S 0 R E N KIERKEGAARD

THE CO~CEPT or FAITH

IN
THE: THOUGhT OF SORC~ KIERKEGAARD

By

I SAAC J AD ES I I'll I, 8. A.

A 'Thesis

Submitted to the taculty of Graduate Studies

in Partial tulfilmant of the Requirements

for the Degre9

~last8r of' Arts

McMaster University

May 1970
MASTER OF ARTS (1970) MCMASTER UNIVERSITY
(Religion) Hamilton, Ontario.

TITLE: The Concept of Faith in the Thought of Soren

Kierkegaard

AUTHOR: Isaac Jadesimi, B.A. (University of Wales)

SUPERVISOR: Professor J. C. Robertson

NUNBER OF PAGES: iii, 124

SCOPE AND CONTENTS: The aim of this study is to investigate Soren

Kierkegaard's concept of faith: more specifically,

faith in itself, faith in relationship to other human acts and stances,

and faith in relationship to the human agent. The author, after analyzing

the problem, attempts to set the problem in the broad context of

Kierkegaard's literary output and overall intention. He then treats his

specific subject genetically and topically, trying to show not only what

Kierkegaard was arguing for but also what he was arguing against (e.g.

rationalism, historical "objectivism", etc.). Since the author discovers

that Kierkegaard was above all opposed to reducing faith to "concepts",

he draws back from a neat set of results, but gives guidelines as to the

nature of personal act that Kierkegaard was trying to help his readers
to perform.
 PREFACE

I should like to take this opportunity of acknowledging

the help I have received from various people.

My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Dr. J.e. Robertson,

whose advice -and painstaking guidance I will always value.

Dr. J.R. Meyer made many valuable remarks after reading ths first

draft, and Professor Paul Holmer of Yale University gave me vary

helpful suggestions. ~rs. Paula Weber was kind enough to type

the final draft with great cars.

(iii)
 CHAPTER I

The main object of this thesis is to locate the role and

define the status given to faith in the thought of Soran Kierkegaard.

We shall sse how Kierkegaard tried to answer the question, "What is

the nature and function of faith?" The guiding thesis of Kierkegaard

is "Truth is subjectivity". He sees subjective truth within the

context of a person's (or to use Kierkegaard's most important category -

en Individual's) inwardness. Faith is one of the chief conditions of

inwardness, along with suffering, (in a special s9nse) hope and love.

Thus faith is a key affirmative element in the make-up of Kierkegaard's

guiding thesis. As an existential determinant, faith occupies the

foremost position, and it is given such a priority that it seams to

be the condition of inwardness in relation to which all other

conditions are defined, but curiously enough it eludes definition

itself. Although ona should not here conclude that Kierkegaard

completely avoided the task of defining faith. Significantly,

Kierkegaard's work does cover a multitude of themes, (hence various

descriptions of him as a man of great genius, an able philosopher, a

powerful theologian, an earnest disciple of New Testament Christianity,

the Knight of Faith, the philosopher of existence and the poet of the

religious), yet he insists that there is one dominant theme in all his

work. In the Point of View,l he says that he was at all periods of his
2
authorship a religious writer. He sought to answer the question:

1
 2

what does it mean for me to become a Christian? Here one se9S rather

fertile ground for studying the main problem of the philosophy of

religion) which is that of understanding the nature of religious

faith. Kie~kegaard was himself an example of what as a philosopher

he sought to analyze and describe. The task which he has set himself

was that of protesting against the dreadful misrepresentation of

Christianity both by the speculative philosopher and the easy going

spiritually complacent "nominal" Christian. The protest was made on

the basis of what he took to be the correct understanding of the

nature and role of faith. It is worthwhile to note that many of

Kierkegaard's ideas developed out of particular situations in his life,

(e.g. his engagement to Regina Olsen and its break up). However) there

is in his w?rk a certain unity which makes the total output the

continuli development of a single theme. The doctrine of subjecti-

vity is the category which Kierkegaard used to interpret Christianity;

it is that factor which gives the total output its unity.

In this thesis we shall see how different concepts are inter-

related or opposed to each other, e.g. (a) Indirect communication or

Maieutic, Reduplication, Double Reflexion, Infinite Reflexion;

(b) Subjectivity) inwardness, passion or pathos; (c) freedom,

"Existence", Actuality (in the sense of what is historical and free);

(d) . Paradox, Leap; (e) Particular, Individual; (f) Repetition;

(g) Subjectivity/Objectivity; (h) Immanence/Transcendence;

(1) Speculation/Existence; (j) Universal/Particular; (k) Abstract/

Concrete; (1) Immediacy/r.1ediacy; (m) Absolute/Relative; (n) Actua-

 3

lity/possibility; (0) suffering/joy; and (p) sin/faith not Virtue.

Referances will be made to concepts such as truth, contemporanaity,

offense, belief, and reason, as applied existentially.

An attempt will be made to sea what Kierkegaard's starting

point is as well as his goal and also how the theory of the "stages"

(which is the basis of Kisrkegaard's whole authorship) is constructed

on the premi~e that man is a synthesis of two different qualities -

"soul and body sustained by spirit»3 or the finite and the eternal.

Kiarkegaard used the premise of the synthesis in an amplified form

(e.g. the theory of the »Stages l ' ) with the result that one sees the

consistency and accuracy characteristic of Kierkegaard's thinking.

Careful note will be taken to see what and how Kiarkegaard saw his

task and how he tried, by consistent and logical reasoning, to fathom

man's being and unite the different manifestations of human life

under a definite and coherent view. Kierkegaard with his creative

imagination enters into all the human experiences and adventures which

he meets in his reading (e.g. about the Greeks and their philosophy,

especially Socrates, the Church fathers, the Christian mystics,

Shakespeare, Faust, Hamann, Schlagel, and Hoffman, etc.) and relives

them and tries to find a coherence in them. Kierkegaard read

authors and works with the greatest promise of yielding the best

and most reliable illumination of man. Kierke9aard's most significant

reading was the Bible, the book that portrays the advent of God and

how Cod casts man into the most earnest decision of his existence.

Kierkegaard underlines the view that Christianity points out to man

 4

his limitations and sin (in the context of presenting a gift and

issuing a summons) and it demands obedience and belief. Man can be

related to the Eternal truths only through faith.

8efore stating the conclusion concerning what has been learnt

about Kierkega~rd's understanding of the nature of believing and

faith, we shall, in this thesis, look at faith and historical truths,

Lessing's Problem, the relation between faith and historical results,

the System, the ethical and the religious.

 5

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER I

1. The full title is The Point of View for my Work as an Author.

A Direct Communication: A reEort to History. This book brings

to light a unity of purpose running through the highly diverse

literature which Kierkegaard had already produced and which he

was to go on producing until his death seven years later.

Kierkegaard could not bring himself to publish this intensely

personal document during his life-time mainly because he doubted

"whether anybody has a right to let people know how good he is."

(The book was written in 1848 and published posthumously by

the author's brother in 1859.) Kierkegaard in the conclusion

(the last paragraph of this work) characterizes his whole work as

"his own education in Christianity" which "he could not ascribe

to any man, least of all to himself". "If I were to ascribe it

to anyone it would be to Governance."

2. The Point of View, translated with introduction and notes by

w. Lowrie, Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto,

1939 - page 5 ff.

3. The Concept of Dread, translated with introduction and notes

1

by W. Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,

1957, pags 39, especially page 79.

 CHAPTER II

TH E OV ER-ALL PI CTUR E

1. Soren Kierkagaard's Aim, Method, and Easic Thames

Kierkegaard often declared that from the beginning he was a

religious author, desirous of "capturing" his readers for religion.

He believed that he must do this by taking them unawaras, as it were,

just where they stood, and that to succBed in this he must use

"indirect communication" or tithe maieutic method". Therefore, he

used pseudonyms. The Creek "'lord maieutes (i...'_·:iLt·/~j) means "midwife".

Kierkegaard used its cognate to refer to that pedagogical mOGe whereby

he attempted to be an evoker of idea, a midwife of the mind and spirit.

With regard to where his readers stood, Kierkegaard says that life

may be lived at one of the three levels or "stc;ges", namely the aasthatic,

the ethical, or the religious level or stage.

Kierkegaard intended to present his thought in such a way

that the reader would become involved in the issues at a deeply personal

level. The aim of his indirect communication was to make the author a

vanishing point and avoid the direct presentation of a system of

argument and conclusions, thus making room for the reader's own

decisive thought. The writings themselves were to be primarily

occasions and not deliverances. Kierkaga6rd understood it as his task

to find that truth which along might rescue man from spiritual

6
 7

destruction, and he stressed the Christian understanding that man can

be related to the eternal truths only through faith. In a note in his

Journal in 1835, Kierkegaard wrote:

The main thing is that I understand my purpose in life

and that I see what God really wants me to do. My main concern
is to find a truth which it true for me, that I find the idea for
which I will live and die.

After he himself has been captured and conquered by Christ-

lanity Kierkegaard regards it as his particular calling to draw the

attention of men to Christianity as the only way out of the anxiety

and hopelessness so innate to the human condition and SO manifestly

present in the modern age. With the aid of ~ lively and creative

imagination, reflection, and a scrupulously logical mind, and with

Christianity as his starting point, Kierkegaard sats himself to the

task of understanding human life, in all its stages and in all its

relationships, in order that through this understanding it may become

clear to him how man may be led to the truth. Kierkegaard attempts

to find a link and a line of development in all the contradictory

possibilities of human life, and he tries both to find his bearings

in human existence and to sketch the boundary of human knowledge.

Indeed Kierkegaard says, "1 cannot understand the first thing

about faith, but I believe. But it is all that understanding and

2
conceiving which is the misfortune."

Kierkegaard's special interest is man in his existence, and

he encompasses the total view of the laws and directions along which

man's existence moves (i.e. the total view of human life) in the

theory of the "stages" which he is convinced embraces all the

 8

possibilities of human existence. He says in a note in his diary,

My abiding Service in literature will be to have stated the

decisive determinants of the whole existential range of life with a
dialectical acuteness and primivity not to be found in any other
lit~rature, as far as I know; and I have not had any books to guide
me.

This total view forms the basis of Kierkegaard's whole authorship,

end as the basis for the theory of the "stages" Kierkegaard states

that man is a synthesis of two different and antithetical qualities

designated by terms such as "time" and "eternity", the "finite" and

"infinite", "body" (and soul) and "spirit", "necessity" and "freedom",

etc. Kierkegaard derived from Christianity the view that man is of

flesh end of spirit, and he tried to include all the possibilities and

contradictions of human life under the formula, man is a synthesis.

In brief, according to this synthesis, the following basic positions

are open to a man's choosing: (a) he may live exclusively in the

visible, temporal world and this constitutes the aesthetic stage;

(b) he may seek the Eternal, Or when the Eternal meets him, he may

accept the Eternal and in either avent he may try to relate the two

components of the synthesis (the temporal and ths Eternal) and this

constitutes the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical stage

and (c) he may proceed beyond this to the religious stage in which

there is always the dangerous possibility that a man knows about the

Eternal but this knowledge has no meaning for his human existence and

he lives in despair over the disrelationship of the two components

of the synthesis. This is why Kierkegaard could define despair as

4
"the disproportion between the temporal and the eternal in man."
 9

It is worthy of note that Kierkegaard was convinced that he

had to show his Hegelian contemporaries, for instance, that what

mattered first and foremost was to "think in existence", i. e. that

he should stand guarantee for his thoughts with his own person and

life, (so that one could say that Kierkegaard experienced next to

nothing from the outside). That, he believed, could best be done by

following the Socratic method of leading his readers to the point

where they themselves could discover what he wanted them to under-

stand without his having to say it directly. To achieve this purpose

he used specific individual figures, whose thoughts and peculiarities

he could pursue to their utmost consequences by the method of

experimentation.

Kierkagaard has been seen as a poet, prophet, philosopher,

and theologian; however he is primarily a religious thinker, a man

struggling for his own soul, like the main character in a ~ilgrim's

Progress. Kierkegaardts central problem is that of becoming a

Christian, of realizing personal existence. faith is Kierkegaard's

goal, and prayer is man's sale means of moving toward that goal.

Kierkegaard's principle is that true piety emerges from a sense of

one's own unworthiness and of the greatness of God and it moves, as

it were, in a tension to an understanding of God's love. His life

and work are examples of his own principles, e.g. the inner is not

the outer and everyone is finally impenetrable and the depths of

personal existence can not be fully grasped in the realm of the

objective. This conviction was the father of his indirect method of

discourse.
 r/

10

The continuing problem of Kierkegaard's life and thought is

that he is seeking to know himself, for "one must know one's self
5
before knowing anything else." Furthermore, knowing himself comes

to mean finding himself and being himself and these in turn come to

mean finally being found by God. With regard to seeking personal

6
truth Kierkagaard said, "What is truth but to live for an idea."

The ultimate answer to Kierkegaard's quest came in terms of Christ-

ianity. The idea turns out to be Christ, and integrity involves

seeking the kingdom first, whilst the Archimedean point is prayer

alone before the Christian God. The meaning of life is to be found

in becoming a Christian. However, one should note here that

Kierkegaard's life involved a movement from a negative relationship

to Christianity, through a positive intellectual interest in and

defense of the faith, toward a more inward and existential identifi-

cation with Christianity. Kierkegaard's goal (of serving the truth)

and strategy (of making his readers aware of the truth in such a way

that they themselves had to take some decisive stand) remained

unaltered throughout the remainder of his life but cama to be under-

stood by him in changing terms as his own relationship to the Christian

faith deepened. Thus he says

I have chosen to serve the truth - to raise the price (of

Christianity) and if Qossibls to whisper to every individual what
the demands could be. B

Also he says, "All my terrific work as an author is one great thought,

and it is; to wound from behind".9 rurthermore, "my whole life is

10
an epigram, calculated to make people aware". liMy task is j 'to

make room that God mClY come, not authoritatively but through suffering. lIll
 11

In his own person, Kiarkegaard thought of himself as

"quite a simple Christian", and he wrote,

I have never maintained, and do not maintain, that I am a

Christian in any exceptional degree. It has been my task to depict
Christianity. I have never maintained that my action was an attempt
to be a perfeqt Christian; this is why I havr taken up a poetic
attitude in my presentation of Christianity. 2

Also,

Real Christianity is self-denial, sobriety. It is too

exalted for me - I have enjoyed many many pleasures. I can only
praise and extol strict Christianity.13

The inward movement which Kierkegaard called his "God-

relationship" can be described as the process of "becoming a

Christian," and in his work as an author he was charting and

reflecting on the course of his life. "Becoming a Christian" defines

the central movement of Kierkegaard1s own life and it was this move-

ment which served to define and determine both the content of his

work as an author and his own sense of personel vocation. With regard

to Kierkegsard's vocation, a point of interest is the dialectic

involved in the affirmative goal of helping people become individuals

and Christians, on the one hand, and the fact that this goal would best

be reached by shocking people with a realization of how difficult it

was to become a Christian, on the other hand. This paradox is wall

expressed by the conviction that, "it is easier to become a Christian

when I am not a Christian than to become a Christian when I am one."14

However, Kierkegaard spells out in less paradoxical terms that,

What I want, is to spur people on to becoming moral charac-

ters, witnesses to the truth, to be willing to suffer for the truth,
and ready to give up worldly wisdom. 15
 12

Kierkegaard tries to clarify the reasons why it was diffi-

cult to become a Christian, and writes that:

My purpose is to make it difficult to become a Christian •••

••• qualitatively difficult, and essentially difficult for every man
equally, for essentially it is equally difficult for every man to
relinquish his understf9ding and his thinking, and to keep his soul
fixed upon the absurd.

Kierkegaard's purpose in making it difficult to become a Christian,

(or in stating Christianity as an either/or) was solely that of

devising a means by which he could shock professing Christians out

18
of their Laodicean state of luke-warmness. Furthermore, Kierkegaard

tried to enrich faith by a defense of inner passion and he was

convinced that wherever passionate, responsible decision was missing,

both individuality and Christianity were also missing. Indeed

Kierkegaard himself openly admitted the great difficulties which

seemed to him inherent in Christian doctrine and says,

In Christianity itself the contradictions are so great that,

to say the least, they prevent a claar view. 19

However (by way of a hint at the assertion that Christianity is

subjectivity) Kierkagaard says, that, "Christianity is not a doctrine

but an existential communication expressing an existential contra-

20
diction."

2. Kierkegaard's View of Man

It is very significant to nota that Kierkegaard strove

diligently to tell what it meant to be an individual and a Christian,

and quite naturally he gave a good deal of attention to the nature

of man.
 13

Becoming an individual blends with the responsibility of

becoming a Christian, because a person does not succeed in becoming

an individual until he realizes with his whole heart that he lives

and moves and has his being 1n God as the heavenly person through

whom one finds selfhood. Kierkegaard asks,

And how does a man become that individual? Well, unless

he has to do with God alone, where the highest matters are concerned,
and ••••• now I weigh the matter as best I can, act upon it that you,
o God may be able to seize hold of me, and I therefore speak to
nobody at all, I dare ~gt do so - unless he does that he cannot
become the Individual.

»)
/
Thus ona finds that Kierkegaard's "Communication is always directed

to the individual, because it forces every man to take a strictly

personal stand toward Christianity, and so "the individual" becomes

a religious category, conditioned by Kierkegaard's psychological

isolation, but at the same time transcending it as a universal

determination of the religious consciousness. Kierkegaard regards

this category as the most important achievement of his work, the

sine qu~ ~ of all religion, and in his diary he notes that

This category is the point at which and across which God

can come to seize hold of the race. To remove that point is to
dethrone Cod. 21

furthermore, Kierkegaard says that,

"The Individual" - that is the decisive Christian category

and it will be decisive also for the future of Christianity.22

Evaryons must rediscover himself as an individual alone before God.

Christianity can not be handed down in a tradition; every man who

 14

comes into this world must be shocked anew, and, in this shock,

advance to faith, or fall into despair.

It is always only as an individual that ona can have the

truest relationship with God; for we alwa~s have the best idea
of our own unworthiness when we are alone. 3

"Every step forward in man's relation with God is a step

backward,,24 and "life can only be understood backward though it

must be liv9~ forward.,,25 The true experience of being before

God never grows into a mystic sense of participation; it remains

a feeling of fear and trembling. Therefore to become a "single

individual" is the most important task of authentic Christianity for

it is only as an individual that one is able to be in a true rela-

26
tionship with God.

In regarding "The Individual" as Kierkegaard's most important

category, one notes his remarks that, "It is a category of the spirit

and of spiritual awakening.,,27 Furthermore, the phrase can be used

in two senses, namely a proud one and a humble one. The humble sense

elone is right, since in humble acceptance of individual responsibility

before God lies man's salvation. Kierkegaard says,

It is the peculiarity of the human race that just because the

individual is created in the image of God, lithe individual II is above
the race. 28

By way of the defense of the individual, Kierkegaard tries to defend

the spiritual responsibility of freedom; - "the most tremendous thing

which has been granted to man is: the choice, freedom. And if you

desire to save it and preserve it, there is only one way: in the very
 15

sarna second unconditionally and in complete resignation to give

it back to God and yourself wit~ it."29 The prophetic cry of

Kiarkegaard seems to be, "be a Christian and an Individual" and

though far from perfection Kierkegaard says, "yet had I to crave an

inscription on my grave I would ask for none other than 'the

Individual 11,30 • It is worthwhile to note here that the whole of

Soren Kierkegaard's work has its unity in his concept of man, and

this is Kierkegaard's distinguished contribution of first-rate

significance. Kierkegaard's approach to the study of man is ana of

introspection and analysis. Since I am the nearest parson to myself

(if one may dare to put words into Kierkegaard's mouth) my starting

point is myself. Hence the nead to revive the self as the starting-

point. Kierkegaard sought a concept of man entirely in terms of a

certain psychology of himself. Kierkegaard's sole field of concern

was the living material of man as he found him. Man himself, the

reality close at hand and most readily accessible, should be the key

to his own mystery and to any other which might lie beyond him. Thus

Kierkegaard was more concerned to show how (i.e. SUbjectivity) to

become a Christian rather than showing what (i.e. objectivity)

Christianity is. Kierkegaard was convinced that the starting point

must be inwardness and says in the Journal entry for July 9th, 1838:

I mean to labour to achieve a more inward relation to

Christianity: hitherto I have fought for its truth, while in a
sense standing outside it. In a purely outward senss I have
carried Christ's cross like Simon of Cyrene. 3l

This is a hint as regards the doctrine of subjectivity. Lessing

stated that "Truth Is Subjectivity". Kierkegaard turns this

 16

sentence around and asserts that subjectivity is truth. At this point,

one should steer clear of the conclusion that Kierkegaard sought truth

in the subjective (psychological) sphere and understood it to be mere

personal feeling. Kierkegaard means and constantly stresses that

only what is apprehended with subjective energy and passion can be

truth for the person concerned. If truth is subjectivity, it is upon

the sUbject, upon the individual, that Kierkegaard's stress lies.

It concerns the self, not only as it is, but as it is capable of

becoming. Thus Kisrkegaard says "A self, every instant it exists, is

in process of becoming, for the self does not exactly exist, it is

32
only that which it is to become."

3. Spirit, the Self, Individuality

Man is Spirit in his essential nature, i.e. there is a

dimension in the individual's life which transcends bodily (or

physical)and psychical life. This dimension is spirit; it is what

gives man "splendour" and it is man's most precious possession.

This "splendour" can be summed up in the words of the Holy Scriptures:

33
"God has created man in His own image". God is spirit; He is

invisible and it is this invisibility which is the very definition

of spirit; man's invisible glory, the image of God in him is spirit

and the other nama for spirit is self. Spirit is the combining factor
34
in the synthesis of body and spirit. Spirituality is the power of

a man's understanding over his life, it is the capacity for holding

ideality and actuality togethar, for reduplication (i.e. "to exist

in what one understands" or to reflect the truth in one's life)

 17

for realizing the truth in one's individual ·

ex~stenc9.
35 Despair is

e disproportion within the self. The self is not a substance; it is

a dynamic relationship. It is not 8 simple relationship between two

terms but a peculiar kind of relationshie between two terms which has

the additional, positive capacity to relate to itself; it has a

36
reflexive character. The self in reflective self-consciousness

creates an ideal self which serves as the goal and guide of its

movement. This explains the dictum; the more consciousness, the

37
more self. The more one strives toward the ideal self, the more

the tension increases within the actual self. Thus the self is two

selves (in the sense of being or containing an actual and an ideal

self) and it also is one self (in the sense that only the actual self

really exists, for the ideal self is its creation.) So when

Kierkegaard writes in Sickness Unto Death that the self is a cons-

ciaus synthesis of infinitude and finitude which relates itself to

itself, whose task is to become itself, he is saying that there is a

self which relates itself (the actual self) to itself (th9 ideal self)

and the task is to actualize the ideal. The self is the dialectical

synthesis of an expansive and a limiting factor. Finitude is thg

limiting factor and the infinite is the expanding factor expressing

itself in man's imagination. Kierkagaard says that the task is to

become concrete. Thus "one becomes concrete by moving away from one's

self infinitely by infinitzing one's self and then rsturning ta one's

self °
~n fO~n~~eLY
0" b y f'~nl~lzlng
.... onlsts s81f."38 One infinitizes one's

self through the imagination, which constructs an ideal salf. But

ons must not remain in the realm of imagination; one shoulo return to
 18

reality, i.e. the ideal self should be actualized, should be related

to the former actual self so that the new self which emerges is the

synthesis of the ideal and the actual. Thus Professor Swenson says

that "reality for Kierkegaard is the ethical synthesis of the ideal

and the actual within the individual".39 for Kierkegaard, the unify-

ing power of personality is the inmost and holiest thing of all. The

main theme of Purity of Heart can be characterized as attaining

unity within the self, and Kierkegaard describes the process as that

of attaining unchangeableness; rather like his concepts of repetition

and reduplication. From the point of view of the ethicist in Eith~rl

Or, the self is seen as that which gives unity to the individual.

The self gives continuity to becoming; it is personality and freedom.

The self is freedom because it is born out of self-choice. Choice

of the self brings the self into existence, yet the fact that it could
40
be chosen implies that it was there all the time.

Kierkegaard stresses that the movement toward recognition of

on3's self as a sinner brings a new depth of self-awareness, a new

intensification of inwardness and subjectivity, a further realization

of personal existence. This movement can be described in terms of

the concepts of spirit, or self or person, and also the category of

the Individual, which is their essential equivalent. Kierkegaard sets

the "individual" over against abstract universality. The individual,

is the category of the spirit, of spiritual awakening; it is the

decisive Christian category. Christianity stands or falls with the

category of the individual. Self-realization is becoming an individual

--------~------------- - - -- - --- -

19

and personal existence is existence as a single one, as an individual!

The main condition of religiousness is to be a single individual man.

In the pseudonymous works, the individual is primarily the pre-eminent

individual in the aesthetic sense, the distinguished person. In the

Edifying Works, the individual is what every man can be. In this

sense the individual might be called the concrete Universal as opposed

to the abstract Universal.

It is worthwhile to note that Kierkegaard's emphasis on the

role of spirit gives one a very helpful introduction to the meaning

of "Truth is subjectivity". The eternal as ethically perceived, is

brought into time whenever a concerned human being undertakes the

task of existence so seriously that his very selfhood is at stake,

i.e. truth becomes part of the subject whenever the subject whole-

heartedly wills to be the truth. The central purpose of the term

"s~irit" is to emphasize the heights and responsibility of human

freedom and such freedom implies the necessity of personal, ethical

choice, (especially as the ethical sphere is characterized by self-

reliance). Whenever the whole self 1s wholly committed to the task

of being a whole self, the mediation of eternity in time results.

Spirit succeeds in uniting the eternal and the temporal by operating

in and through "the instant".

Kierkegaard says,

The instant, is not properly an atom of time but an atom of

eternity. It is the finite reflection of eternity in time, its
first effort as it were to bring time to a stop. The instant is
that ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another,
thereby positing the temporal, where time is constantly intersecting
eternity and eternity constantly permeating time. 4l
 20

4. Nature, Scope, and Variety of the Literary Output

The works of Kierkagaard can be roughly divided into two

categories; the earlier writings and the later writings. We find

that, in the former, Kierkegaard uses "indirect communication" in

stating the a~ternatw3s concretely in such a way that the individual

reader is moved through self-activity and decision toward the r8ali-

zation of his own individuality; it is the attempt to bring the reader

to the point of choosing himself. This is Kierkegaard's equivalent

to Socrates' theme of knowing one's self. It is worthwhile to note

here that Kierkegsard has the highest regard for Greek thinkers,

especially Socrates, and indeed Kierkegaard says,

There cannot really be the least doubt that what Christianity

needs is another Socrates, someone who could existentially express
ignorance with the same cunning dialectical simplicity.42

Socrates moved among men, putting questions to them, passionately

delving into this and that, in order to find out the truth; not by

abstract speculation (because here Kierkegaard would say that abstrac-

tion discounts the uniqueness of the individual who Kierkegaard

upgrades and defends Whilst he downgrades the group or the mass) but

out of the very midst of life itself. However, Kierkagaard does

criticize certain characteristics of Greek thought (especially in

the Philosophical Fragments); for example, he says

The communication of Christianity must ultimately end in

"bearing witness " , the maieutic form can never be final. For truth,
from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the supject (as 43
Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must be proclaim3d.
 21

In his later writings, Kierkagaard abandons indirect commu-

nication for direct testimony. In both the earlier and later

writings, becoming a Christian is not a matter of knowledge; no one

can teach it or do it for another and, since it involves self-

realization of the individual at the deepest levels of self existence,

it must be lived through by the individual himself. This is one

aspect of Kierkegaard's existentialism. When in his later writings

Kierkegaard speaks in his own name, his speech is edifying and is

directed to the individual in the inner recesses of his being.

The intensely personal character of Kierksgaard's thought

constitutes its strength for it gives to his writings a degree of

seriousness and depth. Thus we find that by a very complex and

subtle analysis of human life, Kierkegaard develops his point of view

without resorting to abstract terms; rather he represents the alter-

natives in concrete, dramatic, personal expressions. - With great

artistic skill, Kierkegaard describes a person who lives in this way

or that. The alternatives presented are concrete and the decisions

which are motivated are also concrete. The alternatives are called

"stages on life's way" or spheres of existence; and Kierkegaard shows

through concrete examples how individual men live and think.

Kierkegaard's works are such that they cover the three "stages"; the

aesthetic. the ethical, and the religious. There are two boundary

zones which complete the "picture" of the "stages": Irony (the

boundary between the aesthetic and the ethical) and humour, (the

boundary betwaen the ethical and the religious). Thase three spheres of
 22

existence and the boundaries between them are ideal types, since

no individual is a perfect example of any ona type. In every

individual the way of life may be mixed and confused, yet the

dominant orientation of the life of the individual may be said to be

either aesthe~ic or ethico-religious. The scheme of analysis (with

regard to the "stages") does not constitute an absolutely successive

order, yet personal existence is a movement toward the religious

sphere of existence: a movement away from the domination of the

aesthetic in such a manner that the aesthetic is not rejected but

is incorporated in a higher way of life in which the individual

realizes himself more fully. Authentic personal existence is

constituted in the acts by which the individual moves away from the

aesthetic toward the religious (i.e. in the direction of Christian

faith) and with regard to this movement we must note here that

Kierkegaard was reacting against the reductionism of romanticism and

rationalism. The chief enemies of personal existence are romantic

aestheticism and rationalistic speculation. The true movement of

life is away from the aesthetic and away from speculation, for both

stand in the way of self-realization and both result in the disap-

pearance of authentic individuality.

5. Kierkegaardts Starting Point and the Interpretation of

His Works.

The authorship - as Kierkegaard calls the main body of his

writings, - began with the publication of Either/Or, an aesthetic

work, but Kierksgaard's pattern resulted in edifying discourses

(or religious sermons) being published alongside the aesthetic

 23

works, which formed an independent literature of their own, made up

of essays, letters, disputations and fiction. Elaborate measures

were taken to remove the aesthetic works from all association with

their real author, some of them being pseudonymous two or three times

over, and the author or editor of one work appearing sometimes as a

character in another. In Stages on Lifers Way (edited by Hilarius

Bookbinder) in the chapter called In Vino Veritas, five men at a

Banquet make speeches on the subject of woman, two of these being

Constantine Constantius (author of Repetition) and Victor Eremita

(editor of Either/Or), and Judge William, a character from Either/Or.

Kierkegaard said that the programme of the authorship was not an

arbitrary arrangement of his but was determined for him by Providence

44
and behind it lay a wholly religious purpose. The nature and

content of the pseudonymous works go quite a long way in creating

difficulties with regard to the interpretation of Kierkegaard's

thoughts. On the one hand Kierkegaard refers to the pseudonyms quite

objectively, as though they were real persons and warns the reader
45
never to attribute any of their views to him. On the other hand

he says that the pseudonymous works are a necessary part of the author-

ship, intimately related to the religious works, and that both should

be read together. Furthermore he says that he himself was deeply

involved in the pseudonymous works, and that he came to terms with the

aesthetic by means of them and he was only allowed to indulge in them

46
by a special act of Providence. As far as the rS8sons which led

Kierkegaard to write anonymously or pseudonymously are concerned,

47
Professor Lowrie sets out e few pOints, e.g. (1) Kierkegaard's love
 24

for intrigue in order to mystify people; (2) Kierkegaard's adhere-

nce to the Socratic maxim "know thyself" -. thus Kierkegaard's

pseudonyms were for the most part personifications of aspects or at

least of possibilities which he discovered in his own nature.

48
Lowrie states that Kierkegaard for example says in Repetition

"the individual has manifold shadows all of which resemble him, and

from time to time have equal claim to be the man himself." - this

quotation Dr. Lowrie states, expresses the deepest reason for Kierke-

gaard's use of a pseudonymity which was also a polynymity. ror

example, Kierkegaard hints that his choice of the name Victor Eremite

for the editor of Either/Or, signifies that he himself was victor in

the conflict which rasulted in the choice of the ethical life.

(3) Kierkegaard's introversion for a long time inhibited him from

using what he called "direct communication" t and so, making a virtue

of necessity, he practised and extolled "indirect communication",

using the pseudonyms as instruments to this end. After 1848, when

Kierkegaard experienced a metamorphosis which made it possible for

him to speak out clearly, he renounced essentially the use of

pseudonyms. In so far as "indirect communication" was imparted by the

usa of pseudonyms, it was the only way by which Kierkegaard could

have accomplished the naval task of "making a map of the emotional

cosmos" t of delineatiOi;J the characteristic possibilities of the human

soul. Thus Kierkegaard's characters had to be inhumanly consistent,

ideal exemplifications of a type, whether in the direction of good

or evil, such as human life rarely, if ever, presents. (4) Since

Kierkegaard's thought was essentially dialectic, it had to be

 25

expressed in the form of dialogue as was the teaching of Socrates.

In Repetition for example, two authors, Constantius and "the young

man", were needed to exemplify contrasting attitudes and in the

"stages", Judge William's dissertation on marriage is the answer

to the frivolous speeches at the Banquet and Quidam is necessary to

carry the movement on in the direction of religion. Dr. Lowrie

49
further points out that Kierkegaard's use of pseudonyms in his

later works (e.g. Anti-Climacus in Sickness Unto Death, and Training

1n Christianity) did not mean as it had ~eant in the past, that the

subject of the book was removed to a distance by "double reflection",

- on the contrary it meant that the subject was pressed upon the

reader objectively, without regard to the authority or the personal

character of the author and the reader was left to judge for himself

in the light of the New Testament: e.g. as in for Self-Examination.

Anti-Climacus meant that Kierkegaard wanted to "draw attention", to

"compel people to take notice", of Christianity as it really is.

Pseudonymity in the earlier works was such that the supposed

authors through their fictitious characters hold a mirror up to life-

a mirror in which every man may see himself and so come to know

himself. Kierkegaard used the pseudonyms as a means of private

communication with Regina Olsen after he had broken their engagement,

and also the pseudonyms met Kierkegaard's inclination to embody the

truth not!n abstract propositions but in a person, in a concrete

situation or in a particular mode of living.

 26

Kierkegaard regarded the pseudonyms as essential to the

religious purpose of the authorship, in an attempt to underline the

unity of the authorship. Kierkegaard was keen to show that he was

not an aesthetic author who had turned religious with advancing

years. Thus the Two Discourses were written at the same time as

Either/~~. and both were published almost simultaneously. Thus the

aesthetic works went alongside the religious.

As a turning point, the Postscript appeared, and it was a

work which gathered up the aesthetic as well as the religious works

and showed how they all served to illuminate the problem of the

whol e authorship, i. e. "how to become a Christian."

The PostscriEt was not an aesthetic work, nor yet was it

religious. Even after the period of the pseudonyms was over

Kierkegaard published an aesthetic essay The Crisis, and a Crisis in

the Life of an Actr3sS, to remind the public that he was a religious

author from the beginning who yet remained "aesthetically productive"

50
to the last. Kierkegaard states that "the category of my work is:

to make men aware of Christianity. My task is to deceive people, in

a true sense, into entering the sphere of religious obligation which

51
they have done away with."

The aesthetic always sees life as essentially a matter of

the senses, and finally the outcome 1s despair. The ethical sees

everything under the determination of duty and on neither the

aesthetic nOr the ethical level is unity or consistency of personality
 27

achieved. Thus the purpose of the aesthetic works or "living

experimentations" is to show that the view of life they represent,

if seen through to the end, always reaches a frontier of unhappy

contradiction, and the intrinsic inadequacy can be seen only in

what happens to the people themselves.

The entire project, with regard to the authorship, with its

successive aesthetic and religious productions was set to a pattern

determined in the beginning and designed to achieve a single effect:

i.e. to define Christianity in the most radical way possible and to

bring the reader to an understanding of himself in felation to it.

Kierkegaard1s intention from first to last was religious, i.e. to

recommend the religious as the sole answer to the human situation

which the aesthetic works sO profoundly analysed and clarified.

We see that the authorship has the unity of pattern (or

production) imposed upon it from the beginning. The works are an

organized arrangement in which no work is out of place. Furthermore,

we Sge the unity of intention which lies behind this pattern,

determining the precise ord9r of the works, the manner in which they

would each complement the other, and above all, the precise religious

impact the whole production would achieve. Thirdly, we find the unit~

of a fundamental theme which shows every work,-cut out, as it wars, to

fit the pattern of the authorship like the stone of a steeple. But one

could ask here, how Kierkegaard set about working out in detail the ~ask

involved in the authorship. We find that through knowledge of the

self, Kierkegaard attempts to prepare the way for the knowledge of

 28

God, and by making clear the essential reality of human nature he

52
attempts to show that God alone can set man free. tor this task,

the aesthetic works with their analysis of consciousness and its

mysterious depths were as necessary as the religious. Thus, Either/Or

begins the project. It was a work designed to gain the immediate atten-

tion of the public, and through its varied contents runs ostensibly

the quite commonplace story of a man who lives at the simplest and

least complic~ted level. His chief ambition is to live happily, as

everybody else. Unfortunately, he cannot sustain his happy mood, and

he cannot understand why. In order to show what lies behind his being

unhappy, Kierkegaard introduces an analysis of the human person.

Kierkegaard explains why the man is not happy and why the melancholy

he suffers cannot be removed unless he does one thing. In the Second

Volume, (the first being Either) OR, the man does thing thing; he takes

a ~, he becomes somebody. Although he now decides to taka himself

in hand, has a wife, a family, a career, a place in the community,

strangely enough his peace does not last, and he finds himself becoming

more and more aware that he is not happy. Kierkegaard at this point,

explains what really constitutes a man and also that the sufferer does

not understand himself. The despair he experiences is inevitable and

arises from the fact that he is made in a certain way. All he can do

(within his present concept of living) is to take this despair seriously

and trouble himself to find out where it points. Either/OR ends with

the man b9coming an individual but not yet the individual and he is

not very happy about himself. Thus beside the work Either/OR appear

two religious Discourses, addressed to "That Individual" - i.e. to

 29

the man who was concerned about himself.

Seven months after Either/OR was published came Repetition and

fear and Trembling. 80th works are a further analysis of the human

predicament described in Either/OR to which they are attached, so

firmly as to S8am like postscripts. In Repetition, Constantina

Constantius takes up the problem of the lost happiness, and against a

background of the story of Job and Plato's doctrine of recollection,

explains how it might be restored ("repeated"). Constantina, points

out that the past can never be restored merely by retracing one's

steps or by trying to re-create the events which once gave pleasure,

for what disappeared were not the "happy 9vents"but the man who enjoyed

them. So it is quite useless for him to continue chasing happy

experiences to replace those which are lost; what is really lost is

himself. As long as he seeks a restoration in terms of conditions

outside himself, he will seek forever in vain. He himself must be

restored to himself, and then, in a re-established integrity he will

find happiness everywhere once again. How this can come about is what

the book describes - and it does it on the basis of the very original

concept of man's nature already outlined in Either/OR. However the

book, Repetition, adds its own new quota of meaning to that concept.

fear and Trembling is a similar discussion but at a deeper level.

It corrssponds to the more serious issues raised at the closs of

Either/OR, where a man is on the razor's edge of existence. He must

finally take another step, but where? and how? for there are no more

roads. The author of the book is Johannes de SilentiO, because in the

no man's land where normal categories have broken down and all roads
 ,30

have disappeared, men can talk only "in silence". Through the horror

of the Abraham/Isaac story and the continuing polemics against the

ethics of Kant, Hegel, and contemporary society, Johannes meditates

the next step; the duty b3~ond all duty. for what is at stake is a

man's self, not for some "eternity" at the end of time but now.

Conventional moral advice is worthless because the man's plight is

outside good and evil, yet it is avil he is in peril of, the ultimate

evil of losing himself, so that though he retains all he has fought

for, he loses all - in default of the next step. Johannes directs

him in silence (he never argues) to the only way, a way that starts
53
in the man's own mysterious being 80th Repetition and fear and

Trembling are inconclusive. They point by design beyonq themselves.

They talk of repentance, faith, and forgiveness, but these terms still

await pentecost, as it were. The frontiers of religion are reached but

not crossed. That is left to the reader, who, if he should be interested

could read four successive volumes of Discourses (including Job), all

of them taking up the same themes.

In June 1844, two very important works appeared, the fragments

(Johannes Climacus) and the Concept~of Dread (Vigilius Haufniensis).

Both are closely related to Either/OR, and although not religious

works, they keep the discussion at the frontiers of religion.

The fragments starts with the open question of the truth that edifies

from the end of Either/OR. There ere strongly polemical discussions

of the validity of historical experience, the proofs of Cod,

Platonism and Cartesianismj but underneath them all g08S on the

repeated probing into the natura of self-consciousness, and especially,

 31

In this instance, into the process of "Knowing tha truth". Man, as

he is found, (or in his natural state) is subject to an incalculable

self.alienation which profoundly affects his moral integrity and his

~hinking as he tries to draw from the universe some clue to his own

destiny. In the natural world he collides with contradictions which

baffle his ~eason; in the world of encounter with God, he "collides"

with a ~aradox which offends his raason. Thus in either case he is

subject to intolerable ambiguities in his experience. finally it is

shown that what he needs is not an authentic philosophy (of truth)

but en authentic self; and finding the former depends upon the latter;

furthermore, the secret of the Paradox is that, although it provides

no new information about himself, it enables him "to be himself".

Jh~_tonc§pt or Oread is an exploration of the insinuating melancholy

which piays such a decisive part in the life of man at all levels of

his existence. Yigilius first raises the question of the meaning of

original sin. He refuses however to discuss it from a metaphysical

point of view; he analyses it only in terms of what actually happens

within ~eif-consciousness. We are hera given again the description

of man's nature which is common to all pseudonymous productions, and

bn its basis he proceeds to explore human freedom and the effect of

the forces within it which give it movement and a terrible reality.

We ere shown how a disturbance within freedom, a predisposing anxiety,

is the ground of all good and evil, and is in its turn, the evidence

of a self whose nature is freedom. Alongside this discussion are the

usual polemics against Hegel and Schelling; but these are SO designed

as to elucidate further Kierkegaard's main theme and also to emphasize

54
the validity of his fundamental conception of man.
 32

A year later, two more volumss of Discourses were published .

along with stages on Life's Road (Hilarius Bookbinder), which revived

in a new form the major themes of Either/OR. The stages or levels of

existence are discussed with many incidental comments and digressions,

but even 8S i~ revives past work (as well as past pseudonymous

characters) it adds its extra clarification to the continuing analysis

of the self, especially in respect of the mysterious drives of the

self towards reintegration and self-fulfillment. The religious is

also more closely defined, but there is still no sharp religious

challenge. Everything is once more contrived to bring the reader to

a point where he is left alone with himself and his future.

In February 1846, Kierkegaard published the Postscript,

(Johannes Climacus), three years to the month after Either/OR and

the start of the authorship. This vast work gathar3d together the

pseudonymous productions into a ~hole. Kierkegaard's view of philosophy

and theology are concentrated and given their final form; the issues

raised by human experience, the problem of truth in its various

aspects, the elusiveness of God, the nature of reality and of the

historical course (or events) of society and above all the meaning of

Christianity are all definitively stated. Climacus has no committed

religious belief, but he takes the whole field of human concern,

defines the way that 19ads nowhere, exposes the claims without

substance and leads the reader deviously but carefully towards Cod.

All this wide-ranging discussion is fundamentally an analysis of

human consciousness, of the way it emerges, thinks, gropes for God

 33

and seeks self-authenticity. It is the final elaboration of his

doctrine of man, the gathering together of all the preceding analyses

and results.

After the Postscript came more Discourses and the Works of

Love which is a kind of social ethic, stating the grounds on which

alone a community had validity.

In July 1849, Sickness Unto Death appeared, by Anti-Climacus,

who was a Christian to an exceptional degree, but was pseudonymous

because he was a better Christian than Kierkegaard. Anti-Climacus

Is the last of the pseudonyms. The theme of this work is closely

linked to volume two of Either/OR because it is an analysis of the

despair talked about in OR, the despair or frustration which accom-

panies the more serious (ethical) human activity everywhere. As the

Concept of Dread explores the anxiousness (anxiety) at the ground of

freedom, so the Sickness Unto Death examines the frustration (or

despair) of the individual as he grows in strength and success and

which always appears to become worse as the success is more marked.

It is explained as a "disease" arising inevitably from man's inner

constitution as a person, and Kierkegaard quotes again as the basis

for his diagnosis the same description of the structure of man used

in all the previous works, but a new factor is introduced: -

the "disease~ has a cure provided by God, and in default of which,

the disease becomes sin.

In September 1850, Training in Christianity (Anti-Climacus)

appeared, and this work appears to be Kierkegaard's favourite work

because the whole problem of his authorship "turns on the question

 34

of what it means to be a Christian - in Christendom," and in this

work Kierkegaard tries to answer this question. The answer takas the

form of a single concept - contemporaneousness with Christ in His

suffering and humiliation and this is the polar opposite of the

historical results of Christ's existence. contemporaneousness

involves the possibility of the pffens9; it involves the possibility

that Christ and His teaching do not appeal to ona and one is positively

offended by them for one reason Or the other. The idea of the Offense

is a generalization and also an intensification of "the Perado)(" as

found in the Postscript. The "Paradox" may be defined as the offense

in the realm of the intellect and the offense is that which repels a

man at the very centre OT his being, whether it acts as a stumbling

block to his intellect, his aesthetic nature, his herd instincts or

any other aspect of his ~lmmediacy". Thus Anti-Climacus embraces

Christianity as the Way and the ~.

We have Sgen (briefly) how the themes of the individual works

are all related togeth3r and how the pseudonymous works serve a

spacial purpose as being Kietkegaard's analysis of man and of the

human condition to which thristianity is the only answer. The three

"unities" in the authorship, i.e. (1) the unity of production

involving the deliberately designed sequence of publication;

(2) the unity of intention, und9rlining the religious purpose which

tuns through the authorship from beginning to end, and (3) the unity

of a fundamental theme, are worthy of note. The third unity has to

do with a certain understanding of man of which all the works are an

elaboration but for which the pseudonymous works ara used for the
 35

purpose of specific analysis. Pll Kierkegaard's ideas, even the

apparently contradictory ones, have their fitting place in this

schema and his views of sin, faith, reason, ethics, subjectivity,

and paradox fall naturally into place, making together a powerful

and consistent statement of human self-understanding.

 36

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER II

1. The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard - a Selection edited and

translated by Alexander Dru, Oxford University Prass, London

1959, page 15, Journal entry number 22.

2. Ibid, p. 232.

3. Ibid, p. 171

4. Soren Kierkegaard's Papirar, edited by P.A. Heiberg, Vikuhr,

and E. Torsting - Copenhagen 1909-48. Volume VIII, section B,

antry 168 of the Diary.

5. Journals, op.cit., p. 17.

6. Ibid, P' 15

7. Ibid t p. 117

8. Ibid, p. 220

9. Ibid, p. 232

10. Idem.

11. Ibid, p. 544

12. Ibid, p. 335

13. Ibid, p. 400

 37

14. Kierksgaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by .

D.f. Swenson and W. Lowrie, Princeton University Press,

Princeton, N.J., 1960, p. 327.

15. Journals, op.cit., p. 408.

16. Ibid, p. 418.

17. Postscript, op.cit., p. 495.

18. Biblical text - Revelation Chapter 3, verses 14-22.

19. Journals, op.cit., p. 8.

20. Postscriet, op.cit., p. 339.

21. Saran Kierkegaard's Pepirer, op.cit., - Volume ~1, section A,

entry 218, of the Diary.

22. The Point of View, op.cit., p. 135.

23. Kierkegaard's Pepirar, op.cit., - Volume~, Section A, entry

317 of the Diary.

24. Ibid - Volume ~2, section A, entry 642.

25. Journals, op.cit., p. 127.

26. Soren Kierkegaard's Papirer, op.cit., Volume~, Section A,

entry 318 of the Diary.

27. The Point of View, op.cit., p. 134.

 38

28. Journals, op.cit., p. 370.

29. Ibid, p. 371.

30. The Point of \jiel~ - op.cit., p. 131.

31. Journals, oe.cit., p. 59.

32. The Sickness Unto Death, translated by W. Lowrie, Oxford

University Press, London, 1944, p.~44.

33. Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life:

translated by D.F. Swenson, Augsburg Publishing House,

Minneapolis, 1941, pp. 47-8.

34. Concept of Dre~~, 0R.cit., p. 39.

36. The Sickness Unto Death, op.cH., p. 17.

37. Ibid, p. 43.

38. The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p.44.

39. Som8t~ing about Kiarkegaard, by D.f. Swenson, Augsburg Publisbing

House, Minneapolis, 1945, p. 51.

40. Either/OR - Vol. I translated by D.F. and L.M. Swenson;

Vol. l! translated by W. Lowrie, Princeton University Press,

Princeton, N.J., 1944 - Vol. II p. 180.

 39

41. Concept of Dre3d - op.cit., pp. 79-80.

42. Journals, op.cit., p. 232.

43. Ibid, p. 259.

44. The Point of View, op.cit., p. 10 ff and Journals, op.cit.,

p. 346.

45. Ibid, p. 454.

46. Ibid, p. 309 and The Point of Vi.ew, op.cH., p. 10 ff

47. A Short Life of Kierkegaard, by W. Lowrie, Princeton University

Press, Princeton, N.J., 1942, pp. 153-6.

48. Ibid, p. 154.

49. ~'P' 217.

50. The Point of View, op.cit., p. 13 ff.

51. Journals, op.cit., p. 348.

52. Kierkegaard's Dogmatsche Anschauung, by T. Bohlin, (Gutersloh,

Bertelsmann 1927), p. 47.

53. The Point of Vialli, op.cit., p. 21 and

Journals, op.cit., p. 107.

54. Ibid, p. 105.

 CHAPTER III

THE DIALECTIC OF THE ACT OF FAITH

INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter we shall examine some key concepts in

Kierk9gaard'~ thought (e.g. subjectivity, and Paradox) and see for

example the interrelatedness of one concept to the other, for example

the definition of truth closely allied with (if not similar to) the

expression for faith. We shall see Kierksgaard's method of prog-

ressively building up his presentation, in a logical and consistent

manner, especially with regard to how and why the concept of faith

occupies such a dominant position in his thought. Furthermore we

shell examine Kierkegaard's treatment of what faith is vis-a-vis

subjectivity, history, Paradox, and the System. Certain convictions

underlie Kierkegaard's concept of faith, the most prominent of which

has to do with his understanding of man, as the three stages so

adequately show (as we have seen in the preceding chapter).

(I) The dialectic of the stages (or Inwardness)

(A) The Aesthetic Stage:-

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel expounded his masterly

dialectic of the stages by which the mind awakens to self-conscious-

ness, to universal consciousness and to the standpoint of absolute

thought. Kisrkegaard also expounds a dialectic but it is radically

40
 41

different from that of Hegel. In the first place it is the process

by which spirit is actualized in the form of individuality, the individ-.

ual existent, not in the form of the all-comprehensive universal. In

the second place, the transition from one stage to the next is

accomplished not by thinking but by choice, by an act of the will, and

in this sense, by a leap. There is no question of overcoming anti-

c
thesis by a process of coneptual
,. synthesis. There is a choice betwean

alternatives, (Either/OR) and the choice of the higher alternative, th,~

transition to a higher stage (like a kind of mstamorphosis) of the

dialectic is a willed self-commitment of the whole man.

The first stage (or sphere of existence), discussed in the

first volume of Either/OR and in the first part of stages on life's ~22.:'y

is the aesthetic, and it is characterized by self-dispersal on the

level of sense. It is life at its simplest and most general leval.

The aesthetic man is governed by sense, impulse, and emotion. How9v~r,

this orientation should not be understood as necessarily linked ~ith

the gross indulgence and flagrant immoralities conventionally Bssociat-

ed with the word "sensualism". It may include this but it also inclue'_

the activity of the poet who transmutes the world into an imaginativ3

realm. The essential features of the aesthetic consciousness are the

absence of fixed universal moral standards and of determinate religio~~

faith, and the presence of a desire to enjoy the whole range of emotiv~

and sense-experience. The form of life of the aesthetic man is its

very formlessness, and self-dispersal on the level of senss. The

aesthetic man prefers to dwell (as Kierkegaard says in Sickness Unto

 ~2

Death) in the cellar rather than in the building of the soul ish-

bodily synthesis in every man, which is planned with a view to being

spirit, i.e. he prefers to dwell within the context of the determinants

of sensuousness (in the broad sense of the term). The more aware a man

is that he is living in the cellar of the building, the more subject he

becomes to "despair", for he finds that ~here is no remedy, no salva-

tion at the level on which he stands. He is faced therefore with two

alternativas~ either he must remain in despair on the aesthetic level

or he must make the transition to the next level by an act of choice,

by self commitment. Mere thinking will not do the trick for him.

It is a question of choice, an either/or.

In his various aesthetic writings, Kierkegaard attempts to

show the shallowness of life at the aesthetic level in such a way (by

indirect communication) that the reader himself will be moved to decide

against it and in and through this decision to become aware of himself

and realize himself at a deeper level. It is significant to note that

Either/OR ends with a little meditation entitled "Ultimatum" and the

theme ("the upbuilding truth in the thought that in relation to Cod we

are always in the wrong") with its edifying contents already points in

the direction of the religious. The first part of Either/OR ends with

the "diary of the seducer" which describes a specific level of the

aesthetic stage and Kierkegaard feels that it contains valuable obser-

vations concerning human life. The second part of EitherLOR in sub-

stance introduces the ethical stage and here Judge William, the repres-

entative of the ethical stage defines the boundaries for the whole

realm of the aesthetic and he is able to do this because he has passed

 43

through the aesthetic and now as ethical man, he can from his new

position survey the whole aesthetic stage. Judge William sets up p

vary completely graded scala of all the possible lavels of aesthetic

stances. There are a multitude of areas in temporal existence which

a man may choose as most important and to which he can relate and this

feet provides 'a multitude of aesthetic viewpoints e.g. health, riches,

honour, poetic talent, artistic talent or philosophical talent, may be

considered the greatest values in life and one may build one's whole

life on these premises, but when no room is left for the spiritual,

the result is melancholy. In the first part of the stages on Life's

Way, we see the aesthetic stage also, in the section called "In Vino

Veritas,"with a series of consistently drawn aesthetic stances all of

which represent man's view of woman when he has rejected the Eternal

and sees woman only with the eyes of temporal existence. Here,

Kierkegaard procaeds, in delineating the aesthetic stage, from the

scriptural doctrine that man was created a synthesis of the temporal

and the Eternal and the two components of this synthesis originally

stood in right relation to each other. man was obedient to the Eternal

and lived in a state of innocence without knowledge of good and evil.

The condition of the pure aesthete is one of anxiety and despair.

Deliverance will come by making room for the principal component of

the synthesis, i.e. the Eternal. Kierkegaard feels that every man

begins his life in the aesthetic stags but with the possibility of the

Eternal. Kierkegaard stressds that the aesthetic man never comes to

grips with the heart of the problem, i.e. himself. Kierkegaard uses

as his guiding rule, the dialectic of existence and argues that there

is no straight line to better things. In the aesthetic stage, there

 44

is no emerging of a real self and no real development. Although the

end of aesthetic man is despair, yet he h8s to choose despair, i.e.

to recognize it for what it is, a sickness of the spirit caused by

a defrauded human nature, and it is a symptom of the presence of

possibility. Thus Judge William urges the young man to "choose

despair", to despair absolutely and thereby tear himself loose from

all aesthetic illusions. Kierkegaard says, "Whoever chooses despair

paradoxically chooses himself, for the choice of despair is the

1
choice of myself". To choose despair is to choose oneself

concretely as a definite individual, to choose oneself as the person

one actually is.

(8) The Ethical stage

The second stage is the ethical. Here, a man accepts

determinate moral standards and obligations, the voice of universal

reason and thus he gives form and consistency to his lifa. The

ethical stage is typified by Socrates. A simple example of the

transition from the aesthetic to the moral consciousness is for

Kierkegaard that of the man who renounces the satisfaction of his

sexual impulse according to passing attraction and enters into the

state of marriage, accepting all its obligations, because marriage

is an ethical institution, an expression of the Universal law of

reason. The ethical stage has its own heroism. It can produce the

tragic hero who renounces himself in order to express the Universal.

This is what Socrates did and Antigone was prepared to give her

life in defence of the unwritten natural law. The ethical conscious-

ness does not understand sin and the ethical man thinks that human
 45

weakness can be Overcome by strength and will, enlightened by clear

ideas and he believes in man's moral self-sufficiency, yet, in fact,

a man can come to realize his own inability to fulfill the moral law

8S it should be fulfilled and to acquire ~erfect virtue. He can come

to an awareness of his lack of self-sufficiency and of his sin and

guilt. He has then arrived at the point at which he is faced with

the choice or rejection of the standpoint of faith. Just as "despair"

forms the antithesis to the aesthetic consciousness, an antithesis which

is overcome or resolved by ethical self-commitment, so consciousness

of sin forms the antithesis to the ethical stage and this anti-

thesis is overcome only by the act of faith, by relating one's self

to God.

One should note that,for Kierkegaard the ~ical means that

the Eternal with its claims has impinged upon a man, and he believes

In the possibility of fulfilling these claims in the temporal world.

Whereas in the aesthetic stage the whole centre of gravity lies in

the temporal world and the individual has not and does not will to

have an eternal self, an eternal I, in the ethical stage, man with a

consciousness of his eternal significance is in the centre. The

ethical stage points farther, to the third and last centre of

gravity, to the thought of God and his reality. On the ethical

level one learns how much or how little one can do by oneself and

where the essential goals of human lifa are to be found. The

ethical stage culminates in the understanding of how tenaciously a

man is bound to temporality and how little he achieves by his own

 46

endeavours. In this awareness, the centre moves from man to God.

In the story of Abraham, we see a transition from the morality

which still lies within the compass of aestheticism (temporality) to

the ethical which always has its ground in faith, in the Eternal

beyond the boundaries of the visible. After God has called Abraham,

his life comes under divine authority and he becomes responsible to a

Lord who stands infinitely higher than all the moral laws and customs
2
of this world. Therefore Kierkegaard states in Fear and Trembling

that Abraham relates himself to the paradox, i.e. to a Power which

exceeds the boundaries of the visible and also that of human under-

standing. God can issue commands which are contrary to the universally

human law and (since He is not accountable either to the individual or

to the Universal) God can bring a person into conflict with these laws

and can demand their suspension. Abraham moves from a purely moral

position through the ethical and crosses the frontier into the

religious. Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac expresses the ethical-

religious position in which man, out of obedience to God, is willing

to suspend the moral laws and isolate himself from the community.

By this act, Abraham in humble faith, surrenders his own reasonable

calculation and enters into the paradox. He has faith in the Eternal

and submits his temporal existence to the eternal claims of the laws

of God. Within paganism the possibility of an ethical outlook came

first with Socrates, who was convinced that in man's inwardness,

there was the possibility of a high9r knowledge than was to be found

by exploring the outer world (i.e. temporal and visible). Every man

possesses in his inner self the possibility of a knowledge of eternal

 47

truths and by "recollection" man can discover these truths. This

Socratic insight forms the point of departure for man's ~thical

activity. Socrates' understanding and actualization of the ethical

standpoint are formulated in Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific

Postscript in.the sentence: "Subjectivity is truth". This means

that a man tries to act in accordance with the eternal truth which

he finds in his innermost being. In this way the Eternal, which was

only an abstract knowledge acquires a personal meaning for a man.

Thus the more enthusiastically one decides to be, the more perfectly

one becomes truth and this dialectic of inwardness helps one to gauge

one's location within the three "stages" on life's way. We may say

therefore that the Eternal is truth or inwardness is t~uth. But this

does not mean that truth is subjective and arbitrary sO that every man

may decide for himself what is the truth. This precisely is Socrates'

significance, that, he points away from the arbitrary understanding of

truth which was practised by the sophists. Truth, which Socrates

found in his inwardness, is an etsrna~ and universa~ truth, and it can

become a personal and living truth in each individual only by the

passionate personal appropriation of the individual self. This is

the meaning of the "Socratic Wisdom" as it is called in Kiarkegaard's

3
Concluding Unscientific postscript. However, Socrates still has the

untried ethical man's confidence that man can easily fulfill the

ethical claims in his life and believes that the chief difficulty

lias on the side of self-knowledge, i.e. if a man comprehends the

truth, he will act accordingly. Although Kierkegaard values Socrates

highly, he admits that at this point Socrates' insight was insufficient.

 48

In Either/Or, Judga William represents an early position in the

development of the ethical being. He is inspired by th~ Socratic

confidence that if only one knows the truth one can easily make it

valid in one's life. In his letters to the young man, (the aesthete

who is supposed to have written the first part of Either/Or) he

describes the new life of the ethical stage and tells how one can

and must make the leap from the aesthetic to the ethical. The Judge

is familiar ~ith Christianity and as an ethical man he understands

the claim of Christianity to be that a man must allow the Eternal to

pervade all his relationships in life. He also understands that a

man is strongly bound to the temporal and that the beginning of finding

oneself can only be made by repenting onas91f out of rootage in the

4
temporal. The main factor in his position is that he has discovered

his eternal self, and has chosen himself. The Judge therefore believe~

that "the moment one becomes conscious of one's eternal worth is more
5
meaningful than everything else in the world." In a moving way h3

describes the movement when the transition from the aesthetic to the

ethical stage is accomplished.

When all has become silent around one, when the soul becomes
alone in the whole world, then before one appears the Eternal Power
himself. Then heaven will seem to open and the "I" chooses itself,
or more correctly receives itself. Than the soul has S3en the
ultimate - that which no mortal eye can sea - and which never can be
forgotten. Then the individual receives the salutation which elevates
him forever. 6

Not until this choice has besn made will there be an absolute

distinction between good and evil, between an absolute either/or. In

the aesthetic stage these differences are only relative. The Judge

stresses that marriage, ideally speaking, belongs essentially to

 49

Christianity, ~nd it is the centra of existence. Love and a rela-

tianship to God are the two factors making up such a marriage.

In Eithar/~r, the Judge presents his hum~n ethical views

with conviction. In stages on Life's W~y, he is a little older and

more experienced and has discovered more difficulties than he imagined

at the beginning. He speaks of marriage so warmly:

Marriage is and remains the most important journey of

discovery a man can undertake. Every other kind of acquaintance
with existence is superficial compared to that acquired by a married
man - for he and he alone has thoroughly fathomed the depths of
human eXistence.?

The JUdge is well acquainted with all the attacks on woman

and marriage which the aesthetes expound in "~ Vino Veri tas" and

rejects them energetically, however, he now admits that the way to

the ideal is difficult. He still regards marriage as the highest

goal in individual human eXistence,S and the marriage resolution

can be maintained and the difficulties in marriage can be overcome

only if one believes in God "in all dangers and tamptations."9

The Judge is beginning to comprehend the inadequacy of all human

endeavours and is on the way to a religious crisis in which the

centre of gravity shifts from man (or the human) to God. Finally

he says (and the admission shatters his former point of view):

I do not say that marriage is the most sublime life.

1 know one more sublime. But woe to him who without justification
wants to skip over marriage. lO

In the last pages of his discourse, the Judge investigates

what circumstances would justify a transition from the stags he

 50

represents to a higher one, and speaks about the "terror"ll and

sufferings which await the man who becomes involved in the religious

life.

Brief Summary of the Aesthetic and Ethical stages

A person who lives on the aesthetic level is not an integral

self; such a parson lives in immediacy determined by externals. l2

There is no inner integrity, no self determination from within, no

real continuity at the base of one's existence. 13 Such persons

14
live for enjoyment. The aesthetical in man is that by which he
15
is immediately what he is. Time is not taken sariouslyl6, and the

aesthete just is; he nevar is becoming. In our age it is believed

that knowledge settles everything, but to exist and to know are two
IS
very different things. To ask with infinite interest about a

reality ~hich is not one's own, is faith, and this constitutes a

paradoxical relationship to the paradoxical. Aesthetically it is

l9
impossible to raise such a question except in thoughtlessness.

Kierkegaard's insistence that man is a synthesis of the finite

and the eternal is very relevant here. If the aesthete tends to view

himself within the finite, the ethicist tends to view himself within

the eternal. The ethicist hopes to reach authentic being by a

realization of universal obligation. Ethically the incividual

20
subject is infinitely importBnt. The ethical man is involved in

a serious shift from indiffer3nc8 to r3sponsibility. The 8astretic

in a man is that by which he is imm3diately ~hat he is; the ethical

21
is that whereby he becomes what he becomes. The act of choosing
 51

22
is essentially a propsr and stringent expression of the ethica1.

The ethical stage prepares the way for the religious stage by

acquainting the sslf with that which gives every promise of being

a way of salvation for the self. When an individual abandons himself

to lay hold of something great outside him, his enthusiasm is

aesthetic; when he forsakes everything to save himself his an thus-

1asm is ath1cal. 23 Existentially understood, the absolute natura

of ethics is a means by which the self, confronted with despair, finds

its way to a life of faith and hope. The ethical does not destroy the

aesthetic; ,it transforms it. The individual is on the move; he has

chosen despair, and in doing so, he has chosen himself, and crossed

the threshold of a new level of existence. He has chosen freedom

for he hes chosen himself. I choose the absolute which is myself

i n my e t arna 1 va l 1·d·t
1 y. 24 As a frea spirit I am born of the

principle of contradiction or born of the fact that I choose

\ 25
myself. The background to this is Kierkegaard's concept of the

self with its dialectical structure and his view that a man is and

yet is not until he is "synthesized". The self is onl y a possibi-

lity until it is precipitated by an act of will; but the possibility

is there all the time, grounded in the self as its "eternal validity".

The ethical can distinguish between his actual (or typical) self and

his ideal self, i.8. his own self in a new and more dacisively intense

quality. The goal he seeks is within him; his task is himself; his

ideal self is not outside him. The ethical takes everything up into

itself. In his choice, the ethical man becomes himself, paradoxically

the same self he was before, yet he has now become another, for his
 52

choice permeates everything. He strives to be an ideal self which

is a reality within his own person. His task is to express the ideal
26
(which is himself) in himself by clothing himself in the ideal and

permeating himself with it. At this point he has become the "single
27
individual" as well as the Universal man. He is not making a

choice between good and evil but is simply choosing "the good thing " ,

i.e. the choice itself (from the aesthetic).28 The decisive use of
29
will lifts the initial choice into the ethical. Ethics arises

from the depths of personality which is an absolute whose telos is

in itself. The ethical is not something outside personality30.

The ethical's ultimate aim is the radical strengthening of personality.

The ethical is an existential attitude grounded in the structure of

the self. Duty arises from an inner necessity which becomes the
31
direction of one's inmost nature. (Here Kierkegaard is trying to

find a formula for living which is grounded alone in the nature innate

to the autonomous self. In this respect he is in the tradition of

such men as Kant, Schleiermacher, and Nietzsche). Moral conventions

32
are relative but the axistential imperative is not, and it is the

primitive source of all morality. The overall task of the etnical

man is the creation of equilibrium within his total experience. His

movement is from himself, through the world back to himself,33 i.e.

a double movement in which he will return to himself enriched in

experience and in authenticity. In Fear and Trembling, Ki9rkegaard

tries to show, through the simple tensions of the Abraham/Isaac story,

the existential fallacy of all ethical readings of human existence.

Kierkegaard here seas the ethical, not as the last leap of victory
 53

but the prelude to a heart-breaking personal crisis (precipitated by

ethics itself) and so, the end of ethics is defeat. The ethical man

consequently "gathers himself together" and in the struggle with

himself and his environment, the struggle itself is the victory.

However, the ethical finally breaks down under the strain of the

ambiguities of existence; e.g. moral clashes within the conte~t of

conflicting interests and also the fact that the ethical man in

seeking hims?lf or the virtue which is himself becomes increasingly

aware that his self, his ideal salf is always beyond him. The gulf

between aspiration and actual achievement grows wider and wider, and

guilt gets deeper and deeper. Ethics is as such the Universal, and
34
so is valid for all at every moment. The dilemma is that the man's

ethical task is to express himself in the Universal, "to strip himself

of his individuality in order to become the universal." If he asserts

his individuality he sins, for he is guilty of deviating from the

universal; if he does not assert his individuality, he also sins, for

he is not manifesting what he is. Guilt is his lot whichever way he

moves. If he is a religious man, he feels he is a "sinner" and knows

35 He cannot remove th3
that he is always in the wrong before God.

tension of guilt and if Cod does not help him he is in worse trouble

guilt and despair worsen. He may feel the opposite of his present

plight is virtue 36 , but Kierkegaard says it is not virtue but faith.

The ethical represents the universal demand, i.e. what every

man ought to do. In the ethical stage, a man acts, he is concernad,

he is interested and he lives seriously. "Despair" affects the whole

person, it is itself a choice and is the baginning of the decision

 54

which marks the break with the aesthetic and the leap to the

ethical sphere.

(c) The Religious Stage

for Kierkegaard, to affirm one's relationship to God, the

personal and transcendent Absolute, is to affirm oneself as spirit.

By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the

self is grounded transparently in the Power (i.e. God) which consti-

37
tuted it and this formula is the definition of faith. Considered

as infinite, man is not indead God, but he is a movement towards

God, the movement of the Spirit. The man who appropriates and

affirms his relationship to God in faith becomes what he really is _

the individual before God. In order to emphasize the difference

between the second and the third stages, Kierkegaard uses as a

symbol Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son Isaac at God's

command. The tragic hero, (e.g. Socrates) sacrifices himself for

the universal moral law but Abraham does nothing for the Universal,

and thus he stands "in the presence of the Paradox"; he is neither

. 38
a tragic hero nor an aesthetic hero." Kierkegaard does not mean

that religion involves the negation of morality but that the man of

faith is directly related to a personal God whose demands are

absolute and cannot be measured simply by the standards of the human

reason. Kierkegaard's dialectic is one of discontinuity, in the

sense that the transition from one stags to another is made by

choice, by self-commitment and not through a process of conceptual

mediation, and he therefore plays down the role of reason and

 55

emphasizes that of will, whsn he refers to religious fa~th. Faith

is a leap, an adventure, a risk, a self-commitment to an objective

uncertainty, i.e. Cod, the transcendent Absolute, the Absolute thou,

and not an object whose existence can be proved. Man's response to

God is a venture, an act of faith in a 8eing who lies beyond the

reach of speculative philosophy. God reveals Himself to the human

consciousness in the sense that man can become aware of his Sin and

alienation and his need of Cod. This act of faith has to be constantly

repeated. Cod has revealed Himself in Christ, the God-man, but

Christ is the Paradox, to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the

Creeks foolishness. Faith is always a venture, a leap. In one

sense, Kierkegaard's account of the standpoint of faith is a vigorous

protest against the way in which speculative philosophy, represented

principally by Hegelianism, blurs the distinction between God and man,

and rationalizes the Christian dogmas, turning them into philosophi-

cally demonstrated conclusions. In the Hegelian system, the quali-

39
tative distinction between God and Man is "pantheistically" abolished.

Kierksgaard believes that, in this life, there can be no higher stand

point than that of faith. The transformation of faith into speculative

knowledge is an illusion. The fact that man is held eternally

accountable for belief or disbelief shows that balief is not a matter

of accepting the conclusions of a demonstrative argument but rather,

8 matter of will. Kierkegaard deliberately stresses the nature of

faith as a leap and his famous interpretation of truth as subjectivity

is very significant; "An objective uncertainty held fast in an

appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth,

 56

40
the highest truth attainable for an existing individual."

Kiarkegaard does not deny that there is such a thing as objective,

impersonal truth, but mathematical truths, for instance do not

concern the "existing individual" as suc~. They are irrelevant to

a man's life of total self-commitment, although he accepts them, he

does not stake his whole being on them. That on which a man stakes

his whole baing is something which he can doubt but which is sO

important to him that i f he accepts it, he does so with a passionate

self-commitment, and is in a sense his truth. The truth is precisely

the venture which chooses an objective uncertainty with the passion

41
of the infinite. Truth thus described is what Kierkegaard means

by faith. The definition of truth as subjectivity and the definition

of faith are the same.

Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the

contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's
'inwardness and the objective uncertainty.42

Kierkegaard asserts that the eternal truth is not in itself a

paradox, but becomes paradoxical in relation to us. There is, and

remains "objectivB uncertainty", e.g in Nature, or the Gospels. The

idea of the God-man is itself paradoxical for the finite reason.

Faith grasps the objectively uncertain and affirms it, maintaining

itself, as it were, over a fathomless sea. Religious truth Bxists

only in the "passionate" appropriation of the objectively uncartain.

Faith is a self-commitment to the absolute and transcendent Thou,

the Personal God, rather than to propositions. Kierkegaard does not

 57

say that there are no rational motives for making the act of faith,

but he takes delight in minimizing the rational motives for religious

belief, and in stressing the subjectivity of truth and the nature of

faith as a leap.

With Judge William's discourse in stages on Lifa's Way, we

reach the border between the ethical and the religious stages.

The Judge discovers there the difficulties of fulfilling the ethical,

and realizes the inadequacy of merely human endeavour. He realized

also that the goal of human existence lies outside the borders of

the visible world. With this insight (since hitherto the centra of

gravity for all his efforts was in the temporal world) tha centr3

of gravity in man's spiritual development moves from man to God.

The ethical stage, however, does rest upon a religious premise and

is impossible without an apprehension of Gnd. Thus Abraham's

sacrifice of Isaac was a religious act, although Abraham otherwise

acted on strictly ethical principles in his daily life and Socrates'

43
ethical position approached the "border of the religious". The

Judge tries to find his way into repentance, which expresses a

religious outlook, but the religious is still only secondary, since

he still believes in the possibility of accomplishing, by himself, a

temporal-Eternal synthesis. As long as a man believes in his own

ability to do the good and refuses to admit how strongly he is attached

to the temporal, he is still in the ethical stage. On the last level

of the ethical stage, man doubts his ability to do the good. Through

Christianity a man comes to know for the first time how deeply he is

grounded in evil, and not until ha has this realization is it possible

 58

for a"radical cure" to begin. The religious stage also has many levels,

and man comes to tha religious position through his unsuccessful

attempts to accomplish on his own the ethical demands upon him.

With the Edifying Discourses, we arrive at the central part of

Kierkegaard's authorship, in which he characterized the levels in the

religious development. The religious stage is in two primary divisions _

Religion A, and Religion~. In the former, the individual has realized

his own bondage to the temporal and his own insufficiency and now wills

to relate himself to all things only through God. Furthermore, in

Religion A, the individual will consequently become conscious of his

own nothingness in relation to God, but he has not entirely relinquished

the action of his own goodness. He still relates himself to Christ

only as a prototype, not as Saviour, the relationship characteristic

of Religion B. In Religion ~ the individual expresses his under-

standing of existence by trying to relate himself absolutely to tha

44
Eternal and relatively to the tamporal. He begins by making room

for God's claims. The main point of the discourses is that eternal

life (or faith) involves renouncing all forms of self-reliance and

earthly security, i.e. the individual learns in everything to bend

his will to God's demands and endure patiently his destiny. The

righteous man strives in prayer with God and conquers in that God

conquers. One has to risk oneself out upon "the seventy thousand
45
fathoms of water". This daring act is the beginning of the journey

on the religious way.

The good must be willed for its own sake, and a person must
 59

be willing to do everything for the sake of the good and be willing

to suffer everything for the sake of the good. In this challenge one

sees the preparation for Christianity's demands. The goal of human

life lies beyond the temporal and a man in relating himself absolutely

to the Eternal'(which is now greatly stressed) and relatively to the

temporal (which a man sooner or later will lose) will inevitably

suffer in this world; thus suffering (through free decision) becomes

the characteristic mark of the religious life, but its counterpart is

joy, which nothing and nobody can take away. For the truly religious

man, suffering and joy belong together in the same way that enjoyment

and pleasure belong togather for the aesthetic man 8nd action and

victory for the ethical man. Kierkegaard talks of the "joy in the

fact that man in his relation to God always suffers as one who is guilty.»46

In Repetition, we see Job recognizing his unrighteousness before God,

and this theme is mora stron~ly stressed in the last portion of Either!

OR, 1.13. I1Ultimatum"; "The Edification in the thought that in relation

to God we are always in the wrong". However, Kiarkegaard talks later

on, (in the third part of Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits) not

of wrong but of guilt, in the relationship to Cod. In the theoretical

47
survey of the transition from Religion ~ to £, Kierkegaard says that

the leap from ~ to £ is effected when the individual has fully realized

his own insufficiency and sets all his hopes on Christ, who now becomes

for the individual both the prototype and Saviour. Pefore going into

detail about Religion ~ and ~, we should note that just as the whole

edifying literature reveals how the Eternal, the dominant force of the

synthesis, (of the temporal and the Eternal) gets increasing power
 - -- - - -----------~~~~-------~~~~~

60

over man, The Sickness Unto Death describes the disrelationship

between the two components of the synthesis. While the rest of the

edifying literature deals with man's progress on the way to faith,

The Si~.s Unto Death describes man's attempts to break allJay from

faith, The c~ndition of the man without faith is one of despair end

offense and only faith can conquer and remedy the situation.

Christianity is not a system or a dogma far removed from

lifa, but the Life and tha Way itself, (as Train~ng in Christianity

stresses), and so there are many levels in the growth of inwardness.

Kierkegaard calls Religion ~, "immanent", "immediate", and is the

religiousness which has always characterized man, and he has the

conviction that it has never brought a new man into existence.

However, when the individual crosses the guilt-threshold, his only

way is through faith to Religion B. Here we get the moment of

being born again (the new Adam or the new man as the New Testament

calls it ). Kierkegaard having S8en faith simply as an act of will,

(simply as the ultimate volitional act) now probes more deeply into

his category of faith in order to analyse its effects on the man who

exercises it. Abraham's story along with Isaac, is Kierkegaard's

choice of the greatest symbolic expression of faith. In the story,

Kierkagaard seas an illustration of a teleological suspension of

ethics, through faith. By his act, Abraham g09S beyond the ethical

stage and he possesses a purpose outside of it in favour of which he

48
suspends ethios. He did it for God's sake and also for his own

sake; for God's sake because God demands this proof of his faith;

for his own sake because he wanted" to furnish this proof. Abraham

was tested but he believed.

 61

This is the paradox which keeps him on the summit and which

he cannot explain to anyone else; for this paradox consists in

setting himself as the Individual in an absolute relationship to

49
the Absolute.

Abraham was justified not by what happened to him, (Isaac's

reprieve), but what happened in himself (i.e. what he did). He

repossessas:his son, but he has expressed himself as an individual

over against the Universal. By breaking the law he has fulfilled

the law, and he has become himself, an Individual; this cannot be

explained rationally; it is a paradox for ever inaccessible to

50
thought. The law was made for man and it expresses God's will,

yet paradoxically man must transcend it in order to be saved.

Kierkegaard sees in Abraham, an instance of an absolute duty to

God which transce~~s the ethical universal; a duty beyond all duties.

Abraham discovered such a duty when he came up against the paradox

of ethics, i.e. of the absolute that lies beyond it. God is He who
51
demands absolute love and this love (ethics would say) demanded that

Abraham hate Isaac, but the bitterness experienced by Hbraham and the

greatness of his faith lay in the love he had for Isaac. Hence the

distress and dread in the paradox of faith, and this constitutes the

"infinite passion" of the existing individual, 9specially, as such a

52
faith, must be continually exercised. To become an Individual calls

for an infinite struggle or endeavour because the object is set in

infinity. Kierkegaard furthdrmore sees in Abraham's story, faith

as absolute trust, a trust on the basis of which a man will offer all.

In his complete trust, Abraham lovad God, thus reflecting an inner

 62

relationship with the unknown. Faith is the creative acceptance of

the worst, all the time holding to a good purpose as the end of its

trial. Abraham gave up Isaac and himself, in the certain hope that

both would be restored to him. He had no "reasonable" proof that

this would come about, sO he was always in suspense; the suspense

that creates the tension of faith. Faith holds to its final goal

even in suspense. Thus faith is belief and trust to an absolute

degree but it has no validity apart from the object which evokes and

sustains it, i.e. tha paradoxical God-man. Nothing is so offensive

. 53
to reason as the concept of the God-man who ~s Incognito, an

Offence and a Paradox before which reason must halt. He is the

unity of God with a particular man. He lived two thousand years ago,

but asks to be regarded as concretely present just as though the

centuries no longer intervened. From the possibility of the offance,

a man turns away either to offence or to faith. 54 Christ further-

more, died to save man. and His dgath is the atonement and satisfaction 55

and this is the infinite guarantee with which the man who is striving

starts out - the assurance that infinite satisfaction has bean made.

We must accept forgiveness on the authority of the GOd-man, and we

56
are commanded to accept and believe it. This is the Paradox. tha

mystery of the God-man, whom the individual is commanded to believe

as the sine qua non of "being born again". Thus the Individuel has

reached existence, chosen th8 P8radox and thereby he has chosen

himself. He has made the leap of faith, the intensely personal

gesture of belief which has brought him over the brink of death to

a new level of life. and he is now forgiven (this proc9ss Kierkegaard

 63

cells Repetition, i.a. the restoration of the self, the recovery of

possibility and harmony). The movement involved in becoming is the

transition to a state that once existed; a movement in virtue of

57
the absurd. The self moves forward by becoming what it once was.

I
Man is unlike God due to his sinfulness, i.e. the loss of real being

by his own error, and he needs new being, i.8. existence. As an

example of "repetition", Abraham received back his son and himself

as elements in the movement of faith, and he repossesses (though in

a new way) everything: Isaac, the past, himself and the present,

as well as all things else in existence. Abraham (and Job) received

back what he had lost together with a "born-again" personality.

The individual must copy Christ 58 and be the Knight of Faith and

he is committed to trust Christ absolutely. It is faith (passionate

and sustained) that savas, not faith plus virtue (even in the midst
59
of a man's sins) for "purity of heart" is to will one thing.

The Individual was born beneath the Paradoy and by the

Paradox he must remain; for the Paradox is the source of the

. 60
t hlnker's passion. Thus the Incarnation (the Paradox of Paradoxes)

is used by Kierkagaard to account for how a parson brings himself to

the place where he succeeds in going beyond Religion ~, to the

Paradoxical Religion~. By interpreting the Incarnation as the

"absolute Paradox", Kiarkegaard tries to establish the uniqueness

of Christianity, the necsssity of a "leap" of faith and the lack

of any advantage in being rationally claver.

 64

Brief Summary of the Three stages.

The normal life-movement for an existing individual is from

the aesthetic, through the ethical ~ the religious. The existing

thinker has aesthetic passion enough to give his life content,

ethical enthusiasm enough to regulate it, and the religious is the

fulfillment. The transition from one stage to the other is a crisis,

or a breach of continuity, but the leap by which the religious (or

faith) emerges, requires a divine assistance, and is 8 true creative

act of God.

The aesthetic man identifies human happiness with enjoym9nt

but the ethicist identifies it with the realization of an obligatory

task, in such an immanent way that it is the realization of his true

and given self. The aesthete lives statically, but the ethicist

lives dynamically. The religious life begins with a discovery that

there is something wrong with the personality and it needs a period

of preparation and preliminary transformation before the ethical

task can be begun. Here, Kierkegaard distinguishes between Religion A

(Religion of Immanence) and Religion f (Religion of Transcendence).

The former is characterized by a passive relation to the divine and

is accompanied by suffering and a sense of guilt. The latter consists

of a transformation of the sense of guilt into the sense of sin, which

cuts man off from God. However l with Christianity, a ne~ immediacy or

passion is introduced, i.e. the passion of faith. "Conversion" takes

place, and through God manifesting Himsalf in time, outsida the

individual, a new point of contact between God and man is established.

 65

(II) Objectivity and SUbjectivi~

(A) Contra Hegel

Soren Kierkegaard's theory of faith must be understood as

a reaction against Hegel, for whom faith is primarily an undeveloped

form of knowledge. For example, Hegel said,

What I believe, that I also know; it is content in my

consciousness; faith is a knowled~e, but by knowledge one usually
understands ~ mediated cognition. 6

And

The whole of rational thought is already present in faith,

but not in the form of science; it is there only as representation.
Faith, therefore, is an immediate stags of thought, the content of
which must be made explicit by reflection and ultimately be
developed into a sci8nce. 62

For Hegel, faith is an imperfect form of knowledge; it receives its

object from without. In order to become truth, the content of faith

must first be produced by reason from within itself by means of

idealistic philosophy, and the dualism of the act of faith is

terminated in the unity of the philosophic "notion".

In 1843, Kierkegaard tried to determine the stages of

63
consciousness leBding to faith. In a first moment consciousness

is totally immedia~, that is, indeterminate. Since there is nothing

whatever of relation here, there is likewise no problem of truth;

every impression as an immediate datum is "true", but must at the

very next moment give ~ay to a new datum, and thus it b9comas

untrue. The immediate, therefore, is not yet full consciousness,

but only a moment in the process of consciousness. According to

 66

Hegel, full consciousness is reached when subject and object are

united as two terms of one relationship, which he calls "reflection".

But for Kierkegaard, Hegel's reflection only creates the possibility

for a relationship which, in order to become real, requires a third

element, a pas~ionate interest of the subject in its object. As long

as the subject has only a speculative interest in its object, the two

terms remain externally related and are not wholly united. The

relationship, and consequently also consciousness, is not fully

actualized in reflection. Reflection is~ "dichotomic", while full

consciousness is "trichotomic". This distinction is important, as

for example in the case of an exact conception of faith and doubt,

both of which presuppose a personal involvement of the subject. 64

Reflection is not yet a real relationship between subject and object,

and consequently is incapable of doubt and faith. Doubt is situated

on a higher level than objective thought and from Kierkagaard's

theory of consciousness, it follows that no objective knowledge

can ever eliminate the need for faith. In the act of faith we are

infinitely interested, because it concerns our eternal salvation, but

objective knowledge never appeals to our subjectivity. True (8S

opposed to immediate) faith is possible only beyond both the

stage of reflection and objectivity. In the sphere of faith,

arguments for the truth or the probability of faith are useless,

for they belong to a lower level of consciousness. The characteristic

o f f 81 th 1 s comm~. t t 'oy th e
men ,. t •
SUOJ8C 64 Kierkegaard regards the

true essence of religious consciousness as post-reflective,

because religion begins where ordinary reflection ends.

 67

This means that faith "goes further", (contra Hegel) than philosophy

and not vice versa. raith, like thought is a dialectic of subject

and object, but in faith the tension acquires infinite potentialities

both becous8 the subject is infinitely interested and because the

object is not'a pure datum of reason itself and thus is not immed-

lately assimilable by the mind. Faith involves an acceptance of

something not "given" by reason and never deducible from a previous

content of consciousness. Subject and object are fundamentally

opposed in faith and the acceptance of its "data" is achiev9d in a

dialectical process which goes deeper by far than pure reflection.

A faith which presents itself as objectively true is no faith at all,

and Kierkegaard stresses that so-called "scientific proofs" of faith

are based on the initial error that faith can be proved. Faith rests

ultimately on free decision, and thus it depends in the last analysis

exclusively on subjectivity. ~o possible objectivity can ever relieve

man of the responsibility to choose for himself. Kierkegaard

maintains that all arguments and proofs and historical evidence of

the truth of Christianity must be discarded because Faith or the innsr

proof is the only proof. One's conviction (which is an inner dster-

mination in the direction of spirit) is always stronger than reasons -

conviction is what supports the reasons, not the other way around.

Conviction represents passion, the passionate or the innermost depth,

and it is personal and rather decisive in import. Conviction, means

personality and it leads the way; - reasons are relegated to a lower

p1 ana and th is is th 8 d irec t OppOSl. t e 0 f a 11 ma d

ernba ·Jec t·lvl. t y. 65

A man's development may start off with some reasons, (but they
 68

represent the lower.plane) then he makes a choice, and under the

weight of responsibility before God a conviction will be born in

him by God's help. Henceforth one cannot defend one's conviction

or prove it by reasons - one can only defend one's conviction

ethically or p~rsonally, through the sacrifices which one is willing

66
to make for it and by the dauntlessness with which one maintains it.

Kierkagaard stresses the point that it is not the reasons

that motivate belief in the Son of God, but rather, belief in the

Son of God constitutes the evidence -

It is the very motion of the Infinite, and it cannot be

otherwise - Reasons do not motivate convictio~; conviction motivates
the reasons ••••• All that went before was merely preparatory study,
something preliminary, something that will disappear as soon as
conviction makes its appearance and transforms everything, or turns
the relationship around. Repose, absolute repose in a conviction,
in faith, simply mean that faith itself is the evidence, (the
witness) and conviction the motivation. 67

With regard to the question of a person's (or an individual's) free

decision, (upon which faith ultimately rests) together with man's

responsibility to choose for himself, Kierkegaard remarks that:

Hance we do not here raise the question of the truth of

Christianity in the sensa that when this has been determined the
subject is assumed ready and willing to accept it. No, the question
is as to the mode of the subject's acceptance; and it must be
regarded as an illusion to assume that the transition from something
objective to the subjective acceptance is a direct transition
following upon the objective deliberation as a matter of course.
On the contrary, the subjective acceptance is precisely the decisive
factor; and an objective acceptance of Christianity is paganism or
thoughtlessnass. 68

furthermore, Kierkegaard states that:

 69

If Christianity is essentially subjectivity, it is a

mistake for the observer to be objective. In every case where
the object of knowledge is the very inwardness of the subject-
ivity of the individual, it is necessary for the knower to be
in a corresponding position. 69

As far as Kierkegaerd is concerned, every objective approach

to Christianity is. illegitimate, and with r3gard to faith, no specu-

lation is possible, except whether one accepts it or not - and this

for Kierkegaard is the crucial question. If one tries to concen-

trate on the Bible, with a view to giving the truth of faith a

historical foundation, Kierkegaard would maintain that historical

studies and textual criticism remain in essence approximative,

because in matters of faith our eternal salvation is at stake.

If one's faith was based on an objectively correct text, the least

variant would acquire capital importance, and the smallest doubt

about the authenticity of an inspired text would fill one with

despair. Kierkegaard underlines the view that:

Feith does not result simply from 6 scientific inquiry - it

does not come directly at all - on the contrary, in this objectivity
one tends to lose that infinite personal interestedness in passion
which is the condition of faith, the ubiqu8 et nus quam (everywhere
and nowhere) in which faith can come into being. 70

Scientific Biblical study has nothing to do with faith, because even

if one lived to se8:

the last definitive study, (on which the greatest scientists

had collaborated) so that not the least vestige of a problem remained
concerning the Bible - what then? ~ould anyona who had no faith
before, have come even a step closer to it? Not one! And he who
had already been a believer, would he have gained anything? Nothing!
On the contrary it would be extremely dangerous for him, because he
might then be inclined to confuse faith with science, (knowledge) if
he should not hold himself in fear and trembling.?O
 71

Furthermore, Kierk3gaard says:

I assume now the opposite, that the opponents have Succ93dad

in proving what they desire about the scriptures, with a certainty
transcending the most ardent wish of the most passionate hostility
what then? Have tha opponents thereby abolished Christianity?
By no means, not in the least. Has the opponent made good a right
to be relieved of responsibility of not being a believer? Not in
the least. 71

The point here is that, with regard to faith, objective certitude

about the Bible can neither add nor detract anything. All the
~

authority of the Bible derives from inspiration, but inspiration

presupposes faith and cannot be deduced from the 2ible even by the

most powerful argument. Faith is not to be founded on the Bible;

the Bible is to be founded on faith. Even when some Protestant

thinkers took refuge in the notion of the Church, in trying to avoid

the difficulties of the historical method inherent in an attempt to

ground religion in the Eible, (e.g.Grundtvig) and furthermore tried

to eliminate all historical arguments which were approximate,

Kierkagaard's raoction was rather predictable. At this point one

should note that these Protestant thinkers tried to found faith on

a datum belonging not to the past but to the present, i.e. the Church

to demand further proofs hera would be like asking a living man to

prove his own existence. Thus, the objectivity of the undeniable

fact of the existing Church was sufficient once and for all to

safeguard one's faith. Kierkegaard maintains that this argument

merely postpones the difficulty, for the Church has authority only

if it can prove that it is apostolic, i.e. the same 8S it was eighteen

hundred years ago.

 72

(8) Historical Research

This is the same as the historical proof which Kierkegaard

had already rejected for the Bible. Consequently, this renewed

effort to ground faith objectively turns out to be in vain. The

only way out ~s to accept faith as a primitive fact, irreducible

to any objective datum. Kierkegaard gives G.E. Lessing credit for

pointing this out, by his repeated attacks against every form of

objectively-founded Christianity. Lessing asks whether the historical

facts of Christian religion, evan supported by an overwhelming

scientific certainty, could provide a sufficient foundation on which

to build ana's etarnal salvation. On this point, Lessing's answer is

negative, but Kierkegaard (as opposed to the skeptic Lessing) states

that if anyone is convinced that there is some reliability in the

historical facts, he should act as Socrates did with respect to the

soul's immortality. Socrates did not first go about collecting

materials to support his point and then live by faith in these proofs;

he was absorbed so completely in the question itself that he did not

hesitate to stake his life on it. Risking ona's whole self is the

only possible proof botr for. im~ortality snd for the truth of the

Christian religion. All others are insufficient.?2 In more precise

terms, Kierkegaard says:

Carefully used, that may be adapted to the problem of becoming

a Christian. First of all, there is, quite rightly the doubt (Lessing's)
whether on3 can base eternal happiness upon something historical. And
consequently hara is something historical l the story of Jesus Christ.
But now, is the historical fact quite certain? To this one must
answer: even though it wefe the most certain of all historical facts
 --------------------------------------

73

it would be of no help, there cannot be any direct transition from

a historical fact to the foundation upon it of an eternal happiness.
That is something qualitatively new. Directly I cannot be helped,
end so I choose - then I live full of the idea, risking my life for
it and my life is the proof that I believe - that is called risking,
and without risk faith is an impossibility. To be related to spirit
means to undergo a test; to believe, to wish to believe, is to
change one's life into a trial; daily test is the trial of faith.
Where becoming a Christian is concerned, there is, as compared with
Socrates, a dialectical difference, namely, where immortality is
concerned man is only related to himself and to the idea, no further.
But when a man chooses all at once to believe in Christ,i.a.,
chooses to stake his life upon him, he is allowed to have immediate
(direct) recourse to Christ in Qrayer. Thus the historical is the
cause, yet the object of faith. 73

Thus Kierkegaard rejects any objective foundation of faith

and replaces it by a "pathological proof", (in the etymological

sense of pathos) and he states that:

There is only Dna proof for the truth of Christianity, and

that is precisely the pathological proof: when the anguish of sin
and the pangs of his conscience force a man to cross the narrow
dividing line which separates the despair bordering on madness, and
Christianity. There lies Christianity.74

Kierkegaard refers to what he called the Archimedesn point for

faith - pure interiority which, free from every objective datum,

becomes capable of lifting this world by placing itself outside it.

Faith properly sO called can never be alarmed by rational objections.

The believer knows that nothing in this world can separate him from

Christ. By a leap, faith takes man beyond all rational thought into

a new world.

(3) Subjectivity and Dialectic

What is the nature of this non-objective faith? As a

relation to God, faith has a spiritual character. This means, first

 74

of all that the relation lies entirely within subjectivity which

for Kierksgaard constitutes the essence of the spirit. The closer

our relationship with God, the more we grow within, so that the

whole religious life can be viewed as a process of interiorization.

Secondly, our relationship with God is necessarily d~alectical.

The spirit cannot grasp its own essence (subjectivity) without

continually objectifying itself; but the resulting objectivity

is not prope~ to the essence of spirit, therefore spirit must ~lways

leave it again to turn back to itself. Objectivity is, as it were,

a necessary pole for the ascent of the spirit end spirit uses

objectivity as the rungs of the ladder to which one clings and from

which one looses one's grasp to pull oneself up. At this point one

should note Kierkegaard's formula that:

Man is a synthesis of the soulish and bodily. But 8

synthesis is unthinkable if the two ere not united in a third factor.
This third factor is spirit. 75

furthermore:

Man is spirit; but what is spirit? Spirit is the self.

But what i~ the self? The self is a relation which relates itself
to its elf • 76

Dialectically, man is material yet spiritual, he is determined yet

free, and the will is a certain modification of self-consciousness.

Self-consciousness is:

the decisive criterion of the self. The more consciousness

the mara self; the more consciousness, the more will, and the mora
will the more self. A man who has no will et all is no self; the
more will he has, the more consciousness of self he has also. The
self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitudq which
relates itself to itself, whose task is to become Hsel f. 71'-_0-
 75

Kierkegaard relates spirit first to the self as self-consciousness,

and then to the will as that point at which self-consciousness is

most concentrated and most normally itself. What is this self of mine?

Kierkegaard asks, In the most abstract and yet the most concrete

sense, it is freedom. And what is freedom? freedom is the will. 78

Thus the self is a highly individualized pattern which has emerged

from a synthesis of "the Soulish and the bodily" and the spirit or

Will, and the decisive factor in this emergence is the will. 'The

self is a synthesis brought about by an~act of will, and upon this,

Kierkegaard makes two comments corresponding to the two levels of

his authorship, i.e. (i) the "deception" along with the aesthetic

with its general appeal and (ii) the religious with its more spec-
79
ific appeal. firstly Kierkegaard comments that because the

self is a synthesis, it is paradoxically the most contingent (fragile)

and yet the most concrate thing we know. Contingent, because it is

not a solid thing like a billiard ball, "rounded and permanent", for

its reality is a pattern, a web of relationships which we ourselves

have brought about. Concrete because it is the only thing we know

with absolute certainty.

The most concrete content consciousness can have is

consciousness of itself, not the pure consciousness but the self-
consciousness which is so concrete that no author has ever been able
to describe such a thing, although such a thing is what every man
is. This self-consciousness is not contemplation.80

The self is not a completed human entity: it is a "becoming".

The self, every instant it exists, is in process of becoming,

for the self does not actually exist, it is only that which is to
81
become. We are always "becoming" and are never"finished products!',
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------

76

and the will (as the synthesizing agent) is the main factor in this

process. It is the will that makes the difference between man and

man, not knowledge, opinion, nor feeling. The will is the power to be.

The more will, the more freedom, for freedom is intensity of will; the

more will the more consciousness; the mora consciousness, the more

awareness of self; the more awareness of self, the fuller appreciation

and use of all its powers, physically, mentally, and spiritually and

consequently ~he more of a self it becomes. However, this self-

progress has a limit which represents the limit of the aesthetic.

We always fail through ignorance of what we are and of what we must

really do about ourselves, and so Kierkegaard of:ers the second and

"serious and edifying comment": Whatever power originally constituted

the self planned it to be a perfect synthesis, i.e. with all its parts

in "equilibrium" and with a perfect balance of the "soulish and the

2
bodily" both exerted to their maximum possibility.8 Until this

comes about, the self is in "disequilibrium"; a mutilated and crippled

version of the original concept. To "become" is the act by which the

self is reconstituted in such fashion that effective "becoming" can

now take place by means of a relation to God. 83 This relation is

achieved when man's powers are organized and integrated together in

one resolve towards God in an act of "conscious" seriousness and deep

intent to believe, to choose God as He presents Himself in His

"unbelievable" paradoxicalness in the God-man, togethar with the

life-view and the teaching associated with Him. This calls for en

absolute act of will, and the strain of willing-to-believe tenses

the will to breaking-point, heightens the self-consciousness, and

 77

draws the self into 8 new synthesis, making it 8 fully effective

basis for all future activity and d9velopment. Thus there is here

a qualitative change, a decisive choice, en expression of the will,

and Kierkegsard calls the re-constituting act of \JJill the "qualifl1nQ

leap". The r~ali ty of the self lies in the balanced unity of its

dimensions; a reality which has emerged from the synthesis of the

" sou lish", "bodily", and "tensed \JJill". Human raali ty, or (as

Kierkegaard calls it) existence is that which stands out or emerges

(directly from the Latin verb ex-stare, meaning to stand out from) in

the sensa of being intimately connected with the environment from

which the individual as an individual stands out or emerges. Human

reality has to be seen within the context of peculiar singularity and

utter aloneness, and absolute difference from anything alse on earth

or in heaven.

SUbjectivity is one of the characteristics of faith, and

Kierkegaard concludes that the degree of involvement of the subject

increases to the extent that objective certainty dim}~ishe~.

Subjective interest in the act of faith reaches its peak when every

shred of objective certainty disappears. Faith withdraws itself

from all objectivity to become purely interior. This process of

interiorization does not stop with the act of faith. Faith too

rests on sheer faith, i.e. on the belief that I believe. This is

why oni for example could raise the question, "can one have faith

in such a Faith?" Does one here not need to say, as in the New

Testament, "Lord I believe, help thou my unbelief?" Faith cannot

possess the certitude of knowledge. The believer can say only:

 78

• I believe that I have faith. This faith has its roots embedded in

a world that transcends man. Thus it is not an acquired possession

but a conti~ striving in fear and trembling. In this sense,

faith is only concern about faith, for this very concern, as extreme

objective uncertainty, is the sign of complete interiority. Every

certainty seduces the believer from his interior existence into

objective knowledge".84

A further consequence of the subjectivity of our relation to God is

that the truth of the act of faith is rather in the bearing of the

act on its object than in the object itself. How we believe is more

important than what we believe. To know God truly is not to know the

true God, but to achieve a true relation to God;85 not unlike the

New Testament text, "I know in whom I have believed." A Christian

• who does not pray truly to Cod is in reality praying to an idol,

whereas the heathen who kneels before a false God in spirit -and in

truth, is adoring the true Cod. 86 While objective thought is

indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective

thinker is an existing individual essentially interested in his own

S
thinking, existing as he is in thought. ?

The truth of faith consists in this: that one commit oneself

end risk one's life for a truth which one does not possess, but which

is posited by the commitment itself. A second characteristic of faith

is that the subjectivity of faith can be realized only in a dialectical

process of ever-increasing interiority. The ect of faith n8c~ssarily

objectifies itself by positing its content as truth, but it cen only

maintain its distinctive character by returning to the subjective.

 79

Thus faith constantly tends to become objective knowledge, but at the

same time it keeps detaching itself from its acquired positions by an

ever-renewed inwerd movement. Only such a dialectical faith 1s

authentic for Kierkegaard. The essential characteristic of faith

is personal commitment which so-called "immediate" faith lacks

depending as it does upon external circumstances. Dialectical or

reflective faith is determined by a subjective attitude which

constantly abandons all objective footholds. Here, one needs courage

enough to abandon oneself and to place one's life in God's hands.

However, the dialectical character of faith requires the

existence of an object. It is the transcendent reality of the objact

of faith that makes the act purely subjective. Kierkegaard's

subjectivity is the subjectivity of the ~ which essentially depends

on an object. But, as soon as the object is "assimilated" by the

believer, the object of faith ceases to be transcendent and- the act

is reduced to an act of cognition. Thus all the emphasis is placed

on the subjective involvement. A religious truth depends entirely

on the free decision by which we make it our own. Faith cannot

effirm its object except by a personal commitment, a choice, 8 decision.

The truth of faith is never 8 result; it is the truth of

a Way. There is only one method for finding it: to follow the
88
Way from beginning to end, just as our predecessors did, The

role of the will is predominant in the act of faith. Kierkegaard

says for example:

 80

FBith surely implies an act of the will, and moreOver

not in the same sense as when I say for instance, that all
apprehension implies an act of the will; how can I otherwise
explain the sayin§ in the New Testament that whatsoever is not
of faith is sin. S

All the believer has to do is to be concernad solely with

himself and lito become subjective is the most difficult of all

90
tasks". man always wants to make history, to playa leading

role on the stage of life. But to believe is to choose oneself as

9l
the absolute - that is, to choose oneself in the sight of God.

Faith begins with an agonizing leap, not with an intellectual-

dialectical transition. The leap of faith is the risk of love,

and the certainty of faith is the trust in the beloved. Thus,

Christ said, "1 will make myself known to him who loves me."

What Saran Kierkegaard means by"Subjectivity":

We should note that, for Kierkegaard, subjectivity-means

the activity of a subject, not mere self-cantredness or introspection.

Subjectivity implies the state of being a self-conscious subject; a

consciousness in which the self is known as the active subject which

performs the knowing. Kierkegaard defends himself against the

criticism of subjectivism by stressing that faith is not a matter of

those unaccountable and fantastic forms of subjectivity which everyone

92
possesses in abundance, but it is the subjectivity of the will.

Furthermore, Kierkegaard emphasized that subjectivity is not identical

with immanence, and he maintains that the highest subjectivity and

the most profound interiority become possible only by reference to

a wholly transcendent object. This object of faith is not attainable

 81

through objective knowledge due to its transcendence. Thought

remains in the realm of the immanent, but faith leads to the

transcendent. The subjectivity of the act of faith is such that the

act itself proceeds entirely within the realm of subjectivity,

but that does not mean that no objective reality corresponds to it.

But how is the act of faith connected with its object? Kierkegaard

stresses that the subjectivity of the act of faith ultimately results

from the transcendence of its object. Subjectivity is the only way

to approach a divine object, and only by the abandonment of all

objectivity does our relationship with God become truly objective.

If God is the Wholly Other, the only correct attitude toward Him

consists in renouncing all objective content to the point where the

relation has no content other than itself; thus complete subjectivity

is the only objectively correct approach to God. In its term and

origin, the act of faith is connected with a transcendent object,

and the pure subjectivity of the act is due entirely to the trans-

cendence of its content. The characteristic of faith is not that

it has no objectivity, but that the act itself (the appropriation)

is disengaged from the objective content. The transcendence of the

content of faith implies that it can be communicated only by a

revelation. The truth of Christianity entirely transcends the

93
subject. Thus the act of faith does not occur in a vacuum, but

is attached at either end to a pole of objectivity. But how, can the

act of faith maintain sufficient freedom in respect to its object so

that Kierkegaard can call it pure subjectivity? Kierkegaard finds

the answer, again, in the very nature of the object of faith. The
 82

object of faith is not given immediately such that it determines

assent but it can fail to determine assent only if it (the object

of faith) contains itself something paradoxical for the understanding.

Kierkegaard says:

When subj8ctivit~, inwardness, is the truth, the truth

becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact that the truth is
objectively a paradox sho~s in its turn that subjectivity is the
truth. 94

(4) SUbjectivit~ and Paradox

Paradox means contrary to appearance, plausibility or

probability, and so one could raise the question as regards how one

could believe in what is paradoxical or absurd. Kierkegaard would

answer by stressing the question, how could one believe anything

except the paradoxical? furthermore, if the object is not paradoxical,

we have left the realm of faith for that of knowledge.

The problem here amounts to this: why is the object of

religion such that ;t can not ba known, but must be believed?

or in other words, why must it be paradoxical? Does the solution

lie in the fact that between a divine revelation and human knowledge

there is an unbridgeable gap? Kierkegaard feels that a proof for the

'truth of faith or even for the existence of God ought a priori to be

95
rejected. Only for faith is God existing; is He really present.

This existence never can be the object of rational demonstration;

it rests on convi?tion, e notion that goes beyond human proof. In

every respect God is the unknown, the limit of our thinking.

Nothing divina falls within the scope of human thought,96 ~nd it

 83

is precisely this paradoxical character of its object which makes

the act of faith purely subjective. Subjectivity reaches its height

when the object, in which it has infinite interest, becomes pure

uncertainty; at that moment the subject is moved to genuine passion.

Thus Kierkegaard calls Paradox "the passion of thou.ght". The objective

repulsion of the Paradox throws the subject back upon itself ~nd forces

it to approach its object from within itself with no other foothold than

its own interestedness, i.e. passion. Kierkegaard then defines faith

as "objective uncertainty, due to the repulsion of the absurd, held

fast by the passion of inwardness. 1I97

Kierkegaard uses the category of Paradox in two senses -

(a) to describe the logical eva~uation of faith and its psychological

character. This is a "broad" use of the category, and (b) the "narrow"

use is the description Kierkegaard gives of the specifically Christian

faith and the object of such faith. Thus he says very often that

Christianity is the Absolute Paradox and also that Christian faith is

faith in the Absolute Paradox, the God-man. This Paradox is the

speCla 1 s t um bl lng bl oc k of Ch rlS t·lanl t y. 98

o
o
0 0 for Kierkegaard, the

object of faith must by definition be something uncertain, i.e.

objectively uncertain. The contrasting certitude (inner certainty)

end uncertainty (objective lack of certainty) of faith he called the

99
Paradox of faith. Kierkegaard remarks in the Journals, that

"Paradox is really the pathos of intellectual life - and paradoxes

are only grandiose thoughts in embryo.lI lDD Kierkegaard interprets

faith as paradox in fear and Trembling;Dl but in the Philosophical

. 102
Fragments he deals with the Absolute Paradox.
 84

Kierkegaard's use of the category of paradox in the broader

sense as the category for all religious assertions derives from Hamann,

and the discussion of the Paradox in the Philoso~hical Fragments

103
d lrec
· tl y re f ars to hl·m. Fur th ermore: Ki er k egaar d men ti ons
104
Tertullian, who also probably influenced his idea of the Paradox.

Kierkegaard says that the paradox is the source of the

105
thinker's passion, and the fact that we are wrestling with a

paradox is _a sure mark of the value of our thinking. But since this

thinking contains passion it will end in thought destroying itself.

This is the paradoxical passion of reason, that it should seek

collision with something when this collision will prove its undoing.

This something, the reason collides with, is the "Unknown", which we

may call God. It is folly to attempt to prove God, for this would

assume, from the outset, the existence of God, and argument moves

from, not toward existence. So Socrates would never have dreamed of

proving God's existence. 106 Thus reason is forever coming into

collision with the Unknown; this is the limit of reason's reach;

it cannot go further than this, but yet it comes to it again and again.
lO
The Unknown is the limit, the different, the absolutely different. ?

Reason can have knowledge of an absolute unlikeness (which is sin)

only as it obtains it from God. The problem of the Fragments is

restated with greater force in the Postscript where Kierkegaard maintains

that Christianity is a relation of subjectivity towards a paradox.

"When subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the truth becomes

objectively a paradox. nlOa Thus the earadox is what corresponds to

subjectivity which, to balance the equation, is truth, and (since faith

is paradoxical) this also corrasponds to faith. Since the absurd cannot

 85

be handled objectively, and the truth is objectively a paradox,

subjectivity is the truth. The Paradox, is the object of religious

faith because it is such that it evokes a decision. 109 In Tra~ing

in Christianity, Kierkegaard discusses "the offence of the Paradox".

He stresses the offence and risk of believing in One whose humiliation

during His life on earth was a terrible reality. Furthermore, he

insists that the concept of offence is a characteristic note of

Christianity in the same way as the concept of faith, and the two
110
concepts are closely related. It is the possibility of offence

that makes it necessary to choose either faith or offence. The

offence has to do with the God-man, end it Cdn take the form of

lowliness or loftiness. There is, for exa~ple, the offence at the

contradiction that an individual lowly man acts in a way that proclaims

he is Cod, e.g. the "sayings" of Christ, along with his teaching, and

particularly His miracles. Faith and the offensive paradox are two

sides of the same coin, since, i f one is to believe, one cannot avoid

the possibility of offence. Believing means having faith, and faith

implies the possibility of the offence, and we go through this

. . 111
possibi11ty to the blessed acceptance of th1s humble man as God.

The challenge which the Paradox must have for us is that it confronts

us as a challenging "Thou" to our "1",112 and it is this challenge

113
that demands faith. Since faith alona can assert that He is
114
the God-man, the Paradox therefore exists only for faith.

Kierkegaard stresses that the historicity of the God-man makes it

a paradox of an absolute kind. Kierkegaard regards the paradox as

being above every system and says that the concept of the absurd is

to understand that one cannot undarst~nd. Furthermore, Kierkagaard

 86

distinguishes faith from reason, and stresses that reason can only

say of the paradox that it cannot resolve it, since for reason, it

is not intelligible. This does not mean that the paradox is nonsense.

Faith believes in the Paradox, it believes the Paradox. With regard

to things that are above reason; faith is not supported by reason,

because faith does not at all understand what it yet believes with

all its power and to quote Hugo de St. Victor, "reason can well allow

itself be determined to honour faith; for it gains profundity by the

negative category of the paradox" - here is something by which reason

is determined, to hold faith in honour, and this faith it cannot

115
understand fully. Thus faith is "above" and "beyond" reason,

and so the Postscript rightly moves from faith to faith, to the

existential and not to speculation. A Christian knowledge can only

be based on the principle that faith cannot be understood; thus the

Bible affirms, "I know that my redeemer liveth", not in the sense of

knowledge "about" a person, i.e. God. Rather this knowledge is of a

more direct and personal sort. Only to faith does the paradox reveal

its depth of meaning. For the reason and the non-believer, the

content of faith is the absurd, but for him who believes it is not
116
the absurd. However for Kierkegaard, the absurdity of the

paradox lies in the fact that it was said of a particular human being

that he was God. The Incarnation therefore is paradoxical; it cannot

be understood and is not supposed to be. Its meaning is the religious

117
and moral use. For Kierksgaard, the main point is the existential

meaning of the content of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Thus the

only entrance to Christianity is by way of a practical experience of

profound pathos, in which the individual yields himself absolutely in

 87

a devotion analogous to that of a woman's love.

The insistence on the fact that the God-man is Absolute,

enables Kierkegaard to safeguard the interpretation of our attitude

to Him and thus we are confronted by something we cannot understand

and must therefore accept. Furthermore, ~ Christ was, could not

directly be perceived (you do not perceive a contradiction).

The divine character of Christ's person could not have been

obvious, hence, the Paradox exists only for faith and Christ was God
118
incognito. So we see that the communication of Christianity is

always indirect, since Christ Himself, due to his transcendence,

cannot be communicated direct~y. Kierkegaard was the first person

to state and define the problem and the nature of indirect communi-

cation which (e.g. the negative category of the Paradox) is a series

of negative hints in language designed to drive us away from language

and through irony and humour, we are forced from language to a

confrontation and a personal appropriation. Communication, to be

effective in existence, must be indirect; so, the art of communica-

tion at last becomes the art of taking away, of luring something away
119
from someone.

It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard brings out the

ethico - religious usa of the Paradox by means of the idea of

contemporaneity, because one feature of Christian faith is that it is

a present relation to a past historical figure. In the Philosophical

Fragments, Kierkegaard says that the object of faith is the contempor a ry,l20
 88

and then he discusses the disciple at second-hand being not less

fortunately situated than the disciple at first-hand. Thus, as far

as "Christian experience" or Christian faith is concerned, Christ's

contemporaries were no better situat3d than we are. This faith-

relation is co.ntemporaneousness. The man who knows Christ, has

faith in Him, is contemporanous with Him, no matter to what genera-

tion he belongs. In regard to the Eternal, the only tense possible

is the present. Hance Vie tCilk of the "nearness of Christ" or the

"living Christ". However, the assertiori that Christ is God incarnate

carries with it certain ethical and religious directives which are

essentially prescriptions as to what I should do ~; in this sense

I am presently related or contemporanous with the past.

It is worthwhile to refer to Kierkegaard's point about the

immediate knowledge after tbe break-up of immediacy ("faith is

121
immediacy after reflection"). The absurdity of the paradox

is not absurd to the believer;12la it is an absurd that must be

true and must make sense when we have believed. Having taken the

leap through the possibility of offence, we see the meaningfulness

and truth of the absurd, so that (since we do believe) it is no

longer for us the absurd. This meaning and truth is what the

Paradox involves, i.e. its ethico-religious use. The lesson here

is that the absurd is always a contradiction for the reason which

is thought outside of faith, while being truth "for me" in faith.

However, we should note that for Kierkegaard reason is valid, but

limited in scope, e.g. it cannot deal with existentiel problems.

Thus the Postscript for example, confronts us with the passion

of existence in which action as opposed to reason, is the

 89

decisive element; only subjectivity is adequate to meet problems

of existence. In this sense, there are no reasons for accepting

the Paradox, otherwise the Paradox would be a rational answer to

our problem of eternal happiness. Hence one believes against one's

reason. Man's quest for eternal happiness is to be met only by

Christianity. To be a Christian is to accept the Paradox of Jesus

as Christ.

Brief Summary of Paradox

The Paradox violates the laws of reason and reason can never

accept the Paradox as rational but, reason has its own limits. Since

reason is limited to the logical sphere only, it cannot make judge-

ments about the reality or existence of the Paradox but only about

its rationality. faith therefore is above reason in the sense that

the Paradox may exist even when found to be irrational. The Paradox

is for reason the symbol of its limits. In confronting the Paradox,

reason knows it to be irrational but not thar3fore impossible.

Reason finds the Paradox to be against reason since the Paradox is

self-contradictory. Reason, must, when confronted with the Paradox,

understand that it cannot understand. Reason cannot judge the reality

or existence of that which denies reason, e.g. the laws of thought

(or reason) are denied in the affirmation of the Absolute Paradox.

Since language is 'fitted to express what binds man to man,

it must break down before the secret which isolates a man and leaves

him face to face with his maker. The existence of the Paradox may

be marked by terms of possibility, probability, improbability, etc.,

 90

which are not within the sphere of reason.

Kierkegaard talks of religious suffering in the Postscript

in more than one sensej one sense is the tension between man's

experience of an absolute relation to God, and his inability to

find any adequate external expression for this relation, (suffering

here is not physical , but is a psychic tension in which the religious

individual is pulled in two different directions by conflicting

forces within himself). Kierkegaard says:

Here in lies the profound suffering of true religiosity

to stand related to God in an absolutely decisiv9 manner, and to be
unable to find any decisive external expression for this. 122

Kierkegaard is than able to say that when a man trusts Cod completely,

he also learns that joy which comes through suffering and prepares him

for eternal happiness. This is the hard and narrow way, but it is the

only way and ona must choose it and follow it if he would reach the

goal. It is not the way which is narrow, but the narrowness which
123
is the way. Christianity is an existential contradictionjl24

the contradictions are essential for Christianity for they provide

the tension, the heightening of passion and the dialectic which are

the means by which and through which an individual becomes a Christian.

To be in faith means that one expects the impossible while realizing

the expectation to be mad. The problem for human knowledge is to see

that there is something which it cannot understand, and also to

determine what that something is.

T. Haecker, rightly says that there is a strong flavour of

 91

paradox in all religious language and this is as it should be:

The genuine paradox is a form of honourable acknowledgement

on the part of human understanding, of the majesty of the divin3
mysteries, and of the fact that His ways are not our ways. It is
an expression of the otherwise indefinable relation between finite
man and the infinite creator. l25

The paradox must always retain its irrationality because

it is the sale means by which men are brought into existence, and

so God must always be "incognito " , and the truth always objectively

uncertain. Man's reason always arrives at the unknown and he can

only conceive Cod in impossible terms, consequently all our talk of

126
God is human talk. This is due to man's incapacity to know God

and the necessity for giving man something impossible to believe.

The paradox is the only gesture of self-disclosure which God can

make. The purpose of the paradox demands that it remains offensive

forever, an offence which is the opposite of knowledge and the

antithesis of a direct approach to God. Kierkegaard uses paradox

to safeguard the uniqueness of the Christian's object of interest.

Christ seems to be asking that men live by dying, win by losing,

and get by giving.

Christ, the Absolute Paradox of Faith.

One sees in Kierkegaard's thought two types of religion:

Socratic and Christian. For a parson whose norm of truth is the

subjective, faith is the ground for every deeper understanding.

However, sincs tho paradoxical element in Socratic truth (with truth

being primarily a personal affair, originating within the existential

interiority of the knower, and all truth as the objective correlate

 92

of this interiorization is, paradoxical, since the objective always

presents itself as a challenge to a subject which is pure interiority)

is due solely to the subject, not to the object in itself as it is in

Christian feith, Kierkegaerd cells Socratic feith "KnowledQ~".

Thus Kierkegaard seys:

The eternel essential truth is (for Socrates) by no means

in itself a peredox; but it becomes paradoxical by virtue of its
reletionship to an Bxisting individual. The Socratic ignorance
gives expression to the objective uncerteinty attaching to the truth,
while his inwardness in existing is the truth. 127

for Socretes, paradox is only objective ignorance, but a ~

element enters into the Christian perspective. At this pOint, one

sees a distinction between simple paradox and what Kierkegaard calls

"the ebsolute paradox", or "the absurd". If the relationship of the

eternal truth to an existing subject was already paradoxical in a

Socratic perspective, it becomes an absolute paradox in the Christian

situation where Eternity and the existing subject are totally disprop-
128
ortionete. The absolute diversity between Cod and man is due to

sin by which men himself deliberetely cut off his reletion with Cod
. 129
in an act of supreme lndependence. Therefore, it follows that

any contact between God and man is not only paradoxical but absolutely

paradoxicel or absurd. Kierkegaard says:

When Socrate8 believed that there was a God, he held fast

to the objective uncertainty with the passion of his inwardness and
it is precisely in this contradiction and in this risk that faith is
rooted. Now it is otherwise. Instged of the objective uncerteinty
there is here e certainty, namely, that objectively it is absurd;
and this absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness, is feith. 130
 93

The absurdity of faith is that Cod, despite the total

otherness- of man (which results from sin) nevertheless enters into

6 relation with him. Revelation and redemption, by which God comes

into contact with man, become contradictions in the situation of sin.

With this absolute paradox, faith has reached the summit of interio-

rity. for Socrates, also, subjectivity had been truth, but his vary

confidence of achieving truth by subjectivity had placed him in

constant dan~sr of falling back on objectivism. The Christian concept

of sin avoids this danger, and in it, subjectivity becomes untruth.

Guilty before God, man becomes untrue to the depths of his being;

thus, the last refuge for the objective, which was located in
13l
subjectivityJitself, is closed off.

The other side of the coin, as it were, as far as the

absolute paradox is concerned, is that God made Himself like man,

to reveal man's sinful state and subsequent redemption; the Eternal

became incarnate in time. Kierkegaard states that:

Thus our paradox is rendered still more appalling, or the

same paradox has the double aspect which proclaims it as the absolute
paradox; negatively by revealing the absolute unlikeness of sin,
positively by proposing to do away with the absolute unlikeness in
absolute likeness. l32

Man's relationship with God, (despite His otherness) now

becomes transcendent and as another ~~, He takes his place in

history beside ma and becomes external to me. Hare is the depth

of the mystery of Christ, that God as a particular individual in

time transforms man in his subjectivity. (At this point, Kierkagaard

underlines one of the key problems of religious discourse.) Every

effort to understand God in His Incarnation, Kierkageard feels

 94

is vain. Speculative understanding is powerless before this absolute

paradox. To explain it is to destroy it; the only valid explanation

is that it is inaxplicable. 133 Kierkegaard says:

The eternal happiness of the individual is decided in time

through the relationship to something historical, which is further-
more of such a character as to include in its composition that which
by virtue of its essence cannot become historical and must therefore
become such by virtue of en absurdity.l34

The Paradox of the Incarnation consists in a personal

identity of God and this particular man - Christ, who is the sub-

sistant ambiguity of a man who is God. That is why He is necessarily

135
paradoxical and could communicate Himself only as object of faith.

Kierkegaard states that: "The coming of Christ is and remains a

paradox."136

Christ's divinity is impervious to sensa and understanding

and indeed Kierkegaard says that "the supreme Paradox of all thought
l37
is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think.

The paradox of the person of Christ, as Kierkegaard understands it,

underlines the strictly personal character of the act of faith.

Christianity is not a doctrine, but a person to whom I entrust

myself without reserve, and the principles of Christiantiy can never

be understood independently of the Personof Christ, and one needs

to take account of the element from which Christ's words receive

their basic meaning (i.e. the divinity of their speaker) in order

to understand, Christ's words. To be understood, Christ's words

have to be believed, i.e. to be connected with the living Paradox

who proclaimed them and who Himself cannot be understood but only
 95

believed in. Significantly, Kierkegaard says that "the God-man

is the paradox, absolutely the paradox, hence it is quite clear

that the understanding must come to a standstill before it.,,138

(5) faith and History

One can fully believe only in a person in the present, in

a contemporary. Christ, however, lived and died many hundred of

years ago. Therefore, we must bridge the ages which separate us

from Him, in order to establish a genuine relation of belief. Since

(as the Philosophical Fragments stresses) the very conditions of our

faith in Christ cannot be received at secondhand, Christ himself has

to create within e8ch of His disciples the conditions necessary for

"understanding" Him. History can have no place in the act of faith,

end so one finds that, to approach Christ, a trans-historical rela-

tionship is required. The Jew of the year A.D. 30 was not closer

to Him than we, and we both face the same paradox. Only faith

makes one a true contemporary of Christ. As long as there is one

believer in the world, Christ remains contemporaneous, and only the

contemporary presence of Christ makes true faith possible.

We should note that Philosophical fragments prepared the way

for an understanding of what is meant by contemporaneity, and it

stresses the fact that it was just as difficult for Christ's

contemporaries to believe in Him as it is for later generations.

Christ's contemporaries, as well as later generations, could accept

Christ as the Son of God only with the eyes of faith. The incarnation

of Christ contains a contradiction for logical thought, and when Christ

 96

came into the world he was "a sign of contradiction" and this will be

for all time. Christianity is absurd from a philosophical point of

view, and it is improbable from a historical point of view.

Kierkegaard stresses the fact that only in the imitation of Christ

does contempo~aneousness (this most important category in the

dialectic of faith) receive its final existential determination. In

faith, we and Christ's contemporaries become contemporaries. True

Christianity has no history; it is always present. History, the

objective standard par excellence, is totally out of place as far as

evaluating religion is concerned, because it knows only results and

judges by the past whereas one's relationship with God is realized

in the present, in a decision determining the individual's stance in

139
respect to God. The Postscript stresses that historical proofs

are always approximative and therefore insufficient to found an

absolute authority. Kierkegaard stresses that all historical commu-

nication has to do with "knowledge" but about Christ "nothing can be

140
known; he can only be believed" • Here one sess the force of the

distinction between intellectual consideration (objective approxi-

mation) and existential commitment (subjective appropriation).

Thus this Person, (Christ) far off in history is contempo-

raneous with us and we with him. When he speaks to us and we decide

for him, the limits of time and distance disappear. Kierkegaard

rightly urges and undsrlines the Christian thought as regards our

relation to Christ, the same yesterday, today and forever. Only

from a standpoint of faith can a genuinely historical interpretation

of human life become possible. From history, faith has nothing to

 97

learn and God is the Eternal; history is the field of limitation and

temporal sequence.

(6) Philosophical Systems

Although Kierkegaard gave considerable weight to defending

the thesis "Truth is Subjectivity", he also tried to refute the main

positions which sought to eliminate the subjective character of truth,

e.g. Speculation, Hegelianism and Objectivity. The central issue hera

-
for Kierksgaard is the fear that much "violence" will be done to the

dialectic of inwardness, to the extent that all that is involved for

one to be an individual. and a Christian will be watered down, thus

making it an easy matter rather than one of infinite passion and

decisive choice. Kierkegaard sees spiritual complacency as a common

factor within the three main positions which he tried to refute.

(A) The Place of Reason

One may wonder whether there is any room left for reason in

Kierkegaard's theory of faith, especially a faith which is basad

entirely on paradox. It is relevant to note here that Kierkegaard's

purpose W8S basically apologetic. He re-examined the stages of

consciousness to bring to light the possibility of an authentic act

of faith. Kierksgaard tried, to rediscover the commensurability of

faith with reflective thought by means of a mora profound meditation

on the experience of modern man. This commensurability Kierk8gaard

finds, is based not on a rationalistic coincidence of faith with

reason, but on the limitation of reason itself. Kierkegaard is

convinced that idealism fails to explain the ulti8ate 9round of the

 98

existential synthesis of the finite and the infinite; (i.e. the infini~e)

and so he carries through his own reflection, down to the very ground

for the experience of the infinite; absolute subjectivity. In cont-

rast with idealism, the dialectic of subjectivity demonstrates that

the more profo~nd reflection leads man not to identity, but to opposi-

tion with the Divine, resulting in man's awareness of himself as guilty

before God. Thus, Kierkegaard bases his procedure on reflection

itself but does not justify faith by human thought; he rather tries

to show that thought necessarily falls short of responding to the

question about the ultimate ground of existence, by means of a deeper

reflection on existence itself. Reflection on the essence of the self,

the subjectivity, shows that only an act which goes beyond objective

thought can reveal man's innermost nature: his relation to the source

of his existence. Such an act is faith, and it originates from the

depths of the self which lie beyond any objectivation. Thus faith

is seen to be beyond reason and accessible only by a reflection that

penetrates more deeply into human reality than objective thought aver

does. This analysis of faith forces reason to acknowledge that faith

proceeds from a more profound reflection on reality than reason.

Kierkegaard very significantly says:

People have always thought that reflection would destroy

Christianity, and is its natural enemy. I hope I have shown, with
God's aid, that religious reflection can retie the knot which a
superficial reflection has unraveled for so m~ny years. T~a
authority of the Bible, and all that b~longs to it, have been
abolished, and it looks as if one were only waiting for the ultimate
stage of reflection to clear up everything. But see how, on the
contrary, reflection is going to render service by putting springs
under Christianity again, and in such a way that it is able to hold
out against reflection. Christianity of course remains completely
unchanged; not a jot has been altered. But the struggle has become
different; previously it was only between reflection and immediate
 99

simple Christianity; now it is between reflection and simplicity

armed by reflection. The real task is not to understand Christianity
but to understand that one cannot understand it. That is the sacred
cause of faith, and reflection is sanctified by being used for it. 141

Reason plays its part in the preparation of faith, and also

in the reflection upon faith. Since faith is paradoxical, reason is

assigned the negative (as being Kierkegaard's reaction against the

rationalistic theology of the 19th century) but indispensable task

of pointing up the incomprehensibility of faith. Thus reason must

know precisely what is and what is not outside its competence, and

such knowledge is a prerequisite for defining with accuracy the

sphere of faith. Rather than dispel the mysteriousness of faith,

reason must set itself the task of making clear the outline (of faith)

distinctly and vividly. Kierkegaard says that:

Nonsense therefore he (the believer) cannot believe against

the understanding. For precisely the understanding will discern that
it is nonsense and will prevent him from believing it; but he makes
so much use of the understanding that he becomes aware of the
incomprehensiblel and then he holds to this, believing against the
understanding. l4Z

Kierkegaard implies in the above quotation, that reason is

required (as part of its task) to be able to distinguish bet~3en the

contradictory and the incomprehensible.

One sees a kind of ambivalence in Kierkegaard's writings.

He is not unwilling to defend the expediency of speculation,'

(although he was conc8rned th~t speculation has drifted away from

its true purpose) but at the same time he is of the opinion that the

speculator has no fitting place in the assembly of existentially

committed lives. However, when Kierkegaard clashed with rational

 100

speculation, he was merely trying to show that the rightful limits

of human reason had been exceeded, but this has to be seen within

the context of Kierkegaard's vocation -- that of making it difficult

to become an individual and a Christian.

Kierkegaard was confident that a right use of reason implies

an acknowledgement of reason's limitations, thus opening the way for

faith, and he states:

What then is the Unknown? It is the limit to which the

Reason repeatedly comes ••••• it is the different, the absolutely
different •••• the Reason cannot even conceive an absolute unlikeness •••• 143

(8) ~egelianism

We do not intend here to go into details with regard to

Hegel's thought ~ se, rather, our main concern is what Hegel's

thought meant to Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard denounced Hegel mainly because he felt that the

latter failed to relate his rational system to the living responsibility

of a finite individual. He says for example, "one thing always escaped

Hegel - what it was to live. He could only give a representation of

life. 1I144 However, although Kierkegaard takes a dim view of any

attempt to set up an existential system, he deliberately sets up a

logical system when dealing with the Christian position as a problem

of thought and in the Philosophical Fragments he reduces Christianity

to a proble~ of thought.

Whereas Hegel strove to mediate everything in the category

of both/and, Kierkegaard turned to the strenuous and exacting category

of either/or and he says that:

MCMA~TER UNIVE.RSITV \.18RAR'f

 101

If Christianity is the opposite of speculation is it also

the opposite of mediation, the latter being a category of specula-
tive thought; what then can it mean to mediate them? But what is
the opposite of mediation? It is the absolute paradox. 145

146
Professor Swenson points out, that both Kierkegaard's

philosophical ~tyle and terminology show the influence of Hegel.

Furthermore, Dr. Lowrie has uncovered a laudatory passage, part of

which states,

I cherish a respect for Hegel which is sometimes an enigma

to me; I have learnt much from him, and I know that on returning
again to him I could still learn much more. 147

(C) Objectivity

Kierkegaard does not deny that the data of Christianity are

objective in the sense of existing "out there", but his concern lies

on the way professing Christians substituted intellectual assent to

these data for the decisive ethical state of being Christians.

Kierkegaard sees the objective as the converse of the

subjective, which is character change, spiritual development, personal

responsibility, and inner concern and he says,

Here we are again reminded of my thesis that subjectivity

is truth; for an objective truth is like the eternity of abstract
thought, extraneous to the movement of existence. l48

By way of contrast here, one notes that Descartes and Hegel had found

the reality of man in the imperative nature of reason. Kant had found

it in the imperative demand of the moral self. Kierkegaard found it

at a more fundamental level - the imperative nature of existence, i.9.

the existential imperative to be. ~an is a being who makes himS3lf

 102

and he is burdened with ontological responsibility, for his absolute

interest is, how to become himself. Kierkegaard for example, says:

But suppose that Christianity is subjectivity, an inner-

transformation, an actualization of inwardness, and that only two
kinds of paJple can know anything about it; those with an infinite
passionate interest in an eternal happiness base this their happiness
upon their believing relationship to Christianity, and those who with
an opposite passion, but in passion reject it - the happy and unahappy
lovers •••••• Now if Christianity is essentially something objective,
it is necessary for the observer to be objective. But if Christianity
is essentially subjectivity, it is a mistake for the observer to be
objective. 149

(7) Faith and Historical Truths

The dialectic of inwardness is supported by the fact that the

eternal God assumed the form of a finite person and thus became the

God-man at a particular point in tima;"The historical assertion is

that the Deity, the Eternal, came into being at a definite moment in

time as an individual man".150 Spiritual passion and ethical decision

are experienced when the existing individual, by an act of faith, casts

himself upon the contradiction involved in basing "an eternal happiness

151
upon the relation to something historical".

Christianity is an existence-communication which makes the

thing of existing paradoxical and difficult to a degree it never was
before and never can be outside of Christianity, but it is no short
cut to becoming incomparably clever. 152

Furthermore, Kierkegaard states that:

It is subjectivity that Christianity is concerned with, and

it is only in subjectivity that its truth exists, if it exists at all;
objectively, Christianity has absolutely no 3xistence. If its truth
happens to be in only a single subject, it exists in him alone; and
there is greater Christian joy in heaven over this one individual than
over universal history and the System, which as objective entities are
incommensurable for that which is Christian. 153
 103

(A) Lessing's Problem

In Kierkegaard's view, there is:

Only one proof of the truth of Christianity, and that, quite

rightly is from the emotions. When the dread of sin and a heavy
conscience torture a man into crossing tha narrow line between despair
bordering upon madness - and Christendom. There lies Christianity.154

Thus the state of subjective truth has no reality until the existing

individual perceives a relation between the spiritual happiness of

the self and_the degree to which the self is passionately committed.

When the gaining Or losing of eternal happiness is at stake, a maximum

of inner passion should be expressed, and Kierkegaard is convinced that

only Christianity could confront one with such an option. The God-man

doctrine is worthless as part of the Christian religion no matter how

objectively and historically it may be viewed, until it is passionately

perceived as the absolute paradox. Whatever the amount of objective

and historical evidence one gathers by combination or addition, (one

after the other) the final outcome is never more than probability or

an approximation.

If all the angels in heaven were to put their heads together,

they could still bring to pass only an approximation, because an
approximation is the only certainty attainable for historical knowledge
but also an inadequate basis for an eternal happiness. 155

Here one notes that Kierkegaard quotes approvingly Lessing's dictum;

contingent historical truths of reason can never constitute a basis

for the eternal truths of reason. This Kierkegaard argues, immediately

invalidates the Bible as a basis for certainty since it is composed of

historical documents and doubt always arises over the genuineness of

one of these documents or about the exegesis of some part of them.

 104

Lessing concluded the above dictum by saying "that God raised a dead

man does not prove that God has a Son co-essential with Himself".

Kierkegaard is convinced that past and present experience confirm

that we shall find no certainty within this field either now Or in

the future but suffer only recurring crises of faith. Kierkegaard

says, "there can be no direct transition from the historical to the

156
eternal". "Nothing historical can become infinitely ,certain for

me excep t th e f ac t 0 . t ence. "157

f my own exls

(8) Relation between Historical Truths and Faith

One finds in the Philosophical Fra~ments, that Kierkegaard

concludes that the relationship between philosophical Idealism and

Christianity is one of thorough-going contrast, and he poses the

problem which Lessing first raised concerning the relationship between

revelation and history and the question on the title page 158 delves

into Lessing's question. The historical fact of the Christ-revelation

is a unique one and as a historical event it belongs to the category

of reason (like ordinary historical events) and that of the Eternal

and SO it is humanly conceivable only as self-contradictory or

paradoxical and it can be apprehended only by faith or belief in the

ordinary sense and faith in the unique sense; the faith which is just

as paradoxical as its object. The Christ revelation is an absolute

historical fact and is the object of the Christian faith. Christ

as the Truth incarnate in the Moment (or contempor~ry situation)

meets the "existing individual in his actual situation and challenges

him to be either for Him (through faith) or against Him (by way of

offence), Thus Lessing's problem is solved by Kierkegaard by his

 105

stressing the truths of revelation which are accessible only when

the condition of faith is given by God Himself. Christianity is

the truth of revelation, given in a particular place, at a particular

time, and in a particular form, i.e. the Incarnation.

Kierkegaard in disparaging historical evidences, stresses

that because they are sO external they stand in the way of an

individual coming to himself inwardly. It requires great faith to

resist the temptation of objective complacency. It is disastrous

to confuse knowledge with faith, and so Kierkegaard says:

In this objectivity one tends to lose that infinite personal

interestedness in passion which is the condition of faith, the ubiqu3
et nus quem (the everywhere and nowhere) in which faith can come into
being ••••• In this voluminous knowledge, this certainty that lurks
at the door of faith and threatens to devour it, he is in so dangerous
a situation that he will need to put forth much effort in great fear
and trembling, lest he fall a victim to the temptation to confuse
knowledge with faith. While faith has hitherto had a profitable
schoolmaster in the existing uncertainty, it would have in the new
certainty its most dangerous enemy; for if passion is eliminated, 159
faith no longer exists, and certainty and passion do not go together.

In the main then, Kierkegaard tries to show that "objective

knowledge" is ambiguous and we cannot deduce from things meanings

about what lies behind (and beyond) them. The nature of existence

is such that it cannot be mastered by reason because living experience

is split, as it were, by paradoxes which mark that abyss where all our

knowledge drops away into ambiguities. We cannot pass beyond the

frontier of the known and even in this sphere of the known our

knowledge is never more than "approximate" and an absolute degree

of certainty is impossible. Kierkegaard does not deny the laws of

thought and logic but uses them as Kant did "to clip the wings of
 106

reason", and he limits it by its own laws, i.e. limiting it to its

nature, scope and procedure. Kierkegaard insists that with regard

to reason, the frontier is the 'unknown' and the reason cannot say

with positive certainty what that 'unknown' is. Kierkegaard says,

as regards th~ question, "what then can I know?" Nothing, i.e

I can know nothing with any degree or real certainty; nothing about

God, or the world as it really is. The only thing known with

certainty is myself, my own 9xisting self, and even that is not,

and never will be fully "transparent" to me. The only reality to

which an existing individual may have a relation which is mora

than cognitive (i.e. mora than approximate) is his own reality,

the fact that he exists; and this reality constitutas his absolute
160
interest.
 107

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER III

1. Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. II p. 189

2. fear and Trembling, op.cit., pp. 42-43.

3. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op.cit., p. 183.

4. Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. lI, p. 188

5. Ibid, p. 173.

6. Ibid, p. 149.

7. Stages on Life's Way, transleted by Walter Lowrie,

Princeton University Press, Princeton, ~.J. 1940, p. 97.

8. Ibid, p. 107.

9. Ibid, p. 160.

10. Ibid, p. 166.

11. Ibid, p. 166.

12. Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. !i, p. 151

13. Purity of Heart, translated by A.S. Aldworth and W.S. Ferrie; -

C.W. Daniel Co. Ltd., London, 1940, pp. 53-67.

14. Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 21

15. Ibid, p. 149.

 108

16. Postscript, op.cit. , Vol. .!i, p. 265.

17. Either/OR, op. cit. , Vol. g, p. 142.

18. Postscript, op. ci t. , p. 264.

19. Ibid, p. 288.

20. Ibid, p. 132.

~

2l. Ei ther/OR, op.cit., Vol. .!i, p. 150.

22. Ibid, p. 14l.

23. Postscript, op.cit. , Vol. g, p. 350.

24. Either/OR, op. cit. , Vol. g, p. 245

25. Ibid, p. 179.

26. Ibid, p. 217.

27. Ibid, p. 215, and p. 208.

28. Ibid, p. 141,

29. Ibid, p. 143, and pp. 182 ff.

30. Ibid, pp. 212-220.

31. Ibid, p. 213.

32. Ibid, pp. 220-222.

33. Ibid, p. 219 cJnd p. 270.

 109

34. Fear and Trembling, op.cit., pp. 66 ff.

35. Either/OR, op.cit., VoL .!.!.' pp. 283 ff.

36. The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., pp. 172 ff. and p. 204.

37. Ibid, p. 216.

38. Fear and Trembling, op.cit., p. 171.

39. The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit. , p. 192.

40. The Postscript, op.cit. , p. 182.

41- Ibid, p. 182.

42. Ibid, p. 182.

43. Ibid, p. 449 ff.

44. Ibid, p. 386.

45. Stages. on Life's L\)a~, op.cit., p. 403.

46. The Gospel of Suffering, translated by D.F. Swenson and L.M.

Swenson, Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolosis 1948, pp. 65-96.

47. Postscript, op.cil., pp. 496 ff.

48. Fear and Trembling, op.cit., p. 74.

49. Ibid, p. 78.

 110

50. Ibid, p. 69.

51. Ibid, P' 95.

52. Ibid, p. 100 ff.

53. Training in Christianity, translated by W. Lowrie, Oxford

University Press, London 1941; Princeton University Press,

Princeton, N.J. 1944, p. 28 ff.

54. Ibid, p. 83.

55. Ibid, p. 270.

56. Ibid, pp. 270-271.

57. Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology, transl~t8d

by W. Lowrie, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,

1941, pp. 3-4.

58. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. 232.

59. Purity of Heart, DE.cit., pp. 41 ff.

60. Philosophical fragments, translated by D.F. Swenson,

Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1936, p. 29

61. G.w.r. Hegel, Philosophic der Religion (Jubilaumausg.) pp. 129-30.

62. Phenomenology of Mind, by G.w.r. Hegel, translated by

J.B. Baillie, (Allen and Unwin, London, 1931) pp. 549-58.

 111

63. An unpublished paper, by Johannes Climacus, (1843) or

De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Volume ~, section S, Part I

(1843) - A polemic against Descartes and his rationalist successors.

64. The Diary of Soren Kierkegaard, translated from the Danish by

G.M. Andersen, edited by P.P. Rohde, published by the Polyglot

Press, New York, 1960, pp. 159-65, the third section with the

title: "Faith and Doubt".

65. Ibid, pp. 163-64.

66. Ibid, pp. 164-65 - In support of this we see that in the first

Epistle General of st. John, (chapter 5, verse 9), the fact

that the only proof of the truth of Christianity is the inner

proof, is heavily underlined by the words "If we receive the

witness of men (that is all the historical evidence and conside-

rations) the witness of God is greater", (that is the inner

testimony is greater) - and in verse 10, "He that believeth in

the Son of God hath the wi tness in himsel f".

67. Ibid, p. 165.

68. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by D.F. Swenson

and W. Lowrie - Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,

1941, pp. 115-116.

69. Ibid, p. 51

70. Ibid, p. 30.

 112

71. Ibid, p. 31.

72. The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard - a selection edited and

translated by A. Dru - Oxford University Press, London, 1959,

p. 367, ~ntry 1044.

73. Ibid, pp. 367-368, entry 1044.

74. Ibid, p. 314, entry 926.

75. The Concept of Dread,op.cit., p. 39:-

The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., pp. 17 ff where the formula

is used as a trichotomy of the self-consciousness and not of

the wholeness of man.

76. The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p. 17.

77. Ibid, PP. 43-44.

78. Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. il' p. 180 - The Conc8~ of Dread,

op.cit., pp. 127 ff - (The Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p. 65)

79. The Point of View, op.cit., p. 123 and pp. 125-126.

80. The Concept of Dread, op.cit., p. 127 - "The pure self-consciousness"

refers to the abstract philosopher's consciousness, presumed to

be the self-consciousness common to Jones and Smith - This

Kierkegaard says is a purely fictitious construct and it is the

author's personal conception which he applies to all as a general

principle.
 113

81. Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p. 44.

82. Ibid, pp. 18-19, and pp. 43-44.

83. Ibid, p. 19 (Either/OR, op.cit., Vol. !I, pp. 141 ff)

84. Journals, op.cit., Entry 763.

85. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 178.

86. Ibid, p. 180.

B7. Ibid, p. 67.

88. Training in Christianity, op. cit., p. 202.

89. Journals, op.cit., entry 10.

90. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 116.

91. Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p. 77.

92. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 117.

93. Journals, op.cit., entry 809.

94. The Postscript, op.cit., p. IB3.

95. Journals,~op.cit., entry 605.

96. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., pp. 55-56.

97. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 540.

 114

98. Ibid, pp. 194-195.

99. Ibid, p. 183; pp. 180-186; p. 187.

100. Journals, oe.cit., entry 206.

101. fear and Trembling, op.cit., p. 52, p. 56, p. 57.

102. Philosophical fragments, op.cit., p. 29ff.

103. Ibid, p. 34.

104. Journals, op.cit., entry 1192.

105. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., p. 29.

106. Ibid, Ope 34.

107. Ibid, p. 35.

108. The Postscriet, op.cit., p. 183.

109. Ibid, p. 201 ff and p. 188.

110. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. 83.

111. Ibid, p. 100, p. 106, p. 107, pp. 122, 140 and 141.

112. Journals, op.cit., entry 975.

113. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. ld3.

114. Ibid, p. 122, Philosophical Fragments, 02.cit., p. 80.

 115

115. Journals, op.cit., entries 282, and 1033.

116. Ibid, entry 1084.

117. The-E~~~~~£!£~, ~£.cit., pp. 191, 192, 197, 288 and 290.

118. Training in Christianity, op.cit., pp. 122, 142-143, 127

and 131.

119. Tha Postscript, op.cit., p. 72.

120. The Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., pp. 84-85.

121. Journals, op.cit., p. 240.

121a. Ibid, entry 1084.

122. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 440.

123. The Gospal of Suffering, translated by D.F. Swanson and

and L.M. Swanson, Augsburg Publishing House, ~inneapolis, 1948,

p. 97.

124. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 339.

125. Kierkegaard, tha Cripple, by T. Haecker; Harvill Press,

London, 1948, p. 22.

126. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., p. 36 ff.,

and Christian Discourses, translated by W. Lc~rie,

(Oxford University Press, London 1939), p. 299.

 116

127. The Postscriet, op.cit., p. 183.

128. Ibid, p. 188.

129. Philosophical Fragments - op.cit., p. 58.

130. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 188.

131. Ibid, p. 188.

132. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit.,p. 59.

133. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 197.

134. ~,p. 345.

135. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. 29.

136. Journals, op.cit., entry 417.

137. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., p. 46.

138. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. 85.

139. Journals, op.cit., entry 783.

140. Training in Christianity, £p.cit., p. 28.

141. Journals, ~.cit., entry 183.

142. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 504.

143. Philosophical Fragments, op.cit., p. 55.

144. Journals, op.cit., entry 610.

 117

145. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 338.

146. Something about Kierkegaard, op.cit., p. 11.

147. The Postscript, op •ci t. , p. 338.

148. Ibid, p. 278.

149. Ibid, p. 51-

150. Ibid, p. 512.

15l. Ibid, p. 513.

152. Ibid, p. 50l.

153. Ibid, p. 116.

154. Journals, op. ci t., entry 926.

155. The Postscript, op.cit., p. 31-

156. Ibid, p. 89.

 CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Just as the main concern of this thesis has to do with

the concept of faith in Kierkegaard's thought, (with special

emphasis on the third stage of life, i.e. the religious, which

is the telos of the aesthetic and ethical stages, and is also

closely interlinked with them) one finds that faith is the leading

existential determinant for Kierkagaard. Professor Lowrie quite

rightly says:

Do not tell me that what I have said about Soren Kierkegaard's

notion of faith is inadequate. I know that very well. How could it
be adequate, seeing that Soren Kierkegaard without essential exaggera-
tion, affirms that the immense literature he produced had only ona
theme, namely, faith; and that from beginning to end his whole
effort had been to define what faith is. l

Kierkagaard defines faith thus; "that the self in being

itself and in willing to be itself is grounded transparently in

Christ is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, so that the only

truth which should passionately concern a Christian is, Whether he

himself is truth as a living subject. Subjective truth is "an

objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation - process of the

3
most passionate inwardness."

Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite

passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty.

118
 119

If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but

precisely because I cannot do this, I must believe. If I wish to
preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding
fast the objective ~ncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep'4
over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.

The movement toward subjectivity, toward inwardness, is the

movement toward eternal happiness. Thus Christianity may be described

as the maximum expression of the principle that subjectivity, inwardness,

is the truth. The first condition for becoming a Christian is to be

- 5
absolutely turned inward. Each existing individual needs the

promise of eternal life, but this promise can come only from God,

the euthor of life; thus the important position held by faith; for

faith reassures the existing individual that his life is held by

God in Christ and that consequently he is heir to eternal happiness.

An infinite personal passionate interest is related to one's eternal

happiness.

Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, inwardness

is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and, in its
maximum, an infinite, personal, passionate interest in one's eternal
happiness. 6

Kierkegaard stresses that only two kinds of people can know

anything about Christianity - those who have an infinite passionate

interest in their eternal happiness and those with an infinite

passionate condemnation of Christianity. The speculative philosopher

misses the whole meaning of Christianity because he turns it into

something·objective Qnd dispassionate. We see that Kierkegaard makes

much of passion, and it is the source of his critique of rationalism.

Kierkegaard says that faith is the highest passion; passion is active,

but the action is inward, continuous, l'lnd has to be "repeeted",

 120

i.e. it is not once-for-all.

The thesis that "Subjectivity is Truth" underlines the fact

(for Kierkegaard) that truth has no other organ with which to express

itself than the individual. Truth lies not in a what but in a how and

the how of truth is precisely truth.? Truth can only be apprehended

through an inward passion by someone who lies struggling for his life

upon seventy thousand fathoms of water. Without risk there is no

faith; the more risk, the more faith. The more objective certainty

the less inwardness (for inwardness is subjectivity); the less

8
objective certainty, the more deeply is inwardness made possible.

Kierkegaard stresses that Christianity is a personal faith,

a unique relationship of the individual to God. It is the way that

leads to life and few are they who find it. Christianity is faith

in the absolute paradox of a God who came in human form and became

man's servant. There is no intellectual proof of Christianity; (and

here Kierkegaard stresses that he has nothing against pure thought

provided its limitations are realized; although he underlines the

inadequacy of reason) it has to be accepted in a subjective way, and

it is reached and maintained by subjective faith held with passion.

The historical fact on which the salvation of man is based contains

in itself an irreconcilable contradiction. The incarnation brings

us face to face with something which is impossible for the intellect

to accept and only by a leap of faith can one accept this "absurdity"

or contradiction. .The only way to reach God is by way of subjectivity.

God is the object of faith, as He is revealed in the God-man, i.e.

Christ, the Absolute Paradox, a stumbling-block to the human mind.

 121

Thus faith belongs to the practical side of human existence, which

is the will. The venture of faith in God as revealed in Christ is

faith in an absurdity which must be held with the passion of

subjective conviction.

Christianity is a religion of the individual, a religion of

inwardness, of subjectivity, of faith, of paradox and its truth is

subjectively known by individual Christians. It cannot be objectively

proved or understood and it is intended to be lived. Indeed Kiarkegaard

says that we have to choose between "existing subjectively with passion

or objectively in distration".9 Christ personifies the truth by being

the Way, the Truth and the Life, thus (Christianity, being an individual

matter) faith is an individual relationship and the truth of Christ-

ianity is primarily subjective (personal) truth. So we see that

Christianity is a relation of subject to subject,i.e. in the sensa of

an encounter of man with God. Truth is subjectivity, and subjectivity

in the existence-sphere of Christianity is a relationship of faith;

a man's grateful acceptance of God's love and passionate commitment to

love, trust and obey God. Kierkegaard stresses that speculation deals

with objectiv3 truth but this (although it has its US3S) is irrelevant

to faith. The subjective problem is the relation of the individual to

the objectively given truth and so we get here an objectivity to which

intense subjectivity is the only possible means of approach. For

faith to be faith (and one may add, in order to have faith in such a

faith) the object must be uncertain. In the religious life, reasons

will never amount to proof because this life is one of choice and

passionate commitment. Reason (along with contradiction, intelli-

gibility, etc.) belongs to the level of concepts, but, as far as the

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religious life is concerned, personal experience is necessary in order

to go beyond this level. (At this point one should underline the

difference between contradiction and paradox, because paradox

involves another sphere or level beyond the scope of reason, - the

latter being ~n the same level with contradiction.) In religion,

every assertion to be properly understood must be regarded as having

some reference to me, and in this sense, religion is a personal (or

as Kierkegaard would say, an "Individual") matter. Faith is a choice

and SO it cannot be transformed into a demonstration.

Faith is the choice of a way of life or a policy of action,

and (in the case of the Christian faith) it is a policy of action

based on the assertion of a paradox. Faith is subjectivity, and

subjectivity is the truth. If faith is the goal, prayer is the

means of moving toward that goal. Only in prayer can we express

that Cod has become everything for us, and, at the same time, infinitely
10
transcends us. Subjectivity is the truth and faith in Christ is

the deepest form of subjectivity which fosters the fullest objecti-

vity, for the act of faith beQins in a divine revalation. Faith is

a dat~m and does not diminish man's subjectivity. The authority

of revelation is paradoxical and it enforces the subjectivity of

religious experiance.

Some of the lessons one can draw from Kierkegaard's works

8re:- (i) to be a Christian must cost a person something; it

involves sacrifice, and the condition of discipleship is to take

up one's cross and follow Christ; (ii) Christianity is the ultimate

truth about human existence; 8 trut~ ~hich man could not have
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discovered for himself. The self-revelation of the infinite God cannot

be subjected to finite human standards (e.g. as sanctioned by human

reason;) (iii) knowledge and faith are polar opposites - the former

is objectively certain, the latter highly uncertain, but by taking

the "leap" and, exercising it, one comes into contact with actuality -

that of one's own being; (iv) only by an act of faith and trust can

one know Jesus as Christ, the God- rmn.

How can one attempt to summarize or draw any conclusions

which would do no violence to what Kierkegaard regarded as his task

in life? Can any summary really exhaust the whole of what Kierkegaard

saw to be his task? Kierkegaard not only tried to show men tha

occasion for the movement of faith, but also the way whereby a man

would be able to understand both himself and his existence.

We sea that Kierkegaard forces us to moments of self-examination,

rather than abstract conclusions, results, or summaries, and the clarion

call is to "be an Individual and a Christian".

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'f'
REFERENCES TO CHAPTER IV

1. Kierkegeard, by W. Lowrie; Oxford University Press, London,

1938, p. 319.

2. Sickness Unto Death, op.cit., p. 132.

3. Postscript, op.cit., p. 182.

4. Idem.

5. Training in Christianity, op.cit., p. 220.

6. Postscript, op. ci t. , p. 33.

7. I fJid , p. 18!.

8. Ibid, p. 188.

9. Ibid, p. 249.

10. Ibid, p. 369.