Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs Drilon

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm
"engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas
placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND
HOUSEHOLD WORKERS.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed
in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-
impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face
should the Order be further enforced.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing
the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland.

Issue:
Whether or not Department Order No.1 is valid as a police power measure under the
Constitution.

Held:
The petition must be dismissed.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the
Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the
enforcement whereof.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

Notes:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the
"state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not
inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety,
and welfare of society."

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does
not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is
a clear misuse of the power.

Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts:
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their
death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of
the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of
licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail
business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and
(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action
to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of
Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it
denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the
Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization
for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Issue:
Whether the said act is unconstitutional for violating the limits of police power.

Held:
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed
law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the
legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free
the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which
the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy
of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.

Notes:
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost
unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless,
just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and
have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and
demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the
State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of
our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in
democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application,
without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.

Lutz vs Araneta
Facts:
This case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental to test the legality of
the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment
Act.

Promulgated in 1940, the law in question opens (section 1) with a declaration of emergency,
due to the threat to our industry by the imminent imposition of export taxes upon sugar as
provided in the Tydings-McDuffe Act, and the "eventual loss of its preferential position in the
United States market"; wherefore, the national policy was expressed "to obtain a readjustment
of the benefits derived from the sugar industry by the component elements thereof" and "to
stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential
position in the United States market and the imposition of the export taxes."

In section 2, Commonwealth Act 567 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar, on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufactured; while section
3 levies on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane and
ceded to others for a consideration, on lease

Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act, for the crop years 1948-
1949 and 1949-1950; alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose
for which a tax may be constitutioally levied. The action having been dismissed by the Court of
First Instance, the plaintifs appealed the case directly to this Court

Issue:
Whether the taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567 are legal.

Held:
Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full), will show that the tax
is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of
the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police
power.
Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a
matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds
what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. Here, the legislative
discretion must be allowed fully play, subject only to the test of reasonableness; and it is not
contended that the means provided in section 6 of the law (above quoted) bear no relation to
the objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their
prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power

That the tax to be levied should burden the sugar producers themselves can hardly be a ground
of complaint; indeed, it appears rational that the tax be obtained precisely from those who are to
be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. At any rate, it is inherent in the
power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that "inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation"

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:
Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was
followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive
agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by
tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and
the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.

n his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the
petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by
Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No.
11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No.
18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and
Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985
(Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners
are now barred from invoking this right.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless
not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that
a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.

Issue:
Whether the said law does not constitute the police power of the State.

Held:
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private
property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment
of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the
said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only
if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference
of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As
the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we
may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a
mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual
taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation
mandated by the Constitution.

Notes:
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such
as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals.

Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives
the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of
rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question
is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession
of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents
the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the
use prohibited ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social
conditions — the restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy
his property as heretofore.

Lozano vs Martinez
Facts:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the
Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by
these petitions for decision.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank
to stop payment."

Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the constitutional
provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of contract; (3) it contravenes
the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and (5) its
enactment is flawed in that during its passage the Interim Batasan violated the constitutional
provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on Third Reading.

Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held:
Considering the factual and legal antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not
difficult to understand the public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported
that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and
thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 million to
80 million pesos a day.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The ‘check flasher’ does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of
business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same category
with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the constitutional inhibition
against `imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud’ was intended as a shield and not a
sword.

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

Notes:
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable
of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the
state, plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man
in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional
rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order and welfare."

Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs San Diego

Facts:
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as
many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis
of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to
compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic
freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed
to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an
amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS
Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised
were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the
challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary
exercise of the police power.

Issue:
whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled
to take it again.

Held:
We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed. In Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the
admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to
be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the
closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to
harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not
used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common
good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:
It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of
carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to
circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting
carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said
Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the
violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January
13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo,
for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for
lack of authority and also for its presumed validity

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial
court

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries.
His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right
to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as
constitutional.

Issue:
Whether such law is a valid exercise of police power

Held:
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.

we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
City of Government of Quezon City vs Ericta
Facts:
This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon
City Council null and void.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE

ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City
for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area
so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than
six months from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities
but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the
following resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question

The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

Issue:
Whether there is a valid exercise of police power

Held:
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground
of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in
the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation
of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.

We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to
be well-founded.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33,
Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private
cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Notes:
In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of
government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the
powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995,
May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya
Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope
that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being
coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the
modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to
almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all
embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope
of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public
interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).

The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause
being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.

Manila Memorial Park vs Secretary of DSWD

Facts:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following
privileges:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:

a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation
centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private
establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;

b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema
houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and
amusement;

c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable
income does not exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;

d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of
its work;

e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country,
subject to guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service
Insurance System and the Social Security System;

f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges
given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and
PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.

On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432.
Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:
Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS. – For purposes of these regulations: i. Tax Credit – refers to the amount
representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by all establishments relative
to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be
deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from
their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes. x x x x Sec. 4.
RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. –
Private establishments, i.e., transport services, hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants, recreation centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture[,] leisure and amusement, giving 20% discounts to
qualified senior citizens are required to keep separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to
senior citizens, which shall include the name, identification number, gross sales/receipts,
discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for every transaction. The amount of 20%
discount shall be deducted from the gross income for income tax purposes and from gross sales
of the business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, the Court declared
Sections 2(i) and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene RA 7432,

On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit:

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior
citizens, including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006,
the pertinent provision of which provides:

SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS AS DEDUCTION

FROM GROSS INCOME. – Establishments enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder
granting sales discounts to senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services specified
thereunder are entitled to deduct the said discount from gross income

The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9257, to wit:

RULE VI DISCOUNTS AS TAX DEDUCTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS

Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. – The establishment may claim the discounts
granted under Rule V, Section 4 – Discounts for Establishments, Section 9, Medical and Dental
Services in Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 – Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.

Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales
receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended; Provided, finally, that the implementation of
the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF).

Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse, praying
that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these
allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax
deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax
credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.

Issue:
WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT
(20%) DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Held:
Petitioners emphasize that they are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens
but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA
9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation."

They assert that "[a]lthough both police power and the power of eminent domain have the
general welfare for their object, there are still traditional distinctions between the two" and that
"eminent domain cannot be made less supreme than police power.

As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments extending the
twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax deduction. The law is
a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It
is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." For this reason, when the conditions so
demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police
power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. Given these, it is incorrect for petitioners
to insist that the grant of the senior citizen discount is unduly oppressive to their business,
because petitioners have not taken time to calculate correctly and come up with a financial
report, so that they have not been able to show properly whether or not the tax deduction
scheme really works greatly to their disadvantage. In treating the discount as a tax deduction,
petitioners insist that they will incur losses because, referring to the DOF Opinion, for every
₱1.00 senior citizen discount that petitioners would give, P0.68 will be shouldered by them as
only P0.32 will be refunded by the government by way of a tax deduction.

Furthermore, it is unfair for petitioners to criticize the law because they cannot raise the prices of
their medicines given the cutthroat nature of the players in the industry. It is a business decision
on the part of petitioners to peg the mark-up at 5%. Selling the medicines below acquisition
cost, as alleged by petitioners, is merely a result of this decision. Inasmuch as pricing is a
property right, petitioners cannot reproach the law for being oppressive, simply because they
cannot afford to raise their prices for fear of losing their customers to competition. The Court is
not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must
accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in
the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.

We, thus, found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of
the police power of the State.

Notes:
Police power versus eminent domain.

Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to restrain the use of liberty and
property for public welfare.

The only limitation is that the restriction imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive.
In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it must have a lawful subject or objective
and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal.

Under the police power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government."

The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to
promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and not arbitrary."

Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or appropriate
private property for public use.

The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall not be taken without due process
of law and the payment of just compensation.

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise of
police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely
prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no
compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required. Examples of these
regulations are property condemned for being noxious or intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a
building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials to be
destroyed in the interest of public morals) as well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of
property for purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a
city’s territory into residential and industrial areas).

It has, thus, been observed that, in the exercise of police power (as distinguished from eminent
domain), although the regulation affects the right of ownership, none of the bundle of rights
which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.

On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are
appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just
compensation therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to
the expropriating authority. Examples include the acquisition of lands for the construction of
public highways as well as agricultural lands acquired by the government under the agrarian
reform law for redistribution to qualified farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the
acquisition of title or total destruction of the property is not essential for "taking" under the power
of eminent domain to be present.

Examples of these include establishment of easements such as where the land owner is
perpetually deprived of his proprietary rights because of the hazards posed by electric
transmission lines constructed above his property or the compelled interconnection of the
telephone system between the government and a private company.
Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association(digest again please)
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
(PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section
511 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-
07 valid and constitutional

However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended
transition period.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and
oppressive in view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial
spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal
Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the term aerial
spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and beneficial
effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides or
fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and
could enhance agricultural production.

Issue:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an invalid use of police power

Held:
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test:
the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law);
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to
promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by
Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables
the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its
creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.

Section 16 of LGC comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general
legislative power and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the power
delegated by Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case
of Dayao City, to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations.
This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the
power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties legally conferred to
the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local
government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity,
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government unit and its
constituents, and for the protection of their property.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of
the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of
three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to
constitute abuse of police power.

The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of legislative and police
powers by the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section 458 in relation to Section
16 both of the Local Government Code. The respondents counter that Davao City thereby
disregarded the regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA),
including its identification and classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.

We uphold the respondents.

The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible
authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and consistency of
the exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the State. More
importantly, because the police power of the local government units flows from the express
delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any
doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the power should be construed
against the local legislative units. Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the exercise of
police power affects life, liberty or property. The presumption of validity and the policy of
liberality are not restraints on the power of judicial review in the face of questions about whether
an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass
the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.

Notes:
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government. A local government
unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.