Muttakin Dan Subramaniam (2015)

Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal
Firm ownership and board characteristics: do they matter for corporate social responsibility disclosure
of Indian companies?
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin Nava Subramaniam
Article information:
To cite this document:
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin Nava Subramaniam , (2015),"Firm ownership and board characteristics: do they matter for
corporate social responsibility disclosure of Indian companies?", Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal,
Vol. 6 Iss 2 pp. -
Permanent link to this document:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/SAMPJ-10-2013-0042
Downloaded on: 22 April 2015, At: 00:04 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 0 other documents.
To copy this document: [email protected]
The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 44 times since 2015*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
Downloaded by University of Birmingham At 00:04 22 April 2015 (PT)
Mohammed Ziaul Haque, Fara Azmat, (2015),"Corporate social responsibility, economic globalization and developing
countries: a case study of the ready made garments industry in Bangladesh", Sustainability Accounting, Management and
Policy Journal, Vol. 6 Iss 2 pp. -
Fiona Ann Robertson, Martin Samy, (2015),"Factors affecting the diffusion of integrated reporting - A UK FTSE 100
perspective", Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 6 Iss 2 pp. -
Mohammad Badrul Muttakin, Arifur Khan, Mohammad I Azim, (2015),"Corporate social responsibility disclosures and
earnings quality: Are they a reflection of managers’ opportunistic behavior?", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 30 Iss 3 pp.
277-298 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-02-2014-0997
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by 374558 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please use our Emerald for Authors service
information about how to choose which publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please
visit www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society. The company manages a portfolio of
more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online
products and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner of the Committee on Publication
Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.
*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

Firm ownership and board characteristics: do they matter for corporate
social responsibility disclosure of Indian companies?
1.0 Introduction
Reporting on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities is increasingly vital for
businesses to show their commitment to environmental and social issues (Adams, 2004;
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). A long-line of research has burgeoned over the years (Gray et al.,
1987; Roberts, 1992; Kolk, 2008; Mishra and Suar, 2010) indicating CSR disclosures as being a
function of corporate characteristics (e.g. industry affiliation, financial performance, firm size,
etc.), general contextual factors (e.g. culture, political and legal systems), and internal contextual
factors (e.g. board composition and expertise) (Adams, 2002). However, much of the evidence to
date on CSR disclosure is derived from developed countries (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989;
Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Kim et al., 2012) where the capital
markets are mature, the approach to CSR is more business-model oriented, and stakeholder
awareness of business accountability is high.
We argue that in light of evolving global economic trends and the underlying differences
in socio-cultural factors between the developed and developing nations (Jamali and Mirshak,
2006; Blowfield and Frynas, 2005), further research on CSR practices from a developing nation
context is warranted. Moreover, Jamali and Mirshak (2006) contend that CSR in developing
nations is still embedded in a more philantrophic culture where there is little emphasis on formal
accountability processes (e.g. formal planning and reporting of CSR activities). Furthermore,
given that capital markets in developing nations are still maturing and their institutional,
regulatory and governance environments are generally weak, the impact corporate governance
1
mechanisms may have on CSR disclosure becomes questionable. A review of prior studies on
CSR in developing countries unfortunately sheds limited light on this issue. Despite research
conducted in a variety of countries (for example, Bangladesh (Belal, 2001; Belal and Cooper,
2011), Thailand (Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Virakul et al., 2009), Indonesia (Gunawan, 2010),
Malaysia (Othman et al., 2011), Turkey (Dincer and Dincer, 2010); and Iran (Nejati and
Ghasemi, 2012)), much of the evidence lacks generalisability and is largely descriptive and
anecdotal in nature (Haider, 2010).

Another justification for further research on CSR reporting in developing economies
relates to the rising demand for such reports, particularly as firms in such countries increasingly
become a critical part of the global supply chain. In addition, recent high profile environmental
and industry disasters such as the factory fires in Bangladesh (e.g. the Tazreen Fashions and the
Savar fires), Pakistan and Mexico (Manik & Yardley, 2012; Washington Post, 2013) have
heightened the scrutiny over the supply firms’ social and environmental responsibility (Young
and Marais, 2012). Prieto-Carron et al. (2006) argue that “…if CSR initiatives are to be
legitimate, their content and implementation should be adapted to the particular country or region
in which they are taking place” p. 977. They also contend that further research is needed on
“issues of power and participation and the need for contextualizing discussions about the links
between governance and CSR” (Prieto-Carron et al., 2006, p.987).
1.1 The Present Study
In this study, we aim to assess the effects of firm ownership and board composition on
the level and nature of CSR disclosures using data from the top 100 Indian public listed firms
covering a five-year time frame (2007-2011). We draw on prior empirical findings linking
2
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Haniffa and Cook,
2002, 2005; Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Li et al., 2013),
which in general indicate that such firm disclosures are dependent upon the self-interests of
owners and managers. Many of these studies adopt an agency theory (Jensen and Meckling,
1976) perspective where voluntary disclosure is seen as a mechanism for managing the
separation between owners and managers i.e. owners (principals) are able to monitor
management (agents) so as to ensure that their residual claims are not diluted (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Empirical findings by Ho and Wong (2001) indicate family ownership is
negatively associated with voluntary disclosures, while Chau and Gray (2002) report a positive
association between such disclosures and outside ownership. Eng and Mak (2003) found
voluntary disclosure increases with lower managerial ownership and higher government
ownership, but blockholder ownership had no significant effect. Huafang and Jianguo (2007), by
contrast, found both blockholder and foreign ownership associated with increased voluntary
disclosure. Empirical evidence also supports significant associations between board composition
and voluntary disclosure. Gul and Leung (2004) found CEO duality to be negatively associated
with disclosure level while Chen and Jaggi (2000) found a positive association between the
proportion of independent directors on boards and voluntary disclosure. More recently, Michelon
and Parbonetti (2012) examined board characteristics and sustainability disclosures among US
and European firms listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. They found that the traditional
measures of corporate governance such as board independence and CEO duality had little impact
on sustainability disclosures, but instead specific characteristics of directors such as whether they
are community influential members play a significant role in engendering sustainability
disclosures.
3
Studies assessing the effects of ownership and board characteristics on CSR disclosures
in a developing economy context are scant and less clear. Ghazali (2007), based on Malaysian
firm data, found lower managerial stock ownership and higher government ownership associated
with greater CSR disclosure. Rashid and Lodh (2008) use Bangladeshi firm data and report
ownership by outside directors had a negligible effect on CSR disclosure, but corporate
governance regulatory pronouncements had a strong and positive effect. More recently, Li et al.
(2013) analysed Chinese firm data and found firm ownership as a significant moderator of firm
performance and CSR disclosure where high performing state-owned firms exhibited lower CSR
disclosure than high performing non-state owned firms. However, as noted by Belal and Momin
(2009) in their review of corporate social reporting in emerging economies, most studies have
concentrated on the Asia-Pacific and African regions, are descriptive in nature, and have focused
on the level and volume of disclosures contained within the annual reports using content
analysis. Many of the studies have not fully assessed the associations between corporate
governance mechanisms and corporate social reporting
In the present study, our aim is to extend this line of research by assessing the effects of
both ownership structure and board composition characteristics on CSR disclosure by Indian
firms. In the next section we provide a brief background to India’s economic and institutional
settings, followed by justification for choosing Indian firms for this study.
1.2 India - Background and Contextual Justification
India gained its independence from British rule in 1947, and subsequently opted for a
socialist governance structure with most of its industries and enterprises controlled by the State.
Economic growth was slow with demand driven internally while organisational systems became
4
highly bureaucratic. By 1991, there was a massive financial crisis resulting in the intervention by
the IMF where loans were agreed to under the condition that India liberalised and privatised
most of its sector. Consequently, the government had no choice but to loosen its grip and
corporatize the various Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) while maintaining majority
ownership in an attempt to keep control over key assets including infrastructure, oil and gas,
mining and manufacturing. Increased privatisation was fostered as it was seen as a way to attract
foreign direct investment which was a critical factor for addressing the financial crisis. Other
developments to attract foreign direct investment included a major revision of its legal and
regulatory systems including corporate law with many of the changes closely resembling those in
developed economies such as the United States and United Kingdom. Subsequently, the
regulatory framework and related governance mechanisms grew, leading to the various amended
versions of the Companies Act (1956), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act
(1992), the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act (1956), Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act (1985), and the Listing Agreement (2006).1 Some of the revised corporate
governance recommendations included having more outside directors, separation of CEO and the
Chairperson roles, and establishing an audit committee. Collectively, these changes aimed to
promote the accountability and transparency of listed companies and protect minority
shareholders (Jackling and Johl, 2009).
Our justification for choosing Indian firms for this study relates to the following reasons.
First, the Indian economy is one of the world’s largest and fastest growing economies. India’s
GDP has risen almost 10 percent per year in recent years which is much higher than that of the
US and closer to China (Arevalo and Aravind, 2011). For example, the market capitalization-to-
GDP ratio reached a record level of 132.47 per cent in 2010-11 compared to 23.28 per cent in
5
2002-03 (SEBI, 2012). Its capital market has also grown rapidly in the last decade with the
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) listing 5,174 firms in 2012. Among these firms, some of the
largest and most profitable are the central government owned companies (also known as Central
Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs)). As at 31st May 2013, there were 260 operating CPSEs
contributing to about 9% of the country’s GDP, and of these, 50 CPSEs were listed on the stock
exchanges contributing to about 17% of the total market capitalization (Gupta, 2013).2 However,
India also houses some of the poorest economic groups in the global income pyramid (Ramani
and Mukherjee, 2013), and CSR is increasingly heralded as being a critical avenue for achieving
economic development and social equity (Timane and Tale, 2012). Traditionally, corporate
giants such as Tata and Birla Inc. have undertaken many high profile community support
projects and have come to symbolise how private sector benevolence can help to promote social
equity and welfare (Kumar et al. 2001).
In more recent times, however, there has been a strong push for Indian firms to adopt a
more business model-based approach to CSR where the rationale for considering social and
environmental issues is predominantly related to firm value creation (Narwal and Singh, 2013).
The promotion of this view is particularly reflected in the rapidly evolving regulatory rules
governing Indian corporate affairs and related CSR policies. Provided below are some of the key
policies and guidelines covering the period 2008 to 2014:
• In 2009 - The Ministry of Corporate Affairs released the “National Voluntary Guidelines
(NVG) on CSR (2009)” (MCA, 2009a) as well as “The Corporate Governance Voluntary
Guidelines” (MCA, 2009b).
• In 2010 - the Department of Public Enterprises mandated CPSEs to undertake CSR. The
“Guidelines on CSR for CPSEs” was distinct from the NVG on CSR in that it only
6
applied to CPSEs, and with the requirement of mandatory expenditure on CSR based on
the firm’s net profit.3
• In April 2013 - the Department of Public Enterprises released a revised set of CSR
guidelines, titled “Guidelines on CSR and Sustainability for CPSEs” (DPE, 2010), which
brought the subject matters of sustainable development and CSR together.
• In August 2013 - the new Companies Bill 2013 was passed by Parliament, mandating all
large, profit-making companies in India to earmark 2% of average net profits of three

years towards CSR (namely, companies with net worth of more than Rs. 500 crore
(approx. USD 50 million) or an annual turnover of over Rs. 1,000 crore).
• In February 2014 - The ‘Companies CSR Policy Rules 2014’ were released to provide
more specific guidelines for the implementation of CSR according to the Companies Bill.
Some key highlights are: expenditures related to normal course of business and those that
directly benefit employees and their families are excluded from the mandatory CSR
spend. Further, companies not compliant with the required mandatory expenditure would
have to "cite reasons for non- implementation", as per the proposed legislation.
Nevertheless, while these regulatory developments signal a highly visible public
commitment to CSR by Indian authorities, they have also been hotly debated with resistance
from many private sector firms. It is argued that a more voluntary approach may better achieve
the intended objectives of CSR through business-led initiatives than the regulated model which
appears to still be based on an altruistic approach (Vijayaraghavan, 2013).
In terms of reporting on CSR, the guidelines accompanying the Companies Bill as
released in February 2014 state that at minimum an annual report on CSR is needed for the
financial year commencing after 1st April 2014 with disclosures on firm CSR policy, types of
7
projects planned, expenditure amount and an explanatory statement if the firm did not meet the
required minimum spending. Prior to this policy document, the guidelines for CSR reporting in
India tended to be more general. For example, the 2009 NVG on CSR (MCA, 2009b) merely
states, “The companies should disseminate information on CSR policy, activities and progress in
a structured manner to all their stakeholders and the public at large through their website,
annual reports, and other communication media”. Likewise, the 2010 CSR guidelines for CPSEs
(DPE, 2010) simply noted that ‘each CPSE should include a separate paragraph/chapter in the
Annual report on the implementation of CSR activities/projects including the facts relating to
physical and financial progress’ (DPE, 2010, p.16).
Interestingly, there have been no specific external audit nor enforcement processes set in
place for monitoring and assessing CSR activities and reporting. Instead, it would appear
significant emphasis has been placed on internal governance mechanisms, namely the governing
board to oversee implementation and reporting of activities. For instance, the new Companies
Bill mandates a specialized CSR board committee with at least one independent director for CSR
oversight. Given this increasing confidence placed on the governing board by the evolving CSR
guidelines, a key empirical issue that emerges is whether corporate governance mechanisms have
an impact on the nature and level of CSR disclosures in Indian firms. In particular, as CSR
entails a broad range of multi-dimensional activities e.g. environmental impacts, community
upliftment, employee welfare and customer/product safety, further investigation may be fruitful
for detecting any inherent biases on the disclosure choice of particular activities based on
shareholders’ or board members’ (i.e. directors and CEO) interests.
2. Conceptual Framework
8
Various theoretical perspectives have been proposed to explain why firms voluntarily
disclose CSR and how owners and managers come to choose the type and level of disclosure.
Some of the more commonly adopted theories include agency theory (Jensen and Meckling,
1976), institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2009)
stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), and political economy theory (Gray et al., 1996). In this
study, we have chosen agency and institutional theories as the weighing of the costs and benefits
of CSR disclosure are often made by owners and managers who are generally in a principal-
agent setting, and the rapidly evolving regulatory and socio-economic developments within the
Indian corporate sector are likely to place various pressures on firms to conform and legitimise
their environment and community activities.
Agency theory generally concerns the principal-agent relationships between managers and
capital providers (principals) who can be either shareholders or debt holders (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), and with the separation of ownership and management it is assumed that
information asymmetry will exist between principals and agents. The principals may utilise
bonding or monitoring mechanisms to reduce the information gap although both entail costs. The
use of boards and board committees, as well as firm reports produced by management are
different monitoring mechanisms which align the interests of principals and managers and reduce
the cost of debt. Prior studies on voluntary disclosure have more specifically focused on
systematic variations between board characteristics such as board independence, CEO duality,
and board diversity in general and voluntary disclosures (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Beltratti,
2005; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). However, these studies essentially focus on internal
monitoring mechanisms and do not fully consider or integrate other societal and environmental
factors that may drive CSR disclosure. For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) identify ethnicity
9
and cultural factors, and Othman et al. (2011) refer to regulatory efforts as externally-oriented
drivers of CSR disclosure.
As such, we further draw on institutional theory which proposes that the broader societal
and environmental context have the potential to shape organisational structure and practices to
guide our understanding of how certain ownership structures may be influenced in their
disclosure decisions. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) contend that firms come to exhibit similar
values, structures and practices as a result of isomorphic pressures from three sources: coercive
(law or regulatory enforcement-based), mimetic (stakeholder and general societal driven) and
normative (professional community-related). More specifically, according to DiMaggio and
Powell (1983), coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by social expectations.
Deegan (2009) argues that those stakeholders who have the greatest power over the firm are able
to better demand the information they require or desire. Mimetic isomorphism is a process where
organisations tend to adopt structures and processes that resemble others in society or the
referent group so as to meet societal or group expectations. By contrast, normative isomorphism
is driven by professionalization, members of a profession or occupation tend to define structures
and practices. In general, these pressures are seen to motivate firms to gain legitimacy and
demonstrate conformance through formal disclosures. Applying an institutional perspective to
the Indian corporate environment, we predict mimetic pressures related to the NVG on CSR as
released in 2009, and coercive pressures emanating from CSR guidelines issued by the
Department of Public Enterprises for CPSEs, are likely to play a strong role in affecting how the
ownership composition of public-listed Indian firms may influence the level and type of CSR
10
information disclosure. For instance, firms with significant government ownership have been
found to be more sensitive to disclosing on social or community-related issues (Ghazali, 2007).
2.1 Indian firms - CSR Reporting Practices
A review of prior studies on CSR reporting among Indian firms indicates that, to date,
there have been limited efforts to disclose on environmental and society-oriented activities and
outcomes. Most studies tend to focus on what was reported rather than the role of governance
mechanisms in such CSR disclosures. For example, Dutta and Durgamohan (2009), based on the
annual reports of 26 public-listed firms, found education issues were the most frequently
reported, followed by health and social causes. A larger descriptive study involving the top 500
companies, Gautam and Singh (2010), indicates only about half report CSR activities, and most
reporting appears to be making token gestures with little evidence of a structured, planned CSR
approach. Kansal and Singh (2012) find that community development is the most disclosed item
followed by human resource disclosure in the annual reports of 100 public-listed firms. More
recently, Das (2013), based on 26 insurance firms, reveals that non-life insurance companies
disclosed less social information than life insurance companies. Murthy and Abeysekera’s (2008)
study of the top 16 software companies in India documents community planning and child
education as the two most popular community-related activities, and employee training,
employee numbers and career development as the three most reported items under human
resources. They also interviewed managers of 14 such firms and found that a key motivation to
disclose human resource activities was the need to attract and retain staff in an industry that
faced a severe skills shortage; while community activities disclosure were driven by a genuine
interest to help society.

11
In summary, studies on CSR disclosure by Indian firms are largely based on small
samples and are predominantly descriptive, and provide little understanding of the drivers of
CSR disclosure.
3. Hypotheses Development
3.1 Promoter ownership
In India, a promoter of a company is defined as any person or family member who is
directly or indirectly in control of the company (Jackling and Johl, 2009).4 The more
concentrated the company’s ownership by the promoters, the greater the power they are likely to
have in influencing decision-making.
According to agency theory, with higher levels of ownership concentration there is likely
to be less information asymmetry and the potential for conflicts between principals and agents is
reduced as well (Fama and Jensen, 1983), thus diminishing the need for more disclosure. By
contrast, in situations where there is greater diffusion in ownership, the different shareholders
have less access to management boards, and the agents are likely to voluntary disclose more so
as to signal the market and shareholders that they have acted in the best interests of the owners
(McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). Empirical evidence based on prior research linking
ownership diffusion and voluntary corporate disclosures, however, appear mixed. Studies by
Chau and Gray (2002), Prencipe (2004), Ghazali (2007), and Brammer and Pavelin (2008) find
negative associations between concentrated ownership and voluntary disclosures using data from
public-listed firms in Singapore, Italy, Malaysia and UK, respectively. Likewise, based on
S&P500 data, Ali et al. (2007), report that family firms, where ownership concentration is
generally high, are less likely to make voluntary disclosures on corporate governance practices in
their regulatory filings. By contrast, Craswell and Taylor (1992), which involved firms in
12
environmentally sensitive industries, find no significant association between ownership diffusion
and voluntary disclosures. Most of the prior studies, however, did not specifically assess CSR
disclosures. We argue that the cost of disclosure is likely to exceed the benefits in promoter firms
where the concentrated power over decision-making is high and thus the need to appease other
stakeholders is low.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between promoter ownership and the level of CSR
disclosures.
3.2 Foreign ownership
Greater foreign ownership generally indicates stronger influence of foreign practices (Oh et
al., 2011; Jeon et al., 2011), as well as a greater separation of ownership and management as a
function of geographic distance (Schipper, 1981; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). It is also argued that
foreign shareholders tend to demand higher level of corporate disclosure due to the geographic
separation (Bradbury, 1991). Many of the foreign shareholders are also likely to be multi-
national businesses that have invested in local firms and thus may potentially hold different
values and wider knowledge because of their foreign market exposure. From an institutional
theory viewpoint, CSR disclosure may function as a proactive legitimating strategy to obtain
continued inflows of capital and to please ethical investors. Foreign owners are also likely to be
more aware and sensitised to the rising expectations for businesses to be socially accountable in
the broader global community, and thus may concede to mimetic pressures through CSR
disclosures comparable to multinational firms. Empirical findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2005)
13
and Khan et al. (2013) provide some support from an Asian context perspective for a positive
relationship between foreign ownership and CSR disclosures.
Based on the above discussion, we propose the second hypothesis of this study as follows:
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the level of CSR
disclosures.
3.3 Government ownership

Government owned companies tend to be politically sensitive because their activities are
more visible in the public eyes and there is a stronger expectation for such firms to be conscious
of their public duty (Ghazali, 2007). CSR activities by their very nature ideally can reflect how
government entities are willing to serve both the business interests and society’s well-being.
Thus, government owners are likely to generate pressures for companies to disclose additional
information because the government as a body that is trusted by the public will need to meet its
stakeholders i.e. the public’s expectations. In other words, public disclosure of CSR activities
can function as a critical vehicle to legitimise government owned enterprise activities. Both Eng
and Mak (2003) and Ghazali (2007) provide evidence of a positive and significant impact of
government ownership on CSR disclosure.
In India, there are high expectations set upon CPSEs which were specifically set-up post-
independence as vehicles for industrial development, and employment generation. However, a
recent review of the World Bank of the governance of these entities (World Bank, 2010)
suggests that corporate disclosure varies in quality and that they may need the support of
professional expertise from private sector to improve governance and transparency. The
promulgation of the CSR guidelines specific to CPSEs in 2010 by the Department of Public
14
Enterprises thus can be seen as a form of coercive pressure from the government for CPSEs to
implement CSR activities and to report upon them.
Based on the preceding discussion, we therefore propose the following third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between government ownership and the level of
CSR disclosures
3.4 Board Independence

According to agency theory, independent directors are more conscious of promoting their
reputational capital and thus will pay attention to the company’s stakeholder interests when
making board decisions. It is argued that the economics of the managerial labour market
provides incentives for independent directors to enhance their reputation (Fama and Jensen,
1983). As such, it is contended that independent directors will act as monitors to ensure that
companies are not only properly managed by the management but also are presented in the best
light (Andres et al., 2005). Further, from an institutional perspective where there is societal
pressure for firms to be aligned with society’s interests, independent directors are likely to
respond to concerns about honour and obligations and would generally be more interested in
satisfying the social responsibilities of the firm as well as preserving their professional reputation
(Zahra and Stanton, 1988). Forker (1992) find that a higher percentage of independent directors
on the board enhances the monitoring of the financial disclosure quality and reduces the benefits
of withholding information. Chen and Jaggi (2000) find that the proportion of independent
director is positively related with mandatory disclosure. Similarly, Khan et al. (2013) find a
positive and significant relationship between board independence and CSR disclosure.
Therefore, we propose the fourth hypothesis of this study:

15
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent directors and
the level of CSR disclosures.
3.5 CEO duality
CEO duality reflects a situation where board leadership is held by the same person who
holds the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the organisation as CEO. As such,
CEO duality is generally seen to significantly empower the CEO/Chairman while increasing the
risk of minority interest neglect. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) likewise argue that CEO duality
offers greater decision-making power, which may enable the CEO to make decisions that do not
take into account the greater interests of a broader set of stakeholders. Consequently, this may be
reflected in lower firm involvement in social or community activities, and limited disclosure of
these activities. Li et al. (2008) argue that separation of the roles of chairman and CEO is
preferable as it tends to enhance monitoring quality, particularly on matters related to stakeholder
responsiveness. However, Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) find no association between CEO
duality and sustainability disclosures. Empirical evidence by Gul and Leung (2004) based on
Hong Kong firm data indicate CEO duality is related with a lower level of voluntary corporate
disclosure.
We therefore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the level of CSR
disclosures.
4. Research Design
4.1 Sample
16
The sample consists of the 100 top Indian companies listed on the Bombay Stock
Exchange (BSE) by market capitalization in India from 2007 to 2011, producing a total of 500
firm-year observations. Due to missing information, we exclude seven firm-year observations,
yielding a final sample of 493 firm-years observations. The data for our analysis comes from
multiple sources. We collected the financial and ownership data from the Prowess database
created by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) which has been commonly
utilised in previous studies on Indian corporate sector (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Sarkar and
Sarkar, 2009; Bhaumik and Selarka, 2012). Social responsibility information was hand collected
from various sections of the annual reports e.g. corporate governance disclosures, directors’
report, Chairman’s statement, and notes to the financial statement. Although companies use
different media for communicating social responsibility disclosures, this study focuses on annual
reports because they (i) are the sole source of certain information that many stakeholders look for
(Deegan and Rankin, 1997); (ii) are widely distributed and thus have greater potential to
influence (Adams and Harte, 1998); and (iii) are more accessible for research purposes
(Woodward, 1998).
As shown in Table 1, the sample consists of firms from a cross-section of industries
including chemicals, consumer products and tobacco, oil and petroleum, iron, steel, and metals;
transport, financial, and computer software and services. In terms of ownership, shares held by
the promoter varied from nil to 81 per cent while the proportion of foreign shares in a firm
varied from 0 and 65 per cent. Only about a third of the sample firms had foreign ownership, and
government ownership varied between 0 to 90 per cent, with 38 firms having shares held by
government.
17
<Table 1 about here>
4.2 Model specification
The following model is used to test our Hypotheses
CSRDI = α + β1 PRMOWN + β2 FOROWN + β3 GOVTOWN +β4 BIND + β5 CEODU + β6

FSIZE + β7 FAGE+ β8 LEV+ β9 ROA+ β10 SEN+ β11YEARDUM + ε
Where
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index

PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by the promoters
FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors. These include

foreign collaborators, foreign financial institutions and foreign
nationals.
GOVTOWN = percentage of shares owned by the government
BIND = proportionate independent directors on the board
CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and
chairman in a firm
FISZE = natural logarithm of total assets
FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception
LEV = ratio of book value of total debt and assets
ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets
SEN5 = dummy variable equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with
significant environment impacts and 0 otherwise
YEARDUM = Year dummy
The independent predictor variables are promoter ownership (PRMOWN), foreign
ownership (FOROWN), government ownership (GOVTOWN), proportion of independent
directors on board (BIND) and CEO duality (CEODU). We also include control variables that
have been found in prior research to be related to disclosure. The control variables included are
firm size (FSIZE), firm age (FAGE), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA) and environmental
sensitive industries (SEN).
For FSIZE, larger firms are expected to disclose more information (Gao et al., 2005), as
they are more visible and tend to be subject to greater public scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman,
18
1978). For FAGE, older firm provides more social responsibility disclosure (Roberts, 1992). A
more mature firm is concerned about its reputation, and hence would disclose more social
responsibility information. In the case of LEV, companies with higher leverage may disclose
more because management needs to legitimise its actions to creditors as well as shareholders
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). Alternately they may report less, as argued by Purushothaman et al.
(2000) companies with high leverage may have closer relationships with their creditors and use
other means to disclose social responsibility information. Finally, profitable companies

(increasing ROA) are likely to have better resources to disclose more corporate social and
environmental disclosure (Gray et al., 2001).
4.3 Dependent Variable - Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure (CSRD) indices
The dependent variable in this study is the level of CSR disclosure which is measured as
an index (CSRDI) based on 17 items as shown in Appendix 1. The checklist items were adapted
from past research including several recent Indian studies (e.g. Das, 2013; Narwar and Singh,
2013; Kansal and Singh, 2012), as well as by an earlier study by Haniffa and Cooke (2005). We
classify CSR activities under the following four areas - environment, community development,
product and/or services, and human resource disclosures. In terms of coding, a dichotomous
procedure was applied whereby an item is coded 1 if it is disclosed in the annual report, and 0
otherwise. One advantage of this method is that it is more reliable than other methods because
less choice is available for coders (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Hackston and Milne, 1996). The
index also facilitates the use of a numerical comparison of CSR disclosure across companies in a
systematic manner, and has been a common procedure employed in this area. Annual reports of
all 100 firms over the five years were reviewed and coded. Further, since coder reliability is an
19
element of concern in studies that adopt content analysis, certain precautionary measures were
adopted to ensure reliability. For example, the first author reviewed all sample annual reports and
proceeded with the coding process. Then, the second author compared the coded data, and in
cases where discrepancies existed, the annual reports were re-analysed and the differences were
resolved.
The CSR disclosure index (CSRDI) is derived by computing the ratio of actual scores
awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items appropriate (applicable) to that firm
(Ghazali, 2007). Following Haniffa and Cooke (2005), the Corporate Social Disclosure Index
(CSRDI) is calculated as follows:
nj
∑X
t =1
ij
CSRDIj =
nj
CSRDIj = Corporate Social Disclosure Index for jth firm
nj = Number of items expected for jth firm, where n≤21

th
Xi j= 1, if i items are disclosed for firm j, otherwise 0
So that 0 ≤ CSRD j ≤1
Consistent with prior disclosure index studies (Botosan 1997; Gul and Leung 2004), we use
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) to assess the internal consistency of our
disclosure index. We find the coefficient score for the four categories in the disclosure index is
0.67 which suggests acceptable internal reliability and that the set of items in the disclosure
scoring index is capturing the same underlying construct.
5. Results
20
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. The average
disclosure score is 0.309 (median= 0.294). The average firm age is nearly 40 years, and the
average firm size is 12. 31 (natural logarithm of total assets).
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix among variables. CSR disclosure index (CSRDI)
is positively correlated with foreign ownership (FOROWN) (ρ = 0.196), government ownership
(GOVTOWN) (ρ = 0.121) and board independence (BIND) (ρ = 0.218). CSRDI is negatively
correlated with CEO duality (CEODU) (ρ = -0.104).
Table 4 reports the mean values of the explanatory variables across the CSR disclosure
scores across firms with a score higher than the median and those with a score lower than the
median. Analysis based on a t-test of means indicates that firms with a CSR disclosure score
higher than the median have higher foreign ownership (FOROWN) and board independence
(BIND) as compared to those firms with a CSR score lower than the median.
Table 5 reports the results of regression analysis using CSRDI as the dependent variable.
In model 1, we find promoter ownership (PROMOWN) to be insignificant. Given that promoter

21
firms are also mainly family-controlled, there may be less need to justify or showcase their CSR
activities to external parties or potential investors who are likely to be in the minority group, thus
avoiding, costs associated with disclosure.
In the next model (model 2), we examine the impact of foreign ownership on CSR
disclosures, and find a significant, positive coefficient (β = 0.092, p < 0.01) on foreign ownership
(FOROWN). This result supports H2. Our findings imply that foreign shareholders are likely to
have different values and knowledge related to broader global issues and are able inform and
shape strategic thinking towards social and environmental activities and subsequently, this is
reflected in the firms reporting. This is consistent with the findings of Haniffa and Cooke (2005)
who suggest that companies with high foreign ownership report more CSR disclosures as a
proactive legitimacy strategy to satisfy ethical foreign investors so that they attract more foreign
capital.
In model 3 we investigate the impact of government ownership on CSR reporting. We
document a positive significant coefficient (β =0.072, p <0.05) on government ownership
(GOVTOWN). This result is consistent with the findings of Ghazali (2007) in Malaysia. From
an institutional theory perspective, this suggests that government owned companies may engage
in more socially responsible reporting as a legitimisation exercise given that they are more
visible in the public eye.
In model 4 we find a positive significant coefficient (β = 0.194, p < 0.01) for our board
independence (BIND) variable, which supports H4. It is likely that independent directors are able
to reduce agency conflicts between managers and owners through encouraging management to
disclose more CSR activities. This finding is also consistent with results found in more
developed nations “e.g., Brammer and Pavelin (2008) and Li et. al. (2008)”.
22
In support of our fifth hypothesis model 5 results indicate a negative and significant
coefficient (β = -0.036, p <0.01) for CEO duality (CEODU). Our finding is consistent with
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), indicating CEOs in dual positions may not be motivated to be visibly
accountable to the interests of the broader stakeholders and are likely to avoid the costs of CSR
disclosure.
Finally, we regress CSR disclosure on all corporate governance variables in model 6 to
test the impact of all the hypothesised variables in one model. Our results with respect to the
hypothesised variables are consistent with main findings reported in models 1 to 5. In regards to
control variables, our overall findings suggest that larger firm size (FSIZE), older firms (FAGE)
and better performance (ROA) are significantly related to CSR disclosure levels. However, we
find a negative significant impact of leverage on the level of CSR disclosures. The results of our
analysis with respect to the control variables are consistent with previous studies (Roberts, 1992;
Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; and Ghazali, 2007, Khan et al., 2013).
5.1 Impact of CSR guidelines and other Robustness Checks
We divided our sample into two different sub-samples based on time periods – from 2007
to 2009 and from 2010 to 2011 and replicated the original analysis. The purpose of partitioning
the sample is to test for any impact the NVGs on corporate governance and CSR released in
2009 may have had on CSR disclosure levels. Results across the sub-periods as shown in Table
6, are qualitatively similar to the whole sample as well where Foreign ownership, board
independence and CEO duality have significant associations with disclosure levels. However,
23
government ownership becomes significantly positively associated with disclosure levels in the
second sub-sample period, i.e. after the release of the NVGs, suggesting that government-owned
firms were responding to institutional pressures following such guidelines.
Since not all government owned companies are CPSEs and there were mandatory policies
released by the Department of Public Enterprises on CSR implementation in 2010, we undertook
further specific analysis comparing CSR disclosure levels between CPSEs and non-CPSEs for
2011. Our sample includes 17 CPSEs and 83 non-CPSEs. Non-tabulated results indicate
significantly higher disclosure by CPSEs in 2011 compared with the previous four years, while
the relation of the variables to disclosure remains qualitatively unchanged. This suggests the
coercive pressures of mandatory guidelines appeared to impact the disclosure.
The results for the other variables remain qualitatively the same i.e. foreign ownership, board
independence and CEO duality held significant relationships with level of CSR disclosure and in
the expected directions as well, in the two sub-sample periods. This finding signals the inherent
coercive pressures held by mandatory guidelines in affecting CSR disclosures.
5.2 Further Analysis
We also undertook additional analysis for each of the four major categories of CSR
disclosure index: community involvement disclosure index (COMDIS); environmental
disclosure index (ENVDIS); employee information disclosure index (EMPDIS); and product and
service disclosure index (PRODIS). The results as presented in Table 7 show that ownership and
board characteristics have different effects on different types of CSR disclosures.
24
<Insert Table 7 about here>
In terms of the ownership predictor variables, foreign ownership (FOROWN) has a
significantly positive impact on ENVDIS. Foreign investors may influence companies to disclose
greater and more relevant environmental information to evaluate corporate environmental
performance, thereby promoting the quality of voluntary disclosure of environmental
information. Government ownership (GOVTOWN) is positively related to the COMDIS,
EMVDIS and EMPDIS, whereas it is insignificantly related to PRODIS. It is likely that given
the higher need and empathy by government to public-related issues – community, environment
and employee levels, government ownership may affect how such firms present their
community, environment and the employee engagement.
Furthermore, board independence (BIND) is seen to have consistent effects on all four
CSR disclosure dimensions i.e. BIND is positively and significantly related to COMDIS,
ENVDIS and PRODIS. According to agency theory, independent directors can put pressure on
companies to engage in these categories of CSR to ensure organisational legitimacy. However,
CEO duality (CEODU) is negatively related to EMPDIS and PRODIS. CEO power may enable
him/her to make decisions that do not take into account of the greater interests of stakeholders.
6. Conclusions
The overarching aim of this study was to assess whether ownership and board composition
affect CSR disclosures by Indian firms. The results of our study reveal that both foreign and
government ownership have positive impacts on the level of CSR disclosures, but promoter
ownership has negligible effects. Our study also indicates that board independence is strongly
associated with greater levels of CSR disclosure, and CEO duality has a negative impact. These
25
results provide deeper insights into the drivers of CSR reporting within Indian firms, thus
enriching other earlier studies that predominantly focused only on describing the CSR practices
and type of information disclosed (Murthy and Ibeysekera, 2008; Narwal and Singh, 2013).
The present study makes several important contributions. First, the study is one of the few
to take a more comprehensive and predictive modelling approach using a relatively large sample
of firm data covering a relatively longer time period (five years) in assessing the effects of
ownership and board composition on CSR disclosure of Indian public-listed firms. Thus this
study adds to the limited pool of evidence on CSR disclosure by Indian firms.
Second, from a theoretical perspective, our results support both agency and institutional
rationalisations. Independent directors are found to hold a more positive stance towards CSR
disclosure, suggesting their reputational risk concerns as predicted by the agency perspective
may encourage their support of more transparent practices. Interestingly, it appears that despite
the traditional settings of an environment where corporate governance may still be evolving in
India (World Bank, 2010), independent directors and CEO duality still have significant effects
on CSR disclosure. Our findings also suggest that different ownership structures are associated
with different types of CSR disclosure which indicates investors as principals tend to monitor
and align voluntary disclosure in their interests. For instance, we find government owned firms
tend to place greater importance on community and employee-related information as expected
given their orientation towards national goals on socio-economic and community development.
Also, our finding indicate that independent directors may be more neutral to the type of
information disclosed given that the level of board independence was significantly and positively
associated with three out of the four CSR categories i.e. community, environment and
product/service disclosure. Nevertheless, more independent boards are also seen to increase CSR
26
disclosures. Our finding also provides support for institutional theory where mimetic pressures
posed by the 2009 NGV on CSR (MCA, 2009b) and coercive pressures from the mandatory
guidelines imposed on CPSEs (DPE, 2010) may explain an increasing trend in CSR disclosure
among government owned firms over 2010 and 2011.
In terms of implications for practice, we offer several suggestions. First, given that the new
Companies Bill of India released in 2013 mandates all profit-making firms to establish a board
CSR Committee, firms may consider having the majority of such a board composed of
independent directors and CSR experts where possible. Further, given that in a more regulated,
mandatory corporate environment, the risk of compliance may supersede substance i.e. the
quality of CSR information rather than quantity of information becomes pertinent for oversight.
As such, independent directors could take an active role in ensuring the strategic planning,
implementation and the performance metrics reflecting CSR outcomes are of high quality. This
also then raises the issue of the level of CSR awareness and knowledge among independent
directors. Professional workshops and skills training in CSR strategy-making and evaluation
appears to be critical for independent directors to play their role more effectively. Additionally,
research is also needed on other elements of board diversity and its impact on CSR disclosure.
For example, the recent Companies Bill mandates at least one board member to be female.
Additional evidence on gender composition of the CSR Committees and its effect on CSR
disclosure will be fruitful.
Our study is subject to several limitations. Our analysis used only disclosures from the
annual reports although it is known that management may use other mass communication
mechanisms. Therefore, future research may consider disclosures in other media such as
newspapers, the internet, etc. Additionally, the CSR disclosure index developed in this study
27
may not have been fully or properly captured all aspects of CSR practices. In this study, we
could not fully consider the quality of CSR disclosure because few companies in India disclosed
their CSR activities quantitatively (Kansal and Singh, 2012). Further, while we focused on
agency and institutional theories, other theoretical explanations could provide additional
understanding of the link between corporate governance and CSR disclosure. For example, better
performing firms and politically connected firms may utilise CSR disclosure for purposes other
than legitimacy. Finally, we assessed only two aspects of board composition (independence and
CEO duality) but prior studies suggest board experience and expertise in general leads to better
governance (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Gul and Leung, 2004). Future studies thus may consider
assessing the impact of board characteristics such as director expertise and interlocks on CSR
disclosure.
In conclusion, this study provides insights on how state-led guidelines on CSR coupled
with corporate governance mechanisms appear to play a critical role in firm disclosure practices
within the developing economy context. Scherer and Palazzo (2011) in their review of the CSR
literature, contend that a new form of politicized CSR is emerging together with globalization.
They propose that “political solutions for societal challenges are no longer limited to the political
system but have become embedded in decentralized processes that include non-state actors such
as NGOs and corporations” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p.922). As such, the quality of firm
disclosures becomes increasingly critical for how well the various stakeholders are informed
which ultimately affects their potential to act on CSR issues.
28
Notes
1. A series of major committees were further set up such as the Bajaj Committee in 1996, Birla
Committee in 2000, Chandra Committee in 2002, and the Narayanan Murthy Committee in 2003
to review corporate governance and propose governance reforms.
2. CPSEs were initially established to pursue macro-economic objectives as envisaged by the Five
Year Plans and Industrial Policy Resolutions, and are among the top performing organisations in
India.
3. The CSR budget was to be created through a board resolution, with firms making less than 100
crore (USD 10 million) setting aside 3-5% of their net profit, those making 100-500 crore, setting
aside 2-3% and those making net profit more than Rs 500 crore (USD 50 million) setting aside
0.5-2%) of the net profit of the previous year. CSR planned initiatives are also to form as part of
the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) to be signed between a CPSE and the government
which essentially is an organisational-level performance agreement.
4. Promoter is defined in clause (h) of sub regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the SEBI (Substantial
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. Owner managed company is very
common in India and in most of the cases the owners are family members (Johl et al., 2010).
5. Consistent with Brammer and Millington (2005) chemical, resource extraction, and utilities
sectors are defined as having high environmental impacts.
29
References
Adams, C.A. (2002), "Internal organisational factors influencing corporate social and ethical
reporting: Beyond current theorising", Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 15,
No.2, pp. 223-250.
Adams, C. A. (2004), “The ethical, social and environmental reporting-performance portrayal

gap”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 17 No. 5, pp. 731 – 757.
Adams, C.A. and Harte, G. (1998), “The changing portrayal of the employment of women in
British banks and retail companies corporate annual reports”, Accounting, Organizations and
Society, Vol. 23, No. 80, pp. 781–812.
Andres, P., Azofra, V., and Lopez, F. (2005). “Corporate boards in OECD countries: Size,
composition, functioning and effectiveness”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,
Vol. 13, No. 2, 197-210.
Arevalo, J. A. and Aravind, D. (2011), “ Corporate social responsibility practices in India:

Approach. Drivers, and barriers”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 11 No.4, pp. 399-414.
Brammer, S. and Millington, A. (2005), “Corporate Reputation and philanthropy : An empirical

analysis, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 29-44.
Brammer S, and Pavelin S. (2008). Factors influencing the quality of corporate environmental
disclosure. Business Strategy and the Environment Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 120–136.
Belal, A. R. (2001), “A study of corporate social disclosures in Bangladesh”, Managerial

Auditing Journal, Vol. 16 No. 5, pp. 274-289.
Belal, A. R. and S. Cooper (2011), “Absence of corporate social reporting in Bangladesh: A

research note”, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, Vol. 22 No. 7, pp. 654-667.
Belal, A. R. and and Momin, M. (2009), “Corporate social reporting (CSR) in emerging
economies: A review and future direction”, in Mathew Tsamenyi, Shahzad Uddin (ed.)
Accounting in Emerging Economies (Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies, Volume
9) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.119 – 143.
Beltratti, A. (2005), “The complementarity between corporate governance and corporate social
responsibility”, Geneva Papers on Risk & Insurance, Vol. 30, pp. 373-386.
Bhaumik, S. K. and Selarka, E. (2012), “ Does ownership concentration improve M & A

outcomes in emerging markets? Evidence from India”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 18,
30
pp. 717- 726.
Blowfield, M. and Frynas, J. G. (2005). "Setting New Agendas. Critical Perspectives on

Corporate Social Responsibility in the Developing World", International Affairs, Vol. 81, No.3,
pp. 499-513.
Botosan, C. A. (1997), “Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital”, The Accounting Review,
Vol. 72 No.3, pp. 323-350.
Bradbury, M.E. (1991), “Characteristics of Firms and Voluntary Interim Earnings Disclosure:
New Zealand Evidence”, Pacific Accounting Review Vol. 3, pp. 37–62.
Brammer, S. and Pavelin, S. (2008), “ Factors influencing the quality of corporate

environmental disclosure”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 17, pp. 120-136.
Chau, G. and Gray, S. J. (2002), “Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure in
Hong King and Singapore”, The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 247-
265.
Chen, C. J. P. and Jaggi, B. (2000), “Association between independent non-executive

directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong”, Journal of Accounting and
Public Policy, Vol. 19, pp. 285–310.
Craswell, A. and Taylor, S. (1992) “Discretionary disclosure of reserves by oil and gas
companies: An economic analysis” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 19, pp.
421-430.
Cronbach, L. J. (1951), “Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests”, Psychometrika,
Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 297-334.
Das, S. C. (2013) "Corporate social reporting and human resource disclosures: experiences from
insurance companies in India", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.19 – 32
Deegan, C. (2009), “Financial Accounting Theory”, 3rd edn. Sydney: McGraw Hill.
Deegan, C. and Rankin M. (1996), “ Australian companies report environmental news

objectively? An analysis of environmental disclosures by firms prosecuted successfully by
the environmental protection authority”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal
Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 50-67.
Deegan, C. and Rankin, M. (1997), “The materiality of environmental information to users of

annual reports”, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 562–583.
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983), “The iron revisited: Institutional isomorphism and
collective rationality in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp.
31
147-160.
Dincer, C. and Dincer, B. (2010) "An investigation of Turkish small and medium-sized
enterprises online CSR communication", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp.197 -
207
Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) (2010) “The CSR Guidelines for CSPEs”, The Ministry
of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises: New Delhi, India.
Dutta, K. and Durgamohan, M. (2009), “Corporate social strategy: Relevant and pertinence in
the Indian context”, Working paper, available at:
www.iitk.ac.in/infocell/announce/conversion/papers.
Eng, L. L. and Mak, Y. T. (2003), “Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure”, Journal of
Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 22 No. 4, pp. 325-345.
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), “Separation of ownership and control”, Journal of Law
and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301-325.
Forker, J. J. (1992), “Corporate governance and disclosure quality”, Accounting and Business
Research, Vol. 22 No. 86, pp. 111-124.
Freeman, R. E. (1984), “Strategic management: A stake-holder approach”, Boston: Pitman
Gao, S. S., Heravi, S., and Xiao, J. Z. (2005), “Determinants of corporate social and
environmental reporting in Hong Kong: A research note”, Accounting Forum, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp.
233-242.
Gautam, R. and Singh, A. (2010), “Corporate social responsibility practices in India: A study
of top 500 companies”, Global Business and Management Research: An International Journal,
Vol. 2 No.1, pp. 41-56.
Ghazali, N.A.M. (2007), “Ownership structure and corporate social responsibility disclosure:
some Malaysian evidence”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 251-266.
Gray, R. H., Owen, D. L., and Maunders, K. T. (1987), “Corporate social reporting:
Accounting and accountability”, Hemel Hempstead, UK: Prentice Hall.
Gray, R., Owen, D. and Adams, C. (1996), “Accounting and Accountability”, Prentice Hall,
Hemel Hempstead.
Gray, R., Javad, M., Power, D. M. and Sinclair, C. D. (2001), “Social and environmental
disclosure and corporate characteristics: A research note and extension”, Journal of Business,
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 28 No. 3-4, pp. 327-356.
Gul, F. A. and Leung, S. (2004), “Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary
32
corporate disclosure”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 23 No. 5, 351-379.
Gunawan, J. (2010), "Perception of important information in corporate social disclosures:

evidence from Indonesia", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp.62 – 71.
Gupta, V. (2013), “Analysis: Why investing in PSUs is a good idea” Available at:
www.arthveda.co.in/media/Analysis-Why-investing-in-PSUs-is-a-good-idea.pdf
Guthrie, J. and Parker, L. (1989), “Corporate social reporting: A rebuttal of legitimacy theory”,
Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 343-352.
Hackston, D. and Milne, M. J. (1996) "Some determinants of social and environmental

disclosures in New Zealand companies", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 9,
No. 1, pp.77 - 108
Haider, M. B. (2010). “An overview of corporate social and environmental reporting (CSER) in
developing countries”, Issues in Social and Environmental Accounting, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp 3-17.
Haniffa, R. M. and T. E. Cooke (2005), “The impact of culture and governance on corporate
social reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 24 No.5, pp. 391–430.
Haniffa, R.M. and Cooke, T. E. (2002), “Culture, corporate governance and disclosure in
Malaysian corporations”, Abacus, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 317–349.
Ho, S. and Wong, K. S. (2001), “A Study of the Relationship Between Corporate Governance
Structures and the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure”, Journal of International Accounting,
Auditing and Taxation, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 139-156.
Huafang, X. and Jianguo, Y. (2007), “Ownership structure, board composition and corporate
voluntary disclosure: Evidence from listed companies in China”, Managerial Auditing Journal,
Vol. 22 No. 6, pp. 604 – 619.
Jackling, B. and Johl, S. (2009), “Board structure and firm performance: Evidence from
India’s top companies”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp.
492-509.
Jamali, D. and Mirshak, R. (2006). "Corporate social responsibility (CSR): Theory and
practice in a developing country context", Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp.
243-262.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-360.
Jeon, J. Q., Lee. C. and Moffett, C. M. (2011), “Effects of foreign ownership on payout policy:
Evidence from the Korean market”, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 344-375.
33
Johl, S., Jackling, B., and Joshi, M. (2010), “Family generation, leadership, and performance:
The role of outside directors in Indian family firms”, Corporate Ownership & Control, Vol.
8 No. 1, pp. 646-662.
Kansal, M. and Singh, S. (2012), “Measurement of corporate social performance: An Indian

perspective”, Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 8 No. 4, 527 – 546.
Kolk, A. (2008). “Sustainability, accountability and corporate governance: Exploring

multinationals reporting practices”, Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 17 No.1, pp.1-
15.
Khan, A., Muttakin, M. B. and Siddiqui, J. (2013), “Corporate governance and corporate
social responsibility disclosures: evidence from an emerging economy”, Journal of Business
Ethics, Vol. 114 No. 2, pp. 207-223.
Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. (2000), “Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An
analysis of diversified Indian business groups”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 No. 2, pp. 867–891.
Kim, Y., Park, M. S. and Wier, B. (2012), “Is earnings quality associated with corporate social
responsibility?”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 87 No. 3, pp. 761-796.
Kuasirikun, N. and M. Sherer (2004), “Corporate social accounting disclosure in Thailand”,

Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Vol. 17 No. 4, pp. 629-660.
Kumar, R., Murphy, D. and Balsari, V. (2001), ‘‘Altered images: the 2001 state of corporate
responsibility in India’’, Business-Social Partnership: Beyond Philanthropy Conference, Indian
Institute of Management, Calcutta, India, December.
Li, Q., Luo, W., Wang, Y. and Wu, L. (2013), “Firm performance, corporate ownership, and
corporate social responsibility disclosure in China”, Business Ethics: A European Review, Vol.
22, No. 2, pp. 159-173.
Li, J., Pike, R., and Haniffa, R. (2008), “Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate
Governance structure in UK firms”, Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 38, No.2,pp.
137-159.
Manik, J. A. and Yardley, J. (2012). “Garments Workers Stage Angry Protest After
Bangladesh Fire”, The New York Times, November 26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/garment-workers-stage-protest-in-bangladesh-
after-deadly-fire.html?_r=0
McKinnon, J. L. and Dalimunthe, L. (1993), “Voluntary disclosure of segment information by

Australian diversified companies”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 33, No. 1 , pp. 33-50.
34
Michelon, G. and Parbonetti, A. (2012), “The effect of corporate governance on sustainability
disclosure”, Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 477-509.
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) (2009a) “National Voluntary Guidelines (NVG) on CSR
(2009)” The Ministry of Corporate Affairs: New Delhi, India.
Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) (2009b) “The Corporate Governance Voluntary
Guidelines”, The Ministry of Corporate Affairs: New Delhi, India.
Mishra, S. and Suar, D. (2010), “Does corporate social responsibility influence firm
performance of Indian companies?”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp.571-601.
Murthy, V. and Abeysekera, I. (2008), “Corporate social reporting practices of top Indian
software firms”, Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 36-
59.
Narwal, M. and Singh, R. (2013), "Corporate social responsibility practices in India: a

comparative study of MNCs and Indian companies", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 9, No.
3, pp.465 - 478
Nejati, M. and Ghasemi, S. (2012) "Corporate social responsibility in Iran from the perspective
of employees", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp.578 – 588.
Newson, M. and Deegan, C. (2002), “ An exploration of the association between global

expectations and corporate social disclosure practices in the Asia–pacific region”, The
International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 183–213.
Oh, W. Y., Chang, Y. K. and. Martynov, A. (2011), “The effect of ownership structure on
corporate social responsibility: empirical evidence from Korea”, Journal of Business Ethics,
Vol. 104 No. 2, pp. 283-297.
Othman, S., Darus, F. and Arshad, R. (2011) "The influence of coercive isomorphism on
corporate social responsibility reporting and reputation", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 7,
No. 1, pp.119 – 135.
Prencipe, A. (2004), “Property costs and determinants of voluntary segment disclosure:

Evidence from Italian listed companies”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 319-
340.
Prieto-Carron, M., Lund-Thomsen, P., Chan, A., Muro, A. N. A., and Bhushan, C. (2006).
“Critical perspectives on CSR and development: what we know, what we don't know, and what
we need to know”, International Affairs, Vol. 82, No.5, pp. 977-987.
Purushothaman, M., Tower, G., Hancock, R. and Taplin, R. (2000), “Determinants of corporate
social reporting practices of listed Singapore companies”, Pacific Accounting Review, Vol. 12
No. 2, pp. 101-133.
35
Ramani, S. and Mukherjee, V. (2013), “Can breakthrough innovations serve the poor (bop) and
create reputational (CSR) value? Indian case studies”, Technovation, in press.
Rashid, A. and Lodh, S. C. (2008) "The influence of ownership structures and board practices on
corporate social disclosures in Bangladesh", Research in Accounting in Emerging Economies,
Vol. 8, pp. 211 – 237.
Roberts, R. W. (1992), “ Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure: an

application of stakeholder theory”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 17 No. 6, pp.
595-612.
Sarkar, J. and Sarkar, S. (2009), “Multiple board appointments and firm performance in
emerging economics: Evidence from India”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 17, pp. 271-
293.
Scherer, A.G. and Palazzo, G. (2011), “The new political role of business in a globalized world –
a review of a new perspective on CSR and its implications for the ﬁrm, governance, and
democracy”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 899–931.
Schipper, K. (1981), “Discussion of voluntary corporate disclosure: the case of interim

reporting”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 19, pp. 85–88.
SEBI (2012), Annual reports, Securities and Exchange Board of India.
Timane, R . and T al e, T. (2012), “A study of c o r p o r at e social responsibility in India,

International Journal of Research in IT and Management, Vol. 2 No. 12, pp. 12-17.
Vijayaraghavan, S. (2013) “5 reasons why the Indian companies Bill negates the power of CSR”,
http://www.csrwire.com/blog/posts/1024-5-reasons-why-the-new-indian-companies-bill-negates-
the-power-of-csr (as cited on 9th April, 2014).
Virakul, B., Koonmee, K. and McLean, G. N. (2009) "CSR activities in award-winning Thai
companies", Social Responsibility Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp.178 - 199
Washington Post (2013), “Survivors of Bangladesh garment factory collapse still suffering, 5
months later”, September 7. Available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-
07/world/41853173_1_bangladesh-garment-labor-studies-rana-plaza
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman, J. L. (1978), “Towards a positive theory of the

determination of accounting standards”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 53 No. 1, pp. 112-134.
Woodward, D.G. (1998), “Specification of a content-based approach for use in corporate social
reporting analysis”, Southampton Institute working paper.
36
World Bank (2010), “Corporate governance of central public sector enterprises, Republic of
India, Research report” www.worldbank.org/corporategovernance
Young, S. and Marais, M. (2012), “A multi-level perspective of CSR reporting: The implications
of national institutions and industry risk characteristics” Corporate Governance: An International
Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 432-450.
Zahra, S.A, and Stanton, W. W. (1988), “The implications of board of directors composition
on corporate strategy and performance”, International Journal of Management Vol. 5 No. 2, pp.
229–236
37
Table 1: Number of observation and Proportion of Firms by Industry classification and by year
Panel A
Industry Number Percentage
Electrical 32 6.49
Chemicals 68 13.79
Consumer products and tobacco 20 4.06
Oil and petroleum 33 6.69
Iron, steel, and metals 40 8.12
Transport 40 8.12
Financial 135 27.38
Computer software and services 60 12.17
Others 65 13.19
Total 493 100
Panel B
Year wise sample description
Year Number of firm in the sample Observed firm years

2007 100 99
2008 100 100
2009 100 99
2010 100 100
2011 100 95
Total observations (Firm 500 493
years)
38
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev.
CSRDI 0.058 0.647 0.309 0.294 0.132

COMDIS 0.000 1.000 0.525 0.667 0.274
ENVDIS 0.000 0.800 0.262 0.200 0.218
EMPDIS 0.000 0.714 0.285 0.286 0.145
PRODIS 0.000 1.000 0.192 0.000 0.289
PROMOWN 0.000 0.810 0.321 0.340 0.226
FOROWN 0.000 0.650 0.087 0.000 0.169
BIND 0.000 0.833 0.407 0.444 0.170
CEODU 0.000 1.000 0.325 0.000 0.469
GOVTOWN 0.000 0.900 0.109 0.000 0.210
LEV 0.002 0.955 0.577 0.568 0.237

FAGE 3.000 116.00 39.87 33.000 27.165
FSIZE 8.647 12.319 12.309 12.319 1.442
ROA -0.134 0.538 0.114 0.081 0.108
SEN 0.000 1.000 0.290 0.000 0.454
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; COMDIS = community involvement disclosure
score/ index ; ENVDIS= environmental disclosure score/ index; EMPDIS= employee information disclosure
score/ index; PRODIS = product and service disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares
owned by the promoters; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors; CEODU = dummy
variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate
independent directors on the board; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the government; LEV= ratio
of book value of total debt and total assets; FAGE = the number of year since the firm’s inception; FSIZE =
natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN=
dummy variable equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant environment impacts and 0
otherwise.
39
Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Variables CSRDI PROMOWN FOROWN BIND CEODU GOVTOWN LEV FAGE ROA FSIZE SEN
CSRDI 1.000
PROMOWN 0.009 1.000
FOROWN 0.196*** -0.503*** 1.000
BIND 0.218*** 0.020 0.006 1.000
CEODU -0.104** 0.134*** -0.082* -0.333*** 1.000
GOVTOWN 0.121*** 0.029 -0.161*** -0.254*** 0.371*** 1.000
LEV -0.305*** 0.006 -0.186*** -0.298*** 0.143*** 0.160*** 1.000
FAGE 0.139*** -0.238*** -0.121** -0.292*** 0.143*** 0.236*** 0.129*** 1.000
ROA 0.242*** -0.152*** 0.371*** 0.074* -0.029 -0.059 -0.433*** 0.122*** 1.000
FSIZE 0.079* 0.176*** -0.311*** -0.250*** 0.161*** 0.428*** 0.456*** 0.084* -0.537*** 1.000
SEN 0.170*** 0.025 0.061 -0.032 0.149*** 0.152*** -0.210*** 0.103** 0.179*** -0.209*** 1.000
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by the promoters;
FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions
of CEO and chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate independent directors on the board; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the
government; LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception;
FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN= dummy variable
equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant environment impacts and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** = statistically significant at
less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
40
Table 4: Difference of Means Tests
Panel A: Differences in the value of the explanatory variables between firms with
higher and lower CSRDI
.
Variables CSRDI > Median CSRDI < Median P value
PROMOWN 0.331 0.301 0.155
FOROWN 0.110 0.061 0.004***
GOVTOWN 0.105 0.099 0.792
BIND 0.432 0.361 0.000***
CEODU 0.304 0.362 0.189
LEV 0.535 0.651 0.000***
FAGE 3.477 3.297 0.018**

FSIZE 12.177 12.551 0.006**
ROA 0.134 0.078 0.000***
SEN 0.357 0.167 0.000***
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by
the promoters; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors; CEODU = dummy variable
equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate independent
directors on the board; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the government; LEV= ratio of book value of
total debt and total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception; FSIZE = natural
logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN= dummy
variable equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant environment impacts and 0 otherwise.
*, **, *** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
41
Table 5: Multiple regression results using CSRDI as the dependent variable

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
CONSTANT 0.078 0.226 0.086 0.170 0.169 0.018** -0.096 0.171 0.066 0.297 -0.068 0.367
PROMOWN 0.013 0.638 0.080 0.459
FOROWN 0.092 0.006*** 0.139 0.000***
GOVTOWN 0.072 0.030** 0.121 0.000**
BIND 0.194 0.000*** 0.181 0.000***
CEODU -0.036 0.003*** -0.043 0.000***
LEV -0.172 0.000*** -0.170 0.000*** -0.174 0.000*** -0.142 0.000*** -0.164 0.000*** -0.124 0.000***
FAGE 0.024 0.001*** 0.018 0.011** 0.019 0.010*** 0.031 0.000*** 0.023 0.001*** 0.029 0.000***
ROA 0.223 0.001*** 0.179 0.006*** 0.195 0.003*** 0.239 0.000*** 0.225 0.000*** 0.191 0.002***
FSIZE 0.017 0.001*** 0.019 0.000*** 0.011 0.044** 0.022 0.000*** 0.019 0.000*** 0.018 0.001***
SEN 0.028 0.030** 0.030 0.017** 0.022 0.090* 0.035 0.005*** 0.036 0.005*** 0.029 0.019**
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2
Adjusted R 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.25
F stat 9.48 10.18 9.83 12.87 10.31 12.42
N 493 493 493 493 493 493
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by the promoters; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned
by the foreign investors; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the government; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO
and chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate independent directors on the board; LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; FAGE = natural log of the
number of year since the firm’s inception; FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN= dummy
variable equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant environment impacts and 0 otherwise.
42
Table 6: Multiple regression results using CSRDI as the dependent variable
Variables Pre- voluntary guidelines period Post-voluntary guidelines

(2007-2009) period(2010-2011)
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
CONSTANT -0.070 0.485 -0.143 0.299
PROMOWN 0.037 0.213 0.068 0.158
FOROWN 0.152 0.002*** 0.091 0.037**
GOVTOWN 0.081 0.108 0.170 0.002***
BIND 0.166 0.000*** 0.260 0.000***
CEODU -0.039 0.017** -0.047 0.034**
LEV -0.146 0.000*** -0.110 0.022**
ROA 0.209 0.014** 0.278 0.012**
AGE 0.027 0.004*** 0.042 0.002***
FSIZE 0.019 0.008*** 0.015 0.089*
SEN 0.037 0.485 0.021 0.073*
Adj R2 0.21 0.29
F stat 9.76 7.95
N 298 195
CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by the promoters; FOROWN = percentage
of shares owned by the foreign investors; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the government; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same
person holds the positions of CEO and chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate independent directors on the board; LEV= ratio of book value of total
debt and total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception; FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of
earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN= dummy variable equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant
environment impacts and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** = statistically significant at less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level.
43
Table 7: Multiple regression results for each of the four categories of CSR disclosure as the dependent variable
COMDIS ENVDIS EMPDIS PRODIS

Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
CONSTANT 0.088 0.568 -0.364 0.007*** -0.069 0.447 0.440 0.015**
PROMOWN -0.067 0.314 0.073 0.129 0.063 0.055* 0.123 0.058*
FOROWN 0.182 0.015** 0.185 0.003*** 0.103 0.015** 0.254 0.003***
GOVTOWN 0.157 0.051** 0.121 0.042** 0.120 0.002*** 0.022 0.779
BIND 0.347 0.000*** 0.276 0.000*** 0.041 0.325 0.192 0.021**
CEODU -0.026 0.304 -0.034 0.118 -0.054 0.000*** -0.056 0.058*
LEV -0.376 0.000*** -0.179 0.000*** -0.030 0.358 -0.026 0.688
FAGE 0.055 0.000*** 0.032 0.013** 0.005 0.589 0.069 0.000***
ROA 0.406 0.001*** 0.327 0.003*** 0.155 0.044** -0.198 0.184
FSIZE 0.017 0.104 0.037 0.000*** 0.022 0.000*** 0.046 0.000***
SEN 0.087 0.001*** -0.013 0.527 0.061 0.000*** 0.015 0.581

Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 27.52 12.87 10.02 10.48
F stat 16.97 6.19 5.19 3.53
COMDIS = community involvement disclosure score/ index; ENVDIS= environmental disclosure score/ index; EMPDIS= employee information disclosure score/ index;
PRODIS=product and service disclosure score/ index; PROMOWN = percentage of shares owned by the promoters; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the
foreign investors; GOVTOWN= percentage of shares owned by the government; CEODU = dummy variable equals 1 if same person holds the positions of CEO and
chairman in a firm; BIND = proportionate independent directors on the board; LEV= ratio of book value of total debt and total assets; FAGE = natural log of the number
of year since the firm’s inception; FISZE = natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and total assets. SEN= dummy variable
equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with significant environment impacts and 0 otherwise.
44
Appendix 1: CSR disclosure items
I. Community Involvement
1. General philanthropy
2. Participation in government social campaigns
3. Community programs (health & education)
II. Environmental
1. Environmental policies
2. Raw materials conservation & recycling
3. Environmental protection programme
4. Awards for environmental protection
5. Support for public/private action designed to protect the
environment
III. Employee information
1. Number of employees/human resource
2. Employees relations
3. Employee welfare
4. Employee educations
5. Employee training and development
6. Employee profit sharing
7. Worker’s occupational health and safety
IV. Product and Service Information

1. Product development and Research
2. Product quality and safety
45

Muttakin Dan Subramaniam (2015)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Muttakin Dan Subramaniam (2015)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Muttakin Dan Subramaniam (2015)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

Reporting on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities is increasingly vital for

awareness of business accountability is high.

anecdotal in nature (Haider, 2010).

Another justification for further research on CSR reporting in developing economies

between governance and CSR” (Prieto-Carron et al., 2006, p.987).

1.1 The Present Study

are community influential members play a significant role in engendering sustainability

governance mechanisms and corporate social reporting

1.2 India - Background and Contextual Justification

shareholders (Jackling and Johl, 2009).

equity and welfare (Kumar et al. 2001).

policies and guidelines covering the period 2008 to 2014:

Guidelines” (MCA, 2009b).

the firm’s net profit.3

brought the subject matters of sustainable development and CSR together.

large, profit-making companies in India to earmark 2% of average net profits of three

(approx. USD 50 million) or an annual turnover of over Rs. 1,000 crore).

Nevertheless, while these regulatory developments signal a highly visible public

appears to still be based on an altruistic approach (Vijayaraghavan, 2013).

In terms of reporting on CSR, the guidelines accompanying the Companies Bill as

physical and financial progress’ (DPE, 2010, p.16).

entails a broad range of multi-dimensional activities e.g. environmental impacts, community

shareholders’ or board members’ (i.e. directors and CEO) interests.

their environment and community activities.

drivers of CSR disclosure.

normative (professional community-related). More specifically, according to DiMaggio and

referent group so as to meet societal or group expectations. By contrast, normative isomorphism

is driven by professionalization, members of a profession or occupation tend to define structures

demonstrate conformance through formal disclosures. Applying an institutional perspective to

found to be more sensitive to disclosing on social or community-related issues (Ghazali, 2007).

2.1 Indian firms - CSR Reporting Practices

interest to help society.

3.1 Promoter ownership

In India, a promoter of a company is defined as any person or family member who is

have in influencing decision-making.

Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:

3.2 Foreign ownership

relationship between foreign ownership and CSR disclosures.

3.3 Government ownership

government ownership on CSR disclosure.

independence as vehicles for industrial development, and employment generation. However, a

implement CSR activities and to report upon them.

3.4 Board Independence

Therefore, we propose the fourth hypothesis of this study:

the level of CSR disclosures.

3.5 CEO duality

preferable as it tends to enhance monitoring quality, particularly on matters related to stakeholder

We therefore propose the following hypothesis:

firm-year observations. Due to missing information, we exclude seven firm-year observations,

As shown in Table 1, the sample consists of firms from a cross-section of industries

4.2 Model specification

The following model is used to test our Hypotheses

CSRDI = α + β1 PRMOWN + β2 FOROWN + β3 GOVTOWN +β4 BIND + β5 CEODU + β6

CSRDI = corporate social responsibility disclosure score/ index

FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by the foreign investors. These include

The independent predictor variables are promoter ownership (PRMOWN), foreign

ownership (FOROWN), government ownership (GOVTOWN), proportion of independent