Joel Jimenez vs Remedios Cañizares refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court

show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude

Facts: the presumption arising out of the suppression of
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a petition for the annulment evidence could not arise or be inferred, because
of his marriage with Remedios Cañizares on the women of this country are by nature coy, bashful, and
ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too shy and would not submit to a physical examination
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis unless compelled to by competent authority.
for copulation. He alleged that the condition of her Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
genitals as described above existed at the time of presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency. The
marriage and continues to exist and that for that lone testimony of Joel that his wife is physically
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear
day after they had been married. asunder the ties that have bound them together as
husband and wife.
Defendant however failed to submit her answer within
the required period. The Court ordered the defendant 3. ISSUE:
to submit to a physical examination by a competent Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for the testimony of the husband.
copulation. Defendant, however, did not follow the
order and did not appear during the scheduled HELD:
hearings. The judge, thus, rendered judgment The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her
annulling the marriage of the parties. husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be
1. Issue: concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this
May the marriage in question be annulled on the country are shy and bashful and would not readily and
strength only of the lone testimony of the husband- unhesitatingly submit to a physical examination unless
plaintiff? compelled by competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-incriminating. She
Held: is not charged with any offense and likewise is not
No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence
that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.
to annul a marriage. Whether the wife is really The case was remanded to trial court.
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court
show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and
shy and would not submit to a physical examination
unless compelled to by competent authority.

"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be

presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.

2. ISSUE:
Whether or not Remedios’ impotency has been
established.

HELD:
No. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage
in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
Joel who was expected to give testimony tending or
aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether Remedios is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily
established, because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had
abstained from taking part therein. Although her
G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 CONSTANZA their report and account of the partition to the court,
YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. who then rendered final judgment, from which, also,
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant. both parties appealed.

FACTS: ISSUE:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the
Constanza Yañez were joined in a Catholic or case and partition of property as decided by the court
canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In should be affirmed.
February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the
Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and HELD:
personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, The partition of property decreed in the judgment
Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her husband appealed from of the 9th of September, 1911, should
was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments
relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special
of that month and year they made an agreement, in a pronouncement of costs in this instance.
public document, by which they "resolved to separate
and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree
by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of
move to Spain, there to reside in such place as the the husband and wife, simply because the whole
said lady pleases." In the same document, the theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to
husband undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private
pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are
Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the
The husband complied with this obligation until August, public or political law of the nation. “The jurisdiction of
1899, after which time he ceased to make further courts and other questions relating to procedure are
payments. considered to be of a public nature and consequently
are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . .
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to All persons that have to demand justice in a case in
the Philippines, but the husband had absented himself which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing
therefrom in the early days of February of the same by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to
year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife the tribunals of the state which have coercive means
commenced divorce proceedings against her husband, (property situated in the territory) to enforce any
alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by decision they may render. Otherwise, one would
him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman expose himself in the suit to making useless
that she named in the complaint and with whom he expenditures which, although he won his case, would
had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two not contribute to secure his rights because of the
children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of court’s lack of means to enforce them.” “Justice,” says
divorce; that the court order the separation of the the same professor, “is a principle superior to that of
properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, to date nations, and it should therefore be administered
from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal without taking into any account whatsoever the state to
society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their
the conjugal property had been determined, that one- relations and develop their commerce, all civilized
half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to
the amount of pension owing for her support but not their own people, but to those foreigners who contract
paid to her, that the defendant be ordered to pay her within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in
the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 some manner effect their sovereignty. Might its courts,
Spanish dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in
at the rate of exchange on the date of the complaint, its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but
amounted to P12,959.90. abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering
justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is
city of Manila held itself to have jurisdiction, decreed not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet
the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff been claimed in any of the theories regarding the
and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality
P5,010.17, directed that the communal property be and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing
divided between the parties, with costs against the extraterritorial law in favor of private persons.
defendant, and in event that the parties could not
agree to the division, it was to be effected by The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is
commissioners according to law. only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not
accompany the persons of the Spanish subject
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke
notwithstanding the appeal, the partition of the it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in
property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain.
with. These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the
ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to
the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege
lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their
personal statute, a law of their nation which gives
jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a
certain court within or without the territory of their
nation. It is a question that has already been settled in
two decisions of the Supreme Court.

In the present action for divorce the Court of First

Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction
over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish
Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and
had their domicile herein.
Quita vs. Court of Appeals Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998 spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
FACTS:
Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were The case was remanded to the trial court.
married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and were
not blessed with children. Their relationship soured
and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A and
in July 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in
a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third
time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August

1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of
letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse
of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan,
opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment
instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved
in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950
private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs

of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. At a
scheduled hearing, the trial court required the
submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten days from receipt thereof, after
which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.

ISSUE:
Who between petitioner and private respondent may
validly claim as the spouse of the decedent

RULING:
The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturo’s spouse
must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

On the other hand, private respondent’s claim to

heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered
void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000 PAULA T. in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our
and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents. laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and
legal capacity." Whether the will is intrinsically valid
FACTS: and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
1927 to September 30, 1957. On February 22, 1937, with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to
United States citizenship and Certificate of
Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by
the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York. He discovered that his wife Paula was
pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on
November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of
San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of
California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce. On January 16,
1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia
lived together as husband and wife. Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will
was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano,
duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano.
In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to
Alicia and their three children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was valid?

HELD:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an
American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)
execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues
arising from these incidents are necessarily governed
by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides:

"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to

the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.”

"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is

subject to the law of the country where it is situated.”

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to

his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown
ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff and Ratio:
appellant, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant The mere act of marriage creates an OBLIGATION on
and appellee. Case Nature: APPEAL from a the part of the husband to support his wife. This
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. obligation is founded not so much on the express or
Ostrand, J. implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the
natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
Doctrine the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate
the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
Phil. Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil protection in the parental home. A judgment for
Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were SEPARATE MAINTENANCE is not due and payable
extended to the Philippine Islands by royal decree on either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in
April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil Rep., 705). the strict legal sense of that term, but rather a
Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read: o "ART. 44. judgment calling for the performance of a duty made
The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done
and to mutually assist each other. o "ART. 45. The from necessity and with a view to preserve the public
husband must live with and protect his wife. (The peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband
second paragraph deals with the management of the makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in
wife's property.) o "ART. 48. The wife must obey her the habit of assaulting her. The pro tanto separation
husband, live with him, and follow him when he resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
changes his domicile or residence, "Notwithstanding impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is
may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and
husband removes his residence to a foreign country. except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as
a means of preserving the public peace and morals
FACTS: may be considered, it does not in any respect
This is an action by the wife against her husband for whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
support outside of the conjugal domicile. Previous purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
Ruling: The defendant cannot be compelled to support
the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by Held:
virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or Decision is Reversed.
separation from the defendant. The parties were
legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, NOTE:
1915, and immediately thereafter established their MARRIAGE in this jurisdiction is a contract entered
residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they into in the manner and with the solemnities established
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects
returned to the home of her parents. The pertinent are concerned requiring the consent of the parties.
allegations of the complaint are as follows: "That the (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil. Rep., 480, citing article
defendant, one month after he had contracted 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the
marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital between the parties. (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion,
organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes
demands of the defendant and refused to perform any of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is
act other than legal and valid cohabitation; that the something more than a mere contract. It is a new
defendant, since that date had continually on other relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned general law, which defines and prescribes those rights,
them, which just refusals of the plaintiff exasperated duties, and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the
the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her f ace interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot
and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
was unable by any means to induce the defendant to contract they may make. When the object of a
desist from his repugnant desires and cease from marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents possible good to the community, RELIEF in some way
should be obtainable.
ISSUE:
1. WON the wife has a good and sufficient cause for 1. MARRIAGE; NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION.
living separate from her husband Marriage is something more than a contract, though
2. WON the judgment for separate maintenance is founded upon the agreement of the parties. When
due? once formed a relation is created between the parties
which they cannot change by agreement, and the
rights and obligations of which depend not upon their
agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be
faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other. 2.
HUSBAND AND WlFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE.-

2 The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode

by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain
an action against the husband for separate
maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil
Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish
support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed
pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own
home the one having the right to the same. 3.
HUSBAND AND WlFE; SUFFICIENCY OF
COMPLAINT.The complaint of the wife which alleges
unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the
husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
separate maintenance. DEFINITION: feme sole, in
Anglo-American common law, a woman in the
unmarried state or in the legally established equivalent
of that state. Pro Tanto [Latin, For so much; for as
much as one is able; as far as it can go.] A term that
refers to a partial payment made on a claim.
WONG WOO YIU V VIVO oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial
G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 proof of husband-wife relationship.

Doctrine: Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws
Laws relating to family rights or to the status of relating to family rights or to the status of persons are
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
even though living abroad. living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order
that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be
Facts: valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the
finding petitioner to be legally married to Perfecto Blas peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any
and admitting her into the country as a non-quota denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library
immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the Board of and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we
Commissioners. assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to
Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China,
However, the same Board, composed of a new set of the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to
be excluded from the country. But it may be contended that under Section 4 of
General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil
denied for lack of merit. She then filed the instant Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction which is valid under the law of the country in which it
(considered as certiorari) before the Manila CFI. was celebrated is also valid in the Philippines. But no
validity can be given to this contention because no
After the respondents filed their answer and the parties proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in
submitted a written stipulation of facts, the court a quo China. Such being the case, we should apply the
declared valid the original decision and restrained general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a
respondents from excluding petitioner from the foreign country it should be presumed that it is the
country. Respondents interposed the present appeal. same as our own.

It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated
declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a
the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to village leader is not one of them, it is clear that
whom she was married in Chingkang, China on petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be
January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated recognized in this jurisdiction.
by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set of
Board of Commissioners found that petitioner’s claim Decision appealed from reversed.
was without basis, it appearing that in the entry
proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947
he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain
her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that
in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas
claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941,
although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he
first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939,
and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same
affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China
when he was merely four years old so that computed
from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in
1912.

Issue:
W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support
fact of her marriage and can thus be admitted as non-
quota immigrant in the country?

Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the
statements made by petitioner and her alleged
husband in the investigations conducted by the
immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support
of petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG acts intended to validate marriages and should retard
BOO, deceased. MORA ADONG, petitioner- acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for
appellant, vs. CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent- public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales
appellant. of their decision in favor of that solution which will
most effectively promote the public policy. That is
Facts: the true construction which will best carry legislative
Cheong Boo, a native of China died in intention into effect. Sec. IV of the Marriage law
Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and provides that “all marriages contracted outside the
left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being islands, which would be valid by the laws of the
claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who country in which the same were contracted, are valid in
alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to
1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then
Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed
conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were by23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be
ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong impugned and discredited, after the death of the
Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage,
marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong “save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as
Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine impediment.” A marriage alleged to have been
Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called
the estate as a natural child. With reference to the matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the
allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, Philippines.
the trial court reached the conclusion that the
marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of
thePhilippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia
would inherit as natural children. The lower court
believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid
under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a
solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage
between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid.
2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between
Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid

HELD:
The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese
marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee
has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found
the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be
valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the
legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights
accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court
held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
The presumption as to marriage is that every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together inapparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency of the law.
As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature
of a curative provision intended to safeguard society
by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid
Ching Huat vs. Co Heong, 77 Phil. 988, January 30, impugned and discredited by the alleged prior
1947 marriage.
Docket Number: No. L-1211
Ponente: HILADO Petition is hereby, dismissed, with costs to petitioner.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Ching Huat filed a writ of habeas corpus to
produce his minor child, Maria Ching alias Avelina
Ching and require respondent, Co Heong, to justify his
right to the custody over his child.

Huat alleged Co Heong for persuading and inducing

his 15 years old child, Maria Ching to elope with the
latter to Plaridel, Bulacan, where they married the
following day before the Justice of the Peace. Huat
further alleged that respondent has been married to
Gue Min, and that such marriage was contracted in
China is still subsisting.

Respondent however argues that he and Maria Ching

were legally married, that they met the essential
requisites for marriage hence a Local Civil Registrar
certificate to attest their marriage was issued.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner retains his right to the
custody of his minor daughter.

RULING:
No. The marriage between Maria Ching and
respondent was valid, hence, the marriage of a Maria
Ching emancipates her and brings about the loss by
the father of his parental authority.

Because the marriage was contracted by a man much

over 16 years old with a girl 15 years old (Act No.
3613, Section 2) and neither of whom was included in
any of the exceptions mentioned in Section 28 nor in
Section 29 of the same Act, both respondent and
Ching’s civil marriage by the Justice of the Peace is
therefore undisputed. On the other hand, Article 48 of
Chapter V of the Spanish Marriage Law of 1870,
whose articles 44 to 78 are now partly in force in the
Philippines states that the wife has the duty, among
others, of living in her husband's company and of
following him to wherever he transfers his domicile or
residence.

As for the alleged Marriage abroad, Act No. 3613,

Section 19 of the Marriage Law provides that “All
marriages performed outside of the Philippine Islands
in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were performed and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in these Islands." In this case, there
is no competent testimony as to what the laws of
China concerning marriage were and there is lacking
proof to produce a moral conviction of the existence of
the alleged prior Chinese marriage. The complete
absence of proof of the supposed former Chinese
marriage makes Sections 29 and 30 of the Marriage
Law inapplicable. In these circumstances, every
presumption is in favor of the validity and good faith of
the Philippine marriage, and sound reason requires
that the marriage of Heong and Ching be not
People v Dumpo well be presumed from the subsequent actions of the
girl.
Facts:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally
married according to the rites and practices of the
Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage being
dissolved, it has been alleged that Dumpo contracted
another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which they
lived together as husband and wife.

Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI

Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.

It has been established by the defense, without the

prosecution having presented objection or evidence to
the contrary, that the alleged second marriage was null
and void according to Mohammedan rites on the
ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had not given
his consent.

Issue:
Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.

Held:
No. Dumpo was acquitted.

The court formulated that there is no general

statement regarding the requisites necessary for the
validity of a marriage between Moros according to
Mohammedan rites. This is a fact which must be
subject to proof in every particular case.

In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari

(Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized to
solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was
that the effect of the consent of the father's bride is an
indispensable requirement for the validity of such
contracts.
It was easy for the prosecution to show that the
marriage was void by refuting Tahari's testimony
because there were 2 other Imans among the State
witnesses in the case, but it failed to do so.

Granting the absolute necessity of the father's consent,

tacit compliance may be presumed because it does
not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his
opposition to the 2nd marriage after he had been
informed of its celebration. But this presumption should
not be established over the affirmation of Dumpo's
father saying that he did not give his consent to the
2nd marriage.

It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd

marriage have all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage cannot be
considered as such, there is no justification to hold her
guilty of bigamy.

Dissent:
There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the
essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice Hull agrees
that the evidence relied upon is not worthy of serious
consideration. If consent were in fact necessary, it can
In re: estate of Jose Yap Siong, deceased. Maria Matrimonio, section 96; Gaines vs. Hennen, 65 U.S.,
Lao and Jose Lao vs. Dee Tim, Yap Kim Ting, et.al. 553.)
GR No. L-21017. 25 February 1924
A woman who is deceived by a man who represents
FACTS: himself as single and who marries him, she and her
Herein petitioners and the respondents are claiming to children born while the deception lasted, under the
be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his Spanish Law, are entitled to all the rights of a
estate.  Petitioner: claims to be the legitimate widow legitimate wife and children. o The common law
of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy allowing none of the incidents of a true marriage to
wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in the follow another marriage entered into during the
Philippine Islands and that Jose Lao is a legitimate continuance of a first, was early found to work a great
child born of that marriage. injustice upon the innocent parties to the second
marriage, and specially upon the offspring of such
Respondents: claims that she and Yap Siong were second marriage. o To remedy that hardship under the
joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of common law and following the wise jurisprudence of
September, 1893, in accordance with the laws of Spain, both England and many of the states of the
China, and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, United States adopted statutes.
and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of
that wedlock.  To support their respective contention, The foregoing conclusions in no way conflict with the
the parties presented their positive proof of marriage. decision of this court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng vs.
Petitioner presented, among others, certificates of Encarnacion (16 Phil., 137) nor with the decision of
marriage; while respondent presented a certificate of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee (43 Phil., 43), for the
marriage as well showing that it complied with the reason that in each of said cases a preponderance of
custom and practice in China. Additionally, respondent the evidence showed that no legal marriage had been
presented several witnesses. performed in China, that is, that the alleged Chinese
wife and the deceased in each of those cases had
To overcome such evidence of respondent, petitioner never been legally married.
presented a letter allegedly from the uncle of the
deceased urging the latter to marry, hence, deceased
was unmarried when petitioned and Yap Siong
contracted their marriage. However, the Court found
such letter as fabricated.

Accordingly, the court found after hearing the case that

a preponderance of the evidence shows that both Dee
Tim and Maria Lao were legally married to Yap Siong
in good faith, believing that each was his sole and
separate wife, living in absolute ignorance of the fact of
his double marriage. They were each married in good
faith and in ignorance of the existence of the other
marriage. Yap Siong up to the time of his death seems
to have been successful in keeping each of his two
wives ignorant of the fact that he was married to the
other.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the estate of Yap Siong be divided
between the two families.

HELD:
Yes, the Court held that under the Leyes de Partidas,
where two women innocently and in good faith are
legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their
children born will be regarded as legitimate children
and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate
of the husband upon distribution of his estate.

That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very

humane and wise law. It justly protects those who
innocently have entered into the solemn relation of
marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all
the parties will be presumed until the contrary is
positively proved. (Article 69, Civil Code; Las Leyes de
Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun testified that a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee
Yen, petitioners, versus Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel according to a Chinese custom.
Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and
Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents. Issue:
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988 Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in
China is valid.
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 Held:
in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving The law requires that a custom must be proved as a
behind real and personal properties here in the fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom
Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita competent evidence like any other fact.
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging
among others that: Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages
performed outside the Philippines in accordance with
a) They are the children of the deceased with the laws in force in the country where they were
Asuncion Gillego; performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be
as administratriz of the intestate estate of the considered as proof of China’s law or custom on
deceased. marriage not only because they are self-serving
evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, that they are competent to testify on the subject
Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot
be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts
a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must
on January 19, 1931 in China; be alleged and proved as any other fact.
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of
the deceased Yao Kee; and As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they
competent, willing and desirous to become the cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat. but only of acknowledged natural children.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on

January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not 2ND Ruling:
have a marriage certificate because the practice during To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must
that time was for elders to agree upon the bethrotal of be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law
their children, and in her case, her elder brother was as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
the one who contracted or entered into an agreement marriage by convincing evidence. Without proofs of
with the parents of her husband; that she and her said requisites, the foreign marriage cannot be
husband have been living in Fookien, China before he recognized in this country.
went to the Philippines; that in China, the custom is
that there is a go-between, a sort of marriage broker In this case the petitioners did not present any
who is known to both parties who would talk to the competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to- China on marriage. The testimonies presented cannot
be their son-in-law, then they agree on a date as an be considered as proof of China's law or custom on
engagement day; that on the wedding day, the marriage not only because they are self-serving
document would be signed by the parents of both evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing
parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known that they are competent to testify on the subject
in the Philippines; that the parties do not sign the matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom,
document themselves; and that she and Sy Kiat were and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
married for 46 years already and the document was accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
left in China and she doubt if that document can still be between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
found now. this jurisdiction.

The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of

Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of his sister
with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued
by the Chinese government, a document signed by the
parents and elders of the parties being sufficient.
Statements were made by Asuncion Gillego when she
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 mischievous results or contravenes the clear purpose
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. of the legislature, it should be construed according to
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
FACTS: extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
Article 26 of the Family Code to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one of them later acquired In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
remarried while in the U.S.A.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ of
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
was blessed with a son and a daughter. spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties
along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
citizen. abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married an American citizen.

Cipriano thereafter file with the trial court a petition for

authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code. No opposition was file. The court
granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thereafter, it
filed petition to the Supreme Court raising a pure
question of law.

ISSUE:
Should the respondent be allowed to remarry under
Article 26 of the Family Code?

HELD:
Yes.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

deliberations showed that according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.

Thus, taking into consideration this legislative intent

and applying this rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the
other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity

and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute

according to its exact and literal import leads to
Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This is not
GR. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961 what the legislators intended.

DOCTRINE: “Reciprocity must be total. If any of the SPECIFICALLY:

two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any Section122 of the NIRC provides that “No tax shall be
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any collected under this Title in respect of intangible
character, the reciprocity does not work.” personal property

FACTS: (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a

Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of resident of a foreign country which at the time of his
British parents, married in Manila to another British death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of
subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where any character in respect of intangible personal
he and his wife moved to. property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in
that foreign country, or
In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to
certain real and personal properties, among which are (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the
210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow
Mines (Mines). a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes
of every character in respect of intangible personal
Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary property owned by citizens of the Philippines not
administrator of his estate filed an estate and residing in that foreign country."
inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to
secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California
Mines shares of stock. Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible personal
property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the time
In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests of his death was a resident of a territory or another
in the estate to the spouses Fisher. State of the United States or of a foreign state or
country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or
Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax death tax in respect to intangible personal property of
return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of its own residents, but either:.
which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines’ Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of
shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the any character in respect to intangible personal
NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially property of residents of this State, or Had in its laws a
paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed in reciprocal provision under which intangible personal
the CFI of Manila for the said amount. property of a non-resident was exempt from legacy,
succession, or death taxes of every character if the
CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be Territory or other State of the United States or foreign
deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b) the state or country in which the nonresident resided
intangible personal property belonging to the estate of allowed a similar exemption in respect to intangible
Walter is exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the personal property of residents of the Territory or State
reciprocity proviso in NIRC. of the United States or foreign state or country of
residence of the decedent."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the
reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting exemption
from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of
stock.

RULING:
NO. Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states
collects or imposes or does not exempt any transfer,
death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the
reciprocity does not work.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or

resident, or non-resident with properties, there are
imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an
inheritance tax.

But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is

imposed. Also, although the Federal Internal Revenue
Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant
exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino