G.R. No.

L-11622 January 28, 1961 properties declared therein, but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. DOUGLAS located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value in the amount of P52.200.00,
FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, instead of P43,500.00. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary
respondents. administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of P2,000.00 and for judicial and
administration expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector assessed the state
BARRERA, J.: the amount of P5,147.98 for estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a
total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were paid by the estate on June 6,
This case relates to the determination and settlement of the hereditary estate left 1952.
by the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G.
Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 of British parents and On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator filed in amended estate and
married in the City of Manila on January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson inheritance tax return in pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing of the
another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in San Francisco, California, preliminary return and for the purpose of availing of the right granted by section 91
U.S.A. whereto he and his wife moved and established their permanent residence of the National Internal Revenue Code.
since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and
which was duly probated in the Superior Court of California on April 11, 1951, In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the
Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his sole heiress to the following real and Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally
personal properties acquired by the spouses while residing in the Philippines, declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation of P79,800.00 to
described and preliminary assessed as follows: P42,000.00. This change in price per share of stock was based by the ancillary
administrator on the market notation of the stock obtaining at the San Francisco
Gross Estate California) Stock Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, that is, As of
Real Property — 2 parcels of land in Baguio, covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 August 22, 1931. In addition, the ancillary administrator made claim for the
= P43,500.00 following deductions:

Personal Property Funeral expenses ($1,04326) = P2,086.52

(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at P10.00 each = 1,770.00
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per Judicial Expenses:
share = 79,800.00 (a) Administrator's Fee = P1,204.34
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. =4,870.88 (b) Attorney's Fee = 6.000.00
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China = 851.97 (c) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9, 1952 = 1,400.05
= 8,604.39
Total Gross Assets = P130,792.85 Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836) =
652.50
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration proceedings were instituted in the Court Claims against the estate:
of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in the Philippines. In due ($5,000.00) P10,000.00 = P10,000.00
time Stevenson's will was duly admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22, 1951
Statt was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, who on July 11, 1951, 22.47
filed a preliminary estate and inheritance tax return with the reservation of having 10,022.47
the properties declared therein finally appraised at their values six months after the Sub-Total
death of Stevenson. Preliminary return was made by the ancillary administrator in P21,365.88
order to secure the waiver of the Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance
tax due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc. In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson assigned all
which the estate then desired to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and Bettina Fisher,
return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the valuation of the personal respondents herein.

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On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator filed a second amended estate Together, the assigned errors raise the following main issues for resolution by this
and inheritance tax return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same assets of Court:
the estate stated in the amended return of September 22, 1952, except that it
contained new claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit: (1) deduction (1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, one-half
in the amount of P4,000.00 from the gross estate of the decedent as provided for (½) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile surviving
in Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue Code which the ancillary spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal partnership and in relation to
administrator averred was allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section section 89 (c) of the National Internal revenue Code;
122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then held by the Board of Tax (2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso embodied in
Appeals in case No. 71 entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952; and (2) Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption from the
exemption from the imposition of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 payment of estate and inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in the
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant to the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines Inc.;
reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In this (3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by
last return, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the amount of P525.34 for Section 861, U.S. Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of the National
estate tax and P238.06 for inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had Internal Revenue Code;
overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of P15,259.83, allegedly (4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the decedent located in Baguio City
overpaid, was accordingly requested by the estate. The Collector denied the claim. and the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., were
For this reason, action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by correctly appraised by the lower court;
respondents, as assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the recovery of (5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the following deductions: P8,604.39 for
said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the judicial and administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral expenses; P652.50 for
Court of Tax Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision the dispositive real estate taxes; and P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness
portion of which reads as follows: allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; and
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the payment of interest on the amount it
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a) the one-half (½) share of the claims to have overpaid the government and to be refundable to it.
surviving spouse in the conjugal partnership property as diminished by the
obligations properly chargeable to such property should be deducted from the net In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a well-known doctrine in our civil
estate of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to Section 89-C of the law that in the absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the intangible personal property belonging to presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal partnership as to the properties
the estate of said Stevenson is exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the acquired during their marriage. The application of this doctrine to the instant case
provision of section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to the is being disputed, however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, who
California Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not entitled to an contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New Civil Code, the property relation
exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of of the spouses Stevensons ought not to be determined by the Philippine law, but
estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real estate of the spouses should be by the national law of the decedent husband, in this case, the law of England. It is
valued at P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode alleged by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal partnership between
Mines, Inc. should be appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate shall be spouses, and that what obtains in that jurisdiction is another regime of property
entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for funeral expenses and judicial expenses of relation, wherein all properties acquired during the marriage pertain and belong
P8,604.39. Exclusively to the husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner cites Article
16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the old) to the effect that in testate and
From this decision, both parties appealed. intestate proceedings, the amount of successional rights, among others, is to be
determined by the national law of the decedent.
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called petitioner assigned four
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and In this connection, let it be noted that since the mariage of the Stevensons in the
Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made six assignments of error. Philippines took place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the old Civil
Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil Code which became effective only in

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1950. It is true that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality theory of of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil
determining the property relation of spouses where one of them is a foreigner and Code.) We, therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted the half of the
they have made no prior agreement as to the administration disposition, and conjugal property in determining the hereditary estate left by the deceased
ownership of their conjugal properties. In such a case, the national law of the Stevenson.
husband becomes the dominant law in determining the property relation of the
spouses. There is, however, a difference between the two articles in that Article On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of the Tax Court in the
1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that it shall be applicable regardless exempting the respondents from paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of
of whether the marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad while Article stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of the reciprocity proviso
13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to marriages contracted in a foreign land. of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851
of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the ground that: (1) the said
It must be noted, however, that what has just been said refers to mixed marriages proviso of the California Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly proven by
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both spouses are the respondents; (2) the reciprocity exemptions granted by section 122 of the
foreigners who married in the Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has National Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by residents of foreign
this to say on this point: countries and not of residents of a state in the United States; and (3) there is no
"total" reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of California in that while
La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en the former exempts payment of both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible
Espana y entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las celebradas en el extranjero cuando personal properties, the latter only exempts the payment of inheritance tax..
alguno de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la regla procedente cuando dos
extranjeros se casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el extranjero hay que To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison Gibbs, counsel for herein
atender en el primer caso a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos pertenezean, y respondents, testified that as an active member of the California Bar since 1931,
en el segundo, a las reglas generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y 10 de he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When
nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.) asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California law as regards exemption
of intangible personal properties, the witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and
If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law determinative of the property relation of (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derring's
the Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English law even if the marriage California Code, a publication of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of
was celebrated in the Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But, as correctly his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence as
observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent English law that allegedly vests in the Exhibits "V-2" by the respondents.
decedent husband full ownership of the properties acquired during the marriage
has not been proven by petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer, It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any evidence as to what English law our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any other fact,
says on the matter. In the absence of proof, the Court is justified, therefore, in they must be alleged and proved.6
indulging in what Wharton calls "processual presumption," in presuming that the
law of England on this matter is the same as our law.4 Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes the manner of proving
foreign laws before our tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable that
Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article 16 of the New Civil Code (art. these laws be proved in accordance with said rule, we held in the case of
10, old Civil Code) to bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old Civil Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of sections
Code, which incidentally is the one applicable, shows that it does not encompass 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 123) will
or contemplate to govern the question of property relation between spouses. Said convince one that these sections do not exclude the presentation of other
article distinctly speaks of amount of successional rights and this term, in speaks in competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law." In that case, we
our opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of property that each heir is considered the testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California who
legally entitled to inherit from the estate available for distribution. It needs to be quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
pointed out that the property relation of spouses, as distinguished from their was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to
successional rights, is governed differently by the specific and express provisions establish the existence of said law. In line with this view, we find no error,

3
therefore, on the part of the Tax Court in considering the pertinent California law as succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work. This is the
proved by respondents' witness. underlying principle of the reciprocity clauses in both laws.

We now take up the question of reciprocity in exemption from transfer or death In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with
taxes, between the State of California and the Philippines.F properties therein, there are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both an
estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is
Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in pertinent part, provides: imposed. On the other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code imposes an
estate tax on non-residents not citizens of the United States,7 but does not provide
... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect for any exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these laws in the manner
of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a the Court of Tax Appeals did in the instant case, we will have a situation where a
resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but has intangible personal
transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible personal properties here, will the subject to the payment of an estate tax, although exempt
property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if from the payment of the inheritance tax. This being the case, will a Filipino, non-
the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of resident of California, but with intangible personal properties there, be entitled to
his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every the exemption clause of the California law, since the Californian has not been
character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the exempted from every character of legacy, succession, or death tax because he is,
Philippines not residing in that foreign country." (Emphasis supplied). under our law, under obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand, if we
exempt the Californian from paying the estate tax, we do not thereby entitle a
On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as Filipino to be exempt from a similar estate tax in California because under the
pertinent, reads:. Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in California he is bound to pay the
same, there being no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both instances,
"SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: Conditions. Intangible personal property the Filipino citizen is always at a disadvantage. We do not believe that our
is exempt from the tax imposed by this part if the decedent at the time of his death legislature has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment of our own
was a resident of a territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign government and people. We, therefore, find and declare that the lower court erred
state or country which then imposed a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect in exempting the estate in question from payment of the inheritance tax.
to intangible personal property of its own residents, but either:.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs.
(a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to Lara (G.R. Nos. L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G. 2881)
intangible personal property of residents of this State, or exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H. Miller from payment of the
inheritance tax imposed by the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted,
(b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property however, that the issue of reciprocity between the pertinent provisions of our tax
of a non-resident was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every law and that of the State of California was not there squarely raised, and the ruling
character if the Territory or other State of the United States or foreign state or therein cannot control the determination of the case at bar. Be that as it may, we
country in which the nonresident resided allowed a similar exemption in respect to now declare that in view of the express provisions of both the Philippine and
intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State of the United California laws that the exemption would apply only if the law of the other grants an
States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent." (Id.) exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character, there could
not be partial reciprocity. It would have to be total or none at all.
It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the reciprocity must be total, that
is, with respect to transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in the case of With respect to the question of deduction or reduction in the amount of P4,000.00
the Philippine law, and to legacy, succession, or death taxes of any and every based on the U.S. Federal Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by
character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, if any of the two states respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the
collects or imposes and does not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the nature of
a deduction and not of an exemption regarding which reciprocity cannot be

4
claimed under the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code. months after the death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents
Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. . have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid for at only P.325 (p.
103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two parcels of land situated been questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the court
in Baguio City, it is contended that their assessed values, as appearing in the tax below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained
rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, ought to have been considered by to reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold that the value of a share in the
petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the National Internal said mining company on August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 as
Revenue Code. It should be pointed out, however, that in accordance with said claimed by respondents..
proviso the properties are required to be appraised at their fair market value and
the assessed value thereof shall be considered as the fair market value only when It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court valued each share of stock
evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the record, we are of P.38 on the basis of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return.
satisfied that such evidence exists to justify the valuation made by petitioner which Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the fact that the ancillary
was sustained by the tax court, for as the tax court aptly observed: administrator had reserved and availed of his legal right to have the properties of
the estate declared at their fair market value as of six months from the time the
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters were valued by the decedent died..
administrator of the estate in the Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at
P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said properties. On the other hand, On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions, from the allowance or
defendant appraised the same at P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this disallowance of which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and respondents have
Court can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for real estate taxation appealed..
purposes are very much lower than the true and fair market value of the properties
at a given time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or in 1952 the Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of record exists to support the
said properties were sold for a price of P72,000.00 and there is no showing that allowance of the sum of P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
special or extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase from the price
of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1) Administrator's fee
1951. Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court that he P1,204.34
was willing to purchase the said properties at P2.00 per square meter. In the light
of these facts we believe and therefore hold that the valuation of P52,200.00 of the 2) Attorney's fee
real estate in Baguio made by defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the 6,000.00
premises." (Decision, p. 19).
3) Judicial and Administrative expenses
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother 2,052.55
Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic corporation), respondents contend that their value Total Deductions
should be fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at the San Francisco P8,604.39
(California) Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of stocks were then
held in that place and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree An examination of the record discloses, however, that the foregoing items were
with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of stock, for purposes of considered deductible by the Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the
taxation, being located here in the Philippines, as respondents themselves probate court to which said expenses, we may presume, had also been presented
concede and considering that they are sought to be taxed in this jurisdiction, for consideration. It is to be supposed that the probate court would not have
consistent with the exercise of our government's taxing authority, their fair market approved said items were they not supported by evidence presented by the estate.
value should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in our country. In allowing the items in question, the Tax Court had before it the pertinent order of
the probate court which was submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2",
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other contention that the said p. 100, record). As the Tax Court said, it found no basis for departing from the
shares of stock commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock Exchange six findings of the probate court, as it must have been satisfied that those expenses

5
were actually incurred. Under the circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-
finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California National Association, which it 59, record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the ground that the local
would appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not probate court had not approved the same as a valid claim against the estate and
inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in respect to the additional amount because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to intangible personal property
of P86.52 for funeral expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo for lack which the Tax Court held to be exempt from inheritance tax.
of evidence.
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower court in disallowing the
In connection with the deduction of P652.50 representing the amount of realty deduction.
taxes paid in 1951 on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City, which
respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax Court, we find that this claim has in Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine probate court of this particular
fact been allowed. What happened here, which a careful review of the record will indebtedness of the decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, it is
reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing the liabilities of the estate, viz: averred has been already admitted and approved by the corresponding probate
court in California, situs of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true that
1) Administrator's fee we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary administration in this case, but, it
P1,204.34 has been held, the distinction between domiciliary or principal administration and
ancillary administration serves only to distinguish one administration from the
2) Attorney's fee other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent.8 The reason for the
6,000.00 ancillary administration is that, a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore,
have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, we
3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9, 1952 have the requirement that before a will duly probated outside of the Philippines can
2,052.55 have effect here, it must first be proved and allowed before our courts, in much the
same manner as wills originally presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate
Total shall be administered under letters testamentary, or letters of administration
P9,256.89 granted by the court, and disposed of according to the will as probated, after
payment of just debts and expenses of administration.10 In other words, there is a
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the estate, to the P1,400.05 for regular administration under the control of the court, where claims must be
judicial and administration expenses approved by the court, making a total of presented and approved, and expenses of administration allowed before
P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived at by the Tax Court for deductions from the estate can be authorized. Otherwise, we would have the
judicial and administration expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of actuations of our own probate court, in the settlement and distribution of the estate
P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, and the P8,604.39 as found by situated here, subject to the proceedings before the foreign court over which our
the probate court, which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty taxes. An courts have no control. We do not believe such a procedure is countenanced or
evident oversight has involuntarily been made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral contemplated in the Rules of Court.
expenses in the final computation. This amount has been expressly allowed by the
lower court and there is no reason why it should not be. . Another reason for the disallowance of this indebtedness as a deduction, springs
from the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the National Internal
We come now to the other claim of respondents that pursuant to section 89(b) (1) Revenue Code which reads:
in relation to section 89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal Revenue
Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should have been allowed the estate as a (d) Miscellaneous provisions — (1) No deductions shall be allowed in the case of a
deduction, because it represented an indebtedness of the decedent incurred non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines unless the executor, administrator or
during his lifetime. In support thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified anyone of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in the return required to be filed
claim, presented to the probate court in California by the Bank of California under section ninety-three the value at the time of his death of that part of the
National Association, which it would appear, that while still living, Walter G. gross estate of the non-resident not situated in the Philippines."
Stevenson obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on 140,000 of his

6
In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross estate of the non-resident Respondent's claim for interest on the amount allegedly overpaid, if any actually
Stevenson not situated in the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted to results after a recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby denied in line
the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue. The with our recent decision in Collector of Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital
purpose of this requirement is to enable the revenue officer to determine how (G.R. No. L-12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the absence of a
much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to (b), number statutory provision clearly or expressly directing or authorizing such payment, and
(1) of the same section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides: none has been cited by respondents, the National Government cannot be required
to pay interest."
(b) Deductions allowed to non-resident estates. — In the case of a non-resident
not a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting from the value of that part of his gross WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore indicated, the judgment of
estate which at the time of his death is situated in the Philippines — the lower court is hereby affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent herewith.
No costs. So ordered.
(1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and taxes. — That proportion of the
deductions specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of this section11 which the
value of such part bears the value of his entire gross estate wherever situated;"

In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the extent of the portion of the
indebtedness which is equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the Philippines
bears to the total estate wherever situated. Stated differently, if the properties in
the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets wherever situated, then only
1/5 of the indebtedness may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted to,
there is no statement of the value of the estate situated outside the Philippines, no
part of the indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted, pursuant to Section 89,
letter (d), number (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the lower court disallowing the
deduction of the alleged indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.

In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:

(a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal
partnership property constitutes his hereditary estate subject to the estate and
inheritance taxes;
(b) the intangible personal property is not exempt from inheritance tax, there
existing no complete total reciprocity as required in section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, nor is the decedent's estate entitled to an exemption of
P4,000.00 in the computation of the estate tax;
(c) for the purpose of the estate and inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock
in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are to be appraised at P0.325 per share;
and
(d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should be deducted in the determination of
the net asset of the deceased Stevenson.

In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed.

7
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 [T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
QUISUMBING, J.: Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion The parental custody for the children Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
allegedly committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987 is granted to the father.
trial court, in matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by
petitioner. The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20,
September 30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96- the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving
1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the
trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s
issues relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
children. with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent.
private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in
Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was
1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the
Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. instant case as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent
Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been
1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of
order7 dated May 28, 1997. the mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the
capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied
in an order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of
appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.
The pertinent portion of said order provides:
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999
filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering
The decree provides in part: that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an
amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as
being still married to his or her alien spouse though the latter is no longer married

8
to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a divorce abroad which is The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
recognized by his/her national law, and considering further the effects of the relied upon is not indubitable.
termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of the
same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
and the support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is (Emphasis supplied.)
partially set aside with respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this
Court. Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action
or claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was order dated July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely
denied by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12 filing of respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997
discretion on the part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
following:
Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as
is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence
had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Hamburg, Germany.
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the
Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr. may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable
without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest. (Emphasis
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues: supplied.)

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration
order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed
1999; and a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court. same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment
completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher
16, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are
even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action yet attained finality.
or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

9
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
abuse of discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany. personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of such, is subject to proof to the contrary.24
Appeals,21 we consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay- opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis
Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to
obtained by a German citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court
held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce
our civil law on the status of persons. decree itself states that neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has
she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist her in
1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to
parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a
binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner. was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth
and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23 Before our Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award questions concerning his care and custody. 28
of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, exceeded the bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: concerning property relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private
respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or
community property nor have they incurred any debts during their marriage."29
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall
the title to the thing; grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence accounted for, respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent resolve a matter no longer deemed in controversy.
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue
regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and

10
private respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to
settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,
issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care,
support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine
Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

11
[G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.] 4. ID.; CONTRACT OF SERVICES WHEN NOT OPPRESSIVE OR
In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant- INEQUITABLE. — Considering the character of the services rendered by the
appellee, v. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants- attorney in the case at bar, the nature and importance of the issues in said
Appellants. litigations, the amount of labor, time (1944 to 1952) and the trouble involved
therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases, the value of the property
SYLLABUS affected by the controversy the professional character and standing of the lawyer,
the risks assumed and the results obtained, Held: that the character and standing
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE‘S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES of the lawyer, the risks assumed and the results obtained, Held: that the contract of
WITHOUT HUSBAND‘S CONSENT; CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT BIND THE LATTER. — Where the wife
executed a contract of professional services whereby she binds herself among 5. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE‘S
other things that she agrees to pay her attorney twenty (20%) per cent of the value CONTRACT OF SERVICES; 20% CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN
of the share and participation which she may receive in the funds and properties of CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; INTENTION TO FILE SUIT FOR DIVORCE AS
the conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, such contract does not seek CONDITION; RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE BY WIFE. — The contract of services
to bind the conjugal partnership. The wife merely bound herself — and assumed was made principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce which the wife intended
the personal obligation — to pay by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in to file before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of the conjugal
said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give to her lawyer any partnership between’ her and her husband. Had she filed said action for divorce
right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount and secure a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. dissolved and then liquidated and the share of the wife therein would have been
fixed. However this cannot take place, either now or in the forseeable future owing
2. ID.; CONTINGENT FEES NOT PROHIBITED IN THE PHILIPPINES. — to the agreements between the wife and her husband which were made for the
Appellants contention "that article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippine in effect evident purpose of defeating the attorney’s claim for his fees. In other words the
prohibit contingent fees in untenable. Contingent fees are not prohibited in the occurrences within the time contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the
Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Canons (No. 13) of Professional nature of and circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of
Ethics. (See also Ulanday v. Manila Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554). services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was
rendered impossible by the wife. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a
3. ID.; WIFE‘S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES; INTERPRETED AND condition or as a period, she may not insist upon its occurrence prior to the
CONSTRUED. — Appellant’s contention that the contract in question has for it enforcement of the rights of the lawyer, for "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled
purpose to secure of divorce allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment," (Art. 1186 Civil Code) and "the
of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not borne out either by the language of the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period" when he "violates any
contract between them or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not undertaking in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198,
to secure a divorce or facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely Civil Code).
sought to protect the interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership, during the
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, DECISION
inasmuch as the husband and wife are admittedly citizens of the United States,
their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Art. 9 of the CONCEPCION, J.:
Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the
execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a
Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of
the contract of services, between the wife and her lawyer, is not contrary to law, the following tenor:.
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
"The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the
contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.

12
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the "3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro M. Recto in
Commissioner with the above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro M. connection with the case above referred to, and said case being for the purposes
Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in the amount of support I now receive
ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS as well as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the properties of the
(P384,110.97), representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden’s share in the conjugal partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the liquidation of said
conjugal properties owned by her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent partnership, I hereby agree to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per
fee stipulated in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ cent of the value of the share and participation which I may receive in the funds
or 20, and the said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said and properties of the said conjugal partnership of myself and defendant Fred M.
amount above-stated." It appears that sometime in July, 1941, appellant, Mrs. Harden, as a result of the liquidation thereof either by death, divorce, judicial
Harden, and appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the following:chanroblesvirtual separation, compromise or by any means or method by virtue of which said
1awlibrary partnership is or may be liquidated.

"CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE "4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my account, but the
PRESENTS: same may be advanced by Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be reimbursed to him
either from the money which I receive by way of support or from the funds of the
"That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to Fred M. Harden, conjugal partnership.
and temporarily residing in the Philippines, with address at 534 Sales Street,
Manila, have engaged the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear and act "5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of Attorney Claro
as my counsel in the action which I will file against my husband, Fred M. Harden, M. Recto in connection with the securing of the liquidation of the properties and
for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support being received by assets of the conjugal partnership of myself and Fred M. Harden, upon dissolution
me from the conjugal partnership of myself and said Fred M. Harden, and for the of said partnership or for any other cause mentioned in Paragraph (3) hereof.
purpose likewise of protecting and preserving my rights in the properties of the
said conjugal partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit which I intent to file IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the City _____ of
against him in the competent Court of California and of the liquidation of the Manila, Philippines this _______ day of July, 1941.
conjugal partnership between us, this contract of services to be under the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary s/ Esperanza P. de Harden

"1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not in a position t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
to pay, I hereby agree to pay Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment to be made
monthly, during the pendency of the litigation and until the termination of the same, ACCEPTED:
twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or pension which may
be awarded to me by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00 which I s/ Claro M. Recto
now receive monthly from defendant Fred M. Harden out of the funds of the
conjugal partnership; Provided, that should the case be terminated or an amicable t/ CLARO M. RECTO"
settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years
from the date of the filing of the complaint, I shall continue to pay the said twenty- In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the appellee, as counsel for Mrs.
five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period. Harden, commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled "Esperanza P. de Harden v. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides." In the
"2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to whatever amount complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other things: (a) that Mrs. Harden be
may be adjudged by the court against the defendant Fred M. Harden or against the given the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of the conjugal
conjugal partnership by way of litis expense, that is, attorney’s fees chargeable as partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (b) that, in the event of denial of this prayer,
expenses of litigation. the defendants be ordered to inform her "of everything pertaining to the
administration of said business and properties", as well as to render accounts

13
thereof and to permit her to examine the books and records pertinent thereto; (c) covering all business transactions passed through said special bank account and
that Mr. Harden be ordered to account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this the same be opened for inspection by the plaintiff’s duly authorized representative.
jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44 allegedly withdrawn by him from the
Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong on April 1, 1941; (d) that defendant "The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above extent, and
Salumbides be ordered to account for all moneys, amounting to P285,000.00, in all other respects is maintained."chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
belonging to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and deposited
by him in a safety box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under
January 23 to December 23, 1940; (e) that the transfer, in the name of military occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of
Salumbides, of certain shares of stock, allegedly belonging to the conjugal this case were destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records were reconstituted at
partnership, be rescinded and said defendant ordered to transfer said shares of the instance of appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in
stock in the name of Mrs. Harden or in that of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October
Harden be allowed to continue as administrator of said partnership; ( f ) that the 31, 1949, a decision the dispositive part of which we quote:
transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or by defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-
fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo Mining Company, to some residents "In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that — "(a)
of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares returned to the assets of the conjugal Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey and established a
partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; (g) that the monthly domicile of choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500 to P15,000; (h) that, pending
final decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the allowance or pension of Mrs. "(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden was
Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to P10,000 a month; and (i) that a writ established in Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on December 14,
of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendants from disposing of the 1917;
assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
"(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their marriage, all
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ, the properties, real or personal, acquired by either or both of them on and after
upon the filing of the corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an December 14, 1917, up to the present, over and above the sum of P20,000.00
agreement submitted by both parties, and with a view to avoiding unnecessary representing Fred M. Harden’s capital, are hereby declared conjugal properties;
embarrassment, restraint or inconvenience in the financial operations of the
business enterprises affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the same was "(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety deposit
amended by an order dated July 19, 1941, in the sense that. boxes in the name of Jose Salumbides, the selling price of the house in Los
Angeles, California, and the pre-war and post-war remittances abroad of Fred M.
". . . without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a separate Harden, from which has already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00 covering
bank account be established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, payments for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorney’s fees, both in the tax
of Manila, and all transactions in connection with the aforesaid businesses passed case and the present one, is hereby declared chargeable to the share of defendant
through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized representative, who at Harden and deductible from whatever participation he may still have in the said
present is Mr. Salumbides, without the necessity of securing a particular order from conjugal partnership upon the liquidation thereof, upon his failure to return and
this Court on each occasion; that the present funds in the Philippine National Bank deposit them in the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila branch of the
in the name of Plaza Lunch and Fred M. Harden be utilized for the purpose of Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to the time this decision shall
starting said special bank account in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and become final;
China; that all income from the aforesaid businesses be deposited in this special
bank account and no checks be drawn upon the same, except to pay the "(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owner’s duplicate of Transfer
necessary overhead and running expenses including purchases of tobacco, Certificates of Title Nos. 24393, 52436 and 54911 of the Register of Deeds of
merchandise, etc., required for the proper operation of said businesses; that a new Manila and in Original Certificate of Title No. 2292 of Quezon Province, and on all
set of books be opened by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized representative the certificates of shares belonging to said conjugal partnership, as well as in the
corresponding books of the companies or corporations issuing them, whereby it

14
will be made to appear that any subsequent alienation or encumbrance of said P500 to be paid by him to her; (2) Mr. Harden had created a trust fund of $20,000
properties by Fred M. Harden alone or his representative without the consent of his from which said monthly pension of $500 would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs.
wife will be deemed fraudulent and subject to revocation or cancellation for being Harden had mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions,
in fraud and prejudicial to the right of Esperanza P. de Harden; debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to the conjugal partnership, in
consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in appellee’s
"( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have become final, "manifestation", that the purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs.
Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to execute a Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney’s fees, for which reason,
document to be approved by this court creating and express active trust upon the he prayed, in his aforementioned motion, that
remaining cash assets and income of the conjugal partnership in the Philippines,
whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila, will act as trustee, "a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein be
subject to the right of Fred M. Harden to receive therefrom the sum of P2,500,00 a authorized to continue holding the properties above mentioned in his custody in
month by way of allowance and an equal amount for the plaintiff as separate order not to defeat the undersigned’s inchoate lien on them;
support and maintenance;
"b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and those of the
"(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final, Fred M. plaintiff and the defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the amount of
Harden shall inform the plaintiff of all the properties and businesses of the conjugal fees due to the undersigned, by the appointment of a referee or commissioner for
partnership, be they in the Philippines or abroad, and render a true and complete the reception of such
accounting of the earnings and profits thereof;
"c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum of
"(h) The plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of P175,000.00 for P400,000.00 as his fees for services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff in this case,
services rendered by her counsel up to the rendition of this judgment, which Fred under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex ‘A’ , and to that end a charging lien
M. Harden or the herein receiver is ordered to pay within a period of fifteen (15) therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;
days after this decision has become final; and
"d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full amount of the
"(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby declared fees to which the latter is found to be entitled."
permanent and the order of receivership of November 20, 1946, is hereby
maintained, but said auxiliary remedies will be automatically lifted upon the Counsel for the defendants-appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the
conclusion of the annotation of the conjugal lien and the execution of the deed of case, to which appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for
trust above mentioned. Without costs. dismissal and in appellee’s motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as
counsel for Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the
"IT IS SO ORDERED." pertinent part of which reads:

The defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was "It will be seen from the above that the defendants-appellants pray for the
docketed as case No. L-3687. While the appeal was thus pending before us, complete dismissal of the above entitled case without prejudice to the annotation
herein appellee filed a manifestation and a motion, both dated February 20, 1952. of the contingent claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto on the property under
In said "manifestation", appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed him, by receivership, other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company which
letter, to "discontinue all proceedings relative to" said case, "vacate all orders and belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto agrees to
judgments rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and
partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden", in accordance with several commitment, and all other interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of
instruments dated January 29, 1952, and executed without the knowledge, advise this case, with the exception of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal of the
and consent of said appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, whereby: (1) Mr. and case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an auxiliary remedy, the
Mrs. Harden had purportedly agreed to settle their differences in consideration of present case should be allowed to remain pending for the purpose of maintaining
the sum of $5,000 paid by Mr. Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of the receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due him.

15
"Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be immediately case and those cases growing out of it which reached the Supreme Court, and the
appointed by this Court to receive evidence in support of his allegations as to his extra services he rendered in her behalf in the tax and other court cases, the
attorney’s lien and its enforcement. Counsel for the defendants-appellants does undersigned Commissioner concludes that claimant is entitled to the full amount of
not object to this proceeding provided that the restrictions set forth by him be 20% of Esperanza Harden’s share of the conjugal properties, as provided in
observed. However, this Court does not have the proper facilities for receiving paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ.
evidence in order to determine the amount of the fees claimed by Attorney Claro
M. Recto, and it is deemed advisable that this matter be determined by the Court "WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends that
of First Instance. This is specially so considering the opposition to the claim of Atty. Claro M. Recto be paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P. de
Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of Esperanza Harden’s share of the conjugal properties or the sum of P369,410.04 as his
P. de Harden. contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf."

"In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby remanded to the court After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30,
of origin in order to determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. 1953, adopting substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the
Recto in his motion dated February 20, 1952. contingent fee of appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the
report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
"It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid, this
case will be completely dismissed as prayed for by the defendants-appellants, The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted
without prejudice to considering the claim of the receiver for compensation as contract of services, which the appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:
stated in his urgent motion dated July 2, 1952. "Pending the determination of the (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband’s
amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, the writ of preliminary consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits
injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all interlocutory orders contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a
which were issued in the course of this case, are hereby lifted and vacated, and decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil
with regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved, only with respect to Code of the Philippines; and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh,
the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the rest of the inequitable and oppressive.
properties, the receivership shall be maintained."
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to the seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden
lower court, which, on September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive merely bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay, by way of
evidence on the amount of the fees collectible by herein appellee and to report contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives,
thereon. After due hearing, said commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953, a nor purports to give, to the appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and
report of about one hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of
forth, in detail, the evidence introduced by both parties, and his findings of fact, said fees.
with the following conclusion and recommendation:
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has
"Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this litigation, the already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are
length of time in which claimant had handled the same for Esperanza Harden, the impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also,
volume and quality of the work performed, the complicated legal questions Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in
involved, the responsibility assumed by the claimant as counsel, his reputation in the United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while handling the same in which he
had to work hard every inch of the way because of the stiff oppositions filed by ". . . in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the validity of
adverse counsel, the diligence he employed not only in the preservation of the contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in contravention of
records in his possession during the days of enemy occupation but also in the public policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an unfair or unreasonable
protection of the interests of Esperanza Harden, his successful handling of said

16
advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned." (See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940
seq.; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.) and 1941.

Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that Again, it appears that appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the
appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of following services, for the benefit of Mrs. Harden:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary
his client Mrs. Harden.
1. He succeeded in defeating defendants’ motion for the dissolution of the writ of
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between preliminary injunction, issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on July
them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a 19, 1941.
divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to
protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the 2. On November 12, 1946, appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver, upon
pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, the ground that, despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the defendants had
inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, been disposing of the properties of the conjugal partnership for the purpose of
their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an order dated November
Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the 20, 1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of said
execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the properties, upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on February 13,
Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, 1947, that the receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed to file a
the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein appellee, is not contrary bond for the discharge of the receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto,
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. unless the defendants posted a P4,000,000 bond. Subsequently or on March 5,
1947, the defendants sought a reconsideration of the order of November 20, 1946,
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one and the discharge of the receiver. By an order dated March 21, 1947, the Court
who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., v. Dy Buncio & Co., authorized said discharged upon the filing, by the defendants, of a bond in the sum
93 Phil., 195; 30 C. J. S. 475), and appellants have not done so, for the of P500,000, provided that Mr. Harden "should bring back all the 368,553 shares of
circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of
aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, at Manila . . .
between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or
defeating the rights of herein appellee, under his above-quoted contract of services "3. On motion of the appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order dated
with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor, acknowledging April 5, 1947, directed Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to be
her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which turned out to be worth charged against her litis expensae. Upon similar motion, filed by appellee on or
almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13, 1947, to furnish
inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the Mrs. Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum
of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to 4. On June 21, 1947, the defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499 of
be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact, no explanation this Court, entitled "Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides v. Emilio Peña,
has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Abelardo Perez and Esperanza P. Harden" for the purpose of annulling and setting
Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the aside, by writ of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July
spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said 12, 1941, November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in
alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the relations between said the meantime, the enforcement thereof. After appropriate proceedings, in the
spouses — which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden course of which appellee appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like counsel
engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden for the petitioners therein, filed several lengthy, detailed pleadings and
were separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence memoranda, decision was rendered on November 21, 1950, denying the writ of
by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the certiorari prayed for.

17
5. On or about September 9, 1947, appellee filed a motion alleging that despite the 8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the appellee
writ of preliminary injunction above mentioned, the defendants had, fraudulently made representations with the Japanese Government to prevent the
and without judicial consent, remitted abroad several sums of money aggregating commandeering of a business establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to return this sum to the Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs.
Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the account of Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former’s deposit in
the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and a local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent
China. Mr. Harden objected to said motion. Appellee filed a rejoinder, to which Mr. her money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of
Harden replied. Appellee filed a rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the the records and papers pertaining to the business and other properties of the
Court granted appellee’s motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
opposed by the appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order dated
November 13, 1947. Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the 9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity, took
suspension of this order, which was immediately objected to by the appellee and all steps essential for the proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among
then denied by the Court. other things, appellee sought and obtained judicial authority for some important
acts of administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He (appellee) secured
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied with, judicial intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of the
appellee filed on November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be conjugal partnership, including orders for the delivery of certificates of stock, the
declared in contempt of court and punished accordingly. Meanwhile, or on return thereof and/or its deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise, represented
November 24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this Court the receiver in seeking war damage payments.
against Hon. Emilio Peña, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
Mrs. Harden. In the petition therein filed, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari 10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
annulling said orders of Judge Peña of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and "Francisco Dalupan v. Fred M. Harden" for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was
prayed that, pending disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be decided, through appellee’s intervention, that the conjugal assets would bear the
issued restraining the respondents therein from enforcing said orders, particularly payment of P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively against Mr.
through contempt proceedings. Hence, the lower court deferred action on the Harden’s share of the conjugal partnership.
aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947. After due hearing, this Court, in a 11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
resolution dated February 12, 1948, refused to issue the writ of preliminary entitled "Abelardo Perez v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Fred
injunction prayed for. Subsequently, or on November 21, 1950, decision was M. Harden", for the recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certificates
rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari. of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12. He (appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated federal tax case against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
February 12, 1948, or to be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an 13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden’s attempts to withdraw: (1) $53,000
order directing Mr. Harden to comply, within five (5) days from notice, with the and forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles,
order of October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, appellee filed with the lower court the California; (2) $50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax
corresponding formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due assessment against him in the United States; and (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
hearing, Mr. Harden was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty as charged
and ordered confined "until he complies with the aforementioned orders" of Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests
October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948. On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April and its assets were worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions,
28, 1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948, on which date he was arrested and rejoinders, and memoranda filed, and the evidence introduced, in the
placed in confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, aforementioned cases — in which appellee was pitted against one of the most
1948, he filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the experienced and able members of the Philippine Bar — were numerous, extensive
Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled "Fred M. Harden v. The Director of and exhaustive. For instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely,
Prisons"), which, in due course was denied in a decision promulgated on October G. R. No. L-3687, consisted of 966 pages.
22, 1948.

18
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the appellee, the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as
nature and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time this relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney’s fees due to appellee
(1941 to 1952) and trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with herein should not have been determined in the decision appealed from.
said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy, the professional
character and standing of the appellee, the risks assumed and the results This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made,
obtained, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden,
question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable. she intended to file before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership between" her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action
Under their second assignment of error, appellants maintain that: for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have
been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would
"The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence that the have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable
legal services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden, future, owing to the aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden,
payment, for which is sought by him in this case, have already been paid by his which were made for the evident purpose of defeating appellee’s claim for
immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R- attorney’s fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time contemplated by
59634 (SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all the parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which
such legal services." they entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon which the amount
of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not insist upon its
represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and Mrs. Harden occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein appellee, for "the
explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to" appellee’s share condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his attorney’s fees of fulfillment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the debtor shall lose every right to make
20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment of error is, use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the
therefore, devoid of merit. creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)

Appellants, further contend, that: It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for appellee’s
services, consists of three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the
3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife, Esperanza allowance of Mrs. Harden; (b) litis expensae; and (c) 20% of her share in the
P. de Harden, in the undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership properties conjugal partnership. The first part was dealt with in the first paragraph of their
of the Harden spouses, is capable of certain valuation before such dissolution and contract of services. The second and third parts were the object of the second and
liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Harden’s share in such third paragraphs, respectively. The first paragraph limited the rights of appellee
conjugal properties without proper evidence. thereunder to two (2) years, in the event of termination of the case or amicable
settlement thereof within two (2) years from the filing of the complaint. No such
4. "The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to Attorney limitation appears in the second and third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the
Claro M. Recto from Mrs. Harden’s interests in the Harden conjugal properties, same were intended by the parties to be fully operative under any and all
summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as of a value of P384,110.97, and conditions.
ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in pursuance of the provisions
of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services."chanrob1es virtual 1aw It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been
library assessed, not summarily, but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course
Appellants’ arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows: The of which both parties introduced testimonial and documentary evidence. Appellants
contract of services in question provides that appellee’s contingent fees shall be presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the appellee were so numerous that,
20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the having begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked
share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, Exhibit 26 Y’s. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers
which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the over 220 pages.

19
The other assignments of error made by appellants herein are mere corollaries of
those already disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.

In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr.
and Mrs. Harden are reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof,
representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty
percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to
the appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as the
appellee has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent
fees, there results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.

Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

therefore, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

20
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the
AL., defendants-appellees. Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the
marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948
REYES, J.B.L., J.: Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not
remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona.
in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his
Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2 job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: was aflame.

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor
Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented
commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were
exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez,
the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
duly registered with the local civil register. dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh.
"B-4").
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court
which was their usual trysting place. by the said tribunal.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954,
marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had
already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children.
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105- She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father

21
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement,
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be
through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim,
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court. archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following: her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was
liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;. under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth
Mena Escaño liable for damages;. of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely
defendant parents on their counterclaims; and. voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of
First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought
consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of
chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages. in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force
and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only at the time, expressly provided:
because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
provided that — capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

22
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree
quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding Art. 333).
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or
concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid
only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the
that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval
(Art. 106, subpar. 1). of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of
legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the
decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have in that case:
for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the
agreed upon in a foreign country. marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance.
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and
means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
the Philippines. excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot
be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should supplied)
have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our
law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the
confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
579). adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation
on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art.
2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known
charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to
Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

23
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the
daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are
animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into
and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not
to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or
his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after
learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social
event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek
recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their
to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her prejudices or spleen.
decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account,
wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132). marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by
publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being
appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry
what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce
malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
presumed until the contrary is proved. recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are
absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and

24
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair.
This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as
valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party
by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other
than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal

separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño
and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages
and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

25
G.R. No. L-6768 July 31, 1954 to the complaint for divorce, Salud R. Arca alleged that it was not true that the
SALUD R. ARCA and ALFREDO JAVIER JR., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo
ALFREDO JAVIER, defendant-appellant. Javier was in the United States at that time and she was not with him then it was
because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United States Navy, as a
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her. She
further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States,
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite ordering him he had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through
to give a monthly allowance of P60 to plaintiffs beginning March 31, 1953, and to allotments made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She
pay them attorney's fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to denied, furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at
this Court attributing five errors to the court below. This implies that the facts are Naic, Cavite, and their separation was due to physical impossibility for they were
not disputed. separated by about 10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old
Civil Code the wife is not bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to
The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for
appear well narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be
appeal, are quoted hereunder: dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R. Arca's averments in her answer,
contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama,
On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by defendant Alfredo Javier, as
their marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d), nevertheless the Circuit Court of Mobile
Manila. At the time of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriage of Salud R. Arca
Alfredo Javier, Junior who was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated April 9, 1941,
defendant Alfredo Javier left for the United States on board a ship of the United a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit 2(f). Thereupon, the evidence discloses
States Navy, for it appears that he had joined the United States Navy since 1927, that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines but
such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca, defendant Alfredo went back to the United States.
Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy. Because of
defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife, Salud In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April
R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents 9, 1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen,
at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having and bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma
occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Francis, defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not
Arca had found it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her disclosed by the evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States
residence to (Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then the relation Navy, defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on
between plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained February 13, 1950. After his arrival in the Philippines, armed with two decrees of
such that on August 13, 1940 defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce — one against his first wife Salud R. Arca and the other against him by his
divorce against Salud R. Arca before the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State
Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No. 14313 of that court and marked as of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javier married Maria Odvina before Judge
Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the complaint for divorce on Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila on April 19, 1950,
September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca — answering the complaint — alleged marked Exhibit 2(b).
in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September 23, 1940
although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13, At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the
1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things City Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the
that defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and
Alabama, for the period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, marked Exhibit 2(a). However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the
but that he was a resident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of charge of Bigamy in a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
interest, which is essential to relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio, dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the

26
proposition that the marriage of defendant Alfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was citizenship papers, this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant
made in all good faith and in the honest belief that his marriage with plaintiff Salud divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine
R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of divorce obtained by him from their matrimonial status, because the wife was still domiciled in the Philippines.
the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA which had the legal The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."
effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant Alfredo Javier and plaintiff
Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that defendant It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the
Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of First Mobile County in view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this
Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no action cannot be interpreted as placing her under the jurisdiction of the court
criminal intent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first because its only purpose was to impugn the claim of appellant that his domicile or
marriage was still subsisting. legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show that the ground of
desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be
Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud considered as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the
R. Arca, another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, jurisdiction of the court over the case.
Alfredo Javier, Jr., who thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in
the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for the United States aboard a navy ship in In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously
connection with his service leaving behind his wife and child, and on August 13, decided on the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases
1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, invoked are Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil.,
U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy of the 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67. In the cases just
complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:
appellant was not a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and
that it was not true that the cause of their separation was abandonment on her part It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which
but that appellant was in the United States, without her, because he was then neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort
enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Mobile County merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their
rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9, 1941. matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to
recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The
The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the
jurisdiction? court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs. Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)

The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence
of similar nature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny in the State or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a
validity to the decree. In essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions spouse leaves the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose
for the validity of a decree of divorce is that the court must have jurisdiction over of obtaining a divorce, and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not
the subject matter and in order that this may be acquired, plaintiff must be sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially true
domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, where the cause of divorce is one not recognized by the laws of the State of his
55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson, 67 Phil., 207, own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)" (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)
which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that
case, John Canson claimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had
Nevada, where the action was brought, but he was an American citizen, although it acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his
was proven that his wife never accompanied him there but has always remained in favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses
the Philippines, and so it has been held that "it is not ... the citizenship of the being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West
plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an
within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Canson appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction
acquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)

27
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9
Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the thereof reads as follows:
purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which "The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
he had entered in 1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.) capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country."
In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile
County Court of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple "And Article 11, the last part of which reads
reason that at the time it was filed appellant's legal residence was then in the
Philippines. He could not have acquired legal residence or domicile at Mobile ". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those
County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that time he was still in intended to promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without
the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements
during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live entered into a foreign country."
there permanently is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in
1941, he moved to New York where he bought a house and a lot, and after his "It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens
divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he returned to of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a
the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite, where he lived ever cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would
since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, not with the grant a divorce."
intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his
permanent abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on
residence is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for
under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on
It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That our
the present case for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the divorce law, Act No. 2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court decide.
court in the course of the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of the (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers between the
United States in the case of Williams vs. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim different governmental agencies restricts the judiciary within the confines of
is not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely cited as authority for the interpretation, not of legislation. The legislative policy on the matter of divorce in
statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this
necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire court (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252; Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana
jurisdiction over a divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; Chereau vs.
State in which it is filed. (Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123; Gorayeb vs.
applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be justified on another ground: Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian
The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of adultery on Ng Shun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra).
predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction.
Said the Court in the Canson case: The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known
principle of Private International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign
. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed: judgment, or the law affecting the same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental
policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in
. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity keeping with our concept or moral values which has always looked upon marriage
of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more tangible
based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to
eliminate altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we

28
cannot but react adversely to any attempt to extend here the effect of a decree
which is not in consonance with our customs, morals, and traditions. (Article 11,
old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code; Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil., 67.)

With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the
crime of bigamy and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her
child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not also entitled to support because he has already
reached his age of majority, we do not need to consider it here, it appearing that
these questions have already been passed upon in G. R. No. L-6706.1 These
questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

29
G.R. No. L-20530 June 29, 1967 sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public
MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD auction the properties claimed by said petitioner.
TEODORO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety filed an "Omnibus
MAKALINTAL, J.: Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Dissolve Injunction" to which an opposition
was filed.
The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. 30916. After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of their respective claims
The case relates to the execution of a joint and several judgment for money and after hearing their arguments, the lower court declared that the properties in
obtained by the said company against the Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. question are community properties of Trinidad Teodoro (herein petitioner) and
and Jose Corominas, Jr., in a litigation started in 1952 in the Court of First Instance Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May 12, 1962, the writ of preliminary injunction it
of Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by the Court of had issued and dismissed the complaint (Civil case No. 6865, CFI Rizal).
Appeals with only a slight modification in respect of the award for attorney's fees.
Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case No. 6865 of Rizal)
The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the decision sought to interposed an appeal. In the meanwhile, however, the Manila Surety filed on May
be reviewed as follows: 29, 1962, in the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of a
third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment debt in civil case
When said decision became final, respondent Manila Surety secured on No. 17014. Acting upon said motion the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on
September 20, 1961, from the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. June 2, 1962, the "Third Alias Writ of Execution."
17014 a second alias writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff
of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for respondent Manila Surety, Thus, on June 7,1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of Rizal again repaired to
repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard Street, the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and levied
Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances and upon the same properties, with the exception of the baby grand piano and the
personal properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to the petitioner "Columbia" phonograph which were the properties of Jose Corominas, Jr. and
with the exception of sewing machine which belonged to a maid by the name of which had already been sold at public auction November 6, 1961 for P3,305.00,
Nati Fresco, a G.E. television set which was the property of the minor Jose Alfonso the Regal sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in the boy's and
Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a Columbia radio phonograph girl's rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a stereophonic phonograph and the
which belonged to Jose Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was then abroad, her G.E. television set. And on the following day, June 8, 1962, respondent provincial
sister Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody and safekeeping sheriff of Rizal advertised the sale at public auction of the aforementioned
of the properties, had made representations to the deputy sheriff and to the properties claimed by herein petitioner, setting the date thereof for June 16, 1962.
counsel of respondent Manila Surety regarding the ownership of the petitioner over
certain personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same and proceeded Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of
with the levy. Appeals to stop the scheduled sale. On October 24, 1962 the said Court rendered
the decision now under review, granting the writ prayed for and permanently
Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places notices of sale, enjoining respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the
preparatory to disposing petitioner's properties at public auction. properties in question for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Jose Corominas,
Jr.
To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner's properties, she filed on November
3, 1961, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with injunction, The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties,
entitled "Trinidad Teodoro vs Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and the Provincial claimed by respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership
Sheriff of Rizal," praying among other things, for damages and a writ of preliminary established between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the
injunction which was accordingly issued upon petitioner's filing of a bond in the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon on execution for the satisfaction
of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon in support of this theory of co-

30
ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo and quoted by the Court of respondent in acquiring the properties in question were "fruits of her paraphernal
Appeals, as follows: investments which accrued before her marriage to Corominas."

Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. The decisions cited under the first ground are Christensen vs. Garcia, 56 O.G. No.
On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State 16, p. 3199; Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No. 11, p. 2401; and Osmeña vs.
of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Rodriguez, 54 O.G. No. 20, p. 5526. In a proper case, where it may be necessary
Corominas, Jr. . . . to do so in order to resolve an unavoidable issue, the precise scope of the "no
impediment to a valid marriage" dictum in said decisions will undoubtedly deserve
Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . closer examination, since it establishes an exception to the broad terms of Article
On March 26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. 144. For one thing, a situation may arise involving a conflict of rights between a co-
Upon their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. ownership under that provision and an existing conjugal partnership formed by a
2305 Agno Street, . . . Manila. On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose prior marriage where, for instance, the husband in such marriage lives with another
Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada. woman and with his salary or wages acquires properties during the extra-marital
U.S.A. cohabitation. A ruling would then be in order to determine which — as between the
co-ownership and the conjugal partnership — could claim ascendancy insofar as
Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and the properties are concerned.
controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the
conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent
decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957. Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by
the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring
The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued
situation thus created. This Article provides: before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by
either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of
either or both of them through then work or industry or their wages and salaries execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Several procedural questions have been raised by petitioner. First, that the
There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was improper since it was not in aid of its
1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that appellate jurisdiction; second, that respondent Trinidad Teodoro having elected to
the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, she may not
been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and pursue the remedy of injunction as she did in this case; third, that respondent's
that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals failed to state a cause of action;
bigamous and void. fourth, that the proper remedy available to respondent was by filing a third-party
claim; and finally, that the trial judge should have been included as party
While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the respondent in the petition for injunction.
Court of Appeals declined to apply it in this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting
marriage of Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid As to the first in second points, the fact is that respondent Trinidad Teodoro
marriage between him and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment, perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, which found that there were
according to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the questions of fact involved therein, one of them being whether the properties in
establishment of a co-ownership under said article, and (2) the funds used by said question were acquired before or after her void marriage to Corominas. In aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, therefore, the said Court could issue a writ of injunction. Of

31
course, what happened here was that before the record on appeal could be filed
(on June 18, 1962) or approved (on September 8, 1962) a third alias writ of
execution was issued by the trial court (on June 2, 1962) and the properties in
question were again levied upon by the sheriff and advertised for sale on June 16,
1962. It was impracticable for respondent to first wait for the appeal to be elevated
to and docketed in the Court of Appeals and there secure the ancillary remedy of
injunction therein. An independent petition for injunction, under the circumstances,
was not unjustified.

Respondent could, indeed, have filed a third party claim instead as indicated in
Rule 39, Section 15.* But then her sister Josefina Teodoro did make such a claim
in her behalf after the second alias writ of execution was issued, but it was ignored
and the sheriff proceeded with the levy. In any event, a third party claim is not an
exclusive remedy: the same rule provides that nothing therein contained "shall
prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
action.

We do not deem it to be a reversible error for Trinidad Teodoro not to include the
trial Judge as party-respondent in her petition for injunction in the Court of
Appeals. The trial Judge would have been merely a nominal party anyway, and no
substantial rights of petitioner here have been prejudiced by the omission.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with
costs.

32
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as it due course.
Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents. For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that
Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
respectively.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
Dorn. property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage,
were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that divorce of the parties.
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of
petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed
property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding. represent him in the divorce proceedings:

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is xxx xxx xxx
not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to
question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me,
capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari without further contesting, subject to the following:
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then 1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

33
xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an Without costs.
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the SO ORDERED.
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton,
45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

34
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY- Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after
SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city
of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents. fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly
REGALADO, J.: filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI
absolute divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question. went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking
private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married that the aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
followed by a separation de facto between them. review.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner and to suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge
in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal
1982. 2 Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved
for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed
January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied
by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. entered a plea of not guilty.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment
of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is

35
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law complaint or petition.
prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the does not mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply.
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the
23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
petitioner. 16 spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action,
or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public
four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case. In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in
by law to initiate the action therefor. the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or

36
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the husband, in any State of the Union. ...
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22 However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said
person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The
complaint. severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses
from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his the other.
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon
concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of by private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially
status of persons. the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to
granted by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to
American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically
an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
stance, thus: that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed

37
before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio.
The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore

cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint
for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation
akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET

ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No.
87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this
case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

38
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. Declarations secured in Australia.9
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
PANGANIBAN, J.: Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had
a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. November, 1997.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that
and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
on evidence. decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the
any and/or both parties."3 case was submitted for resolution.17

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

The Facts Ruling of the Trial Court

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or
"Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 annual.
Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our
Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a Hence, this Petition.
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8
Issues
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

39
"I Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the
thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner. presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question
to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent. courts cannot grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil
"3 Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
case. divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
"4 recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, laws.27
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
"5 concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso valid according to their national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19 fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Divorce as a Question of Fact
Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
more necessity to take up the rest. first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. These articles read as follows:
The Court's Ruling
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
The Petition is partly meritorious. shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil
registrar which shall specify the following:
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent dissolved or annulled;
and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that
the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in xxx xxx xxx
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing "ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements. required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse

40
or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of
marriage. x x x. adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document – a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution. petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of
Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a
foreign country. We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in him.
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an foreign laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be reason of their judicial function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised
demonstrated. with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but Second Issue:
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he

41
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
law. license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
respondent. applicant for a marriage license.50

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46 (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian)
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment
court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47 between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e)
Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c)
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d)
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48 Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred
in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been capacity to contract the second marriage.
presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws. Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to

42
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we

REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above
discussed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

43
G.R. No. 193902 June 1, 2011 faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE possibility of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of
PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Respondents. divorce.

DECISION WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby granted.
NACHURA, J.: Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman
and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated July 30, 2010 of the Court of Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan Province, Philippines.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in G.R. No. 193902, (signed)
thus, affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Lanao del
Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by petitioner Samson R. HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL
Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.
Presiding Judge3
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts. Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she
had previously done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she
rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December
on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and
civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC, Quezon City. Pacasum renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio
Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos’ first marriage to De
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny, namely:
a divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Shari’a Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.
Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Basilan, which issued a
Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows: Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum
turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship
DECREE OF DIVORCE of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle for custody of their minor
children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the former,
Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.
ground that the wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the
authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases
Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the against Zamoranos, to wit:
Philippines.
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC,
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31,
respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage,
their divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18, 1983. alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to
Pacasum, was already previously married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b)
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced Zamoranos’ first marriage, solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided
that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly converted to the over by Judge Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and

44
Pacasum’s marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasum’s marriage was bigamous and and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated
void ab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary of Justice.11
custody of her minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were denied by the Secretary of
custody; (ii) her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) Justice in a resolution dated May 17, 2006.12
her inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession.
Zamoranos’ second motion for reconsideration, as with her previous motions, was
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code likewise denied.
(RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as
3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos’ dismissal from service and Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, rendered a decision in favor of
disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Integrated Bar of the Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC,
Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos and De Guzman are Muslims, and
respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were dismissed in due were such at the time of their marriage, whose marital relationship was governed
course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasum’s appeal by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
from the CSC’s dismissal of the administrative case was still pending resolution. Personal Laws of the Philippines:

Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the allegation of
contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.4 [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992
is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between
Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between
through Prosecutor Leonor Quiñones, issued a resolution dated February 2, 2005, Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been terminated [and] has gone with
finding prima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for Bigamy.5 Consequently, the wind. The fact that divorce by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her
on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos first husband in accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and
before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.6 consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry.
Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband
Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutor’s February 2, Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial,
2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, being unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first
were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005, the City Prosecutor of Ozamis marriage entered into by them under PD 1083.
City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution
granting Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second marriage on
Bigamy against Zamoranos.7 December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or
change the validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by
Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to
resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and
15, 2005.8 Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the Office of the Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals
Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal complaint for Bigamy and also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined
against Zamoranos.9 marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as between
the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial, being a surplusage
In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006, issued and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce by Talaq dissolved the marriage between
a resolution granting Pacasum’s Petition for Review and reversed the February 2, [Zamoranos] and her first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x
2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City Prosecutor.10 Zamoranos x.
immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x x x:

45
"Application The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties SO ORDERED.
are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
Philippines." Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the denial
by the Supreme Court of Pacasum’s appeal became final and executory and was
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and her recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be governed by the Muslim Code and
divorce proceedings shall be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion
the Shari’a Circuit Court. of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy
against Zamoranos.
Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x:
Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that
"Jurisdiction – The Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the
over: offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the decision of the
RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically declared her and
xxxx Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305
2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to: Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be
dismissed.
a) Marriage;
On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos’ Motion
b) Divorce recognized under this Code; to Quash the Information. Zamoranos’ motion for reconsideration thereof was
x x x x" likewise denied.

The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with any civil Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and reversal
courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding undertaken before the of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As previously
Shari’[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings. adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos’ petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety
of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the Information:
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum] against
[Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for immorality, for bigamy and A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary
misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the
Service Commission which were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A inferior court is wholly void. The aim of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within
pure and simple harassment. the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be
imputed to a court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and
In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view and so evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate that the
hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its
for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the Shari’a very power to dispense justice.
Circuit Court that has the exclusive original jurisdiction.
Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which are in the narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray
nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted. at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence, such as an error of

46
judgment which is defined as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may 5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic rites; and
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction 6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, have no
where the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of nullity of marriage
entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Shari’a Circuit Court that has
xxxx original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos’] Motion to
Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos’
respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum
discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously married and
December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos’] [M]otion to [Q]uash divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a second marriage with him,
Information meticulously explained the factual and legal basis for the denial of the likewise under Islamic rites.
issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan
City’s] stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its
jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of petitioner’s motion to 1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari; and
quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of judgment and not of 2. Whether the RTC’s, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CA’s separate factual findings
jurisdiction.18 that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.

Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CA’s dismissal of As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or
Zamoranos’ petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in
and Pacasum. excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed by her two adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.19
counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively, which assail
the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts
remain. of courts—acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform.20

Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore the conclusions The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not appealable. It is an
made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the CA and this Court, to interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an appeal.21
wit:
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The
under Islamic rites; established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
2. Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage ceremony under civil rites before Judge remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or prohibition, but to continue with the
Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D. No. 1083; case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos’ divorce by talaq to De Guzman severed appeal in the manner authorized by law.22
their marriage ties;
4. "Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of [Zamoranos] and However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in certain situations,
her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the Muslim Code and [the] certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Shari’a specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized the propriety of
Circuit Court." the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess

47
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and matter, and cause of action.26
expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial
justice";23 (d) to promote public welfare and public policy;24 and (e) when the The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case.
cases "have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, was
dispatch in the consideration thereof."25 The first four of the foregoing exceptions not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the petition for
occur in this instance. declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Shari’a Circuit Court had
jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, committed Islamic rites.
an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos’
motion to quash. Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy,
should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on the Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim,
conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which heard De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground further declared that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman validly severed their
that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the following evidence:
decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack of jurisdiction 1. Affidavit of Confirmation27 executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who
over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites,
declared that it was the Shari’a Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject declaring under oath that:
matter thereof.
1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as such, authorized to
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of res judicata. solemnize the marriages among Muslims;
The provision reads: 2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both parties are
believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the Isabela, Basilan;
judgment or final order, may be as follows: 3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam
Zamoranos came to see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the the subsequent Talaq by the wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Shari’a Circuit
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was
or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Shari’a Circuit Court;
title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of 4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in accordance
the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court registered their documents;
shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. 5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Shari’a Circuit Court was
housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are: and office equipments of the Shari’a Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements
(1) The former judgment or order must be final; of fact; and
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits; 7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject it may serve.
matter and the parties; and

48
2. Certification issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which confirmed Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must
the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman. have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of
Bigamy hinges on Pacasum’s claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her
3. Affidavit executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk of marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the
Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De truth, and the fact of Zamoranos’ Muslim status should have been apparent to both
Guzman’s divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usman’s affidavit reads, in lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.
pertinent part:
The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a
1. I am the presiding Judge of the Sharia’s Circuit Court in the City of Pagadian; second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved.
2. The first time that a Sharia’s Circuit court was established in the Island Province At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should have suspended the
of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Judge, while I was then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharia’s Circuit
Court; Zamoranos and De Guzman’s marriage before the Shari’a Circuit Court and had
3. The Sharia’s Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan was housed at the successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce by talaq
old Capitol Building, in the City of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines; entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.
4. As the Clerk of Court of the Sharia’s Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in
1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when her
Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings
confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable pursuant against her.
to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
5. In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharia’s Circuit Court were lost by reason In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or
of the fire that gutted down the old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela; the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to "promote the advancement
6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above statements and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the
of fact. State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the
formulation and implementation of its policies."
From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are
officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have
Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences, jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of
and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083. Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim
Filipinos.
True, the Shari’a Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses
penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is correct Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
when it declared that:
TITLE II.
The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or
body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) Article 3. Conflict of provisions.
created the Sharia District Courts and Sharia Circuit Courts with limited jurisdiction.
Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of the (1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of general
Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial application, the former shall prevail.
Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has
jurisdiction over this case.30

49
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special laws or Section 1. Requisites of Marriage.
laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to carry out
the former. xxxx
Section 3. Subsequent Marriages
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and nothing
herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim. xxxx
Article 29. By divorcee.
In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazali’s Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the (1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an
subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon: ‘idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is
pregnant at the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery.
The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any
provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall prevail. For xxxx
example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy under the Revised Chapter Three
Penal Code which is a law of general application and Article 27 of this Code, on DIVORCE (TALAQ)
subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the
subsequent marriage is solemnized "in accordance with" the Muslim Code, the Section 1. Nature and Form
provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not apply. The second
provision refers to a conflict between the provision of this Code which is a special Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage
law and another special law or laws of local application. The latter should be bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all
liberally construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.31 possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by:

On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);

TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE xxxx

Article 46. Divorce by talaq.
Chapter One
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE (1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his
wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally abstained
Article 13. Application. – from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations made during one tular
shall constitute only one repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both expiration of the prescribed ‘idda.
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the (2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or second time, shall
Philippines. have the right to take her back (ruju) within the prescribed ‘idda by resumption of
cohabitation without need of a new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so,
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in the repudiation shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall
apply. xxxx
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
xxxx becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)

50
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another SO ORDERED.
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article 78 of
this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her whole dower in case
the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or one-half
thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be
dissolved and liquidated.

For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazali’s
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:

If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or Muslim
law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage is likewise
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called
combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite
and the second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both
parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise,
in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are
Muslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the
Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties, if
the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with the
Civil Code.32

Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the
effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to severance of
matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.331avvphi1

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos’ divorce from De Guzman, as

confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Shari’a Circuit Court, and attested
to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989.
Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R.
No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is GRANTED.

51
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010 ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to
The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents. remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

DECISION Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
BRION, J.: shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition). and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian under Philippine law.
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005,
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada spouse."11
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5 THE PETITION

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert
went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6 spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since
and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

52
THE COURT’S RULING should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of are to be served.22
the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18 related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows: direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.26
under Philippine law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of
alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of

53
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section states:
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at
judgment or final order is as follows: this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious
successors in interest by a subsequent title. conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested
parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution
fact. must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the
in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
law.27 recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments provides.
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the
his claim or defense. bench and the bar to what had been done.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The
of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal

54
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not."35 Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order
person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
decrees in the civil registry: registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
of persons, in which shall be entered:
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
(a) births; extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
(b) deaths; cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
(c) marriages; judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
(d) annulments of marriages; the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations; Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
(g) adoptions; changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
(i) naturalization; and proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
(j) changes of name. corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
xxxx authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil
entries concerning the civil status of persons: registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to
the proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
(1) Birth and death register; newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
but also divorces and dissolved marriages. filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured

55
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as
well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

56
G.R. No. 221029 allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs MARELYN TANEDO enforcement of a foreign judgment.
MANALO, Respondent
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
RESOLUTION The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
PERALTA, J.:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12,
2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The 3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and
dispositive portion of the Decision states: after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by
the Japanese Court x x x;
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, 4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her
daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila. 5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry
of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former
SO ORDERED.3 Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not
appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is
The facts are undisputed. no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition
for cancellation of 6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national,
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already
judgment of divorce Japanese court. dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the 7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week surname, MANALO.4
for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial
hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan
trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and
March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. 1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to
be sufficient in form and in substance;
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner 2. Affidavit of Publication;
Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of 3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the

57
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband; 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court; grant it.
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, 2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5 abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
Manalo. laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally
of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented
inclusing marriages."6 and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may laws in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the her to remarry under Philippine law.
divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
dissolved filed abroad by the latter. effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition. to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines
does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision. because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which courts.23
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist: According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his

58
or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained
law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even
after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
national laws and perhaps have already married again.25 citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court
citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order
initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26 national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the
event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in We rule in the affirmative.
the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce
law and can thus remarry. decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its
legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, respectively.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who
and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of
remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to
reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
and a foreigner; and decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
remarry. submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in
this jurisdiction x x x.30

59
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus: In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national,
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local of bigamy, We ruled:
law and public policy.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For
aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
794,799: maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate
tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage." family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged x x x34
conjugal property.

60
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of departure."38
capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the
petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and
spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
the pertinent factual issues.
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal
this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an
the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe
fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
the marital bond. a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse
status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the
divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A
that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
same. instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed
We beg to differ. by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact,
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The
neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to only if they are constitutional.43

61
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree
such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and
where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and
accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality
protect such interest.47 in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that
what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance
such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's
individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52 case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our
law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 kababayan.
of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection
clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
arbitrary, and whimsical classification. indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce
proceedings against their alien spouses.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino
who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn
cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that
abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55 was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting

62
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute prohibiting a divorce law?
any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that FR. BERNAS. Thank you.
interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery
are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act
for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the
In one case, it was said: authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce
and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable,
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and
such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of
comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were
it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303
Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows: Committee on Population

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on
recognized. Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill,
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized. the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be 1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified
understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make or amended, as follows:
this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not common child, or a child of the petitioner;
necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer. or political affiliation;

63
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or marriage or supervening after the marriage.
inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) 1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the
years, even if pardoned; time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent; improbable;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent; 2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the
the Philippines or abroad; celebration of the marriage or later;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for
spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
bears a child after being a victim of rape; 4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
child of a petitioner; and reconciliation.
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one (1) year. To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as
years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce an institution and their nature of permanence,
based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can
as follows: neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for
everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was establish a state religion.76
solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the
age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its
together as husband and wife; beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77 While
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the
other husband and wife; The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside
cohabited with the other as husband and wife; from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to
other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
serious or appears to be incurable. development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation

64
s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v.
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. San Luis85 quoted:
In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate,
the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we
("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent
strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a
must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81 legislature, is to render justice.

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few obeyed.
of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are
to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its
is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82 policy that goes beyond them."

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the xxxx
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate
from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for
Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the justice.86
context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
rotten quality. would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains spirit or intent.88

65
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
San Juan, Metro Manila. thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power
be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91 upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country. those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18,
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is Japanese law on divorce.
kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
SO ORDERED.
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of
the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued
by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce;
and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese
national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce
Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the
existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the
jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings
challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit
an opportunity to do so.95

66
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Respondent. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
DECISION reconsideration but it was denied.

QUISUMBING, J.: In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him THE FAMILY CODE
or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law. that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The judicial determination.6
court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads: For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant
Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law. At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
IT IS SO ORDERED.3 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows. RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
Kimberly V. Orbecido. executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may,
before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
American citizen.
...
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
California. and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8

67
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the
when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
his second marriage. objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family 1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad
legislators in its enactment? can.

Brief Historical Background 2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
1988. Article 26 thereof states: supplied.)

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in Legislative Intent
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
now provides:
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating foreign citizenship by naturalization?
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that

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a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
Philippine law and can thus remarry. have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include spouse.
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12 prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows
a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
and a foreigner; and acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record,
remarry. we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife,
who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. aforecited evidence in his favor.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of ASIDE.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry. No pronouncement as to costs.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the SO ORDERED.
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular

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