POLICE POWER

Philippine Assoc of Service Exporters vs. Drilon [G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988]
FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the DOLE, in the character of "Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment
of Filipino Domestic And Household Workers," in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
Order is being assailed for "discrimination against males or females,"  that it "does not apply to
all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.

In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police
power of the Philippine State.

ISSUE: Whether Dept Order No. 1, being in the nature of a police power measure, is valid under
the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The petition is dismissed. The concept of police power has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but
has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Further, it is defined as the plenary power of the
State "to govern its citizens." 

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society."

While the Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment, the concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms, which would suffer as a result of Government regulation in the ordinary sequence
of events.

The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens, and the Court ruled that the
Government has convinced them in this case that this is its intent. Further, the Court held that it
did find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the
extraordinary relief prayed for.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

FACTS: Petitioner et al. brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is
unconstitutional. RA 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted to
nationalize the retail trade business. The main provisions of it are: (1) a prohibition against
persons, not citizens of PH, and against assocs, partnerships, or corps the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of PH, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an
exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens engaged in said business on May 15,
1954, who are allowed to continue, unless their licenses are forfeited, until their death or
voluntary retirement; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of US;
(4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment by aliens actually engaged in
the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, etc.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending, among others, that it denies to
alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law. The SolGen and Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that the Act was passed
in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the
Constitution in the interest of national economic survival, among others.

ISSUE: Whether RA 1180 falls within the scope of the police power of the State.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State and was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national
economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and that, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. Moreover, the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

The Court discussed the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection
clauses related to it. It stated that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. Police power derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Constitutions do not
define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.

Limitations on police power are the basic limitations of due process and equal protection that are
found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. The due process clause has to do
with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would
mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided
there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification
has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

Lutz vs. Araneta [G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955]

FACTS: Walter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, sought to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of Php14,666.40
paid by the estate as taxes under section 3 of the Commonwealth Act No. 567 or the Sugar
Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-1950, alleging that such tax is
unconstitutional and void as it levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively,
which is in his opinion not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied.

ISSUE: Whether the tax provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the
taxing power.

HELD: No, it is an exercise of the police power. The Court held that by analysis of the Act, the
tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization
of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police
power.

The Court stated that sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar
occupying a leading position among its export products, and hence, it was competent for the
legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized
in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide that the
distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components to enable it to resist the
added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to sustain.

Assoc of Small Landowners vs. Sec of Agrarian Reform [GR 78742, July 14, 1989]
READ
FACTS: These are consolidated cases that involve challenges to the constitutionality of the
several measures such as PD 27, EO 228, Presidential Proc. No. 131, EO 229, and RA 6657. In
some petitions, the petitioners are questioning the enactments and seeking to prohibit its
implementation, contending that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the EO 229. In one petition, GR 78742, petitioners claim they
cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the
above-quoted decree.
ISSUE:  Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power.

RULING: No, this is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent
domain. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent
domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious
purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The
confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power
of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The Court held that there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution, that to the extent that the measures merely prescribe
retention limits for landowners. However, where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of
the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is
definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Lozano vs. Martinez [G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986]

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the Bouncing Check Law (BP22), which punishes a
person “who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank.” It is aimed at
putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, which causes injury to the
public interest. Contentions on the law are that (1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt. (2) it impairs freedom of contract, and (3) it contravenes the equal
protection clause, among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: Yes. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check,
not the non-payment of an obligation that the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a
worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a
valid exercise of police power  and is not in conflict with the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.

There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since
contracts that contravene public policy are not lawful. Constitutionality of BP22 is upheld.

Dept of Educ, Culture and Sports vs. San Diego[G.R. No. 89572, Dec 21, 1989]
FACTS: The private respondent is a Zoology graduate from UE who claims that he took the
NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner
rejected his application on the basis the following rule:
h) A student shall be allowed only three chances to take the NMAT. After three
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

He then went to RTC and invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. He then challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal
protection. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right
to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

HELD: No, the Court cannot sustain the respondent judge’s decision, and it must be reversed. In
Tablarin v. Gutierrez,  this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for
a unanimous Court:
[…] the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion
of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession,
has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of access to medical
schools: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to medical schools.
The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT
as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical education in the country." It held that
the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation
in this area. It is said to be for the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.

Further, the Court held police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of
the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method
employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]
FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in
January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO
626-A, which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos not complying with the requirements of EO 626 (except when the carabao is 7 years old
if male, and 11 years old if female). The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the
carabeef.

ISSUE: Whether EO 626-A is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: No. The Court ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the owner was denied
the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights.  Hence, EO 626-
A is hereby declared unconstitutional.

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient
for due process is not an “iron rule.”  The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness.

EO 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the question of measure is missing. The penalty is an outright confiscation and a
supersedeas bond of Php12,000.  The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner, and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play. Hence, the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power.

City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983]
FACTS: In QC, Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 was passed, Section 9 of which provides that 6% of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been QC residents for at least 5 years prior to their death. 

Himlayang Pilipino (HP) filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus to
annul Section 9 with CFI, which declared it null and void. Petitioners argued that the taking of
the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argued that
the QC Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, to make
such ordinances to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by the Act and
such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety and improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and its inhabitants.

ISSUE: Whether Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power.
HELD: No, it is not a valid exercise of the police power. (One provision from the Bill of Rights
states that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” On the
other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property
rights, namely (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of
the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.)

An examination of the Charter of QC does not reveal any provision that would justify the
ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the City. Section 9 cannot be
justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or
confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a
memorial park cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as “the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property.” It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.

Under the provisions of municipal charters, a city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt
ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and the best and highest interests of the
municipality. However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at 6% of the total area of private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

When the Local Government Code provides that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may “provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance,” it
simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation.

Manila Memorial Park vs. Secretary of DSWD [G.R. No. 175356, December 3 2013]
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 7432 (amended by RA 9257)
and the IRRs issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business establishments to
claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction. They posit that the tax
deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that:
"private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." They cited Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, where it was ruled that the 20% discount privilege constitutes taking of
private property for public use which requires the payment of just compensation.

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police
power.
ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police
power.

HELD: Yes, the 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power. The Court first
looked at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it constitutes an exercise of
police power or eminent domain. The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior
citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be employed and more prone to illnesses, among
others. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject regulation affects the
pricing and hence the profitability of a private establishment. The subject regulation may be said
to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate of return on
investment control laws that are traditionally regarded as police power measures. Hence, the
20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.