the custody of the
children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values against the children. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom
they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother
and have been affected in their emotional growth by her
behavior.

ESPIRITU v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995 PEREZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 118870 March 29, 1996
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita
Masauding first met in Iligan City where Reynaldo was Ray Perez is a doctor practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his
employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita wife, (petitioner) is a registered nurse. After six
was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy,
for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo Nerissa finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on
was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in the U.S. twice and
to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his
Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not
law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986, their employed.
daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on
a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in
got married, and upon their return to the United States, Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name She alleged that they came home only for a five-week
Reginald Vince, was born on 1988. vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However,
her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they and promised to follow her with the baby. According to
decided to separate. Instead of giving their marriage a Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the
second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed
left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. her mind and continued working. She was supposed to
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but come back immediately after winding up her affairs there.
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II‘s first
He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. They
and her family. had quarrels. Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws
and rely solely on her husband‘s meager income of
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here,
and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against where he could raise his son even as he practiced his
herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult to
live here since they have their own home and a car. child. In fact, no less than an international instrument, the
Despite mediation by the priest, the couple failed to Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: ―In all
reconcile. actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the custody of their administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
son to her. The trial court issued an Order awarding interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
custody to Nerissa citing the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under In the case, financial capacity is not a determinative factor
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, inasmuch as both parties have demonstrated that they
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order have ample means. Nerissa‘s present work schedule is not
otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time with her
reversed the trial court‘s order and held that granting son. Quite a number of working mothers who are away
custody to the boy‘s father would be for the child‘s best from home for longer periods of time are still able to raise
interest and welfare. a family well, applying time management principles
judiciously. Also, delegating child care temporarily to
ISSUE: qualified persons who run day-care centers does not
detract from being a good mother, as long as the latter
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody of a child? exercises supervision, for even in our culture, children are
often brought up by housemaids under the eagle eyes of
RULING: the mother.

Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family Code, the Revised Although Ray‘s is a general practitioner, the records show
Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, that he maintains a clinic, works for several companies on
Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides: retainer basis and teaches part-time. He cannot possibly
―SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are give the love and care that a mother gives to his child.
separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced
or living separately and apart from each other, and the
questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or
children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may
be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of
each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting
the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit
to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, DACASIN v. DACASIN
habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
under seven years of age shall be separated from its
mother, unless the court finds there are compelling FACTS:
reasons therefor.
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and
The provisions of law quoted above clearly mandate that a respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
child under seven years of age shall not be separated from (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April
his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21
order otherwise. The use of the word ―shall‖ in Article September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to
not be separated from his mother finds its reason in the respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
basic need of a child for his mother‘s loving care. Only the jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
most compelling of reasons shall justify the court‘s
awarding the custody of such a child to someone other On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed
than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of
parental authority. In the past the following grounds have Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive
been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and Philippine courts.
being sick with a communicable disease.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial
It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the
Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual
Stephanie. limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to
adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, respondent are not barred from entering into the
among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent
courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over
decree. Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the parties
back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
ISSUE: paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint
custody of the parties child.

RULING:

At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28

January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was
under seven years old (having been born on 21 September
1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer
married under the laws of the United States because of the
divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also
undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x. (This statutory awarding
of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory,
grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a
narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.) Clearly then,
the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over
their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine
law.

The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary

to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when CARAVAN TRAVEL v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The G.R. No. 170631 February 10, 2016
Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced
or separated because the law provides for joint parental FACTS:
authority when spouses live together. However, upon
separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking
under the law if the child is below seven years old and any along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United
agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-
the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) 300 van with plate number PKM 195 was travelling along
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming
within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex
the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her
best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the
the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to
the maternal custody of children below seven years any have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with
more than they can privately agree that a mother who Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an
is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have hospital.
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons
deemed compelling to preclude the application of the Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal
exclusive maternal custody regime under the second aunt and the person who raised her since she was nine (9)
paragraph of Article 213. years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista and
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista
paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the
until the child’s seventh year. From the eighth year until registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this or sisters. It was under these circumstances that
suit because she is not a real party in interest. According to respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child,
Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised
parental authority. She is also not the judicially appointed substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes' custodian,
guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily
also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with
deceased." According to Caravan, only the victim herself or Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported
her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs. To
aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages. echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated
Reyes as if she were her own daughter.
Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof that it
exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she
supervision of Bautista. She adds that the Court of Appeals' died. Having reached the age of majority, she was already
ruling that Caravan is solidarily liable with Bautista for emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is
moral damages, exemplary damages, civil indemnity ex terminated upon emancipation, respondent continued to
delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld. Abejar support and care for Reyes even after she turned
argues that since Caravan is the registered owner of the 18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes'
van, it is directly, primarily, and solidarity liable for the emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained
tortious acts of its driver. the same. The anguish and damage caused to respondent
by Reyes' death was no different because of Reyes'
ISSUE: emancipation.

Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in

interest who may bring an action for damages against
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on
account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death

RULING:

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent

suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in
this case.
Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who
exercise substitute parental authority:

LIBI v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially G.R.NO. 70890 September 18, 1992
appointed guardian, the following persons shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the FACTS:
child in the order indicated:
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. died, each from a single gunshot wound from a revolver
214; licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one latter‘s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann‘s parents.
over the property of the child becomes necessary,
the same order of preference shall be observed. ISSUE:

Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly
authority of persons exercising substitute parental interpreted by the respondent Court to make petitioners
authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents: liable for vicarious liability.
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person of RULING:
the child as the parents.
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their
paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and
whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
son from committing the crime by means of the gun which indispensable parties to the action.
was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have
not regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, ISSUES:
but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box
only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability a) Whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding
of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not instant petition.
subsidiary. b) Whether the Court may still take cognizance of
the case even through petitioners' appeal had
been filed out of time.

RULING:

Supreme Court granted the petition. Retroactive affect

may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of
some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In
the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority
had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so
as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented would be unfair and unconscionable.

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of

duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental
authority which includes instructing, controlling and
disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the
TAMARGO v. COURT OF APPEALS shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992 still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they
are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
FACTS: Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage
caused by the child under their parental authority in
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Adelberto Bundoc, then a accordance with the Civil Code.
minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death.
Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with
the RTC of Ilocos Sur by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent and petitioner spouses Celso
and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the
tragic incident.

Prior to the incident, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura

had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc
in Special Proceedings before the then CIF of Ilocos Sur.
This petition for adoption was granted that is, after
Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the
result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to
the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their reply contended that since Adelberto

Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished
by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that
 order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send
religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamin‘s religious congregation that chose her for the
task of catechizing the school‘s grade three students, much
like the way bishops designate the catechists who would
teach Religion in public schools. Aquinas did not have
control over Yamyamin‘s teaching methods. The Intons
had not refuted the school directress‘ testimony in this
regard. Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps
to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed
to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said
that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion
teacher. They showed records, certificates and diploma
AQUINAS SCHOOL v. INTON that Yamyamin is qualified to teach. There is no question
G.R. No. 184202 January 26, 2011 that she came from a legitimate congregation of sisters.
They provided Faculty Staff Manual in handling the
FACTS: students. They pre-approved the content of the course she
wanted to teach. They have a classroom evaluation
This case is about the private school‘s liability for the program for her unfortunately, she was new, therefore do
outside catechist‘s act of shoving a student and kicking him not have sufficient opportunity to observe her.
on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in
his seat and not move around the classroom. In 1998, Jose
Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas
School (Aquinas). Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin
(Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that
school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis‘ grade
three religion class. Jose Luis left his seat and went over to
a classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin
noticed this and sent him back to his seat. After a while,
Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same
classmate. Yamyamin approached the Jose Luis and kicked
him on the legs several times. She also pulled and shoved
his head on the classmate‘s seat. She also made the child
copy the notes on the blackboard while seating on the
floor. Respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons)
filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis
against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427. The Intons
also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation
of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was
sentenced accordingly. With regard to the action for
damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s fees, for the hurt
that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered. The RTC
dismissed Victoria‘s personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis‘
favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages
of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and
attorney‘s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit. They
elevated the case to the CA to increase the award of
damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas

solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages awarded
to Jose Luis.

RULING:

No. The school directress testified that Aquinas had an

agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in
 ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE v. MIRANDA distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly,
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010 schools should provide protective gears and devices to
shield students from expected risks and anticipated
FACTS: dangers.

While inside the premises of St. Joseph‘s College, the class

where respondent Miranda belonged was conducting a
science experiment about fusion of sulfur powder andiron
fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being
the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is
Estafania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing
the experiment without having adequately secured it from
any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of
the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test
tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved
it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance,
the compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit Jayson‘s eye and the different parts
of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result
thereof, Jayson‘s eyes were chemically burned, particularly
his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had
to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the
lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still
had to undergo another surgery. Upon learning of the
incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson‘s]
mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home
for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December
26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Jason and
his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and
wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to the
petitioner‘s fault and failure to exercise the degree of care
and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus,
they should be held liable for moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were liable for the

accident.

RULING:

Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the

Jason‘s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to
prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the
conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were
negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence
of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph
College will not exculpate it from liability because it has
been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring and in the maintenance of
what should have been a safe and secured environment
for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is
still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and
employees because it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments but did not take
affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.
Schools should not simply install safety reminders and
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Defendant-appellant St. Mary‘s Academy of Dipolog City

conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying. As a student of St. Mary‘s Academy,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other
high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student
of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary‘s Academy before the RTC of
Dipolog City and claimed for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary‘s Academy is

liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

RULING:

The Court held that for the school to be liable there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because of negligence, must have causal connection to the
accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of
the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
 AMADORA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was

looking forward to the commencement exercises where he
would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives
and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned
out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with
Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining
defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and
all the defendants were completely absolved.

ISSUE:

Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo
Amadora.

RULING:

The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in

question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic
as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli, where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the
general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just
supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved
with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades,
it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts
and trades saw the masters or heads of the school
personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge
is not also liable because there‘s no showing that he was
negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that
he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the
school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact
that he wasn‘t present can‘t be considered against him
because he wasn‘t required to report on that day. Classes
had already ceased.
 SALVOSA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-70458 October 5, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case were impleaded in the civil case for
damages filed against Abon. Salvosa being the (Executive
Vice President of BCF).Jimmy Abon was a commerce
student of the Baguio Colleges Foundation. He was also
appointed as armorer of the school‘s ROTC Unit. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his
appointment from the AFP. He received orders from
Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant
of other ROTC units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of
the AFP. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the
parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro
a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died
and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of
the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article2180 of the
Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.
Abon.

RULING:
Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are
liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The
rationale of such liability is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and
[is]called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used
in[Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in their
custody means the protective and supervisory custody that
the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school , including recess time." In line with the case of
Palisoc , a student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A"recess," as the concept is
embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call
of his mentor and is not permitted to
leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not
include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled
or being in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective
and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in
the law. Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the School," or in the custody of BCF, when
he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity
liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his
acts.
 PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION v.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

FACTS: ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA

MEMORIAL FOUNDATION v. PEREZ
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine G.R. No. 222740 September 28, 2016
School of Business Administration. Assailants, who were
not members of the school’s academic community, while FACTS:
in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This
incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4111 year
and its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged medical students to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-
means and methods before, during and after the attack on appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann
the victim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They
claiming that the compliant states no cause of action were tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at
against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does the clinic and like the previous batches, ti1ey were housed
not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the in the second floor of the clinic.
motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was
likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for
court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately 10 o'clock in the
Court. morning of February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5
o'clock that afternoon, the group went for atojog and
ISSUE: returned the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the evening. They
went again out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy
Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student. beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their
breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after
RULING: midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they
bought was an alcoholic beverage called The Bar, which
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a consisted of either vodka or gin. He also admitted that
contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic beverage which
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from the whole bottle.
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and
bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010 when he heard
this impression has not prevented this Court from Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that
determining the existence of a tort even when there there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the door which
obtains a contract. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article led to the living room and when he opened the same, he
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living
parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should room where there was a glow. He also felt extreme heat,
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of
educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts water with which he tried to extinguish the fire. The girls,
of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind.
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat
made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is coming from the fire.
absolved form liability. When an academic institution
accepts students for enrollment, there is established a Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations female medical students, including the daughters of
which both parties is bound to comply with. For its part, plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting to
the school undertakes to provide the student with an asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St.
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with Luke's compensated the parents of the three deceased
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from
a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of the insurance proceeds.
students while in the school premises. On the other hand,
the student covenants to abide by the school's academic The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Failing investigation on the incident, and in a Certification dated
on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was "purely
their student, PSBA is therefore held liable for his death. accidental in nature due to unattended cooking,".
Petition denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not St. Luke’s is liable for the death REMO v. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the students. G.R. No. 1629202 March 5, 2010

RULING: FACTS:

In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims While her marriage with Francisco R. Rallonza was still
were in the Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a subsisting, Maria Virginia V. Remo applied to renew her
requirement of petitioners. The students were complying passport which was about to expire on October 27, 2000.
with an obligation under the enrollment contract - they With her renewal application is the request to revert to her
were rendering medical services in a community center as maiden name. When her request was eventually denied,
required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon she brought her request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
petitioners to comply with their own obligations under the The Secretary of Foreign Affairs also denied her request,
enrollment contract - to ensure that the community holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman
center where they would designate their students is safe to use her husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed
and secure, among others. in passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Secretary explained
As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No.
inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman
and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of
These precautions could have minimized the risk to the annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.
safety of the victims. The petitioners were obviously
negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. The Office of the President also affirmed the Secretary’s
As found by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was ruling when Remo’s case was brought to it. The CA likewise
constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the also affirmed the ruling. Consequently, Remo filed a
Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency petition for review before the Supreme Court. She argued
facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or clearances that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted
from the appropriate government offices. Petitioners with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil
additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden
direction, supervision, management and control of the name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin v.
Municipality of Cabiao, and that it ensured that there was Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court.
an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide
24-hour security to the Clinic. ISSUE:

In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and Whether or not Remo can revert to the use of her maiden
the victims were bound by the enrollment contracts, and name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence
that petitioners were negligent in complying with their of her marriage
obligation under the said contracts to ensure the safety
and security of their students. For this contractual breach, RULING:
petitioners should be held liable.
No. Indeed, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides, and as
settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court, a married woman has an option, but not an
obligation, to use her husband’s surname upon marriage.
This means that she is free to either use her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name. This is so
because when a woman marries, she only changes her civil
status and not her name. RA 8239 does not conflict with
this principle. It does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. The Department
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) actually allows a married woman
who applies for a passport for the first time to use her
maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt
her husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, if a woman chooses to

adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the
DFA additionally requires the submission of an
authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise,
if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may
still do so. The DFA will never prohibit her from
continuously using her maiden name.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her
husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to
the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 which are; 1) death
of husband, 2) divorce, 3) annulment, or 4) nullity of
marriage. Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists,
she cannot resume her maiden name in the renewed
passport.
Ppine ass
 YASIN v. JUDGE SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT married to another woman after obtaining a decree of
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995 divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

FACTS:

Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in

Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden
name” on May 5, 1990. The respondent court ordered
amendments to the petition because it was lacking in form
and substance in accordance with Rule 103, Rules of Court,
regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought
to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof
which should include all the names by which the petitioner
has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not
covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a
petition to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to
another woman. The respondent court denied the motion
since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is
to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the
use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a woman is required to file a petition for

change of name and comply with the formal requirements
of Rule 103 of the Rules of court when she desires to
resume her maiden name in the case of annulment,
divorce under the Code of Muslim Laws, and her husband
is married again to another woman.

RULING:

No. When a woman marries, she does not need to apply

and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name
by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full
name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden
first name. The law grants her such right under Article 370
of the Civil Code. Similarly, when the marriage ties no
longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or
divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as
the use of her former husband's name is optional and not
obligatory for her.

When petitioner married her husband, she did not change

her name but only her civil status. Neither was she
required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of
her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The
use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after
annulment of the marriage and after the death of the
husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of
legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden

name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already
 IN RE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311 March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia. He averred that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had
been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and
that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name be
changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig” his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered

that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code, the minor
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or

reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use
the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle
name. The lower court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname

of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father

RULING:

Yes. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child

adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason
why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic

Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle
name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely
provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of
the adopter.” Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating
the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an

legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
 IN RE JULIAN LIN WANG compelling reason which may justify such change.
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005 Otherwise, the request should be denied.

FACTS: To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must

show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore
When Julian was born on February 20, 1998 in Cebu City, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
his parents were not yet married to each other. When they and official name. Among the grounds for change of name
eventually got married on September 22, 1998,they which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
Julian’s parents planned to live in Singapore where Julian been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
will study together with a sister who was born in unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Singapore, his mother decided to file a petition in the Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
given for the change of name sought in the petition is that purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in public interest.
Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not In the present case, the only reason advanced by
carried in a person's name. petitioner for the dropping his middle name is
convenience. However, how such change of name would
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. convenient is not clearly established. That the continued
The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the use of his middle name would cause confusion and
name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause
convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that to drop it from his registered complete name.
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this
right should be taken from Julian considering that he was
still a minor. It is only when he reaches majority could he
decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name.

ISSUE:

Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped

in the instant case because it is a common practice in
Singapore to omit said surname

RULING:

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or

filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from
others who may have the same given name and surname
as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by
the father in a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as
his middle name and his father's surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals PRIMITIVA DUTERTE
and entities for purposes of identification, and that a G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that
before a person can be authorized to change his name FACTS:
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry,
he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
On April 28, 1978, petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica FACTS:
Primitiva Duterte prayed to the Court of First Instance of
Rizal that her name be changed to Estrella S. Alfon. Her An Information for plunder was filed with the
parents, Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other
Duterte has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was
Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been likewise filed. The Amended Information reads:
residing in the same house in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
for twenty-three (23) years. Petitioner has been using the “…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his
name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; has been enrolled tenure and his true identity as the President, represents
in the grade school and in college using the same name; himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use
has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his
infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
this name; and she has exercised her right of suffrage documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
under the same name. corporate entities.”

The lower court ruled that, pursuant to Article 364 if the ISSUE:
Civil Code which states that “Legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father,” Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose
the change of name of petitioner is not proper and Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the
reasonable with respect to the surname. The lower court clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142.
further explained that the fact that petitioner has been
using a different surname and has become known with HELD:
such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize and change her surname to The Supreme Court held that it was indeed allowable when
Alfon; the birth certificate also clearly shows that the the act was committed. The Court cited the decision on
father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. The lower court Ursua vs. Court of Appeals stating that “A name or names
granted the petition insofar as the first name is granted used by a person or intended to be used by
but denied with respect to the surname. him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions
in addition to his real name by which he is registered at
ISSUE: birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority.” Thus, the law on
Whether or not petitioner should have been allowed to illegal use of alias to be applied in the case at bar is that
change her whole name from Maria Estrella Veronica there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real
name, and there must be habituality. The repeated use of
HELD: an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as
it does not amount to a customary practice or use.
The Supreme Court held that the lower court should have
fully granted the petition. As held in the case of Haw Liong
vs. Republic, it was stated there some proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a
petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is
a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a
natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when
the change is necessary to avoid confusion.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has,

since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although
her birth records and baptismal certificate show
otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades
up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her
friends call her by this name; she finished her course in URSUA v. COURT OF APPEALS
Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample FACTS:
justification to grant fully her petition which is not
whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion. dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a copy of the
PEOPLE v. ESTRADA complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman.
G.R. No. 164368 April 2, 2009 His lawyer asked him that because the law firm’s
messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the
Ombudsman. Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates that her full
talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels name is Emelita Basilio.
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because
he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition for
than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he does not correction of name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
have to reveal his true identity. Libmanan, Camarines Sur. The petitioner sought to change
the full name indicated in her birth certificate from
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She claimed that
there as “Oscar Perez”. When he was handed a copy of the she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in her
complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”. school records from elementary until college, employment
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that records, marriage contract, and other government records.
he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended
that a criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, ISSUE:
Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating
C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Whether or not the petition for correction of name should
Regulate The Use Of Aliases”. be granted.

ISSUE: HELD:

Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper. The Supreme Court denied the petition. A change of name
is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and
HELD: reasonable cause must exist before a person may be
authorized to change his name. In the case at bar, the
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for
that a strict application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this change of name, i.e. that she has been using the name
case only leads to absurdity – something which could not "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient
have been intended by the lawmakers. or proper justification to allow her petition. In her
amended petition for change of name, the petitioner
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did
a person is not allowed to use a name or an alias other not state whether her parents, at the time of her birth,
than his registered name or that which he was baptized. were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the other, which would make her a natural child.
fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business
transactions without prior authorization by competent The petitioner also failed to adduce any evidence that
authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name “Oscar would show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his
Perez” once, it was not used in a business transaction, the father. The petitioner's evidence consisted only of her
use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez birth certificate signed by her mother, school records,
himself, and even if he used a different name, in this employment records, marriage contract, certificate of
instance, he was not even required to disclose his identity baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming
at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the
a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity Civil Code, she could still not insist on using her father's
because the complaint is a public record open to the surname. It was, thus, a blatant error on the part of the
public. In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. RTC to have allowed the petitioner to change her name
No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."
other than his name. A strict application of the law is not
warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no
fraud was committed; there was no crime committed
punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is
to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was
produced by Ursua’s act, said law need not be applied.

YASUO IWASAWA v. GANGAN

BASILIO GAN vs. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
G.R. No. 207147 September 14, 2016
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa, a Japanese national married
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, private respondent on November 28, 2002, in the
1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Philippines. Thereafter, while the couple were residing in
Chinese national, and Consolacion Basilio, her mother who Japan, petitioner found out that his wife was previously
is a Filipino citizen The petitioner's birth certificate, which married to another man. Petitioner then filed for nullity of
was registered in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. During
trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome
following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the
National Statistics Office (NSO): (1) Certificate of informant on the certificate of live birth.
Marriage between petitioner and private respondent; (2)
Certificate of Marriage between private respondent and On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certificate of Death of Court of Olongapo City a complaint for cancellation of the
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; and (4) Certification from late registration of Reynaldos birth. She claimed that
the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of Reynaldo was not really her son.
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private
respondent. ISSUE:

The RTC, however, ruled that there was insufficient Whether the late registration of Reynaldos birth is valid.
evidence to prove private respondent’s prior existing valid
marriage to another man on the basis that petitioner’s HELD:
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal
knowledge of private respondent’s prior marriage nor of Reynaldos certificate of live birth, as a duly registered
Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to public document, is presumed to have gone through the
the marriage certificate between private respondent and process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It
Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled was only on 8 March 1995, after the lapse of ten long years
that petitioner’s testimony about the NSO certification is from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application
likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation for delayed registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves
of said document. registered her opposition. She should have done so within
the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that
ISSUE: no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar
of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for
Whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly registered
documents issued by said office was necessary before they public document and the flip-flopping statements of
could be accorded evidentiary weight. Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.

HELD: Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a

rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are
The Supreme Court granted the petition. There is no considered public documents and are prima facie evidence
question that the documentary evidence submitted by of the truth of the facts stated there. As a public
petitioner is all public documents as provided in Art. 410 of document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the
the Civil Code. As public documents, they are admissible in presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the
evidence even without further proof of their due execution facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for
and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its
said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so.
not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued
them to testify on their authenticity and due execution
since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given
evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant
case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor
presented evidence to the contrary.
REPUBLIC v. COSETENG-MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011

FACTS:

BALDOS v. COURT OF APPEALS Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward

G.R. No. 170645 July 9, 2010 Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
FACTS: Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth
shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30
October 1948. However, his birth was not registered in the Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally
office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional
or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a
support of his petition, respondent submitted a “bastardization of petitioners.” Petitioners thus label
certification from the National Statistics Office stating that private respondents’ suits before the lower courts as a
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a
National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted Rule 108 proceeding.
his academic records from elementary up to college
showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the Debunking petitioners’ above contention, the Court of
birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as Appeals observed that the proceedings were simply aimed
his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated
respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish
City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain
COSETENG." events which created or affected the status of persons
and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for change of name involving
change of civil status should be made through appropriate Whether or not clerical or typographical errors in entries of
adversarial proceedings. the civil register can be corrected and changed without
need of a judicial order.
HELD:
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that respondent’s petition to
change his name lacks merit. They stated the grounds on The Supreme Court cited Republic Act No. 9048 which
how a person can effect a change of name under Rule 103: substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely wit:
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results
as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the “SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in
continuously used and been known since childhood by a a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of and change of first name or nickname which can be
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
and there is no showing that the desired change of name provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name regulations.”
would prejudice public interest.
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
considered as one of, or analogous to, the recognized corrected and changed without need of a judicial order
grounds. The change being sought in respondent’s petition and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the
respondent’s supplication. scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely
the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of
its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was
not sound doctrine after all.

LEE v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118387 October 11, 2001 IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
FACTS:
FACTS:
The petitioners contended that resort to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court was improper since private A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of
respondents sought to have the entry for the name of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil
petitioners’ mother changed from “Keh Shiok Cheng” to Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
“Tiu Chuan” who was a completely different person. What before the RTC of Cebu City. Julian was the son of Anna
private respondents therefore sought was not merely a Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet married
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when
not born of Lee Tek Sheng’s legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Julian’s parents got married, the latter executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his
Wang. sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the
petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these
The reason for the petition is that since the family plans to changes, among others, so that he can marry his American
stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names or fiancé.
the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
person’s name, they anticipated that Julian will be The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it
discriminated against because of his current registered should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s
name which carries a middle name. Also, the spouses’ misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own
daughter and Julian might get confused if they are really doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that
brothers and sisters because they have different surnames. there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did
Lastly, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no
language since they do not have the letter “R” but if there harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
is, they pronounce it as “L”. community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
ISSUE: happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the
realization of their dreams.
Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped
in the instant case because it is a common practice in ISSUE:
Singapore to omit said surname.
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first
HELD: name in the birth certificate may be changed on the
ground of gender re-assignment.
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court stated
the valid grounds for change of name, which are: (1) when HELD:
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the change entries finds no support in existing legislation. Pursuant to
will avoid confusion; (4) when one has continuously used R.A. 9048, it should be the local civil registrar that has
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and
was unaware of alien parentage; (5) a sincere desire to not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio
adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all insofar as his first name is concerned is procedurally
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (6) infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is
showing that the desired change of name was for a based (gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would for by the law.
prejudice public interest.
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before
The only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of the regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry.
his middle name is convenience. However, how such Not with the courts because there is no law to support it.
change of name would make his integration into And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just
established. That the continued use of his middle name but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
name. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may immutable.
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change
of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007 REPUBLIC VS. CAGANDAHAN
G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
FACTS:
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s
a biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court
that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now has Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B.
Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made
sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth
rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros
both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
grew up with secondary male characteristics. Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13,
1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, and Lucille were married in 1998.
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital,
who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate
female but because her body secretes male hormones, her children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record
both male and female.” The lower court decided in her of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that
favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because
violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and
because the said petition did not implead the local civil subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
registrar.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may pass upon the validity of
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to
certificate be changed. correct entries in the civil registrar.

HELD: HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under
court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
considered “the compassionate calls for recognition of the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations. Rule
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil
use of the availale evidence presented in court including Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
and as to the statement made by the doctor that contemplated therein may generally be used only to
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
(androgen), which is preponderant biological support for innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
considering him as being male.” which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals change such as a correction of name that is clearly
with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of interested parties are impleaded and due process is
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to properly observed.
be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow. The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for
being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and
Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the
BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009 provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
FACTS: filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court
married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident. During a quo.
the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick
 The Supreme Court held in the negative and nullified the
decision of the lower courts. If the subject matter of a
petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong
may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is
used. The Supreme Court adheres to the principle
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog

City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition. The
respondent seeks the correction of her first name and
surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and
her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus,
respondent should have impleaded and notified not only
the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as
the persons who have interest and are affected by the
changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry

in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is mandated.

REPUBLIC v. LUGSANAY UY
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013

FACTS:

On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for

Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth.
Respondent was born on February 8, 1952 and alleged that
she is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay. Accordingly, her Certificate of Live Birth shows
that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly
known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."
Her school records, Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport bear the
name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an
illegitimate child considering that her parents were never
married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother. She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all
her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all
Filipinos. On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in
favor of respondent. OSG assailed the decision for failure
to implead indispensable parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the correction of

entry in her birth certificate.

HELD: