Consti Midterms Review Enan Notes

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1st Semester, School Year 2020-2021

CHAPTER 1: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. The Philippine Constitution

1. Definition, nature, concept and purpose of Constitution


That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of the sovereignty are
habitually exercised – Cooley

With reference to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, it is a written


instrument enacted by direct action of the by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established limited and defined, and by which those powers are
distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit
of the body politic. – Justice Malcolm

2. Classification
Written (one document)
Unwritten (scattered or various sources)

Conventional or enacted in a definite time and place

Cumulative or evolved constitution is a product pf political evolution


-no definite time and place
-result of accumulation of different events that completes the constitution

Manners to change constitution


Rigid constitution – difficult to amend – e.g. approved by entirety of the people
Flexible Constitution- amend by ordinary legislation e.g. enactment of a law by Congress

The 1987 Constitution is written, conventional and rigid.

3. Qualities of a good written constitution


Broad (comprehensive enough) embody the past, reflect the present and foresee the
future
Brief (adjustable to change)
Definite (wordings should not be unambiguous, it should be clear.

4. Essential Parts of a written constitution

Constitution of Liberty – lays down the rights and liberties of the people that cannot be
broken or be violated by the gov’t Art 2. Art3, Art.4, Art 5, Art 12

Constitution of Government; - lays down power of the government, Art 6, Art 7, Art 8, Art 9,
Art 10

Constitution of Sovereignty – how the constitution may be change Art 7 Amendments or


Revisions

5. Principles in Constitutional Interpretation/ Construction


Verba Legis- interpreted in its ordinary meaning Except where technical terms are
employed
Ratio Legis est anoma – or interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers where
there is ambiguity (transcript of records of the 1987 Constitution)
Ut magis valeat quam perear or the constitution is to be interpreted as a whole

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Constitutional provisions must be harmonized if practicable

The Constitution operates prospectively, unless there is something on its face putting beyond
doubt to operate retrospectively;

In case of doubt, constitutional provisions are mandatory than directory,

In case of doubt, the Constitution should considered self executing rather than not self-
executing.

Manila Prince Hotel “Filipino First Policy”


1st and 3rd Paragraph – Not Self executing
2nd Paragraph –Self executing

6. Effectivity of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Art. XVIII, Sec.27)


Took effect on Feb 2, 1987 date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date
Not Feb 11, 1987.
a. Laws and executive issuances prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution
shall remain valid provided not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution
b. Treaties not ratified shall not be renewed or extended without concurrence of
at least 2/3of all members of the Senate.
Treaties are ratified by the President –Art. XVIII, Secs. 3 and4

Pacta sunct servanda – treaties and international agreement should be adhered to in


good faith

7. Amendments and revision (Art. XVII, Secs. 1 to 4)

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution

Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved

a. Difference
1. Lambino vs. Comelec, GR No. 174153, October 25,2006
1. The Two-PartTest

a. Qualitative Test inquires into the qualitative effects of the


proposed change in the constitution
b. Quantitative Test asks whether the proposed change is so
extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions
that alters the basic principle of the government

2. Provisions that needed to be changed to effect change from unitary


to federal form of government, and from presidential to
parliamentary form of government

A shift to a different form of government is revision and must change the


following provisions:

1. Bicameral legislature to unicameral legislature –Art VI


2. Presidential form of government to parliamentary form of Govt –
Art VI and Art VII
3. Unitary state to federal state – Art VI, VII, VIII and X

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-military to federal form of government
-Legislative, Executive and Judicial Department, Local Government
(Article X);
-federal form of government, the central government is the only one which
can exercise the three matters: 1) Monetary/Fiscal 2) Military 3)
Diplomatic Intercourse. All other functions can be devoted to other states.

-Parliamentary form of government


-merger between the legislative and executive
-Executive and Legislative Departments

b. Procedure : (Proposal and Ratification)

Revision:

1. Proposal
1. By Congress(Constitutional Assembly) ¾ votes of all members both
houses voting separately
2. By a Constitutional Convention
a. Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28,(1970)
-must be called upon the Congress
-it requires 2/3 of all its members
-if people will be the one to decide if there will be amendment-
majority votes of all its members

ii Ratification

Amendment:
i. Proposal
1. By Congress(Constitutional Assembly) ¾ votes of all members both
houses voting separately
2. By a Constitutional Convention
b. Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28,(1970)
-must be called upon the Congress
-it requires 2/3 of all its members
-if people will be the one to decide if there will be amendment-
majority votes of all its members

3. By People’s Initiative; Requirements and limitations


a. Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325, 19
March1997

-Is the initiative referendum act for purposes of amending the


constitution? (effecting the peoples initiative
-the SC said no, because there is no specific title that devote
itself for the amending of the constitution.

b. Resolution on the MR filed in Lambino vs.


COMELECdated November 21,2006
-“obiter dictum” only pertaining to the initiative
referendum act.
-Two kinds of people initiative:
1. Proposing laws/statutes/ordinances- 10% signature
2. Amending constitution – 12%

-People’s initiative cannot revise the constitution


because there is no law yet enacted. Only amendment of

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constitution is allowed.

ii. Ratification
-60 days – 90 days
4. Doctrine of Proper Submission
The entire constitution containing all the proposed amendments must
be presented and submitted to the people for ratification or rejection
at one plebiscite only. Submission for ratification of piecemeal
amendments is not allowed.

a. Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA702


-the Congress wants to propose to amend the Constitution.
That before the Constitution is ratified by the People, so
Congress wanted persons who will vote is 18 years old and
above. Hence, the constitution be ratified by persons having
an age of 18 years old and above instead of 21 years of old. If
after it is approve, then that’s the time they will present the
entire proposal.

c. Judicial review of amendments


1. Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA30
-If the question refers to the full discretion of the people to ratify it or not
-political
-If decision of the Congress on what kind of mode in revising- political
-Whether the procedure has been followed? – justiciable question, hence it
can be reviewed

Judicial Review of Amendment:

The choice as to whether Congress wants to propose change in the Constitution


through itself acting as a Constituent Assembly or to call Constitutional convention
for the purpose or to do both is a political question

But whether the constitutionally prescribed method or procedure for amendment,


both as to proposal and ratification has been followed is a justiciable question

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II. The Philippines as a State

1. National Territory (Art.I)***

Should be Understood in 3 Parts:

A. The Philippine Archipelago:

components/ domains: terrestrial, aerial and fluvial domain

Normal baseline method


Staright line baseline method- measuring by identifying outer most points of the
archipelago.

Archipelagic waters – inside the baseline v internal waters (countries cannot exercise
right of innocent passage)
Territorial Sea 12 NM
Contiguious Zone 24 NM
EEZ (200 NM)
Juridical Continental Shelf uo to 200NM
Extended Continental Shelf up to 350 Nautical Miles

B. “all other territories over which the Philippine has sovereignty or jurisdiction
-Had sovereignty or jurisdiction
-the Ph might establish sovereignty or jurisdiction in the future China Philippines Arbitration:

1.) Islands – can sustain life


2.) Rocks
3.) Low tide elevation

The Arbitration Ruling:

1.) The Arbitral Tribunal, among others held:

All territorial objects in Spratly Islands are either low-tide elevations or rocks.
Mischief reef, Johnson reef, cuarteron reef

2.) The UNCLOS classifies features of these territorial objects on the basis of their natural
condition. Hence, reefs which have been modified by land reclamation and installations
such as construction of artificial islands cannot convert a rock or a low tide elevation into an
island.

C. Its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine
areas.

Territortal Sea
-12 NM from straight baseline
-exercises sovereignty

Continental/ insular shelf


-the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
-exercises only “sovereign rights”
General Rule: As far as 200 NM

Extended continental shelf

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2 requirements:
a.) Continental shelf extends ( by natural prolongation) beyond 200 NM but not more than
350NM
b.) Submission thereof is recommended by Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf (CLCS) Benham Rise

a. Territorial waters
b. Archipelagic Doctrine
-Sovereignty- complete control over a certain territory
-Jurisdiction- historical claim
-Territorial Sea- exercise sovereignty, the rest only sovereign rights i.e. Contiguous
zone and ECZ??

2. Doctrine of State Immunity (Art. XVI, Section3)


a. Entitlement of immunity (DFA), justiciable or political question?
-It is inherent upon its existence that a State cannot be sued. So even absence of
provision, the Philippines cannot be sued.
-The provision is not the basis for the doctrine but provides limitation. Limitation: State
can be sued provided it gave its consent.

1.) The Holy See v. Rosario, 238 SCRA 524, Dec. 1,1994

If state or instrumentality, a political question that is conclusive upon the courts.

-you cannot sue the Papal Nuncio, because Papal Nuncio is the Holy See and
the Holy See is the head of a state
-certification of the executive branch of the government is conclusive as to its
immunity. Must be taken on its face and the court must muto propio dismiss the
complaint.

2.) Liang vs. People, GR No. 125865, 28 January2000

If individual, the DFA’s determination is only preliminary which has no binding effect
in courts (Hence, justiciable question).

-official of an ADB charged before the court. While the case was pending the DFA
issued a certification certifying that Liang is immune from suit. However, the SC
ruled that certification is not conclusive it is merely preliminary to the determination
of his/her immunity.

State – certification is conclusive since State is inherently immune from suit.


Individual- certification is not conclusive; individuals can only be immune if the
Philippines agreed that certain person is immune from suit.

b. When a suit is against an individual person deemed a suit against the state?
- If it produces adverse consequences to public treasury in terms of disbursement
of public funds and loss of government property then even if it is a suit against
an individual or the person it is deemed a suit against the state

Can the commanding officers of the US Navy’s war ship be sed for damages for the
ship’s grounding on Tubbataha Reefs while performing official military duties?

No. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of fund by the US Gov’t, the suit is deemed to
be one against the US itself. The principle of State Immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Philippine courts over the persons of respondent

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military officers.
Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206501, 16 September2014
-even if a suit is named after an individual, it is still a suit against the state if
the result of which ultimately appropriate funds or lose government
properties.
-
c. Immunity of International Organizations and Agencies
To secure them legal and practical independence in fulfilling their duties,
international organizations are granted privileges and immunities

1. SEAFDEC vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA580

d. Immunity of government agencies

Unincorporated –
Performing governmental function / non proprietary – not suable
Performing Proprietary function- suable

Incorporated –
if the charter says so regardless of function- it is suable
If silent:
Performing governmental function / non proprietary – not suable
Performing Proprietary function- suable

Agency managing airport?


If there is no original charter or if there is one but same is silent to
suability of is suable even if without consent because it is business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public.

Question: is the rule on immunity of government agencies, classifying the


entity’s personality whether incorporated or unincorporated, applicable as
well to foreign government agencies?

Yes. CNMEG is an unincorporated without original charter performing


proprietary function.

1. Incorporated– there is an original charter


1. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, 194 SCRA486
-can be sued if its charter says so
-if silent as to its suability- apply the rule on unincorporated
2. Unincorporated
1. Governmental function(jus imperi) -cannot be sued
a. Farolan vs. CTA, 217 SCRA298
-three fundamental powers of the state
-general welfare of the people
-empowered by the state to expropriate lands in order to build
a transmission line of fiber optics to send internet services to
remote baranggays to the Philippines
-BIR AND BOC (taxation) – generate revenue for the
government

2. Proprietary function(jus gestoni)-can be sued


-celebration of town fiesta is a proprietary function and not a
governmental function
-public market is not a governmental function of the state

a. China National Machinery and Equipment Corp. (Group)


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vs.Judge Santamaria, GR No. 185572, 7 February2012
-What if someone sues a government of a foreign country in
the domestic courts?
-CNMEG – GOCC’s in china
-CNMEG failed to produce its charter. So, SC applied the
rule on unincorporated agency. CNMEG was performing a
propriety function because they were a contractor to build
something. Hence, they can be sued.
b. Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA, GR No. L-
51806,8 November1968
-maintaining an airport is business/proprietary
function and not governmental

e. Suability not outright liability

Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liablity on the applicable
law and established facts

1. Meritt vs. Gov’t. Of the Phil. Islands, 34 Phil 311, No. 11154, 21 March1916)
-the Congress enacted a law waiving its state immunity only for Meritt
-When the state waives its immunity it just opens the door for the person to
prove its claim. The person still has to prove that the state is still at fault.

f. Waiver of state immunity

Can be given by the legislative branch of the government “Congress”


-ONLY Congress can waive State Immunity
Surrender of sovereignty and therefore construed strictisimi juris

-Express waiver : General Law

-can the state waives its immunity? Yes, expressly- general law/special law;
impliedly- enter a business contract or commences a suit.
-any waiver of immunity must be construed strictly against waiver but infavor of
immunity. Waiver of immunity is a derogation of the Sovereignty of the State.

1. Express consent (Suit against the Philippine government) Read: Republic


vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424)

1. General law
Money claims arising from contracts
a. ActNo.3083 in relation with CA327,as amendedbySecs.49-50,
PD 1445- provides procedure how to file your claim
-state expressly waived its immunity for money claims arising from contract

i. Procedure to collect money claims arising from contracts


-money claims- go to COA
ii. UP vs. Dizon, GR No. 171182, August 23,2012

-what if complaiannat already has a final decision of the RTC validating


his/her claim against a government agency?

COA still has first to adjudicate private respondents claim before


execution should proceed

file a claim in COA but COA rejects/failed to act your claim? file a
certiorari case to SC within 30 days from receipt of the denial

-what if you get a favorable decision from COA?


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Can you go to the National Treasury? No, you have to wait for
appropriation. Remedy?
If COA grants, submit the favorable decision to the DBM for inclusion in
the next budget proposal for Congress’ consideration in the General
Appropriation Act (GAA)

 Go to the DBM, so that DBM will include your claim in the next
budget proposal for Congress deliberation. Then Congress has to
include you validated claim in the next years appropriation. So treasury
now will be allowed to release your claim.

If DBM refuses, file Mandamus case so that the Court will direct these
departments to include your COA-granted claim in the next GAA

-Generally, law making is discretionary and not ministerial. So


mandamus cannot lie. Appropriation is law making. So, supposed
despite you have won and was included in the DBM, but congress
refused to include it in the appropriation. What is your remedy?
Mandamus, because whenever your claim has been validated by the
COA by virtue of PD 1445, the lawmaking function of the Congress is
transformed from discretionary to ministerial. Therefore, mandamus can
lie.

-What if the claim has been validated by COA, but DBM refused to
include it in its budget proposal? Mandamus

-Act 3083- applies only for money claim arising from contract, you
cannot use this when government committed torts or other sources of
obligation. Any suit other than money claim arising from contract
therefore entered between the government and a private individual can
only prosper when the contract entered into is a business contract,
which is an implied consent by the State waiving its suability.

-Act 3083 does not distinguish the function the states is performing. It
is suable regardless if it is performing government or proprietary
function.

2. Special Law–example is the Merrit Case


Express Waiver: Special Law
Either by Aunthorizing a particular person to prove his specified claim
against the state or bu authorizing a particular suit ( A special law for
specific waiver or a special provision in a general law such as Art
2189 of the Civil Code)

a. Arts. 2180 and 2189 of the new CivilCode


-in case of death or physical injury, you can sue the state if
it happens due to defective roads, public works and highways.
-can you use this provision if you sustained damage to
property? No, because it expressly provides death or physical
injury

i. Manila vs. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, 29 January1968


b. How toclaim?
-before the RTC, having general jurisdiction
-Waiver of Immunity – look at the law, if the law provides for
the venue/jurisdiction, then you should follow that. If silent-
RTC, having general jurisdiction

2. Implied consent
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Only to a suit against a foreign government

1. By entering into a business contract (Suit against foreign


government)
a. Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity
Only if contract is proprietary, suable.
If governmental function – not suable
b. USA vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA487
-the contractor was not allowed to sue the United States of the
America.
-“By entering a business contract, it is an implied waiver of the
state immunity because the State has descended to the level of
an ordinary individual. Hence,by commencing a suit, thereby
opening itself for a possible counter suit.”

2. By commencing a suit (Suit against private or individual)

When government commence or a suit


-defense

a. Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping, GR No. L-6060, 30


September 1950
-i.e. A sued B for specific performance, however, B owes
taxes to the government but B has no other property
except the land. So, the government filed a complaint
intervention against B. Even if it is not a complaint, a
complaint intervention is still a complaint hence, B can file
a counterclaim against the state/government.

g. Consent to be sued does not include consent to execution


- Such execution will require another waiver because the power of the court ends
when judgment is rendered.
- Consent to execution may be given by the State through an appropriation statute
passed by Congress

1. Municipality of San Miguel vs. Fernandez, 130 SCRA 56


-someone obtained a favorable decision from the regular court against the
Municipality of San Miguel and was able to get a writ of execution against
the funds of Municipality. The treasurer did not release the fund, hence was
held in contemp.
-The SC ruled that the treasurer was correct because there can be no
government fund be released without proper appropriation. Hence, it must
first be included in the appropriation ordinance.

2. Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA206


-The SC if the SB refused or fail to include the appropriation, you can file a
mandamus case against the Sanggunian.

h. Suit against public officers


1. Arigo vs. Swift, G.R. No. 206501, 16 September2014

i. Immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice on a citizen


-This is so despite the governmental character of the function the agency is
performing

Just compensation in expropriation, a public officer has committed ultra vires act, or
there is showing bad faith, malice or gross negligence, etc,

1. Wylie vs. Rarang, 209 SCRA357


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III. State Policies, Principles and Other General Considerations

1. Republicanism (Art. II, Sec.1)


A Republican government is one where sovereignty resides in people and all government
authority emanates from the people

The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation

Bringing the power back to the people

Manifestation of republicanism
 The existence of the Bill of Rights;
 The periodic holding of elections
 Observance of the rule of majority
 Observance of the principle of government of laws and not of man
 The concept of public office as a public trust thereby holding accountable public
officers
 The prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws;
 The observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers

a. Separation of powers –
Belgicavs.Ochoa,Jr,G.R.No.208566,November19,2013 (November 11 in SC
website)
The pork barrel system violates the Separation of Powers principle
Principle of operative fact doctrine

To sub serve the principles of separation of power and the presidential item
veto,
Appropriation bills must follow the Rule on Singular Correspondence
(specified singular amount for specified singular purpose)

Line item veto cannot be exercised by the president if Singular


Correspondence (singular amount with different purpose) is not followed
thus this violates separation of power of the President

Not All lump sum appropriation is unconstitutional

*Singular amount with different purpose but are related to each other is okay

Four corollary Principles of separation of powers (Check and balance/


blending powers/ political question / non delegation of powers

1. Principle of checks and balances


1. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President,G.R.No.196231,
January 28, 2014
-The ruling of the court is that the law is unconstitutional.
Because Office of the Ombudsman is separate and must be
independent. Hence, the president cannot discipline the OMB.
-The OMB has the disciplinary authority to its deputies.
-This case must be remembered. Only in this case that the SC
applied not part of the constitutional bodies.

3 things covered by the independence of the Ombusdman :


a.) Creation by the Constitution – office and function cannot be
abolished
b.) Fiscal Autonomy – Hence, free to dispose its fund and budget
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cannot be decreased by executive or legislative branch as to
impair its functions
c.) Isolation from executive supervision and control. Hence, official
can only be disciplined by internal authority

Question: A deputy ombudsman, in front of media men, gave a


confirmation about the content of the SALN of the president
which irked the latter. Can the President dismiss him from the
Service?

No. The SC reversed its Sept 4, 2012 Decision and held that
the provision vesting disciplinary authority including dismissal,
in the President over the deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional. Not only the said provision collided with the
independence of the Ombudsman, but also with the principle of
checks and balances.

Question: Invoking independence, the Ombudsman posits that


except the SC, other lower level courts such as the CA cannot
issue writs of injunction against its preventive suspension
orders, pursuant to Sec 14 of RA6770. Is she correct?

No. the same provision is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because the


concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as
basis to insulate the ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts, specially the SC’s rule
making authority. Hence, until the SC adopts the rule that only
SC can issue writs of injunction against the Ombudsman
preventive orders through an administrative circular, the same
rule is declare ineffective and other lower courts can issue the
same.

2. Principle of blending of powers


-it means that the power of each government is not exclusive. There may be
two or three departments sharing powers.
-Budget hearing/appropriations, law making (not exclusive), appointments
( CA and President)
Electoral Tribunal - Shared by Judiciary and Legislative

3. Political question vs. Justiciable question


-Political questions are those questions which are to be decided by the people at
their own sovereign rights or the sole authority is with the legislative or the
executive.
People, the congress or the president.

The courts cannot review

Justiciable Question – power and duty to decide the case

Art 8. Sec 1
Judicial Power is the power and duty of the Court of Justice to settle actual
controversy involving right which legally demandable or enforceable in
accordance with law

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Extended judicial power: The power to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to or lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentalities or agencies of the government.

4. Principle of non-delegation of powers

Exception PETAL:
People’s initiative – *reservation of original power
Emergency powers – in case of war and National emergency, limited time
frame,
Tariff powers - congress can delegate tariff rates to President
Administrative agencies - *power to adopt IRR (for Atty. Flores this is an
exercise of executive power)
Local Government – local laws via LG Code

To ensure that the delegated rule making authority to an administrative


agency is not a law making power, 2 fundamental tests for adequate
legislative guidelines for delegated rule making must be followed:

*Completeness Test - complete with safeguards and understandably


complete in itself and no need for agency to supplement or add provisions
in the IRR.
*Sufficient Standard test- the standard laid down is sufficient, no need for
agencies to put provisions in IRR which are vague and goes against the
law passed by Congress

Two(2)fundamental tests for adequate legislative guidelines for


delegated rule- making - Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr, G.R. No. 208566,
November 19,2013
-Completeness test and Sufficiency Test.

-The malampaya fund, the president has the power to delegate the
funds to other projects. In this case, the law said “subject to the
discretion of the president”. It actually passed the completeness test
but did not pass the sufficiency test. Since it fails to set guidelines or
limitations.

2. The principle of Right of Revolution

The inherent right of people to cast out their rulers, change their polity, or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions, by force or general uprising, when
the legal and constitutional methods of making such changes have proved inadequate or
are do obstructed as to be unavailable

3. Adherence to International law (Art. II, Sec.2)


Doctrine of Incorporation (aka Adoption Doctrine)

Sources of International Law

This Doctrine applies only for:

1.) General principles of International Law – part of the law of the land

Under the principle of pacta sunc servanda, compliance in good faith of treaties

2.) Customary International Law (aka Restricted Automatic Doctrine)


*Magallona v Ermita

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********
3.) Treaties– Doctrine of Transformation – Congress has to act before treaties to be part of
the law of the land. Art 7 of the Constitution (concurrence of the 2/3 votes of the Senate)

4. Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy (Art. II, Sec.2)


-What Constitution renounces is aggressive war and not defensive war
-Congress has the sole power to declare the existence of state of war
-can the president declare war against China?
-No, because the Philippines renounces war as a national policy. It’s a pronouncement
adhere only defensive war and not offensive war.

-Can the congress declare war? i.e. against china find that in example?
-No, because the Philippine renounces war. Hence, congress also is not authorize to do
so as well.

-Can the president declare the existence war?


- No, because congress can only declare the existence of war
-
-Can congress declare the existence of war?
-Yes, there must be vote of 2/3, voting separately

5. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons (Art II, Sec.8)


The Philippines consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

-suppose the Philippines installed nuclear weapons in subic? Is it constitutional?


-No, its not constitutional

-For example, the government installed nuclear weapons in kalayaan, is it constitutional?


-No, its not constitutional

-Suppose we install within the territory in Vietnam but control is in malacanang?


-Yes

-Suppose for example China has already declared war in the Philippines and reported in
the media? Before the actual attack, nuclear weapon was installed in the closes in bataan?
Is it constitutional?
-Yes, Article II, Section – consistent in national interest considering the threat is imminent.
-If the question is constitutional? The answer is it is constitutional.
-But if the question is ,is it a violation of our international obligation? Yes, Because
Philippines is a signatory of non prolification of nuclear weapon.

Under the principle of pacta sunc servanda, compliance in good faith of treaties.
Exception: rebus sic stantibus, if there is substantial change in the situation and when it is
in violation or contrary to constitution.

Under the Philippines, treaty is treated like a statute. Considering that treaty is also a
statute, it cannot be superior our constitution.

If domestic court, it will decide base on domestic laws.

What if international tribunal decide? Of course, it will decide base on international law
rather than domestic laws.

The convention said, what is prohibited is to establish nuclear weapon. The signatories
states can no longer build a nuclear weapon.

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6. Civilian supremacy clause (Art. II, Sec.3)

Civilian Authority is, at all time supreme over the military

Can the President confirm, mitigate and remit a sentence erring of erring military personnel
given by the court martial?

Yes. This is a clear recognition of the superiority of civilian authority over the military.
President is a civilian

a. Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, GR No. 198554, 30 July 2012


-charge with violation of articles of war. Here in this case he was preventively
confined in the campo crame. Upon order of the court martial he was sentenced
and confirmed by the president. Garcia contended that the time of his prevented
confinement should be deducted from his sentence.

-The court held that it is where an instances a civilian by virtue of commander in


chief power is superior of the military.

7. Doctrine of Separation of the Church and the State (Art. II, Sec.6)
a. Relate with Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3)

Two guarantees:
The non-establishment clause
The free exercise clause

8. The right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec.16)
a. Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792[1993]
Intergenerational Responsibility - the right to a balance is not found in the bill of
rights, the court ruled that it is still part of constitutional undertakings. Hence, it
should be followed and respected. Court also ruled that there was no contract, the
license is only a privilege and not a right. Hence, can be revoked.

The Writ of Kalikasan


Requisites:
1.) There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology;
2.) The actual or threatened violation involves arises from an unlawful acts or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3.) The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more vities or provinces

9. Prohibition against Political Dynasties


The State shall prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

-In the constitution, political dynasty is non-self executing. So if a question is ask what is
political dynasty?

-The political dynasty is a nonself-executing provision there is no legislative provision which


defines political dynasty except in SK. RA 10742, Sec 10

Where polical dynasty official having relative 2 nd degree of consaguinity or affinity to any
national, provincial, or city or barangay where an SK wants to run.

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10. Education
a. Free and compulsory elementary education (Art. XIV, Sec.2[2])
-Government cannot abolish public elementary and high school because under the
constitution it stated there that it must be given free.
-Can a law be passed congress punishing if parents will no send there children in
elementary?
-Yes, because under the constitution it is compulsory.

-Can law be passed children punishing parents who will not send them in
highschool?
-no, because it is not compulsory but the government must provide free highschool

b. Constitution in the curricula (Art. XIV, Sec.3[1])


This mandate is general and does not specify the educational level in which it must
be taught
1. ..and Panitikan - Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the
Philippines(CoTeSCUP)v.SecretaryofEducation,G.R.No.216930,October0
9, 2018
-the constitutionality of ched memo being assailed by the petitioner. Which
provides the implementation of k-12, provided that the years that a
highschool student will have 4 years but now is six years, also the non-
inclusion of the Filipino, Panitikan and Consitution in the curriculum.
Constitution from grade 1 to 10, not in college or tertiary.

-The issue is whether or not CMO NO. 20 is constitutional and it violates


the mandate that constitution subject must be included in the curriculum.

-The supreme court held that, it did not violate because first, the SC affirm
that it is mandated the constitution is mandatory but the mandate is
general and not specified. Hence, inslucion in grade 1 to 12 is sufficient or
in compliance with the constitutional provision. Also, CMO No.20 only
imposes minimum standard as to what subjects to be offered taken by the
students it did not encroach universities to include other subjects.

c. Optional study of religion in public elementary and high schools (Art. XIV, Sec.3[3])

Optional Religious Instruction in Public Schools –Conditions:


1.) There must be a consent expressed in writing by the parents or guardians;
2.) The option of parents and guardians is available only in public elementary and
high schools;
3.) It shall be taught within regular class hours
4.) It shall be taught by instructors designated or approved by religious authorities
of the religion to which the children/ wards belong; and
5.) No additional cost is incurred by the government for such instruction, other than
incidental to the use of facilities of the school

Example: St. Jude Academy, offering elementary and high school. Supposed there
are students who are INC. So the parents of members of Inc, wrote a letter to the
school to allow the doctrine of Inc be taught to the students during school hours,
same catholic doctrine. According to that letter, the instructor will be from the list
instructors approved by the deacons approved by the Inc, the cost of the lecture will
be shouldered by the parents of the INC, the school denied. The parents filed a
case in court, questioning the disapproval citing discrimination on the equal
protection clause, will the case prosper?

-No, under the constitution it only provides public elementary and highschool.
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-What if the school invokes academic freedom? Will that be valid to deny their
request?
-No, because academic freedom can only be invoke by a higher learning institution.

Suppose same of facts happen, but parents of members of INC in PUP college of
accountancy? Was denied by the school administration? Do you think it will
prosper?

-It will not proper because it only applies elementary and highschool.

d. Academic Freedom (Art. XIV, Sec.5[2])


-Institution of higher learning (Colleges)

1. Cadet 1CL Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No.
211362, 24 February2015

Question: Can the PMA dismiss a cadet for misconduct for violating Honor
Code implemented by the Academy?

Answer: Yes. As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP,
it certainly has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of
its internal rules and regulations, which are Honor Code and Honor System
in particular.

Academic Freedom afforded to schools


-what is academic Freedom?
-what may be taught
-how it shall be taught
-Who to teach
-Who will be admitted
-the right of the school to confer/withdraw degrees

-can academic freedom be invoked by teachers?


The right of academician to teach without fear of reprisals
-Yes, it is the freedom to pursue academic endeavors without fear of
reprisals.

Do students have academic freedom?


Yes .. Freedom and right of students to exercise their bill of rights

***Highest budgetary is education under the constitution is not mandatory but merely directory
provision.

11. The right of the state to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials and
employees (Art. XI, Sec15)
Rule: Cannot be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel
But this rule applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases which may prescribe in accordance with law governing them.

a. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, et.al. v. Desierto,


G.R.No. 130140, Oct. 25, 1999
-Can crime arising from corruption prescribed?
-Yes, it can prescribe in accordance with law.
-10 years prescription of anti-graft corruption crime

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-How about the civil aspect in collecting the property?
- no, because prescription does not lie against the state. The right of the state to
recover unlawfully acquired property does not prescribe.

12. Nationalist provisions: (Art. II, Sec. 19)

a. Filipino First Policy:


In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos

-this is a self-executing provisions


But does not apply in every aspect of trade and commerce

Certain areas of investments


Congress may require that certain investments have at least 60% Equity under the
following conditions:

a.) Recommendation from NEDA; and


b.) National Interests so dictates

b. Regalian Doctrine (Art. XII, Sec. 2 relate with Art. XII, Sec. 5 and Art. II, Sec.22)

Public Trust Doctrine – emperors and kings Gov’t owns all lands and natural land
and can bestow lands but cannot bestow the rights if it will hinder public interests

General Rule: All lands of the public domain and all other natural resources are owned by
the State
Exception: Any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and his
predecessors in –interest since time immemorial.

Isagani Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6,2000

-Constitutionality of IPRA Law, in violation of Regalian doctrine by giving to


indigenos people lands with natural resources.
-it is not unconstitutional because they got it since in time in memorial since those
lands were never part of the Spanish titles
-all lands are owned by the state = no private properties
-new law abolishes the Spanish titles

Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natral Resources

GENERAL RULE: only the state can utilize natural resources of the Philippines or
with the joint venture with the Filipino/Corpo-60% Filipino.

Exception: 100% Foreign Corporation can utilize when:


1. Must be under FTAA - financial or technical assistance agreement. If
not, it is not allowed.
2. It must refer to utilization of mineral, petroleum or other mineral oils, it
means if the FTAA involves timber, not allowed because the
constitution is specific
3. In accordance with General law- not sufficient if in case the subject
matter is a protected area
Special law- aside from a general law, a special law is required if the
subject matter is a protected area to allow exploration of the said
area
4. Must be signed by the president himself

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5. President shall report it to Congress within to 30 days

2. Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec. Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21
April2015

-Agreement with JApex


-exploitation and development of petroleum
-whether the contract is constitutional?
-exploration and exploitation of natural resources, who can explore and
exploit natural resources?
- the state
-private corporation/individual, if the state allows it requirements?
- 100% foreign corporation is not allowed.
-Was there a general Rule?
-yes, Article 18, section 3
-Tanan Strati is declared NIPAS

-can you use the PD 87 to exploit the Tanan Strait?


- No, this general law is not sufficient. Special law is required if the subject
area is declared a protected area because a law was created protecting a
certain area.

-Validity of the DOE secretary?


-alter ego doctrine/Qualified political agency
-acts of the agent is considered an act of the President. Except when
there is a law which requires the president must act personally.
-not valid because the exception of alter ego doctrine if there is a
provision in the constitution/law requires the president to act personally
-FDA, the agreement must be signed personally by the president.

c. Franchise, certificate and authority for public utilities (Art.XII,Sec.11)


Absolute rule: At least 60-40 Filipino- Foreign Equity

Question
Sec 11, Art XII of the Constitution provides; No franchise, certificate or any other
form of authorization for operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the
laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Does the term capital mentioned in the cited section refer to the local
common shares only, or to the outstanding capital stock or to both or “separately to
each class of shares, whether common, preferred non voting, preferred voting or
any class of shares?

Answer: The term capital refers to the total outstanding capital stock of public
utilities. The requirement that at least 60% of the capital must be owned by Filipino
applies separately to each class of shares, whether common, preferred voting, or
any class of shares. Mere legal title is not enough. Full beneficial ownership of 60%
of the outstanding capital stock is required.

New Answer

1. Roy III vs. Chairperson Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, 22 November2016


-The term capital means therein refers only to shares entitled to vote in the
election of directors excluding preferred non voting shares from 60%-40%

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Filipino –foreign ownership requirement. The pronouncement of the Court in
Gamboa Resolution – the constitutional requirement to apply uniformly and
across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and
category, comprising the capital of a corporation – is an obiter dictum. who
have voting rights regardless of its nomenclatures.

d. Acquisition of Lands

Private land Public Land


Owned by private individuals or Owned by the Government
the Government in its private
capacity
Can be transferred to/ acquired Cannot be transferred to/ acquired
by private corporations or by private associations
associations
Filipinos’ right to acquire does Filipinos’ right to acquire cannot
not have area limitation exceed 12 hectares
An alien may acquire through An alien may not acquire
hereditary succession or if he is
a former natural born Filipino
Alien may lease Alien may not lease

Public Lands
Absolute Rule : Only (1) public corporations; or (2) Filipinos (i.e Natural persons) may
acquire public land by purchase, homestead, or grant, provided it does not exceed 12
hectares.

Public land refers to agricultural land declared alienable and disposable

Lands of public domain:


a.) Agricultural lands
b.) Forest or timber lands
c.) Mineral lands
d.) National parks

Government lands v public lands

Acquisition of Private Lands


-all lands with torrents title of TCT

At least 60-40 Filipino foreign equity


Exemption:
1.) Hereditary (intestate) succession
2.) Former natural-born subject to the following limitations:
-maximum area of 5K square meters of urban land ot 3 hectares of rural land
- maximum of 2 lots which should be situated in different municipalities or cities with
total land area not exceeding 5K aquare meter of urban land or 3 hectares of rural
land

Problem with flip-flopped from Gamboa to Roy III


Question: in owning private lands, does the requirement of 60% Filipino ownership
separately apply to each class of shares with or without voting rights?
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Answer : Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) vs. Keppel Philippines


Holdings,Inc., G.R. No. 202050, 25 July 2016, the SC held that although Gamboa v
Teves decreed that the 60% Filipino ownership requirement applies separately to
each class of shares, whether with or without voting rights was made in the context
of ownership and operation of public utilities, the same should be applied to the
ownership of public and private lands, since the same proportion of Filipino
ownership required and the same pervades. However it should be remembered that
the Keppel case was decided before the Roy III case pronouncing that the above
ruling is merely an obiter dictum. Hence, in the light of new ruling, it is submitted
that the 60% Filipino ownership requirement in owning private lands shall apply
only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, thereby excluding
preferred non-voting shares from the 60-40 Filipino foreign ownership requirement.

e. Practice of profession (Art. XII, Sec. 14, 2ndpar.)


Genral Rule : Limited to Filipinos
Exemption: Congress provides otherwise
(RA 8981 empowers the PRC to issue Certificate of License or Special Temporary
Permit to aliens on the basis of reciprocity or international agreements)

f. Ownership, control, administration and establishment of educational institutions


(Art. XIV, Sec. 4[2])
General Rule: At least 60-40 Filipino-Foreign Equity
Exemption:
1.) Schools established by religious groups and mission boards
2.) Schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents;
3.) School established for other temporary residents

g. Ownership and management of mass media (Art. XVI, Sec.11[1])


Absolute rule : Owned and Managed by 100% Filipino

h. Ownership of and control over businesses engaged in advertising industry


(Art.XVI,Sec. 11[2])
Absolute Rule: At leat 70-30 Filipino- foreign equity

13. Language
a. Classifications
1. National Language (Art. XIV, Sec. 6, 1 stpar.) - Filipino
-medium of communication among Filipinos
2. Official language (Art. XIV, Sec. 7 and Sec. 6, 2ndpar.)
-language use for communication and instructions
-Filipino and until otherwise provided by law, English

-Official Language is not self-executing, the Congress may enact a law


1. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) v. Secretary of Education, G.R.
No.216930, October 09, 2018

3. Auxiliary official language (Art. XIV, Sec. 7, 2ndpar.)


-Filipino though tagalog base is an integration of other dialects and regional
languages
-regional languages
1. Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of
the Philippines (CoTeSCUP) v. Secretary of Education, G.R.
No.216930, October 09, 2018
4. Voluntary or optional language (Art. XIV, Sec. 7, 3rdpar.)

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Spanish and Arabic
b. Language used in the promulgation of the Philippine Constitution (Art. XIV, Sec.8)

14. Symbols of Statehood


a. Philippine flag (Art. XVI, Sec.1)

It cannot be changed by law and may be changed only by constitutional


amendment

b. Country’s name – Republic of the Philippines


c. National Anthem - Lupang Hinirang
d. National seal (Art. XVI, Sec.2)
The congress has the authority to change them :
- But change shall not take effect until ratified by the people in a national referendum,
- they must be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history and tradition of the
people

15. Military (Art. XVI, Secs. 4 and 5)

Duties:
1) Protect the people and the state;
2) Secure the sovereignty of the State and integrity of the National Territory
3) Uphold and defend the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines

*** The exercise of the calling out power by the president to aid in law enforcement to
suppress lawless violence.

16. Police force (Art. XVI, Sec.6)

Features of the New Police Force:


1) One police force
2) National in scope
3) Civilian in Character – the President has the absolute control
4) Administered and controlled by the NAPOLCOM
5) The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be
provided by law. (limited and general in day to day basis)

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IV. Legislative Department

1. Who may exercise legislative power


1.) Congress
2.) Local Governments
3.) Administrative Agencies
4.) The President
- Delegated emergency power
- Delegated tariff power
- only orders and presidential decree in a theater of war during martial law
5.) The people – people initiative
Requirement: Referendum 10% of voter every legislative district / People Initiative 12%
of voter every legislative district

b. Art VI, Sec. 1


The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved
to the people by the provision on the initiative and referendum.
- Bicameralism
- Originally to the people

ii. Houses of Congress

SENATE
1. Composition (Art. VI, Sec.2) : 24 Senators elected at large
Continuing body – does not cease to exist
Antonio F. Trillanes IV vs. Hon. Oscar Pimentel, Sr., in His Capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC–Branch148, Makati City etal.,GRNo.179817,27June 2008

Qualifications of a Senator:
- a natural born Filipino
- at least 35 years of age on the day of the election
- able to read and write
- a registered voter
- a resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding
the day of the election

House of Representatives
Composition: A number fixed by law, composed of:
Reapportionment of legislative Districts
a.) District representatives -80%
b.) Party List representatives 20%

Apportionment of legislative districts

The four rules on Apportionment of Legislative Districts:


a.) Proportional representation – progressive ratio
b.) Prohibition on Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering
-What is Gerrymandering? Creating legislative districts where a
candidate is able to win in an election
- Is it constitutional?
-Yes, as long as it is compact, adjacent and contiguous

c.) 1 Province/City(250K) – 1rep

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Representation of cities and provinces (Art. VI, Sec. 5[3], 2 ndsentence)
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, 7 April2010

Is plebiscite required? It depends!!!

-reapportionment of legislative can be done in 2 ways


1.) directly by act of congress by creating new district by
fixing legislative district by increasing the number
2.) indirectly by passing a law creating a new province or
city with a population of 250K (needs a plebiscite)

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 8 December 2008


-Creating an LGU requires a plebiscite
-Apportionment- no plebiscite is required

Sema vs. COMELEC, 16 July2008


-Is the provision under ARMM law giving power the creation
of all 4 Municipal Corporations?
- No, it cannot apportion Province because only congress
can apportion legislative district.

d.) Reapportionment after every census – Congress is required to review


reapportionment of legislative district representative

PARTY LIST SYSTEM


The 4 Inviolable parameters of the Party List System:
1.) 20% allocation
Number of seats available to legislative district representatives divided by 80%
multiply by 20% = number of seats available to party list representatives

2.) 2% threshold – constitutional to get Guaranteed seats


Banat v. COMELEC
3.) 3 seat limit
4.) Proportional representation

Registration: Groups that may participate as party lists:


1.) National parties or organizations;
2.) Regional parties or organizations
*Does not need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector.
*They only need to not filed candidates in legislative districts
3.) Sectoral parties or organizations
Either:
a.) Sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented:
a. Labor
b. Peasant
c. Fisherfolk
d. Urban poor
e. Indigenous cultural communities
f. Handicapped
g. Veterans
h. Overseas workers
b.) Sectors that lack well defined political constituencies
a. Professionals
b. Elderly
c. Women
d. youth
-Majority of the members must belong to the sector

Qualifications (Art. VI, Sec.6) (Sec. 9 of RA7941)


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Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2,2013
-how many kinds of partylist?
-two kinds of sectors

District representatives Party-List Representatives


Natural born citizen Natural born citizen
A registered voter on the district A registered voter
in which he shall be elected
At least 25 years of age on the At least 25 years of age on the day
day of the election and of the election except a nominee
of the youth sector who must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not
more than thirty years of age on
the day of the election
A resident in the district in A resident of the Philippines for a
which he shall be elected for a period of not less than one (1)
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the
year immediately preceding the day of the election
day of the election
Able to read and write Able to read and write
A bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to
represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of election
The nominees of the sectoral
parties or organization (not
national or regional parties) that
represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that
represent those who lacked “well
defined political constituencies”,
either must belong to their
representative sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors.

Note: The party-lists themselves are no longer required to adduce evidence showing
their track record,i.e proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause
of the sector they represent. If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of
the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represent by their
organization.

iii. Parliamentary immunities and privileges

1.) Privilege from arrest


-offense punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment
-only while Congress is in session
Does not cover privilege from searches

People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb. 3,2000


-When can he be arrested? – when congress is not in session
-What is it is less than 6 years? – he cannot be arrested.

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2.) Speech and debate clause –Art. VI, Sec.11
-only speeches in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees
-Congressmen immune only “in any other place,” but not within the hall of Congress
for disorderly behavior:
1. Osmena v. Pendatun. 109 Phil. 863(1960)
2. Pobre vs. Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, 25 August2009

iv. Legislative Inhibitions/Disqualifications

Compatible Offices No senator or Member of the House of


representative may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof
including GOCC or their subsidiaries during
his term, without forfeiting his seat.
-Acceptance of new office results in forfeiture of
congressional seat
2.Forbidden Offices Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term or which he was
elected
- Acceptance of new office results in forfeiture
of both offices
Other Prohibitions 3.Personal appearance as counsel
4.Financial Interest in government
5.intervention in certain matters
6.Financial accommodations

Incompatible offices – Art. VI, Sec. 13, 1st sentence

Question: A sitting Senator assumed position as the Chairman of the Philippine


National Red Cross. Does it result to the automatic forfeiture of his seat in the
Senate?

No. The PNRC cannot be “classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose
its character of neutrality” as well as its independence. Accordingly, there is no
incompatibility of offices that may cause the forfeiture of the seat of the Senator.
However, the SC further said that while PNRC is not a state instrumentality, it is neither
strictly a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law, and
is treated an auxiliary State.(Liban vs. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, 15 July 2009;
Resolution on the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration dated 18
January 2011, GR No.175352)
*PNRC is a sui generis.

v. Sessions

Regular – held noon of June after election


Special – held during recess (mandatory –recess to be declared before the assembly of the
next congress and optional – from time to time, every after 2 months)
Optional – scheduled and must be approved by the other house
Sine die recess – without assigning a day for a further meeting or hearing
Stopping the clock – practice of the legislative body from preventing another day. If trying to
pass a session before it reach a recess

vi. Election of officers – Art. VI, Sec. 16(1)

The senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker by a

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majority vote of all its respective Members. Each house shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.

Question: A district representative, who is the second placer for speakership, question the
legality of the decision of the House of Representative in choosing a Minority Floor Leader
from members of the ruling party. He argues invoked: (1) the long standing tradition” of
automatically awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership
elections and the rule that those who abstained in the speakership Elections should be
deemed as independent members of the House of Representatives, and thus, they could
not have voted for a Minority Leader. Is he correct?

Answer: No. he is not correct, while the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Speaker of the House of Representative, it is however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers of the Lower House. Therefore, such method must be prescribe
by the House of Representative, not by the Court. These legislative rules, unlike statutory
laws, do not have imprints of the permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In
fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. (Rep. Baguilat vs. Speaker Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, 25 July2017)

vii. Quorum

- “Majority” when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half
of any total (i.e. more than 50%)
- Based on the number of the members who are within the Philippines and within the
coercive power of that body (Avelino v Cuenco)

Voting Majorities:
General Rule: Simple or ordinary majority (more than 50% or MEMBERS PRESENT)
Corollary Principle : Doctrine of Shifting Majority

Exceptions:
a) Qualified Majority of Members Present
- 2/3, in declaring the existence of state of war
- 2/3 in declaring on whether the President able to discharge powers

b) Constitutional Majority of the Entire Membership


- Lesser than half:
1. 1/3, in affirming the Articles of Impeachment of HOR
- Absolute majority
1. In electing Senate President and House Speaker
2. In granting tax exemptions
3. In breaking the tie as Board or canvassers for presidential and Vice-
Presidential elections
4. In confirming the nomination of a Vice President by the President,
whenever there is vacancy
5. In concurring to the amnesty granted by the President
6. In submitting to the electorate the question of calling constitutional
convention
7. In revoking or extending the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
- Super Majority (i.e proportion greater than half)
1. 2/3, in suspending or expelling a Member
2. 2/3, in overriding a presidential veto
3. 2/3, in concurring treaties (SENATE)
4. 2/3, in convicting an impeachable officer by the SENATE
5. 2/3, in calling a constitutional convention
6. 3/4, in proposing to amend or revise the Constitution of both houses
voting separate

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viii. Electoral Tribunals - Art. VI, Sec.17

The Senate or the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of their
respective members

Composition:
9 members : 3 SC Justices designated by the Chief Justice
6 Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties organization registered under the party-list system represented therein.

The senior justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman

Jurisdiction: sole judge of all contests relating to the :


1.) Election, returns (i.e. election protests) and
2.) Qualifications (i.e petition for quo warranto) of their respective members
SET for Senators
HRET for Members of The HOR

Question: It was held in Reyes v. Comelec, GR No. 207264, June 25, 2013 that for HRET to
take cognizance of the case ousting the Comelec of its jurisdiction, the person must be
considered a “member” thereof. And to be considered a Member of House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
1. Valid proclamation,
2. Proper oath,
3. Assumption of office.
Parenthetically, the term of office of a member of the House of Representatives begins only at
“noon of the 30th of June next following their election. “Before that date or before the
assumption to office, the Certificate Of Candidacy (COC) of a district representative was finally
cancelled by the COMELEC due to non eligibility. However, the decision reached the office
and are serving as members thereof. Do you think the HRET has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
case?

Answer: No. When the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the COC of the subject district
representative before the date of his assumption of office to Congress, it held back the
possibility HRET acquiring jurisdiction over him because he was never a member of the HOR.
The legal effect of cancellation of COC, as distinguish from disqualification, is that a person
whose COC was cancelled could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less a
duly proclaimed winner. (Velasco vs. Belmonte GR 211140, January 12, 2016)

Question: Can HRET or SET adjudicate on the legality of the naturalization of A in order to
prove or disprove the Filipino Citizenship or lack thereof of Congressman B who is descendant
of A?

Answer: No. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for
its nullity. The power of the HRET to be sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its Members, no matter how complete and exclusive , does not
carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying its member. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father of its member. (Villando v. HRET 656 SCRA 17 2011)

ix. the Commission on Appointments

Composition: 25 members:
- Senate President as ex-officio Chairman

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- 12 Senators elected by the Senate on the basis of proportional representation
from political parties therein; and
- 12 Members of House of Representatives elected by the House of
Representatives on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system
represented therein

Jurisdiction
1.) Head of Executive Departments;
2.) Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls;
3.) Officers of the AFP from rank of Colonel or Naval Captain
4.) Regular Members of the JBC (i.e., representative of the IBP, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the SC,and a representative of the private sector)
5.) Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC;
6.) Chairman and Commissioners of the Comelec;
7.) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA; and
8.) Members of the Regional and Consultative Commissions

x. Powers
1.) Oversight Functions:
a. Legislative Scrutiny - lesser intensity of determining how the executive operates in the
past in order to influence its future performance (e.g. budget hearings, questions hour-
attendance is discretionary, confirmation of presidential appointees (CA)

b. Legislative Investigation – intense digging of facts how the executive operates in the past
in order to influence future performance (e.g. investigation in aid of legislation –
attendance mandatory)

Power of Inquiry:
Constitutional Requisites/ Limitations:
1.) Inquiries must be in aid of legislation;
2.) Inquiries must be in accordance with a duly published rules of procedure;
3.) The rights of the persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be
respected
Exceptions:
1) Executive Privilege –explain why should be considered Executive Privilege
- State secrets privilege
- Informer’s privilege
- Generic privilege for internal deliberations

2) Commander –in – Chief Clause (limited)


Congress needs to go to Court
3) Judicial privilege (limited)
a. Exceptions: impeachment proceedings
4) President
5) Supreme Court Justices

c. Supervision – continuing awareness and scrutiny regarding executive operations and


over delegated law making authority (e.g. legislative veto) UNCONSTITUTIONAL

2.) Legislative Contempt

Arnault v Senate (1950)


HoR- until final adjournment of last session
Senate ( a continuing body) – no limit

Balag v Senate (2018)

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Both Houses – until termination of the legislative inquiry

Note: The contempt power of the legislature is sui generis and local legislative bodies cannot
correctly possess it (Noreco v. Sang. Panglunsod of Dumaguete)

Journal – actions taken by the House (summary of what was taken)


Record - word for word transcription / recordings

Enrolled Bill Doctrine-


Enrolled Bill - Approve approved by both houses bearing the signature of the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House

If there is Conflict between Journal and Enrolled Bill, the Enrolled Bill should prevail exceptions:
a.) Those matters required by the Constitution that should be reflected/ entered in the
journal
-Yeahs and Nays on any questions as requested by the Congressmen
-objections of the President
-Yeahs and Nays of the 3rd and final reading (approved bill)
-Yeahs and Nays of the of the vetos
- Articles of Impeachment
b.) Withdrawal of the signature of the Senate and the President

3.) Power of impeachment


Immune official
-may not be sued in any civil or criminal (or even administrative) case during incumbency
Vs.
Impeachable official
-may be sued provided it will not indirectly remove them from office without going through an
impeachment proceeding. (e.g. criminal case with accessory penalty)

Impeachable officials
1.) President – the only one immune from any suit
2.) Vice President
3.) Members of the Supreme Court
4.) Members of the Constitutional Commissions (COMELEC, CSC, COA)
5.) Ombudsman

Other impeachable officials, cannot be removed from office except through an impeachment
proceeding
(Quo warranto proceeding (Republic v Sereno))

Limitation:
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year

Procedure: INITIATION
1.) If initiated by less than 1/3 of the HOR
- include in the Order of Business within 10 Session Days
- refer to the Proper Committee within r session days
- Committee report and resolution within 60 days from referral
- if committee approves, calendar for consideration by the House within 10 session
days from receipt of the Committee Report.
- 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm or override
committee resolution

2.) If initiated by at least 1/3 of the HOR


- It shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.

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Procedure : TRIAL
- The senate shall have the SOLE power to TRY and DECIDE all cases of
impeachment
- When the President is on trial, the Chief Justice shall preside but shall not vote.
- No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of 2/3 of all members of the
SENATE.

Consequence of Conviction:

Judgement in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than:


1. Removal from office
2. Disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines

4.) Power to Enact Laws

Law Making process:


1. Filing
2. First reading
3. Committee Action
4. Second Reading – most important
5. Third Reading / Final Reading
6. Bicameral Conference
7. Authentication to become enrolled bill
8. President’s approval

Requirement for Approval by Congress:


1.) One title – One Subject Rule
Effect of hodge –podge (stew) or log-rolling legislation (aka omnibus bill -many)?
e.g Title Two or more unrelated subjects -Entire bill void
Effect of Rider – unrelated provision is unconstitutional

2.) Bills which must originate Exclusively in the House of Representatives:


a.) Appropriation bill
b.) Revenue bill
c.) Tariff bill
d.) Bill authorizing increase in public debt
e.) Bill of local application
f.) Private bill
3.) Three readings on Separate Days Rule:
General Rule: no bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed 3
readings on separate days.
Exception: When the president certifies to the necessity of the immediate enactment to meet
a public calamity or emergency.

4.) The Printed-Form, 3 day Requirement:

General Rule: No bill passed either House shall become a law unless printed copied thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members 3 days before its passage.
Exception: When the President certifies the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency.

5.) No amendment Rule and Journal Entry Rule Upon the Last Reading
a. Corollary Principle: The Enrolled Bill Theory

*Bicameral Conference Committees (settle differences/reconcile provisions) : although it can


include an entirely new provision, it cannot be said that it is a “third legislative chamber”
because its report was final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become
valid as an act of the legislative department.
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1.) The Rule on Presentment:


- legislative veto violates this (Unconstitutional –legislative veto)
- Pork Barrel System also violates this

3 ways a bill passed by Congress becomes a law:


1.) By presidential approval
2.) By legislative override
3.) By Presidential Inaction – 30 days from receipt

Requirement for Approval by the President


1.) Veto power of the President
General veto power: approve entirely or disapprove in toto
Exemption:
Item veto power : can veto any item/s in the following without affecting the items to which he/she
does not veto:
a.) Appropriation Bill
b.) Revenue Bill
c.) Tariff Bill

Item veto power:


General rule: Only items in appropriation, revenue and tariff bills may be vetoed separately.
“Items” mean indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose
Exemption: Doctrine of Inappropriate Provision: Under this doctrine, “inappropriate provisions”,
even though they are not considered “items”, they can be vetoed by the President separately
from an item.

What are inappropriate provisions?


1.) Provisions which does not relate to any particular item (a.ka. “rider”)
2.) A provision which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation;
3.) An unconstitutional provision; and
4.) A provision which is intended to amend other laws.

The President of the Philippine does not have “pocket veto” power

Publication Requirement for the Effectivity of Laws


“Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided”

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V. Executive Department

1. The President
a. Qualifications of President and Vice President (VP)– Art. VII, Sec.2
1.)Natura-born Filipino
2.)Registered voter
3.)Able to read and write
4.)At least 40 years old on the day of the election;
5.)Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding such
election
b. Presidential succession
1. If there is vacancy BEFORE the beginning of the term – Art. VII, Sec.7

- if the President elect fails to qualify, the VP-elect shall Act as President
until the President-elect shall have qualified
- if a President shall not have been chose, the VP-elect shall act as
President until a President have been chosen and qualified
- if the President –elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the VP-elect shall have become the President
- Where no President and VP shall have been chosen or shall have
qualified, or BOTH shall have died or become permanently disabled, the
SENATE President or, in case of his inability, the SPEAKER of the House
shall act as President until a President or a VP shall have been chosen
and qualified.

2. If there is PERMANENT vacancy DURING the incumbency – Art. VII, Sec.8


- In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of the President, the VP shall become the President to serve the
unexpired term.

a. Estrada vs. Disierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, 2 March 2001


”construction resignation of ERAP”

- In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation


of BOTH the President and VP, the SENATE President or, in case of his
inability, the SPEAKER of the House shall act as President until a
President or a VP shall have been chosen and qualified

3. If there is TEMPORARY vacancy DURING the incumbency – Art. VI, Sec.11


- Whenever the President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office and until he transmits them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the VP and Acting
President.
- Whenever the a majority of all Members of the Cabinet transmits to the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House his written declaration that
he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and until he
transmits them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
shall be discharged by the VP and Acting President.
- When the President transmits to the Senate President and to the Speaker of
the House his written declaration and that no inability exists, he shall
reassume the powers and duties of his office,
- After the rebuttal of the President, should a majority of all the MEMBERS of
the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to Senate President and to the Speaker of
the House, their SECOND written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
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issue.
- Should 2/3 of both HOUSES, voting separately, votes to declare that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VP
shall act as President
- Otherwise the President shall continue the powers and duties of his office.

2. Prohibitions Against Additional Position - Art. VII, Sec. 13; relate with Art. XI, Sec. 16
(1) Elective – Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, 1stpar.\
General Rule: No additional position
Exception: Ex-officio capacity w/out compensation
Civil Liberties Union Case

(2) Appointive - Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, 2ndpar.


General Rule: No additional position
Exception:
a.) Allowed by law
b.) Allowed by the primary functions of his position
c.) Ex-officio capacity w/out compensation

(3) Elective (President and VP) and appointive (Cabinet Secretaries, Usecs. and
Asecs.)-
Elective – President
Appointive - Cabinet Secretaries, Usecs. and Asecs.

General Rule: No additional Positions


Exceptions: “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution
a.) VP as Cabinet Member
b.) VP as acting president
c.) Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the JBC
d.) President as Head of NEDA
e.) Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency/ Alter Ego Doctrine
f.) Ex-officio capacity w/out compensation

Important Note: The Prohibition does not apply to in-rank officials.

Important Note: Even if it falls to the exception if the position is Incompatible Office
or if there will be Conflict of Interest it is still a prohibition.

(4) Military in the active service


Absolute Rule: No appointment or designation in any capacity to a civilian position

3. Prohibition Against Double Compensation


General Rule: No additional compensation, directly or indirectly even offered by any foreign
government
Exception: Authorized by Congress

Even an indirect violation is not allowed.

So officers of the Phil. Tourism Authority cannot accept additional compensation in a form of
honoraria and cash gifts for concurrently rendering services to Corregidor Foundation – a
GOCC.

4. Powers of the President


a. Executive power – Art. VII, Secs. 1 and17
Executive power is not limited to what are expressly enumerated powers of the

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President Under Art. VII
These are unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power granted scattered in the provisions of the Constitution.
1. Residual power - Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 178 SCRA760

b. Control power – Art. VII, Sec.17


The president’s power to control All Executive Offices.

Corollary principles:
1. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (aka Alter Ego Doctrine)
-Act of the Executive Department Secretary is act of the President
Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 8 November2016

2. Faithful Execution Clause

Question: in 1992, Former President Ramos allegedly had an agreement with the Marcos
Family to have the remains of remains of the former President Marcos interred in Barac,
Ilocos Norte. However, in 2016, President Duterte allowed the remains of the former
President be buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Is the act a derogation of the 1992
Agreement?

Answer: No. The presidential power of control the executive Branch of Government is a
self-executing provision. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or
rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies
which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most
effective in carrying out his mandate. (Oampo v Rear Admiral Enriquez)

Question: Two Government agencies are quarrelling over an issue. If after dialogues,
negotiation fails, who shall decide or settle the dispute?

The President. If two executives offices or agencies cannot agree (intra-governmental


dispute), it is only proper and logical that the President as the sole Executive who under
Section17, Article VII of the Constitution has the power of control over both offices or
agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead of the courts. Only after the
President has decided the dispute between government offices and agencies can the
losing party resort to courts , if it so desires. Before that, any action filed in court is
premature. Power Sector Asset and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM)vs.Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 198146, 8 August 2017

c. Power of general supervision – Art. X, Secs. 4 and16

Power of the president over LGUs is to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

Control Supervision
Power to alter, modify or nullify or Overseeing or the power or authority
set aside what a subordinate of an officer to see the subordinate
officer had done in the officers perform their duties.
performance of his duties and to -power of the President exercise to
substitute the judgment of the LGU
former for that of the latter

But the power of supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Hence, the
President has the power to investigate erring local government officials.
1. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271(1991)

d. Power of appointment- Art. VII, Secs. 13 to 16

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1.) Requires Confirmation from the Commission on Appointment:
a. Head of Executive Departments;
b. Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls;
c. Officers of the AFP from rank of Colonel or Naval Captain
d. Regular Members of the JBC (i.e., representative of the IBP, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the SC,and a representative of the private sector)
e. Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC;
f. Chairman and Commissioners of the Comelec;
g. Chairman and Commissioners of the COA; and
h. Members of the Regional and Consultative Commissions

2.) By the president alone (without nomination or confirmation)


a. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
b. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
c. Those officers lower in rank whose appointment are vested by Congress,
through a law, in the President alone
d. The VP as a Member of the Cabinet

3.) Require JBC Nomination:


a. Members of the SC and Judges of lower courts; and
b. Ombudsman and his deputies

Question:
There were 6 vacancies in the Sandiganbayan and the JBC submitted at least 3
nominees per vacancy (e.g. submitted 18 nominees or more, all in all). Instead
of picking one per cluster of nominees, the President appointed 6 nominees
from all qualified nominees as if embodied in one JBC list. Are the appointments
Constitutional?

Answer:
Yes. The President is not bound by the clustering of nominees by the JBC and
may consider as one the separate shortlists of nominees concurrently submitted
by the JBC. This rule shall similarly apply to situation wherein there are closely
successive vacancies in a *collegiate court, to which the President shall make
appointments on the same occasion, regardless whether JBC carried out
combined or separate application processes for the vacancies. (Aguinaldo v
Aquino III GR 224302, Nov. 29, 2016)
*(only in SC, CA, CTA, Sandiganbayan)

4.) Regular Appointment v Ad Interim Appointment

Regular Appointment Ad interim Appointment


Appointment made by the Appointment made by the President
President while Congress is in while Congress is in recess
session
It takes effect only after It takes effect immediately after the
confirmation by the Commission appointment of the President
on Appointment
Once confirmed, it continues until It ceases in two ways:
the end of the term of the
appointee a.) Upon disapproval by the
Commission on Appointment
b.) Upon next adjournment of
Congress

Limita
*Ad*Ad interim appointment not confirmed by the Commission on Appointment
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does not constitute a term.

Acting Capacity* Ad Interim Appointment


Effective upon acceptance Effective upon Acceptance
May be extended anytime there is a Extended only during recess of
vacancy Congress
Not submitted to the Commission Submitted to the Commission on
on Appointments Appointments for Confirmation or
rejection
*provided it does not exceed one year

Question: A Comelec Commissioner’s ad interim appointment has lapsed by


the inaction of the Commission on Appointments. He was not re-appointed by
the President. Can the period of service rendered as and Ad-Interim
Commissioner be considered a “term of office” so much so that the same may
be credited to his years of service for purpose of claiming retirement benefits?

Answer: No. While an ad interim appointment is characterized “as a permanent


appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the President once the appointee has qualified into office,” an ad interim
appointment that has lapsed by the inaction of the Commission on
appointment does not constitute a term of office. To hold otherwise would
mean the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the
running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the
confirming power of the Commission on Appointments (Feliciano v Comelec,
686 SCRA 813 2012)

5.) Steps in the appointing process:


1.) Nomination by the President
2.) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
3.) Issuance of the Commission
4.) Acceptance by the Appointee
Exemption: In Art II, Sec. 4 posse commitatus (no need for acceptance)
In case of war, all can be reservist

*Without acceptance is considered Constructive Dismissal

6.) Limitations on the appointing power of the President:


1. Relatives – within the 4th Civil degree of the President to Constitutional
Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
Chairmen, or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCs
2. Defeated Candidate – within 1 year after election
3. Military – in the active service to any civilian post
4. Appointments for buying votes – within the 2 months preceding a Presidential
election. This is also an election offense.
5. Midnight Appointments – after a presidential election and up to the end of his term.
This kind of appointment is made for partisan consideration.

Exceptions to prohibition on the appointments made 2 months before the next


presidential elections (Appointments for vote buying) and up to end of the term of the
Appointing President (Midnight appointments)
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1.) Appointment with concurrence of the following requisites Art. VII:


a. Temporary appointments
b. To executive positions
c. When continued vacancies therein will prejudice service or endanger public
safety

2.) Appointment of members of the Supreme Court, which must be done within 90 days
from vacancy pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec 4 (1) (De Castro v. JBC, GR 191002, April 20,
2010)

Question: Several appointment papers were signed by the President before the ban or
more than w months before the Presidential Elections. However, they were transmitted to
the Malacanang Records Office and the appointee took oaths of office and assumed
positions within 2-month prohibited period. Are the appointments valid?

Answer : No. Any valid appointment must consist of the President signing an appointee’s
appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the appointment paper
(preferably through the MRO) , receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or
his or her assumption to office. Allowing the view that an appointment is complete merely
upon the signing of an appointment paper and its transmittal, excluding the appointee’s
acceptance from the appointment process, will lead to the absurdity that, in case of non-
acceptance, the position is considered occupied and nobody else maybe appointed to it.
Moreover, an incumbent public official, appointed to another public office by the President,
will automatically be deemed to occupy the new public office and to have an automatically
be deemed to occupy the new public office and to have automatically resigned from his
first office upon transmittal of his appointment paper, even if he refuses to accept the new
appointment. (Atty.Velicaira Garafil vs. Office of the President, G.R.No.203372, 16 June
2015)

Special Limitation: on Constitutional Commissions

The President cannot appoint members of any of the 3 Constitutional Commissions for a
term lesser than 7 years IN CASE OF EXPIRATION OF THE TERM OF APPOINTEES
PREDECESSOR.

-But if the cause of the vacancy is DEATH, RESIGNATION, DISABILITY OR


IMPEACHMENT OF the PREDECESSOR, the President cannot appoint replacement
unless only for a term only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors,
no more, no less. (FUNA v COA)

Note: The foregoing rule does not apply to the Ombudsman and the deputies. Whether
the cause of the vacancy is expiration of term, death, resignation, removal, or permanent
disability of the predecessor the successor shall ALWAYS be appointed for a full term of 7
years. (Ifurung v Carpio Morales)

Can be revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.

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e.) Military Powers of the President


(1) Calling out power - or the Commander-in-Chief Clause
(2) Martial law power;
(3) Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus–Art.VII,Sec.18

1. Calling out power


The president may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing the lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion – a duty which ordinarily involves police action
i. Requisites:
1. Whenever it becomes necessary
ii. Limits:
1. Only the President may exercise.

2. Power to proclaim martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
- It does not need the recommendation of the Defense Secretary for the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

- Since the Constitution did not define the term rebellion, it must be
understood to have the same meaning as the crime of rebellion in the RPC.

- Quantum of Proof to determine the existence of rebellion or invasion:


Probable Cause (Lagman vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 231658, 4 July
2017)

a. Requisites for the proper exercise for both powers:


1. Actual invasion or rebellion; and
2. Public safety requires such declaration and or suspension

b. Effects of the proclamation of martial law: Power added to the President


1. arrest and seizures without judicial warrants
2. ban on public assemblies
3. Takeover of news media and agencies and press censorship
4. issuance of Presidential Decrees or orders (strictly in a theater of war)

c. Effects of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus


1. Warrantless arrests of suspects for rebellion and offenses connected with
invasion

2. Arresting officers need not produce the body of the arrested person
before the court

*The arresting officer shall send a note to the court stating that the person
is detained because he is charged of rebellion or invasion

3. Arresting officers may hold the arrested suspect for as long as 3 days
without charging the latter.

d. Limits to Power to proclaim martial law and power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus:
1. Only when there is an invasion or rebellion and public safety
requires them;
2. Not to exceed 60 days;
3. Within 48 hour the President must submit a report to Congress
4. Congress can revoke
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5. The president cannot set aside the revocation
6. Extension should be with Congress approval;
7. Extension must be upon the President’s initiative or request
8. Extension is allowed only if invasion/rebellion persists and public
safety requires it.
9. SC may review the factual basis
10. SC’s decision must be issued within 30 days;
11. Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
12. Martial law does not supplant the functioning of civil court or
legislative assemblies
13. The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to suspects
for rebellion or offenses connected with invasion; and
14. During such suspension, arrested persons should be judicially
charged with 3 days otherwise they should be released.

e. Extension of proclamation or suspension


- No limitation as to the duration and number of times
- Congress’ approval of extension is a political question

Remedies Against Human Rights Violations:


1.) RA 7438 (Law on Rights of Suspects)
2.) RA 9372 (Human Security Act);
3.) RA 9745 (Anti-Torture Act);
4.) Writs Of Amparo and Habeas Data; and
5.) Universal Declaration of Human Rights

f. Modes of Review:
Calling out power
-Petition for certiorari (IBP v Zamora)

Proclamation martial law and suspension the privilege of the writ of


habeas corpus:
- A complaint, a petition or a matter to be resolved by the Court (Lagman v
Executive Secretary)

- Judicial Power to Review v Congressional Power to Revoke


Judicial Power to Review Congressional Power to Revoke
Considers only the information and May take into consideration not only
data available to the President prior data available prior to, but likewise
to or at the time of the declaration events supervening the declaration
It is not allowed to “undertake an Could probe deeper and further
independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.”
Does not look into the absolute Can delve into the accuracy of the
correctness of the factual basis facts presented before it

Note: The power of the Court to review can be exercised independently from
and simultaneously with the power of revocation of Congress.

Congressional power to revoke:


-if Congress is in recess, it is required to convene within 24 hours.
-If Congress is in session, it is required to convene only to vote jointly to
revoke. (no need if no intention to revoke)

g. Ways to Lift the Proclamation or Suspension:


1.) By the President
2.) By Congress’ revocation
3.) By SC’s nullification

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4.) By operation of law (expiration of 60 day without extension)

f.) Special topic: Command Responsibility


The president, as a commander-in chief, can be held responsible for extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. Provided the following elements are present:
1.) Superior-subordinate relationship;
2.) Superior knew OR had reason to know that the crime was that the crime was
about to be OR had been committed; and
3.) Superior failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
Applies as well in civil actions for human rights violations (Macapagal-Arroyo v
People)

g.) Delegated by Congress: Emergency powers – Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)


Requisites/ limitations:
a. War or national emergency
b. Power for limited period only
c. Pursuant to the declared national policy and
d. Subject to restrictions prescribed by Congress.

Art. XII, Sec. 17 must be read with Art. VI, Sec. 23 (2) (David v Macapagal –Arroyo)

-hence, temporary take over any privately owned business affected with public interest in
times of national emergency can be exercised by the president only if Congress grants
emergency powers.

h.) Executive clemencies – Art. VII, Sec.19


Pardoning Power of the President
Should a criminally convicted former government employee who has been pardoned be
reinstated to his former position and be paid with back wages?

-if pardon is based on innocence, yes (Monsanto)


-if not, no. he must reapply to the position (Garcia)

The power of the 3 branches to save life of a death convict do not exclude each other.

Limitations: the president does not have power to pardon on the ff. cases:
1.) Impeachment cases
2.) No final conviction
3.) Violation of election laws, rules and regulations absence the favorable
recommendation from the COMELEC;
4.) Legislative Contempt
5.) Power of the SC to discipline judges

Limitations
The enumerated exceptions cannot be extended even by the Congress by way of
statute. The form or manner by which the President should exercise his pardoning
power cannot be interfered with unless it is so provided in the Constitution. This is the
essence of the principle of separation of powers. This is known as the Doctrine of Non-
dimunition or non-impairment of the President’s Power to Pardon by acts of Congress.

-hence the requirement in Art. 36 and 41 of the RPC that restoration of civil and
political rights must be expressly provided in the pardon should not affect the exercise
of the power of the president to pardon (Risos –Vidal vs. COMELEC GR 206666,
January 21, 2015)

i. The diplomatic / treaty-making power – Art. VII, Sec. 21; Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 (Will
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bethoroughly discussed in Public InternationalLaw)

Treaty Executive Agreement


Requires Senate Concurrence Does not require Senate
Concurrence
Refers to basic political issues Refers to adjustment
and changes in national policy detail carrying out well
national policies
Permanent international Temporary
arrangements arrangements

How do you determine whether an agreement can be just in a form of an executive


agreement?

1.) If the agreement’s purpose is to adjust the details of a treaty;


2.) If the agreement is in pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
legislature; or
3.) If the agreement is in the exercise of the Presidents independent powers
under the constitution.
Saguisag v Ochoa 2016

Question : The president concluded the Enhanced Defense Cooperation


Agreement (EDCA) with the US authorizing the US Military Forces to have access
to and conduct activities within certain Agreed Locations within the Philippine soil.
Does it require to be submitted to the Senate concurrence?

Answer: No. EDCA merely involves adjustment of detail in the implementation of


the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement. Once entry is
authorized by a prior treaty (MDT) pursuant to Sec. 25 Article XVIII of the
Constitution, subsequent acts and agreements involving the same subject matter
and same parties may be in a form of an executive agreement.

Question: The President sent an instrument of accession to the Madrid Protocol or


the Madrid System for the International registration of Marks without the
concurrence of the Senate. Is the act of the President constitutional?

Answer: Yes. An agreement can be just in the form of an executive agreement if it


is entered into pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of Congress. Since there
is already a legislative act (i.e. IP Code) setting forth the policy of the state with
regard to registration of trademarks, the subsequent entry into an international
agreement pursuant thereto can be in a form of an executive agreement.

Question: A law was passed to prescribe guidelines and limitations to the power of
the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans. Thereafter, the President, with
prior concurrence by the Monetary Board entered into a foreign loan contract with
China. Does it require Senate Concurrence?

Answer: No. The President can enter into an executive agreement without
Senate concurrence if it is in the exercise of the President’s independent
powers under the Constitution. Art VII., Sec. 20 of the Constitution empowers
the President to contract or guarantee foreign loan on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Besides, it was held in USAFFE Veterans
Association, Inc. v The Treasurer foreign loan contract and money agreements
relating to the settlement of the pecuniary claims of the citizens legally and validly
fall under the class of Presidential Agreement.

j. Power of impoundment

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Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend
funds made available to Congress:

3 sources of authority:

1.) Authority to impound given expressly or impliedly by Congress


2.) Commander in Chief Clause and
3.) Faithful Execution Clause
- PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, 9 August1994

k. Power of augmentation - Article VI, Section25(5)

The power to augment appropriations from savings of the project from the GAA

a. Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, 3 February2015

CFAG: Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group


COA, COMELEC, CSC, Supreme Court, Ombudsman, CHR

- Savings of CFAG does not need to revert back to the National Treasury.
-Appropriate to other projects

l. Power with regard to the utilization of natural resources–Art.XII,Sec2,


(pars.4and5)

100% Foreign
Requisites
1.) Provided it is an FTAA
2.) Involves only petroleum or other mineral oils
3.) There must be General law, there must be Special law if it is in a preserved
area.
4.) President must sign himself Exemption to Qualified Political Agency/ Alter-ego
principle
5.) Within 30 days report such to Congress

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VI. Judicial Department

1. Concept
a. Judicial power, traditional and expanded meaning – Art. VIII, Sec.1
Traditional Meaning
-is the power of the (court of justice) judicial department to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable
Expanded meaning
- To determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any branch or
instrumentality of the government

Political Question Doctrine


The traditional meaning of judicial power of the SC excludes political questions.
-Are questions that full and discretionary authority is vested to the people or to
either legislative or executive branch of the government
-President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. (Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral Enriquez, G.R. No.
225973, 8 November 2016)

The rule now is that when political questions are involved, the Court may still
exercise the power of judicial review but the Constitution limits the determination
as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion. (IBP v Zamora)

b. Requisites for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review:


- Actual case or controversy
- Proper Party (locus standi)
- Raised in the earliest opportune time
- The constitutional question is the “lis mota” of the case

1. Actual case or controversy


Question: A proposed bill abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund and
replacing it with “Judiciary Support Fund” is filed in Congress. By the said bill, if
passed the funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be
remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds
will be used. The Save the Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movement files a petition to strike down the proposed bill. Will the case prosper?

Answer: No. One of the requirement for the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review is the existence of an actual controversy. The SC is not
empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law. It should be
better for the petitioner to air his concerns by lobbying in Congress. (In the
Matter of: Save the SC Judicial Independence and FiscalAutonomy
Movement vs. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction
of Fiscal Autonomy, UDK-15143, 21 January2015)

Question: The DOJ and the DILG Jointly issued an IRR implementing RA10592
which amends the provisions of the RPC on GCTA, among others, and directs
the prospective application of the grant thereof. Before actual injury resulting
from possible extension of their incarceration, inmates immediately file a case to
question the constitutionality of the said IRR. Has the case ripened to an actual
case allowing the SC to intervene?

Ruling: Yes. By mere enactment of the law or the issuance of an IRR thereto,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act.
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- Hence, advisory opinions are not allowed


International Court of Justice – Article 96, Chapter XIV of the UNCharter

However, Declaratory Relief Under Rule 63 may be file before breach of


violation

- GENERAL RULE – An issue, if adjudicated, cannot affect the result as to the


thing in issue in the case before it is already moot and academic. Being moot,
the Court is not empowered to decide the case or to declare principles of law
because of absence of an actual case controversy.
Exceptions: The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
1.) There is grave violation of the Constitution
2.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest are involved
3.) When the constitutional issue raised, requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and
4.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications,Inc.
vs. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) vs. Court of Appeals,G.R.
No. 209271, 26 July 2016)

2. Proper party (“locus standi” or legal standing)


- General Rule: Application of “direct injury test”
Exceptions:
1.) For taxpayer, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. David vs. Macapagal- Arroyo,
GR No. 171396,3 May2006
5.) For class suit on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balance and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation, it
must be based on “intergenerational responsibility” to the
succeeding generations (Oposa v Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 1993)
6.) For any citizen, as steward of nature, may file “in his own name”
environmental cases.
7.) For any citizen asserting public rights.
8.) For any citizen challenging the basis of the proclamation or
suspension.

Taxpayer Suit
Question: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the President still has no funding and even prescribes
that the implementation of EDCA would require the disbursement of
public funds, there must first be a legislative action by Congress
appropriating funds therefore. A taxpayer questions the
constitutionality of the EDCA. Does a person claiming to be a taxpayer
have locus standi in this case?

Answer: None. A taxpayers’ suit contemplates a situation which there


is already an appropriation or disbursement of public funds. Until and
unless the Legislature appropriates funds for EDCA, or unless one can
pinpoint a specific item in the current budget that allows expenditure
under the agreement, filing of a taxpayers’ suit cannot be justified.
(Saguisagvs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, 12
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January 2016)

Concerned Citizen:
Question: A group of concerned citizens questions the decision of the
President to have the remains of Marcos interred at the Libingan ng
Mga Bayani (LNMB) raising transcendental importance. Is the issue of
grave national importance to warrant a concerned citizen suit?

Answer: No. The transcendental importance connotes that the issue is


of overreaching significance to a society, or of paramount public
interest and the decision on the issues “would have profound effect on
the political, economic and other aspects of national life”, the interment
of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military
cemetery and declared a national shrine (LNMB) would have no
profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national
life considering that more than 27 years since his death and 30 years
after his ouster have already passed. (Ocampo vs. Rear Admiral
Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 8 November2016)

Legislator’s Suit
Question: A member of the House of Representatives files a legislator
suit to question the Constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Does he have locus standi?

Answer: None. In a legislator’s suit, those members of Congress who


are challenging the official act have standing only to the extent that the
alleged violation impinges on their right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of the institution of which they are members. In connection,
the power to concur in a treaty or international agreement is an
institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not
to the entire Legislature. Hence, members of the House of
Representatives have no legal personality and cannot institute a
legislators’ suit to question the absence of a Senate concurrence in
the EDCA. (Saguisagvs. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
212426, 12 January 2016)

Question: A Senator who is also the Chairperson of a committee


created pursuant to the EPIRA Law which Committee has the function
basically of the investigation in aid of legislation, files a legislator suit
seeking to enjoin the sale of a Naga Power Plant Complex to a private
corporation. Does he have personality to sue?

Answer: None. Legislators have the standing to maintain the


prerogatives, power and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. In
this case, however, there was no allegation of usurpation of legislative
function. Being the Chairperson of the said Committee by itself was
not sufficient to vest petitioner with standing to institute the present
suit. Notably the functions of the Committee under the aforesaid
provision are basically “in aid if legislation. ( Omeña III v. Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation, G.R. No.
212686, September 28, 2015)

Question: Without the consent of his colleagues and without an


approved resolution from the House of Representatives, Rep X filed a
legislator’s suit to question the constitutionality of the Agreement

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between the Senate and the House of Representatives providing for
the six-month rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House
of Representatives will represent Congress from January to June and
the Senate July to December, pursuant to the ruling in Chavez v. JBC.
Will the legislator suit prosper?

Answer: Yes. In a legislator suit, each member of Congress has a


legal standing to sue even without an enabling resolution for that
purpose so long as the questioned acts invade the powers,
prerogatives and privileges of Congress, anyone of its members may
validly bring an action to challenge the same to safeguard and
maintain the sanctity thereof. (Umali vs. JBC, G.R. No. 228628, 25
July 2017)

Locus Standi Update

Question: A group of environmentalists filed for writ of Kalikasan on


behalf of the resident marine mammals of Tanon Strait (e.g toothed
whales, dolphins, porpoises and other cetacean species). Does
animate species have legal standing to sue so much so they can be
represented by the environmentalists?

Answer: No. But the new Rules of Procedures for Environmental


Cases (Writ of Kalikasan) allows any Filipino citizen, as steward of
nature to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. Hence, even
without representing either animate species or personal injury, any
Filipino as steward of nature can file a suit in his own name to enforce
our environmental laws.
(Resident Marine Mammals vs. Sec. Angelo Reyes, G.R.No. 180771,
21 April 2015)

Question: We already said that the new Rules of Procedures for


Environmental Cases (Writ of Kalikasan) allows any Filipino citizen, as
steward of nature to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws
without having sustained any personal or direct injury. Does this rule
also allow a juridical person, not a natural person to file a suit?

Answer. Yes. - (West Tower Condominium Corporation vs. First


Philippine Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 194239, 16 June 2015)

Question: Our environmental laws have this Road Sharing Principle


where it mandates that one half of the roads devoted to sidewalks and
bike lanes. In order to push implementation of this principle, what do
you think, as a biker and as an environmentalist, is the smarter move –
file a petition for a writ of Kalikasan or file a writ of continuing
Mandamus?

Answer: File a Writ of Kalikasan. Although the issuance of either may


bring about the same result – to enforce our environmental laws – it is
smarter to file a writ of Kalikasan because in a petition for writ of
continuing mandamus, there is a risk of dismissal for being not a real-
party-in-interest. A petition for writ of mandamus is only available to
one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful omission. While the
requirement of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases,
the general rule of real party-in interest which is to prove direct or
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personal injury applies to continuing mandamus. (Segovia v TCCC)
Question: A Senator who is also the Chairperson of a committee
created pursuant to the EPIRA Law which Committee has the function
basically of the investigation in aid of legislation, files a legislator suit
seeking to enjoin the sale of a Naga Power Plant Complex to a private
corporation. Does he have personality to sue?

Answer: None. Legislators have the standing to maintain the


prerogatives, power and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official
action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators. In
this case, however, there was no allegation of usurpation of legislative
function. Being the Chairperson of the said Committee by itself was
not sufficient to vest petitioner with standing to institute the present
suit. However, when the proceeding involves a public right, the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement
of personal interest. The privatization of power plants in a
manner that ensures reliability and affordability of electricity in
our country pursuant to the EPIRA is an issue of paramount
public interest. ( Omeña III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 212686, September 28, 2015)

Question: Relative to Congress failure to convene in a joint session to


deliberate on Proclamation 216 (martial law in Mindanao), a petition is
filed by a citizen alleging that the convening for that purpose is
legislature’s constitutional duty of congress. Does the petitioner have
locus standi to sue?

Answer: Yes. Every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to interfere
and see that a public offense be properly pursued and punished, and
that a public grievance be remedied. A citizen who files a petition
before the court asserting a public right satisfies the requirement
of personal interest simply because the petitioner is a member of
the general public upon which the right is vested. He may not
sustain an injury as direct and adverse as compared to others but
it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrate in his petition that
he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the
vindication of a public right. (Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines
GR No 231671, July 25, 2017)

Question: Does a citizen, in challenging the factual basis of the


proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, needs to prove specific injury to him or sue as a
taxpayer in order to have a legal standing?

Answer: No. The only requisite for standing to challenge the calidity of
the proclamation or suspension is that the challenger be a citizen. He
need not even be a taxpayer. (Lagman v Executive Secretary GR
231658 4 July 2017)

Note: However in IBP v Zamora, the Supreme Court in effect held that
in questioning the exercise of the calling out power of the President,
the petitioner must show any specific injury which it had suffered and
could suffer by virtue of such exercise.
Prohibition Against Third-Party Standing – This rule states that one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a
violation of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights

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of third persons not before the court.

General Rule: This rule “as applied” challenge where the petitioner
claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any constitutional
ground-
Absence of due process;
Lack of fair notice;
Lack of ascertainable standards;
Overbreadth; or
Vagueness.

Exception: Except to a strictly penal statute, a petitioner may mount a


“facial” challenge to the constitutionality of a stature even if he claims
no violation of his own rights under the assailed stature where it
involves:
Free speech;
Religious freedom; or
Other fundamental rights.
On grounds of
Overbreadth; or
Vagueness
(Disini, Jr. v The Secretary of Justice, GR. No. 203335, Febraury
18, 2014; Imbong v Ochoa, GR No 204819 April 8, 2014)

New Rule: Facial Challenges can only be raised on the basis of


overbreadth not on vagueness. Vagueness relates to violation of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
the overbreadth (Samahan ng mga Progressibong Kabataan v
Quezon City GR No 225442, Aug 8, 2017.

3. Earlies Opportunity

General Rule: If not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the


trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
“Omnibus Motion Rule”
Exceptions:
-In criminal cases – can be raised at any time in the discretion of the court.
-in Civil Cases – can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
-In every case, except where there is estoppel – can be raised at any stage
if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

4. The “lis mota” of the case / necessity of deciding constitutional question

- Courts will not resolve the issue raised if the cases can be disposed of on
some other grounds

- Doctrine of Purposeful Hesitation


The court has the duty not only the discretion but the duty of doctrine of the
purposeful hesitation of declaring a law unconstitutional because the
presumption is that the law makers have passed that law taking into
consideration all the relevant matters and has subjected the law to
appropriate scrutiny before it passed that law and so the rule is that the
court will hesitate to declare the law unconstitutional

- Operative Fact Doctrine


Acts done pursuant to law before it became unconstitutional are considered
valid has the effect of regularity and constitutionality
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- Partial Unconstitutionality
Requisites:
1.) The legislator has expressly allowed the remaining provisions to be
constitutional (Separability Clause)
2.) The remaining provisions can stand independently even in the absence of
those declared unconstitutional

2. Safeguards of Judicial Independence


1.) The SC cannot be abolished by Congress.
2.) The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the CA.
3.) The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment.*
4.) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction.
5.) The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law without its
advice and concurrence.
6.) The SC has administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel.
7.) The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of the lower courts.
-administrative case or certiorari first before filing a case of unjust judged
8.) Members of the judiciary have security of tenure
9.) They shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
10.) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their tenure.
11.) Fiscal autonomy
12.) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. A.k.a. rule making power
13.) Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges.
14.) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary.

Administrative Supervision of all courts and personnel:

Question: Under Article 81 of the Muslim Code, the Clerk of Court of Sharia Circuit
Court enjoys the privilege of wearing two hats: first as the Clerk if Court of the
Shari’a Circuit Court, and second, as Circuit Registrar within his territorial
jurisdiction. A complaint was filed against XYZ, a clerk of Court of Shari’a Circuit
court for wrongfully and or maliciously registering the divorce of the spouse of the
complainant and issuing the Certificate of Registration of Divorce. Can SC
discipline on the basis of the complaint?

Answer: No. Although the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with the power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, it does not have
jurisdiction to impose proper disciplinary action against the civil registrars who is
also member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari’a Circuit Court where
the subject of the complaint seeks to hold the Court employee liable for registering
the divorce issuing the Certificate of Registration of Divorce pursuant to his duties
as Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the test of
jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender. Accordingly, it is the municipal and city mayors, concurrent with the CSC,
have authority to exercise administrative supervision over civil registrars. (Mamiscal
vs. Clerk of Court Macalinog S. Abdullah, A.M. No. SCC-13-18-J,1 July2015)

Not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative


functions
Question: Every bar candidate who follows the electoral protest of Bongbong
Marcos against VP Leni Robredo knows that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) is composed if the SC en banc. Does this violate judicial independence
safeguard that the members of the SC and of other courts shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions?

Answer: No. The PET, in resolving cases, is not exercising quasi-judicial power.
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The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. (Macalintal vs. PET,
GR No 191618, June 7, 2011)

Fiscal Autonomy
Question: Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code mandates the
revision to the General Fund of the unexpended balances of Appropriation,
including savings of the government agencies. Does this provision apply to the
savings of the SC?

Answer. No. the Supreme Court is one of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group, which also includes CSC, COA, COMELEC, CHR and Office of the
Ombudsman. ( Araullo v Aquino GR 209287, Feb 3, 2015)

Question: The COA rejects the practice in the SC allowing retired justices to
purchase SC properties which they used during their tenure. According to the COA,
the practice results in underpayment due to the assailed wrong formula being used
by the Property Division of the Supreme Court in computing the appraisal value of
the purchased items. Can the COA compel the SC to stop this practice?

Answer: No. The judiciary may under the constitution, manage and dispose its own
resources because it has fiscal autonomy. It is the Chief Justice, as the Head of the
Judiciary, possess the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and
dispose of the properties and assets of the department. It is not COA’s authority to
compel or instruct the Judiciary on what and how to manage and dispose such.
COA’s authority is on post audit basis only. (Re: COA Opinion on the
computation of the appraised value of the properties purchased by the retired
chief/associate justices of the Supreme Court, AM No.11- 7-10-SC, 31 July2012)

Rule making power:


Question: Invoking independence, the Ombudsman posits that except the SC, other
lower level courts such as the CA cannot issue writs of injunction against its
preventive suspension orders , pursuant to Section 14 RA 6770. Is she correct?

Answer. No. The same provision is Unconstitutional because the concept of the
Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the
Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts specially
the SC’s rule making authority. Clearly, these issuances of TRO and Writs of
Preliminary Injunction, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs
created under the provisions of the Rules of Courts are matters of procedure which
belong exclusively within the province of the Supreme Court. Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court did not create, define and regulate a right but merely prescribed
means of implementing an existing right since it is only provided for temporary
reliefs to preserve the applicant’s right in esse which is threatened to be violated
during the course of pending litigation. Hence, until the SC adopts a rule that only
SC van issue writs of injunction against Ombudsman’s preventive orders through
an administrative circular same rule is declared ineffective and lower level courts
can issue the same. ( Morales vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November10, 2015)

Question: Sec 23 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 prohibits


plea bargaining on drug suspects. Is Sec 23 Constitutional?

Answer. No. Plea bargaining is a matter of procedure. Hence when the Congress
passed the provision, it violates the rule making authority of the SC. Accordingly,
until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued for the purpose, the same is ineffective plea bargaining is
allowed in drug related cases. (Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. 226679, 15 August 2017)

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3. The Supreme Court
a. Composition
1 Chief Justice
14 Associate Justices

b. Qualifications
i. Natural born Filipino;
ii. At least 40 years old
iii. At least 15 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law; and
iv. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence

Qualifications of Members of CA/CTA/SandiganBayan


i. Natural born Filipino;
ii. At least 40 years old
iii. At least 15 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law; and
iv. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence

Qualifications of Members of RTC Judges


i. Natural born citizen of the PH;
ii. Member of the PH Bar
iii. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence
iv. At least 35 years old and
v. At least 10 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law;

Qualifications of Members of MTC Judges


i. Natural born citizen of the PH;
ii. Member of the PH Bar
iii. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence
iv. At least 30 years old and
v. At least 5 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law

Qualifications of Members of Shari’a Judges


i. Natural born citizen of the PH;
ii. Member of the PH Bar
iii. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence
iv. At least 35 years old
v. At least 10 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law
vi. Learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence

Qualifications of Members of Shari’a Circuit Judges


i. Natural born citizen of the PH;
ii. Member of the PH Bar
iii. Of proven competence , integrity, probity and independence
iv. At least 25 years old
v. Has passed the Shari’a and Islamic jurisprudence examination

Question: The JBC issued a policy limiting qualified applicants for the second level
courts to those incumbent judges of the first-level courts who have served in their
current position for at least five years. A first-level court judge questions this policy
issuance arguing that the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of
members of the judiciary and, so, the same cannot be expanded by the JBC. Will the
SC sustain his argument?
Answer. No. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members
of the judiciary this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and
procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. As the
constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening and selecting
applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the
authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Its discretion

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is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. (Judge Ferdinand R.
Villanueva vs. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, 7 April2015)

- Any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof.

c. Decision-making

Matters to be decided by the SC En banc


1.) cases in which the constitutionality of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
2.) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes death or reclusion
perpetua;
3.) cases raising novel questions of law;
4.) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
5.) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the CSC, Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit;
6.) cases where the penalty recommended or to be imposed is the dismissal of
a judge, official or personnel of the Judiciary, the disbarment of a lawyer, the
suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine
exceeding forty thousand pesos;
7.) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement
in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll
of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge's suspension or a lawyer's suspension
from the practice of law;
8.) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate courts;
9.) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division may be modified or reversed;
10.) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
11.) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
12.) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a community;
13.) subject to Section 11(b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion
of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and present, are
appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc,
14.) Cases that the Court en banc deems sufficient importance to the merit its
attention; and
15.) All matters involving policy decisions in the Administrative supervison of all
courts and their personnel.

Matters to be decided by the SC in Division

a) All cases and matters under the Jurisdiction of the court


-not otherwise provided by law,
-not otherwise provided by the Rules of Court; or
-not otherwise provided by the Internal Rules of the SC to be cognizable by
the Court en banc

*May sit in division 3, 5, 7


*Cases are decided by members who actually took part and voted thereon.
However, a division cannot decide unless there is concurrence of at least 3
members

Question: The constitutionality of a decision rendered by a division of the SC


is being questioned in a petition before the SC en banc. The petition alleges
that the division has no jurisdiction to decide because the issue in the case
is the alleged ‘verbal order” of the President to cancel a competitive
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challenge in a procurement process before the BCDA. In the petition, the
petitioner invoked the 1953 case of Ykalina v Oricio where the SC said that
a presidential order may either be in written memorandum or merely verbal
order must be heard by the Supreme Court en banc. Did the SC Division
have jurisdiction in deciding the case?

Answer. Yes. In Ykalina, the subject of the controversy was an oral


appointment by the President as opposed in the instant case where the
subject was an alleged order of the President wishing for cancellation of the
competitive challenge by BCDA. Furthermore, it was observed in Ykalina
that the verbal appointment was established in evidence by a
communication duly signed by then Acting Executive Secretary by “order of
the President”. Applied in modern scenarios, the limited application of
Ykalina doctrine should only govern those that were similarly verbally given
by the President but were, nevertheless attested by the Executive Secretary.
(SM Land vs. BCDA, G.R. No. 203655, 7 September2015)

Procedure if the Necessary Majority cannot be had


a.) Deliberate anew
b.) If still no decision:
1. In civil Cases:
Original action – dismiss
Appealed Cases – affirm the judgement/ order appealed from
2. In Criminal Cases
Acquit the accused
3. In Administrative Cases
Dismiss the case, unless majority want to impose a lesser
penalty
4. In annulling treaties, law, executive issuances
Deny the challenge to its constitutionality
5. In all matters incidental to main action
Relief sought should be denied

Periods to decide the case:


24 Months - Supreme Court
12 Months - Collegiate Courts
Other Lower Courts (including Sandiganbayan) – 3 months

Question: An RTC judge penned his decision in a case within 3 month period
but promulgates the same outside the period.
1.) Is it enough that the judge penned his decision within the 3 month period
to comply with the constitutional period in deciding cases?
2.) If not, did he lose jurisdiction after the lapse of 3 months?
3.) If the judge fails to decide the case within the said period, what remedy
the litigant can avail to speed up the promulgation of the judgment?
4.) If the judge, because of heavy caseloads, cannot promulgate the decision
within the said period, what can he do to avoid any adverse effect upon
his position?

Answers:
1.) No. It is imperative to promulgate the decision within the mandated period.
2.) No. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court
does not lose jurisdiction and can still resolve the case without further
delay (Art. VIII Sec. 15(4))
3.) File an administrative case in the SC against the judge.
4.) Request the SC for an extension of the period. A heavy caseload may
excuse a judge’s failure to decide the case within the reglementary period
but not their failure to request an extension of time. Re: report on the

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Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court,Br. 56, Mandaue City,
Cebu, A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC, February 16,2011

4. The Judicial and Bar Council – Art. VIII, Sec. 8 and9

Chavez vs. JBC, G.R. 202242, April 16,2013

- Only one member of Congress (either from Senate or House of the


Representatives) Shall sit a representative in the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
proceedings in accordance with Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Umali vs. JBC, GR 228628, July 25 2017

- In the light of the decision in Chavez v JBC, the Supreme Court held the valid
agreement of both Houses of Congress on a six-month rotational representation in the
JBC wherein the House of Representative will represent Congress from Jan to June
and the Senate from July to December.

Jerdeleza v CJ Sereno GR 213181 Aug 19 2014

The SC has supervisory authority over the JBC per Section 8, Article 8 of the
Constitution. However, it does not mean it has the power to declare invalid the unanimity
rule” adopted by the JBC which prescribes that when an integrity question is raised
against an applicant in the JBC , the voting requirement of his/her inclusion as a
nominee in to a judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead majority vote. In exercising
supervision, the supervisor does not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion
to modify or replace them.

If a nominee alleges violation of due process in his nomination, certiorari is the proper
remedy, not mandamus, to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
function. A writ of mandamus against the JBC is not available because the JBC’s duty
to nominate is discretionary.

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VII. The Fundamental Powers of the State

1. Similarities and differences - (Purpose, Delegation, Persons affected, Effects of the


exercise, Benefits of the persons affected, Amount of imposition, and Constitutional
limitation)
Exercise by the State through Congress

Police Eminent Domain Taxation


Definition Power of the State to Power of the State to Power of the
enacts such laws in take private property State to
relation to persons and for public use upon demand forced
property as may public paying to the owner a contribution
health, safety, morals, just compensation to for public
and the general welfare be ascertained purposes.
of the public. according to law.

Authority Only the government and Maybe granted to public Only the
exercising its political subdivisions service utility companies government and
the power its political
subdivisions

Purpose To promote the general For public use For support of


welfare the government
Persons A class of individuals or An individuals as the A community, a
affected their property owner of a particular class of
property individuals or
their property
Effect No transfer of ownership There is transfer of Money
of the property seized, at ownership or a lesser becomes part of
the most there is restraint right (e.g lease), of the public
on the right or on the property funds.
injurious use of the
property

Benefits No direct benefit but only Just Compensation Protection from


Received as such may arise from the government
the maintenance of the and the
healthy economic enjoyment of
standard of society living in a
(Altruistic feeling) civilized society
Amount of Not more than the No amount imposed Generally no
imposition necessary expenses of limit
the regulation
Relationshi Relatively free from Subject to certain Subject to
p to the Constitutional Constitutional certain
Constitution Limitation and is limitations (e.g. inferior Constitutional
superior to the non- to the non-impairment of limitations
impairment provisions contracts clause).

2. Police Power
Requisites for valid exercise:

Lawful Subject: The interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a
particular class require the exercise of the police power

Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

- Unlike MMC, MMDA does not have police power

-The power given to Secretary of Labor to suspend deployment of OFW is valid exercise of
police power

-Taxation can be used as an implement of police power

-Distinction must be made between a the grant of a license or permit to do business and the
issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession

-Prohibiting taxicabs older than 6 years to operate is a valid exercise of police power is a
valid exercise of police power

-A statute which legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed and
every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the power and rights claimed under its
authority. PAGCOR was not delegated with this police power by Congress.

Question: A University in Pampanga applies for a building permit to construct a new


building inside the campus. However, it refuses to pay the building permit fee that the
government is collection on the ground that an an educational institution, it is exempt from
taxation. Is it correct?

Answer No. Building permit fee is being collected for purposes of regulation. Hence, it
is an exercise of police power, not taxation. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of
police power the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the
purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure
results in some form of regulation, On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate,
then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though
incidentally, revenue is generated. Concededly, in the case of building permit fees imposed
by the National Government under the National Building Code, revenue is incidentally
generated for the benefit of local government units although the main purpose is to
regulate. (Angeles University Foundation vs. City of Angeles, et. al., GR No. 189999, June
27,2012)

Question: A pharmaceutical company questions constitutionality of 2 laws mandating 20%


discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It argues that the
laws are confiscatory in the sense that the State takes away a portion of its supposed
profits which could have gone into coffers and utilizes it for public purpose (in the form of
discounts to senior citizens and PWDs) without just compensation. Should pharmaceutical
companies be compensated?

Answer: No. The issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had
already been made clear in the case of Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by
the State in the imposition of senior citizen (and PWD) discount was its police power. Unlike
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just compensation is not required in
wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an
imposition of burden. Furthermore, the subject laws only affect the petitioner’s right to profit,
and not earned profits. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs. DSWD, G.R. No. 199669, 25
April 2017)

3. Eminent Domain

Requisites for valid exercise (Section 9, Article III):/ Limitations

1.) The subject is a private property;


2.) For public use or purpose; (cannot be delegated for another public purpose)
3.) Payment just compensation

Requisites for proper exercise delegated power of eminent domain to LGUs:


1.) The subject is a private property;
2.) For public use or purpose;
3.) Payment just compensation;
4.) Enactment of an ordinance
5.) A definite and valid offer to buy which was refused.

What if the constitution does not provide provision? Can the state still exercise the power of
eminent domain?

Yes, because it is inherent power of the State. The provision under Section 9, Article III provides
a limitation in rather than basis of power.

The subject is a private property


-Before the completion of the expropriation proceeding, the owner may sell

For public use or purpose:


-Only just compensation may be the subject of a compromise agreement, not the determination
of “public purpose”

-The property must be used for the declared specific public purpose. Otherwise, the original
owner may repurchase

-Tourism and/or urban development is a public purpose even through some private individuals or
group may benefit from it.

Payment for just compensation:


-Compensation must be just

-A compensation is not just if not paid within a reasonable time.


-Reasonable time means payment within a period of 5 years. Otherwise, the owner may recover.

-Requiring print media company to give free space to every newspaper is tantamount to kaing
without just compensation, but not tv and radio stations

-Requiring malls to provide free parking space for customers is not an exercise of police power
but us taking of private property without just compensation

Question: The City of Davao enacted an ordinance imposing ban against aerial spraying within
the defined buffer zone as an agricultural practice by all entities in order to minimize the effects of
aerial spraying within and near the plantation. Under Sec. 3(e) of the said ordinance, it requires
the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone. A group of banana planters/
landowners questions this Ordinance arguing that this amounts to taking without just
compensation because it prohibits landowners from freely exercising ownership over their lands.
Are they entitled to just compensation?

Answer. No. A landowner may only be entitled to just compensation if the taking amounts to a
permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The landowners
cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they
can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. No. 189185, 16
August 2016

Question: In 1940, The property of ABC was taken by the government without an
expropriation proceeding. Only in 2018 that he files an action for compensation. The
government argues that: 1.) considering that more than 70, years has passed, his action for
compensation has already prescribed; 2.) even assuming, without admitting, that he cas still
ask for compensation, the same should be fixed based on the FMV of the property in 1940.
Are the arguments of the Gov’t correct?

Answer: No. 1.) Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without
first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action
to recover the land or value does not prescribe.
2.)No. Just Compensation is the “fair value of the property as between one who receives,
and one who desires to sell, fixed at the time the actual taking by the government (1940 in
this case.) This rule holds true when the property is taken before filing an expropriation suit,
and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. Secretary of the
DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April 21,2015

Question: So now, you know that where a private property is taken by the Government for
public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale,
the owner’s action to recover just compensation does not prescribe. What if there was an
expropriation proceeding, say by virtue of the Agrarian Reform Law, but the judgment fails to
decide on the amount of just compensation. Can the owner indefinitely sleep on his right,
and consider his action to recover just compensation imprescriptible and file the same
whenever convenient for him?

Answer. No. While our Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) itself does not provide for a period
within which a landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation before
the Special Agrarian Court, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be place
in limbo indefinitely. The Civil code settles such conundrum. Considering that the payment of
just compensation is created by law, it should only be 10 years from the time the landowner
received notice of coverage. Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the
government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period.
(LBP vs Daluata GR No 190004, August 8, 2017)

Question: What can we learn from these two cases regarding the prescription of period
within which to file a petition for the recovery of just compensation?

Answer:
1.) IF the property was taken without an expropriation proceeding and there is no specific
law allowing such taking, the action to recover just compensation is imprescriptible;
2.) IF there is a specific law allowing such taking for expropriation purposes, the action to
recover just compensation prescribes in accordance with the provision of that law, and
3.) IF there is a specific law allowing such taking for expropriation purposes, the action to
recover just compensation prescribes in 10 years, the same being an oblidation created
by law which prescribes in 10 years according to the Civil Code.

Question: Is the payment still “just” even after the government has taken a private property
without a proceeding it can pay an amount fixed based on prices decades ago, hence, way
too low than the FMV at the time of filing the case? Is there a rule where the SC remedy this
apparent injustice?

Answer: Yes. Just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective


forbearance (of money) on the part of the State – a proper subject of interest computed from
time the property was take until the full amount of just compensation is paid. Aside from this,
interest shall be compounded at the time judicial demand is made. In addition to the
foregoing interest, additional compensation shall be awarded to respondents-movants by
way of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in view of the government’s taking without
the benefit of expropriation proceedings. DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, April
21,2015, Resolution on the MR filed to July 1 2013 decision)

Question: It is established that the amount of just compensation shall be based in Fair Market
Value (FMV) or the selling price for an item to which a buyer and seller can agree.” Are courts
allowed to adopt a different standard or method of valuation in order to estimate the FMV?

Answer: Yes, in cases where the FMV of the property is difficult to ascertain such as specialized
properties or buildings designated for unique purposes, Examples of these specialized
properties are airport terminals, churches, colleges, cemeteries, and clubhouses. In case of
airport terminal, for example, the Depreciated Replacement Cost Approach can be used.
(Republic v. Mupas, GR No 181892, September 8, 2015)

Question: As a bar candidate, you know at your fingertips that just compensation must be base
on the FMV at the time of taking. However, if the filing of an expropriation case against property
of A of XYZ. In 1993, the government entered into a compromise agreement with XYZ whereby
instead of property A, the latter agreed to just get property B of the latter. Unfortunately, the said
compromise agreement was eventually annulled by the Court. So the government reproceeds to
take property “A”. In which year shall just compensation be based?

Answer: In year 1993. The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case, whether
correct on general principles or not, continues to be law of the case for as long as the facts of the
case before the court. Where the expropriator agreed to a land swap in 1993 in a compromise
agreement that was eventually annulled, it impliedly agreed to paying just compensation using
the market values in 1993, not those at the time when the expropriator complaint was filed in
1981. (EPZA v. Pulido, 656 SCRA 315 2011)

Question : Your law professor in Constitutional Law and Law on Local Government kept on
repeating that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function and no law or
administrative regulation can take away that function from courts. Under the rules being
implemented by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board, an administrative
agency under DAR, a petition for determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian
Court (an RTC for agrarian cases) shall be proscribed and adjudged dismissible if not filed within
the 15-day period from receipt of the decision order of the DAR. Suppose a landowner files a
petition for just compensation outside the 15 days prescriptive period, should the Special
Agrarian Court dismiss the case?

Answer: Yes. The SC in Limkaichong vs land Bank of the Philippines, GR No 158464, Aug 2,
2016 held that although the determination of just compensation in eminent domain is a judicial
function therefrom a petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrariam Court is not
an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the parties only
have 15 days from their receipt of the decision/order of the DAR within which to invoke the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC as stated in the DARAB Rules. Otherwise, the
Decision/order attains finality and immutability. The Supreme Court nonetheless held this ruling
should be applied prospectively.

New Answer: No. The Limkaichong doctrine case was abandoned. The SC held that to ”maintain
the ruling ( 15 day prescription, otherwise, dismiss) would be incompatible and inconsistent with
the legislative intent to vest the original and exclusive jurisdiction in the determination of just
compensation with courts. Indeed, such rulings judicially reduced the Special Agrarian Court to
merely an appellate court to review the administrative decisions of the DAR.

Nonetheless, it is not imprescriptible. Since, payment of just compensation is an obligation


created by law, it should only be ten years from the time the landowner received the notice of
coverage. Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like proceedings in
the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period. DPWH vs. Spouses Tecson, G.R.
No. 179334, April 21,2015

Question: A party to an agrarian reform case insists on saying that Special Agrarian Court
should base the amount of just compensation in accordance with the formula issued by the
DAR. The judge refused saying that considering that the determination of just compensation
is a judicial function, courts are not obliged to apply the DAR formula in cases where they
are asked to determine just compensation for property covered by RA6657. Decide.

Answer: For the guidance of the bench, the bar,a dn the public the Supreme Court
prescribes the rule: Out of regard of the DAR’s expertise as the concerned implementing
agency, courts should henceforth consider the DAR formula in determination of just
compensation for the properties covered by said law. If, in the exercise of judicial discretion,
courts find that a strict application to said formulas is not warranted under specific
circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided
that this departure or deviation is supported by reasoned explanation grounded on the
evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the power to make a final
determination of just compensation. Alfonso vs. LBP and DAR, G.R. No. 181912, 29
November 2016; LBP v Rural Bank of Hermosa, GR 181953 July 25, 2017)

Question: What is “inverse condemnation” and how do you differentiate that to an action for
damages?

Answer: Inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of the property taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. The measure is not the taker’s
gain, but the owner’s loss.

An action for damages, on the other hand seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages
which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary.
(National Power Corporation vs Heir of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCR 60 2011

Additional requirement for LGU : Enactment of an ordinance


- A mere resolution does not suffice

Additional requirement for : A valid offer to buy which was refused


- Unsuccessful negotiation is requirement that applies only to LGU. Mere deposit of
provisional value suffices the government to possess / take the property

4. Taxation
Requisites for valid exercise:
1. Due process or tax should not be confiscatory
2. Equal protection or the tax should be uniform and equitable; and
3. For public purpose
Question: Users of tollways who are private citizens filed a case in court seeking to stop the
BIR from imposing VAT on toll fees as it will result in the increase thereof and they will be
affected thereby. They argue that NIRC imposes VAT on “sale of services”, and since a toll
fee is a users tax and not a sale of services, it should not be subject to VAT. Are the
petitioners correct?
Answer: No. Fees paid by the public to tollway operators for use of tollways, are not taxes
in any sense. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally for the
purpose if raising revenue to fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand are
collected by private tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses
incurred in the construction maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well as to assure
them a reasonable margin of income. Although toll fees are charged for use of public
facilities, therefore they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax.
Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority, toll fees may
be demanded by either the government or private individuals or entities as an attribute of
ownership (Diaz v Secretary of Finance GR 193007, July 18, 2011)
VIII. The Bill of Rights

*Police Power is an implied limitation of the Bill of Rights

*Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality – The Constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every


instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the
Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and
invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation become arbitrary
or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to injury and
investigation in the light of changed conditions.

There is hierarchy among the rights (e.g. the right to free expression is preferred over property
right)

1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

A. Due Process – right to life, liberty or property


- One may be deprive of life liberty or property as long as one is provided due process

a. Hierarchy of rights
i. Life
ii. Liberty
iii. Property

b. Property right
- Permit To Carry Firearms is not a property right but merely a privilege and even if
it is a right, can be regulated by the police power of the state and therefore due process
is not a valid ground for having it unconstitutional Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA
534(2004)

- If the legislative franchise is given by the Congress it is a property right and must
be afforded due process

Question: In 2018, resort and restaurant owners complained of the rehabilitation and
temporary closure of Boracay from tourists arguing that they were deprived of their
properties without due process because they were divested of whatever they may
earn from tourist arrivals were they correct?

Answer: No. Only rights which have completely and definitely accrued and
settled are vested (property) rights entitled to protection under the Due Process
Clause. (Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, February 12 2019)

c. Constitutional vs. Statutory Due Process


Agabon vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17,2004

Constitutional Due Process Statutory Due Process in Labor


Code
Has 2 aspects: Substantive and Has 2 aspects: Substantive and
procedural procedural
Assures rights in criminal, civil or Assure right in labor cases
admin proceedings
Protect individuals from the Protects employees from unjust
government termination by their employers

d. Aspects of due process


i. Substantive due process
Requisites:
Lawful Subject : The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those a particular class, require the exercise of the police power
Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

ii. Procedural due process


1. Judicial proceedings
Requisites:
a.) Impartial court/ tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
b.) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person and / or over
the property
c.) Opportunity to be heard; and
d.) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

2. Administrative Proceedings
Requisites
a.) Right to hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case
and submit evidence in support thereof;
b.) Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
c.) Decision must have something to support itself
d.) Evidence must be substantial;
e.) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
f.) Tribunal/body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate
g.) Board/body should in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.

Question: On the strength of an anonymous letter-complaint filed in


the Internal Affairs Services (PDEA-IAS) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a formal charge for administrative
investigation was initiated by the Agency against its own agent “X”.
After requiring him to submit a Reply to said anonymous complaint
a decision by the PDEA finding him guilty of conspiring with his co-
agents and rendering him liable for misconduct was issued.
Dissatisfied with IAS-PDEA’s decision he elevated his case to the
Civil Service Commission (CSC) which likewise found him guilty of
the accusations. He goes all the way up to the SC questioning
decision raising violation of his due process, Specifically, there was
no hearing conducted to get his side of the story and the only basis
of the findings is the anonymous complaint and his reply thereto.
Will the case prosper?

Answer : NO. There is no violation of procedural due process even


if no formal or trial-type hearing was conducted, where a party is
given the chance to explain his side of the controversy. In this
case, he filed his reply to the anonymous letter-complaint and he
was also able to give his side when he elevated the case to CSC.
(Magcamit v Internal Affairs Service- Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency GR 198140, January 25, 2016)

B. Equal Protection
A. Requisites for valid classification: (ReGLA)
1.) Rest on substantial distinction
2.) Germane to the general purpose of the law
3.) Not limited to existing conditions only; and
4.) Apply equally to all members of the same class,
i. Can application of Art. 29 of the RPC to military officials? Yes.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 198554, July 30,2012
ii. Anti VAWC Law does not unduly favor women over men
Garcia v. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352(2013)

B. Judicial standards of equal protection:


1.) Rational basis- The Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power;
2.) strict scrutiny - imposed two demands : a demand not only as to means but
also one as to ends; and
3.) intermediate – classifications must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives
- Central Bank Employees Association vs. BSP, GR No. 148208, December 15,
2004

2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

A. SEARCH and SEIZURE

GENERAL RULE : NO COURT WARRANT, NO SEARCH and SEIZURE

EXCEPTONS:
1.) Warrantless State intrusion held valid by the SC
2.) Warrantless arrest allowed by the Rules of Court
Note : Even aliens may invoke this right. (People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 432)

1.) Requisites for a valid warrant:


1.) Warrant shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
2.) Warrant shall particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
1.) Warrant shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.

Determination of Probable cause of a Determination of Probable cause of a


Prosecutor Judge
Executive and quasi-judicial Judicial
Made during Preliminary Investigation Made upon filing of criminal information
To determine whether a crime has been To ascertain whether a warrant should be
committed and the person should be held issued
for trial

In a Preliminary Investigation:
- Probable cause means more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction

- Technical rules of evidence should not be applied. Hence, the probable cause can
be established with hearsay evidence. (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
212593-94, 15 March 2016)

1.) Warrant shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

- It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or

- If, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence

1.) Warrant shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce

- An administrative warrant of arrest may be issued by the Deportation Board, but


only after the investigation resulted to and carry out the final order of deportation.

- But an administrative warrant of arrest cannot be issued for purposes of


investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued is a violation of Art3.,
Sec. 2.

- An administrative search such as mandatory, random and suspicionless drug


testing for employees and students under RA 9165, needing “swift and informal
disciplinary procedures,” is reasonable and does not require the application of
probable cause standard (SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870,
November 3, 2008) (no need for warrant)

1.) Warrant shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce

Question: Is hearing necessary before a judge can issue a warrant of arrest?

Answer: No. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report
and supporting documents. (Ocampo v. Abando GR 176830 Feb 11, 2014)

2.) Warrant shall particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

- This requirement outlaws the so-called “general warrants that encourages fishing
expeditions.
- Thus the SC held invalid search warrant which authorized the search and seizure
of records pertaining to all business transactions of a person and a corporation
whatever their nature are, and regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal.
“Knock and Announce” Principle – Police officers, in executing a warrant, must
first give the notice show their authority, and demand that they be allowed entry.

Exception (unannounced intrusion):

1.) Upon demand, refused to open;


2.) Already knew the identity and authority of the officers
3.) There is an imminent peril to life and limb; and
4.) A belief that an escape or destruction of evidence is being attempted

Valid Warrantless state intrusions

2 Categories:

Reasonable Search Warrantless Search


Valid even without a warrant Valid even without a warrant
Arises from a reduced Presumably “unreasonable
expectation of privacy Art.III, search”
Sec. 2, finds no application Art. III, Sec. 2 applies, but for
(Location) reasons of practicality, a search
warrant can be dispensed with.

Reasonable search:
1.) Mandarory, random and suspicionless drug testing for employees and students
under RA 9165, needing “swift and informal disciplinary procedures” (SJS v
DDB)
2.) Search at airports;
3.) Search at seaports;
4.) Search at bus terminals;
5.) Search at malls; and
6.) Search at similar public places (Saluday v People April 3, 2018)

Guideline in bus searches:


Prior Entry - passengers can be frisked, bags can be inspected
While in transit – passenger and his effects can still be inspected:
a.) Upon receipt of info on contraband;
b.) If he is picked en route; and
c.) In routine inspection at military or police checkpoints.

In both situations – the following conditions for valid and reasonable search must
be met:

1.) Manner the least intrusive and uphold the person’s dignity;
2.) Search must not be discriminatory and protect the rights of vulnerable
identities;
3.) Purpose of the Search must be contained to ensuring public safety; and
4.) Precautionary measures in placed to prevent planting of evidence. (Saluday v.
People, April 3, 2018)

Rule in Airport Searches:

1.) Election not to be searched must be exercised before walking through the
magnetometer or replacing baggage on the conveyor belt of the X-ray machine.
2.) Except in anti-hijacking program, deliberate search for drugs violates Art.III,
Sec. 2 ( People v O’Cochlain, December 10, 2018)
Valid warrantless state intrusions

Warrantless Search:
1.) Search incidental to lawful arrest;
2.) Consented Search;
3.) Plain View Doctrine;
4.) Stop and Frisk Search;
5.) Search of a private moving vehicle;
6.) Custom search;
7.) Searches at checkpoints;
8.) Exigent and emergency circumstances; and
9.) Search by private persons.

1.) Search incidental to lawful arrest


- Valid arrest must precede the search
- Arrest is valid if:
- there is a court warrant or it falls under Rule 113, Sec. 5

2.) Consented Search


- Airport search no longer falls under consented search – a kind of warrantless
arrest- as previously held in People v Leila Johnson, but a post -9/11 world
reasonable search per Saluday v People (2018).

3.) Plain View Doctrine – Requisites:


a.) Prior justification of intrusion or in a position which he an view;
b.) Discovery is inadvertent;
c.) Immediately apparent that item observed may be a contraband;
4.) Stop and Frisk (a.k.a. Terry Search)
-Has two fold interest:
1.) Crime prevention; and
2.) Self-preservation
-Limited to protected search of outer clothing for weapons.

5.) Search of a private moving vehicle


-There must be a reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search; that
either, the motorist has committed a crime or the content of the vehicle a subject
matter of some criminal offense.
- Taxis fall under this category and the guidelines for bus searches not applicable
(Saluday v People)

6.) Customs search


- Not applicable in dwelling house
- Warrantless search for violation of the Fisheries Code is akin to Customs Search

7.) Searches at checkpoints


- During COMELEC gun ban

8.) Exigent and emergency circumstances; and


- There is coup and civilian courts are closed.

9.) Search by private persons.


- Art III, Sec. 2, and its corresponding Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, is a
prohibition against the state and not against private individuals.

Warrantless arrests Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

1.) In flagrante delicto. When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Requisites:
a.) An overt act indicating that the person to be arrested has just committed; is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
b.) Such overt act done is the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The following are continuing offenses which a warrantless arrest is allowed under in
flagrante delicto:

- Rebellion
- Subversion
- Conspiracy or proposal to commit such Rebellion or Subversion; and
- Crimes or Offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith

2.) Arrest in Hot pursuit. When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and

Question: Upon a complaint lodged by an alleged victim, police officers responded to the
scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the mauling. The alleged crime transpired in
a community where the victim and the suspect reside. Upon arrival to the area, the victim
positively identified the suspects as those responsible for his mauling. When the suspects
were confronted by the police officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident
with the victim, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. Being not
present during the alleged mauling, do the police have “personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances” to justify a warrantless arrest of the suspects?

Answer: Yes. Personal knowledge if the crime just committed, does not require the actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being committed. It is enough that the evidence of
the recent commission of the crime is present and the police officer has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime. With what the police officers gathered in less
than one (1) hour from the time that they arrived qualify as their personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, to justify a warrantless arrest. (Pestilos vs.
Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014)

3.) Escapee. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a personal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

a. Right to Privacy
Not limited to privacy and correspondence includes rights to personal information
and decision of the citizen

Two Fold test to determine whether entitled to right to privacy:

1) Subjective test where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter; and
2) Objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is
prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

Subjective Test where one claiming the right must have an actual or legitimate
expectation of privacy over a certain matter;

 The right of privacy of a “public figure” is necessarily narrower than that of an


ordinary citizen.
 Pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights. Hence, letters may be inspected by prison officials, except
letters from the detainees’ lawyer marked as confidential.

Question: Based on a complaint that Atty. ABC of Agency “XXX” (a government


agency) is doing his private law practice without authority and using government
properties in furtherance thereof, investigators of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), with the consent and authority from the agency head, opened Atty. ABC’s
office- issued desktop computer without his consent. Various pleadings were found
therein evidencing his law practice. He was charged administratively for misconduct.
In his defense. Atty. ABC invoked his right to privacy stating that any evidence
obtained from his computer in a warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence
against him for any purpose and in any proceeding. Decide

Answer: Atty. ABC is incorrect. An employee of the Government agency who has
been issued with a computer for official use has no legitimate expectation of privacy
as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found
during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in an administrative case
against him. The employees personal files stored in and retrieved from the computer
can be used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. (Pollo v.
David, GR No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

Question: A warehouse owned by a Chinese is implementing a very strict security


measure. Part of this measure is installation of CCTVs. One of the CCTVs is diretly
facing the business office of his neighbor. The owner of the said business office,
who is also a Chinese, demanded that the owner of the warehouse direct the focus
of the camera to somewhere else as it violates the privacy of its business office. The
owner of the warehouse refused on 2 grounds: (1) He has all the right to exercise
ownership over his property including installation of CCTVs therein and (2)
Considering that the focus of the CCTV is a business office and not a residence
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the occupants. Decide.

Answer: Decision should be in favor of the owner of the business office. The right to
privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the
public are excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter. The
petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they
use it as business office or as a residence and that the installation of CCTV directly
facing his neighbor’s property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their
consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. It would be no different from
eavesdropping, which is a crime under RA 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
(Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, 26 June2013)

Question: High school student went to a beach party and took digital photos of
themselves in swimsuits. These pictures were the uploaded by another student on
her Facebook profile. Their computer teacher learned this then asked her students if
they knew the names of the students in the pictures, who were readily identified
them. The students were asked by the teacher to logged onto their Facebook
accounts and showed the pictures to the teacher drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes. Upon discovery, the said teacher reported the students to the school’s
Discipline –in- Charge. After investigation, the school was able to identify the
students who, in their opinion violated the school’s Student handbook. The school
did not allow them to join the graduation ceremonies. The parents sued the school
arguing that since the pieces of evidence used in disciplining their children were
obtained in violation of the teen’s right to privacy – as people who accessed and
used them are not their children’s listed friends – they are inadmissible in evidence
against the latter. Was there a violation of privacy?
Answer: There was none. The teacher and school officials were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any lies with the friends of the minors. Had it been proved that the
access to the pictures were limited to the original uploader, through the “me only” privacy
setting, or the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to select few, through
the Custom setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public
at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
(Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)

Two categories of privacy:

1.) Decisional privacy - involves the right to independence on making certain


important decisions
2.) Informational privacy – refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters

Two aspects of Informational Privacy:


a.) The right not to have private information disclosed; and
b.) The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
- Disini, Jr. vs. The Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014

Data Privacy Act of 2012 (RA10173)


- a law protecting informational privacy

Right of the data subject:


1.) Right to be informed;
2.) Right to object;
3.) Right to access;
4.) Right to data portability
5.) Right to correct
6.) Right to block or remove;
7.) Right to file a complaint; and
8.) Right to be indemnified

“Right to be Forgotten” - Google Spain vs. AEPD(Spanish Data Protection Agency) and
Mario Costeja Gonzalez, C-131/12
Q: What happened to Mario?
A: There was a publication containing a case against Mario regarding eviction and
attachment against him.

He asked Google to remove his name in the search engine since the information is no
longer relevant since the case against him was already settled.

Q: Did the Supreme Court of Spain resolved the matter? How?


A: The Supreme Court of Spain referred the matter to the EU court and the EU court gave a
response for the purpose to resolve the matter. The answer of EU is that people have the
right to be forgotten under the General Data Protection act of EU.
Q: So what is right to be forgotten?

A: Is the right of data subject to order or request for the removal of an information of that
person where that information is incorrect, unlawfully obtained, outdated, illegal or no longer
accurate.

Q: Is right to be forgotten can be invoked in our Jurisdiction?

A:Yes, in Section 5 (e) RA 10173 (Data Privacy Act). Similar on the doctrine of right to be
forgotten is the right of data of the subject to block or remove information is incorrect,
unlawfully obtained, outdated, illegal or no longer accurate.

Concept of Data Inheritance - heirs and assigns may invoke rights of the data subject after
the latter’s death or incapacity.

The privacy of communication and correspondence under Art III, Sec. 3 is one under
informational privacy.

The privacy of communication and correspondence is invocable not only against the State
but also against private individuals.

-Consequence of violation: The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree (a.ka. Exclusionary Rule)
-Not only in criminal cases but also in civil and administrative cases (e.g. annulment. Legal
separation, disqualification from practice of profession)

Question: A female judge, Judge Panalo filed am administrative complaint against a


colleague, Judge Tibam who is also a female, for sending her obscene messages. For the
purpose of investigation, the SC, with Judge Panalo’s consent, directed the Management
Information System Office MISO to retrieve the messages sent by Judge Tibam to the
complainant Judge Panalo through the latter’s Yahoo and Facebook accounts with the use of
Judge Panalo’s workstation. On the basis of what have been retrieved, the SC disciplined
Judge Tibam. Judge Tibam protested and argued that since the evidence was obtained
violating her right to privacy, the exclusionary rule applies. Is she correct?

Answer: No The subjects of the present inquiry were the messages sent by the respondent
to a colleague Judge regardless of the mode of their transmission, the ownership of the
messages pertained to the latter as the recipient in accordance with Article 723 of the Civil
Code. Considering that it was the latter who granted access to such messages to the MISO,
there was no violation of the sender’s right to privacy. As such, the grant of access by the
recipient judge did not require the consent of the Respondent as the writer. (Office of fthe
Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, 22 November 2016)

Q: What did the provision of the Civil Code say?

A: As a recipient of the message she is already the owner of the information. So as


an owner of the information she can appropriate it/use it without the consent of
the one who send it, provided that she will not publish it in the public.

Doctrine:
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine; The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents
of the Government, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined under
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.—The exclusionary rule, or the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine, presupposes a violation of law on the part of the agents
of the Government, and bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures expressly defined under
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2),
Article III of the Constitution refers to the prohibition against the issuance of
general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions.

Art. 723. Letters and other private communications in writing are owned by the
person to whom they are addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published
or disseminated without the consent of the writer or his heirs. However, the court
may authorize their publication or dissemination if the public good or the interest
of justice so requires

Exception to privacy of communication and correspondences:

1.) Upon lawful order of the Court; or


2.) When public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.

Scope of Freedom of Speech and Press


- Freedom prior restraint and freedom from subsequent punishment
- Absence of one makes it unconstitutional

1. Freedom from prior restraint/censorship- the government cannot restrict you from saying
something;

If a regulation is Content-based:
It is a censorship which is a violation of the freedom of expression
It pertains to the subject matter itself and not merely on the incidents of the speech
The test used is the Clear and Present danger test

If a regulation is Content-neutral
It is not a censorship, hence, allowed
It pertains merely to the incidents of the speech (e.g. the time, place and manner of the
assembly)
The test used is Substantial Government Interest Test

2. Freedom from subsequent punishment- the government cannot punish you after saying
something

Discussion first of Content-based regulation:


Question: The Comelec issued a notice to The Diocese of Bacolod ordering the latter to
remove the tarpaulins containing the heading : Conscience Vote” and lists of candidates
as either “Anti-RH –Team Buhay” with a check mark, or ‘Pro-RH” Team Patay with and X
mark. The Comelec deemed it proper to issue such order because the tarpaulins, in its
opinion are election campaign propaganda material which exceed the 2x3 feet
requirement allowed therefor. Does the Comelec have the authority to issue the order?

Answer: None. The Comelec does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate. While the tarpaulin
may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party list group.
Furthermore, the order to remove the tarpaulins for being oversized is a content based
regulation. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. In this
case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the
maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate
their right to exercise freedom of expression. (The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 205728, 21 January 2015)

Question: A resolution was adopted by Comelec introducing a radical change relative to the
airtime limitations on political advertisements by computing airtime on an aggregate basis
involving all the media of broadcast communications instead of computing on a per station
basis, as it had done in the past. In effect, it drastically reduced the allowable minutes
within which candidates and political parties will be able through the air. Does it violate the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, of speech and the of the press of the
candidates?

Answer. Yes. This resolution on airtime limits goes against the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press. The guaranty of freedom to speak is
useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where
there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media
for such dissemination becomes critical. (GMA Network, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
205357, 2 September 2014)

- The holding of exit polls and dissemination of their results through the mass media
constitute an essential part of the freedom of speech and of the press

-Live TV and radio coverage of the trial is not allowed because it will affect the
maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process. But in 2012, the SC allowed
pro hac vice (for this particular case only) live media broadcast of the Ampatuan trial,
subject to 12 conditions.

Prior restraint: Content- neutral regulation

The O’Brien Test – Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, it should be invalidated:

a.) If such governmental interest is related to the suppression of free expression; or


b.) Even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech and it is merely a
restriction on freedom of expression, but the restriction is greater than is
necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question.
The O’Brien test – 4 prongs: absence of one, it would be struck down as
unconstitutional
1.) If it is within the constitutional power of the government;
2.) If it furthers an important or substantial government interest;
3.) If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
4.) If the incidental restriction on freedoms of speech, expression and press is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of interest.

Commercial Speech has not accorded the same level as political speech but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.

Requirements for the valid government restriction of commercial speech of State:


a.) Not false, misleading or proposing an illegal activity;
b.) Substantial government interest;
c.) Regulation must directly advance government interest; and
d.) Regulation must not be overbroard

Question: Determine whether the following laws are constitutional:

1.) Prohibiting and punishing transmission of unsolicited ads or email spam.


2.) Punishing cyber libel.
3.) Punishing those who aid or abet cyber libel through liking, commenting or sharing libelous
statements posted online by another person

Answer:

1.) Unonstitutional. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads (email spam) would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Unsolicited advertisements are commercial speeches.

2.) Constitutional. Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has
an obligation to protect individuals from defamation. Cyber libel is not a new crime since
Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, it
merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel.

3.) Unconstitutional. Except for the original author, the rest (those who pressed Like, Share
and Comment) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or
haphazardly of their response to the original posting. The term “aiding or abetting“
constitute broad and sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, (likes) and other messages. Disini, Jr. vs. The
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18 2014
Now we discuss: Freedom from subsequent punishment

Subsequent punishment: Test or restraint (validity of law)

Determines a whether a law is Constotutional

Dangerous Tendency Clear and present Balancing of Interest


Rule Danger Rule Rule
Speech is punishable by Speech is punishable Speech is punishable if
mere presence of rational only when it is of such on balance it appears the
connection between the nature as to create a public interest outweighs
speech and the evil clear and present danger the abridgment of
apprehended freedom
Question of Question of proximity and Question of greater
reasonableness degree weight
More in favor of the More in favor of liberty Courts duty and
government authority and discretion
safety and public order

Schools academic freedom vs students’ freedom of expression:

General rule: While the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go as far as to be violence of constitutional safeguards such as the
student’s freedom of expression
Exception: The conduct by the student materially disrupts class work or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the right of others

Assembly and Petition

- BP 880 (The Public Assembly Act of1985) does not restrict but only regulates the time,
manner, and place of the assembly. In granting or not granting the permit to rally, the Mayor
should use the Clear and Present Danger Test

-Public Assembly/Rally within the 200-meter radius from the outer boundary of any courts is
not allowed.

-Government employees are not allowed to hold a strike.

Question : Every second year law student knows that the right to association of government
workers does not include the right to strike. In a government water district however,
members of an employee’s association joined an office-sanctioned fun run in sports attire
but with a grievance inscription on Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA). Because this
act, several association members were disciplined administratively by the head of the
agency for violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulation within the government
hours. Is the Act of the head of the agency valid?

Answer. No. Although those who enter government service are subjected to a different
degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind, it is not tantamount to the
relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment. The Collective incentives was not to effect work stoppage or
disrupt the service as they were in sports attire and they were allowed, and required to wear.
Hence, even done within government hours, the wearing of t-shirts with grievance
inscriptions does not constitute as a violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations.
(Davao City Water District vs Aranjuez GR 194192 June 16, 2015)

5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free


exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

3 parts:
1.) Non-establishment Clause – (No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion)
2.) Free Exercise Clause - No law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise religion. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed)
3.) Non-Religious Test Clause - No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights

Non-establishment Clause

Purpose: To avoid sponsorship, financial support and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity.

Exceptions:
1.) Properties actually, directly and exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from
taxation;
2.) Public money may be paid to religious preachers when they are assigned to the AFP, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium;
3.) Subject to certain conditions, optional study of religion in public and elementary and high
school is allowed; and
4.) Educational institutions established by religious groups and foreign mission boards can be
owned by foreigners.

2016 BAR Question : Congress passed a bill appropriating PlOO-billion. Part of the money is to
be used for the purchase of a 200-hectare property in Antipolo. The rest shall be spent for the
development of the area and the construction of the Universal Temple for All the World's Faiths
(UTAW-F). When completed, the site will be open, free of charge, to all religions, beliefs, and
faiths, where each devotee or believer shall be accommodated and treated in a fair and equal
manner, without distinction, favor, or prejudice. There will also be individual segments or zones
in the area which can be used for the conduct of whatever rituals, services, sacraments, or
ceremonials that may be required by the customs or practices of each particular religion. The
President approved the bill, happy in the thought that this could start the healing process of our
wounded country and encourage people of varied and often conflicting faiths to live together in
harmony and in peace.
If the law is questioned on the ground that it violates Sec. 5, Article III of the Constitution that "no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," how will you resolve the challenge? Explain. (5%)

Answer: The contention must be rejected. The use of the site temple will not be limited a
particular sect. it will be made available to all religious sects. The temporary use of public
property for religious purposes without discrimination does not violate the Constitution. (Ignacio
v Dela Cruz Phil 346 1956; People v Fernandez, 40 OG 1089 1956)

Alternative Suggested Answer: The contention is meritorious. The state cannot pass laws which
aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one religion over another. (Emerson v Board of
Education, 330 USA 1 1947)

Correct Answer: The contention is meritorious. It is true that although the State rejects
establishment of religion, it however adopts a policy of accommodation whereby it gives
consideration to its Citizen who want to freely exercise their religion. Sec. 29 (2). Article VI of the
Constitution, nonetheless, specifically prohibits appropriation or application of public money or
property, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion. It has been held that this Constitutional provision “
does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes (provided) the religious
character of such use is merely incidental, temporary use which is available indiscriminately to
the public in general”. In the instant case, money is appropriated to construct a temple for the
sole purpose of accommodating religions, albeit indiscriminately to all religions. Furthermore it
would appear that the religious purpose or use of the government property is permanent and not
temporary. Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice
Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, 7 March 2017

Question: The Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost) printed and sold 1.2 million copies of
postage stamp for the 100th anniversary of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) in 2014. 50K copies were
paid by the INC but 1.5 M copies were distributed and sold to the public. Did it amount to
violation of the non-establishment clause?

Answer: No. Because there was no law mandating anyone to avail of the INC commemorative
stamps, nor was there any law purporting to require anyone to adopt the INC’s teachings. It was
merely an acknowledgement of the historical and cultural contribution of the INC to Philippine
Society. (Peralta v Philippine Postal Corporation (PhilPost), G.R. No. 223395, December 04,
2018)

Free Exercise Clause

Ecclesiastical affair - involves the relationship between the church and its members and
relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation (e.g.
excommunication)

-The State is prohibited from interfering purely ecclesiastical affairs and from taking cognizance
of the same

Question: A petition was filed to question the constitutionality of the RH law. The petition
alleges that the law violates the rights of medical practitioners to practice their religions as the
whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema and the government should not adopt a
policy that would require them to practice against their religious beliefs. Is the law
constitutional?

Answer: Yes, the law is constitutional. The RH law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality the
beliefs of these medical practitioners should be respected. In the same breath that the
establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere
to a particular religion and thus, establishing a state of religion (Imbong v Ochoa GR 204819,
April 8, 2014)

Also in Imbong v. Ochoa:


- Life begins at conception, reckoned from fertilization
- Unilateral decision of the wife availing of the RH services in case of disagreement –
unconstitutional
- Debarment of parental consent in case where the minor , who will be availing RH services, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage- unconstitutional.
- RH education constitutional

Non Religious Test Clause


- Religious oats is not required before assuming a public office
- A law may not prohibit “ecclesiastics: from holding appointive or elective office

Standards in religious clause:

1.) Strict neutrality - strict separation of church and the state; the wall of separation is to protect
the state from the church
2.) Benevolent neutrality – accommodation; the “wall of the separation” is meant to protect the
church from the state. (we use this in PH)

Test in religious clause:


1.) Clear and Present Danger Test - A test whether there is immediate and grave danger;
(only use in freedom of speech and expression in PH)
2.) Compelling State Interest test – a test with three steps: a.) whether religious activities
burdens the State? b.) if there is justification of compelling for state to put the interest c.
Means – Is it Less intrusive? (We use this in PH)
3.) Conscientious Objector Test – a test of sincerity of beliefs refraining a person from
participating in any war. (Cannot be use in PH)

6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.

Liberty of Abode:

General Rule: The liberty of abode and of changing the same within limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired.
Exception: Upon lawful order of the court.

- The deportation of women of ill repute to Davao by the Mayor of the City of Manila was held
invalid.

- The order if the Director of Health placing lepers to a certain was held valid.
The Right to Travel:

General Rule: The right shall not be impaired

Exception: The right to travel may be impaired if the following requisites concur:

1.) If the impairment is in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and
2.) The authority to impair this right is provided by law. (law or ordinance)

Coverage:
1.) Right to travel anywhere within the country;
2.) Right to travel from PH going outside the country;

Excluded:
1.) Right to travel from outside the country going back to the PH;
2.) Mere consequential effect to the right to travel;
3.) Alien going to or travelling within the PH.

Note: The SC pronounced that there are 3 tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness
of classifications:

1.) Strict strutiny test;


2.) Intermediate scrutiny test; and
3.) Rational basis test.

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by
our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test.

There are two prongs (points) to pass the strict scrutiny test:

1.) The State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote (e.g. juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime); and
2.) The State has shown that the measure provides for the least restrictive means to achieve the
interest.

Hence, a curfew ordinance which does not narrowly draw to achieve the state’s purpose by providing
for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, will not pass the second prong of the strict scrutiny.

To pass the second prong, an ordinance may provide, for example, a provision which allows an
exception to the curfew in case of the minor who are permitted or accompanied by their parents.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August
2017

Exception to the right : in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.”

2019 Bar Question: The unabated rise of criminality and the reported identification of delinquent
children loitering in the wee hours of the night prompted City Z to implement curfew ordinance.
Minors unaccompanied or unsupervised on the streets by their parents or guardians between 10:00
PM to 5:00 AM may be apprehended by law enforcers subject certain exclusive exceptions. These
exceptions are: 1. Minors running lawful errands, such as buying medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like, 2. Night school students and 3.
Minors working at night. Minors apprehended for violation of the curfew ordinance shall be required
to undergo counseling, accompanied by their parents/ guardians.

a.) Does the curfew ordinance violate the primary right and duty of parents to rear their children?
Explain.

Answer: No it does not. While parents have the primary role in child rearing, it should be stressed
that when actions concerning the child have relation to public welfare and well-being of the child, the
state may act to promote these legitimate interests. Thus, in cases in which is harmful to the physical
or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children. As parents patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid in the moral development
of their children. Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City, G.R. No.
225442, 8 August 2017

a.) Does the curfew ordinance infringe any of the minors’ fundamental rights? Explain.

Answer: No. it does not. The ordinance has passed the two prongs of the strict scrutiny test. (1) The
ordinance is necessary to achieve the compelling state interests – that is, there is a compelling
interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in accordance in the concerned locality;
and 2. Least restrictive means to protect such interests or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest – that is the ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors
to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours and therefore narrowly
drawn to achieve the State’s purpose Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017

- DOJ Circular No.41 on the issuance of the watchlist/ Hold departure order is unconstitutional
because no law allowing it. Only a law (or ordinance) or Rules of Court may impair right to
travel. (Genuino v. De Lima April 17, 2018)

- The right to travel of members of the military is limited than civilians.(Gudani v Senga 2006)

Question: A court judge applied for an authority to travel abroad in the Office of the Court
Administration. (OCA). However, the authority to travel still had not been issued before the date of
his travel abroad. He then proceeded with the travel without the authority. When he came back, the
OCA ordered him to explain why he should not be subjected to disciplinary action for leaving the
country, without an authority to travel abroad, in violation of an OCA circular. The judge posed a
defense arguing that in requiring him to ask for an authority before he can leave the country, it unduly
restricts his right to travel. Is he correct?

Answer: No. The constitutional right to travel should by no mean be construed as limiting the Court’s
inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. The said OCA circular does not
restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel,
before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. (OAS-OCA vs. Judge
Ignacio B. Macarine, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770, July 18, 2012)
Other statutory and inherent limitations - Leave Division,
OCA-OAS vs. Heusdens, etc., A.M. No. P-11-2927. December 13,2011

Some statutory limitations on the right to travel:

1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372 / Anti-terrorism Act.
The law restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with the crime of terrorism even
though such person is out on bail.

2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant to said law, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of,
restrict the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.

3] The "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No. 9208. Pursuant to the
provisions thereof, the Bureau of Immigration, in order to manage migration and curb
trafficking in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No. 2011-011,12 allowing its Travel
Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload passengers with fraudulent travel documents,
doubtful purpose of travel, including possible victims of human trafficking" from our ports.

4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as amended
by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific country that
effectively prevents our migrant workers to enter such country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts
movement of an individual against whom the protection order is intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant thereto, the Inter-Country
Adoption Board may issue rules restrictive of an adoptee’s right to travel "to protect the
Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in
connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child."

Requirements to limit right (Inherent limitation):

1.) The power of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the
country. In such a case, permission of the court is necessary and,

2.) The inherent power of the legislative department to conduct a congressional inquiry in
aid of legislation. In the exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress has the power to issue
a subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed
by the chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker of the
House; or in the case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in his absence by the
Acting Chairman, and approved by the Senate President.

7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Coverage :
1.) Matters of public concern;
2.) Official records, documents, and papers pertaining to official acts;
3.) Official records, documents, and papers pertaining to transactions;
4.) Official records, documents, and papers pertaining to decisions; and
5.) Government research data used as basis for policy development.

Limitations:
1.) Those limitations provided by law;
2.) Offers in treaty negotiations which may affect diplomatic or military objectives (Akbayan v
Aquino, 2008);
3.) Executive privilege – state secrets (Country to country without treaty negotiations,
generic privilege (internal deliberations) informants privilege
4.) Presumptive Presidential Communication Privilege (Neri v Exec. Secretary)
5.) Judicial Privilege –

8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.

Coverage:
1.) Right to join
Except : if the purpose is contrary to law

2.) Right not to join


Except : There is contractual obligation to join.

The SC held valid RA1700 that punished mere membership in:


- CPP and continue to pursue the objective of the Party; and
- Non-CPP organization but the objective is to overthrow the government

- However, RA 1700 was repealed by Congress through RA 7636 on Sept 24,, 1992.

- Lawyers have the right to dismember themselves from the IBP and stop paying annual dues.
Only that they can no longer be allowed to practice law.

9. Private property shall not be taken be taken for public use without just compensation
- Discussed in eminent domain

10. No law impairing the obligation of contract shall be passed.

Coverage:
Laws that impair contracts. Hence a limit on legislative power.

Not covered:

1. Judicial or Quasi-Judicial orders affecting contracts;


2. Impairment of non-contractual privileges such as government franchise and licenses.

Exceptions to the right – i.e., law can impair contracts it is pursuant to:

1.) Police power;


2.) Eminent domain; and
3.) Taxation
11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

- Invocable only by natural party litigant. Not available to corporation.

- All lawyers are required to render 60-hr free legal services to indigent litigants. Services
exceeding this entitles a lawyer deduction of amount actual services or up to 10% of his gross
income, whichever is lower. (Free Legal Assistance Act of 2010)

12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The
law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.

When one is under custodial investigation?


Custodial Investigation is the stage where an investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime, and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements (People v Dela Cruz GR No. 118866-68, Sept 17, 1997

Under Sec.2 last par., of RA7438, custodial investigation also includes the practice of issuing an
“invitation” to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is a suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the “inviting” officer for any violation of law.

However, in Luspo v People, Oct 22, 2014, the fact that a civilian was “invited” to a hearing by the PNP –
investigating committee regarding an anomalous transaction in the PNP involving police officers does
not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial. The nature of the proceeding must be
adjudged on a case to case basis. It was simply a general inquiry to clear the air reported anomalies and
irregularities within the PNP. What was conducted was an administrative, and not custodial,
investigation. Hence, she was not entitled to right to counsel during the proceedings.

Miranda rights/warnings: (Miranda v Arizona 1966)


1.) You have the right to remain silent;
2.) Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law
3.) You have the right to an attorney; and
4.) If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you

Rights of a person under custodial investigation:

1.) Right to remain silent


2.) To have competent and independent counsel preferably his own choice and if he cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one;
Right to competent and independent counsel:
- A lawyer police station commander, although presumed to be competent, is not
independent.
- The same goes with a prosecutor/ fiscal.
3.) To be informed of such rights;
4.) Waiver of these rights not allowed except in writing and in the presence of counsel
5.) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will can
be used against him.
6.) .Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited; and
7.) Any confession or admission in violation of these rights are inadmissible in evidence against him;

Kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions: (People v Obrero)

1.) Product of 3rd degree method such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will; and
2.) Without the benefit of Miranda Warnings;

Consequences of violation: “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine

-But spontaneous voluntarily confessions by a suspect not elicited through questioning by law
enforcement officers such as one given to the media or to a municipal mayor is admissible.
-Also, evidence obtained through mechanical acts (e.g. giving of urine samples, to line-up for
police inspection, etc.) are admissible because they do not constitute testimony or confession.

Question: ABC was presented by PNP Chief Takbo Sapaputoknileila to the media as a prime
suspect to a killing because a witness positively identified him. After which, a the court
proceeding, the same witness reiterated the identify of ABC as the killer after the prosecution
lawyer asked him to repeat what he identified to be the perpetrator during the press conference
with PNP Chief. The defense lawyer, during trial, questioned the legality of the arrest. The court,
after trial found ABC guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua. The
defense lawyer filed an appeal to the higher court and argued that the identification of ABC as
suspect is invalid because it was made without affording the latter his right to counsel. The
defense counsel further argued that although a police lineup is not part of a custodial
investigation is not part of a custodial investigation to be entitled to a counsel, the same is not
true if the suspect was singled out as the prime suspect. Do you think the conviction of ABC has
a defect?

Answer: As a rule a police line up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. If there was a defect
during out of court identification, the in-court identification cured whatever irregularity might have
attended the police line-up. It must be emphasized that the defense did not object to the in-court
identification for having been tainted by an irregular out-of court identification in a police line up.
They focused instead, on the legality of the appellants’ arrests. (People v Pepino GR 174471,
January 12, 2016)

Question: PO! Matalas, a police officer assigned as a traffic enforcer, flagged down Ronald dela
Fuente who was driving a motorcycle for violating a city ordinance which requires all motorcycle
drivers to wear helmets during driving. PO1 Matalas then invited Ronald to come inside their
substation since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub
station. While PO1 Matalas was issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that Ronald was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He was alerted
and so he told Ronald to take out contents of the pocket of his jacket as the alter may have
weapon inside it, Ronald obliged and slowly brought out the content of the pockets which was a
metal container and upon further instruction to open the container a sachet of shabu was found
therein.
Should he be apprised of his Miranda Rights when Ronald was flagged down for allegedly
committing traffic violation?
Answer:
No. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (RA4136, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the license of the
latter. When flagged down for the issuance of a violation ticket, he was not that moment placed
under custody – such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights – and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
Question 2: Is the sachet of the shabu obtained from Ronald admissible in evidence against
him?
Answer:
No. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
There are known instances where warrantless search is allowed and none of these, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest are applicable to this case. It must be noted that the evidenced
seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was concealed
inside a metal container inside the petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred but shown by clear and convincing evidence. The subject items seized during the
illegal arrest are inadmissible. (ibid.)

Question: An accused was arrested and a sworn confession was obtained from him without
affording him the right to independent and competent counsel in violation of his Miranda rights.
Likewise, during his custodial investigation, as sachet of shabu was found in his possession. The
accused objects to admissibility of his alleged confession and the shabu obtained from him
decide.

Answer: Only the confession is inadmissible in evidence against him – the shabu is admissible.
The infractions of the so called Miranda rights render inadmissible “only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence,
such as the confiscated Shabu in this case, provided they are relevant to the issue and are not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation (Ho Wai Pang v People 659 SCRA 624 2011)

13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.

What the Constitution and Rules of Court provide:

When bail a matter of right:


1.) Before or after conviction by the MTC
2.) a.) Before conviction by the RTC; b) of an offense is not punishable by death,RP or LI. Rule 114
Sec. 4)
3.) When continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to the health or endanger the life
of the accused, regardless of the crime charged and independently of the merits of the charge.
(Enrile v Sandiganbayan GR 213847, Aug 18, 2015)

When bail discretionary:


1.) a.) upon conviction by the RTC;(pending an appeal) b. of an offense not punishable by death,
RP or LI; c. any of the of the pertaining to the accused below is not present (Rule 114 Sec 5)
2.) (a) Before conviction by the RTC; b) of an offense is punishable by death, RP or LI. Rule 114
Sec. 5 (Because the judge must determine whether evidence of guilt is strong or not)

When bail is absolutely not allowed:


1.) (a) Upon the conviction by the RTC The offense charged is punishable by death, RP, or LI b.)
when the evidence of guilt is strong (Art III Sec. 13) Because the conviction proves that the
evidence of guilt is strong)
2.) A Upon the conviction by the RTC; b. of an offense not punishable by death, RP, LI c. but the
accused has/ is a :
a.) recidivist;
b.) Quasi-residivist:
c.) Habitual delinquent;
d.) escapee;
e.) evaded sentence;
f.) violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
g.) committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
h.) flight risk;
g.) may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal (Rule 114 Sec.5)

Missing:
a.) Before conviction by the RTC, b) of an offense punishable by death, RP, or LI
-Bail is a matter of discretion because the judge has to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong or not.
b.) Upon conviction by the RTC b) of an offense punishable by death, RP, or LI
-Bail is not allowed because the conviction shows that the evidence of guilt is strong

Question: An 80 year old Senator was charged for plunder and other serious crimes. He filed a
petition for bail praying that the court exercise compassion enough to grant provisional liberty to a
sickly old man who is at the dusk of his life. The prosecution objected on the ground that the crime
charged is punishable by life imprisonment and with the pieces of evidence presented, the evidence
of guilt is strong. Is the Senator entitled to bail?

Answer: Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged (e.g.
even to a charge punishable by death, RP, or LP), should be allowed independently of the merits of
the charge (i.e regardless of whether the evidence of guilt is strong), provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or endanger his life. Indeed denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial. Granting provisional liberty to the accused will not only aid in his
adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly will guarantee his appearance in court
for the trial. (Enrile v Sandiganbayan GR 213847, Aug 18, 2015)

*if Death, Reclusion Perpetua without benefit of parole or privilege of parole


Reclusion Perpetua Life Imprisonment
A sentence imposed by the RPC A sentence imposed by special penal law
Duration is 20 years 1 day -40 years Duration is indefinite
Carries with it an accessory penalty General Rule: No accessory penalty
(suspension / permanent disqualification to XPN: Unless SPL carries with it accessory
hold public office) penalties
Eligible for pardon after 30 years No details on pardon specified (no period
for the president to grant pardon)
Indivisible Indivisible
Cannot be extended with parole Cannot be extended with parole

Question: A criminal proceeding for complex crime of malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
of Official / Public Documents involving an amount exceeding P22K before the RTC was
commenced. The accused filed a petition for bail. However the prosecution objected on the ground
that the imposable penalty for the crime charged is not bailable. According to the prosecutor, Art 48
of the RPC states that in complex crimes, “the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. Thus, in Malversation and falsification should be
taken into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation and falsification should be taken
into account. Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount
involved exceeds P22,000 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum to reclusion perpetua. On the
other hand prison, the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed for falsification committed by a
public officer. Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the imposable penalty for
malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the amount involved
exceeds P22K is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of
“reclusion temporal in its maximum period ro reclusion perpetua.” Is the bail in this case a matter of
right, a matter of discretion or is not allowed?

Answer: Bail is a matter of right in this case. Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which states that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence if guilt is strong shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law, the term punishable should refer to
prescribed, not imposable penalty. If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be
imposed in its maximum period, there is no doubt that in case of conviction, the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The case, however, is still at its inception, Criminal proceeding is yet to ensue.
This is not the proper time, therefore to call for the application of the penalty contemplated under
Article 48 by imposing the same in its maximum period. (People v Valdez GR 216007-09,
December 8, 2015)

The “evidence of guilt is strong” standard:

This standard should be applied in relation to the crime as charged. Thus, when there is merit in the
accused’s claim that the evidence presented by the prosecution could, at most, convict him only of
Homicide and not Murder, the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied his motion to fixed
bail filed after the prosecution had rested its case, but before conviction (Recto v People GR
236461, December 5, 2018)

Question: If the granting of bail a matter of discretion on the part of the judge under the Rules, is still
necessary for him to conduct a hearing therefor with notice to the prosecution?
Answer: Yes. Enrile v Sandiganbayan GR No.214847, August 18, 2015)

Question: Is bail available as a matter of right in extradition cases?

Answer: General Rule, no. Except the applicant can show “clear and convincing evidence that:

1.) The applicant is not flight risk or danger to the community; and
2.) There exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. (GHSAR v Olalia)

Quantum of proof - “clear and convincing evidence” means lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

Question: Can a court release on bail a person subject to a deportation case?


Answer: NO. if the person is detained by the Deportation Board (Now, the Board of Commisisioners
of the BOI) for deportation, a court cannot release him on bail even in a habeas corpus proceedings
there is now law authorizing it. (Go v Ramos)

However, it must be noted that under the present law, it is the Board of Commissioners which
can order the release on bail of a foreigner subject of a deportation case.

Question: Can a member of the AFP detained by the Military Court Martial apply for bail on the
reason that his case has been pending for so long?

Answer: No. The rights of members of the military is limited. Instead of invoking the right to bail, he
should invoke right to a speedy trial (Comendador v De Villa)

14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Rights of an accused during Trial:


1.) Criminal due process;
2.) Presumption of innocence;
3.) Right to be heard;
4.) Assistance of counsel;
5.) Right to be informed;
6.) Right to speedy impartial and public trial;
7.) Right to meet the witnesses face to face (aka Confrontation Clause);
8.) Compulsory process;
9.) Trial in absentia; (sec. 14)
10.) Bail (Sec. 13)

Presumption of innocence:

Equipoise Rule – Where evidence of parties are evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence would tilt the scales in favor of the accused..
Presumption of innocence vs presumption of regularity in the performance of duty

- Presumption of innocence prevails. Otherwise, the Constitutional guarantee of the accused


being presumed innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the
burden of evidence (People v Supat GR 217027 June 6, 2018)

Question: Pepino and Gomez were convicted of a crime, committed in conspiracy. Both the
accused filed their respective appeal. While the case is under review, Pepino filed an urgent motion
to withdraw his appeal, which the court granted. After hearing the appeal of Gomez, the court
deems it necessary to reduce the penalty. Will the reduction of sentence benefit the non-appealing
party?

Answer: Yes. Reduction of penalty to the non-appealing party is proper since it is more favorable
to the accused. (People v Pepino GR No174471, January 12, 2016)

Right to be informed

Question: After an information for a crime plunder was filed against the accused, he filed a motion
for bill of particulars such as the names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions involving
withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint. The prosecution objected argued that an information
only needs to state the ultimate facts and not evidentiary details that are not required to be
contained in the information. Should the motion be granted?

Answer: Yes. Ultimate facts refer to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. Evidentiary
facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the
premises that lead to ultimate facts as conclusion. In the instant case what the accused is asking
are not evidentiary in nature. These particulars are material facts that should be clearly and
definitely averred in the complaint so that the defendant may be fairly informed that the claims
made against him and be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. (Entile v People GR No. 213455,
Aug 11, 2015)

Question: An information was filed against XXX for sexually harassing a 15 yr old girl. He was
found guilty for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness and for violation of the Anti Child abuse Law
(RA 7610). He appealed and contend that, he should only be held liable for the crime as penalized
under the RPC and not under RA7610. According to him, the failure to put the designation of the
offense charged (violation RA7610) in the caption of the Information constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. is he
correct?

Answer: No. The Court has consistently put premium on the facts embodied in the information as
constituting the offense rather than on designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an
investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its
formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts in the information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble
thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions
of law. (Quimvel v People, GR No. 214497, April 18, 2017)

Confrontation Clause
Exception: Examination of a Child Witness
1.) Live link television testimony;
2.) Videotaped deposition; or
3.) Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused.

Trials in Absentia
- The right of the accused to be present at all stage of the criminal proceeding also includes the
right to waive it. Hence, a trial may proceed absent the accused provided the following requisites
are present:
- He has been arraigned;
- He has been duly notified; and
- His failure to appear is unjustifiable.

-The right of the accused to waive his right to be present at all stage of the criminal proceedings,
however has a limitation:
- He must be present in an in-court identification to his identity is necessary for a witness.

15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

Once the accused has been charged in “court”, even though there was illegality in the arrest, the
proper remedy is to file a motion to quash the information and not petition for habeas corpus.
-The term “court” in here includes quasi-judicial bodies authorized to order confinement.

Thus in GO v. Ramos, it was held that if the person is detained by the Board of Commissioners for
deportation, a court cannot release him on bail even in a habeas corpus proceedings because there
is no law authorizing it.

16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Speedy Trial Speedy disposition of cases


Rationale: To prevent delay in the Rationale : to prevent delay in the
administration of Justice administration of justice
Courts/ Tribunals mandated to Courts/Tribunals mandated to
proceed with reasonable dispatch proceed with reasonable dispatch
Right is violated only when the Right is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious and vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays oppressive delays
Invocable by all citizens, including Invocable by all citizens, including
those in the military those in military
Invocable against the courts Invocable even against quasi-
judicial or administrative bodies
Invocable only in criminal cases Invocable in civil, criminal, or
administrative cases
Covers only the period during trial Cover the period before, during
and after the trial
Effect of violation of the right in Preliminary Investigation by the OMB:
May result in the dismissal of the case.
Whose burden of proof?
-if the delay occurred:
- during the periods provided by law or rules, the burden is on the respondent or the
accused to prove that the delay was inordinate.
- beyond the given periods, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that the delay
was reasonable under the circumstances and that no prejudice was suffered by the
accused as a result of the delay.
Requisites:
If the defense has the burden of proof. It must prove:
1.) Whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended
by utter lack of evidence; and
2.) That the defense did not contribute to the delay.
If the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution. It must prove:
1.) That it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in
the prosecution of the case;
2.) That the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and
3.) That no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay

General Rule - the determination of delay is never mechanical or mere mathematical reckoning
but a consideration of the entire context of the case.

Exception – Requisites:
1. There is an allegation that the case is solely motivated by malice; and
2. No waiver to the right to speedy disposition of cases or trial.

When there is waiver of the right?

When the respondent, upon the lapsed of the statutory or procedural periods, fails to file the
appropriate motion.

-the ruling in People v Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division that fact finding investigations are included in
the period for determination of the inordinate delay was abandoned by the Supreme Court in
Cagang v Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018.
The rule now is that for the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is
deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of
the preliminary investigation. The period spent for fact-finding investigations is not counted in
determining whether there is violation of the right because same is not yet adversarial proceedings
(Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, July 31, 2018)

17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Right Against Self Incrimination


Scope: Only to testimonial compulsion
Excluded: Mechanical acts (finger-printing, photographing, paraffin testing, urine samples, fitting
clothes involved in a commission of a crime, etc.)
N.B. Writing is not purely mechanical act because it requires intelligence and attention

-A juridical person cannot invoke this right.

2 types of statutory immunity to a witness:


a.) Transactional immunity – Broader in scope of its protection because a witness can no
longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction
b.) Use and derivative use immunity – a witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution.

18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Freedom from Political Beliefs:


Political Prisoner – is a person imprisoned for their political beliefs or actions.
-Unless his action constitutes a crime, a person shall not be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs.

Fundamental principle : Freedom to believe is absolute, but the freedom to act on one’s belief is
not absolute and subject to laws.

Freedom Against Involuntary Servitude


General Rule: No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist.
Exceptions:
1.) A punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and
2.) Posse Comitatus – the right of the state to call upon the people to defend the State. (Art II,
Sec.4)

19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Rights against Cruel, Degrading and Inhuman Punishment


- Death penalty is not considered cruel and inhuman by the 1987 Constitution.
- Death penalty is allowed under the Constitution for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
But the Constitution leaves the discretion to Congress.
-Through RA 9346, the Congress suspends the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines.

20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.


- BP 22 (Anti-bouncing Checks law) does not violate this constitutional proscription because what is
being punished is not the non-payment of the debt but the issuance of worthless instrument.

- A tax is not a debt in the sense of an obligation incurred by contract, and therefore is not within
this meaning of the Constitution.Non Payment of a poll tax
Poll tax - a tax of a fixed amount upon all persons, or upon all persons of a certain class, resident
within a specified territory, without regard to their property or the occupations in which they may be
engaged.

The non-imprisonment rule applies to non-payment of poll tax which is punishable only by a
surcharge, but not other violations like falsification of community tax certificate and non-payment of
other taxes. (e.g. tax evasion)
21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Right against Double Jeopardy

2 Kinds:
1.) DJ of punishment for the Same Offense – “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense.”

Under this kind of DJ, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act
provided that:
- he is charged with different offenses; or
- the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case.

Incidentally, it was held that conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of
double jeopardy so long as jeopardy has attached under one of the information charging
said offense.

Requisites of DJ:
1.) A first jeopardy attached prior to the second;
Elements:
a.) Valid complaint/ information;
b.) Competent court
c.) A plea has been entered during arraignment; and
d.) Accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
What if the dismissal or termination of the case was with the express consent of the
accused?
General Rule: No jeopardy attaches. Hence, he/she can be tried again for the same offense.
Exceptions:
a. Insufficiency of evidence (demurrer to evidence); and
b. Right to speedy trial

2.) The first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and

3.) A second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.


a.) identical offense
b.) attempted
c.) frustrated
d.) Necessarily includes the offense charged
e.) Necessarily included the offense charged

But even though all the 3 requisites are present, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
to another prosecution for an offense if the Doctrine of Supervening Fact/Event applies. That is:

a.) The graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission constituting the former charge; or
b.) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or where discovered only after a
pleas was entered in the former complaint or information
2.) DJ of punishment for the Same Act – ‘if an act is punishable by a law (national law) and
an ordinance (Local law), conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.”
- Under this kind of DJ, if the two charges filed, one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute, are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either charge shall bar a prosecution under the other even if the offenses
charge are not the same.

Question: Can a judgment of acquittal be reconsidered through a Motion for


reconsideration?
Answer: As a general rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places
the accused in double jeopardy.
Exceptions:
a.) Grave abuse of discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction; or
b.) When a mistrial has occurred (lejano v. people January 18 2011)

Question : Can a judgement of acquittal be appealed by the prosecution?


Answer: As a general rule, judgment of acquittal cannot be appealed because it places the
accused in double jeopardy.
Exception:
a. ) There was a sham trial amounting to denial to the People due process (People v
Tria-Tirona, 2005)

Question: Can a judgment of acquittal be reviewed by the court in a petition for certiorari filed
by the prosecution?

Answer:
-if there was error of judgment, no.
-if there was error of jurisdiction, yes.

22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Right against ex post facto law


Kinds:
1.) Makes criminal an act before the passage of law;
2.) Aggravates the crime;
3.) Inflicts greater punishment;
4.) Alter the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction on less/ different testimony;
5.) Assuming to regulate only, but imposes penalty; and
6.) Deprives lawful protection formerly entitled, such as former acquittal or amnesty

Right against bill of Attainder:

Bill of Attainder – is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.


-RA 1700 (Anti Subversion Law) was held valid because it simply declares CPP as an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the government. It did not apply to CPP alone but to all other
organization with the same objective.
-Prosecution still has to prove that you are indeed a member and
-The guilt of the alleged members still has to be judicially established. (People v Ferrer)
IX. Social Justice and Human Rights
1. Social Justice

a. Old concept (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940)


Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex.

b. New or Expanded concept (Art II, Sec. 10 and Art. XIII, Sec. 1)
While social justice under the previous Constitution emphasized equality in economic opportunities,
social justice under the 1987 Constitution covers “all phases of national development” and includes not
only economic equities but also social, political and cultural equities.

2. Human Rights
The freedoms, immunities and benefits that according to modern values- specially at an international
level – all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in the societyin which they live in

a. Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defined


Under the 1976 ICESR the following human rights are sought to be promoted and protected:
1.) The right to work in just and favorable conditions;
2.) The right to social protection, to an adequate standard of living and to the highest
attainable standards of physical and mental well-being;
3.) The right to education and the enjoyment of benefits of cultural freedom and scientific
progress

b. Civil and Political Rights defined


Under the 1976 ICCPR and its optional protocols, the freedom/Rights are dealt with:
-mostly rights under the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution

c. Commission on Human Rights (CHR)


- Constitutional creation. Hence it cannot be abolished even by a law.
- Because CHR is not a constitutional commission it enjoys “limited fiscal autonomy” only.

i. Composition, Qualifications, Term, and Disabilities of CHR Members (Art. XIII, Sec. 17[2])
Composition : Chairman and 4 members
Qualifications :
a.) Natural born citizens
b.) Majority must be members of the Bar
c.) Other qualifications that may be provided by law
Term - shall be provided by law
Disabilities - shall be provided by law
ii. Powers and functions (Art. XIII, Sec. 18)

1.) Investigate – includes investigation of HR violations involving civil and political right
committed not only by public officers but also those committed by civilians and rebels.
The power to investigate does not include:
- The power to adjudicate because it is neither a court of justice nor a quasi-judicial
agency.
- Investigation involving social and economic rights
- Investigation of HR violations arising from private contracts
- Investigation involving employer-employee relationship
- Investigation of individual crimes not connected with the performance of function of a
public officer
2.) Provide for preventive Measures –
This does not include ; The power to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction. It
has to seek them from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights
violations. (EPZA v CHR)
3.) Contempt power - Applies only to violations of adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers.

-Does not include the power to issue an order to desist (an interplay of a restraining
order ) because it has no adjudicatory power (Simon, Jr. v CHR)

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