Morales v CA

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 126623. December 12, 1997]

ERNESTO MORALES y DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO J. GUSTILO,

as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 116 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The key issue in this case is whether, in light of R.A. No. 7659[1] as interpreted in People v.
Simon,[2] and R.A. No. 7691,[3] Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over violations of R.A.
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, when the
imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years.
The petitioner was charged with the violation of Section 15 in relation to Section 20 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City on 13 March 1996. The accusatory portion of the said information reads
as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of March 1996, in Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Morales y De la Cruz, without authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to another 0.4587 grams of Metamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),
a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [4]

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-8443 and raffled to Branch 116 of the said
court.
Upon his arraignment, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. [5] Subsequently, on 30 April
1996, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to try the case considering that pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659 as construed
in People v. Simon, [7] the penalty imposable for the offense charged should not
exceed prision correccional or six (6) years and under R.A. No. 7691 it is the Metropolitan Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order [8] of 9 May 1996, the RTC denied the motion. It held:

It is true that under the aforementioned provision, cases punishable with penalties of not more than six (6) years are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts. However, the exceptions are cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court Under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the Court of First Instance now the Regional Trial Court and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which no
longer exist, shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act. It is
therefore clear that this case, which is a violation of Republic Act No. 6425, although punishable by a penalty of less than
six (6) years, falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

His motion for the reconsideration[9] of the order having been denied,[10] the petitioner filed with
respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[11]
 The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40670.
In its Comment[12] in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed
with the petitioner that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try the criminal case. It, however,
asserted that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari,
as the same involved only the question of jurisdiction of an inferior court, hence, cognizable by
the Supreme Court alone pursuant to Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, in connection
with Section 5(2)(c), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 17 of Republic Act No.
5440. The OSG then recommended that the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for
disposition, or that the Court of Appeals grant the petition and set aside the challenged order
of the RTC should it rule that it had jurisdiction over petition.
 Morales v CA
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In its Resolution [13] of 8 August 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction over the action. Explaining its ruling, it declared:

In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General, inter alia, contended that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition for it properly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

We fully agree.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers; x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in: x x x

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. x x x

Section 17 of R.A. 5446 otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 says that the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all
cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is on issue. It is hereby stressed that the issue in the petition at bench is
purely a question of jurisdiction which is resolvable on the basis of the records.

After the denial [14] on 13 September 1996 of his motion for reconsideration, [15] the petitioner
came to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHERE THE
ISSUE IS THE JURISDICTION OF RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE TO TRY THE ALLEGED
VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE/COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, IN RELATION TO SECTION 20, ART. III OF R.A. 6425,
AS AMENDED, INVOLVING ONLY 0.4587 GRAMS OF SHABU.
As to the first, the petitioner insists that respondent Court of Appeals has concurrent original
jurisdiction with this Court over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
involving decisions or orders of Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Section 9(1)[16] of B.P. Blg.
129 in relation to Section 5(1)[17] of Article VIII of the Constitution. He cites De Jesus v. Court
of Appeals  [18] wherein this Court held that the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, and with that of
Regional Trial Courts for writs enforceable within their respective regions. The petitioner
further maintains that Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 5440, relied upon by the Court Appeals are not
applicable inasmuch as they relate to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and not to
an original action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the second issue, the petitioner asserts that the RTC below has no jurisdiction over
the offense charged considering that only 0.4587 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) is involved. In light of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659,[19] as interpreted in People v.
Simon  [20] and further explained in People v. Santos  [21] and Ordoez v. Vinarao, [22] the
imposable penalty therefor would not exceed prision correccional, whose maximum period is
six (6) years. Hence, under R.A. No. 7691 exclusive original jurisdiction therein is vested in
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
In its Comment on the petition, the OSG submits that all violations of R.A. No. 6425, as further
amended by R.A. No. 7659, which are punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years
now fall under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since on the basis of the quantity of the regulated drug involved
in this case the penalty imposable does not exceed prision correccional, it is the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City which has jurisdiction over the case. It disagreed with the opinion of
the RTC that violations of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, still fall within the jurisdiction of the
RTC because the latters jurisdiction thereon mandated by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425 has
been preserved by the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. It submits that Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425 was repealed by Section 6 of R.A. No. 7691, which provides:
 Morales v CA
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SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified
accordingly.

In support of its submission, it cites this Courts resolution in Gulhoran v. Escao, Jr.  [23]
The OSG further contends that respondent Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction in view of Section 9(3) of B.P. Blg. 129; Sec. 5(2)(c)
of Article VIII of the Constitution; and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
R.A. No. 5440. Nevertheless, it prays that this petition be given due course and that Criminal
Case No. 96-8443 be remanded to the proper metropolitan trial court for further proceedings.
We resolved to give due course to this petition.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it had no jurisdiction over petitioners special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has concurrent original jurisdiction
with the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section
17(1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and with the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 21(1)
of B.P. Blg. 129 to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto.[24] These are original actions, not modes of appeals.
Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, the original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals thereon is beyond
doubt.
This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its misapplication of Section 5(2)(c) of Article VIII
of the Constitution and of that portion of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 vesting upon
the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. It forgot that this
constitutional and statutory provisions pertain to the appellate -- not original -- jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, as correctly maintained by the petitioner. An appellate jurisdiction refers to
a process which is but a continuation of the original suit, not a commencement of a new
action, such as that of a special civil action for certiorari. The general rule is that a denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash in criminal cases is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an
appeal or of a special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court has allowed a special
civil action for certiorari where a lower court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss or to quash.[25] The petitioner
believed that the RTC below did so; hence, the special civil action for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals appeared to be the proper remedy.
The next most logical step then is for us to simply set aside the challenged resolutions and to
direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on the merits the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670. But,
that would further delay the case. Considering the special importance of the lone legal issue
raised, which can be resolved on the basis of the pleadings heretofore filed, and the fact that
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction over petitioners special action in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670,
we deem it more practical and in the greater interest of justice not to remand the case to the
Court of Appeals but, instead, to take direct cognizance thereof and resolve it once and for all.
[26]

We now address the second issue.

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon,[27] People v. De Lara,[28] People v. Santos,
[29]
 and Ordoez v. Vinarao,[30] the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams
of shabu should not exceed prision correccional. We say by analogy because these cases
involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In Section 20 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana and
methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the
same. For the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million shall be
imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200 grams, the imposable penalties
should be as follows:

a) reclusion temporal -- if the quantity involved is from 134 to 199 grams;

b) prision mayor -- if the quantity involved is from 66 to 133 grams;

c) prision correccional -- if the quantity involved is 65 grams or below.

 Morales v CA
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Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-
8443 would at most be only prision correccional whose duration is from six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no
jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 by R.A. No. 7691,
which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties? This section 32 as thus amended now reads:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Criminal Cases. -- Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offender or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. By
virtue thereof, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases does not cover those cases which
by provision of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan regardless of the prescribed penalty. Otherwise put, even if such cases
are punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto
mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
The aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases,[31] but also to other laws which
specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive jurisdiction over specific criminal
cases, e.g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. Nos. 1289 and
4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as
amended), which vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases
therein mentioned regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case
at bar, Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said Act.
Jurisdiction is, of course, conferred by the Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases
enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the plenary power
to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[32] Accordingly, Congress
may, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined
by one court. Such would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the
general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. In short, the special law prevails over the general law.
R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be considered another special law on jurisdiction but merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, it does not have the effect of repealing or modifying Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code; Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property; and Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44. In a manner of speaking, R.A. No. 7691 was absorbed by
the mother law, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction
in the Regional Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided
for in the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by the repealing clause (Section 6) of
R.A. No. 7691.
Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No.
44, is no longer operative because Section 44 of B.P. Blg. 129 abolished the Courts of First
Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed,
Section 44 provides that these courts were to be deemed automatically abolished upon the
declaration by the President that the reorganization provided in B.P. Blg. 129 had been
completed, this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts merely
 Morales v CA
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replaced the Courts of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section
44, to wit:

Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to
hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this
Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and necessary personnel.

In short, there was a change in name only -- from Courts of First Instance to Regional Trial
Courts. The Interim Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129
promulgated by this Court on 11 January 1983 also provides that the reference to the courts of
first instance in the Rules of Court shall be deemed changed to the regional trial courts.
Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the abolition of the Courts of First Instance carried
with it the abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual
Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v. Court of
Appeals  [33] and in the resolution of 26 February 1997 in Villalon v. Baldado, [34] this Court
expressly ruled that Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel
cases pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96
this Court mandates that:

LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM
TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT.

It likewise provides that jurisdiction over cases involving violations of intellectual property rights
are confined exclusively to the Regional Trial Courts.
The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
regardless of the quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial Courts
therein designated as special courts. As to the latter, this Court in its Resolution of 1 April 1997
in A.M. No. 96-11-421-RTC [35] resolved as follows:

to AMEND Administrative Order No. 104-96, dated October 21, 1996, with respect only to the violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Thus, if the imposable penalty is
below reclusion perpetua the drug related cases will be raffled among the regular courts as ordinary criminal cases.

Thereafter in Circular No. 31-97 dated 15 May 1997, the Court Administrator directed Judges
of special courts for Kidnapping, Robbery, Carnapping, Dangerous Drugs and other Heinous
Crimes to comply with the aforesaid amendment to Administrative Order No. 104-96. To avoid
any further confusion or misunderstanding, we hereby declare that the term regular courts
found in the above amendment refers exclusively to the Regional Trial Courts and was not
intended to include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
In view of the foregoing, this Court hereby abandons the resolution in Gulhoran v.
Escao  [36] where, through its Second Division, we ruled, in effect, that Section 39 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended, was repealed by virtue of the repealing clause of R.A. No. 7691.
The RTC then did not commit any error in denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
96-8443.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, but only insofar as the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 is concerned. The Resolution of 8
August and 13 September 1996 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE, while the challenged
orders in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 116,
are AFFIRMED. The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case
No. 96-8443 with all reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco,
Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.