MARIANO VS CALLEJAS ISSUE:

Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against W/N the common carrier Celyrosa Express is liable
respondents for their failure to transport his wife and mother of his three minor
children safely to her destination. He is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda Mariano RULING:
who was a passenger of a Celyrosa Express bus bound for Tagaytay when she met
her death. Respondent Ildefonso C. Callejas is the registered owner of Celyrosa
Express, while respondent Edgar de Borja was the driver of the bus on which the NO.
deceased was a passenger. At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along
Aguinaldo Highway, San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite, the Celyrosa Express bus, The liability of a common carrier for personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests
carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger, collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of diligence that the law
plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531. The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay requires. In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that
while the trailer truck came from the opposite direction, bound for Manila. The trailer respondents failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against them. The
truck bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion. Due to the impact, the totality of evidence shows that the death of petitioner’s spouse was caused by the
passenger bus fell on its right side on the right shoulder of the highway and caused reckless negligence of the driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which lost its brakes and
the death of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries to four other passengers. Dr. Mariano bumped the Celyrosa Express bus, owned and operated by respondents. According
was 36 years old at the time of her death. She left behind three minor children, aged to the sketch prepared by PO3 Magno S. de Villa, who investigated the accident, the
four, three and two years. Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. passenger bus was facing the direction of Tagaytay City and lying on its right side on
They claimed that the proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness of the the shoulder of the road, about five meters away from the point of impact. On the
driver of the trailer truck which bumped their bus while allegedly at a halt on the other hand, the trailer truck was on the opposite direction, about 500 meters away
shoulder of the road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a third-party from the point of impact. PO3 De Villa stated that he interviewed De Borja,
complaint against Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the name and style of La respondent driver of the passenger bus, who said that he was about to unload some
Perla Sugar Supply, the owner of the trailer truck, for indemnity in the event that he passengers when his bus was bumped by the driver of the trailer truck that lost its
would be held liable for damages to petitioner. brakes. PO3 De Villa checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really
failed. The evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising
Callejas filed a complaint,4 docketed as Civil Case No. NC-397 before the RTC of on its rightful lane along the Aguinaldo Highway when the trailer truck coming from
Naic, Cavite, against La Perla Sugar Supply and Arcadio Arcilla, the truck driver, for the opposite direction, on full speed, suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane,
damages he incurred due to the vehicular accident. On September 24, 1992, the said and bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion. Respondent driver De Borja
court dismissed the complaint against La Perla Sugar Supply for lack of evidence. It, had every right to expect that the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction
however, found Arcilla liable to pay Callejas the cost of the repairs of his passenger would stay on its proper lane. He was not expected to know that the trailer truck had
bus, his lost earnings, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. A criminal case, lost its brakes. The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a
Criminal Case No. 2223-92, was also filed against truck driver Arcilla in the RTC of fast speed as it was found 500 meters away from the point of collision. Secondly, any
Imus, Cavite. On May 3, 1994, the said court convicted truck driver Arcadio Arcilla of doubt as to the culpability of the driver of the trailer truck ought to vanish when he
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, multiple slight physical pleaded guilty to the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight
injuries and damage to property. In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision physical injuries and damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92, involving the
dated September 13, 1999, found respondents Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de same incident.
Borja, together with Liong Chio Chang, jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner
damages and costs of suit. TIU VS ARRESGIADO

Respondents Callejas and De Borja appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending A complaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorney’s fees before
that the trial court erred in holding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage. The the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 was filed by Pedro Arriesgado
CA reversed the decision of the RTC and stated that the presumption of negligence is against the petitioners, D’ Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his driver,
rebutted. The injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the Virgilio Te Laspiñas on May 27, 1987. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus
means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and that
private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident. Such
duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury accident took place when, at about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck
arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control marked "Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" was loaded with firewood
or even knowledge or could not have prevented. in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires
exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national
highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about
700 meters away.3 Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were fully on, and the vicinity
stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away 4 behind was well lighted by street lamps.16 It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu,
the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The truck’s tail lights that he based the selection of his driver Laspiñas on efficiency and in-service training,
were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987. At about 4:45 a.m., D’ and that the latter had been so far an efficient and good driver for the past six years of
Rough Riders passenger bus driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the his employment, was insufficient to prove that he observed the diligence of a good
national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The CA affirmed
was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu. the ruling of the lower court and stated that the action of respondent Arriesgado was
Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito based not on quasi-delict but on breach of contract of carriage. As a common carrier,
Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus, about three (3) or four (4) it was incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary diligence was
places from the front seat. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the observed in ensuring the safety of passengers during transportation. Since the latter
stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away.5 He applied the breaks and tried failed to do so, he should be held liable for respondent Arriesgado’s claim. The CA
to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into also ruled that no evidence was presented against the respondent PPSII, and as
the truck’s left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several such, it could not be held liable for respondent Arriesgado’s claim, nor for
passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in contribution, indemnification and/or reimbursement in case the petitioners were
his right colles.6 His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was adjudged liable.
later transferred to the Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly
thereafter. ISSUE:

Respondent alleged that the accident caused the death of his wife Felisa as W/N the common carrier is negligent and therefore liable
evidenced by her death certificate, and that the proximate cause was the defendant’s
failure to observe utmost diligence required of a very cautious person under all
circumstances. He also alleged that owner defendant William Tiu of Rough Riders RULING:
passenger bus which figured in the said accident, wherein plaintiff and his wife were
riding at the time of the accident, is therefore directly liable for the breach of contract YES.
of carriage for his failure to transport plaintiff and his wife safely to their place of
destination which was Cebu City, and which failure in his obligation to transport safely Laspinas is negligent. The damage sustained by the truck25 itself supports the finding
his passengers was due to and in consequence of his failure to exercise the diligence of both the trial court and the appellate court, that the D’ Rough Rider bus driven by
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees, petitioner Laspiñas was traveling at a fast pace. Since he saw the stalled truck at a
particularly defendant-driver Virgilio Te Laspiñas. The petitioners, for their part, filed a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspiñas had more than enough time to swerve to
Third-Party Complaint11 on August 21, 1987 against the following: respondent his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tiu’s insurer; per hour as he claimed. As found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that
respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m., the hour of
respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged that petitioner the accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner
Laspiñas was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and, thus, could
Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that have avoided the truck.26 Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted him to apply
the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the the break to avert the impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he
highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspiñas caught sight of the stalled truck. It is quite hard to accept his version of the incident
promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, that he did not see at a reasonable distance ahead the cargo truck that was parked
but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the when the Rough Rider [Bus] just came out of the bridge which is on an (sic) [more]
passengers, the right-side portion of the bus hit the cargo truck’s left rear. The elevated position than the place where the cargo truck was parked. With its
respondent PPSII, for its part, admitted that it had an existing contract with petitioner headlights fully on, defendant driver of the Rough Rider was in a vantage position to
Tiu, but averred that it had already attended to and settled the claims of those who see the cargo truck ahead which was parked and he could just easily have avoided
were injured during the incident.13 It could not accede to the claim of respondent hitting and bumping the same by maneuvering to the left without hitting the said cargo
Arriesgado, as such claim was way beyond the scheduled indemnity as contained in truck. Besides, it is (sic) shown that there was still much room or space for the Rough
the contract of insurance. Rider to pass at the left lane of the said national highway even if the cargo truck had
occupied the entire right lane thereof. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and found petitioner Laspiñas to be proceed to pass through the left lane it would fall into a canal considering that there
negligent. It stated that had he not been driving at a fast pace, he could have easily was much space for it to pass without hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left
swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus, averting the unfortunate incident. lane of said national highway. The records, further, showed that there was no
The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early warning device near the place incoming vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway which would have
where the truck was parked was not sufficient to impute negligence on the part of prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving to its left in order to avoid hitting and
bumping the parked cargo truck. But the evidence showed that the Rough Rider where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
instead of swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway plowed recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at its rear portion; and thus, the Civil Code. Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent
(sic) causing damages not only to herein plaintiff but to the cargo truck as well. Arriesgado’s wife due to the negligence of petitioner Laspiñas, his employee, on this
score.
By his own admission, he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision However, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to consider that respondent
occurred. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per Pedrano was also negligent in leaving the truck parked askew without any warning
hour.29 And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner Laspiñas also lights or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that such failure created the
violated Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Condor, in
4136, as amended: supervising his employees properly and adequately. The petitioners were correct in
invoking respondent Pedrano’s failure to observe Article IV, Section 34(g) of the Rep.
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. – (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on Act No. 4136, which provides:
a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater
nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the (g) Lights when parked or disabled. – Appropriate parking lights or flares
width of the highway, and or any other condition then and there existing; and visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the
no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.
than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear
distance ahead.30 The manner in which the truck was parked clearly endangered oncoming traffic on
both sides, considering that the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent occurred in the wee hours of the morning. The accident could have been averted had
if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.31 respondent Condor, the owner of the truck, equipped the said vehicle with lights,
flares, or, at the very least, an early warning device. 49 Hence, we cannot subscribe to
Tiu also failed to overcome the presumption against him as an owner of a common respondents Condor and Pedrano’s claim that they should be absolved from liability
carrier. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported because, as found by the trial and appellate courts, the proximate cause of the
to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of collision was the fast speed at which petitioner Laspiñas drove the bus. To accept this
such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to proposition would be to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law
transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act
proved.36 This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed or omission. Indeed, our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens
the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination of living in society and to allocate them among its members. To accept this
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. proposition would be to weaken the very bonds of society. The trial court correctly
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, awarded moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000 in favor of respondent Arriesgado.
and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary The award of exemplary damages by way of example or correction of the public
diligence in the care of his passengers.39 It must be stressed that in requiring the good,64 is likewise in order. The respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado, as the surviving
highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a spouse and heir of Felisa Arriesgado, is entitled to indemnity in the amount of
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the ₱50,000.00.
recklessness of their drivers. The negligence of petitioner Laspiñas as driver of the
passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger LRTA VS NAVIDAD
bus engaged as a common carrier.
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station, and while he was
The doctrine of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, because it only standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was
contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. 43 The blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad
common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was
plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. the widow of Nicanor,
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for
role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for
death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
The trial court ruled against Prudent Security and Escartin, and dismissed the employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
complaints against LRTA and Roman, and ordered PS and Escartin to pay jointly and strangers if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence
severally, the actual damages of P44,830.00; compensatory damages of could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In case of such death or injury,
P443,520.00; indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and 8 by simple proof of
moral damages of P50,000.00; attorney’s fees of P20,000; and costs of suit. Upon injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of
appeal to the CA of PS, the CA exonerated PS and held LRTA and Roman jointly and the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
severally liable to the plaintiffs of P44,830.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. 9 In the absence of
nominal damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as indemnity for the satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
death of the deceased; and P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. The CA court petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a would be that it has been at fault, 10 an exception from the general rule that negligence
contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place must be proved.11
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the
corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed The Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." If at all, that
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 12 and related
been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, 13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however,
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once
evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
stopped the train. presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and
ISSUE: can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one
might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand,
W/N LRTA and Roman are liable and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
RULING: causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana,
Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise
YES. Nominal damages was deleted and Roman is absolved from liability. even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. 16 Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or the rules on tort to apply. There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo
prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s conclusion on the Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
not of the LRTA. liable only for his own fault or negligence.

The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to CALALAS VS CA
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about
responsibilities under the contract of carriage. The law requires common carriers to 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden
carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion
Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis common carrier the burden of proof.
of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490,
August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney,
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period. Sunga filed a complaint between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
owner of the Isuzu truck. obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety
3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the passengers. In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption
damage to his jeepney. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had
court was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The driver of
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise jeepney did not carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide,
the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third- using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. circumstances. The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
ISSUE: the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
W/N petitioner is liable
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
RULING: any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
YES. vehicles on the highway.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the It is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. It provides:
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating any motor
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for vehicle than its registered capacity.
quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly transporting passengers.
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking
safely to his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing
that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through the
by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO
jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the calesa which
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was
was inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the killed; that the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the
cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped
or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill open. The BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion. two (2)
his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart
injury to the from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its present action, which was tried jointly with a similar action of the Tolentinos, to
body protruding two meters into the highway. recover damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to
as BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Biñan
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive Transportation Company — hereinafter referred to as Biñan — and its driver,
and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken. As a general rule, moral Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include
damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of therein, as defendants, said Biñan and Ilagan. The Court of First Instance of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Batangas rendered a decision dismissing the complaint insofar as the BTCO is
Code.5 As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's right to sue Biñan — which had stopped
mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. participating in the proceedings herein, owing apparently, to a case in the Court of
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or First Instance of Laguna for the insolvency of said enterprise — and Ilagan, and
bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6 In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding without pronouncement as to costs. On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the Court of
moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that Appeals reversed said decision and rendered judgment for them, sentencing the
petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's BTCO, Biñan and Ilagan to, jointly and severally, pay to the plaintiffs the aggregate
contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney sum of P10,500.00 1 and the costs in both instances. Hence, this appeal by BTCO,
failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission upon the ground that the Court of Appeals erred: 1) in finding said appellant liable for
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the damages; and 2) in awarding attorney's fees.
hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at ISSUE:
fault for the accident.
W/N appellant is liable for damages
BTC VS CAGUIMBAL
RULING:
Pedro Caguimbal, was a paying passenger of BTCO bus going south on its regular
route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its YES.
regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The
deceased's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. The
bus of the Biñan Transportation Company driven by Marciano Ilagan, was coming BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. In order to
from the opposite direction (north-bound). Along the national highway at Barrio permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right
Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have
Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan bus, was also coming from the and should have seen to it — had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" — that his
opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the north. As the BTCO bus was bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the
nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the
alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed bus. He could have and should have done this, because, when the aforementioned
down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa, passenger expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had seen the
then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters away, coming from the
bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Biñan bus was opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a
about 100 meters away likewise going northward and following the direction of good speed. 3 When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to
the calesa; that upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the
light as established by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Biñan bus at the time of calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the
the accident; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space
opposite directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Biñan bus
attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its to go through. It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or
stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no special obligations P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting from the
toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise accident.
"utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation
to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their ISSUE:
safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. Such obligation becomes
more patent when we considered the fact — of which the Court may take judicial
cognizance — that our motor vehicle drivers particularly those of public service W/N the petitioner is negligent
utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, the
comfort or the convenience of others RULING:

YES.

It is established that the victims were on board the second coach where the
petitioner-appellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its
BRINAS VS CA speed and the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded
to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its
regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were
Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, seen no more. It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag
Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita stop when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of
Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature and
2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter erroneous. That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the
among the passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were relieved, with fact that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full
Victor Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor, and speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed
Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag its regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio
in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the Lagalag. It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers
conductor shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Thereupon, the old woman walked towards like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and
the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common
holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually
the train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes
and they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train
the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the passengers who resumes its run before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus
disembarked thereat. Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two may be stopped. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature
corpses were found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. They found the and erroneous announcement of petitioner' appelant Briñas. This announcement
lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to the prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said
ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with the back announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats
portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the corpse of an old woman when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature
about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is
the left hand missing. The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm direct and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes. Any negligence of
was found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old woman. Blood, the victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from
pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the scene. Later, the bodies criminal liability.
were Identified as those of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Among the personal
effects found on Martina was a train ticket. After autopsy, the victims were found to
have died of shock due to traumatic injury caused by being run over a train. The With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the
Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Briñas for heirs of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate
double homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino civil action for damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal
and Victor Millan. This was affirmed by the CA. During the pendency of the criminal action, the said court had no more power to include any civil liability in its judgment of
prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, the heirs of the deceased conviction. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978
victims filed with the same court, a separate civil action for damages against the is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the
Manila Railroad Company entitled "Civil Case No. 5978, Manaleyo Gesmundo, et al., appellant's arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is
v. Manila Railroad Company". The separate civil action was filed for the recovery of the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant Briñas Culpa contractual
and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of obligation. The
petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence of
any kind of damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no private prosecutors sustained injuries,6 and had lost money, jewelry, important documents, police
appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of uniforms and the .45 caliber pistol issued to him by the PNP; and that because it had
damages, the trial court erred in awarding death indemnity in its judgment of committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to sail despite the storm signal, the
conviction. petitioner should pay him actual and moral damages of ₱500,000.00 and
₱l,000,000.00, respectively. Petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V
A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port of Manila by
double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force majeure;  that it had not
independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila been negligent; and that its officers and crew had also not been negligent because
Railroad Company. The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing they had made preparations to abandon the "'vessel because they had launched life
with it of the separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still rafts and had provided the passengers assistance in that regard.
awarded death indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the petitioner-
appellant. It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that petitioner had not established
crime, the following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the its due diligence in the selection and supervision of the vessel crew; that the ship
death of the victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) officers had failed to inspect the stowage of cargoes despite being aware of the storm
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of signal; that the officers and crew of the vessel had not immediately sent a distress
litigation, and (6) interest in proper cases. The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, signal to the Philippine Coast Guard; that the ship captain had not called for then
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable "abandon ship" protocol; and that based on the report of the Board of Marine Inquiry
separately from and in addition to the fixed slim of P12,000.00 corresponding to the (BMI), the erroneous maneuvering of the vessel by the captain during the extreme
indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of death due weather condition had been the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking.
to a crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the determination of the court
based on the evidence presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated Upon appeal to the CA, the CA lowered the temperate damages to ₱120,000.00,
on the issue of damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death which approximated the cost of Sesante's lost personal belongings; and held that
is separate and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages. despite the seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable because
its officers and crew had been negligent in performing their duties.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death
indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of ISSUE:
P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00,
but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency imposed by the lower
court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects. W/N the complaint for breach of contract and damages is a personal action that does
not survive the death of the plaintiff
SULPICIO VS SESANTE
W/N the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code
M/V Princess of the Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner,
sank near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were W/N there is sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages
lost.3 Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and
a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the sinking. He sued the petitioner RULING:
for breach of contract and damages. He alleged in his complaint that the M/V
Princess of the Orient left the Port of Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing YES. The trial court is not required to make an express finding of the common
stormy weather; that at around 11:00 p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing carrier's fault or negligence.21 Even the mere proof of injury relieves the passengers
starboard, so he had gone to the uppermost deck where he witnessed the strong from establishing the fault or negligence of the carrier or its employees. 22 The
winds and big waves pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he had seen how presumption of negligence applies so long as there is evidence showing that: (a) a
the passengers had been panicking, crying for help and frantically scrambling for life contract exists between the passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the injury or
jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew; that sensing danger, he had death took place during the existence of such contract.23 In such event, the burden
called a certain Veney Ceballos through his cellphone to request him to inform the shifts to the common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence, and
proper authorities of the situation; that thereafter, big waves had rocked the vessel, that an unforeseen event or force majeure  had caused the injury. Sesante sustained
tossing him to the floor where he was pinned by a long steel bar; that he had freed injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and consequent sinking of M/V Princess of
himself only after another wave had hit the vessel;5 that he had managed to stay the Orient where he was a passenger. To exculpate itself from liability, the common
afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the waves to the coastline carrier vouched for the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, and referred to
of Cavite and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had suffered tremendous the BMI report to the effect that the severe weather condition - a force majeure – had
hunger, thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety and mental anguish; that he had brought about the sinking of the vessel. A common carrier may be relieved of any
liability arising from a fortuitous event pursuant to Article 1174 25 of the Civil Code.  But of the Princess,  when the Captain maneuvered her to starboard, her body shifted its
while it may free a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires exclusion weight to port. Being already inclined to an angle of 15 degrees, coupled with the
of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.26 Else stated, for a common carrier instantaneous movement of the ship, the cargoes below deck could have completely
to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the shifted its position and weight towards portside. By this time, the ship being ravaged
accident was caused by a fortuitous event. The common carrier must still prove that it simultaneously by ravaging waves and howling winds on her starboard side, finally
did not contribute to the occurrence of the incident due to its own or its employees' lost her grip.30
negligence. The petitioner is directly liable to the respondent and his heirs. The
petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm notwithstanding its Even assuming the seaworthiness of the M/VPrincess of the Orient, the petitioner
position on the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, but the findings of the could not escape liability considering that, as borne out by the aforequoted findings of
BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's attribution. the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel had been
the gross negligence of its captain in maneuvering the vessel.
The Captain's erroneous maneuvers of the MIV Princess of the Orient  minutes before
she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It should be noted that during the first two The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal No. 1 during
hours when the ship left North Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards the time of the sinking.31 The BMI observed that a vessel like the M/V Princess of the
Limbones Point. During the same period, the ship was only subjected to the normal Orient, which had a volume of 13.734 gross tons, should have been capable of
weather stress prevailing at the time. She was then inside Manila Bar. The waves withstanding a Storm Signal No. I considering that the responding fishing boats of
were observed to be relatively small to endanger the safety of the ship. It was only less than 500 gross tons had been able to weather through the same waves and
when the MV Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while navigating winds to go to the succor of the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of
towards the direction of the Fortune Island when this agonizing misfortune struck the the latter's distressed passengers.32
ship.
As to the damages (ask Klang)
Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the ship to her portside
had continuously increased. It was at this point that the captain had misjudged the
situation. While the ship continuously listed to her portside and was battered by big
waves, strong southwesterly winds, prudent judgement [sic] would dictate that the
Captain should have considerably reduced the ship's speed. He could have GV FLORIDA
immediately ordered the Chief Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile,
the winds and waves continuously hit the ship  on her starboard side. The waves were Romeo L. Battung, Jr. (Battung) boarded petitioner’s bus in Delfin Albano, Isabela,
at least seven to eight meters in height and the wind velocity was a[t] 25 knots. bound for Manila.5 Battung was seated at the first row behind the driver and slept
The MV Princess of the Orient being a close-type ship (seven decks, wide and high during the ride. When the bus reached the Philippine Carabao Center in Muñoz,
superstructure) was vulnerable and exposed to the howling winds and ravaging seas. Nueva Ecija, the bus driver, Duplio, stopped the bus and alighted to check the tires.
Because of the excessive movement, the solid and liquid cargo below the decks must At this point, a man who was seated at the fourth row of the bus stood up, shot
have shifted its weight to port, which could have contributed to the tilted position of Battung at his head, and then left with a companion. The bus conductor, Daraoay,
the ship. notified Duplio of the incident and thereafter, brought Romeo to the hospital, but the
latter was pronounced dead on arrival.6 Hence, respondents filed a complaint7 on July
Minutes later, the Captain finally ordered to reduce the speed of the ship to 14 knots. 15, 2008 for damages in the aggregate amount of ₱1,826,000.00 8 based on a breach
At the same time, he ordered to put ballast water to the starboard-heeling tank to of contract of carriage against petitioner, Duplio, and Baraoay (petitioner, et al.)
arrest the continuous listing of the ship. This was an exercise in futility because the before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 22-1103. Respondents contended that
ship was already listing between 15 to 20 degrees to her portside. The ship had as a common carrier, petitioner and its employees are bound to observe extraordinary
almost reached the maximum angle of her loll. At this stage, she was about to lose diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers; and in case of injuries and/or death on
her stability. the part of a passenger, they are presumed to be at fault and, thus, responsible
therefor. As such, petitioner, et al. should be held civilly liable for Battung’s death. In
Despite this critical situation, the Captain executed several starboard maneuvers. their defense, petitioner, et al. maintained that they had exercised the extraordinary
Steering the course of the Princess  to starboard had greatly added to her tilting. In diligence required by law from common carriers.In this relation, they claimed that a
the open seas, with a fast speed of 14 knots, advance maneuvers such as this would common carrier is not an absolute insurer of its passengers and that Battung’s death
tend to bring the body of the ship in the opposite side. In navigational terms, this should be properly deemed a fortuitous event.
movement is described as the centripetal force. This force is produced by the water
acting on the side of the ship away from the center of the turn. The force is The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents ordered petitioner, et al. to pay
considered to act at the center of lateral resistance which, in this case, is the centroid respondent the amounts of: (a) ₱1,586,000.00 as compensatory damages for
of the underwater area of the ship's side away from the center of the turn. In the case unearned income; (b) ₱50,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages. The RTC found that petitioner, et al. were unable to rebut the presumed as driver and conductor, respectively. Instead, the case involves the death of Battung
liability of common carriers in case of injuries/death to its passengers due to their wholly caused by the surreptitious act of a copassenger who, after consummating
failure to show that they implemented the proper security measures to prevent such crime, hurriedly alighted from the vehicle.25 Thus, there is no proper issue on
passengers from carrying deadly weapons inside the bus which, in this case, resulted petitioner’s duty to observe extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the
in the killing of Battung. As such, petitioner, et al. were held civilly liable for the latter’s passengers transported by it, and the presumption of fault/negligence against
death based on culpa contractual. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court’s ruling petitioner under Article 1756 in relation to Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
in toto and held that the killing of Battung cannot be deemed as a fortuitous event, should not apply.
considering that such killing happened right inside petitioner’s bus and that petitioner,
et al. did not take any safety measures in ensuring that no deadly weapon would be On the other hand, since Battung’s death was caused by a copassenger, the
smuggled inside the bus. applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that "a common
carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful
ISSUE: acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s
employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the ruling of the RTC finding petitioner liable have prevented or stopped the act or omission." Notably, for this obligation, the law
for damages to respondent arising from culpa contractual provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a family, in
assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part. Case law
states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family "connotes reasonable
RULING: care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed
when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence
NO. attended the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against
them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier’s duty towards its
its passengers. Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on
negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common
relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything
negligence on the former, because the presumption stands in the place of dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own.
evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is rebuttable by proof Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is
that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as
by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event. in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature
of a passenger’s baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
company makes it an insurer of the passenger’s safety, but that its liability for
personal injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to In this case, records reveal that when the bus stopped at San Jose City to let four (4)
exercise the degree of diligence that the law requires. Therefore, it is imperative for a men ride petitioner's bus (two [2] of which turned out to be Battung's murderers), the
party claiming against a common carrier under the above-said provisions to show that bus driver, Duplio, saw them get on the bus and even took note of what they were
the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of the common wearing. Moreover, Duplio made the bus conductor, Daraoay, approach these men
carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers. The Court and have them pay the corresponding fare, which Daraoay did. 31 During the
clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no way due (1) to foregoing, both Duplio and Daraoay observed nothing which would rouse their
any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the suspicion that the men were armed or were to carry out an unlawful activity. With no
negligent or willful acts of the common carrier’s employees with respect to the such indication, there was no need for them to conduct a more stringent search (i.e.,
foregoing – such as when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers bodily search) on the aforesaid men. By all accounts, therefore, it cannot be
which the carrier had no control of or prior knowledge to prevent – there would be no concluded that petitioner or any of its employees failed to employ the diligence of a
issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in its duty to provide safe and good father of a family in relation to its responsibility under Article 1763 of the Civil
suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport business; as Code. As such, petitioner cannot altogether be held civilly liable.
such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code
should not apply. In this case, Battung’s death was neither caused by any defect in
the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or to the negligent or willful
acts of petitioner’s employees, namely, that of Duplio and Daraoay, in their capacities