ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:

EXISTENTIALISM

Volume 6

PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE
PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE
An Introduction to the Basic Thought
of Kierkegaard, Heidegger,
Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre

JEAN WAHL

I~~~o~:~!n~~~up
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First published as Les philosophies de l’existence
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 Philosophies
of
Existence
An Introduction to the Basic Thought of
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre

by
JEAN WAHL
translated from the French by
F. M. LORY

LONDON
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL
First published as Les Philosophies de L'Existence
©Jean Wahl I959
by Librairie Armand Colin, Paris

English Edition first published z969

by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited
Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane
London E.C,4
Typography by Keith Kneebone
Printed in Great Britain
by C. Tinling & Co. Ltd., Liverpool
© F. M. Lory z969
No part of this book may be reproduced
in any form without permissionfrom
the publisher, except for the quotation
of brief passages in criticism
SBN 7zoo 6229 X
 Contents

FOREWORD vii

Part One
CHAPTER I Generalities 3
CHAPTER II The Traditions leading to the Philosophies of
Existence 7
CHAPTER III The Traditions to which the Philosophies of
Existence are opposed 12
CHAPTER IV General Evolution of the Philosophies of Exist-
ence . . I9

Part Two
The Categories of the Philosophies of Existence

CHAPTER I The First Triad: Existence - Being - Transcen-

dence . . 29
CHAPTER II The Second Triad: Possibility and Project -
Origin-Now, Situation, Instant 50
CHAPTER III The Third Triad: Choice and Freedom -
Nothingness and Dread - Authenticity 57
CHAPTER IV The Unique - The Other - Communication 76
CHAPTER v Truth-Subjectivity-Truth-Being-Multiplicity
of Truths 83
CHAPTER VI Paradox - Tension - Ambiguity 87
CHAPTER VII Comprehensive View 89
V
 Contents
CHAPTER VIII The Ultimate Problems of the Philosophies
of Existence. Respective Value of Their Various Features 94
APPENDIX A Note on Dread . . II l

BIBLIOGRAPHY I 19

INDEX 121

vi
 Foreword

THEphilosophies of existence are no doubt of very ancient origin.

They go back to Socrates, refusing to separate his thought from
his life, Plato, refusing to separate Socrates' death from his thought,
the prophets, answering the call of God, Job, calling out to God-
not to mention all the philosophers whose thought and existence
have been intimately united: Nietzsche, for example, or William
James, Lequier, Maine de Biran, or Amiel-even Hegel or
Renouvier. But the fact remains that it was only in the XIXth
century that certain philosophies began calling themselves 'philo-
sophies of existence', wishing thereby to distinguish themselves
from other philosophies, if not in their origin, at least in their
structure and approach.
It is with that structure, it is with the categories of the philo-
sophy of existence that we are concerned in this book. We have
attempted to show their basic articulations, their essential mo-
ments.
It is hoped that a study of these categories-in spite of the
dryness at times of their nomenclature-will lead the reader to
reflect on his own existence. It is hoped, too, that he will see in
these philosophies neither something totally new nor the restate-
ment of old ideas, but primarily a call to his own subjectivity and
perhaps the transition towards a new mode of thought that will
combine sharpened subjectivity with a deep sense of communion
with others and with the world.

vii
Part One
 I
Generalities

IN approaching the philosophies of existence1 we are faced with a

certain number of difficulties. The first arises from the extreme
diversity of the various philosophical positions designated by that
name.
The philosophy of existence springs from the essentially
religious meditations of Kierkegaard. And today when this
1 We prefer the name, philosophy of existence, to the name, existentialism, for

the reason that several of the most important philosophers that we shall discuss
-Heidegger and Jaspers in particular-refuse to be called existentialists.
Heidegger in several lectures has spoken out against a doctrine he calls
existentialism, and Jaspers has said that existentialism is the death of the philo-
sophy of existence. They have done so because in existentialism they see a
doctrine and they are wary of rounded doctrines.
On the other hand, there are philosophers-Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Simone
de Beauvoir-who accept the title of existentialist. Gabriel Marcel also happens
to accept occasionally the name of Christian existentialist, and Messrs. Lavelle
and Le Senne do not reject the word 'existentialism'.
But if we wish to refer to this philosophy as a whole, the term 'philosophy of
existence' is more appropriate. Yet even that term is not wholly satisfactory, for
Heidegger would no more be called a philosopher of existence than he would an
existentialist. For him the philosophy of existence is mainly the philosophy of
Jaspers. As for himself, he believes that the basic problem in philosophy-the
one and only problem-is that of Being. And if in Sein und Zeit he has taken up
the question of existence, it is because he believes that the approach to Being is
by way of an inquiry into our own existence. Being, then, is the essential object
of all philosophical investigation for Heidegger, and he has sought to be not a
philosopher of existence, but a philosopher of Being. Thus we ought to speak of
Heidegger neither as an existentialist nor as a philosopher of existence.
For other reasons Kierkegaard, who is the father of all these philosophies,
would decline the name of philosopher of existence: he would object not to the
word 'existence' but to the word 'philosopher'. He is not a philosopher, he would
say; he is a religious man and has no philosophy to call 'philosophy of existence'
or to oppose to other philosophies.
3
 Philosophiesof Existence
philosophy is mentioned people usually think of Sartre-a non-
religious and even at times an anti-religious philosopher.
One of Sartre's essays is called Existentialismis a Humanism.
Heidegger, on the other hand, has written a letter, Letter to
Beauffret,in which he attacks the idea of humanism. And Kierke-
gaard was certainly not a humanist.
Here then, we have two examples of conflict on matters of
fundamental importance between the doctrines of some of the
so-called philosophers of existence.
The same could be said of the ideas of inwardness and secrecy.
If the philosophy of Hegel is not satisfactory to Kierkegaard it is
largely because Hegel ignores the element of absolute inwardness,
the fact that we cannot externalize ourselves completely. And we
shall have the occasion to say that the whole philosophy of existence
stems from the reflections of Kierkegaard on the events of his
private life, on his engagement, for example, or on the impossi-
bility of communicating with his fiancee. But when we come to
read Sartre, we are told the contrary: a man is the sum total of his
acts; there is no secret inner life. On this point it is the influence
of Hegel, Kierkegaard's chosen enemy, that is dominant in Sartre's
thought.
Bei:ngand Nothingnessends with a condemnation of what Sartre
calls the spirit of seriousness. Kierkegaard, on the other hand,
tells us that the category of seriousness is one of the most basic
existential categories.
Thus, there are not only diversities but very grave conflicts
between the so-called philosophers of existence. Can we, in the
light of all these divergencies, still maintain that there really is a
body of doctrines which could be called the philosophy ofexistence?
Let us rather speak of an atmosphere, a climate that pervades all of
them. The proof that there is such a thing as the philosophy of
existence is that· we can legitimately apply the term to certain
philosophies and not to others. Therefore, there must be some-
thing that is common to these philosophies. That something we
shall try to pursue without perhaps ever attaining it.
A second difficulty arises if we stop to consider the fact that we
are trying to find the essence of the philosophy of existence which
is a philosophy that rejects the idea of essence. But, as we shall see,
the philosophers of existence, and in particular Heidegger, if, as
we believe, he is to be classed among them, do not reject the idea
of essence. We shall see how Heidegger holds that it is the essence
4
 Generalities
of man that he seeks to define and how he concludes that the essence
of man is his existence. And the word 'essence' comes up so to speak
on every page of Heidegger's last book. This last difficulty is
therefore only an apparent one.
We are faced with a more serious difficulty in that the specific
character of these philosophies is liable to fade away when we treat
them objectively. Is not existence for a Kierkegaard or for a Jaspers
the business of the solitary individual, the affair of subjectivity?
Are we not likely to transform existence by the very act of talking
about it-to transform it from authentic existence into unauthentic
existence ? Are we not likely to level it out, to demote it to the
impersonal domain of one, of Everyman, which is precisely what
must be avoided ? Ought we not, then, to leave existence to our
solitary meditations, to our dialogue with ourselves ?
But it is only by attempting to study the philosophy of existence
that we shall be in a position to decide whether this danger can be
avoided.
Is it possible to define the philosophies of existence ? We shall
see that all definitions are more or less inadequate.
For example, in an article published in an American philo-
sophical journal, Father Culbertson defines the philosophy of
existence as a reaction against absolute idealism and positivism
and as a constant effort to see man in his totality. It will easily be
seen that this definition is not satisfactory: it can be applied just
as well to pragmatism and the so-called life philosophies as to the
philosophies of existence.
Existentialism has been defined in Rome by a high religious
authority as a philosophy of disaster, a pessimistic irrationalism
and a religious voluntarism. But this definition includes a con-
demnation and a dismissal and cannot therefore be taken as an
approach to the philosophies of existence.
In his essay, Exz"stentialismz"sa Humanz"sm,Sartre says that
existentialism is a doctrine that 'renders human life possible; a
doctrine, also, which affirms that all truth and all action imply
both an environment and a human subjectivity'. Is it possible that
Sartre himself considers this definition satisfactory ? One is struck
by the 'also', which is a good indication that the definition is made
up of disjunct elements. As to the contention that this philosophy
'renders human life possible', we could remark that all philosophies,
except those of Schopenhauer and E. Von Hartman, would claim
to 'render human life possible'. And as to the statement that all
5
 Philosophiesof Existence
truth and all action imply an environment and a human subjec-
tivity, many an idealist philosopher would maintain it as staunchly
as Sartre himself. Besides, many people would say that the philo-
sophy of existence renders human life impossible.
That the philosophies of existence start out from subjectivity is
true; this is the element of truth in Sartre's definition. But the
crucial thing is the meaning that is attached to subjectivity. For in
a certain sense all great philosophies-Descartes', for example, or
Socrates'-may be said to start out from subjectivity.
In his excellent book on contemporary philosophies, Father
Bochenski writes that, rather than propose a definition, we must
try to enumerate a certain number of concepts that we consider
to be the basic concepts of the philosophy of existence and set them
against the background of experiences-such as anguish, nausea,
etc.-which give them their initial impetus.
This is true. It can be said, to go back to one feature of Sartre's
definition, that the philosophy of existence begins with subjec-
tivity as it is experienced in certain states such as anguish. 1 These
philosophies are characterized by a common climate, by a pre-
occupation with certain particular experiences.
Father Bochenski also remarks-and the remark is again true-
that the philosophies of existence repudiate the separation between
subject. and object. But although the attempt to overcome the
subject-object alternative is one of the important facets of these
philosophies, it is not their primary aim.
1 Anguish, however, is not a central experience in the case of Gabriel Marcel.

6
 II
The Traditions leading to
the Philosophiesof Existence

LET us, while keeping in mind Father Bochenski's remarks, take

as our point of departure an observation by Emile Brehier: the
philosophies of existence combine metaphysical empiricism with
man's feeling of anxiety. This is not a definition but a characteriza-
tion, and characterization is all we can hope for.
The word empiricism here refers to the element of facticity, to
use one of Heidegger's terms, to that element of fact which is
irreducible to any metaphysical construction or interpretation, and
which is emphasized by the philosophers of existence. This em-
piricism is quite different from ordinary empiricism: it is coupled
with an affirmation of a sort of metaphysical contingency and is
itself in a sense metaphysical.
To retrace the tradition of this empiricism, one could go back to
Schelling who sought to develop, as against what he calls nega-
tive philosophies which are according to him all rational philo-
sophies, a positive philosophy. Now, it is known that Kierkegaard
had attended Schelling's lectures in Berlin and was enthused for a
time by Schelling's treatment of the notion of existence in his lectures.
From Schelling we can go back to Kant. In his critique of the
ontological argument, Kant insisted on the fact that existence can
never be deduced from essence.
And we can go still further back, as far back as Aristotle's
criticism of Platonic Ideas. When Aristotle says that the individual
is the real, he could be looked upon as the progenitor of one of
the traditions which culminate in the philosophy of existence,
especially if it is remembered that the same philosopher who
says that substance is the concrete individual also affirms that
7
 Philosophiesof Existence
the individual cannot be subsumed under genera and species.
It should also be noted that Schelling makes frequent references
to Aristotle.
But this is only one of the traditions of the philosophy of exist-
ence. It was seen that, according to E. Brehier, the philosophy of
existence is a metaphysical empiricism allied to man's feeling of
anxiety. This means that there is another tradition we must retrace
-a tradition of religious anxiety. It can be traced back to certain
XIIth-century irrationalists who have had little influence on subse-
quent thought; it can be traced back to Saint Bernard. We could
go further back to Saint Augustine, and even to certain sentiments
expressed in the Old Testament. We could recall the importance
Cheslov accorded to the Book of Job; he called him the private
thinker who meditates on his own life.,as against the professor of
philosophy who deals with the impersonal. We could point to some
of the aspects of this tradition of religious anxiety in a Pascal in the
XVIIth century, in a Hamann at the end of the XVIIth century.
These two traditions., the one insisting on facticity., the
other on affectivity., had already come together several times
in the history of philosophy-in Pascal, in Hamann and Jacobi
at the end of the XVIII th century, a little later in Schelling. Already
in these cases we can see· how the junction of the category of
facticity and that of affectivity or emotivity engenders the idea of
existence.
A few other considerations must be added to what has already
been said in order to understand the origin and the development
of the philosophy of existence.
We have spoken of Kierkegaard as the father of the philosophy
of existence, but we must not forget Nietzsche. It is certain that
on Heidegger.,on Jaspers, and even on Sartre., Nietzsche has had a
very great influence.
Some of the philosophers of existence would have us also
mention the influence of Hegel. But., in point of fact, we shall see
Hegel primarily as the enemy against whom the philosophy of
existence rose up in protest, particularly at the moment of its birth.
It is nevertheless true that in the Phenomenologyof Spirit there is
an attempt to follow out the concrete development of the human
mind which in some ways anticipates the philosophy of existence
and may be said to be its precurser .1
1 What Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have in mind when they speak of Hegel's
influ~nce is the fact that Hegel, especially in the Phenomenology of Spirit,
8
 Traditionsleadingto Philosophies
Before the philosophies of existence there had developed in
Germany life philosophies, on the one hand, and phenomenology
on the other. It would be interesting to compare and contrast the
philosophies of existence. and the philosophies of life. Between
these two forms of thought there are some affinities and some
violent oppositions. Life philosophies, anxious above all to bridge
the gaps that previous philosophical doctrines had created within
reality and within the human individual, insisted upon the two
ideas of unity and continuity. Life philosophies were too facile or
at least appeared to be so. The philosophies of existence, on the
other hand, have tended perhaps to separate too rigorously and to
isolate the various elements between which life philosophies had
posited an all too easy continuity.
We ought also to mention here the doctrine of personalism as
developed by some followers of Scheler, and in particular by
P. Landsberg and E. Mounier. Scheler, proceeding from the
phenomenology of Husserl, insisted on the person as the centre
of human acts. Under his influence Landsberg and Mounier make
a radical distinction between the person,who is in· communication
with other persons, and the individual, who is not; the word
'individual' they think ought to be reserved to convey man's isola-
tion and atomic character in contrast to his open personality.
It was in the school of Husserl that Heidegger's thought
developed. It would take too long to go into the entire legacy that
was handed down from Husserl to Heidegger. We should mention
the idea of intentionality, which according to Heidegger, only
becomes comprehensible in the light of the idea of transcendence
as propounded by Heidegger.
There are no doubt profound differences between the philo-
sophies of existence and phenomenology. Nevertheless, the idea
of'being in the world' which is essential to Heidegger's philosophy,
comes from Husserl. It is true that Husserl proposed to 'bracket'

attempts to go into the different doctrines not in the abstract, but as they were
lived, as they were embodied in the various stages of history.
The dialectic of the master and the slave, the unhappy consciousness, and a
good many other passages of the Phenomenologyof Spirit are at the origin of
Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's existentialism. Hegel's youthful tendencies are
also being rehabilitated. But we must take care not to accord too much import-
ance, at least historical, to the young Hegel, unknown for such a long time.
On the other hand, even the pre-Kierkegaardian features which have been
integrated into subsequent Hegelian philosophy have been integrated in such a
way that they lose their character of subjective protestation.
B
9
 Philosophiesof Existence
the world; but on the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty points out in
the preface to his thesis, The Phenomenologyof Perception,it was he
that awakened us to the fact that such 'bracketing' is finally
impossible, that all our ideas are embedded in what could be
called a pre-predicative soil that is our being in the world. More-
over, by the application of the idea of intentionality not only to
thought but also to emotions, Husserl and Scheler paved the way
for the philosophies of existence.
Scheler was one of Husserl's disciples and his thought may in
fact be regarded as a kind of transition between phenomenology
and the philosophy of existence.
If we consider the titles of the major works of Heidegger and
Sartre: Sein und Zeit and L' Etre et le Neant, we see that the idea of
being occupies a key position in both of them. Jaspers, too, accords
a central position to the idea of being. To what we have been
discussing, therefore, we must add an ontological factor, which
has been essential to the development of the philosophies of
existence.
But the origins of the philosophies of existence are not exclu-
sively philosophical. There has also been the personal example of
some past philosophers. Kierkegaard, for example, is not simply
interested in Socrates' thought; he is also interested in Socrates
the man. Jaspers, again, has felt the influence of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche not only as philosophers but also as individuals.
What is more, the question may be asked whether the philo-
sophies of existence are not a part of a vaster movement of our time:
nowadays we feel just as much attached to the man as to his works,
if not more so. At the end of the XIX th century the appreciation of a
work of art came, more than ever before, to involve a kind of
sympathy for the efforts of its creator. The admiration that we feel
before the work of a Van Gogh or a Cezanne cannot be separated
from the feeling that what we are contemplating is the effort of the
man, that we are in the presence of the human individual at the
same time as that of the artist. Subjectivity has acquired an
increasing importance.
As Helmut Kuhn points out, the existentialist movement can
be viewed as belonging to a more general intellectual movement
not limited to philosophy. The existentialist notion of crisis is,
says Kuhn, perhaps better expressed in Kakfa's novels and short
stories or in Sartre's plays than in actual philosophical treatises.
Nausea, to quote Kuhn again, is better described by T. S. Eliot
IO
 Traditionsleadingto Philosophies
or W. H. Auden than by Kierkegaard or Heidegger. Without
committing ourselves wholly to the opinion of the author of
Encounter with Nothingness, we can at least agree with the view
that existentialist thought extends beyond the confines of philo-
sophy.
There are a large number of philosophers, in addition to those
we have mentioned, who could be classed as philosophers of
existence. There is Buber, there is Berdyaev,1 there is Cheslov,
there is Unamuno. But important as they are, we shall confine
ourselves to Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre and Gabriel
Marcel.
In the case of each of these philosophers there are particular
influences that we have not always mentioned in our discussion
of general influences. For example, Jaspers and Heidegger have
been greatly influenced by Kantian thought. Jaspers has also been
influenced by pantheistic and mystic thinkers-pantheists such as
Bruno, mystics such as Plotinus-as well as by Spinoza and Schel-
ling.
1 I heard it said to Berdyaev that he himself was the real existentialist and
heard him castigate all the others, except Gabriel Marcel. Special chapters
would be needed for Berdyaev, for Cheslov and the rest.

II
 III
The Traditions to which the
Philosophiesof Existenceare opposed

LET us now see to what the philosophers of existence are opposed.

They are opposed, in the first place, to the classical conceptions
of philosophy, as formulated by a Plato or a Spinoza or a Hegel;
they are in fact opposed to the whole tradition of classical philo-
sophy since Plato.
Platonic philosophy, as it is usually understood, is an inquiry
into Ideas which are held to be immutable. Spinoza aspires to an
eternal life of beatitude. The philosopher, in general, seeks some
universal truth valid for all times; he aims to rise above all change;
and he proceeds, or thinks at least that he does, solely with his
powers of reasoning. One would have to pass in review the whole
history of philosophy in order to explain what the philosophers of
existence are pitting themselves against.
Philosophy was once supposed to be the study of essences.
Plato's theory of Ideas, according to the philosophers of existence,
was formed in the following manner: a sculptor carving a statue,
or a carpenter making a table, had first to consult the Ideas in his
mind; everything made by man was fashioned after an essence.
This notion of the activity of the artist and the artisan served as
the model for an understanding of all activity. The essential
property of all essences or Ideas was changelessness. This theory
was, according to Heidegger, consolidated by the idea of creation
as conceived in the Middle Ages: all things had been created as by
a great artist in reference to Ideas.
The philosophers of existence reject the idea of essence thus
understood. As Heidegger would say: perhaps objects and tools
have essences; the table and the statue we were just now talking
12
 Traditions to which Philosophiesare opposed
about have such essences. But the maker of the table or the
statue, namely man, has no such essence. I can ask, What is a
statue ? because a statue has an essence. But I cannot, as regards
man, ask what it is; I can only ask, Who is it ? Man, in this sense,
has no essence; he has only an existence.
Here we may mention a disagreement between Heidegger and
Sartre. Sartre has said: essence follows existence. Heidegger
rejects this proposition, because he believes that Sartre is using
the words 'existence' and 'essence' in the classical sense; he has
reversed the usual word order but remains, despite this reversal,
within the fold of classical thought. He has failed to grasp what
Heidegger regards as an essential element.of his own theory. This
element involves the definition of existence which, Heidegger says,
must be understood to mean 'being in the world': ex-sistere,'to be
outside oneself'. If it is agreed that existence is this, and not the
simple empirical reality, then we shall arrive at a proposition quite
different from Sartre's 'essence follows existence'-a proposition
made ·by Heidegger himself, and which is : the essence of man is
existence-the essence of man consists in 'being outside himself'. 1
The assault on essences, on Ideas, on Plato is followed by an
assault on Descartes. Descartes' statement, 'I think, therefore I
am', does not, according to Kierkegaard, correspond to the reality
of man's existence, for the less I think, the more I am, and vice
versa.
Kierkegaard himself, it must be remembered, resorts to what
he calls existential thought, that is thought which is at once in
strife and in harmony with existence. But this is very different from
thought as Descartes conceived it, i.e. as universal and as objective
as possible.
We have mentioned the opposition to Plato and to Descartes.
Both regard philosophy as a search for the changeless and the
universal.
There is a moment in the course of the history of philosophy
when philosophy seems to abandon the search for one of the
elements which had till then constituted its essence. This is the
moment when Hegel replaces the idea of permanence by that of
universal movement. But Hegel retains the ideas of objectivity,
necessity, universality, and totality of the classical philosophers;
the only fundamental idea he dismisses is that of permanence.
1 Heidegger, as we shall see, does not reject essence-a dynamic essence in the

strongest sense of the word.

13
 Philosophiesof Existence
And it so happens that by his genius he is able to maintain side by
side the idea of movement and the ideas of objectivity, necessity,
universality, and to reinforce the idea of totality. The idea of
movement as essence, ushered in by Nicolas of Cusa and Giordano
Bruno, was by Leibniz pressed even into a rational philosophy.
It was for Hegel to unite still more rigorously the ideas of move-
ment and reason. It is by opposition to Hegel above all that Kierke-
gaard forms his philosophy of existence. He considers him the end
of the tradition which begins with Plato and perhaps Pythagoras.
What does he reproach Hegel with ? First of all, he reproaches
him with having built a system, for there are, he maintains, no
possible systems of existence. Kierkegaard refuses to be taken for
a moment in the development of reality. According to Hegel,
there is but one veritable and complete reality, and that is totality,
rational totality, for all that is real is rational and all that is rational
is real. This totality is the Idea. Nothing exists except by virtue of
its relation to a totality and finally with the totality. Let us take
for example the most fugitive of our sentiments. It exists only by
virtue of being a part of a totality-the totality of my life. But my
life itself only exists, Hegel would maintain, in so far as it is related
to the culture I belong to, to the country I am a citizen of, to my
function and my profession. I am deeply bound to the State of
which I am a member, but this State in turn is only a part of a vast
historical process-the unique Idea which unfolds itself in the
course of this process. And we arrive at the notion of a concrete
universal which comprehends all things. From the most fugitive
sentiment we can advance to the universal idea, of which all other
concrete universals-the works of art, for example, or people, or
States-are only parts. And this universal idea exists at the time
of the beginning of things and at the time of their end, since, being
the unique reality, it is the eternal reality.
From a Hegelian's point of view, Kierkegaard himself would
have a place in the very development of this reality. For example,
the Hegelian would say of Kierkegaard that he is the moment of
irony, that he embodies the reaction of romanticism to Hegelianism
-a reaction bound to give way, through the play of destiny,
through the irony of destiny, to a new triumph of Hegelianism.
To Kierkegaard the Hegelian would say: 'You are the moment of
irony, the moment of romantic reaction, the moment of subjectivity
-a moment which will presently be obsolete, which has in fact
been eternally obsolete.' But this is exactly what Kierkegaard
14
 Traditions to which Philosophiesare opposed
refuses to accept. He is himself; he is not a moment; he is a stranger
to universal development. To Hegel's quest for objectivity, to the
yearning for totality, Kierkegaard opposes the idea of subjective
truth. To the objective thinker, he opposes what he calls the
subjective thinker-the unique one as he calls him. By dint of
knowledge, he declares, we have forgotten what it means to exist.
His archenemy will henceforth be the man who seeks an objective
understanding of things, the man who expounds a system, the
professor. For there are things which cannot be grasped by a system
of knowledge.
Very early in his life, in 1834, Kierkegaard writes: 'I must live
for an idea,' and a year later he emphasizes the subjective element
essential to truth. What to a Christian is the height of objectivity,
that is to say, the statement of dogma, begins with the first person
singular, with the credo, 'A man must always live in the secrecy
of his innermost chamber, his holy of holies.' 'One must seek a
truth which is not universal but personal,' an idea for which one
chooses to live and die. So long as one remains in this innermost
chamber, one is in the sphere of certainty. 'Everything,' he writes
during the same year, 'must finally be founded on a postulate, but
as soon as you commit your life to it, it ceases to be a postulate.'
And a year later he writes: 'Death and hell-I can make abstraction
of everything, but not of myself; I cannot forget myself, not even
in my sleep.'
To Hegelian thought Kierkegaard opposes passion. The danger
of Hegelian thought, he maintains, is to make us lose all passion.
The man who is lost in his passion has lost less than the man who
has lost his passion; the romantic, lost in his passion, has lost less
than the Hegelian who has lost his passion. According to the
Hegelians, at least as Kierkegaard interprets them, one must never
become fully absorbed by an idea; beyond a certain point, one must
control his passion. But, says Kierkegaard, controlled passion· is
not passion at all.
Hegelianism makes the blunder of attempting to explain all
things. Things must not be explained but experienced. Hence,
instead of seeking a truth which is objective, universal, necessary,
and total, Kierkegaard affirms that truth is subjective, particular,
and partial. There can be no question of a system of existence;
the two words, 'existence' and 'system', are contradictory. If we
opt for existence, we must abandon the idea of a system such as
Hegel's. All that thought can ever attain to is past existence. or
15
 Philosophiesof Existence
possible existence; but past existence and possible existence are
radically different from real existence.
If we know so preciously little about Socrates it is precisely
because Socrates was a genuine individual, an 'existent'. Our lack
of knowledge about him is proof that there was something in the
person of Socrates which must necessarily elude historical science,
a sort of gap in the history of philosophy bearing testimony to the
fact that wherever there is existence there can be no real knowledge.
Socrates defines description; he is without relation and without
predicate. And yet there is more truth in Socratic ignorance than
in the whole Hegelian system. To exist objectively, or rather to be
in the category of the objective-that is no longer existence but a
divorce from existence. Objective truth as Hegel conceives of it
is the death of existence.
The opposition of Kierkegaard to Hegel extends to all matters.
For instance, for Hegel the inner and the outer worlds are identical;
secrets have no place in the Hegelian world-view. But Kierkegaard
knows that there are within him things which cannot be brought
into the open, which cannot be expressed.
Moreover, the feeling of guilt will, according to Kierkegaard,
make us leave behind all philosophical categories in order to enter
the realm of religious life. The Hegelian philosopher will, no doubt,
reply that he also arrives at religion, and even at what he calls the
absolute religion, which is identical with philosophy at its apex.
But here again Hegel and Kierkegaard are in opposition to each
other. For Hegel sees in Christ the symbol of humanity in general,
of reason itself: Christianity is the absolute religion, because it
affords the most valid expression of the identification of an indivi-
dual with humanity as a whole. Kierkegaard, on the other hand,
sees in Christ not the symbol of anything at all, but a particular
individual, and it is this particular individual that is infinite and
absolute. Hegel's system is a system of universal mediation, but
there is something which cannot be mediated. This is the absolute,
the Christian absolute, the Christian God for Kierkegaard, and on
the other hand, the individual in so far as he too is an absolute.
At truly religious moments, we perceive a relationship between
these two absolutes, God and the individual, but this relationship
is wholly different from those which Hegelianism might conceive
by mediation.
Thus there is a great difference between the mediator in the
Christian sense and Hegelian mediation.
I6
 Traditionsto which Philosophiesare opposed
Let us now return to the idea of a system. We said that the idea
of a system is unsatisfactory to the impassioned and unyielding
Kierkegaardian thought. Kierkegaard can even take the offensive
and show that systems are in reality impossible. Not only are there
no systems of existence, but the very creation of a system is impos-
sible. For how would it be begun ? And this, in fact, is one of the
problems that Hegel himself had faced: how do you begin a
system? Furthermore, Hegel's system is not, properly speaking,
ever finished, for it would only be finished if Hegel were to give
us an ethics, which he does not. And not only is it impossible to
begin and to finish a system, but between the inconceivable
beginning and the inconceivable ending there can be nothing, for
the middle is to be supplied by the idea of mediation which cannot
give us access to reality.
But what is there behind Hegel's system ? An individual striving
to construct a system. Behind the system, there is Hegel, Hegel
the man, an individual who, by his very existence, by his very
yearning for a system, gives the lie to his whole system.
Kierkegaard looks upon his assault on Hegel as an assault on all
philosophy. Hegel is the symbol of all philosophy, especially as
Hegelian philosophy was the dominant philosophy of the time,
dominant even within the Lutheran Church to which Kierke-
gaard belonged.
This critical and negative aspect of Kierkegaard's doctrine can
also be seen in a variety of forms in the works of the other philo-
sophers of existence, and notably in the work of Jaspers.
The first volume of the book in which Jaspers sets forth his
philosophy is called Weltorientierung,'orientation in the world',
and it constitutes an examination and a critique of science.
It is not especially, then, a critique of Hegelianism. Never-
theless, there is in this volume a critique of Hegelianism.
For according to Jaspers, there are two important philosophical
theories which have attempted to take the sciences as foundation
for a world view, positivism on the one hand, and idealism on the
other. Both of these philosophies result in a negation of indivi-
duality, in other words, of existence. They disregard existence
because they wish·to reduce everything to what we are capable of
comprehending. There is, in the world view these philosophers
offer us, no longer a place for decisions, just as for Kierkegaard
there was no place for decisions within the Hegelian system.
But let us look more closely into Jaspers' critique of science.
17
 Philosophiesof Existence
Science, he argues, cannot give us a comprehensive and true view
of the world, for there is not one unique science but many sciences,
each with its own particular postulates. Every science is founded
on postulates and these postulates always vary from one science
to another. In this connection, we may compare Jaspers' critique
of the sciences to Plato's critique of particular sciences in the sixth
and seventh books of the Republic.Plato, like Jaspers criticizes each
particular science, on the one hand, for being founded on hypotheses
which it does not demonstrate, and on the other hand, for being by
these very hypotheses cut off from the other sciences. Each class of
objects dealt with by the different sciences has in fact specific char-
acteristics of its own. The sciences dealing with life, Jaspers argues,
can in no way be reduced to the sciences dealing with matter, nor
the sciences dealing with mind to the sciences dealing with life.
Moreover, in order to grasp the essence of science, it is necessary to
turn our attention to the creator of science, to the concrete, existing
individual, and to ask ourselves, as Husserl did for example, what
need in him the creation of science is meant to satisfy.
A somewhat similar line of thought is expressed by Gabriel
Marcel when he says that there can be no comprehensive world
system. Gabriel Marcel began his philosophical meditations with
a study of the neo-Hegelian philosophers, Bradley and Bosanquet.
Hegelian philosophy was dominated by the idea of absolute know-
ledge. But, according to Marcel, there can be no absolute knowledge
of the real, nor of ourselves, for that matter. What do we know of
ourselves ? We are beyond truth and falsehood, we cannot be
qualified, writes Marcel in the Journal Metaphysique.We consti-
tute the domain of the non-qualifiable. All qualification about
us-wise, good, bad, etc.-is insufficient qualification. We possess
no truth about ourselves. Nor do we possess, as it was seen
a moment ago, any all-embracing truth about the world.
Heidegger also criticizes the sciences, though more briefly, for
being founded on presuppositions, for leaving existence out of
consideration, for being based on the subject-object opposition,
and for operating with a system of pure representation.
Such then, briefly put, is the negative aspect of these philo-
sophies. We must now turn to their general evolution. 1
1 The following are what might be called the major dates in the history of the

philosophies of existence: r855, Kierkegaard's death; r916, publication of

Jaspers' Philosophie der Weltanschauungen; 1927, publication of Gabriel
Marcel's Journal Metaphysique and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit; r932, publica-
tion of Jaspers' Philosophie; 1943, publication of Sartre's L'Etre et le Neant.
I8
 IV
GeneralEvolution of
the Philosophiesof Existence

THE philosophies of existence spring, as we have said, from the

essentially religious meditations of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard is
the man who, through the act of sinning, sees himself standing
before God. To be conscious of sin, as we shall see, is to see one-
self standing before God, and for Kierkegaard, as for Luther
before him, the idea of 'standing before God' is one of the funda-
mental categories.
The individual forms the realms of existence; God, that of
transcendence. These two concepts-existence and transcendence
-are among the key concepts of the philosophers of existence.
What these philosophers are concerned with is existence in its
relation to transcendence.
We are, here at the core of Kierkegaard's thought, faced with
difficulties before which he refuses to retreat, for he believes that
the highest purpose of thought is to take stock of its own difficulties
without turning away from them. All our thoughts about the
wholly Other must of necessity be tortuous and contradictory.
The transcendent, the wholly Other-God-is that which is in a
sense related to nothing whatsoever-it is the Absolute in the true
and etymological sense of the word. And yet not only have I a
relationship with this Absolute, but my very being as an existent
individual depends upon this fervent relationship. In many
passages Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that the Absolute also
owes his being to this relationship with the existent individual: if
I separate my thought of God from my intense yearning towards
Him, the thought will shrink into nothing. Hence the basic para-
dox: I form a relation, an intense, fervent relation, with a thing
I9
 Philosophiesof Existence
that is absolutely without relation, and this paradox defines exist-
ence, in so far as it can be defined.
This doctrine is related to what Kierkegaard calls the doctrine
of how. The crucial thing is not what I believe in-not the object
of my belief-but the way in which I believe in that object. If I
believe in an absolute way, then it is the Absolute that I believe in.
God is to be found in the way in which I seek after Him. And so
Kierkegaard is wont to say: though I may very well think I believe
in God, it is not God that I believe in if my belief is not intense
enough; and though I may think that another man believes in
nothing but an idol, that idol, by the intensity of belief invested in it,
can turn into the real god, for the reality of god is defined by the
intensity and absoluteness of my seeking after him. It is therefore
the how of my belief that defines the object (or rather, what others
call object, for in reality it is no such thing).
Here we have the extreme subjectivistic aspect of Kierkegaard's
thought. But it is perhaps just one aspect. For Kierkegaard believed
that it is impossible to communicate directly with others and that,
consequently, it would be idle, in bringing others to the Christian
religion, to tell them simply and directly: Christianity is the true
religion. Hence-and some commentators have stressed this point
-we must perhaps go beyond the subjectivistic aspect of Kier-
kegaard's thought and look for something else. Another fact that
confirms this view is Kierkegaard's insistence that we must always
return to the word of God and seek a state of contemporaneousness
with Christ. Consequently, the purely subjectivistic aspect of his
thought is complemented by the affirmation of a reality which is
independent of the believer. But the fact remains that in most of
his writings what is emphasized first and foremost is the subjec-
tivistic aspect. Subjectivity, he writes, is truth.
We would like to say a word about the way Kierkegaard's
successors-particularly Heidegger and Jaspers-have generalized
his thought and enlarged upon it. Out of his non-systematic,
existential thought they have sought to evolve a system, and one
may well ask whether their undertaking is not contrary to the
essence-if that is here the word-of the philosophies of existence.
Kierkegaard liked to call Hegel a great professor. The word, on
his lips, spelled contempt rather than homage. Would it not be
accurate to say of Heidegger and Jaspers that they are great pro-
fessors? Have they not, intentionally or unintentionally, betrayed
Kierkegaard's thought a little by ex.pounding it as a system? But
20
 GeneralEvolution
we shall leave these questions aside for the moment and turn our
attention to what Hegel and Jaspers have brought to Kierkegaard's
thought.
Kierkegaard, as we said, depicts the individual as standing
utterly alone before God. Though he speaks in certain passages
of what he calls the Invisible Church, the significant thing for
him is the relationship between the individual and God. The
crucial task is to become God's contemporary at the moment of
his Incarnation on Earth. Jaspers elaborates this idea in two ways,
with the result that the individual is no longer seen as absolutely
isolated. First, there is what Jaspers calls Geschichtlichkeit-a
profound historicity. Jaspers and Heidegger .make a distinction
between Historie,that is, history in the ordinary sense of the word,
the sequence of events, and Geschichtlichkeit which is our particular,
deep-rooted situation in history, the fact that we are born at a
particular moment in the historical process. Thus the tie between
the individual and previous generations which was broken by
Kierkegaard is re-established by Jaspers. We are given historical
perspective; we occupy a certain point in the sequence of events.
Jaspers, it was seen, regards it as essential to his own philosophy
that he comes after Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. To understand
his philosophy, it is necessary to take into account this 'after
Kierkegaard' and 'after Nietzsche' dimension.
Secondly, we can, according to Jaspers, communicate with
others. The idea of communication had been a problem for
Kierkegaard. Communication with other individuals had to .take
a detour in the form of communication with God. Only indirect
communication was possible. And even communication with God
was often indirect and, in a sense, abortive. The very story of God
on Earth, culminating in the Crucifixion, is an example of a
colossalmisunderstanding. Kierkegaard's whole thought, it seems,
was governed by the idea of misunderstanding-misunderstanding
with his fiancee, misunderstanding on a more general scale between
man and God, inevitable misunderstanding in the expression of
belief in God before others, since such expression must take the
form of indirect communication.
For Jaspers, on the other hand, communication is possible, and
it is one of the characteristics of existence. Existence is essentially
Ge$chichtlichkeitor profound historicity, as we saw, and it is
essentially communication. But it is not easy to communicate.
Communication,accordingto Jaspers, is at the same time a struggle;
21
 Philosophiesof Existence
it is a struggle of love or love in struggle-kampfinde liebe, to use
his own phrase. Each man must remain himself and at the same
time evolve with the other. Thus to the Kierkegaardian categories
is added a new category which admits direct communication, but
regards it as a necessary struggle.
In Heidegger the idea of community is not as central as in
Jaspers. Nevertheless, we are not said to be isolated from others.
Heidegger has been criticized for viewing the individual as stand-
ing in isolation. This is not true. Being with others-Miteinander
sein-is essential to Heidegger's definition of Dasein. Far from
locking us up inside ourselves, ·Heidegger tells us that we are not
subjects faced with objects, that we must give up the classical
concept of subject, explode it, in order to make room for the view
that we are perpetually 'outside ourselves', this expression itself
being rather meaningless as there is no such container-like 'we'
that we are outside of.
The question remains as to what extent this 'being-with-others'
is merely a condition imposed by common pursuits and to what
extent it involves genuine direct communication.
There are passages in which Heidegger affirms the reality of
direct communication and love.
Heidegger like Jaspers, emphasizes the idea of historicity but
his own particular contribution is the idea of 'being in the world'.
Thus, the individual who had been completely cut off from the
world finds his place in the world once again. The Dasein, Hei-
degger affirms, is by his very essence in the world.
Here we might mention the influence of Husserl on Heidegger.
Like Kierkegaard, but of course with a totally different manner of
approach, Husserl had tried to probe into the nature of conscious-
ness without reference to the world. But toward the end of his life
Husserl had insisted strongly on the fact that we are in the world.
On this point, then, Heidegger's philosophy does not, as one might
think at first glance, run counter to Husserl's thought, but is a
continuation of it.
What has been said so far does not exhaust the points of com-
parison and contrast between the philosophies of Heidegger and
Jaspers and that of Kierkegaard. If it is true that they generalize
and enlarge upon Kierkegaard's thought, it is also true that
Heidegger cuts out, so at least it seems in Sein und Zeit, some of
its basic tenets. He abolishes all that is religious and transcendent
in Kierkegaard; indeed, he circumscribes Kierkegaard's whole
22
 GeneralEvolution
thought by the idea of death and our essential :fip.itude.Neverthe-
less, the question of God is not without relevance to Heidegger's
philosophy. The idea of God, as we saw, is central to Kierkegaard's
thought; it appeared at first to have no place in Heidegger's
philosophy, but in his later writings-in the 'Commentaries on
Holderlin' and even in the Holzwege-it seems that the idea of the
holy is accorded a place. Heidegger and Kierkegaard are thus no
longer in total disagreement on this point.
What Heidegger tries to make us feel is that Being (Sein) is at
once present and absent, manifests and conceals itself at the same
time. Once this fact has been grasped, we can inquire into the
ensemble of beings (Seiendes). Through such an inquiry, he
says, we can arrive at the idea of the holy. And once we have
arrived at the idea of the holy, we can take up the question
of God-a question which Heidegger has not thus far taken up
directly.
The main difference between the philosophies of Jaspers and
Kierkegaard lies in this: that Kierkegaard makes a choice, chooses
to be a Christian, and in order to consummate his choice, comes to
recognize another factor-the grace of God. Jaspers, on the other
hand, merely puts before us the various possible choices, the
different viewpoints that different men have had, and defines
existence in terms of choice, rather than commit himself to any
particular choice. Thus, whereas Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have
definite viewpoints, Jaspers, influenced as he is by them, strives
to put before us all the various possible viewpoints, rather than his
own particular one. He speaks, for example, of what he calls the
'Law of Daytime' and on the other hand, of what he calls the
'Passions of Night'. The Law of Daytime is that which finds
expression in Classicism; the Passions of Night, that which find
expression in Romanticism, and particularly German Romanticism.
Jaspers endeavours to show us the diverse possibilities that are
co-present in the individual: hope and despair, defiance and
confidence, etc. But at the same time Jaspers himself is aware that
all profound thought must be limited, is profound only because it
is limited. His undertaking is therefore somewhat paradoxical.
He presents us with a sort of catalogue of all the possible world-views
but at the same time warns us that a world-view must of necessity
be limited. We are thus left with what seems to be an inextricable
contradiction unless, by looking behind the philosopher, we find
Jaspers the man.
23
 Philosophiesof Existence
But, if in order to resolve the contradiction it is necessary to
make a. distinction between Jaspers the philosopher and Jaspers
the man, would not such a recourse throw doubt on the very
concept of a philosophy of existence ?
The philosophy of Sartre has many points in common with
that of Heidegger despite the fact that Sartre has criticized Hei-
degger in Being and Nothingnessand Heidegger has, in his 'Letter
on Humanism', elaborated some basic differences which he believes
separate him from Sartre.
One might, by taking Sartre's philosophy as a terminal point,
describe the evolution of the philosophies of existence as going
from a purely religious thought with Kierkegaard to a non-
religious and at times even an anti-religious thought with Sartre.
But it must be ·remembered that there exists another kind of
philosophy of existence side by side with Sartre's, namely, Gabriel
Marcel's. The philosophy of existence has, at least in present-day
France, developed into the rival forms of Sartre's non-religious or
irreligious existentialism and Gabriel Marcel's religious existen-
tialism, known as Christian existentialism.
Gabriel Marcel was not particularly influenced by Kierke-
gaard, although in certain respects his position has paralleled
Kierkegaard's. His chief concern is to overcome conceptual
oppositions-oppositions of subject and object, thought and being,
body and soul-so as to arrive at a domain that he calls the domain
of mystery in contradistinction to the domain of problems. By
reaching this domain we become aware, in so far as such awareness
is possible, of the inexhaustible, the non-objectifiable which
encompasses us and transcends us, which we have not invented
but recognize, and owing to which we are able to come face to face
with God.
It is too early to follow the ulterior development of the philo-
sophies of existence, but if we turn to the work of Merleau-Ponty,
we find ourselves in a position that runs counter to the beginning
of our history of philosophies of existence, for here, as in Husserl's
last philosophy, perception comes to occupy a central position.
From a theory that isolated man from the world, with Kierkegaard,
we go all the way to a theory that regards man as being essentially
in the world, first with Heidegger, and in a more resolute, more
rigorous fashion with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
Beginning with the Kierkegaardian individual who faces God
in isolation, we have gone, with Jaspers, to an existence that
24
 GeneralEvolution
involves communication with others and is intimately bound with
the profoundly historical succession of generations and, with
Heidegger, to an existence that is essentially being in the world.
Jaspers has generalized and extended Kierkegaard's experience,
has tried to see how much of it is universally valid (assuming that
these terms are acceptable to Jaspers), and Sartre has cut existence
off from transcendence as Kierkegaard conceived it, but on the
other hand, Gabriel Marcel, quite independently of any direct
influence, has arrived at doctrines that are in some ways identical
with Kierkegaard's.

C 25
 Part Two

The Categories
of the
Philosophiesof Existence
IN the chapters that follow we shall try to group, in a kind of
table, the basic categories of the philosophies of existence. Such a
procedure will not always be wholly satisfactory; it will neverthe-
less help us to find our way through the principal ideas of these
philosophies.
 I
The First Triad:
Existence- Being- Transcendence

IT was seen that the union offacticity and emotivity begets the idea
and the feeling of existence. The term 'existence', which marks the
conjunction of an empirical tendency (a metaphysical empiricism,
to be more exact) and an affective and romantic tendency, will be
the first term of our first triad: existence, being, transcendence.1
This triad will detain us longer than the ones to follow, particularly
its first term, 'existence'. Once we have said all that we have to say
about existence, we can discuss the other categories more rapidly.
The interpretation of this first triad will lay the groundwork, so to
speak, for the interpretation of the later categories.
Kierkegaard writes : 'One cannot put more emphasis on exist-
ence than I have done.' In this he was partly inspired by Schelling;
he had, as we said, attended a few of Schelling's lectures in Berlin.
What he sought above all was to oppose existence to essence.
'Existence,' writes Schelling, 'is that which brings to ruin every-
thing that derives from thought.' Tua res agitur, he adds. And, as
against 'negative philosophies', he founded his 'positive philo-
sophy'.
But one must go further back, to Hamann, and further still, to
Luther. Eventually Kierkegaard was to turn violently against
Luther, nevertheless many of his ideas and feelings derive from
him. 'What forms the essence of Luther's thought in his com-
mentary on the Epistle to the Romans is the idea of for me'. It is
for ourselves that we pray (pro nobis). Luther's great discovery was
1 It is hoped that the reader will excuse the rather arbitrary and seemingly

Hegelian character of this order. We consider it simply as one way of looking at

the material in hand.
29
 Philosophiesof Existence
that our relation to God is not of the nature of a rational thing; it
is personal and irrational. Moreover, Kierkegaard puts great
emphasis on the fact that belief is never sure of itself; it is forever
in struggle with non-belief. (This idea is also to be found in
Jaspers.) Belief, as Luther said, is an anxiety-ridden thing, forever
in strife with itself. And to reach the highest spheres of belief, one
must first taste the agonies of conscience; the tormented conscience
is, for Luther, a necessity; the sinner alone can receive justification.
In order to become conscious of 'standing before God', we must
first become conscious of our sins, for only in sin do we come to
find ourselves before God-by the very consciousness of the gulf
that separates us from him.
As early as 1834 Kierkegaard writes: 'Christ does not teach, he
acts; he is.' Elsewhere he tells us: 'Existence corresponds to the
individual which, in the teaching of Aristotle, is something that
subsists outside the sphere of concepts.' In this twofold fashion
the idea that existence is not amenable to thought finds its way
into Kierkegaard's philosophy.
Ought we to attempt a definition of existence? To abstain from
such an attempt is regarded by Kierkegaard as a sure sign of what
he calls philosophical tact. All we can do is to enumerate the
characteristics of existence.
'The word existence,' writes Jaspers, 'is one of the synonyms of
the word reality, but owing to Kierkegaard it has acquired a new
dimension; it has come to designate what I fundamentally mean to
myself . . . From its obscure origins in the works of Kierkegaard,
this reality has emerged to assume a profound history.'
The word 'existence', to quote Jaspers again, is only a sign that
is used to point the way, not to intellectual certitude, not to objec-
tive knowledge, but to existence itself, which no one can arrogate
to himself or to others. And so, according to this view, neither as a
philosopher, nor even as an individual existent, should a man call
himself an 'existentialist' or even an 'existent', since he must
perpetually doubt his own existence, since he exists more by
doubting his existence than by dogmatically asserting it. We use
the word existence, we talk about the reality we call existence; but
existence is not a concept; it is only a sign that points the way to
the realm of non-objectivity.
The philosophers of existence, beginning with Kierkegaard,
chose the word existenceover a number of other words-such as
life, value, soul-which had previously been in philosophical use.
30
 The First Triad
Kierkegaard was looking for a word that might express the acuity
of the relation between the 'I' and the Transcendent. In The
Concept of Irony, he uses the word person; but soon after he
chooses the word existence.'By dint of knowledge, we have for-
gotten what it means to exist. We have forgotten not only what it
means to exist religiously, but what it means to exist as a man.'
The first characteristic of existence, if this can be called a
characteristic, is that it is not definable, that it is not knowable
objectively. As Jaspers says, we can only talk about past existence,
that is to say objectified existence. But real existence we cannot
objectify, nor express in words. If observed, existence vanishes.
Perhaps the first thing to note is that the existent knows him-
self. That is why Socrates is looked upon as the first existent; that
is also why the first existential precept is: 'Know thyself'.
But the self we are called upon to know is not given to rational
considerations, like the Cartesian 'I', nor to objective considera-
tions, like the Hegelian mind, nor to the contemplation of ideas;
it is indifferent to what is recognizable to all. The existent is the
man Kierkegaard calls the Unique one1 or the subjective thinker.
He is constantly 'related to himself' and infinitely concerned about
himself.
What does it mean to exist, for Kierkegaard? To begin with, it
means to be a self-willed and impassionate individual, 2 who knows
himself as such. Passion springs from our awareness of the con-
tradiction between the finite and the infinite, from our uncer-
tainty. Passion and will manifest themselves by the intense
character of their relation with the terms that they come into
contact with.
In the fourth place, existence is becoming.Passion and decision
are movements. Existence is not definable, but by calling it a
movement, a becoming, we characterize it legitimately, for we
define it in terms of something that is itself undefinable. Existence
is temporality, continuous becoming, a task.
It is not a becoming after the manner of the Hegelian Idea; it is
not a logical becoming, but one that grows out of choices and
decisions made in the heat of passion.
Moreover, this becoming may be seen to be related to the dictum
1 Translator's note: This term is often translated as the 'single one'. I think
the word 'unique' (which is used in the French translation) is better because it
brings out the sense of being exceptional as well as being particular and concrete.
2 Here we might recall Feuerbach's saying: 'Passion is the sole criterion of

existence.'
 Philosophiesof Existence
'Know thyself'. All ethical and ethico-religious knowledge 'refer
to the fact that the existent subject exists'. To be an existent is to
consider oneself not as something given, but as something that
must be created by oneself.
This becoming is such that it perpetually exposes us to danger.
The existent is the man who is forever risking his own being. The
same idea will be found in another form in Heidegger, when he
says that the existent is the man who puts his own being at stake.
We have not as yet touched upon the idea of God and the reli-
gious aspect of Kierkegaard's thought in our description of
existence. And, as a matter of fact, certain passages reflect the
view that, for Kierkegaard, it is possible to be an existent outside
Christianity: Socrates was an existent; the average Greek philo-
sopher was more of an existent than any modern philosopher.
But the fact remains that, for Kierkegaard, Christianity is a
sharpening, an intensification of existence. In what respect ? The
will and the passion of which we spoke are in Christianity
rendered more intense, because the term they come in contact with
is the Absolute itself. And how do we know that it is the Absolute ?
Precisely by the intensity of our will and passion. We feel that we
are standing before God. Thus the category of 'standing before
God', which was central in Luther, becomes central to Kierke-
gaard's thought.
To attain to the presence of God, one must first become
conscious of sin; to feel sinful is to feel the presence of God, and
to feel the presence of God is to feel sinful. Sin, then, is the
gateway to the religious life. To exist, therefore, is to be a sinner.
To exist is to become conscious of the fact that existence itself is
sin. But, on the other hand, existence is the highest state to which
we can attain. We are here faced with a paradox; Kierkegaard's
thought, it was already seen, is essentially paradoxical. Existence
is at once the highest state and a sinful state. With this statement
we leave behind the sphere of religion in general and enter upon
the sphere of paradoxical religion-what Kierkegaard calls
'religiousness B' as opposed to 'religiousness A'. A is a state of
religious immanence, while B, which is the height of religiousness,
is the religion of transcendence and the absurd.
Hence, even after entering upon the religious sphere, one must
still undertake a kind of spiritual journey to go from a religion that
borders on philosophy-a religion similar to Plato's, for example-
to the veritable religion, which is a scandal to Reason.
32
 The First Triad
Such, then, is the way in which passion and will are intensified
by a Christian existence. Becoming is also transformed: it is no
longer of a general nature; it is henceforth a Christian becoming.
Christianity is indeed not a given thing; it is a thing that must be
won. One is not born a Christian, Kierkegaard says; one becomes
a Christian; and in fact, it is easier to become a Christian if one
is not born within its fold. But one never becomes a full Christian,
for that is too high a determination for man. It was probably this
belief that prompted Kierkegaard to say as he did often: 'I am not
a Christian,' meaning: I am not worthy of calling myself a
Christian. The words, 'I am a Christian', might be said to be
contradictory, for a man can only advance towards Christianity; he
is never fully Christian.
Thus, the ideas of will, passionand becomingare transformed by
their contact-which is more than a contact-with Christianity.
The same could be said for the idea of risk: for what we are now
risking, and fully aware of risking, is our eternal salvation or
perdition. What is now at stake in our every act is our own ever-
lasting happiness; at every moment of our life the question of our
eternal happiness or sorrow is raised once again.
The individual's thought is essentially paradoxical, because, at
the moment of his accession to 'religiousness B', to profound
Christianity, his thought is the reflection of the contact between a
finite being and the Infinite, which he cannot comprehend. As a
finite trying to grasp the Infinite, the individual him.self is a
paradox. But, on the other hand, the Infinite, which the individual
must seek to apprehend, is also a paradox, for God who is infinite
and eternal incarnated Himself at a particular point in space and a
particular moment in time. That is the greatest paradox of all.
And it is under the burden of this paradox that our minds toil and
strain from the moment we become aware of it.
The philosophy of existence is not opposed to thought so long
as it is intense and passionate. Let us recall that Kierkegaard
defines existence, in so far as it can be defined, as an energy of
thought. Existential thinking could even be described as reflection.
It is not true that reflection stifles originality; it can sharpen it.
Kierkegaard seeks to combine reflection and the authentic,
pristine character of thought in what he calls immediate serious-
ness, serious youth, acquired primitivity, matured immediacy. It is
true that in a spirit of opposition to the Cartesians, Kierkegaard
says at times: 'The more I think, the less I am, and the more I am,
33
 Philosophiesof Existence
the less I think.' But the fact remains that, for Kierkegaard,
genuine existence is never possible without reflection on existence.
These two terms-thought and existence-form an antithesis;
between them there is a fight to the death. But it is precisely this
fight that constitutes existence. Kierkegaard writes : 'If I think
about existence, I annihilate it. But by thinking about existence, I
exist. Existence is thus exercised at the same time as thought.
One can neither conceive existence, nor eliminate it, nor eliminate
one's thought. That is the paradox and at the same time the essence
of existential thinking.
Once one has reached this stage, what is one to do ? Can one
return to earthly matters, to the here below ? Kierkegaard thought
such a return possible; by the idea of repetition, he sought to
return to the here below after the encounter with the paradox, with
the absurd, with God.
A man must choose and choose himself, choose himself as he
is; he must take his destiny upon himself. This is what Kierke-
gaard calls matured immediation, to which divine mediation is a
prerequisite. A man must choose himself, but at the same time he
must, armed with his passion, his passion for the absolute, con-
stantly try to become simpler.
This effort towards simplicity, towards unity, must be made
into a lifetime task, for the simple is higher than the complex.
Children have a multitude of ideas, but the true thinker, a Socrates,
for example, has one idea only. To expand our knowledge, says
Kierkegaard going back to a neo-Platonic notion, is very often to
strip ourselves of excessive baggage.
But it must be added that Kierkegaard is at the same time quite
aware that he himself is made up of dualities and diversities-
infinite diversities. He is torn between his desire for unity and the
numberless tendencies thronging inside him.
Existence is the palpitation of an intense life, the sharp point
of subjectivity.
The subjective thinker becomes an infinite existent mind; he
turns into a mystery through his profound relations with himself
and with the object of his belief.
We have seen in what ways Jaspers' thought is a continuation of
Kierkegaard's. For Jaspers, too, existence is a becoming; it is
oriented towards possibilities, and at the same time, it is oriented
towards its own fountain-head, towards its own source. This is
what is meant by Ursprung.
34
 The First Triad
Both of these ideas are Kierkegaard.ian in origin. The existent
is that which is related to itself and to transcendence at the same
time. By this proposition Jaspers explicates his own thought as well
as Kierkegaard's, which is at the origin of his own. Existence, for
Jaspers, is intermediate between the domain of matters susceptible
of scientific study-Jaspers' Weltorientierung deals with this
domain-and the domain of transcendence. On the threshold of
transcendence existential problems come to a close; for trans-
cendence does not admit of possibilities, while existence is
essentially of the nature of possibility and at the same time a return
towards its own source. 1
We can find parallel trains of thought in Gabriel Marcel. What
he seeks, as we saw, is to go beyond the polarities of subject and
object, thought and being, body and soul, in order to arrive at
something that, unlike conceptual truths, cannot be expressed in
words. But what distinguishes Gabriel Marcel from the other
philosophers of existence, except Sartre and especially Merleau-
Ponty, is the importance that he attaches to the body. For the
body had no place in Kierkegaard's thought, nor a very prominent
one in the philosophies of Heidegger and Jaspers. It is wrong,
writes Gabriel Marcel, to say I have a body; for I am my body. The
body is no mere instrument, and the body-soul relation, undefin-
able as it is, is the key to the other relations between ourselves and
external objects. We must not model our understanding of the
body-soul relation on these other relations which are, on the
contrary, derived from it. In his Journal Metaphysique Marcel
reflects at length on the bond between the self and the body and on
the meaning of the words: my body.
But we must not, Marcel believes, stop short at this. We must
transcend ourselves and enter into communion and into union
with something that envelops and transcends us-the non-
objectifiable, non-exhaustible to which we have already alluded.
Having become conscious of this non-objectifiable domain,
Gabriel Marcel sets up a series of antitheses : on the one hand, there
is objectivity, science, technology, problems; on the other hand,
1 Between existence and Dasein there is, according to Jaspers, at once a

reciprocity and an antagonism. Existence owes its being to Dasein, although it is

higher than Dasein. And on the other hand, existence lends consistency and
weight to Dasein, although the latter vanishes at the first contact of existence.
Finally, it is existence that deciphers all 'codes': 'Existence comes into being in
Dasein, becomes intelligible in consciousness in general, and reveals its content
in spirit.'
35
 Philosophiesof Existence
there is existence, presence, the 'I' and the 'thou', being as
opposed to 'having', metaphysics, faith, mystery. Problems are an
affair of the intellect; I behold a problem but remain detached
from it. Mystery, on the other hand, encroaches upon my very
being; I am, as it were, caught in the very problem, and that is why
the problem becomes a mystery. A mystery is a problem in which
the investigator himself is involved.
In order to understand the meaning of existence in Heidegger,
it is necessary to turn our attention to the etymology of the word.
No doubt some of Kierkegaard's remarks on existence were also
of an etymological derivation. He tells us, for example, that
existence is separation, because to exist is to stand out from, to
remain outside of. Existence is always separation and interval;
existence and distance come to be well-nigh synonymous; exist-
ence is distance. That is why for Kierkegaard there can be no
junction between thought and being, as in Hegel's system. That is
also why sin is what gives us our first insight into existence. The
first thing to remark about existence is its dissemination, its
plurality. There is a multitude of existents. But the goal of each
is, and ought to be, to achieve unity, simplicity. We might say that
from existence qua extension and dissemination we go to existence
qua tension. And the further we go, the deeper things become and
the further we leave behind existence qua dispersion in space and
time, to arrive at existence qua tension, and from there we can go
on to existence qua ecstasy; there is a kind of ladder mounting
from existence qua extension to existence qua tension and to
existence qua ecstasy. Thus, existence which at first consisted
in separation and fissure now turns into union. The very
intensity of our experience, born of dispersion, drives us on
toward unity.
But whereas Kierkegaard, in certain passages, concludes from
this etymology that existence is dispersion and dissemination,
Heidegger concludes from the same etymology that to exist is to
stand out of oneself. This is what he means when he asserts that
existence is naturally ecstatic, in the pristine sense of the word. To
stand out of oneself is to be in the world. Thus, the Cartesian 'I
am' is replaced by the Heideggerian 'I am in the world', for the
subject never finds himself in total isolation from the world,
according to Heidegger, and modern philosophy has been wrong
in putting the subject on one side and everything else on the other.
The subject always creates a world about himself, or to try to
36
 The First Triad
translate Heidegger's own term, he 'worlds' a world, for the world
is not found ready-made but.is worlded by the subject. Heidegger
feels that a word must be coined so as to make it clear that the
world is not after the fashion of ordinary objects or things.
Perhaps it would be useful here to show how the idea of the
world, which had hardly a place in Descartes' philosophy, though
one of his treatises is called The World, comes to occupy a position
of growing importance in modern philosophies, first in Kant, and
then in Heidegger. Descartes, at the beginning of his meditations,
doubted the reality of the world. Husserl does likewise at the
beginning of his. Kant put in doubt the concept of World, con-
sidering it an idea in which we are inclined to believe. Heidegger's
contention is that we are always open to the world.
Here we might mention a comparison that Heidegger makes
between his own philosophy and that of Leibniz. He says that the
beings which we are have no need of doors and windows, not
because, like Leibniz's monads, we are shut up in ourselves, but
because we are in direct contact with the world, because we are
thoroughly in the world, because we are down in the street, so to
speak. Hence consciousness, to use a word that Heidegger avoids,
has no need to wander out of its dwelling-place, for it has none;
we are already and have always been in the world; and we have
always been in immediate contact with other individuals. In what
we said earlier about communication we already referred to this
idea of being with others. Even at the height of his individuality,
even in the depth of his solitude, the individual is not separated
from others; the very notion of 'being without others' is, according
to Heidegger, nothing more than a variant mode of 'being with
others'. Heidegger, it was already seen, does not isolate us from
others, as has been sometimes said; for him, we are by our very
essence with others as we are in the world.
We could compare Sartre's views on existence to those of the
philosophers we have already mentioned. According to Sartre,
we do not have an essence. I will have an essence only when I am
dead. Essence is something that applies to what no longer exists.
It would be interesting in this connection to confront Sartre's
thought with Gabriel Marcel's and Heidegger's. For Gabriel
Marcel, we do not have an intellectual essence, but we do have
what he calls an affective essence, a presence of ourselves before
ourselves which is a kind of veiled essence in the same sense that
all values are veiled essences. And for Heidegger, it is wrong to say
37
 Philosophiesof Existence
that I have no essence. I do have an essence: my essence is my
existence, that is to say, my being in the world.
What is existence for Sartre ? It is first and foremost defined by
my acts and in my acts. He appropriates for himself Lequier's
formula, 'faire et en faisant se faire' : one is what one does. You are
nothing other than your life, says a character in one of Sartre's
plays. You define yourself by your acts. Sartre, then, does not
subscribe to the notion of unknown genius. On this point Sartre's
thought is, as we suggested earlier, much nearer to Hegel's than to
Kierkegarrd's. We can never, according to Sartre, determine the
true value of our affections save by the acts that define them. Our
feelings are developed in and by our acts. Just as there is no genius
save he who produces works of genius, so there is no possible love
save that which manifests itself. Man is at first a project lived
subjectively; he chooses what he will be, and he will be what he
has chosen to be.
Though, as we saw, there is here a conflict between Sartre and
Kierkegaard, they are nevertheless agreed that we are essentially
making a choice-a choice by which, according to Sartre, we commit
not only ourselves but others as well.
We come now to our second idea, the idea of Being. Existence
is essentially drawn towards Being. We emphasized the subjective
side of Kierkegaard's thought. But for him there can be no
subjectivity except in relation to a being that transcends us.
In 1854 Kierkegaard writes in his journal:
'The existence of a Christian is in contact with Being.' Jesus is
first and foremost Being rather than thought.
Kant had shown that Being is not demonstrable since it is
position, and Schelling had gone on from there to develop his
philosophy of existence. In discussing one of the major traditions
from which the philosophies of existence derive, we emphasized
the affirmation of the irreducibility of Being and identified it with
what Heidegger and Sartre after him call facticity. Being is a
starting-point and can never be a terminal-point of thought. In
vain do abstract thinkers attempt to demonstrate Being •by
thought; they only succeed in demonstrating one thing: that they
are abstract thinkers. The minute I begin to talk about Being, I
no longer talk about Being, but about essence.
The idea of Being presents itself in Kierkegaard in the form of
the 'Wholly Other' which we cannot think, but which, at the same
time we cannot not think. Our thoughts ramble about the Wholly
38
 The First Triad
Other like a butterfly about a lamp. We cannot keep clear of it,
and it consumes us.
Thus, from the moment of their inception the philosophies of
existence involve an affirmation in ontology.
We said earlier that the philosophies of existence combine an
affirmation of existence proper and the affirmation that existence
thinks Being; that existentialism and ontology are thus united;
that there is a union of the existential and the ontological.
We already noted this union in Kierkegaard when he says that
our mind rambles about the thought of Being which it cannot fully
grasp, but which at the same time it cannot leave alone. The
philosophy of Jaspers, too, is concerned with the problem of Being,
and Heidegger writes that the only philosophical problem is that of
Being.
The idea of Being is presented to us in these philosophies as
posited, as undemonstrable. Gabriel Marcel, for instance, tells us
that Being is above all the irreducible,that we cannot arrive at
Being but must necessarily take it as our point of departure.
A second characteristic which we have noted as regards Being
in these philosophies is that, in most of them, the idea of Being is
not uniform. It is no doubt true that in Kierkegaard and Gabriel
Marcel we do not find any preoccupation with the distinction
between the different modes in which Being manifests itself. But
if we turn to Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre, we see that they are
concerned with noting the different modes in which Being presents
itself to us.
Take Jaspers, for example. From a form.al point of view, he
elaborates three forms of Being: Being as object, Being as subject,
and Being in itself. From the point of view of the contents of
these forms, he distinguishes what he calls Dasein,that is to say a
particular and determinate Being. But to be exact, this particular
and determinate Being is never wholly particular and determinate.
It is forever in pursuit of goals; it is tied to a body that is itself
coherent only in the light of life taken as a whole. Nevertheless,
Daseinis an incipient particular and determinate Being. Secondly,
there is what Jaspers calls Being of consciousness in general, that
is to say Being as the object of intellectual inquiry, especially in the
sciences and rational philosophies. The whole domain of science
and analytic philosophy is to be subsumed under the heading of
consciousness in general. Thirdly, there is existence which is
reducible neither to particular and determinate Being nor to the
39
 Philosophiesof Existence
Being of consciousness in general. Now, each one of us combines in
himself these three forms of Being. We feel them co-existing, and
together they constitute the Being that we are. They are in a
certain way united and at the same time they are at war with one
another. To become conscious of existence we must wage a kind
of war against Dasei,n,i.e. particular and determinate Being, and
against consciousness in general as it manifests itself in science.
These, then, are the three kinds of Being that we are. But we would
not be, were there nothing other than ourselves, says Jaspers
echoing one of the lessons he has learned from phenomenology.
We exist and are only by virtue of the fact that there is something
other than ourselves. There is the world and there is transcendence.
We cannot be if the world is not. (On this point the positions of
Jaspers and Heidegger are identical.) And we cannot be if trans-
cendence which we seek after is not.
Thus, there are according to Jaspers five forms of Being, three
human and two non-human. And the three human forms cannot
be without the two non-human forms.
Jaspers does not arrive at a single, unified idea of Being; he
leaves us with a plurality of Beings. This is in a sense a failure of
ontology. The philosophy of Jaspers might be described both as
an ontology of failure and a failure of ontology. Ontology is indis-
pensable and yet it is doomed to failure. For to set up ontologies
is the very reverse of setting up an ontology. An aggregate of
ontologies is the very opposite of ontology.
It may, however, be added that Jaspers believes that this very
failure will reveal transcendence to us, that by its failure ontology
will reveal Being to us, that in a sense the failure of ontology and
ontology are identical.
If we now consider the role of the idea of Being in Heidegger's
philosophy, we see that he begins with the fact that we have some
idea of Being, a native understanding of Being-what he calls
Seinsverstandnis.And it is precisely because our Being has such
an insight into the idea of Being that knowledge becomes possible.
The idea of Being is a prerequisite to all knowledge.
Seinsverstandnisis not a purely intellectual understanding. The
idea of Being, according to Heidegger, is exposed to doubts and to
risks, so to speak, in all our actions. In philosophical reflection,
which is of the very essence of man, we engage our Being, we risk
our Being. What is at stake in all our activities is our Being and
thereby Being itself, for without us, Heidegger seems to think,
40
 The First Triad
Being itself cannot be. In a certain sense, Sein cannot be without
Dasein, just as, conversely, Dasein cannot be without Sein.
Thus, on the one hand, we have a native understanding of
Being without which we would be lost, and on the other hand, we
are put in danger by this idea of Being which we harbour in all our
reflections and actions.
According to Heidegger, it is only because man exists that there
can be an ontology, and this raises the whole question of realism
vs. idealism. Heidegger may in one sense be regarded as a realist,
for he holds that there are beings (Seiendes) which are independent
of us. Whether we have seen the stars or not, the stars considered
as beings (Seiendes) are. And yet if man did not exist there would
be no Being (Sein). 1 Thus the 'ontic' is independent of man, but
the ontological is not, and the 'ontic' depends for its being on the
ontological; for these beings (Seiendes) can be so conceived only
because there is a being, i.e. man, that thinks Being (Sein).
Seiendes and Sein are therefore interdependent.
The authentic existent is precisely the man who is aware of
what Heidegger calls the onto-ontological distinction, that is, the
distinction between Being and particular beings. These two con-
cepts must always be distinguished and at the same time conjoined,
and the main problem of philosophy is the quest for Being.
Philosophy's unique question, says Heidegger, echoing a passage of
Aristotle that he likes to quote, is the question of Being. And that
question is to be couched in these terms: what do we mean when we
say that Being is the Being of beings?
How is the problem of Being to be approached, according to
Heidegger? We must distinguish two periods in Heidegger's
thought-the period in which he produced his basic work, Sein
und Zeit, and the more recent period as represented by his book,
Holzwege.
What he says in Sein und Zeit, and this he could still maintain,
is that we cannot approach the problem of Being without a know-
ledge of our· own being. We must therefore inquire first into the
Being of our own being. And the whole of Sein und Zeit is a study
of the Being of our own being, arriving at the conclusions that we
are essentially care, that care is an attendant state of temporality
and that therefore we are essentially temporality.
I Translator's note: In keeping with English translations of Heidegger, the
word Being corresponds to the German Sein (and the French etre), and the word
being, to the German Seiendes (and the French etant).
D 41
 Philosophiesof Existence
What does Heidegger mean when he states that. we are care?
He means that we are forever reaching out toward the future, for-
ever looking beyond the present, but at the same time conditioned
by our whole past. We are in a certain situation, the present, which
is nothing but a junction of our future• preoccupations and past
conditionings. (We shall come back to this proposition later.)
To say this is to say that care implies time. Inquiring into the
nature of the Being of our being, Heidegger finds care and, under-
lying care, time. And he concludes not that Being is time, but that
time is the horizon which must be reached before the question of
Being can be asked.
He does not conclude that Being and time are identical. For he
regards our being as only one form of being, and we shall find him
facing the same problem that Jaspers had faced: the problem of
the plurality of beings.
There is, to begin with, Dasein, which is not defined by
Heidegger as particular and determinate being, as it is by Jaspers.
Dasein in Heidegger's usage stands for our own being, for exist-
ence. There is therefore a fundamental difference between
Heidegger's use of the word Dasein and Jaspers' use.
In addition to Dasein or human existence there are other forms
of being. There are the things that we see, what Heidegger terms
Vorhanden,such things as mountains, clouds, rivers, etc. There is
Zuhanden, that is tools, instruments. There are living beings.
There are mathematical entities that may be said to subsist, but
not to be, properly speaking. There are, then, other than our-
selves, four forms of being and each would seem to imply a different
kind of Being. The question may be asked as to whether these
other forms are reducible to Dasein, to ourselves. Here again
Heidegger is faced with the idealism-realism issue which, to tell
the truth, he does not resolve. He believes that we should be able
to get round the question altogether, that the terms 'idealism' and
'realism' do not correspond to the reality of our situation, and that
consequently we should go beyond them. His ambition is un-
doubtedly sound, but the reader is usually left with the impression
that in such and such a passage Heidegger is committed to
idealism, in such and such other to realism, and that he does not
get round the problem as he would like to.
Let us, to get a clearer idea of Heidegger's different forms of
being, look at the relation between them.
First, there is, among these different forms, one which can be
42
 The First Triad
reduced to another. The Vorhanden, the spectacle world, is only a
subsidiary form of being. Initially, what we have is a world of
obstacles and tools; only gradually do we come to set up a world of
pure spectacle. The setting up of this world was the achievement of
the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. At the outset, then, there is
only a world of obstacles and tools, and to advance from this world
to that of spectacle, it is necessary to abstract something from the
world of obstacles and tools. It is necessary to turn them into
objects of pure contemplation.
But it is not clear whether the form of tools, the Zuhanden, can
in turn be reduced to Dasein, nor whether the other forms of being,
about which Heidegger has little to say, can also be so reduced.
Heidegger regards the subsistence of mathematical entities in
all likelihood as a derivative form of the world of obstacles and
tools, although it is necessary to resort to a priori reasoning in
order to see this.
But there remains the world of living beings. Partly in reaction
against the philosophies of life which preceded the advent of the
philosophies of existence, Heidegger contends that the concept of
life is not one to prove useful in resolving philosophical problems.
There is little that we can say as regards life. This of all the con-
cepts at our disposal is the one which confronts us with the greatest
number of difficulties. We are not as yet prepared to bring a satis-
factory solution to the problem of life.
Were the solution on hand, there would still remain the question
as to whether the essence of life is care, like the essence of our
being, of Dasein. But Heidegger does not reach this stage of the
problem.
Such seems to be the position of Heidegger at the end of Sein
und Zeit. He points to the horizon that must be reached before the
question of Being can be asked; he does not bring an answer to
that question, for all we have discovered in Sein und Zeit is that
the Being of our own being is care; but as yet we do not know
whether we can assume that the Being of our own being and the
Being of other beings are one.
In Holzwege Heidegger appears to approach the problem from a
somewhat different angle. Nevertheless, what he says in Holzwege is
not unrelated to what he had said previously. He has always main-
tained that philosophy's unique problem is the problem of Being,
but his later position is that we cannot resolve this problem,
because our approach to Being is in a sense an impossible one:
43
 Philosophiesof Existence
Being reveals itself to us by its absence, as it were. Being is at once
presence and absence; it manifests itself but never completely, and
we might go so far as to say that it conceals itself. That is why we
can offer no possible solution to the problem of Being; we can
only ask questions about it. Philosophy's task is rather to grasp the
problem than to bring a solution to it. And as for contemporary
man, his distinguishing characteristic lies in the fact that he is able
to appreciate the presence of Being only through its absence.
Moreover, we see in Being's successive manifestations such as
presence, as representation, as will to power, the deeply temporal
aspect of the manifestations of Being.
In Sartre, too, we find difficulties of the same order, due, as in
the cases of Jaspers and Heidegger, to the lack of unity in his con-
cept of Being. He adumbrates two kinds of Being-Being-in-itself
and Being-for-itself. The one is sheer plenitude, the other, absence
and vacuity. The one is Being proper, if you will, the other,
nothingness. Being-in-itself is static, Being-for-itself, endowed
with an incessant dynamism which amounts to absence rather than
to presence. But here once more we are faced with the problem of
idealism vs. realism. It will easily be seen how and for what reasons
Sartre is led to assert the existence of the in-itself. There are two
reasons for this. First, a kind of epistemological concern to posit
some reality that would be independent of knowledge. If knowledge
is to be possible, there must be something which is independent of
knowledge and which is the in-itself. Secondly, the observation of
certain emotional states leads Sartre to conclude that we are, as it
were, nostalgic for a static state, for inertia, for restful plenitude.
Thus, the for-itself yearns to pass into the in-itself. Epistemologic-
ally, then, the for-itself postulates the in-itself, and psychologically,
the for-itselflongs to turn into the in-itself.
But if Sartre's underlying motives for setting up the for-itself
and the in-itself are fairly evident, it is less clear which of the two
he holds as prior to the other. If he maintained that the in-itself
comes first and the for-itself is merely a sort of gap in the in-itself,
he would be committing himself to realism. If, on the contrary,
he gave precedence to the for-itself, he would be embracing
idealism.
The point to be made here is that the concept of in-itself,
motivated by a double concern, the one epistemological, the other
psychological, is primarily a response to that concern, rather than
the simple observation of a reality. Have not a Heraclitus, a Hegel,
44
 The First Triad
or a Bergson shown that nothing is static, that there is nothing but
what Sartre would call for-itself? If Sartre's motives for positing
the in-itself are clear, the legitimacy of his doing so is not.
But perhaps the oscillation between realism and idealism that we
have noted in Sartre and in Heidegger could be justified if one
allowed that the philosophy of existence is a philosophy of ambi-
guity because existence itself is ambiguous.
To sum up what has been said about the concept of Being: for
Kierkegaard, Being is the Wholly Other round which our mind
hovers as if spellbound without ever seizing it. The other philo-
sophers of existence share the same fascination with Being and the
same ineluctable failure before it, ineluctable because our experi-
ence of Being is always fragmentary: all we ever encounter are
disjointed forms of Being. This disjunction was present in Jaspers.
It was also present in Heidegger and Sartre. What they offer us,
then, are ontologies, but they are abortive ontologies, and they are
themselves well aware of this abortive character and regard it as
inevitable. Possibly this is the import of Heidegger's title, Holzwege,
which means something like 'Roads leading nowhere'. We cannot
reach Being.
The philosophy of existence is characterized by an intimate
union of the existential and the ontological. The ontological is in
turn characterized by a two-fold feature: on the one hand, by the
fact that it is undemonstrable, that it is posited and not established;
on the other, by the fact that, in Heidegger, in Jaspers, and in
Sartre it is multiple. On the basis of the first remark, we may say
that such an ontological position is a failure from the point of view
of reason; and on the basis of the second, we may add that it is a
failure even from the point of view of ontology itself. For could a
theory of multiple categories of Being go by the name of ontology ?
Is not the idea of ontology in the plural the very negation of
ontology?
From the idea of failure we can pass on to the idea of trans-
cendence.Our failure is a sign that there is transcendence. That
existence is always attracted to Being is proof of its transcendence.
Jaspers is right when he points out that the philosophies of exist-
ence do not constitute what he calls the absolutization of existence.
Materialism is the absolutization of matter because it reduces
everything to matter. Idealism is the absolutization of mind
because it reduces everything to mind. But the philosophies of
existence do not reduce everything to existence, for existence must
45
 Philosophiesof Existence
always be defined with regard to something other than itself, with
regard to transcendence.
We saw that, for Kierkegaard, subjectivity is sharpened and
intensified when brought into contact with something other than
itself. No doubt the subjective thinker concentrates upon his own
thought; but by this very concentration he seeks to reach the
Wholly Other. Subjectivity at its highest pitch points the way to
objectivity. When I have reached the limits of an intense existence
I come upon Being, and my relation with Being makes my existence
still more intense.
Transcendence does not have the same meaning in Kierkegaard
as in the various aspects of Heidegger's philosophy. And in
Jaspers, as we shall see, the meaning of the word is sometimes
akin to Kierkegaard's meaning and sometimes to Heidegger's.
But in order to understand the place of the idea of transcendence
in the philosophies of existence, we must go back, not only to
Kierkegaard, but also to Husserl and to Kant.
Husserl believes that thought is always turned towards some-
thing other than itself. And Heidegger contends that this idea of
intentionality as it is found in Husserl is rooted in an idea which is
deeper than the idea of intentionality and which is the idea of
transcendence.
In his book on Kant, Heidegger advances the view that what
Kant calls the transcendental is not really comprehensible unless
it is seen as a step towards the ontological, and that Kant, appear-
ances notwithstanding, is not a theoretician of knowledge, but a
theoretician of Being.
These, then, are the historical origins of the role of the idea of
transcendence in the philosophies of existence.
What does Jaspers mean by transcendence? Two uses of the
word must be distinguished. First, there is transcendence as the
domain of Being-and here we have something analogous to
Kierkegaard's Wholly Other; secondly, there is the movement of
transcendence that we accomplish-and here the meaning of the
word is analogous to the meaning that Heidegger gives it at times
and Sartre almost always. First we shall take up transcendence as
the domain of Being, expounded by Jaspers in the third volume of
his Philosophy, which bears the title of Transcendence.
Beyond the scientific domain and the domain of existence there
is what Jaspers calls transcendence. That transcendence should lie
beyond the scientific domain as Jaspers defines it, that is, as always
46
 The First Triad
implying some particular postulates, goes without saying. That it
should lie beyond the domain of existence and how it can be beyond
this domain, calls for some explanations.
The domain of existence is the domain of possibility-not intel-
lectual possibility, but possibility as it is lived, as it manifests itself
by our will to act in a certain way. Jaspers always speaks of
possible existence. In science we are concerned with the domain of
what is, in existence, with the domain of what is about to be, but is
not as yet. We shall see in effect that the ideas of futurity, of
projects, of possibility, are essential to the idea of existence. We
are what we shall make of ourselves, what we are about to be, or
again, what we have to be.
Hence, all existence is free existence. The ideas of existence and
freedom are interrelated for Jaspers, as for Kierkegaard, and this
is one of the reasons why they are against posivitism, on the one
hand, and absolute idealism, on the other.
But the existent individual, in what Jaspers calls boundary
situations-in the face of suffering, in the face of death, in the face
in
of his own inner contradictions, the face of the problem of truth
and of faith-feels that there is something other than himself,
other than humanity in general, and that something is trans-
cendence.
This is particularly evident in the problems of truth and faith.
The existent, says Jaspers, only exists in so far as he devotes himself
entirely to a truth that he considers unique-the unique truth to
which he must dedicate his life. But at the same time the existent
knows quite well that other existents devote themselves to truths
other than his, which they regard as unique, and that by virtue
of their devotion, they, too, come to exist. Therefore, concludes
Jaspers, above each man and his truth there must be something
which we cannot reach, and which somehow reconciles in itself all
the unique individuals and their unique truths, and all their
projects and their differences. That something is transcendence.
The domain of transcendence, for Jaspers, is a domain that lies
over and above possibility, choice, freedom. Choice, freedom,
possibility expire in this domain, of which we can only say
that it is and nothing more-save perhaps, says Jaspers, by
resorting to tautologies, to vicious circles, to antitheses, to all
manner of roundabout speech.
Thus, beyond our own selves, we discover something which is
the very bedrock of our existence, but about which we can say
47
 Philosophiesof Existence
nothing without descending into absurdity. This, for example, is
what Shakespeare wants to convey when he says: 'The rest is
silence'. 'The rest' is that which is utterly impervious to the mind.
Here in Jaspers, then, we find the equivalent of Kierkegaard's
Wholly Other, with this difference that Jaspersian transcendence is
no longer the god of revealed religion, but something unnameable,
the ineffable background against which all things must be seen.
The word 'transcendence', as we said, has two meanings in
Jaspers. It also designates the movement we accomplish in trans-
cending ourselves, in soaring above ourselves.1 The existent must
accomplish a continual movement of self-transcendence, says
Jaspers, going back to Nietzsche, whose influence he has felt, along
with Kierkegaard's.
Such, then, is the twofold meaning of the word transcendence in
Jaspers.
Heidegger also uses the word, but with a variety of meanings,
applying to a variety of movements of transcendence.
The existent is in a perpetual movement of transcendence; that
is why he is existent. We said that to exist, for Heidegger, is to be
outside oneself, to be in the world. But we must not think of this
movement as involving an 'I' or a self in which we are initially
enclosed and which we transcend, for the 'I' is not enclosed in
itself; it is transcendent from the outset. Here, then, we have a
mode of transcendence-transcendence towards the world-
which is absolutely essential to existence, which defines the very
notion of existence, according to Heidegger.
That is not all. We exist insofar as we communicate with others.
Mitsein-being with others-is essential to Dasein, to human
existence.
Thirdly-and this is at least as important as transcendence
towards the world-we are continually transcending towards the
future. The place of the ideas of future and possibility in the
philosophies of existence has already been emphasized.
Thus, we are always in the world, always with others, always
reaching out towards the future. These are the first three meanings
of the word 'transcendence' in Heidegger, and they correspond to
the second meaning of the word in Jaspers. We are perpetually
transcending ourselves. But the word has two more meanings in
Heidegger, which are akin to Jaspers' first meaning and the classical
1 For distinctions between the different modes of transcendence in this
second sense, see my La pensee de !'existence (Flammarion, 1952).
48
 The First Triad
meaning of the word. We transcend perpetually towards Being.
We transcend towards Being in virtue of our understanding of the
ontological distinction which permits us to distinguish Being from
individual beings. And at the same time, we know that we exist in
the sense that we stand above nothingness, that we transcend our-
selves out of nothingness. It remains to be seen-and we shall come
back to the problem-what nothingness is. Is it not, in the end,
the same thing as Being ? If so, our last two modes of transcendence
would in reality be identical.
But for the moment we may say that Heidegger elaborates five
modes of transcendence, of which transcendence towards Being
comes nearest to the ordinary meaning of the word.
Several of these meanings of the word are to be found in Sartre,
who speaks rather often of transcendence towards the world and
transcendence towards the future.
In this brief discussion of the idea of transcendence, we began
with Kierkegaard's Wholly Other, touched upon the two senses of
the word in Jaspers, and saw the five modes of transcendence in
Heidegger, of which only two resemble the classical idea of
transcendence, the remaining three being, like Sartrian transcend-
ence, what could be called 'horizontal' transcendence.
The question may be asked: have the philosophers of existence
put the word 'transcendence' to proper use ? Gabriel Marcel has
said that it is illegitimate to use the word in the various senses that
Heidegger and Sartre use it, that the word applies primarily to
God in so far as he is beyond qualification. Marcel is an advocate of
the classical meaning of the word.
But one may go further and ask whether Heidegger is not more
faithful to the origins of the word than even the classical meaning,
whether he does not hark back to a more ancient meaning of the
word. The word 'transcend' suggests an upward movement and
consequently one may agree with Heidegger's remark that the
Daseinalone transcends; God, just because he is up above, could
not be said to transcend. To transcend is to make a movement, and
it is the Dasein,the human existent, that makes the movement of
transcendence.
Thus, one could conclude that the philosophies of existence go
back to a more ancient, more pristine sense of the word 'existence'.

49
 II
The Second Triad:
Possibilityand Project- Origin - Now:,
Situation:,Instant

WE have examined what we called the first three philosophical

categories of existence: the concept of existence itself, the con-
cepts of Being, and the concept of transcendence.
We would now like to study a second series of categories relating
to time, after briefly discussing the role of the idea of time itself in
the philosophies of existence. The time-categories to be studied
are: first, the concepts of possibility and project; second, the con-
cept of origin or source,especially as developed by Jaspers; third,
the three concepts of now, situation, and the instant.
But first, let us take up the idea of time in general.
It was already seen, apropos of Kierkegaard, that existence is
essentially a becoming. But, as we took care to point out,
the Kierkegaardian notion of becoming, and the existential
notion in general, are radically different from the Hegelian
notion of becoming. For time, as Hegel sees it, is a con-
tinuous becoming, a becoming that is rational and explicable.
Kierkegaardian time, on the other hand, is a discontinuous
becoming, made up of crises, advancing by leaps and bounds;
it is an inexplicable becoming, containing irreducibly novel
elements-the upshots of our decisions. Time, for Hegel, is the
becoming of the Idea. For Kierkegaard, it is the becoming of the
human individual himself. Time, for Hegel, leads us to the Abso-
lute, which will reveal itself at the end of time and is potentially
present from the beginning of time; so that time leads us to an
eternity which goes beyond time. For Kierkegaard, there is a
centre to time: the paradoxical moment when the Eternal
turned himself into man, the moment of Incarnation, a moment
50
 The Second Triad
which cannot, properly speaking, be thought, and is an enigma,
a mystery, a scandal.
Several contemporary schools of philosophy, and pragmatism
in particular, have been described as time-philosophies. The term
is also applicable to the philosophy of Bergson and to the philo-
sophies of existence.
But, while we are on the subject of time, we ought to make some
distinctions between Kierkegaard and his successors, especially
Jaspers and Heidegger. To the Kierkegaardian position, which
shuts the individual up, as it were, within his subjectivity and his
subjective relationship with God, Jaspers and Heidegger bring the
idea of what they call Geschichtlichkeit-the individual's deep
historicity. We have already dwelt upon the difference of meaning
between the words Geschichteand Historie in German. Historie
simply denotes the chronological recording of events, but not in
depth, so to speak, while Geschichte(historicity) is the very source
of historical time-the fact that an existent individual is deeply
grounded in a temporal situation, in a historical setting. Thus, to
the Kierkegaardian idea of the individual, Jaspers and Heidegger
add the idea of the individual's deep historicity.
What is historicity according to Jaspers? Historicity, says
Jaspers, is the unity of the being that I am and existence; it is the
unity of Dasein and existence. It is the unity of necessity and
freedom. I am in effect situated at a particular point in space and
in time. This is the import of the idea of situation, which we
shall examine later. I must acknowledge and assume this situation,
and it is only by doing so that I become aware of my historicity.
We can now consider our first time-category, which is that of
possibilityand project, and which therefore involves the idea of the
future.
Indeed, the primal dimension of time, for the philosophers of
existence, is the future. The individual, properly speaking, is not,
but is about to be; he is a task that he sets himself. No doubt
Hegel had already proclaimed the future as the pre-eminent dimen-
sion of time, but in Kierkegaard and his successors the proclama-
tion takes on a different accent, for here the future is the future of
the individual, a subjectively felt future.
The first dimension of time, the 'first ecstasy of time', to use
Heidegger's expression, is the future. 1 We are always in the
1 We must not overlook the fact that Sartre is not in agreement with Heidegger
on this point. More akin to Husserl in this respect, he maintains that the primal
51
 Philosophiesof Existence
planning stage, in 'projection'. What Heidegger means when he
speaks of the 'ecstasy of time', of the 'ec-static character of time'
is that time is never enclosed within itself, that it is, so to speak, in
flight before itself. Just as existence is outside itself, so time is at
every instant outside itself, in flight before itself.
Now, the idea of possibilityis central to Kierkegaard's thought.
One of his main charges against Hegel is that.he leaves no room in
his System for genuinely lived possibility; he makes possibility
impossible and thus deprives man of the oxygen necessary to his
life and actions. A world that does not admit of possibility,
Kierkegaard believed, is a world in which the individual suffocates.
It is particularly in the Conceptof Dreadthat Kierkegaard develops
the idea of possibility, discovering in dread the apparition of
temptational possibilities which plunge us into a state of giddiness
and bewilderment. But if there are temptational possibilities,
possibilities which degrade us, there are also possibilities which
elevate us, which deliver us from temptation, and these are
essentially religiouspossibilities,rendering possible things that to
pedestrian reason would appear impossible. 1 Here we might men-
tion a philosopher not included in our study, Cheslov, who dwells
at length upon this point-the possibility of impossibility-in his
definition of faith as superior to reason.
Jaspers, as it was seen, has a great deal to say about possible
existence,meaning by this that existence is not ready-made, but
always about to be. Man is always ahead of himself, says Heidegger.
And from here it is but a step to Sartre's statement that the existent
is a pro-ject. The idea of project is central to Sartre's philosophy,
and central also to Heidegger's. The existent makes himself; he
must above all not be tied down to his past; he must not let time
fossilize, whether at some point in the past or at some point in the
future. To yoke oneself to some moment of one's past, to refer
continually back to some prior happening or, for that matter, to
clutch in anticipation to some future event-a post, for example,
1 It is thus seen that the idea of a duality of possibilities-possibilities that
degrade us, possibilities that elevate us-is the bridge taking us from unauthen--
ticity to authenticity in Kierkegaard.

dimension of time is the present, that it is in terms of the present, that we form
the future and the past.
But it must also be noted that the present as Sartre conceives it is constantly
vanishing, receding, as it were before itself, so that we may wonder how, on the
basis of such an unstable foundation, the other dimensions of time are to be
construed.
52
 The Second Triad
that one has coveted ever since youth-is to stop the flow of time
indispensable to the for-itself, to mould oneself after a petrified
past or a petrified future, which cease to belong to the for-itself
and lapse into the in-itself. This leads Sartre to his analyses of
self-deception (mauvaiseJoi): self-deception is a disregard of what
one really is; it is an attempt to bring time to a standstill, and
therefore a falsification of time.
We can now go on to our second category, to the idea of origin
or source.
'Generally speaking,' writes Kierkegaard as early as r835, 'all
veritable development is a return back to our origins,' and he cites
the example of great artists who 'go forward by going backwards'.
In our own lives the first instants, the. beginnings are of crucial
importance. The genuine individual, the existent, will therefore
seek to know himself by turning back towards his origin; and he
will, at the same time, seek self-knowledge by turning forward
towards his future. He will thus unite his past and his future in the
fullness of the present.
Kierkegaard invites us to go back to what is pristine, to what is
primitive, to what is primogenial. He believes that existence should
recover its eternal primitivity. And as a Christian, too, Kierke-
gaard wants to go back to the source, back to Christ himself. We
must, he says, sweep away the centuries that separate us from
Christ and estrange us from him; we must become contempor-
aneous with Christ himself: this is the essence of the act of faith.
If we succeed in this act, we shall be just as near Christ as were
his disciples in Jerusalem.
In the other philosophers of existence, too, we find similar
efforts to go back to the source. Thus Heidegger, no doubt in a
different way and in a wholly different domain, would have us
hark back to the earliest Greek philosophers. And Jaspers says
that, in the study of every great philosopher, we must endeavour
to discover the source of his thought (Ursprung).Whether we are
studying Descartes, or Leibniz, or Nietzsche, or Plato, there is
always a core, a fundamental intuition-of which Bergson also
spoke-that must be excavated from beneath the more or less
superficial, rational superstructures of the system. In a long article
on Descartes, Jaspers attempts to show that there is a valid
element in Cartesianism, but that it is vitiated and falsified by the
systematization, by the rationalization that Descartes imposes
upon it.
53
 Philosophiesof Existence
After the categories of possibilityand origin,we come to the last
category of our second triad, bearing the triple title of now,
situation, and instant.
These three ideas are in reality radically different from one
another. What Heidegger would particularly emphasize is that it is
not with the present that we must begin if we wish to gain an
insight into the constitution of time: we must begin with the past
or with the future, for the present is nothing but the junction of the
past and the future. But this junction can be effected in several
ways. It can be effected superficially, and in that case what we have
are nows, the sequence of nows that constitute unauthentic time.
Heidegger makes certain distinctions about time. First, there is
pragmatic time (though he does not refer to it by this name), the
time of everyday life-what he calls time for. Every time we act,
we do so with a practical end in view. This, for instance is the
hour for studying philosophy. The next hour may be reserved/or
lunch, etc. Time in everyday life is always time for. But, on the
basis of this everyday time, science has created abstract time. It is
here that the idea of now comes in. Out of pragmatic time, which
consists of blocks of duration each destined to a particular purpose,
the mind makes a homogenous and infinite time. This homogenous
and infinite time is posterior to everyday time and derived from it.
And it is into this scientific time that nowsare incorporated.
We must therefore make a thorough distinction between the
idea of now and the idea of the instant, which we shall consider
after the ideas off acticity and situation.
There is an element of fact that is neither reducible to, nor
deducible from, anything else; and this element of facticity, as
Heidegger and Sartre call it, is inherent to our very essence.
If we examine this element closely, we shall arrive at what
Heidegger terms Geworfenheit, that is to say the fact that we find
ourselves thrown into this world without knowing why. One may
wonder whether this Heideggerian conception is at all meaningful
independently of religious presuppositions; for perhaps only if
there lingers in the back of our mind the notion of a deity who is
to bring us aid and comfort, can we be surprised and shocked to
find that we are here without aid. Thus our feeling of abandonment
may simply be due to our abandonment of the notion of a bene-
volent deity.
But let us leave this question aside for the moment. What we
wanted to emphasize in connection with Geworfenheit-our
54
 The Second Triad
'throwness' into the world-is that we are facticity through and
through, so much so that even the element of freedom that we
possess .is characterized as facticity. Our very freedom is facticity.
We may now pass on to the idea of situation. No doubt every
philosophy is concerned with man's situation in the universe. But
only when a thinker has a quasi-affective conception of the human
situation can we compare him to the philosophers of existence.
Thus, man as Descartes conceives of him-placed above pure
mechanism and below divine perfection-cannot, properly speak-
ing, be said to be in a situation in the existential sense of the word.
But when a thinker such as Pascal represents man as standing
between two infinities, in the silence and as it were under the
silence of the firmament, alone before his God, then we recognize
a conception of human situation akin to that of the philosophies of
existence.
The idea of situationhas a great importance in all these philo-
sophies. When possibility is placed in actuality it is in a situation.
We have already mentioned the role this idea plays, implicitly at
least, in Kierkegaard's thought. No philosophy was ever more
motivated by a particular situation than Kierkegaard's; it was, as
we saw, in response to the problems raised by his engagement and
his relations to Regina, his fi.ancee,that he developed his entire
philosophy. It is on his private situation, then, that Kierkegaard
meditates. His private situation forms the cornerstone of his
thought, and his thought in turn forms the cornerstone of the
subsequent philosophies of existence.
But not all situations are of this kind; there are also philo-
sophical situations. This, for example, is what Jaspers means when
he says that today one cannot do philosophy as one did philosophy ·
before those momentous events that we call Nietzsche and Kierke-
gaard. The philosopher's situation, therefore, is at least twofold:
there is his private situation and there is his philosophical
situation.
In Gabriel Marcel's thought the idea of situation is equally
present and it enters into his very conception of metaphysics.
Not only must we never abstract a problem from the situation in
which it arises, but also the domain of metaphysics is that in which
our own situation, the situation of the questioner, is called into
question, becomes the object of our scrutiny; thus, it is when our
situation is itself involved in the problem, when the question
recoils back at the questioner, that the problem is transformed
55
 Philosophiesof Existence
into mystery and the realm of metaphysics opens up before us.
The importance of the idea of situation in Sartre's thought is
well known. All our acts, he maintains, can be interpreted differ-
ently depending on whether they are interpreted in terms of our
freedom or in terms of our situation. Sartre's position here is not
free of difficulties, for he affirms at the same time that our situation
is dependent largely on our freedom; He regards freedom as the
more basic idea, to which the idea of situation must be reduced;
the situation only exists because our freedom comes up against
such or such empirical facts, and these facts in turn, only exist in
relation to the goals we set ourselves. Obstacles, then, are obstacles
only because we set ourselves goals, and these goals, Sartre
declares, are set up by our freedom.
Finally, we must mention what Jaspers calls boundarysituations.
In the face of evil, war, suffering, death, our existence is tried to
the extreme, finds itself at its own extremity, realizes that it exists
only because there is something else which it cannot surmount
and before which it must finally assume silence: transcendence.
We come now to the idea of instant. This idea, too, is in a sense
central to Kierkegaard's thought. We have spoken of the instant
of Incarnation as the centre of history according to Kierkegaard.
It is also in the instant that we can break with our conceptual
habits of thought and our social habits in order to commune with
that centre of profound history. Here Kierkegaard invokes both
the Parmenidesof Plato, whose third hypothesis concerns the idea
of instant, and the Gospel's assertion that we transcend time in the
act of receiving the good tidings.
The instant springs from the junction of the past and the future
authentically conceived, just as the now springs from unauthentic
past and future. But the instant lifts us above the planes of past
and future; the instant, says Kierkegaard, is the encounter of time
and eternity; the instant, for Heidegger, is the moment when with
resolute decision we take ourselves upon ourselves and, uniting
our origins and projects, accept the responsibility of what we are.
We can draw a parallel between this concept and the doctrine of
Jaspers according to which what is highest in the hierarchy of
realities is also the most precarious, the most fragile, revealing itself
only in flashes. For a moment the flashes light up the darkness of
our night; they are the carrier of all values. In a view such as this,
value may be said to be inversely proportional to stability.
 III
The Third Triad:
Choiceand Freedom - Nothingness
and Dread - Authenticity

WE shall now take up a third triad of categories: choice and

freedom; nothingnessand dread; authenticity and repetition. It was
seen earlier that existence is time; it will now be seen that it is
choice and freedom within time. It was seen that existence is
related to Being, but that it is also related to that rarefied being,
that diminished being-possibility; and now the diminishing of
Being will continue to the point of nothingness; situation will
become situation of dread. And from nothingnessand dread we
shall be able to go back to the idea of originwhich will, in the idea
of repetition,reveal itself as authenticity.
The first concept we shall take up is that of choice. It will easily
be seen that choice occupies a very important place in Kierke-
gaard's thought. The title of one of his books is Either/Or. We
must choose to choose. Indeed, the idea of possibility would be
nugatory were it not related to the idea ofchoice-choice within
time. Kierkegaard elaborates several levels of choice. First, there
is superficial choice, belonging to what he calls the 'aesthetic stage'
-the stage of pure pleasure. Then come ethical choice and reli-
gious choice.
No doubt Kierkegaard sees a beauty and a purpose to the
ethical choice; some of his writings may even be read as an
apology of that choice. To choose the ethical is to become part of
the community, find a vocation, marry, perform some function in
life. But on the other hand, Kierkegaard believes that there is
something higher than all this, higher than the ethical; this belief
finds its practical expression in the breaking of his engagement,
its philosophical expression in Fear and Trembling.For there is
E 57
 Philosophiesof Existence
what Kierkegaard calls a 'suspension of the ethical', a suspension
prompted by the fact that I hear the voice of God, and God can
absolve us even from our moral obligations.
On this matter one could compare the philosophies-always
dissimilar and yet always calling for comparison-of Nietzsche
and Kierkegaard. ·
Thus the choice is between the aesthetic, which is a region of
scarce faith and scarce choice, the ethical, which is a mature and
integrating choice, and finally the religious, which is abrupt and
disintegrating at first.
But how can we know that it is the voice of God we hear? How
does Abraham know that it is the voice of God bidding him to go
and sacrifice Isaac? No external sign can here be of any use what-
soever, and Kierkegaard lays great emphasis on this point, which
was to become central to the philosophy of existence as a whole.
Independently of all established values, independently of all
determined essences, through our own subjectivity, we shall
decide that what we hear is the voice of God.
In his lecture, Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre, so unlike
and in many ways so opposed as he is to Kierkegaard, advocates
the same point of view.
This, Kierkegaard believes, is not a matter of objective considera-
tions like those of the Hegelians, nor of scientific considerations
like those of the Cartesian or Kantian philosophies; it is above all a
matter of being oneself in one's relations with the Absolute. And
even if the choice we make should involve consequences that appear
foreign to the ethical, we must accept the responsibility of our
choice; though there are no objective signs to point the way, we
must nevertheless go beyond the ethical stage.
Thus, behind the idea of choice we discover the idea of sub-
jectivity which, as we saw in connection with the idea of existence,
occupies a very important place in Kierkegaard's thought.
The idea of choice is also present in the philosophy of Jaspers;
indeed, his whole philosophy, at least as it is set forth in the second
volume of his massive work, Philosophie, may be looked upon as a
kind of catalogue of the various choices open to us.
We are here faced with a problem to which we have already
alluded: is the idea of a list of choices compatible with genuine
existential thought? For example, Jaspers pairs off what he calls
the choice of confidence and the choice of defiance; he contrasts,
as it was seen, the 'Law of Daytime' and the 'Passions of Night'.
58
 The Third Triad
The 'Law of Daytime' is rather similar to the ethical stage in
Kierkegaard. It would have us follow the dictates of reason, find a
vocation, etc.; the 'Passions of Night', the romantic 'Passions of
Night' would have us fly in the face of the 'Law of Daytime'. (The
opposition here is not the Kierkegaardian opposition between the
ethical and the religious, for although Jaspers' 'Law of Daytime'
corresponds closely to the ethical stage in Kierkegaard, the
'Passions of Night' cannot be said to correspond to Kierkegaard's
religious stage.) In the 'Law of Daytime' and 'Passions of Night',
then, we have conflicting attitudes, and both attitudes, Jaspers
believes, can be authentic. The question is whether Jaspers, in
compiling a catalogue of possible choice, remains faithful to the
spirit of the philosophy of existence, to the spirit of his own
philosophy; for he tells us at the same time that the way to pro-
fundity is by way of narrowness. Thus as an existent, Jaspers would
choose one specific course, either the 'Law of Daytime' or the
'Passions of Night'. But as a philosopher reflecting on existence
and not on any one existent, he ventures to make a list of the
various possible choices. There is nevertheless a difficulty here, a
sort of antinomy in Jaspers' thought. We can do one of two things:
either draw up a list of possible choices or adopt and put into
practice one specific choice. It would seem that both cannot be
done at the same time.
But the main point we wanted to make is theimportanceoftheidea
of choice in Jaspers, its elemental character. All choice, so long as
it is authentic, takes us nearer to the origin,leads us to the instant.
The idea of choice can also be found in the philosophy of
Sartre. Sartre insists above all on the fact that it is by my choice
that I create values. I am the unfounded foundation of all values;
since I am the one who founds everything, I myself am without
foundation; I am the being that brings values into the world and
for that very reason I myself am unjustifiable. Sartre, like Kierke-
gaard, insists that there are no external signs to guide me; I must
make my own rules and make them alone: 'There was in his world,'
Sartre writes in The Age of Reason, 'no evil or good save what he
set up as such. All round him things had formed a circle and
waited without making a sign; he stood alone in the midst of a
monstrous silence, alone and free, without recourse or excuse,
irrevocably condemned, condemned to be free.'
From here we can pass on to the idea of freedom. It is the
question of freedom that brings Kierkegaard into conflict with
59
 Philosophiesof Existence
Hegel. Freedom, says Kierkegaard, is man's greatness and gran-
deur. His charge against Hegel is that he has left no room in his
system for our feeling of freedom.
The idea of freedom is also to be found at the centre of Jaspers'
thought. How is it, he asks, that we are free, how is it that existence
is essentially freedom? It is because transcendence is concealed
from us. If transcendence were revealed to us directly, we should
not, says Jaspers, be able to be free: transcendence would dominate
us. Transcendence conceals or veils itself. Transcendence, to use a
Kierkegaardian expression taken over by Jaspers, refrains from
revealing itself save indirectly so as to put our freedom to the test.
Accordingly, the domain of existence is the domain of freedom,
and hence that of possibility, project and choice.
The same is true of Sartre; indeed, it may be said that Sartre's
whole thought revolves round the idea of freedom.
Freedom, says Sartre, is the sole foundation of values. It is true
that he lays down a sort of in actu universalization of values : my
freedom is interdependent with that of all others; nevertheless.,
my freedom is basically my freedom. No other can nor has to
follow the path that I follow. Akin to the Kafka character for whom
opens a door which can open for no other, the existent knows that
his problem is his alone, and his solution only his.
Here one could underscore the meeting in Sartre of two tradi-
tions both going back to Kant, one via Lagneau and Alain and the
other via Heidegger.
The Sartrian doctrine of freedom has a number of peculiar
features. To begin with, Sartre maintains that if a being is free,
he is always free, in all situations, under all circumstances. In
classical theories of freedom we are said to be free at certain
moments and not free at certain others. But Sartre tells us that if
man is free, he is always free. It would be incomprehensible, he
argues, that freedom should disappear and then reappear at some
later moment. Consequently we are equally free whether we decide
to be cowardly or courageous. Whichever way we act, our re-
sponsibility is in no way cut down, on the contrary, since in either
case there is a choice: in both cases there is decision and freedom.
The view that man is equally free at all times is one which had
not been previously maintained; it is to Sartre's credit to have put
forward this view which, though tending to destroy the very feeling
of freedom that Sartre means to safeguard, offers us a new subject
for reflection.
60
 The Third Triad
What is more, freedom always appears in Sartre-and this could
also be said of Jaspers and Heidegger-as limitation and :finitude.
An act of freedom is always an act by which we choose some
specific thing. Sartre goes even further: freedom is in a sense a
lesser kind of being; it is a deficiency, a lack, a sort of gap, a sort
of nothingness within being. What is here involved is Sartre's
whole doctrine of the for-itself, his whole doctrine of nothingness.
I am the being that I am not and I am not the being that I am.
Freedom is tied up with my essential negativity (in the Hegelian
and dialectical sense of the word as well as the Sartrian sense).
Thirdly, our freedom is a fact; it is part of our facticity, to use
the word used by Heidegger and after him by Sartre. Freedom is
not self-determined initially; and as it is part of our facticity, we
are not free not to choose, we are not free not to be free. This is the
import of Sartre's statement that we are condemned to be free.
Thus there is not only a facticity but also a necessity to our con-
tingency. We might say-and this would indicate an internal
difficulty in Sartre's thought-that it is man's nature to be free,
but Sartre rejects the idea of nature properly speaking, and freedom
in fact is not a 'nature' since it always affords us the possibility of
being something other than what we are.
In the light of what has been said, we see the genesis of the
Sartrian idea that we are what we make of ourselves. He appro-
priates Lequier's precept: Faire et, enf aisant, sefaire (man makes
himself). I am the sum total of my acts. We have already contrasted
Sartre and Kierkegaard on this point; Sartre, unlike Kierkegaard,
does not believe in the ineffable. He holds that we must express
ourselves, that we do express ourselves, and that a feeling does not
exist apart from its expression. Here Sartre's thought is in line
with Hegel's rather than with Kierkegaard's.
We make ourselves. This is what Sartre has sought to show in a
good many of his books. In his essay on Baudelaire, for example,
he tries to show how Baudelaire wanted his defeats in a way, how
behind every failure there lurks Baudelaire's will to failure. And
from here we can go on to the Sartrian idea that we are always free
to accept the judgements of others about ourselves or to refuse
them. In this respect again there is a pre-eminence of freedom
over my situation. We said a moment ago that the situation only
exists through my freedom, since obstacles only exist in relation
to the goals I set myself; now we can add that my freedom can
choose to recognize or not to recognize the situation.
6r
 Philosophiesof Existence
Another novel feature that Sartre brings to the doctrine of
freedom as found in the philosophy of existence in general (except
in certain passages in Jaspers) is the interdependence of my
freedom and that of others. Their freedom is dependent on mine,
and mine on theirs. Nothing could matter to me without mattering
to others. Perhaps some sort of analogy could be drawn between
this Sartrian notion and the Kantian idea of the universalization
of the maxim in the Critique of Practical Reason: in choosing a
mode of behaviour for myself, I choose it in a way for all men; I
decide that all men ought to behave in such and such a fashion.
Hence man is responsible not only for himself, but also for others.
He is totally responsible not only for his own existence but also .
for that of others. I cannot will my own freedom without at the same
time willing that of others. 1
Having considered the place of the idea of freedom, we may
now try to see the limitations of that idea in each of these philo-
sophies.
It will be seen that freedom which seemed at first to occupy a
foremost place in these philosophies is nevertheless dominated in
a sense by necessity, by endless struggle against necessity, and is
finally transcended by transcendence.
Let us first take Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard believes in human
freedom, but on the other hand he believes in grace and affirms a
certain co-operation between the two. A new factor, then, is added
to the doctrine of freedom. Moreover, in the most profound
instances of choice, in the most intense instances of volition, we
have a feeling of being unable to act otherwise. Finally, Kierke-
gaard lays it down-and the other philosophers of existence sub-
scribe to the same position-that we must take our situation upon
ourselves. This view is somewhat similar to Nietzsche's 'yea' to
destiny, to his amor fati. We must accept what we are; we must,
after the 'leap' towards transcendence which Kierkegaard would
have us make, come back to ourselves and say 'yes' to ourselves.
These, then, are the three factors which tend to cut down the scope
of freedom in Kierkegaard's thought.
The position of Jaspers is not unlike Kierkegaard's. Jaspers
emphasizes the fact that freedom does exist in that intermediate
domain which is the domain of existence. But there is for him a
domain higher than that of existence, a domain analogous to that
of Kierkegaardian grace-the domain of transcendence, and here
1 But here again there is a difficulty: Is freedom willed? Is it not simply a fact?
62
 The Third Triad
there is no more possibility, no more freedom. Freedom vanishes
on the threshold of transcendence. It ends in failure precisely
because there is beyond existence the domain of transcendence.
Freedom is a movement leading to self-negation, to self-efface-
ment, so that transcendence may manifest itself. Freedom is the
vanishing appearance of transcendence. It vanishes almost as soon
as transcendence appears; and as it is itself one of the highest
manifestations of Being, it partakes of the characteristic of Being's
highest manifestations: it appears only in flashes.
Moreover, in our profoundest acts of freedom, we do not have
the feeling of choosing ourselves. When we reach what could be
called the highest point of freedom, there is no longer a feeling of
choice, but rather the feeling of being unable to will otherwise.
Kierkegaard, too, as it was seen, had insisted on this idea. Beyond
choice there is something else: there is non-choice, which is superior
to choice. In our highest acts of freedom we have the feeling
that we are no longer acting alone, that we are impelled by some
force no longer wholly our own; and at such times we experience
the feeling of having, by our very choice, reached a region where
it is no longer possible to choose. This, in the philosophy of Jaspers,
is one of the ways in which freedom at its height makes for the
appearance of that region where there is no more possibility, no
more freedom-the region of transcendence. This is a second factor
which, in Jaspers as in Kierkegaard, diminishes the scope of free-
dom.
Thirdly, Jaspers stresses the fact that we are 'given' to ourselves.
We do not have the feeling of creating ourselves, but are given,
'consigned', as he says, to ourselves; we must receive ourselves,
as it were. This constitutes a third factor tending to reduce the
place of freedom in Jaspers' thought. It must also be ol:,servedthat
for Jaspers, freedom exists only in relation to something other than
itself.-in relation to obstacles, in relation to things that deny
freedom. Freedom implies non-freedom and struggle against non-
freedom. Freedom is inherent to man's nature, to his facticity, and
it is a struggle against facticity. That is why it ends in failure in
Jaspers' philosophy and perhaps in all the philosophies of exist-
ence.
Lastly, the idea of repetition,present in Jaspers' thought as in
Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's, tends to diminish the scope of
freedom; for we must take what we are upon ourselves. It is
precisely the given element of myself that I must, it seems, assume,
63
 Philosophiesof Existence
make my own. This idea too helps us to see that the place of
freedom is not as preponderant as it would appear at first sight.
We could make parallel observations about Heidegger. For
although Heideggerian man is characterized by the ideas of
possibility and project, he is also characterized by the fact that
his projects have an end-an end not in the sense of goals, but
one which puts an end to them: death. And everything, at least in
Sein und Zeit, is envisaged from the point of view of this end, which
is evidently tantamount to the defeat of freedom, since death is
defined by Heidegger as the possibility of impossibility or perhaps
one might equally say as the impossibility of the possible. This is
an inexorable incarnation of facticity-an incarnation which is
really a disincarnation. It is only when we are dead that our life
becomes a veritable whole according to Heidegger. Thus the idea
of boundless freedom ends in failure.
On the other hand, what ought we to do with our freedom?
This is where Heidegger's idea of resolutedecisioncomes in. We
ought-as in Kierkegaard and Jaspers-to say 'yes' to our fate.
Here again Heidegger's thought is influenced as much by Nietzsche
as by Kierkegaard. Our fate is to live as beings limited by death;
we must decide to be what we are-finite beings, limited by death.
Once again freedom is submerged by a feeling of necessity.
Our projects are limited by our past. The relation between
projects, possibility, the future, on the one hand, and the past and
the situation, on the other, raises the problem of idealism vs.
realism in Heidegger's philosophy. There is in his philosophy an
oscillation between an extreme idealism that accords a central
position to freedom and a realism that emphasizes Being-a for-
saken and humiliated Being in Sein und Zeit. Perhaps some sort of
reconciliation between these two tendencies could be conceived
if it were granted that truth itself, at least as defined by Heidegger,
that is, as consisting in letting Being be what it is, implies a certain
freedom; for does not the very word letting indicate an act of mind,
and in this case the act of a mind no longer humiliated, as it seemed
to be in certain passages of Sein und Zeit, but simply taking Being
in, receiving it; and once again Being predominates. We are on the
road to Holzwege.
These philosophies which present themselves as philosophies
of freedom are perhaps not so freedom-centred as they at first
appear to be, and when we come to the philosophy of Sartre, we
are confronted with at least two problems concerning the limits
64
 The Third Triad
of freedom. To begin with, there is the problem raised by the idea
of situation. For freedom is always freedom in some given situation;
it is limited, conditioned. Thus each of our acts can be interpreted
in two ways : in terms of our situation or in terms of our freedom.
Then there is the problem of the overall unity of our freedom.
Freedom, according to Sartre, is the constant possibility of being
something other than what we are. But on the other hand, is there
not a fundamental freedom governing all our particular acts of ·
freedom? This question is raised by Sartre in Bei'ngand Nothing-
ness. Is there not, over and above all our particular projects, some
one general project which is the project of our life ? If the answer is
yes, then it would seem that we are committed to the idea of a
timeless freedom rather similar to that of Kant and to that proposed
by Plato. But then all our particular acts of freedom would depend
on this unique and timeless choice. No doubt the original project
is rather a general configuration or even a virtual image. Neverthe-
less the problem remains unsolved.
Lastly, our freedom tends to be self-destructive. It fosters
necessity; no sooner is an act performed than it escapes us and
turns into an in-itself. But here again we are faced with a number
of difficulties: did we not say that according to Sartre we are free
always to the same extent? Now we are told that freedom puts
fetters upon itself, that the pour-soi (for-itself) transforms itself
into en-soi (in-itself). Did we not say that for Sartre freedom
consists in being what one is not and in not being what one is ?
Now we are told that our past acts weigh down upon us, weigh
us down, so to speak. Is not Sartre attributing two rather contra-
dictory characteristics to freedom? Such is our condition says he,
that we are at once a freedom which tends to become petrified and a
freedom which overcomes, or at least ought to overcome, this
petrification, and it is not genuine unless it does overcome the
tendency to ossification, the tendency to be what it is when its
deeper tendency is to be what it is not.
Freedom is due to nature, since it is our nature to be free; but
it is also contrary to nature, since it must continuously try to
struggle against its own inner tendency toward petrification,
toward transformation into what Sartre calls in-itself. Consequently
freedom always ends in failure, and, as a matter of fact, it would
be more precise to speak of self-liberation than freedom.
In Jaspers too, freedom is caught-caught between nature and
transcendence, between two stronger elements which negate it.
65
 Philosophiesof Existence
But this does not mean that it will fade away. It must, according
to Jaspers, exist precisely in this zone of struggle against nature
and transcendence. From this point of view, it may be said that we
are not free, absolutely speaking, but are engaged in an endless
attempt to liberate ourselves.
In Jaspers, freedom disappears on the threshold of transcend-
ence. In Heidegger, it gives way before facticity and necessity.
In Jaspers, existence is the impossibility of attaining transcendence
and yet an endless hankering after it. In Heidegger, the supreme
possibility is the possibility of impossibility, and our greatest act
of freedom appears, in some passages at least, to be that in which
we recognize that our freedom is overwhelmed by necessity. In
Sartre, freedom is always on the verge of disappearing, on the verge
of being swallowed up by the in-itself.
It is nevertheless in Sartre that the sense of freedom and the
call to freedom remain the strongest, secure from transcendence.
We have seen two triads of categories, the first comprising
existence,Being, and transcendence,the second relating to time and
including, in the first place, possibility and project, secondly, origin
or source,and finally, a set of concepts ranging from now to situation
and culminating in the instant. We had come to the third triad,
whose first term, choiceand freedom, we have studied. We shall now
take up the second, composed of dread and nothingness,and then go
on to the third term of this triad: repetition and authenticity.
It was seen that dread or anguish is, in Kierkegaard, related to the
idea of choice. There are possibilities of evil in us. There are
temptational possibilities. Hence a first source of dread.
A second source lies in the fact that what is constantly at stake
is our eternal salvation or perdition.
The role of sin is twofold in Kierkegaard. First,it is consciousness
of sin that destroys the Hegelian world view; discontinuous,
individual, transcendent, it shatters the System. Nothing, according
to Kierkegaard, is more individual, nothing shuts me up more
thoroughly in myself than sin. But in the second place, it leads us
towards religious existence, since the very idea of sin implies the
idea of appearing before God.
The third source of dread consists in this: that it is exceedingly
difficult to make out what is good and what is evil, to determine
whether a particular possibility is a temptational possibility or a
redemptive one. For everything in the province of existence is
utterly ambiguous; there are no external signs to help us. And
66
 The Third Triad
once again we find the recurrent theme of Kierkegaard and
Sartre: There are no fast rules, no landmarks; we are navigators
without a compass.
The authentic individual, the existent, whom we have sought to
portray, will never be sure of being what Kierkegaard calls the
Knight of Belief. 'Am I the Knight of Belief' or am I merely
tempted ?-I cannot say; it is not for me to say; I am here in the
region of absolute risk.'
At every moment, Jaspers tells us, I must try to decide whether
I am sinking into nothingness or whether I am retaining my self-
identity by affirming my own existence. I am perpetually caught
between the choices of being and non-being. I must decide whether
or not I am and what I am. Therefore I am never something that
is decided, but always a person who must decide, who is about to
decide; shall I remain the same, constant to myself, deeply histori-
cal, or shall I abandon myself, uproot myself from my own history ?
The ideas of passion and uncertainty are interrelated for
Kierkegaard; it is the unsure thing that solicits our passion. We
are not impassioned by certainties, but by things involving a risk.
The subjective thinker is not in possession of any u:niversalizable
truth in the rational sense of the word; rather, he always has the
sensation of being in danger, of being on the high seas amid a
storm. It is his uncertainty as regards what he believes that
heightens and intensifies his subjectivity. He is on a stormy,
bottomless sea. In the sphere of existence, in the sphere of sub-
jectivity, there are no proofs, no demonstrations. When he has
come to know this risk, the individual is thoroughly transformed;
here there are no results in the sense that science gives us results,
but the individual is internally transformed and, in this sense,
everything is transformed.
There is a fourth sense of dread, related to ontology. We already
touched upon it when we said that we cannot think of Being, nor
yet not think of Being.
Such are the causes of Kierkegaardian dread.
Nor is the role of dread less prominent in Jaspers. For Jaspers,
what is at stake is not our eternal salvation or perdition, but our
existence, and in existence all choices are made independently of
objective references.
In Heidegger, too, the idea of dread plays a very important
role, at least in Sein und Zeit. Only by means of dread can we
advance from the sphere of the unauthentic to that of the authentic.
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 Philosophiesof Existence
Heidegger, like Kierkegaard before him, makes a distinction
between dread and fear. Fear always results from particular situa-
tions, while dread is our response to the world as such, to the sum
total of beings. We experience dread not in connection with any
particular thing, but in connection with the world as a whole.
Dread is ever-present for Heidegger as for Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard had said that even the absence of dread is a sign of
dread: if a man seems free of dread, he is sure to be hiding his
dread from himself through dread of dread. There is never an
absence of dread. Dread, in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, is
the bedrock of all our feelings. It is our fundamental feeling. It
could be said that in Kant the ontological 'feeling' is of quite a
different order: respect is the ontological 'feeling'; the role
played by respect in Kant is replaced by dread in Kierkegaard and
Heidegger.
In his analyses of existence, Heidegger sometimes turns to
another feeling, to the feeling of boredom. He believes that bore-
dom reveals our temporal nature, and particularly deep boredom,
for he comes to elaborate a whole hierarchy of boredoms: there
are particular boredoms, but underlying these there is what he calls
deep boredom. It is not difficult to see that deep boredom is
nothing other than dread.
Nor is it difficult to see how Heidegger, taking the word 'bore-
dom'-in German Langeweile, 'long while'-concludes that the
feeling of duration is the foundation of our being.
The same feeling of dread or anguish accompanied by the
feeling of nausea, is to be found as the fundamental feeling in
Sartre and much for the same reasons as have already been dis-
cussed: absence of all objective references, absence of landmarks,
the fact that we are in a world where there are no predetermined
norms, where we must set up our own norms. We justify all things
and consequently we ourselves are unjustifiable. It is this feeling
of unjustifiability that permeates Sartre's Orestes and other
characters and is the cause of dread.
However, Sartre suggests another source of dread, especially in
his lecture Existentialismis a Humanism.Dread, Sartre here argues,
is caused by the fact that our decisions are never for ourselves
alone, but for all men. We have already spoken of this Sartrian
notion. By our decisions we commit not only ourselves but all men;
hence enormous responsibility is involved in the way we make a
decision and in the way we interpret the universe.
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 The Third Triad
In this lecture, then, the idea of dread is accounted for in a rather
novel way. But though the accounts may vary-and among the
most cogent is the absence of predetermined norms-the feeling
of dread is always there as a fundamental theme in the philosophies
of existence (exception made of Gabriel Marcel).
From the idea of dread we can pass naturally on to the idea of
nothingness. Choice and freedom emerge out of nothingness.
Already in Kierkegaard the idea of nothingness was present, tied
up to the idea of dread: Temptational possibilities which are inter-
mediate between being and nothingness float before our eyes and
make us giddy, fill us with dread.
Nevertheless, the idea of nothingness cannot be said to be
central to Kierkegaard's thought. It is true that Kierkegaard could
be so interpreted as to stress the role of the idea of nothingness
in his thought; his feeling of his own nothingness before God,
his assertion that God can in no way be characterized are some-
what similar to the Being of negative theologies. None the less,
the idea of nothingness is of secondary importance in Kierkegaard
if compared with Heidegger; for Kierkegaard, despite what has
just been said, was concerned primarily with relative nothing-
ness in the form of possibilities, and not with absolute and
actual nothingness.
Heidegger arrives at the idea of nothingness in several ways.
First, by the idea, essential to his philosophy, that we are finite
beings. Now, the idea of finitude implies the ideas of limitation and
nothingness. Secondly, we are brought to an end, terminated, by
the last moment of our life, which is death. And here again what
we find is the idea of nothingness; it is in the anticipation of death
that we come face to face with our own nothingness. In these two
ways Heidegger goes from the idea of finitude to the idea of
nothingness.
Thirdly, we are, according to Heidegger, always in a state of
guilt. We are limited. The idea of limitation is in Heidegger con-
nected to the idea of guilt. Here the question may well be asked
whether in Heidegger, as in Jaspers, this idea of guilt is not the
vestige of a religious state that they themselves claim to have for
the most part left behind.
To exist is to be limited. To be limited is to depart from the
absolute and the infinite. Therefore to exist is to be guilty. This
idea may be traced back to the Kierkegaardian notion of existence
as guilt, but in Kierkegaard the idea is part of a larger doctrine
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 Philosophiesof Existence
stating that existence is at once the highest value and sin. We are
separated from the Wholly Other in relation to whom we live in a
state of ceaseless tension. This separation is a guilty thing, but at
the same time, this separation is what gives our existence all its
intensity and thereby its value.
But the idea of finitude serves merely as a preliminary account of
the idea of nothingness in Heidegger. In his essay 'What is
Metaphysics ?', Heidegger treats the matter in a much wider and
more radical way, contending that every definition, as Spinoza
had said, implies a negation. Metaphysics, for instance, is such and
such a thing, and that thing only, and not something else. Now,
every negation of this kind, according to Heidegger, presupposes
nothingness. The error of classical philosophy-and on this score
Bergson would also be ranked as a classical philosopher-is that
it explains the idea of nothingness in terms of negation. Now, it
is the opposite course that we must take. If it were not for the fact
that nothingness exists in us, and consequently in the universe,
there would be no negation.
But what can we say about nothingness ? We cannot say that it
is, for that would be a contradictory assertion. We must therefore
coin a new word. Nothingness has a certain activity, an activity of
negation that Heidegger tries to render by the word to nought or
to nihilate. We are obliged, he believes, to coin new words or
rehabilitate words grown obsolete so as to impart certain notions.
For instance, it is wrong to say that the world is: the world
worlds.We cannot say that time is: it temporalizesitself. We cannot
say that nothingness is; it performs an activity of noughting by
which it tears things down and reduces them to nought. And, on the
other hand, the things that it reduces to nought spring originally
from nothingness. Nothingness is therefore the foundation of all
things.
The metaphysical question in hand is further complicated by
the fact that upon republishing his essay 'What is Metaphysics ?',
Heidegger has added a postscript in which he tells us that nothing-
ness is none other than Being. Nothingness can only be defined as
that which is no particular being. Now, there is something which
is no particular being, namely, Being itself. Heidegger takes it for
granted that there cannot be two things having the property-if
one can here speak of properties-of not being any particular being.
And so he is left with the conclusion that nothingness is Being
itself, inasmuch as it defies all determination.
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 The Third Triad
It will be seen that Heidegger's position here borders on negative
theology as founded partly on the first hypothesis of Parmenides,
elaborated by the Pseudo-Dionysius, and taken up again by the
major Christian mystics, and particularly by Eckhart who has had
an influence on Heidegger.
It may seem natural here to mention the name of Hegel:, as at the
beginning of his Logic we find the same affirmation that nothing-
ness and Being are one. Hegel believes that if the idea of Being is
considered simply and purely, independently of all determination,
it will be seen that Being is nothingness. But the Being that Hegel
is dealing with at this point in his Logic is a purely abstract
Being. Therefore, it is to negative theology rather than to Hegel
that Heidegger's idea should be compared.
But if Heidegger's own interpretation of his doctrine is accepted,
it becomes rather difficult to see how the very concepts of this
essay on metaphysics are to be understood, how it can be main-
tained that Being, since Being and nothingness are now identical,
reduces everything to nought, destroys everything. Are we to
understand that the world is engulfed, swallowed up by Being ?
It is not impossible that Heidegger should think: so. Nevertheless,
between the essay itself and the Appendix, there seem to be some
differences and divergencies. And the question remains as to what
nothingness is in Heidegger.
It must be admitted that Heidegger's attempt to probe into the
nature of nothingness is highly suggestive and significant, one at
any rate that has rarely been carried out with so much logic.
In effect one of Plato's conclusions in the Sophist was that there
can be no absolute nothingness, that there can only be relative
nothingnesses, that there can only be Difference. And classical
philosophy has always dismissed the idea of absolute nothingness.
It is to Heidegger's credit to have tried to show what such an idea
of absolute nothingness would consist in. Does he succeed? Perhaps
it is not possible to succeed. And so he falls back on the idea that
nothingness is Being itself. Being, he says, is all that we have before
us. Being reveals and conceals itself at the same time. But what
does concealment mean? It is difficult to comprehend such a concept
as concealmentwithout, in one way or another, thinking of negation,
and Heidegger tells us that negation cannot be comprehended
without nothingness, and the whole problem arises again.
Let us now examine Sartre's doctrine of 'nihilation'. Here the
two concepts, existence and nothingness, which were not quite
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 Philosophiesof Existence
linked in Heidegger, or at least not always in the same way, are
linked together. There certainly are passages in Heidegger assert-
ing that it is essentially in Dasein that nothingness makes its
appearance. But the link between the two ideas is far more
rigorous in Sartre. I myself am nothingness; I am the one who
introduces the idea of nothingness into the world. The world is
plenitude, or rather it would be plenitude were it not for the for-
itself, were it not for man. Man is a kind of gap, an empty and
vicious duration; it is man that brings absence into the world.
It could be said that Sartre often uses the word 'being' as a
synonym for 'Being-in-itself', and the word 'nothingness' as a
synonym for 'Being-for-itself.' Being and Nothingness, the title
of his book, stands really for the in-itself and the for-itself. I, the
subject, am nothingness.
But perhaps there is not just one kind of nothingness in Sartre's
philosophy; and perhaps his doctrine of nothingness is a regression
in comparison, if not with Heidegger's findings, at least with his
effort and ·goal. Heidegger tries, and the attempt, as we said, is
significant and suggestive even if not successful, to make us grasp
the reality of nothingness.
In Sartre's philosophy there is a multitude of nothingnesses or
rather what he calls nihilations. Every psychological phenomenon
is interpreted by him in terms of nihilation. Imagination, for
example, is that which is not perception; perception, in turn, is
that which is not reducible to itself. Each thing, indeed, is nothing-
ness in comparison with something else. For instance, if I wish to
achieve some goal, I must set myself an ideal, that is to say, I must
nihilate reality; then I must realize my ideal and nihilate once again
by my action some aspect of reality. There is a succession, a cas-
cade of nihilations. Every act in the domain of the for-itself
constitutes a nihilation.
And so one may wonder whether Sartre does not go back from a
Heideggerian conception of nothingness to a Hegelian conception
of nothingness-for Hegel firmly regarded mind, which underlies
everything, as negativity-and even further back to a Platonic
conception. Behind the Sartrian idea of nothingness what we find
is the idea of otherness.
The ideas of dread and nothingness make it possible for us to
advance from the unauthentic to the authentic. The two concepts
of unauthenticity and authenticity, found above all in Heidegger,
are also central to Kierkegaard's thought.
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 The Third Triad
Heidegger makes a distinction between the domain of One
(Man), that is to say the domain of our being in so far as we are
replaceable by any other human being, and another domain to
which we accede only after experiencing dread.
Heidegger says that when he speaks of authenticity and un-
authenticity, he does not mean to imply a superiority of the one
over the other, that they are both metaphysical categories, and that
as metaphysical facts they are of equal importance. Actually, it is
difficult to follow him on this score, for no sooner does one dif-
ferentiate between authenticity and unauthenticity than one
becomes deferential to authenticity.
We come now to the ideas of failure (echec) and repetition.
In Kierkegaard's case there is failure in his very life, and it is to
overcome this failure that he resorts to God, turns to transcen-
dence. It is the consciousness of the failure of geniuses-be it
Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche, or Van Gogh-that leads Jaspers to
consider the category of failure as essential to the philosophy of
existence. It is through failure that, as we noted, the existent may
approach transcendence. We noted also that Jaspers' philosophy
may be regarded both as an ontology of failure and as a failure of
ontology, since he fails to achieve a unified idea of Being.
The idea of failure is also to be found in Sartre, for example in
connection with the individual's relations with others.
Now, to overcome failure there is according to Kierkegaard a
way, which he propounds in a highly complex and confused
fashion in the work called Repetition. This idea of repetition, by
which Kierkegaard hoped to turn failure into triumph, has re-
mained one of the existential categories of the philosophies of
existence.
What does Kierkegaard mean by repetition ? In a period of his
life previous to that in which his thought crystallized, Kierkegaard
was firmly convinced that we can be happy only if we can recapture
a given moment of the past exactly as it was lived. This Kierke-
gaardian idea is somewhat similar to Proust's ambition in A la
Recherche du Temps Perdu: to really recapture some moment of
the past is to achieve happiness. And in a rather puerile fashion, it
seems, Kierkegaard had attempted repetition, for example by
returning to the opera-house to hear his favourite opera, so as to
put himself in exactly the same state of mind as that in which he
had heard it for the first time. But he came to realize that this was
an impossible task. His relations with his fiancee decided the
F
73
 Philosophiesof Existence
matter, and he finally concluded that it is not in this world that
repetition is possible, but in the next, and through faith. Never-
theless, he added: once we have found faith we can perhaps
achieve repetition even in this world. Is not Job, for example, said
to have found his family and his sons again in the end ? Conse-
quently., this world can be rendered hallow precisely by our
renunciation of it.
Kierkegaard would therefore have us distinguish between a
primary immediation, which is prior to reflection and faith, and
what he calls matured immediation-mediated immediation, we
might call it, using the phrase of his archenemy, Hegel-which
one would attain after having been in contact with transcendence.
Only after living this instant which is the encounter of time and
eternity can one really regard this world as hallowed.
Kierkegaard's final aim, then, is not to get away from this world
through religion, but to return to the world, the world as it is, and
even not to differ from other men; the man who has a great faith,
Kierkegaard believes, will in no way differ from others, will rejoice
like them, and the ideal would perhaps be that his faith will not be
known to others; he will have transfigured the real world in such a
way that he himself will on the face of it not differ from those who
bestow all their confidence upon the real world.
When we come to Heidegger the idea of repetition cannot be
interpreted or accounted for in the same way, for in Heidegger, at
least in Sein und Zeit, there is no allusion to any godhead. We are
in this world limited in our very being. The only way to take our
destiny upon ourself-for this finally is the meaning of the Heideg-
gerian decision-is to want ourselves to be limited by death. It is
therefore by way of dread and the thought of death that we arrive
at repetition. We must take what we are upon ourselves. This is
what Heidegger calls the anticipatory resolute decision by which we
live our own death in advance. We overcome our failure by be-
coming conscious of that failure.
Jaspers' interpretation of the idea of repetition is different from
Heidegger's and a little closer to Kierkegaardian repetition: our
failures, he believes, are nothing but the affirmation of transcen-
dence; they are the reverse side of transcendence. The fact that we
fail is an indication that there is some greater thing, a sphere
higher than that of existence. We become aware of this sphere in
what Jaspers calls boundary situations.
Thus, failure makes it possible for us to mount from existence
74
 The Third Triad
towards transcendence, and for this reason, in so far as it conducts
us to repetition, it is the supreme 'cipher', the supreme symbol of
transcendence.
Through failure, Jaspers believes, we attain being, for in failure
we attain something that is in no way reducible to ourselves; we
see glittering at a distance something greater than ourselves. Only
for an instant do we see it glitter, for that which is higher than all
else is necessarily precarious; the symbol of transcendence reveals
itself only in flashes, flashes in the night, but these flashes account
for everything.
It is thus seen that the two ideas of failure and repetition are not
so opposed as they seem at first, since in both Heidegger and
Jaspers it is failure that brings about the possibility of repetition,
it is failure that leads us to triumph and to authenticity.
Nietzsche tells us that the world in which we find ourselves is an
absurd one since all things will recur exactly as they are. The
superman is the man who can stand this vision, depressing to
others, and can affirm and even will the eternal recurrence of
things. The man who says 'yea' to life and says it eternally and
does not retract it even if life recurs in this absurd fashion-such
a man will have triumphed over pessimism, over Schopenhauerism;
he will have achieved love of destiny. Now, this Nietzschean idea
is evidently present, and intimately so, in the thought of Heidegger
and Jaspers.
We have come to the end of this triad which consisted of the
following categories: first, choiceand freedom; second, nothingness
and dread; third, repetition and authenticity.

75
 IV
The Unique- The Other -
Communication

WE shall now take up a fourth triad of concepts comprising the

ideas of the Unique, the Other, and communication.
Kierkegaard says that it is always to the isolated and unique
individual that he addresses himself. In this he may be compared
to Stimer and Nietzsche. No other philosopher, says Kierkegaard
speaking of himself, has put so much emphasis on the concept
of the individual, of the Unique one. And, as we have seen, it
was on the basis of this concept that he opposed Hegelian-
ism. The individual is not reducible to any system; he is not
just a moment in the history of the System; he is not expressible
by his works. For Hegel the individual is the sum total of his
acts and works, and parallel assertions can be found in Sartre.
But for Kierkegaard, as we saw, the individual has secrets that
cannot be communicated. This is Kierkegaard's germinal and
central insight.
In the province of existence, Kierkegaard believes, the individual
can only hear his own voice; he cannot, properly speaking, join
the society of other men; he must take his secret to the grave. But it
is exceedingly difficult to expose doctrinally the category of the
Unique one. 'This category,' says Kierkegaard, 'cannot form the
subject of a dissertation; it is a power and a task.'
In the defiles of belief the door is opened to the individual and
closed behind him. Never are we as alone as in our confrontation
with God.
If Kierkegaard asks the individual to be unique this does not
mean that he should develop his individuality in a direction wholly
different from that of others. There is a radical difference between
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 The Unique-The Other-Communication
an aesthetic determination, like that of the romantic genius, and a
moral determination.
The idea of the Unique is also present in Jaspers, under
the twofold influence of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. We have
already mentioned the importance of the idea of choice in
Jaspers' thought, and it is by way of the idea of choice that the
concept of the Unique may best be approached in Jaspers. The
Unique is the existent as he is and chooses himself before
transcendence.
In Gabriel Marcel we find the idea, if not of the Unique, at
least of irreducibility: the problems of existence, according to
Marcel, are those that are not reducible to intellectual terms.
But face to face with the Unique there is in all these philosophies,
in one form or another, what we may call the Other. It was already
seen that in Kierkegaard God is called the Wholly Other. The
Wholly Other is that which is infinitely above us, and we are what
we are, we exist, only because there is such a transcendence.
Kierkegaard is concerned at the same time with the problem of
others and one of the questions we shall discuss in connection with
the idea of communication is this : how can we·tell others that the
Wholly Other exists ?
In the domain of subjectivity there is something else besides the
individual in the first person singular. Great as his solitude may be,
Kierkegaard carries on a sort of passionate dialogue: there is a
second person, the person he addresses, and over and above the
first and second persons there is God, conceived not as a he, but
in such a way as to render possible, by invocation and prayer, the
relationship between the first person and the second. For Kierke-
gaard all true love is grounded in the love of God.
It is already evident that our first two categories-the Unique
and the Other-cannot be discussed without the third: communi-
cation. The problem of communication is one with which
Kierkegaard was greatly concerned.
How can we communicate our subjective knowledge to others ?
Kierkegaard believes that we cannot communicate it directly; we
can only communicate it in roundabout ways, by a sort of dis-
simulation, so as to 'seduce the others towards the truth'. The
mind can reveal itself only indirectly, for no outward sign can
completely reveal the inner state. There will always remain a
residue of secrets. Moreover, certainty is impossible in this matter.
And indirect communication alone can preserve the freedom of
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 Philosophiesof Existence
the other person; in a 'passionate tension' the other will be able
to make the truth his own.
Kierkegaard worked out what he calls the theory of indirect
communication, which probably responds to some deep aspect of
his own personality, for he has the feeling that he cannot give
direct utterance to what he thinks. He must resort to roundabout
ways, and that is what he does when he has to break his engage-
ment. Thus, indirect communication is a psychological necessity
for Kierkegaard, but, according to him, it is also a necessity of the
times for the religious writer exposing his religion. (It would be
of no avail to tell people directly: 'Become Christian'.) Hence
Kierkegaard took detours, describing first the aesthetic experience,
showing why it can hardly be satisfactory and why it must make
way for the ethical experience. And at least one of his books seems
to have been written with the intention of showing that the
individual must become part of society by finding a vocation in
life, by getting married, and so forth. But above the aesthetic
experience as above the ethical experience, there is religious
experience proper, and this is what Kierkegaard propounds,
particularly in Fear and Tremblingby the example of Abraham.
These, then, are two reasons, one psychological, the other related
to the feebleness of religious feelings in modern times, which
cannot be aroused directly, for indirect communication. A third
reason is that indirect communication alone preserves the freedom
of the other person and at the same time allows us to see the extent
to which the other person is free, to see the quantity, if one may so
call it, of freedom which is in the other person.
But the idea of indirect communication has a still greater import
in Kierkegaard's thought: God himself did not communicate
directly with humanity; he came disguised, he came incognito; he
did not choose to reveal himself directly; he chose to reveal himself
indirectly.
Thus indirect communication, which stemmed from Kierke-
gaard's own psychological experience and from the necessities of
the communication of religious truth, is finally ascribed to God
himself and to the relation between God and man.
The idea of indirect communication is related to another idea,
that of misunderstanding. Indeed, between God and man, as is
shown by the life and death of Christ, there is, according to
Kierkegaard, an immense misunderstanding. And the idea of
misunderstanding dominates Kierkegaard's whole psychological
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 The Unique-The Other-Communication
life. Here again his religious conception and his psychological
experience correspond.
But in the last years of his life Kierkegaard went beyond indirect
communication. When he rose against what he called the Estab-
lished Church, against the Lutheran Church of Denmark, he said:
I must speak out; I must express myself directly; I must tell the
truth in the most direct way possible. But except at the very end,
Kierkegaard believed in indirect communication.
The idea of indirect communication is also found in a certain
way in Jaspers. For transcendence, which is higher than man,
cannot form the subject of direct communication. Jaspers reiterates
that the transcendent cannot be talked about except by tautologies,
antinomies, antitheses and finally by petitio principii and nonsense.
His position here is parallel to negative theology. That which is
higher than all else cannot be talked about, cannot form the subject
of direct communication.
Nevertheless, Jaspers allows for the possibility of direct com-
munication to a far greater extent than Kierkegaard. But even as
regards Kierkegaard, we have perhaps not given enough attention
to the importance he accords to love. One of the volumes of his
sermons is called Works of Love. He believes in a certain direct
communication between God and His creatures, even if he insists
in the first instance on God's incognito and His misunderstanding
with His creatures. There is what Kierkegaard calls the Invisible
Church; we can become united with others; there is a domain
which Buber and Marcel were to call the domain of 'Thou', which
is the domain of the relationship between man and man.
This is what Jaspers insists upon when he speaks of love in
struggle or the struggle of love; for it must not be imagined-
Scheler had already pointed this out-that love is a fusion of two
souls; each remains itself; and according to Jaspers, who differs
from Scheler on several aspects of this doctrine, each soul has to
struggle against the soul of the being it loves. The two form one
another by a kind of creative combat.
The ideas we have been discussing are of less importance in
Heidegger, but it must nevertheless be said that it is unfair to
charge Heidegger with disregarding the union between men,
for the Heideggerian Sein is always also Mitsein: to be is to be
with.
It has been said that Heidegger exemplifies this 'being with'
primarily by work. But it will be seen, for example in his com-
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 Philosophiesof Existence
mentaries on Holderlin's poems, that love and direct communica-
tion are also given a place in Heidegger's philosophy.
Thus we see that the problem of communication between man
and man, which is rather insignificant-at least as a problem-in
classical philosophies, is highly significant in the philosophies of
existence, even if these philosophies do not admit a thoroughly
direct communication-direct in the usual sense of the word-
withothers. Kierkegaard's personal difficulty in communicatingwith
others is one of the sources of importance given to the problem of
communication. What was taken for granted in classical philos-
ophies becomes a problem in the philosophies of existence.
Sartre seems to imply, when he speaks oflove and communica-
tion in Being and Nothingness, that communication is always
awkward or abortive. The individual needs love, according to
Sartre, mainly for the purpose of self-justification; he feels justified
because he is appreciated by another. But, on the other hand, Sartre
has a very strong feeling that no sooner do we feel the glance of
another than that other takes hold of our world, as it were, which
hitherto belonged to ourselves alone. No sooner do I feel looked
at than I am robbed of myself and my world by the glance of the
other. And our relationship with others is in Sartre's novels and
plays held to be the cause of our unhappiness. 'Hell is others.'
The reason for this, according to Sartre, is that what we really
want is to possess the other in his freedom, and this is something
of a contradiction. For a person may be free, or on the other hand,
he may be possessed. But he cannot be free and possessed at the
same time; we cannot possess a person in his freedom.
Moreover, love as described in Being and Nothingness is always
tempted by the in-itself; it tends to make us slip from the for-
itself into the in-itself, tends to make objects out of us.
The question may be asked whether Sartre considers satisfactory
communication impossible also in the world of authenticity or
whether he confines it to the world of unauthenticity. In his book
on Sartre, Jeanson maintains, and largely with reason, that Sartre's
description of love in Being and Nothingness applies only to un-
authentic love and not to profound love, which originates and ends
in moments of authenticity.
We have seen that all these philosophies consider communica-
tion far from easy. Communication is indirect, is a struggle in
Kierkegaard and Jaspers; it is awkward and abortive in Sartre.
But in this matter as in several others, we must make an exception
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 The Unique-The Other-Communication
of Gabriel Marcel as well as of Buber and Berdyaev; for Marcel
affirms the possibility and reality of communication, of religious
communication, that is to say, communication of the 'I' with the
'absolute Thou', and also of communication with others, which is
founded, for Gabriel Marcel, on the religious communication with
the 'absolute Thou'. There are values, values of fidelity and of
hope, which depend on communication, which do not exist wr-Ji-
out the reality of communication; the 'we' is as real as the 'I'.
Love, says Gabriel Marcel, always bears on an infinity; it is
tied to a feeling of inexhaustibility, of 'evermore'. Marcel con-
trasts on the one hand the 'I' and the 'thou', on the other, the 'he'.
The 'he' forms the sphere of judgements, the 'I' and the 'thou',
the sphere of appeal, of invocation, of prayer.
Thus, one may contrast Gabriel Marcel with Sartre, the Sartre
at least of Being and Nothingness. Whereas Sartre says that the
glance of another robs us of something, Gabriel Marcel believes
that there are glances which have the power of revealing us to
ourselves, of revealing the other, of revealing the world. The world
after such a glance becomes a world of appeals and prayers and
invocations.
Belief and love are in effect not judgements essentially, but
appeal and invocation. To believe, according to Marcel, means
always to believe in a 'thou', a 'thou' that seems unique to us. But
when it is the 'absolute Thou', then what is involved is no longer
love, or rather it is that love which is belief.
Love, then, is a refusal to call the 'thou' into question and
transform him thereby into a 'he'. (Quite similar ideas are to be
found in Kierkegaard.) The 'thou', says Gabriel Marcel, is to
invocation what the subject is to judgement. There is here a sort
of creative fidelity, for it creates that in which it believes. Hence the
idea of consecration; hence also the importance of the ideas of
hope and faith in Gabriel Marcel.
Gabriel Marcel forbids us, as it were, to question our own
deepest feelings. For such questioning would transform the
mystery into a problem, into a question, doing away with the
mystery as such. But what then is to be done with the 'dialectic of
certainty and uncertainty' which (along with obedience) constitutes
love according to Kierkegaard ? The question remains as to what
extent the object of belief and the believer can be separated from
one another. No doubt Marcel's ideas call for some sort of theory
of relations which he has not elaborated fully. In his case the same
8I
 Philosophiesof Existence
question comes up that came up in connection with Kierkegaard:
to what extent is the object of belief independent of the believer ?
Kierkegaard tells us : between the Absolute and me there is
absolutely no relation. And, on the other hand, he tells us:
between the Absolute and me there is an intense relation. How can
both statements be true ?
Let us recall that in his first philosophical work, Journal
Metaphysique, Gabriel Marcel's position was very close to a
negative theology; it contained profound formulas such as this :
'As soon as you speak of God, you are no longer speaking of God.'

82
 V
Truth-Subjectivity - Truth-Being -
Multiplicity of Truths

WE have examined what we called the main categories of existence:

first existence, Being, transcendence; then the categories relating to
time--possibility and project, origin, and now, situation, instant;
thirdly choice and freedom, nothingness and dread, repetition and
authenticity; fourthly, the Unique, the Other, and communication.
We would now like to discuss two final triads, one concerning
truth, the other relating to paradox.
Truth in Kierkegaard appears essentially as subjectivity. In
Jaspers we shall find a theory of multiplicity of truths, and in
Heidegger a theory attempting to identify truth and Being. Thus,
we can follow through a movement going from truth-subjectivity
to truth-Being.
What does Kierkegaard mean by the statement: truth is sub-
jectivity? According to Hegel, the business of the philosopher is
to identify himself with the absolute Mind in its successive
incarnations; he must trace out-and this is what Hegel does in
his Phenomenology and with a different approach in his Logic-
the various steps that the mind takes in going either from percep-
tion to the absolute Reality or from the abstract idea of Being once
again to the absolute Reality.
To understand truth, according to Kierkegaard, is to approp-
riate it for oneself, to produce it, and at the same time to be
infinitely interested in it. Kierkegaard's thought is dominated by the
idea of an infinite concern about oneself.
For Hegel, truth is to be gained by following the transformations
of the Idea-transformations which result from the mechanism or
dynamism of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. With each transfor-
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 Philosophiesof Existence
mation there appears a moment higher than the preceding one-
what Hegel calls the truth of the preceding moment. So that the
truth of a moment of mind always lies in the moment that follows,
leading finally to the totality which contains all the successive
moments and which is the absolute Idea. At that point we shall
have gone beyond time, we shall have really lived the eternity of
the Idea, we shall have entered upon absolute philosophy.
Kierkegaard is radically opposed to such a conception. I live at
a particular moment in time, and my business is not to identify
myself, in a way that to Kierkegaard would be sacriligious.,to the
totality of moments of time; I must assume my position in time; I
am a finite individual and must not attempt to measure up to
eternity.
What am I to do ? I must strive and strain towards what I shall
call truth. And truth for Kierkegaard is essentially God in His
Incarnation, Jesus Christ, who said Himself: 'I am the Truth.'
And when the God-man that is Christ says: 'I am the Truth', He
comes to us as a scandal, as a paradox, and it is in this tension that
we must place ourselves in. order to understand that the Infinite
incarnated itself, that is to say, embodied itself in a finite form;
it is this tension that permits us to attain truth, for truth lies
essentially in the intensity of our relation to the thing in which we
believe. Here we meet again Kierkegaard's doctrine of how, about
which we have already said a word. It is not the what, it is not the
dogma, that constitutes truth; it is my attitude towards the dogma.
Thus Kierkegaard's precept is: 'Be subjective, and you will be
within truth.'
The subjective thinker, says Kierkegaard, unites eternity and
time; he himself is the union of eternity and time, since he con-
ceives eternal truth but conceives it at a particular instant in time.
He himself is therefore a paradox.
Belief, Jaspers tells us, is a movement of existence, is 'the cer-
tainty of the being of love'. Kierkegaard defines it as the voice of
the Divinity, as a battle with God, signifying by this the movement
and affirmation of the existent outside of any objective guarantees,
acting in accordance with his origin and in an unconditional
manner.
However, this idea has to be completed; there is a Kierkegaard-
ian dialectic which places man, essentially finite, at once in the
domain of truth and in the domain of falsehood; man cannot
render himself adequate before God; he is guilty, and it is only
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 Multiplicity of Truths
through his feeling of guilt that he can advance to the religious
sphere.
But for the moment let us take the following as the first conclu-
sion about truth in the philosophy of existence: truth is subjec-
tivity.
But let us note, too, that from the very beginning of the philo-
sophy of existence, truth is also identified with Being. Jesus is
Being. All belief is belief in Being.
Here as in other facets of his philosophy, Jaspers tries to arrive
at a more general conception, while preserving the Kierkegaardian
conception. There is, he says, no doubt truth as it was conceived
by Kierkegaard and at times by Nietzsche. But there are other
forms of truth. There is the truth of the empirical domain; there is
the truth of the scientific domain. These, too, are truths.
Jaspers attempts to show that the idea of truth varies from one
human discipline to another, that these various truths are at war
with each other, and that each attains its true worth only by its
struggle against the others. Thus, truth-subjectivity achieves its
full worth only because there is a truth-objectivity with which it
must join battle.
Hence we must always, in dealing with the question of truth,
decide in which domain we wish to define it, and Kierkegaard's
theory is thus integrated into a larger whole.
Moreover, Jaspers insists on the bond between truth and Being:
on this point he is at times close to Heidegger. The idea of truth
cannot be separated from the idea of Being, Heidegger tells us.
Philosophers have been wrong to look for truth in judgements.
Judgements always refer, says Heidegger, following Husserl's
phenomenological theory, to something other than themselves, and
prior to themselves, namely Being. And only in reference to Being
is there truth in a judgement. Consequently, from the truth of
judgements, which is a secondary truth, we must go back to a
primary truth, which is the truth of Being. Heidegger likes to
point out that the word c0..1J0eia, by which the Greeks designated
truth, is composed of the privative prefix a and A:1J0r;ia
which comes
from the verb i\av0aviv which has the same root as the name of the
river Lethe. A>i.~0ELa,
therefore, is that which is unveiled, that which
is not hidden. If we reflect on the word aA7J0eia, we shall, according
to Heidegger, see that the Greeks felt that truth for man is some-
thing that is initially in a hiding-place whence it must be dis-
lodged.
 Philosophiesof Existence
Thus-and we have already encountered this from a different
point of view in Kierkegaard-man is in error or at fault by his
very nature as a finite being.
But wherein lies truth? It is, Heidegger declares, in beings.
It is not in judgements; all we have to do is to reveal it. Thus it is
that there is a truth which is identical with Being, and that truth,
according to Heidegger, is the light of Being. We are in the light
of Being and in the darkness of error.
Concerning the idea of truth, then, we can see a kind of dialectic
proceeding from truth-subjectivity, as elaborated by Kierkegaard,
to truth-Being, as elaborated by Heidegger, and passing through
truth-multiplicity as propounded by Jaspers.
But on the other hand, it must not be thought that Heidegger's
theory is completely opposed to Kierkegaard's, for if in Heidegger
we can come to the idea of Being, it is after all through Dasein,
through existence, that we can do so; it is therefore by setting out
from truth as we feel it in ourselves that we can go towards truth-
Being. It is through existence that we can arrive at Being.

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 VI
Paradox - Tension -Ambiguity

WE come now to the last triad of categories, composed of paradox,

tension, and ambiguity. We have already insisted on the idea of
paradox in connection with existence. And from the idea of paradox
we can proceed easily to that of tension.
The Kierkegaardian dialectic differs from the Hegelian in that
it is individual, passionate, and discontinuous, proceeding by
sudden leaps, by crises. 'Man,' he says, 'is a synthesis whose
opposite extremes must be kept intact.' He wants to maintain the
thesis and the antithesis without letting them pass into a synthesis
which would really spell their annihilation. And so the antithesis
is to remain present in the thesis, as uncertainty is present in belief,
as that over which I triumph is present at the moment of my
triumph.
The existent is a man who is the battleground of contrary
tendencies; he is a man who unites in himself the different ages
of life by an existential contemporaneousness, who unites the
pathetic, the dialectic, and the comic in an indissoluble moment.
But we can remark that it is not so much the ideas of paradox and
tension and dialectic that are present, for example, in Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty as the idea of ambiguity. In his Phenomenologyof
Perception and in what he writes on behaviour, Merleau-Ponty
throws into relief the idea of ambiguity. And for Sartre, as we saw
in our discussion of freedom, there is always some ambiguity
between the interpretation of our acts in terms of the situation
and the interpretation of the same acts in terms of freedom. There
are different possible interpretations, different possible decipher-
ments of human acts, and we are free to choose, and at the same
87
 Philosophiesof Existence
time in a situation to choose, some particular interpretation. The
history of the philosophies of existence may be represented as
going from the ideas of paradox and tension to the idea of am-
biguity. What used to be central to existential thought was the
affirmation of contact between antithetical terms: finite and
infinite, temporal and eternal. Today, it is the affirmation of a
diversity of interpretations; the human condition is such, it is said,
that the same phenomena may be interpretated in a variety of ways.
No doubt in going from the idea of a paradox to that of ambiguity
existential thought loses some of its acuity; but perhaps on the
other hand it gains in amplitude.

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 VII
ComprehensiveVz"ew

WE can now glance back at the different categories that we have

enumerated. We shall be able to see better what the individual
existent is in so far as he is the actual subject of the philosophy of
existence.
The existent is oriented towards possibility; he is choice,
freedom, projects, uniqueness, subjective truth, paradox.
But on the other hand, the existent exists only because there is
something else beside him; this is what we designated by the
three terms-essentially different from one another, but all three
opposed to existence-Being, nothingness, and the Other. The
existent exists only because there are other things beside him:
because there is Being which the existent tries to seize in thought
without ever fully succeeding; because there is nothingness from
which the existent emerges and into which he dissolvesin a sense in
Sartre's philosophy; because there is the Other with whom the
existent communicates.
We also saw the feelings that accompany the existent, feelings of
dread and tension.
We saw, too, the categories that bring into union the various
existential terms: transcendence, effecting a union between
existence and Being; situation, effecting a union between the
future and the past; communication,· effecting a union between
the existent and the Other.
All the essential existential concepts could be traced back to
the influence of Kierkegaard. The idea of solitude, of dread, the
idea of subjectivity, of forlornness, even that of care, the importance
accorded to time, to possibility, to project, the idea of nothingness,
G 89
 Philosophiesof Existence
the idea of paradoxical relations-all this is to be found in Kier-
kegaard's meditations.
Every philosophy has a certain number of terms that it has
forged or appropriated for itself; every philosophy possesses a
vocabulary of its own. The Cartesian speaks of clear and distinct
ideas, of evidence; the Kantian of a priori synthesis., of pure
reason. Let us try to compile a short existentialist vocabulary:
Ambiguity Failure Risk
Antinomy Finitude Scandal
Authenticity Freedom Secret
Care Future Sin
Choice Guilt Situation
Communication Historicity Solitude
Contingency Instant Subjectivity
Contradiction Leap Thou
Death Nothingness Transcendence
Despair Origin Trembling
Dialectic Otherness Uncertainty
Dread Paradox Unique
Exception Possibility World
Existence Project
Facticity Repetition
It is true that some of these categories figure less in Gabriel
Marcel. This could be historically explained to a certain extent by
the fact that Marcel's thought developed independently of Kierke-
gaard's. And it could also be explained by the fact that the
religious solution is accompanied and prepared far less by dread
in Marcel than in Kierkegaard. The ideas of dread and nothingness
do not play as important a role in Gabriel Marcel as in the other
philosophers that we have classed along with him as philosophers
of existence.
What can we say now about the general character of the philoso-
phies of existence ? We recalled at the beginning E. Brehier's
observation, which helped us to seek out the origins of these
philosophies: metaphysical empiricism and anxiety.
In a book on existentialism by an American author, Mrs. Grene,
there is the following sentence: 'Existentialism is an attempt to
grasp human nature in human terms without resorting to the
superhuman or to what could be called the subhuman.' In other
words, the philosophies of existence-and Mrs. Grene is mainly
concerned with Sartre's philosophy-are an attempt to explain
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 ComprehensiveView
man independently of purely scientific categories, on the one hand,
and purely religious categories, on the other. Existentialism rejects
the excuses that materialism can give, or seems able to give; it
rejects, too, the aid and refuge offered by supernaturalism and
religion. There can be no purely materialistic explanation and
therefore no excuse for our responsibility; nor can there be any
refuge outside this world.
From a rather similar standpoint one could note, particularly
in Sartre's philosophy, an attempt to attribute to man what is
ordinarily attributed to God alone.
Perhaps the point should not be laboured; nevertheless it can
be remarked that, for example, essence and existence, which
theologians say are one in God, are now said to be one even in man.
Moreover, it is said that man is freedom and that this freedom
knows, as it were, no limits. And curiously enough, in his Preface
to the Marceaux Choisis de Descartes, Sartre tells us that Descartes
really wished to attribute an unlimited freedom to man, that the
freedom he attributed to God is the freedom he would have liked
to attribute to man, but that he did not succeed in doing so.
Historically viewed, the interpretation is highly questionable.
Nevertheless, it is useful as an insight into Sartre's own tendency;
for the urge that he attributes to Descartes he probably felt in
himself: the need to give man the greatest possible freedom is
undoubtedly one of the driving forces of Sartrian philosophy.
Thirdly, it is said that man is the source of all value judgements.
Thus, in these three respects, it may be said that Sartre's
existentialism tends to put man in the place of God. 1
But if man is endowed with qualities that traditional philosophy
reserved for God, he is nevertheless said to be a failure as a God;
for to be a full God he would indeed have to achieve a union
between the in-itself and the for-itself, and such a union is declared
impossible by Sartre.
We might inquire into the causes of the popularity of the philo-
sophies of existence. No doubt it was due first of all to the rejection
of other philosophies and the consciousness of their bankruptcy. It
must furthermore be borne in mind that after the turmoil of the war
and the Occupation there was an urge to rally about a doctrine,
1 What has been said of Sartre is not true of the other forms of existential
philosophy: not true of Jaspers, who speaks of transcendence, of a domain
higher than man; nor of Gabriel Marcel evidently; nor of Heidegger, who says
that beyond man there is the domain of Being and that man exists only by virtue
of his contact with Being.
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 Philosophiesof Existence
and the newer the doctrine the better; in this respect, it may be
said that 'existentialism' assumed the same role that surrealism had
assumed after the preceding war. In the third place, no philosophy,
save that of Nietzsche, had put forward so emphatically the idea
that man is the creator of all values. And it is certain that the
importance given to freedom and the idea that our freedom per-
sists in all circumstances contributed to the fame of these philo-
sophies. On this point:, one could to some extent compare the
initial cause of the popularity of Sartre's philosophy to that of the
popularity of Stoicism.
The very ambiguities of existentialist thought, at least as they
are found in Sartre, have contributed to its impact. What appeared
to be a pessimistic philosophy first in Nausea and even in Being
and Nothingnessturned with The Fli'es,for example, or with some
of Sartre's political studies, into a doctrine of hope.
F. Alquie has shown how this philosophy, by its very ambiguity.,
by some of its contradictions, is characteristic of modern mau and
perhaps of the human condition in general.
The philosophies of existence must not be conceived of as a
series of philosophical dogmas. Man is the being that calls his own
existence into question, puts it at stake, puts it into danger. Exist-
ence is a self-questioning thing. Man is the being that is a philoso-
pher by his very being.
But as man is bound to the world, in putting himself into
question, he puts into question the world which he develops about
himself in some way. If for Heidegger the first definition of
philosophy is an inquiry into Being by the being that we are, the
second definition, based on the etymology that Heidegger attri-
butes to the word 'philosophy', would be 'the wisdom of love' (and
not, as is ordinarily said, the love of wisdom), if by wisdom we
mean our communion with the world. To philosophize is to be
versed in the love of Being and the world. Philosophy, then, is
according to Heidegger the knowledge of being-in-the-world-
not only of the existent in so far as he is oriented towards his future,
and as he is defined by Kierkegaard, but of the existent in so far as
he stands in an ecstatic relation with the world. Thus, there is no
longer a subject facing an object; we must destroy the classical
concept of subject in order to understand that we are always out-
side ourselves, this expression itself ceasing, as we said, to have a
clear meaning since there is no longer a we that we are outside of.
In calling himself into question, man calls into question the
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 ComprehensiveVz'ew
entire universe which is bound to him. In every philosophical
question the totality of the world is involved, even as the indivi-
dual's existence is risked as a supreme stake. Thus we find the
ideas of individuality and totality constantly united.
It could likewise be said that the ideas of individuality and
generality are joined. Heidegger, in fact, does not speak for a
particular individual, but for all individuals. He describes human
existence in general. Dread is no doubt a particular experience,
but through it we arrive at the general conditions of existence, at
what Heidegger calls existentialia. Heidegger would have us
distinguish his philosophy from Kierkegaard's by this: that
Kierkegaard always remains in the Existenziell whereas Heidegger
attains the Existenzial, that is to say, the general characteristics of
human existence. The question may well be asked whether in
doing so Heidegger does not reintroduce the idea of essence into
his philosophy, whether Kierkegaard is not more constant to
existential thinking in banishing the idea of essence. In other
words, the question may be asked whether the search for existen-
tialia is compatible with the affirmation of existence.
Naturally, a philosophy such as Kierkegaard's poses many
problems. On the one hand, does he not after all attempt to
rationalize and to explain the paradox by presenting it as the union
of the finite and the infinite ? And although he purports to show us
a scandal to reason, does he not give a sort of justification to the
scandal, which would ultimately do away with the scandal as
such ? On the other hand, Kierkegaard himself says that the coming
of Christ into the world, in the manner in which it took place, does
not constitute the supreme paradox; for the supreme paradox
would require that no. one notice the coming of God. 'I meditate
on this problem,' he writes, 'and I am bewildered by it.' Let us add
that the paradox exists only for those who inhabit this earth. For
the Blessed, that is to say for those who see the truth, the paradox
vanishes. In other words, these considerations are only valid in
relation to man's existence here below.

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 VIII
The Ultimate Problemsof the
Philosophiesof Existence
RESPECTIVE VALUE OF THEIR VARIOUS FEATURES

BUT perhaps all this does not amount to objections. It is very

difficult to determine whether such observations are objections or
whether, by accentuating the paradox, they reinforce the Kierke-
gaardian conception. The same is true of the questions raised by
the relations between subjectivity and history, the intensity of
the subjective feeling being based, paradoxically, on a historical
and objective fact. The same is true, again, of the relations between
eternity and history, for if the moment of Incarnation is an eternal
moment with which we must continually be contemporary, the
paradox is likely to vanish.
Perhaps with the objections that philosophers such as Reuter
and Kate Nadler and Etienne Gilson address to Kierkegaardian
thought, we come, on the other hand, to a set of criticisms which,
should they prove valid, would undermine the very possibility of
such thought. 'Kierkegaardian existentialism of subjectivity does
not side-step the common necessity of operating with essences; it
simply creates new ones of which it could be said that they take
refuge in a particularly ferocious manner behind their essential
purity. The pure faith of subjective existentialism is one such
essence, and the history of religious thought hardly knows any
other that objects more strenuously to all participation.' 'Such
oppositions are ordinarily the product of abstract thought, and it
may be asked whether, at the very moment when Kierkegaard
passionately spurned the confusion between abstraction and
existence, he did not treat existence as a new abstraction, one whose
essence required that it make an abstraction of all abstraction.' It
is seen by the end of the quotation that what is at stake here is the
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 The Ultimate Problems of the Philosophies
possibility of a war on abstractions; the conflict is then between
Kierkegaard's thought, affirming the possibility of an existent
essence whose abstraction is a felt abstraction, and a thought of a
rational order.
We might now try to make some critical remarks about the
philosophies of existence.
We could distinguish different elements, that enter into these
philosophies. For the first thing to note is that the philosophy of
existence is rather heterogeneous, composite. In the philosophy
of existence in its various forms there are elements that are
properly existential. Those are the ones we dwelt upon when we
said that they are retraceable to Kierkegaard. There are pheno-
menological elements deriving from Husserl and found particularly
in Heidegger and Sartre. There are Hegelian elements. There are
ontological elements, and these we shall take up first.
The philosophies of existence attach great importance to the
idea of Being. The idea of Being was already present in Kierke-
gaard's thought, but it occupies a much more prominent position,
a much more explicit position in the philosophies of Heidegger and
Jaspers. For all the philosophers of existence, philosophy is essen-
tially the study of Being. Heidegger is particularly insistent on this
point, and a little reflection on the title of Sartre's book, Being and
Nothingness, will reveal the importance of the idea of Being in
Sartre's philosophy.
But what can we say about the idea of Being in these philoso-
phies? We can describe it as a state of dispersion, a state of non-
unity. All we find-and we already dwelt upon this point-are
categories of Being not amenable to complete unification. We find
what Husserl called regional ontologies. We do not find a single,
unified idea of Being. In his major work, Being and Time, Heidegger
orients us towards the idea that the Being of our being is time, and
he arrives at this conclusion by bringing to light the idea that we
essentially are. But can we, from the idea that the Being of our
being is time, go on to conclude that Being as a whole is time ?
To do so, we must first reduce all the other forms of Being to the
Being of our own being, for there are besides ourselves such
beings as mountains or rivers, such beings as tables or lamps, such
beings as ,mathematical entities, such beings as living creatures.
Heidegger does not tell us whether these various beings are
reducible to ourselves.
Perhaps he believes that beings of the type of mountains and
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 Philosophiesof Existence
rivers are initially seen as instruments or obstacles, that is to say
are not fundamentally different in type from such beings as tables
and lamps. Consequently, we could do away with purely objective
being, since it is first seen as an obstacle or an implement and only
afterwards as pure objectivity. But there would, nevertheless,
remain the question whether other beings are dependent upon
ourselves.
And we are thus referred back to a problem that we shall leave
aside for the moment-the problem of realism and idealism. A
unified ontology would be possible only if Heidegger opted clearly
for an idealistic theory, which he does not seem to do, and so we
are forced for the time being to state that ontology remains in a
state of dispersion, that there are ontologies rather than an on-
tology; and to say that there are ontologies is in a sense tantamount
to stating that there is no ontology, for ontology is truly possible
only if there is a single idea of a single Being. Heidegger does not
lead us to such an idea, and the same could be said of Jaspers, who
replaces ontology by what he calls periechontology (theory of
Encompassings), and of Sartre.
It is known that Heidegger's great book, Being and Time, has
not been completed, and especially that the last section of the first
part is missing. The reason for this is that Heidegger had thought
it possible to solve what he considers the sole problem of philo-
sophy in terms of the existence of the Being that we are; he believes,
in effect, that there is Being only.because of existence. But can an
ontology be founded on our own mode of Being? This question has
not been decided yet, and that is why after Sein und Zeit Heidegger
has attempted other approaches to the problem. But he himself
knows that none will lead him to the solution, that Being is essen-
tially separate from our being, even though Heidegger can declare
in a sense that we and all things are 'in the light of Being.'
Since the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger has attemp-
ted, in a number of essays and particularly in his commentary on
Holderlin, to erect a kind of mythical philosophy, to teach us the
way to a communion with the earth and the world. Gradually he
has abandoned the problems centring on Dasein in favour of
problems centring on the notions of Being and truth, these two
notions being ultimately defined, in so far as they can be said to be
defined, by each other. And today Being, for Heidegger, is the
union of Being itself and the understanding of Being-the union
of Sein conceived as the Parmenidean Being and the Sophoclean
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 The Ultimate Problems of the Philosophies
dike with the understanding, the noein, the techne. It is the sum
total of heaven and earth, of mortals and immortals.
Heidegger's attempt may be viewed as prompted by the will to
go beyond ordinary metaphysical considerations which are, he
believes, oriented towards particular beings, in order to initiate us
into a meditation he calls ontological, and which seeks to lay hold on
Being in its essence. But certain features of Heidegger's thought
would lead us to doubt the superiority of the ontological over the
ontic. For does not human existence, in so far as it is limited by
death, ·characterize the Being of our particular being ? Is it not a
fact, secondly, that all reflection on Being in its essence depends on
the fact that the particular Being that we are can reflect on Being ?
Thirdly, in a number of passages, it seems that Heideggerian Being
reduces itself to the sum total of beings. Thus the prerogative
attributed to the ontological is gradually replaced by a priority,
and perhaps even a prerogative, attributed to the ontic. But these
considerations, we ought to add, become, or at least might become,
less valid as Heidegger continues to philosophize. In Holzwege the
prerogative of the ontic tends to disappear to make way once
again for a less interesting and more classical prerogative of the
ontological.
But on the other hand, the study of the history of philosophy
shows us, according to Heidegger, that Being reveals itself dif-
ferently at different times. There is a history of the revelations of
Being. And this history affords us a configuration of the profound
union of Being and time.
Jaspers, too, as we saw, elaborates different kinds of Being-
empirical Being, the Being that we are, scientific Being-and they
cannot be reduced to unity. Or, to use another Jaspersian classi-
fication, there is Being-object, Being for itself, Being-subject,
and once again we find a plurality of Beings. For Sartre there is
Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself.
Behind the Sartrian in-itself there is no doubt an epistemological
motive which seems legitimate enough: knowledge is possible only
if there is something that is known, and if that something is inde-
pendent of knowledge. But is it also legitimate to affirm that that
something is absolute plenitude, absolute im.111obility ? Does this
not amount to making a reality out of an epistemological postulate ?
And can we not say that one of the least contestable acquisitions
of philosophy is the proposition that reality is movement and
temporality through and through ?
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 Philosophiesof Existence
Hand in hand with the epistomological motive there is, in
Sartre, a psychological motive: our mind tends ceaselessly to be-
come petrified, stablilized; Sartre describes this tendency to
petrification by the affirmation that the for-itself tends continually
to transform itself into in-itself. But this psychological motive
does not provide any reasons for asserting the reality of the in-
itself any more than the epistemological motive; our psychological
tendency does not prove the reality of a thing any more than the
epistemological postulate.
Behind the Sartrian duality of the in-itself and the for-itself, we
find something rather similar to the Cartesian duality of extension
and thought. And yet, if the in-itself can be compared to Car-
tesian extension, the for-itself cannot be said to correspond to
thought as Descartes conceived it; it is rather to thought as con-
strued by Hegel that the for-itself may be compared. In this sense,
it could be said that the in-itself and the for-itself have a relation
analogous to that which could be envisaged between Cartesian
extension and Hegelian thought.
It should also be noted that Sartre's in-itself consists not only of
the material world, but also of the past, and on this point we could
compare Sartre's conception to Bergson's, since in both the material
world and the past are coupled together.
To the ontological problem is connected the problem of nothing-
ness. Is the idea of nothingness a legitimate idea ? It is interesting to
note that in modern philosophy two philosophers-Bergson and
Heidegger-have adopted two absolutely opposed positions on the
problem of nothingness. Bergson, in Creative Evolution, tries to
show that nothingness is a pseudo-idea. We arrive at the idea of
nothingness only by the intermediary of the idea of everything and
by the negation of the idea of everything. The idea of nothingness
is the idea of everything plus the negation of the idea of everything.
It is the product of negation. Heidegger takes the opposite view.
For him there can only be negation if underlying all things there is
nothingness. It must be noted that Heidegger himself-as we
pointed out earlier-believes that nothingness is the absence of all
beings, rather than the absence of Being, so that his position is
finally not very far from Bergson's. Being is not something that can
really be negated. What can be negated are beings. And at the end
of the postscript to his essay What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger
tells us that nothingness, being the absence of all being, is not
different from Being, which is the absence of all being. We arrive,
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 The Ultimate Problemsof the Philosophies
then, at a conception that identifies nothingness and Being, in a
manner different from that in which Hegel identified them.
There was an attempt in Heidegger, at least at one phase of his
thought, to probe into absolute nothingness-an attempt that had
never been made before. But it seems that Heidegger himself has
not been able to remain constant to his initial ambition.
The attempt to throw light-a dim enough light, as it happens-
on the idea of nothingness has been more interesting and exciting
than satisfactory.
In Sartre's philosophy nothingness is presented in a form much
nearer to Hegelian negativity than to the absolute nothingness of
Heidegger. Sartre endeavours to translate all our activities into
negative form. The imagination is the negation of the real that we
encounter in perception. Perception, in turn, is the nihilation of
myself. And I myself am nihilation. What we see here is no longer
the metaphysical attempt that we saw in Heidegger, but rather the
application of a will to underscore the restrictive and negative
aspects of all that is in our mind.
We said a moment ago that the question of the value of ontology
in these philosophies is linked to the question of idealism and
realism.
Heidegger tries to overcome the alternative between idealism and
realism. Bergson and William James had made similar attempts.
The question is whether Heidegger's attempt is successful.
No doubt Heidegger puts forth some important arguments to
show that we must pass beyond the problem as it is ordinarily
stated. He tells us that classical philosophy has over-separated the
subject from the object, that the being that we are is by nature in
the world, that we must not question the reality of the world, for
to do so would be to underestimate our rapport with the world.
The human condition is precisely such that the reality of the world
is not questioned, since we are being-in-the-world. Thus idealism
is the product of a separative reflection. Heidegger's views on this
point are perfectly legitimate. But what is striking ordinarily, when
he develops his ideas to the end, is that he does not manage to re-
main faithful to his own conception: at times he veers too near
toanabsoluteidealism,at other times too near to an absolute realism,
without overcoming these terms, despite all his desire to do so.
Heidegger is very close to an absolute realism when he tells us
that man's duty is to let Being be what it is. We must accept
Being as it is. And he is also speaking as a realist when he tells us
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that other beings are independent of the being that we are. If we
did not exist, according to Heidegger, other beings would still
continue to be, but Being would not, because Being is not inde-
pendent of our thought of it.
We are here faced with problems extremely difficult to resolve.
Heidegger says that beings are dependent upon Being; now,
Being is dependent upon our thought of it, and therefore we can
conclude that, despite what was just said, other beings are not
wholly independent of our thought, since Being to which they
owe their being cannot be without our thought of it.
In any case, such are the features of Heidegger's thought that
point to realism; but on the other hand, he contends that under-
lying all things there is freedom. And so behind Heidegger's
realism we find idealism-an absolute idealism not unlike that of
Fichte. But freedom for Heidegger consists in letting Being be
and once again we swing back to realism.
One of the attractions of Heidegger's philosophy comes from the
fact that it carries very far the two great tendencies of the human
mind: the tendency to insist upon the world of things as almost
impervious to the mind and the tendency, so recurrent in German
philosophy, to explain everything in terms of freedom. Thus,
Heidegger will say, on the one hand, that truth consists in letting
Being be, that truth is in beings, and on the other hand, that the
source of truth lies in our freedom. But it seems that our freedom,
in turn, must be defined as the capacity to surrender to things, so
that what we have is a kind of game permitting us to see the face
of the universe either in an idealistic context or in a realistic one,
and referring us continually from one context to the other.
The Sartrian distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself
leads us likewise to ask the question, which is the more funda-
mental form of Being ? Is the for-itself the elemental form of
Being? Indeed, the in-itself is said to exist only for a for-itself.
But, on the other hand, the for-itself is said to be a kind of absence,
a kind of gap in the in-itself. Thus, according to whether the one
or the other is affirmed as prior, we are left either with a realism
or with an idealism.
In Sartre's thought, then, we find ambiguities rather similar
to those found in Heidegger. By his insistence upon the inten-
tionality of consciousness, by his definition of knowledge as a
'not-being', by his conception of a massive in-itself to which
consciousness is opposed as a nothingness, by his affirmation of
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 The Ultimate Problemsof the Philosophies
radical contingency, even at times by his insistence upon failure of
communion in love, Sartre's philosophy seems to sum up the
grounds for the modern world's often justified resentments against
idealism. But, on the other hand, the importance accorded to
freedom, the influence of such thinkers as Lagneau and Alain,
point in this same philosophy to an idealism. Perhaps the duality
that we have found in Heidegger as well as in Sartre is a character-
istic, and not the least valuable, of these philosophies; perhaps
they reveal themselves thereby as the embodiments of what has
sometimes been called the problematism, the ambiguity of con-
temporary thought.
As regards the concept of freedom, we find a problem similar to
that of idealism, the questions of idealism and freedom being
evidently rigorously linked to one another.
It was seen that these philosophies, which appear to be philo-
sophies of freedom, are at the same time philosophies which
endanger the idea of freedom, philosophies in which freedom
appears to be dominated or submerged by its negation-dominated
by transcendence and grace in the philosophies of Kierkegaard and
Jaspers, submerged by necessity in the philosophy of Heidegger.
And in Sartre's philosophy our acts can be interpreted in terms of
our freedom, but Sartre would not deny that, in a certain way, they
can also be interpreted in terms of our situation.
We are here faced-as we said-with questions very dose to
idealism and realism, particularly as regards the question whether
in Sartre's philosophy there is a unique act of freedom, a unique
project that forms us-something analogous to the timeless act by
which, in Kant, the individual chooses his character-or whether
there are constant possibilities of change in our freedom. There is
here an antinomy in Sartre's philosophy, since to be, for the for-
itself, is to be what it is not and not to be what it is; to be is there-
fore to be constantly able to negate one's past acts, for not to negate
them would be letting them sink back into the in-itself. But, on the
other hand, if I am a person there must be an overall project to
characterize my being as a whole. There is thus a struggle between
the idea of unity and the idea of multiplicity, both being in a sense
essential to the definition of our freedom.
From the idea of freedom we can go on to that of communication
and the problem it presents in the philosophies of existence. We
have already seen the difficulties of interpretation that this question
involves in Sartre's philosophy. According to some of his inter-
IOI
 Philosophiesof Existence
preters, what was said in Being and Nothingness applies only to the
unauthentic. At the time of writing Being and Nothingness, it seems,
Sartre believed that there was an impossibility of communication
in love relationships, but we must take into account both the
diversity of interpretations and the evolution of Sartre's thought,
which has on this point gone beyond his position in Being and
Nothingness. And perhaps it is true that in that book he was
referring to unauthentic love only.
We must also take care to distinguish between the different
interpretations that Sartre gives of love; besides a need for self-
justification, love is, on the one hand, a desire to possess another's
freedom, failing by its very nature since one cannot possess
another's freedom, and on the other hand, a desire on the part of
the for-itself to freeze itself into a kind of in-itself.
What has been said explains the pessimistic aspect that Sartre
seems to have given, at least in Being and Nothingness, to his
philosophy. But perhaps it is not so pessimistic as it appears at
first sight, and perhaps Sartre has left behind this aspect of his
thought. The fact remains that the formulas which have enjoyed
the greatest circulation are formulas such as: 'Man is a futile
passion', or 'Man is condemned to be free', or again 'Hell is others',
that is to say three formulas emphasizing failure-and we have
said that these philosophies are, generally speaking, philosophies of
failure.
The question may be asked whether human relationships are
marked by hostility as Sartre claims. In Being and Nothingness
the existence of others is often looked upon by him as a menace.
Does not this view of Sartre fail to take into account all the forms of
human relationship ·and perhaps itself call for an existential
psychoanalysis ?
It could be said, moreover, that Sartre has outgrown the
narrower features of his philosophy as presented in Being and
Nothingness. Today he admits the possibility of free relationships
between people, as he admits the reality of social action. On this
point as on certain others, the works of Merleau-Ponty show in
what direction the ideas of Sartre could be completed; and
generally speaking, the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, by its
emphasis of a return towards the immediate, by its admission of
communication, by its recognition of the fecund character of
ambiguity characteristic of the human condition, paves the way
for new developments in existentialism.
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 The Ultimate Problems of the Philosophies
Let us go back from Sartre to the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit.
Heidegger enumerates three aspects of existence: the project
oriented towards the future; its determination and conditioning
by the past; and thirdly, the essential character of man which is
that of a fallen being. But does not the affirmation of this last
aspect, which strikes us immediately as different in its structure
from the other two, imply a certain conception of man that cannot
be maintained if the overall conception of Heidegger's philosophy
is to be maintained ? Does not the notion of man as situated in a
kind of dereliction, of abandonment, imply a number of pre-
suppositions that have not hitherto been accorded a place in
Heidegger's philosophy? Man cannot feel abandoned unless he
feels abandoned by someone-by God. Thus we find ourselves
in the strange position where, if we carry Heidegger's thought to
its logical conclusion, we are led to destroy some of the most basic
feelings that characterize Heidegger's thought in Sein und Zeit.
It has even been suggested that Heidegger frequents the world of
Nietzsche with the feelings of Kierkegaard and the world
of Kierkegaard with the feelings of Nietzsche. This was the case at
least until Holzwege.
Thus the third aspect of existence implies a pessimism which is
open to question. But even the second aspect, the determination by
the past, is perhaps tinged illogically, or if not illogically at least
unnecessarily, by the sombre nuances of pessimism.
But these tendencies were to be corrected by the considerations
of Holzwege and even more so by those of a very short piece,
Feldweg, which, like the commentaries on Holderlin, opens the
way to hope.
Questions may also be raised as to the role of the feeling of dread
in Heidegger as well as the role of nausea in Levinas and Sartre.
Ought these feelings, along with that of boredom to which
Heidegger resorts at times, to enjoy such a special status in the
philosophies of existence ?
For Heidegger, orientation towards death is an essential part of
the definition of existence. But one may well ask if the objections
of Sartre are not valid on this point and if death has not been given
undue importance.
This consideration leads us to a further consideration concerning
the essence of time. If time is essentially directed towards the
future, our individual existential time will be ended, overwhelmed
by death. But to the philosophies that take the future as the basic
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dimension of time, that is to say the philosophies of Hegel, certain
neo-Kantians, and Heidegger, one could oppose the philosophies
of Husserl and Sartre, who say that it is in terms of the present that
time must be defined.
What has been said allows us to understand the generally pessi-
mistic mood that has been associated with the philosophies of
existence. It is certain that the importance accorded by Heidegger
to the ideas of care, abandonment, death, the role of the idea of
failure in Jaspers, some of Sartre's formulas which proved the most
popular at first, continue to give an impression of pessimism. It is
not quite clear to what extent this impression is due, on the part of
the reader, and even perhaps on the part of the authors, to a certain
nostalgia for religion.
It was moreover seen that Jaspers, by means of the ideas of the
instant and transcendence, Sartre, by the development of his social
thought, surmount or try to surmount this pessimistic phase.
Kierkegaard reproached Hegelian philosophy for lacking a
conclusion, meaning by this that it did not yield a moral. We may
ask what moral conclusion could be drawn from the philosophy of
existence. The doctrines of Jaspers and Heidegger appear to be
locked up in a kind of moral formalism. Jaspers tells us that the
existent is characterized by choice; and no doubt in his own action,
Jaspers, when Germany was under Nazi rule, adhered to certain
principles with a courage worthy of respect. But for the reader who
has only studied his great book, Philosophie, what appears is a
multiplicity of possible choices, each capable of being existentially
lived, and none-at least among the authentic ones-receiving
preference. Defiance and confidence, respect for the 'Law of
Daytime' and the 'Passions of Night' are all possible attitudes
among which we may legitimately choose. The one thing that man
must ultimately do is to accept himself as he is. And it is to a
similar conclusion that we come in the philosophy of Heidegger.
Generally speaking, the philosophies of existence can only urge
man to accomplish what Kierkegaard called repetition, to effect
what Heidegger calls the act of resolute decision. The nature of
this resolute decision itself is left undetermined, though it is said
to consist in the recognition of the fact that life is by its very
essence terminated.
It has been remarked that, in the moral sphere, the philoso-
phies of existence result in a kind of formalism and that they tend to
encourage one or the other of two extreme attitudes : a quietism
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 The Ultimate Problemsof the Philosophies
which would accept everything or an activism whose action would
be without foundation. 'It is difficult,' writes Helmut Kuhn, 'to
maintain that Heidegger's adherence to Nazism in I933 was a
logical consequence of his philosophy. Only the illogicality of this
step was logical. The mechanism of freedom., anguish and fear
may catapult the individual to almost any position offered by the
circumstances.' What existential ethics demands of us is to decide
to decide. But, as the same author points out, 'a philosophy of
resoluteness is under suspicion of being an irresolute philosophy.'
'The thesis of total freedom excludes commitment to any particular
cause while enjoining commitment to commitments.,' and it is
certain that the Kierkegaardian idea of repetition, the Jaspersian
idea of a large gamut of possible choices and alternatives among
which the individual must choose one, the Heideggerian notion of
the resolute decision, the Sartrian notion of an infinite and un-
varying freedom, plunge us into a quandary whence we can
extricate ourselves only by means of certain criteria not given in
existential philosophy itself.
Sartre believes that it is always a mistake to raise a particular
moment of the past or of the future to a privileged position and to
judge the whole of one's life in the light of that moment. It is
always a mistake to choose either a moment in one's future, for
example., a post to which one aspires, or a moment in one's past,
for example, a moment of particular excellence, and to entrench
oneself definitively within that moment.
But the question may be asked whether it is not, on the con-
trary, a human possibility-one of the most legitimate and even,
in some cases, the highest-to strive to perpetuate a moment of
excellence.
Helmut Kuhn, in his book Encounterwith Nothingness,remarks
that the philosophers of existence overstep the bounds of the
philosophy of existence. The philosophies of existence tend, in
the end, to turn into something other than themselves, be it the
ontology of Heidegger, the humanism of Sartre, the theory of
transcendence of Jaspers. Each of these philosophies, says Kuhn,
pass in one way or another beyond the limits of the philosophy of
existence proper.
'It is one of the characteristics of Existentialism that its adherents
are continually on the verge of apostasy/ Like the Sartrian idea of
for-itself, Existentialism is never what it is; it tends continually
to transform itself into something else, for example, says Kuhn,
I05
 Philosophiesof Existence
into the eschatological neo-paganism and the Dionysiac ontology
of Heidegger, or into the humanism of Sartre and his reversion to
Hegelian negativity, or, with other philosophers, into religion.
Each of Kuhn's assertions calls for a separate examination.
Heidegger's ontology appears to be the necessary outcome of a
philosophy which was primarily concerned with the problem of
Being, and which undertook the analysis of existence only as an
approach to Being. Sartre's humanism is in his eyes part and parcel
of his existentialism. Christianity is for Jaspers but one of the
possible forms of transcendental revelation.
Perhaps Kuhn does not pay enough attention to Jaspers' remark
that the philosophies of existence must never be regarded as
philosophies which reduce everything to existence; perhaps his
idea of these philosophies is too rigid and narrow, although he
analyses them with acumen.
The question remains whether a philosophy of existence, in the
precise sense of the term, is possible. We have already said that
Heidegger and Jaspers are to be distinguished from Kierkegaard in
that they have sought to develop a philosophy. But have they not,
by developing a philosophy, abandoned something of the character
of the subjective thinker as defined by Kierkegaard ? In other
words, does not the very idea of the philosophy of existence involve
an antinomy?
No doubt the existential thinker could reply that he must not
let himself be frightened by such antinomies; and this is precisely
one of Kierkegaard's teachings. Did not Kierkegaard himself allow
the possibility of an existential thought, which is nothing less than
an antinomic thought, since Kierkegaard, while proclaiming
'The less I think, the more I am/ admits nevertheless the pos-
sibility of a thought in which existence and thought unite and
struggle against each other at the same time ?
This is a problem that can upset the existentialist's knowledge
and even his existence. Does he not, by philosophizing, run the
risk of destroying that very existence which he seeks above all to
preserve ? Perhaps one must choose between existentialism and
existence. Such is the dilemma of existentialism.
Everything that we have said shows how difficult it is to make a
general assessment of these philosophies, first because of their
diversity, and secondly, when dealing with them individually-
and this is particularly true of Sartre-because of the diversity of
their positions at different periods of their thought.
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 The Ultimate Problemsof the Phz1osophies
And this leads us back to the assertion that ambiguity is a funda-
mental category of these philosophies-ambiguity between idealism
and realism, ambiguity between freedom and commitment,
between pessimism and social action. But this ambiguity is possibly
one of the sources of the value and the popularity of these philo-
sophies, for it characterizes contemporary man, as Alquie has
remarked in one of the articles he has devoted to Sartre's philo-
sophy, and no doubt even perennial man.
It is thanks to this idea that existentialism can meet some of the
objections that we have raised against it. Sartre's thought as
expressed in Nausea is quite different from his thought as ex-
pressed in The Flies. We saw likewise a duality between his idealism
and his realism, between his ontological tendencies, his pheno-
menalistic tendencies, his phenomenological tendencies, between
the idea of freedom and the idea of commitment, .between an
intermittent stoicism and a recommendation of action, between
pessimism and confidence. But his ambiguity, as we have already
said, is characteristic of today's man and perhaps of man of all
ages. The impossibility of justification and the search for justi-
fication intertwine in Sartre's philosophy. There is, as we said,
the Sartre of Nausea and there is the Sartre of The Flies. There is
also the Sartre of Morts sans Sepulture, who combines the two
contrary tendencies. There may yet be a Sartre who will go
beyond ambiguity.
We have alluded to the heterogeneity of the various features
that enter into these philosophies. We dwelt upon the ontological
feature which ought perhaps not to be so essential to the philo-
sophies of existence. On the other hand, the phenomenological
element, to judge by the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, is
gaining in importance. Here again we are witnessing a dialectic in
the history of this philosophy, which began with the solitary
meditations of Kierkegaard and which results finally in a medita-
tion on perception and on union with the world.
The philosophies of existence raise many problems which they
do not solve. But what is more important is that we cannot ignore
these philosophies.
One of the consequences of the existentialist movement is that
we have to destroy most of the ideas of so-called 'philosophical
common sense' and of what has often been called 'perennial
philosophy'-particularly the ideas of essence and substance.
Thanks to this movement, we have become conscious of the
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 Philosophiesof Existence
necessity of questioning all philosophical concepts and of denying
the existence of rational and pre-existent essences.
In the second place, the existential feature proper in these
philosophies invites us to a kind of sharpening of subjectivity.
This is the Kierkegaardian. feature of the philosophy of existence.
In the third place, their phenomenological feature permits us to
experience more than ever before our union with the world, to
discover that which is prior to reflection and judgement, to arrive
at the sphere of the pre-reflective, the pre-predicative, to surmount
the dichotomy between idealism and realism.
In this way we become conscious of the movement of trans-
cendence which is present in existence itself. Kierkegaard and
Husserl, two of the most important inspirators, and the most unlike,
make us understand that we do not exist without something other
than ourselves.
To exist or not to exist, that is always the question. And there is
always the second question: what does it mean to exist? To exist
is to have a rapport with the Other (which means God, for Kierke-
gaard), with others, with the world (to exist is to be outside oneself),
and it is also to have a rapportwith one's own self, to converse with
one's own self. Every genuine individual, since the beginning of
man, exists. Although to exist is, for Kierkegaard, to be in fear and
trembling, for Sartre, to will always and always to fail to achieve
one's project, it is nevertheless possible to conceive of an existence
where the individual is in a state of joy before all things, in com-
munication with other individuals, and free at last from fear and
trembling.
Doubtless we have noticed, in our study of these philosophies,
that we find ourselves time and again before impasses. Impasse in
Heidegger: we do not know whether it is finally an idealism or a
realism that he advocates, though his ambition is to go beyond
both; we do not know whether nothingness is or is not identical
with Being. Impasse also in Sarte, and return on certain points,
perhaps even retreat, from the conceptions of Heidegger towards
those of Hegel and Husserl. But the consciousness of such impasses
does not mean that we must, or can, turn back; the dogmatisms in
whose name the philosophies of existence are attacked render it
that much more imperative for us to reaffirm their importance
and their role. Let us remember that philosophy has quite often
found itself in apparent impasses which have later proved to be
thoroughfares. Perhaps, in order to facilitate the way out of these
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 The Ultimate Problemsof the Philosophies
difficulties, it would be well to distinguish more and more carefully
among the different features that we have enumerated: the
insistence upon solitude and the insistence upon communication;
the insistence upon freedom and the insistence upon the situation;
the insistence upon. existence and the insistence upon transcen-
dence. The necessary distinction between different problems,
different levels., different features would lead us to see that the
problematical character of these philosophies can at least make us
conscious of fundamental philosophical questions and of our-
selves qua questions. In these philosophies, existence and trans-
cendence, solitude and communion, freedom and situation,
eternity and history struggle against one another and are nurtured
by one another.

I09
 APPENDIX

A Note on Dread

AMONG the philosophers of dread-or perhaps rather of anxiety-

mention must be made of Pascal, if he may be called a philosopher,
and of Lequier.
The word dread or anguish (angoisse)comes up frequently in
Lequier's writings, for example in the passage on 'la feuz'lle de
clzarmille.' He thinks of himself as a child, aware of the fact
that he can set in motion a chain of events: he can break off
or not break off the tree branch. 'I can no longer tell between
the dreads of the adult that I am and the dreads of the child I
was then.' He thinks of the whole of nature as participating in
his dread.
In Abel et Abel, he describes 'the birth of an anxiety.' 'So it is
that standing on the edge of a high cliff, a man is sometimes seized
by a feeling of anxiety . . . Drawn inexorably as by the dizzying
motion of a whirlpool, he sees himself in the abyss, the abyss
engulfs him.' This is the giddiness to which Renouvier, the author's
friend, has accorded an important place in his psychological and
moral philosophy.
And we might even extend the field of our considerations and
speak of dread in the works of writers such as Poe, Kafka, Henri
Michaux, Blanchot-or even in Hamlet. But let us limit our sub-
ject. As Heidegger has said, 'It was Kierkegaard who made the
most thorough study of dread.'
Kierkegaard had read Hamann, who speaks of dread as a 'sacred
melancholy,' and describes it as preserving man from total cor-
ruption, and sees in it the proof of our heterogeneity in relation to
the whole of nature.
III
 Appendix
He had read Schelling, who insists upon giddiness, the anguish
of nature, and even the anguish of God.
But it is not in terms of influences that one can explain the
central role of dread in Kierkegaard's thought; it is rather in terms
of Kierkegaard the man, in terms of his life, dread-ridden from
beginning to end. He tells us himself, speaking of the rigorous
education his father gave him, that 'this education was to plunge
me into sadness and dread.' He speaks of childhood anxieties born
of prohibitions imposed upon him by this father: 'If a child was
told that it is a sin to break his leg, in what dread would he live,·
and perhaps he would even break it more often.'
He is familiar with temptation; he experiences the dread that is
attendant upon temptation. He seeks, at a certain period in his
youth, the truth that resides in evil, and 'the whole of reality,' he
writes, 'fills me with dread, from the smallest gnat to the mysteries
of Incarnation.'
Dread in the face of sin; dread in the face of the possibility of
having a stable family life: he breaks his engagement. Dread in the
face of Christianity: 'I suffered such dread in the face of Chris-
tianity, and yet I felt drawn towards it.'
Dread plays an essential role in Kierkegaard's thought in that it
is one of the factors which deliver him from Hegelianism. In a
philosophy where Being is said to be plenitude, rational and clear,
there is no room for a phenomen such as Kierkegaardian dread
which is basically ambiguous, on the one hand, and linked to
nothingness, on the other.
We have already alluded, in reference to Kierkegaard's child-
hood, to the fact that for him dread is born of prohibition: the
prohibition imposed by God on Adam was the cause of the first
dread. Already in innocence there is a dread, the germ of a dread:
latent at first, it is roused by prohibition. What happens then ?
Man awakens to possibility and is assailed by the dread of possi-
bility.
The two ideas of dread and possibility are intimately linked
together. There is in us a knowledge which is not quite aware that
it is knowledge, for possibility results from the combination of
ignorance and knowledge; it is being and non-being; it is lived as
dread.
Now the presence of possibilities, good possibilities and evil
possibilities, is the cause, especially in the case of evil possibilities,
of temptation, which is a weakening of our will.
II2
 Appendix
'There is here a captivating anxiety which fascinates us like the
serpent's eye,' says Kierkegaard, 'and plunges us finally into the
reality of evil.'
As dread is linked to the idea of possibility, it is also linked to
the idea of ambiguity. What we find in dread is a kind of power
by which we are attracted and repelled; it is an antipathetic sym-
pathy and a sympathetic antipathy.
What appears here is essentially the idea of ambivalence and at
the same time the idea of dialectic. One is drawn towards something
which one cannot and does not wish to look at and which at the
same time one cannot not look at.
The bond between dread and possibility is further strengthened
by the fact that dread is always turned towards the future. One
ought to make a study of the relations between dread and time.
Dread is always oriented towards something that has not yet
occurred. But, at the same time, there is a kind of slowing down
of time. When one is in dread, time goes by more slowly, and when
one is in the height of dread, time goes by extremely slowly, and
one has the sensation of no longer being able to move. And yet,
at the same time, it could be said that the instant of dread is a
decisive instant. There are therefore, three rather incongruous
ways in which dread is related to time: it is oriented towards the
future; it slows down the passage of time; and yet it is an instant,
a decisive instant.
From the idea of possibility we can also go to the idea of free-
dom. Dread is the giddiness of freedom. Freedom is caught in its
own trap; it is its own captive.
Are we free or are we determined ? Or again, are we innocent
or are we guilty ? We are free and determined, we are innocent and
guilty. We are not guilty yet; nevertheless, it could be said that we
have already lost our innocence; dread has already taken hold of
us, or rather we have given in to dread. Thus we are never sure
whether we are free or determined. Man feels guilty without
knowing when he has been guilty, for we are not conscious of the
moment when we become truly guilty.
Dread produces simultaneous feelings of necessity and freedom~
and at the same time we are seized by an anticipatory feeling of
repentance as it were, because we already see ourselves as having
committed the act that we did not want to commit. And all that
remains for us to do, even before the act, is to surrender to remorse.
Dread and possibility; this leads us to another idea which was to
H II3
 Appendix
be developed by Heidegger: dread is connected to nothingness.
There is a positive nothingness, and it is revealed to us in dread. In
the philosophies of antiquity, according to Kierkegaard, there was
hardly a place for nothingness. With Judaism and Christianity,
we come to the idea of a creation ex nihilo, to the idea of sin as the
manifestation of an active moral nothingness within us, to the
reality of time.
One might also mention the bond between dread and what
Kierkegaard calls spirit. ·For man, according to Kierkegaard, is
not composed only of soul and body: he is founded on something
which ties the soul to the body, and this is spirit; and the more a
man is spirit, the more is he in dread. Kierkegaard said of himself:
'Ever since childhood I have been spirit.' But, on the other hand,
dread is also linked to the body, and it is the intensity of the
consciousness which a man has of being a spirit that leads him to
become also conscious of the fact that he is a body. Never was man
more conscious of his body as opposed to spirit than since the ad-
vent of Christianity. Thus dread is linked both to the presence of
the spirit and to that of the body; and the more the spirit is felt as
spirit, the more the sensible world will be felt as sensuality.
One could dwell upon the different forms of dread that Kierke-
gaard distinguishes-dread before sin, dread after sin, but which
is really always a dread before sin, for sin is never-ending; dread in
paganism, for even in paganism there is an obscure feeling of
guilt; dread in Judaism, dread in Christianity, Judaic dread
coming from the idea oflaw, Christian dread, from that of paradox.
We shall not insist upon these different elements which have not
been retained by Kierkegaard's successors.
What is to be done with dread? In what way can it be of use to
us? 'One must,' Kierkegaard tells us, 'school oneself in the most
terrible possibilities.' He calls himself, 'the student of possibilities.'
'We must anticipate our destiny by means of dread, and welcome
every terrifying experience that comes our way. Dread corrodes
everything belonging to the finite world and lays bare all illusions;
it extirpates that which is mediocre in us.' Thus, to know oneself
to the utmost, one must have experienced dread to the utmost,
to the point of death and annihilation. Dread moulds the
individual by destroying all his finitudes; it educates him in
an infinite manner. And it is in dread that we demand the
presence of God.
It is at the moment when we believe ourselves completely lost
II4
 Appendix
that aid arrives. Thus dread is the remedy for dread; it purifies the
air, renders all things more pleasant finally, more agreeable., more
inward, and more surprising at the same time. But dread does not
disappear just because we accept this aid; there is a new dread:
dread before the Paradox, dread before the Other, the Absolute,
which our mind cannot fully grasp, and from which it nevertheless
cannot turn away.
All this is but one aspect of a divine action, according to Kierke-
gaard. It is, as it were, a choice of God which is effected by dread,
if we can turn away for a moment from the side of man to catch a
glimpse of the side of God.
But dread is always with us: it is inherent to our human con-
dition. Consequently, even in happiness-as we saw in connection
with paganism-there is dread. We try to escape from the con-
sciousness of dread by taking refuge in diversions which Pascal
spoke of. Nevertheless it abides, since it is the essence of man,
in so far as man partakes of the absolute and is dra\lffi to evil, in so
far as he is at once a temporal being and an eternal being, in so far
as he is a spirit. Man is therefore the more fully man as his dread is
the more profound.
Later, after his treatise, The Concept of Dread, it seems that
Kierkegaard was inclined to give to despair, which he considered
more active, more masculine, and at the same time more par-
ticular, the importance that until then he had accorded to dread.
But whether we call it dread or despair, the two phenomena are
very similar.
Thus, dread, according to Kierkegaard, allows us to understand
how man has sinned in his freedom, while at the same time allowing
us to hold that man. is determined. And in everything he wrote
about dread, we find what could be called the Kierkegaardian
rhythm, that is to say the idea that we must go from one extreme
to the other, from the lowest to the highest, from the extremity
of dread to the thought of beatitude. We are not to choose the one
or the other, but rather to choose the one and, by the one, to choose
the other.
By dread, by the crisis of dread, we accentuate our individuality
and at the same time, we bring it into contact with the unknown.
What is the role of dread in Heidegger's philosophy ?
In the first place, Heidegger brings to light more clearly the role
that dread can play for a philosopher. 'What is needed,' he says,
'is a phenomenon that can unlock Being for us.' There must-and
II5
 Appendix
this is a postulate-be something in man that can give him access
to the Real itself; and this something is not intelligence; it is
feeling, what Heidegger calls Befindl£chkeit. Fundamentally, every
feeling reveals to us something of the essence of things, but there is
a special feeling-the feeling of dread.
'Every feeling,' says Heidegger, 'has an intentionality, is directed
towards some reality: it is not a fugitive, superficial appearance;
it puts us in touch with something.'
Now, on the one hand, dread is a kind of sharpening of our
individuality. This idea which ·was implied in all Kierkegaard's
thought is made explicit in Heidegger. Dread individualizes the
human being, unifies him in his most original tendencies.
But, on the other hand, it brings us into contact with something;
we can hardly say what; something extremely general. Dread is
characterized by its indetermination. Fear, fright, are caused by
definite things, but dread has a thoroughly indeterminate object.
There are no bases from which dread advances upon us; the object
of dread is nowhere; we cannot locate that which throws us into
dread.
And this brings us to the idea of nothingness. After a paroxysm
of dread we tell ourself: actually, there was nothing to be in dread
about; I was in dread over nothing at all. According to Heidegger,
we are not aware of the truth of our statement; it is exactly the
nothing that is the cause of our dread.
But behind the idea of nothing, Heidegger finds something else.
Dread shows us something which is a nothing, because it is not any
particular being, to use Heidegger's own language, but the world
as a whole.
And that is why dread is a special phenomenon. It reveals to us
what Heidegger calls the world, i.e. that which surrounds the
individual, that without which the individual cannot exist. It is thus
the fundamental feeling, since it is the world as such that it reveals.
And our fundamental nature, according to Heidegger, is exactly
to be-in-the-world. Dread reveals to us the world as a totality.
That which Kant had denied the existence of, and probably
rightly, from the point of view of theoretical reason, is grasped
from the point of view of feeling, of Befindlichkeit, by Heidegger.
We have a feeling of the world as a whole. That is why dread is a
phenomenon of special status, a Grundbefindlichkeit.
The role of dread in Heidegger is essentially to allow us to
distinguish between the authentic and the unauthentic. Heidegger,
II6
 Appendix
in effect, begins with the observation of the everyday world, that is,
of the world as it is discovered by pragmatists, of the world of
objects and obstacles. But this first consideration of the world must
be destroyed so that we may turn our attention to a world of
profounder reality, and this can be done only by means of the
phenomenon of dread.
In Heidegger, as in Kierkegaard, dread is essential to man;
although it appears rarely, it is a constant phenomenon. Its very
rarity is proof that we flee from. it through dread of dread.
It is consequently not surprising that few philosophers have
analysed the phenomenon. 'One could,' he says, 'cite Saint
Augustin, and Luther, but not so much for phenomena of dread as
for phenomena of fear.' Kierkegaard alone, according to Heidegger,
has made a true study of dread.
But we must triumph over dread. And we can do so only after
experiencing it in our innermost being, by meditating on death,
on the impossibility of possibility, which is at the same time the
possibility of impossibility. It is by way of dread of death that we
can approach the highest state of authenticity. That dread is our
reaction to death is proved by our very flight and cowardice before
dread. But it cannot be said that Heidegger and Kierkegaard wish
to leave us in dread; they would have us try finally to triumph over
dread and to unite it, as they say, with a kind of serenity.
As for Jaspers, he distinguishes two kinds of dread; a vital dread
and an existential dread. Vital dread concerns our life and exis-
tential dread concerns our existence, the value of our being.
Existential dread occurs in what Jaspers calls boundary situa,-
tions. In such situations all that is non-essential disappears; and
in this sense dread is a kind of metaphysical instrument, or a path
towards metaphysics. The giddiness of dread is the deep origin
of the philosopher's act, because everything that is pure Dasein, in
the Jaspersian sense of the word, is wiped away by dread.
But Jaspers, too, tells us that man must triumph over dread, and
he must have the courage, in a world without guarantees, to live on
and by the values that he creates for himself.
In Sartre, as in Heidegger and even in Kierkegaard to a lesser
extent, dread is linked to nothingness. In La mart dans l' ame we
read: 'Dread went round in a circle among the flowers and vege-
tables; it could alight nowhere.' This is the same idea of nowhere
that we encountered in the preceding philosophers.
Again as in the preceding philosophers, dread is linked to
II7
 Appendix
freedom: dread, which is the consciousness of freedom, is grasped
by freedom.
In Sartre it is particularly linked to the idea that we choose our
values without any objective guarantee, that we choose them
absolutely by ourselves. 'I find myself in a state of total freedom,'
says Sartre, 'and I give a meaning to the world,' as the Nietzschean
superman gives it a meaning. I am the foundation of all values-
and he quotes the example given by Kierkegaard: if Abraham
hears the voice of God and obeys Him, it is in the last analysis
because he himself has decided that it is the voice of God. Sartre
says: 'I shall never find any objective proof, any external sign, to
convince myself of it; even if I believe that it is God I obey, I
myself am the one who decides that it was the voice of God I
heard.' The final decision is our own.
Moreover, we do not make decisions simply for ourselves, but
for mankind as a whole. Each of our acts is valid in our mind for
the whole of humanity. We are a legislator who, while choosing
himself, chooses all men. Sartre's thought here is not very far from
Kant's.
It is the synthesis of these two ideas-total absence of objective
justification and responsibility for all men-that is the source of
Sartrian dread.
Thus, these different philosophers do not account for dread in
exactly the same way, but the diversity of accounts shows all the
more clearly the necessity of dread in the philosophies of existence.
The substantiations are different, but dread is always there in all
of them. In Kierkegaard, it is theologically motivated: it allows
us to understand man's sin. In Heidegger, it plays a role in the
structure of his system: it allows us to advance from the everyday
world to a world of authenticity.
Are these philosophers justified in giving dread a special status ?
Does dread deserve such a status ? Does not the importance
accorded to dread stem from memories of earlier metaphysics ?

u8
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

On the philosophies of Existence in general: JEANWAHL,A Short

History of Existentialism, New York, 1949 (especially for the
remarks of Berdiaeff and Gabriel Marcel).- E. MouNIER,Intro-
duction aux Existentialismes, Paris, 1947.-H. KUHN,Encounter
with Nothingness, Hinsdale, 1949.- H. MouGIN, La Sainte
Famille existentialiste, Paris, 1947.- L. PAREYS0N,Studi nel
l'esistenzialismo, Florence, 1947; Esistenza e persona, Turin,
1950.-P. PRINI,Esistenzz'alismo,Studium, Rome, 1953.
On Kierkegaard: Jean WAHL, Etudes Kierkegaardiennes, Paris,
l95I.
On Jaspers : Jean WAHL,La pensee et l' existence, Paris, Flammarion,
1952.-Jeanne HERSCH, L'illusion de la philosophie, Paris, Akan,
1936.-M. DuFRENNE et P. RIC0EUR,Karl Jaspers et la philoso-
phie de !'existence, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1947 (cf. J. WAHL,
'K. Jaspers en France', Critique, t. IV, June 1948).
On Heidegger: P. CHIODI,L'esistenzialismo di Heidegger, Turin,
1947; L'ultimo Heidegger, Turin, 1952.-A. DE W AELHENS,
La philosophie de Heidegger, Paris 1945.-Max MULLER,
Existenzphilosophie im Geistigen Leben der Gegenwart, Heidel-
bert, 1949.-E. LEVINES, De l'existence a l'existant, Paris, 1952.
On Gabriel Marcel: P. RIC0EUR,G. Marcel et K. Jaspers, Paris,
Ed. du Seuil, 1948.-E. GILSON et divers, Existentialisme
chretien, G. Marcel, Paris, Pion, 1948.-P. PRINI, G. Marcel
e la metodologia dell'inverifiabile, Rome, Studium 1950.-
P. TROISFONTAINES, G. Marcel, Paris, Vrin, 1953, 2 vol.
On Sartre: CAMPBELL, J. -P. Sartre ou une litterature philosophique,
Paris, 1947.-G. VARET,L'ontologie de Sartre. Paris, 1948.-
JEANS0N, Le proleme moral et la pensee de Sartre, Paris, 1947.

II9
 Index
Abel et Abel (Lequier), III Boundary situations, 56, 74, II7
Affectivity, 8 Bradley, 18
Age of Reason (Sartre), 59 Brehier, Emile, 7, 8, 90
Alain, 60, IOI Bruno, Giordano, II, 14
Alquie, F., 92, 107 Buber, II, 79, 81
Ambiguity, 87-8, 107; and dread,
II3 Care, concept of, 41-2
Amiel, vii Cartesianism, see Descartes
Anguish, 6, 66, II 1-12 Changelessness, 12
Aristotle, 30, 41; criticism of Chestov, 8, II, 52
Platonic Ideas, 7-8 Choice, 57-9, 66, 104, 105
Auden, W. H., III Christ and Christianity, 20, 23,
Augustine, St., 8, II7 33, 53, 84-5, 93, I06, II2, n4;
Authenticity and unauthenticity, mediation, 16; the Christian
12 -3 absolute, 16, 32
Christian existentialism, 24-5
Baudelaire, 61 'Commentaries on Holderlin'
Befindlichkeit, n6 (Heidegger), 28, 79-80., 96, 103
Being, 38-45, 91 n., 92, 95-100, Communication, 77-82, 101-2;
106; and truth, 85-6 and love, 80-2, 102; indirect,
Being and Nothingness(Sartre), see 78-9; misunderstanding, 78-9
Etre et le neant, L' Conceptof Dread, The (Kierke-
Being and Time (Heidegger), see gaard), 52, II 5
Sein und Zeit Creative Evolution (Bergson), 98
Berdyaev, II and n., 81 Crisis, notion of, IO
Bergson, 45, 51, 53; on idealism Critiqueof PracticalReason(Kant),
and realism, 99; on nothingness, 62
98 Culbertson, Father, 5
Bernard, St., 8
Blanchot, II I Dasein, 22, 35 n., 39-40, 42-3, 48,
Bochenski, Father, 6, 7 51, 72, 86, 96, II7
Body-soul relation, 35 de Beauvoir, Simone, 3 n.
Bosanquet, I 8 de Biran, Maine, vii
I2I
 Index
Descartes and Cartesianism, 6, 31, Infinite, 33; Seinsverstiindnis,
33, 36, 53, 55, 58, 90, 91, 98; 40-1; transcendence, 45--9;
concept of the world, 37; Ursprung,34
opposed by Kierkegaard, 13; Existentialia, 93
Sartre and, 91 Existentialism, 3 n., IO-II, 105;
Dionysiac ontology, 106 ambiguities, 92; Christian,
Dread, idea of, 66-9, 90, 103, 24-5; definitions, 5-6; essential
u1-18; and ambiguity, u3; concepts, 89-90; vocabulary, 90
and freedom, u3, n8; and Existentialismis a Humanism
nothingness, n4, n6, n7; (essay by Sartre), 45, 58, 68
and possibility, II2-13;
boundary situations, n7; vital Facticity, 7, 8, 29, 38, 54-5, 61,
and existential dread, n7 66
Failure, idea of, 73-5, 104
Eckhart, 71 Fear and Trembling(Kierkegaard),
Either/Or (Kierkegaard), 57 57, 78
Eliot, T. S., IO Feldweg(Heidegger), 103
Emotivity, 8, 29 Feuerbach, 31 n.
Empiricism, 7-8 Fichte, 100
Encompassings, theory of, 96 Finitude, 69-70
Encounterwith Nothingness Flies, TJ,,e(Sartre), 92, 107
(Kuhn), II, 105 Freedom, 59-66, 91, 101, 105,
Essence, idea of, 4-5, 12-13 107; and dread, n3, n8
Etre et le neant, L' (Being and
Nothingness)(Sartre), 4, 10, Geschichtlichkeit(profound
18 n, 24, 65, 80, 81, 92, 95, 102 historicity), 21, 51
Evolution of philosophies of Geworfenheit,54
existence, 19-25; communica- Gilson, Etienne, 94
tion, 21-2; existence and Grene, Mrs., 90
transcendence, 19-20; Geschicht- Grundbefindlichkeit,116
lichkeit, 21; Heidegger and
Jaspers, 20-3; Kierkegaard, Hamann, 8, 29; on dread, II 1
I 9-20; Marcel, 24-5; Sartre, Hegel, vii, 12, 38, 44, 58, 61, 87,
2 4-5 95, 98, 106, 108; and mediation,
Existence-Being-Transcendence, 16; and objective truth, 15-16;
29-49; Being, 38-45; body-soul and time, 50-1; creation of
relation, 35; characteristics of system, 14, 17, 36, 60, 66; Idea
existence, 30-4; choice of word as totality, 14-16, 31; idea of
'existence', 30-1; concept of the truth, 83-4; idea of universal
world, 36-7; Dasein, 35 n., 39- movement, 13-14; Jaspers and,
40, 42-3, 48, 49; etymology of 17; on Being and nothingness,
existence, 36; existence and sin, 71, 72, 99; opposed by Kierke-
32; existence as becoming, gaard, 4, 13-18, 20, 6o, 74, 76,
31-3; finite beings and the 104, II2
I22
 Index
Heidegger, 3 n., II, 25, ro3, 106, 108; and phenomenology, 9,
108; adherence to Nazism, 105; 85, 95; influence on Heidegger,
and communication, 79-80; and 22, 85; school of, 9-10
Dasein,22, 42-3; and dread,
67-8, 103, III, 114-18; and Idealism, 96, 99-101, 107
facticity, 7, 54, 61; and :finitude, Ideas, theory of, 12-13; the Idea
69-70; and freedom, 61, 63-4; as totality, 15
and guilt, 69; and limitation, Instant, idea of, 56, 59, 104
69-70; and meaning of
existence, 36-8; and Sartre, 24; Jacobi, 8
and school of Husserl, 9, 22, James, William, vii, 99
85; and time, 42, 51-2, 54, 1o4; Jaspers, 3 n., 5, 24-5, 50, 55, 56,
authenticity and unauthenticity, 62, 67, 101, 106; and Cartesian-
72-3; Befindlichkeitand Grund- ism, 53; and choice, 58-9, 104,
befindlichkeit,II6; concept of 105; and Dasein, 35 n., 39-40,
care, 41-2; concept of world, 42, 51, II7; and communica-
36-7; critique of sciences, 18; tion, 21-2, 79, 80; and dread,
differences from Kierkegaard, 67, u7; and existence, 30-1,
21-3; different forms of being, 34, 52; and freedom, 60-6; and
42-8; .evolution of system, guilt, 69; and Hegelianism, 17;
20-1; existentalia,93; Geschiclit- and repetition, 63, 74-5; and
lichkeit, 21-2, 51; Geworfenheit, the Unique, 77; and tran-
54; idealism and realism, scendence, 35, 45-9, 91 n.,
99-ro1; idea of God, 23; idea 104-6; critique of science,
of nothingness, 69-72, 98-9; 17-18; differences from
idea of repetition, 74-5; idea of Kierkegaard, 21-3; evolution
resolute decision, 64, 104, 105; of system, 20- 1 ; exposition of
idea of the instant, 56; influence possible viewpoints, 23;
of Eckhart, 71; influence of Geschichtlichkeit,21-2, 51; idea
Kant, II; influence of of failure, 73-5, 104; idea of
Nietzsche, 8; on Being, IO, truth, 84-5; influence of Kant,
38-45, 91 n., 92, 95-100; on II; influence of Kierkegaard,
essence, 4-5, 12-13, 37-8; on 10, 77; influence of Nietzsche,
metaphysics, 70, 98; on source, 8, IO, 48, 77; influence of
53; ontology, 41, 105-6; on pantheists and mystics, n;
transcendence, 46; on truth 'Law of Daytime\ 58-9, 104;
and Being, 85-6; orientation on Being, 39-40, 44-5, 95, 97;
towards death, 103-4; Seins- on boundary situations, 56, 74,
verstiindnis,40-r; Vorhanden n7; on source, 53; 'Passions of
and Zuhanden, 42-3 Night', 58-9, 104; periech-
Heraclitus, 44 ontology, 96; truth-multiplicity,
Holzwege (Heidegger), 23, 41, 43, 83-6
45, 64, 97, 103 Jeanson, 80
Husserl, 18, 24, 37, 46, 51 n., 104, Job, Book of, 8
123
 Index
Journal Metaphysique (Marcel), 18 104, n2; problem of com-
and n., 35, 82 munication, 77-80; religion
Judaism, 114 and the feeling of guilt, 16, 69;
religious meditations, 3, 19,
Kafka, 60, I I I IOI; Wholly Other, the, 38-9,
Kant, 58, 60, 62, 65, 90, IOI, n6; 45, 48, 49, 70, 77
and concept of world, 37; and Kuhn, Helmut, 10-11, 105-6
respect., 68; influence of, 7, II;
on Being, 38; on the tran- Lagneau, 6o, IOI
scendental, 46 Landsberg, P., 9
Kierkegaard, 3 and n., 4-5, IO, Langeweile (boredom), 68
II, 18 n., 24, 35, 87, 92-3, IOI, Lavelle, 3 n.
103, rn4, rn6; and dread, 66-8, Leibniz, 14, 53; monads, 37
90, 111-18; and freedom, 59- Lequier, vii, 38, 61; and dread,
64; and impossibility of III
systems, 14, 17, 20; and love, Le Senne, 3 n.
77, 81-2; and misunderstand- Letter to Beauffret (Heidegger), 4,
ing, 78-9; and nothingness, 69; 24
and passion, 15, 67; and Levinas, 103
repetition, 34, 73-4, 104, 105; Love, 77; and communication,
and sin, 19, 32, 66; and 80-2, 102
situation, 55; and subjective Luther, 19, 29-30, 32
truth, 15-16, 20, 83-6; and the Lutheran Church, 17, 79
Christian absolute, 16, 32; and
the instant, 56; and the Unique, Marcel, Gabriel, 3 n., 6 n., II and
76-7; and time, 50-1; n., 69, 79, 90, 91 n.; and
authenticity and unauthenticity, impossibility of world system,
72; choice of Christianity, 23; 18; and transcendence, 49;
Christ as the source, 53; Christian existentialism, 24-5;
doctrine of how, 20; father of idea of irreducibility, 77; idea of
philosophy of existence, 3, 8; situation, 55; on Being, 39; on
idea of failure, 73; idea of essences, 37; on love and
'standing before God', 19, 21, communication, 8i-2
24; influence of Schelling, 7, Mediation, 16, 34; matured
29; influence on existentialism, immediation, 34
89-90, 94-5, 106, 108; on Merleau-Ponty, 3 n., 8 n., IO, 24,
Being, 38-9, 45; on charac- 35, rn2; idea of ambiguity, 87;
teristics of existence, 30-1, phenomenological element, rn7
33-4; on choice, 38, 57-9, 66; Metaphysics, 70
on matured immediation, 34; Michaux, Henri, 11I
on origins, 53; on transcend- Misunderstanding, 78-9
ence, 46-8; opposition to Mitsein, 48, 79
Descartes, 8; opposition to Mort dans l'ame, La (Sartre), II7
Hegel, 4, 13-18, 20, 60, 74, 76, Morts sans sepulture (Sartre), 107
124
 Index
Mounier, E., 9 ambiguity, rn7; and idea of
Being, 95-100; and idea of
Nadler, Kate, 94 essence, 4-5; causes of popu-
Nausea, IO-II, 103 larity, 91~2; definitions, 5-6;
Nausea (Sartre), 92, 107 different elements, 95;
Neo-Hegelianism, 18 diversities of, 3-4; general
Neo-Kantians~ 104 character, 90-1; general
Nicolas of Cusa, 14 evolution, 19-52; major dates,
Nietzsche, vii, 21, 23, 53, 55, 58, I 8 n.; mood of pessimism, 104;
62, 75, 76, 85, 92, 103, II8; opposing traditions, 12-18;
influence of, 8, IO, 48, 77 possibility of, 106; traditions
Nihilation, 71-2, 99 leading to, 7- II; alternate
Nothingness, 67, 69-72, 90, 98-9; problems, 94- 109
and dread, It4, II6, II7 Plato, vii, 14, 32, 53, 56, 65, 71,
Now, meaning of, 54-5 72; critique of sciences, 18;
theory of Ideas, 7-8, 12-13
Old Testament, the, 8 Plotinus, II
Ontology, 10, 39-41, 45, 46, 67, Poe, III
68, 73, 95-8, 105-7; Dionysiac, Possibility: and dread, II2-I3;
106; onto-ontological distinc- and project, 51-3
tion, 41; periechontology, 96; Proust, 73
regional, 95 Pseudo-Dionysius, 71
Origin or source, 53, 59 Pythagoras, ·14
Other, the, 77
Realism and idealism, 96, 99-101,
Paradox, 87-8, 93, 94 107
Parmenides, 96; first hypothesis Recherchedu Temps Perdu, A la
of, 71 (Proust), 73
Parmenides(Plato), 56 Regional ontologies, 95
Pascal, 8, 55, III, II5 Renouvier, 7, III
Perception, 24, 99 Repetition, 66, 73-5, 104, 105
Periechontology, 96 Reuter, 94
Personalism, doctrine of, 9
Phenomenology, 9-10, 83, 85, 95, Sartre, 3 n., 35, 51 n., 67, 76, 89-
107 92, 101, 105, 108; ambiguities,
Phenomenologyof Perception,The 92, 100, 107; and dread, 68, II7-
(Merleau-Ponty), 10, 87 18; and essences, 13, 37; and
Phenomenologyof Spirit (Hegel), facticity, 54, 61; and humanism,
8 and n. 4, 24, 105, 106; and nausea,
Philosophie(Jaspers), 18 n., 46, 103; and time, 104; and
58, 104 transcendence, 49; Being in-
Philosophieder Weltanschauungen itself and for-itself, 44-5, 97-8,
(Jaspers), 18 n. 100, 105; criticism of Heidegger,
Philosophies of existence: 24; definitions of existentialism,
125
 Index
5-6; doctrine of freedom, 60-2, now, situation and instant,
64-6, 91, IOI, 105; doctrine of 54-6; origin or source, 53;
nihilation, 71-2, 99; essay on possibility and project,
Baudelaire, 61; idea of ambi- 51-3
guity, 87; idea of failure, 73; Traditions leading to philosophies
idea of situation, 56; influence of existence, 7-n; affectivity,
of Hegel, 4, 8 n.; influence of 8; doctrine of personalism, 9;
Nietzsche, 8; on Being, IO, empiricism, 7-8; facticity, 7, 8;
38-9, 44-5, 95-8; on choice, ontological factor, 10; personal
38, 58, 59; on Descartes, 91; example of philosophers, IO;
on existence, 37-8, 52-3; on phenomenology, 9-ro
love and communication, 80-1, Traditions of opposition, 12-18
101-2; pessimistic aspect, rn2, Transcendence, 19-20, 45-9, 60,
104; phenomenological element, 63, 74, 79, 91 n., IOI, 104-6;
107 'horizontal', 49; self-tran-
Scheler, 9, IO, 79 scendence, 48
Schelling, 8, I 12; influence of, 7, Transcendence(Jaspers), 46
II, 29; philosophy of existence, Truth and Being, 85-6
38 Truth as subjectivity, 83-6
Schopenhauer, 5, 75
Seinsverstiindnis,40- I
Sein und Zeit (Heidegger), 3 n., Unamano, II
IO, 18 n., 22, 41, 43, 64, 67, 74,
Unique, the, 76-7
Universal movement, idea of,
95, 96, 103
Shakespeare, 48 13-14
Sin, 19, 66; and existence, 32 Ursprung,34, 53
Situation, 55-6; boundary
situations, 56, 74, n7 Vocabulary of existentialism, 90
Socrates, vii, 6, 10, 16, 31, 34 Von Hartman, E., 5
Sophist, The (Plato), 71 Vorhanden,42-3
Sophoclean dike, 96-7
Spinoza, n, 12, 70 Weltorientierung(Jaspers), 17,
Stimer, 76 35
Stoicism, 92 Wholly Other, the, 38--9, 45, 48,
Subjectivity and truth, 83-6 49, 7°, 77
System, possibility of, 14, 17, 18 Works of Love (Kierkegaard), 79
World, concept of., 36-7
Tension, 87-8 World, The (Descartes), 37
Time and time-categories, 5o-6,
103-4; ecstasy of time, 51-2; Zuhannden, 42-3