Cases Summary:

1. Alvarez – Heirs paid the obligation of the decedent

2. Lopez v. Liboro – Validity of will despite omission of page; Thumbmark can be used by
testator as a means of authenticating the will; No statutory requirement that such
knowledge of language by testator be expressly stated in the will itself.
 In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be
necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the
conventional numerical words or characters.
 there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of
mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference.
Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the
signature is made by the testator's mark.

3. Suroza v. Honrado – Void will. Language used in the will not known to illiterate testatrix;
Judge Honrado guilty of negligence and dereliction of duty
 In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language
"understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was
stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language".
 hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial
acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
"testator" instead of "testatrix". Had respondent judge been careful and observant,
he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that
there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole
heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive

4. Abangan v. Abangan – Valid will. Will composed of 2 pages not signed in the left margin by
testator and 3 witnesses in the first page is valid.
 But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the
bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on
the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless.

5. Payad v. Tolentino - Valid will. Duly signed in accordance with the law using testator’s
thumbmark.
 The testatrix approved all the contents of the document and requested Attorney
Almario to write her name where she had to sign by means of her thumbmark in
view of the fact that her fingers no longer had the necessary strength to hold a pen.
She did after having taken the pen and tried to sign without anybody's help.
  It is clear therefor that it was not necessary that the attestation clause in question
should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name
inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

6. Matias v. Salud – Valid will. Validity of the thumbprints as signature by a sick testator (herpes
zoster in the right arm)
 Validity of thumbprints should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A
thumbprint is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the
requirements of the article

7. Garcia v. Lacuesta - Cross is not the usual signature of testate; Attestation clause is fatally
defective ;
 It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of
Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name
 the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express
direction, as required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

8. Barut v. Cabacungan.-- Requirements: (1) agent must write the name of the testator by
hand; (2) advisable if the agent write his name also.

9. Nera v. Rimando.-- Actual seeing is not required. What is required is that the person
required to be present must have been able to see the signing, if he wanted to do so, by
casting his eyes in the proper direction. His line of vision must not be impeded by a wall or
curtain. This is a question of fact for the lower court to determine. Blind witnesses are
therefore disqualified.Javellana v. Ledesma

10. Javellana v. Ledesma.-- The case deals w/ the question of whether or not the
acknowledgement of the will should be done on the same occasion as the execution of the
will. The SC said no. The law does not require that execution and acknowledgement be done
on the same occasion. Acknowledgement may be validly done after execution. In fact, the
testator and the witnesses do not have to acknowledge together. You can acknowledge one
by one. The law does not require it to be made simultaneously. As long as the testator
maintains his testamentary capacity and the witnesses maintain their witnessing capacity
until the last person acknowledges, then the will is valid. However, if the testator dies
before the last person acknowledges, then the will is not valid. The will is considered as
being unacknowledged.

11. Garcia v Vasquez.-- In the case, the will was read to the testator only once. The SC denied
probate of the will for failing to comply w/ the requirements of Art. 808. Such failure is a
formal defect. If the testator is blind, the will must be read to him twice: (1) by one of the
subscribing witnesses; and (2) by the notary public, not necessarily in that order. The
provision mandatory. If this is not followed, the will is void.

12. Alvarado v Gabiola.-- Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and
codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado
comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808 -the will shall be read
 twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private
respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same
aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.

13. Icasiano v. Icasiano.-- In the will submitted for probate, one page was not signed by one of
the witnesses. Such failure to sign was due to inadvertence since in the copy, all pages were
signed. The SC held that this was not a fatal defect. Considering the circumstances, the fact
that the other requirement was complied with, and the notarial seal coincided w/ the third
page during the sealing, then the will could be probated. Unusual circumstances w/c existed
in the case: (1) there was another copy (2) inadvertence/ oversight (3) because of the
notarial seal. The presence of these facts led the SC to allow the will. The general rule,
however, is that, the failure to sign any page is a fatal defect.

14. Cagro v. Cagro.-- In the case, the page where the attestation clause appears was signed by
the witnesses on the side and not after the attestation clause. The SC held that this was a
fatal defect. The logic is that if there had been no signature at the bottom but on the sides,
there will be ample room for fraud, that is, to add in the attestation clause upon the death of
the decedent an essential matter w/c was not there in the first place to validate it.

15. Javellana v. Ledesma.-- Supra Case # 10

16. Cruz v. Villasor.-- This case involves a will wherein the notary public was also one of the
three instrumental witnesses. Did the will comply w/ the requirement of 3 witnesses? No.
The SC gave 2 reasons: (1) The notary public can not be an oath witness and at the same
time an oath taker. It is impossible for him to acknowledge before himself; (2) the aim of
the notary public to insure the trustworthiness of the instrument would be lost bec. he will
try to insure the validity of his own act.

17. Caneda v CA.—Defect in attestation clause cannot be cured by substantial compliance. The
foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact
that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.35 In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by
Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the
defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible way by which we can
read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the
attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of
its pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.

18. Gan v. Yap.-- In the case, the proponent of the supposed will sought to establish its contents
through extrinsic evidence. The SC denied such attempt to probate a holographic will that
was not presented before the court. The SC said that the actual will should be presented to
the court. The reason is that the will itself is the only material proof of authenticity. How
can they oppose the will if the will is not there?
19. Labrador v. Ca.-- In this case , the date was indicated in the body of the will as part of the
narration. Is this valid? Yes. It is not necessary that the will be separate from the body. In
fact, it can be anywhere in the will as long as the date appears in the will.

20. Azaola v. Singson.-- In the case, the oppositors of the will contested the will on the ground
that it was executed through fraud. They, however, admitted its due execution. During the
case, the proponent presented only one witness to identify the signature and handwriting of
the testator. Is one witness sufficient considering there is an oppositor to the will? Yes. The
SC held that one witness is sufficient. What the law envisions is that the genuineness of the
handwriting and signature be contested. Contested holographic will refers to the challenge
by the oppossitors that the will is not in the handwriting of the deceased. The oppossitors in
this case did not challenge the handwriting of the deceased. Their ground for opposing
probate is that the will was executed through fraud and improper and undue influence.
Hence, the probate required only one witness. The authenticity of the will is not contested.
Therefore, the will itself, not being contested was that of the testator. The oppossitors here
precisely admit that authenticity of the will but oppose on the ground that there is fraud or
undue influence initiated upon her in the execution of the will. Hence, it is uncontested.

21. Codoy v Calugay.-- The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory. In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by
the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat
the wishes of the testator. Art 811 par 1: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the
will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”

22. Maloto v. CA.-- In the case, the estate was distributed equally by intestacy bet. the 4 heirs.
Subsequently, a will was found. In the will, more was given to 2 of the heirs. As such, the 2
who got more sought the probate of the will. The other 2 objected claiming that the will had
been revoked. The issue is whether or not there had been a valid revocation. The SC held
no. While there may have been intent to revoke, there was no corpus. There is no evidence
to show that what was revoked was the will of the testator. Also, the destruction was not
proven to have been done in the presence and under the expression of the testator.

23. Gago v. Mamuyac.-- Where the will can not be located at the time of the death of the
testator but was shown to have been in the possession or control of the testator when last
seen, the presumption is that in the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, the will
was cancelled or destroyed by the testator. The rationale is that it is hard to prove the act of
revocation of the testator. The presumption is disputable.

24. Nepomoceno v. CA.-- In the case, the testator left his entire estate to his legal wife and
children but devised the free portion to his common-law wife. When the common-law wife
sought the probate of the will, the CA declared the will valid, but held the devise to the
commonlaw wife null and void for being contrary to Art. 739 of the NCC. In effect, the court
ruled on the intrinsic validity of the will in the probate proceedings. Was the holding of the
 CA correct? The SC held that it was correct. Although the general rule is that only extrinsic
validity could be at issue during the probate, this rule is not absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court may do what the situation constrains it to do by passing
upon certain provisions of the will. Clearly, the devise for the common-law wife was void.
The CA had the authority to rule on such nullity. It would be practical for the court to rule
on such an obvious matter. Otherwise, the probate might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void.

25. Gallanosa v. Arcangel- Probate are proceedings in rem and are mandatory. If the probate is
allowed, it becomes conclusive as to its extrinsic validity which provides that: 1. The testator
was of sound mind when he executed the will. 2. The testator was not acting under duress
or fraud-- his consent was not vitiated 3. The will was executed in accordance w/ the
formalities required by law 4. The will is genuine and not a forgery

26. De la Cerna v. Rebeca-Potot.-- This case involves a joint will executed by a husband and a
wife. The husband died before the wife and the will was probated. Now, the wife died and
the testamentary heirs sought the probate of the will. Will the will be probated? No. The
SC held that the first probate was valid only as to the share of the husband. However, such
earlier probate cannot be applied for the share of the wife bec. she was still living at the
time the first probate was made. As such, there is no res judicata as to the share of the wife.
As to the wife, since it is against a joint will, then it is void and her property will pass by
intestacy.

27. Austria v. Reyes.-- In the case, the oppossitor sought to nullify the institution of the adopted
children as heirs bec. it was found out that the adoption did not comply w/ the law. The SC
held that the institution was valid. For it to be invalid, and be an exception to the general
rule, 3 requisites must concur: 1. Cause for the institution must be stated in the will; 2.
Cause must be shown to be false; 3. It must appear on the face of the will that the testator
would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The wishes of
the testator must be respected. In the case, the third requisite was absent. As such, the
exception was not applicable and the general rule would apply. If there is doubt as to
whether there is a valid institution bec. of the false cause, resolve it in favor of validity.

28. Reyes v. Barreto-Datu.-- In the case, Lucia received a part of the estate through a judicially
approved project of partition w/c was based on the will of her father. However, it was found
out later on that he Salud was not really the child of her parents. As such, Lucia sought to
annul the institution of Salud as heir claiming that she was preterited. The SC held that she
was not preterited be. she had received a part of the estate. There is no preterition if the
heir is given testamentary disposition, even if it be less than her legitime. The remedy of the
heir is for the completion of her legitime pursuant to Art. 906.

29. Nuguid v. Nuguid.-- In the case, Rosa died having 6 brothers and sisters and her parents.
However, she instituted one of her sisters as her universal heir. The parents opposed the
probate claiming they were preterited. The SC held that the parents were preterited. As
such, the institution of the sister as universal heir is void. The estate will be distributed by
intestacy. The SC further stated that just bec. you are an heir, but not a compulsory heir, it
does not mean that you will receive anything. If compulsory heirs in the direct line are
preterited, and the free portion had already been devised to other people, the annulment of
 the institution of heir will in effect anull your institution. Also, when the law says devise or
legacy, this is used in its ordinary sense. The claim of the sister that her institution as a
universal heir is equivalent to a devise is untenable. If such were accepted, it would render
Art. 854 useless.

30. Acam v Acam

31. Acain v. Acain.-- In the case, Acain left his estate to his brothers, completely omitting his
wife and legally adopted daughter. As such, the two opposed the probate of the will
claiming they were preterited. The SC held that the adopted child was preterited but not
the wife. A wife is not a compulsory heir in the direct line so she cannot be preterited. With
respect to the adopted child, it is different. Under Art. 39 of PD 603, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter
and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. The SC further stated that since
there were no devises or legacies, and a compulsory heir was preterited, the effect is, as if
nothing was written in the will. The whole estate will be distributed by intestacy.

32. PCIB v. Escolin.-- In the case, the spouses executed reciprocal wills. It provided that the
share in the conjugal assets will pass to the surviving spouse and that the surviving spouse
can do whatever he or she wants with the inheritance, even sell it, and if there is any residue
from the inheritance from the other spouse upon the death of the surviving spouse, it shall
pass to the brothers and sisters of the spouse who first died. The wife died first. The
husband did not liquidate the conjugal assets bec. he was the sole heir of his wife. Upon the
husband's death, it is now questioned whether there is any residue from the wife's estate
that could pass to her brothers and sisters. PCIB, (and the) administratrix of the husband
claims that: (1) There was no fideicommissary substitution bec. there was no obligation
upon the husband to preserve and transmit the prop. to the brothers and sisters of the wife
as seen in his authority to sell the property, and (2) since there was an invalid attempt to
make a substitution, then the testamentary disposition is void and there can be no
transmission of rights to the brothers and sisters. The SC agreed w/ contention no. 1 on the
same ground. The second requisite was absent and there could be no ficeicommissary
substitution. With regard to the second contention, the SC disagreed. The SC said there was
a simultaneous substitution. The institution of the husband was subject to a resolutory
condition while the institution of the brothers and sisters was subject to a suspensive
condition. Both conditions are one and the same. It is the existence in the husband's estate
of assets he received from his wife at the time of his death. If there is, the husband's right to
the residue is extinguished upon his death while the right of the brothers and sisters vests at
the same time.

33. Palacios v. Ramirez.-- In the case, 2/3 of the usufruct of the free portion was given to
Wanda, w/ 2 other persons not related to her as her substitutes by way of simple and
fideicommissary substitution. Her grandnephews object on the ground that there could be
no fideicommissary substitution bec. the substitutes were not w/in one degree of each
other. The SC agreed w/ the nephews. It said, quoting Tolentino, that one degree refers to
one generation. As such, the fideicommissary can only be either a parent or child of the
fiduciary.