Int J Coal Sci Technol (2018) 5(3):339–357

https://doi.org/10.1007/s40789-018-0219-0

Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel

facilities by modified analytical hierarchy process
Nuhindro Priagung Widodo1 • Budi Sulistianto1 • Ahmad Ihsan1

Received: 13 April 2018 / Revised: 26 June 2018 / Accepted: 30 August 2018 / Published online: 14 September 2018
 The Author(s) 2018

Abstract This study focused on developing a risk assessment method for explosion at a coal reclaim tunnel (CRT) facility.
The method was developed based on an analytical hierarchy process (AHP), which is an expert system that quantifies the
factors of explosion incidents, based on events and hierarchies. In this paper, the proposed model was modification from
original AHP model, specifically modifying the structure from ‘‘alternative’s results’’ to ‘‘total risk-rating’s results’’. The
total risk-rating is obtained by summing up risk-rating of each factor, where the risk-rating is a multiplication product of
the risk value by the AHP weighted value. To support decision-making using the expert system, data on the real conditions
of the CRT were collected and analyzed. A physical modeling of the CRT with laboratory-scale experiments was carried
out to show the impact of a ventilation system in CRT on diluting the methane gas and coal dust, in order to support the
quantification of AHP risk value. The criteria to evaluate the risk of explosion was constructed from six components that
are: fuel, oxygen, ignition, confinement, dispersion, and monitoring system. Those components had fifty-two factors that
serve as sub-components (root causes). The main causes of explosion in CRT were found to be: mechanical ventilation
failure and abnormal ventilation, breakdown of monitoring system, and coal spontaneous-combustion. Assessments of two
CRT facilities at Mine A and Mine B were carried out as a case study in order to check the reliability of the developed AHP
method. The results showed that the risk rating of Mine A was classified as high and Mine B was classified as medium,
which is in a good agreement with the site conditions.

Keywords Risk  Explosion  Coal reclaim tunnels  Analytical hierarchy process

1 Introduction According to the risk assessment matrix of the Aus-

tralian and New Zealand risk management standards AS/
Reclaim tunnels are usually constructed underneath the NZS 4360:2004 (Ristić 2013), risk level is defined by
coal stockpiles area near the port and are equipped with a comparing the likelihood and potential consequences of
conveyor belt to transport coal continuously from stockpile accident event and can be classified into four levels:
to a coal barge or to a coal carrier. In coal reclaim tunnel, extreme risk, high risk, medium risk, and low risk. The
there is a risk of fire and explosion because the explosive CRT explosion can be classified as an extreme risk level
methane gas and coal dust could be present in the tunnel as (which means a detailed action plan is required) because
consequences of coal transportation operations. the likelihood of accident is ranked between ‘‘possible’’
and ‘‘almost certain’’. Moreover, the potential conse-
quences can be rated ‘‘catastrophic’’ (Smith and Du Plessis
& Nuhindro Priagung Widodo 1999). This risk has to be reduced from extreme risk to
[email protected] medium or low risk that can be managed by conducting
1
Mining Engineering Group, Faculty of Mining and Petroleum
mitigation plan or risk control. In order to control the risk
Engineering, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Jl. Ganesha No. 10, effectively, factors that contribute to the risk must be
Bandung 40132, Indonesia

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340 N. P. Widodo et al.

understood and the relationships of the factors have to be and Kowalski-Trakofler (2010) in Table 1 show that the
quantified. most frequent accidents in underground coal mining are
Significant research has been conducted on fire and explosion and fire related to methane gas as strata gas and
explosion caused by methane gas and coal-dust in under- coal dust resulting from mining operations.
ground coal mines and coal stockpiles (Brooks et al. 1988; Five conditions are required for an explosion: fuel, heat,
Smith and Du Plessis 1999; Kissell et al. 2007; Brune et al. oxygen, mixing (suspension), and isolated space (confine-
2007; Yuan and Smith 2012; Chalmers 2013). However, ment). The first three factors are called the fire triangle.
only a few of articles mention explosion in CRT. One of According to Stephan (1998), the pressure and speed of the
these articles appeared in ‘‘Guidelines of Safety require- explosion are strongly influenced by the suspension factor,
ments for coal stockpiles and reclaim tunnels’’ (Mine whereas the confinement factor serves to maintain the
Safety Operations Branch New South Wales Australia concentration of dust at the Lower Explosive Limit (LEL)
Trade & Investment 2013), which pointed out that the CRT and to confine energy from the explosion.
hazards are related to: people accessing a reclaim tunnel,
tunnel blockages impeding means of egress, atmospheric 1.2 Coal reclaim tunnel
contamination, electricity, fire, explosion, flooding, con-
veyor failure, draw down equipment failure, airborne dust, A coal reclaim tunnel is facility located underneath the coal
and poor maintenance on feeders and valves. The preven- stockpile (as illustrated in Fig. 1) that serves as a transfer
tion and handling of explosion risk at a reclaim tunnel point for coal from the stockpile to other areas. Coal from
facility has been explained in the literature, but the quan- the stockpile will be transferred onto the conveyor belt
titative risk from the combination of those hazards has not through the feeder, and then the conveyor brings the coal to
been described specifically. the destination, such as a coal barge or vessel. There is
This study aims to develop a risk management method some equipment inside the CRT, including the conveyor,
at a coal reclaim tunnel facility using the principles of the coal feeder, jet fan and others. Dimensions of the CRT vary
analytical hierarchy process or AHP (Merna and Al-Thani depending on the size of the coal stockpile and conveyor
2008). The method was chosen because the explosion belt.
processes at a reclaim tunnel facility are triggered by a According to the Denton (2004), the conditions that
number of events and consist multiple hierarchies, each trigger the occurrence of explosion in CRT are as follows:
factor of which can be quantified by AHP. The developed coal dust that is passed through the coal feeder; methane
AHP model was a modification of original model (Saaty gas is released from coal; sparks from an electrical motor
2008) that is modified by changing the ending of the AHP such as in jet fan, conveyor belt motor, lamp and so forth;
structure from ‘‘alternative results’’ to ‘‘risk- score results’’. heat from a moving conveyor; conditions of the confined
Moreover, the developed AHP model also refer to the one space (confinement), and so on. Other factors also con-
presented by Lang and Fu-Bao (2010), who developed a tribute to explosion in CRT, including heat from coal
similar method for assessing the risk of spontaneous spontaneous combustion, presence of CO gas (which is a
combustion in a coal seam. combustible gas from incomplete combustion), and insuf-
In this present research, experimentation using a phys- ficient ventilation system.
ical model of a CRT on a laboratory scale was carried out
in order to study the effect of the ventilation system in the
CRT. Furthermore, the study case using modified AHP
method has been conducted in CRT facilities with different
conditions, in order to check the reliability of the devel- Table 1 Number of underground coal mine worker fatalities by type
oped AHP method. of disaster in United States, 1900—2008 (Brnich and Kowalski-
Trakofler 2010)
1.1 Explosion risk Type of incident Number of events Percentage (%)

An explosion in underground facilities or tunnels is one of Explosion 420 81.7

the most feared mining accidents. The explosion is very Fire 35 6.8
dangerous to the miners life and all facilities underground Haulage 21 4.1
due to its very high released energy and the difficulty in Ground fall/bump 14 2.7
preventing and controlling it, as the cause of explosion is Inundation 7 1.4
very complex and the location is very difficult to access. Other 17 3.3
Data collected by the Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (MSHA) in the United States presented by Brnich

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 341

Fig. 1 Design example of stockpile and reclaim tunnel (NSW Guidelines 2013)

1.3 Modified AHP modified AHP structure can be seen in Fig. 2. Hierarchy I
is the ‘‘risk’’, Hierarchy II is the ‘‘main factors’’ that con-
According to Merna and Al-Thani (2008), some of the tribute to the risk, and Hierarchy III is the ‘‘cause factors’’
preferred methods used to find the root cause of risk are: that contribute to each main factors.
hazard and operability study, fault tree analysis, what-if The modified AHP is conducted in several stages as
analysis, and checklist. However, those are not suitable to follows (Fig. 3):
understand the weighted value of a root problem in terms
(a) Determine the cause of the explosion factor in a
of the event. The AHP developed by Saaty (1980) use
CRT.
pairwise comparisons and relies on the judgements of
experts to derive priority scales. The AHP can quantify The risk of explosion in CRT has two main factors, namely
each factors that contributes to the risk. The steps to per- internal and external factors. Internal factors come from
form the analysis with AHP are as follows (Saaty 2008): natural conditions, such as: coal dust, methane gas, spon-
taneous combustion propensity, and so forth. External
(1) define the problem and determine the kind of factors are derived from engineering design and confined
knowledge required, space condition, insufficient airflow quantity, the presence
(2) establish the decision hierarchy (goal of the decision, of external triggers, and so on. These factors are described
criteria on which subsequent elements depend, and in the modified AHP structure.
alternatives),
(3) weigh the priorities, and continue this process of (b) Calculate the weighted value of each factor.
weighing and adding, until the final priorities are The weighted value is derived from the expert assessment,
obtained. which is then processed using Super Decisions software
(RC1 2016).
The AHP structure developed in this research is a
modification of the second and third steps of the original (c) Determine the parameters of the risk level for each
structure listed above and the final priorities or alternatives factor.
are not used as a conclusion in the modified AHP. The Parameters are derived from some references and are also
derived from site assessments.

Hierarchy I Risk

Hierarchy II Main Factor I Main Factor II

Hierarchy III Cause Factor I-1 Cause Factor I-2 Cause Factor II-1 Cause Factor II-2

Fig. 2 The modified AHP structure (modification from Saaty 2008)

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342 N. P. Widodo et al.

Determining the cause of the Determine the risk rating of explosion:

explosion factor in a CRT Determine the risk value for each factor.
AHP structure refers to the Parameters are derived from references materials
model developed by Lang and and from internal assessments
Fu-Bao (2010)
Calculate the risk rating for each factor, is
Add several factors, adjusted obtained from multiplication of the weighted
to the CRT conditions value and the risk value

Expert provides assessment of

pairwise comparison matrices

Calculate the risk matrix:

Calculate the total risk from a sum up of each risk
rating value.
Calculate the weight of
influence of each factor using Determine the risk classification that is obtained
AHP Super Decisions software
from the results of testing and observation in the
(RCI, 2016)
field

Concluding results of AHP

Find the weighted value of
each factor

The value serves as the weight

of the influence a factor on
explosion process

Fig. 3 Research stages to develop modified AHP model

(d) Calculation of risk matrix, include: explosion in CRT. The first ten factors are the dominant
factors that contribute to 55.86% (Mechanical Ventilation,
• Calculate the total risk from a sum up of each
Monitoring System, and Coal spontaneous combustion) of
risk rating value.
the explosions risk. The weighted value for each factor
• Determine the risk classification that is obtained
have to combined with values of the factor that represent
from the results of testing and observation in the
individual risk of each factor, and the summation of all
field
factors is then analyzed to estimate the CRT explosion risk
In modified AHP model, the highest hierarchy (Hierar- potential.
chy I) is the event of explosion. The second hierarchy is the The risk value (RV) is a semi-quantitative value that
factors causing the explosion. The second hierarchy is the combine the quantitative value from technical data and
factors causing the explosion. The hierarchy consists of six qualitative value from expert judgement based on site
factors: fuel, oxygen, ignition, confinement, dispersion and conditions, which then RV will be applied to represent
monitoring system. These six factors are divided into 52 individual parameter risk of CRT explosion. The risk rating
cause factors that are expressed in the lower hierarchy, as of each factors (RRi) then is calculated using Eq. (1), which
shown in Fig. 4. is multiplication of ‘‘100’’ as a constant value, weighted
Based on the assessment of pairwise comparison value for each factor (Ci) as described in Table 2, and risk
matrices and analysis by Super Decision, the weighted values for each factor (RVi). The formula used to determine
value results are shown in Table 2. The results show that risk rating for each factor is as follows:
spontaneous combustion factor is the largest contributor to

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 343

Reclaim Tunnel
Explosion

Fuel Oxygen Ignition Confinement Dispersion Monitoring

System

Monitoring Facilities
Unstable Condition

Ventilation System
Planned of Air

Design of Tunnel

Monitoring Tools
Design of Tunnel
Unplanned of

Monitoring Staff
Monitors Layout
Combustible

Chemically
Gases (CO,

Electricity

Physically
H2S, H2)

Methane

Monitoring
Procedures
Coefficient
Diffusion
Dust

Air
Concentration

Electric Motor

Electric Motor
Concentration

Concentration
Reactivity of

Cabel system
Innert Gases

Geometry of
Spontaneous
in Conveyor
Combustion

Ventilations
Combustion

Mechanical
ventilation
Electronic

Electricity
Fineness

Pressure
Normal

Friction

Natural

Tunnel
device
at Fan

Gases
Static
Coal

Heat
fire

Number of Void
Metane Emision

Total Resistence

Specification of

Number of Fan
Coal Production

Size of Void
Between Fan
Methods of Fire

Coal in Stockpile
Extinguishment

Temperature
and Humidity

Existence of

Location of
Coagulation of

Coal Handling

Temperature
compositionof

Barometric
Coal Properties
Dust Particles
belt conveyor

Time Period of

Humidity
Ventilation

Distance
Pressure
Ventilation

Due to RH

Type of coal

Coal size in
Chemical

Winds

Void
System
Facility
System

stockpile

Fan
Coal in Stockpile

Coal Production
Time Period of
Calorivic Value

Volatile Matter
Total Moisture

Type of coal
Geometry of
Ash content

Ventilations
Exhaust Fan

Mechanical
Not Fireproof
Type of fluid /

ventilation
Geometry of
Ventilations
Temperature

Mechanical
ventilation

Sprayer

Natural

Tunnel
extinguish
agent used

Sulfur
Fireproof

Level
Natural

Tunnel
time to

Flame

Level

Distance Between

Location of Void

Number of Void
Total Resistence

Number of Void
Specification of

Sprayer Presure
Type of Nozzel

Total Resistence
Number of Fan

Specification of
Type of FLuid

Number of Fan
Temperature

Size of Void
Existence of

Size of Void
Between Fan
Temperature
Barometric

Existence of

Location of
Barometric
Humidity

Pressure

Humidity

Distance
Pressure
Winds

Winds

Void
Fan

Fan

Fan
Fig. 4 Modified AHP structure for explosion root cause in CRT

RRi ¼ 100  Ci  RVi ð1Þ The physical model was constructed of acrylic (methyl
methacrylate monomer) 5 mm in thickness, and has a
where a constant value of 100 is used to create a sufficient cross-sectional area of 40 cm 9 40 cm, and a length of
range for risk classification, RRi = Risk rating for factor i, 6 m, which is a scaled down of the real CRT at mine site
Ci = Weighted value for factor i, RVi = risk value for (1:10 of cross-sectional area and 1:35 of length). The
factor i, i = code of factor. model has two rectangular obstructions that represented
After calculating RR for each factor, then the RR of all coal feeders in CRT. Four MQ4 sensors have been placed
factors must be summed to get the total risk rating (TRR), at the top of the physical model in positions from upstream
as follows: to downstream (two sensors after the upstream coal feeder
Xn
and the other two sensors located after the downstream
TRR ¼ RR ð2Þ
feeder), thus the methane concentrations from upstream to
i
downstream of airflow could be detected by the sensor
where RR = Risk rating, TRR = Total risk rating, i = code using a data logger and computer. Ultra High Purity (UHP)
of factor ‘‘i’’, n = code of factor ‘‘n’’ methane gas was injected into the physical model at 0.1;
The authors classify the level of TRR into five group- 0.2; 0.3; 0.4 and 0.5 L per minute. Two axial fans (Rayden
s/classes that is from Class 1 to Class 5 (with interval of Fan, 12 cm 9 12 cm 9 3.8 cm; AC 220/240 V 50/60 Hz;
TRR is 100 point), where Class 5 is classified as ‘‘very high 0.14 A; 0.033–0.055 m3/s) were used at the upstream
risk’’ and Class 1 is classified as ‘‘very low risk’’, as shown portal of the physical model, with the purpose of blowing
in Table 3. fresh air from outside of the tunnel. Several axial fans with
The ventilation system parameters are a cause factor that diffuser outlets (Rayden Fan, 9.2 cm 9 9.2 cm 9 2.5 cm;
is mainly related with the concentration of methane gas and AC 220/240 V; 0.08 A; 0.0245 m3/s) were placed in the
coal dust (as the main fuel components) in CRT explosions. physical model to simulate jet fans inside the CRT.
To investigate this factor, the laboratory physical model A Kestrel 2000 thermo-anemometer (dimension:
(Figs. 5, 6) has been developed at the Center of Research 122 mm 9 42 mm 9 20 mm, velocity range of 0.4–40 m/
Excellence in Underground Mining and Mine Safety of the s, and accuracy of ± 0.1 m/s) was used to detect air
Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia (CoRE UMMS). velocity in the inlet at inside and outlet of the physical
The experiments were carried out to investigate the fan model. The air velocity has been measured by using fixed-
system configuration that would optimally dilute and point measurement method with 9 (nine) segments on the
remove dangerous gases and coal dust in CRT by mea- cross-sectional area of the CRT physical model.
suring the concentration–time curves of methane gas that The results of laboratory experiments show that a dou-
injected in CRT’s physical model. ble-fan-path with straight line fan positions provides better
dilution to reduce the concentration of methane gas, in

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344 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 2 Parameters of each factor from AHP

No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

1 Spontaneous Propensity for spontaneous 0.0990 R70 laboratory test of coal R70 [ 0.8 (highly prone to 3
combustion coal combustion is self-heating rate in spontaneous combustion)
determined using R70 adiabatic conditions (C 0.5 B R70 B 0.8 (medium risk) 2
parameter (Humphreys h-1) (Humphreys et al.
R70 \ 0.5 (low risk) 1
et al. 1981; Ren et al. 1981; Ren et al. 1999 in
1999 in Beamish et al. Beamish et al.
2000, 2001; Beamish and 2000, 2001; Beamish and
Hamilton 2005; NSW Hamilton 2005; Beamish
Guidelines 2011) or and Arisoy 2008; NSW
Liability Index (LI) (Feng Guidelines 2011)
et al. 1973, in Sensogut Liability Index (LI) (Feng LI C 7.5 3
and Cinar 2006) to get et al. 1973 in Sensogut 2.5 B LI \ 7.5 2
initial risk value (1–3) and Cinar 2006) is an
0 B LI \ 2.5 1
For the next step, the value index showing the
has to be checked with propensity for coal
coal spontaneous spontaneous combustion.
conditions in the field (that LI is based on the average
is in the stockpile). If heating rate of coal
conditions for coal between 110 and 220 C;
spontaneous combustion and crossing point of
are present or tend to be temperature of coal, that
present, then risk value is the temperature at
should be increased to or 5 which the temperature of
the coal and the
furnace/bath coincides
Coal spontaneous Coal spontaneous combustion 5
combustion in the field is present
(that is in the stockpile) Coal spontaneous combustion 4
tend to present
2 Normal air Oxygen concentration in air 0.0825 Concentration of O2 plotted 5% B O2 B 21% 5
on Coward explicability 4% B O2 B 5% 4
diagram (Coward and
3% B O2 B4% 3
Jones 1952)
1% B O2 B 3% 2
Less than 1% O2 1
3 Total resistance Conditions of mechanical 0.0569 Fresh air quantity and air Average velocity (v) less than 5
ventilation system in velocity (McPherson 0.5 m/s
4 Specifications of fan CRT. The mechanical 0.0538 2012; Juanzah 2017) 0.5 B v \ 0.75 m/s 4
ventilation can provide based on site condition
5 Distance between 0.0522 0.75 B v \ 1.0 m/s 3
fresh air to dilute
fan
dangerous gases and
6 Number of fan dusts, then remove them 0.0515 1.0 B v \ 1.5 m/s 2
from the tunnel 1.5 m/s B v 1
7 Monitoring facilities Conditions of monitoring 0.0468 Based on site assessment Very insufficient 5
facilities that monitor Insufficient 4
dangerous gas
Sufficient 3
concentration (methane,
CO, CO2), smoke, and Complete 2
temperature that indicate Very complete 1
fire and explosion in CRT
8 Monitoring Whether the tunnel has a 0.0262 Based on site assessment Very insufficient 5
procedures complete monitoring Insufficient 4
procedures for explosion
Sufficient 3
aspect
Complete 2
Very complete 1

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 345

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

9 Unstable conditions Explanation of the tunnel 0.0378 Based on site assessment Very unstable 5
around the tunnel stability conditions Unstable 4
Stable 3
Stable to very stable 2
Very stable 1
10 Coal properties The influence of coal 0.0365 The US Bureau of Mines Antracite 5
properties on methane estimated the methane Low volatile bituminous 4
content content of a coal, which
High volatile bituminous 3
depends primarily upon
rank and pressure (Kim Subbituminous 2
1977) Lignite 1
11 Coal production The influence of coal 0.0355 Fresh air quantity More than 30 kton/day 5
level (related to production on methane (McPherson 2012) and 20–30 kton/day 4
methane concentration based on site condition
10–20 kton/day 3
concentration in
CRT) 5–10 kton/day 2
Less than 5 kton/day 1
12 Time period of coal The influence of the amount 0.0222 Heat map of stockpile More than 3 weeks 5
in stockpile of time the coal is in the (Pratama 2014; Aristien 3 weeks 4
stockpile on spontaneous and Widodo 2015) and
2 weeks 3
combustion and reactivity based on site condition
of coal 1 week 2
Less than 1 day 1
13 Humidity The influence of humidity 0.0315 Based on site assessment, RH C 95% 5
on natural ventilation obtained from ventilation 85% B RH \ 95% 4
survey of Relative
80% B RH \ 85% 3
Humidity (RH)
70% B RH \ 80% 2
70% B RH 1
14 Addition of inert The influence of inert gases 0.0275 Based on site assessment, Not 5
gases on fire countermeasures obtained from ventilation Has been planned but not ready 4
survey
Ready to be used but system 3
has not been developed
Ready to be used and system 2
has been developed
Ready to be used and system 1
has been developed in real
time
15 Gases The presence of 0.0248 Based on site assessment, Extremely significant effect 5
combustible gas in the obtained from ventilation Very significant effect 4
tunnel survey
Significant effect 3
Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1
16 Fire The presence of fire 0.0206 Based on site assessment, Extremely significant effect 5
potential in the tunnel; obtained from ventilation Very significant effect 4
how much a fire would survey
Significant effect 3
decrease oxygen level in
CRT Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1

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346 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

17 Coal production The influence of coal 0.0199 Effect of coal production More than 30 kton/day 5
level (related to production on dust level on the concentration 20–30 kton/day 4
coal dust concentration of coal dust in the air
10–20 kton/day 3
concentration in (McPherson 2012)
CRT) 5–10 kton/day 2
Less than 5 kton/day 1
18 Design of tunnel The influence of tunnel 0.0189 Based on site assessment Very disorganized 5
design on confinement Disorganized 4
and dispersion factor
Fairly organized 3
Fairly to very organized 2
Very organized 1
19 Total moisture Total moisture of coal 0.0187 Total moisture (TM) affects TM B 2% 5
on propensity of coal 2% \ TM B 6% 4
spontaneous combustion
6% \ TM B 8% 3
(Beamish and Hamilton
2005) and based on site 8% \ TM B 10% 2
condition TM [ 10% 1
20 Cable systems Condition of cable systems 0.0182 Based on site assessment Very disorganized 5
in the tunnel, as a Disorganized 4
potential source of
Fairly organized 3
ignition
Fairly to very organized 2
Very organized 1
21 Size of void The effect of void size on 0.0174 Size of void affect to Extremely significant effect 5
methane trapping methane distribution in Very significant effect 4
tunnel (Pratama 2016;
Significant effect 3
Kusuma 2016b; Juanzah
2017) and based on site Insignificant effect 2
condition No effect 1
22 Friction Sparks by friction, as a 0.0165 Based on site assessment Very often 5
potential of heat source Often 4
for explosion
Occasionally 3
Rarely 2
Very rarely 1
23 Monitors layout Whether the tunnels has a 0.0139 Based on site assessment Very insufficient 5
good monitor layout Insufficient 4
Sufficient 3
Good 2
Very good 1
24 Monitoring staff Whether adequate personnel 0.0131 Based on site assessment Very inadequate 5
are available to monitor Inadequate 4
the system
Adequate 3
Adequate to very adequate 2
Very adequate 1

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 347

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

25 Volatile matter Volatile matter of coal 0.0128 According to Uludag (2007) VM has very high contribution 5
in Nalbandian (2010), it is to R70 self-heating rate
generally agreed that VM has high contribution to 4
spontaneous combustion R70 self-heating rate
is a rank-related
VM has contribution to R70 3
phenomenon. As Volatile
self-heating rate
Matter (VM) and Oxygen
content increase VM has less contribution to 2
(indicative of decrease in R70 self-heating rate
rank), the rate of self- VM has no contribution to R70 1
heating is also raised self-heating rate
26 Fireproof Is fireproof material present 0.0128 In general, three types of Very high risk 5
in the tunnels to avoid materials are used for High risk 4
spreading of fire through mine conveyor belts,
Medium risk 3
the materials namely, styrene-
butadiene rubber, Low risk 2
neoprene, and Very low risk 1
polyvinylchloride
(McPherson 2012)
27 Heat How the presence of heat 0.0124 Heat contributed to ignition: Very high risk 5
condition (an ignition) in air temperature, heat from High risk 4
the tunnel increasing of temperature
Medium risk 3
on equipment surfaces
(Iqbal 2016; Kusuma Low risk 2
2016a) and based on site Very low risk 1
condition
28 Number of void Whether there is a void that 0.0096 Methane distribution in Very high risk 5
became a methane tunnel (Pratama 2016; High risk 4
trapping Kusuma 2016b; Juanzah
Medium risk 3
2017) and based on site
condition Low risk 2
Very low risk 1
29 Electric motors on Conveyor belt can produce 0.0091 Based on site assessment Very often 5
conveyor belt sparks from its electrical Often 4
motor
Occasionally 3
Rarely 2
Very rarely 1
30 Dust particle How the effects of relative 0.0089 Based on site assessment Very high risk 5
coagulation due to humidity on the High risk 4
RH coagulation of coal dust
Medium risk 3
Low risk 2
Very low risk 1
31 Monitoring tools The tunnel have a complete 0.0069 Based on site assessment Very less 5
monitoring Tools Less 4
Sufficient 3
Complete 2
Very complete 1

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348 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

32 Combustion Potential for combustion in 0.0069 Based on site assessment Combustion exist 5
the tunnel Combustion has a potential to 4
exist
Combustion has a potential to 3
exist when triggered by other
factor
Very small combustion 2
potential
Combustion does not exist 1
33 Ash content Ash content of coal 0.0064 Ash content effects on Sub-bituminous: ash 5
propensity of coal (db) B 5%;
spontaneous combustion Sub-bituminous: 5% \ Ash 4
(Beamish and Hamilton (db) B 30%;
2005)
Sub-bituminous: 30% \ Ash 3
(db) B 40%;
Medium–high volatile 2
bituminous: 5% \ ash
(db) B 25%
Medium–high volatile 1
bituminous: ash (db) C 25%
34 Coal size in The influence of the fineness 0.0061 Based on site assessment Very high risk 5
stockpile of the coal in the High risk 4
stockpile
Medium risk 3
Low risk 2
Very low risk 1
35 Ambient The influence of ambient 0.0050 Based on site assessment, Td C 33 C 5
temperature temperature on natural obtained from ventilation 30 C B Td \ 33 C 4
ventilation survey of dry bulb
27 C B Td \ 30 C 3
temperature (Td)
24 C B Td \ 27 C 2
24 C B Td 1
36 Electric motors in Sparks from the fan electric 0.0049 Based on site assessment Very high risk 5
fan motors are a potential High risk 4
heat source for explosion
Medium risk 3
Low risk 2
Very low risk 1
37 Flame temperature The influence of flame 0.0047 Based on site assessment No effect 5
level temperature level on the Insignificant effect 4
emergence of
Significant effect 3
combustible gas
Very significant effect 2
Extremely significant effect 1
38 Time to extinction The influence of time to 0.0047 Based on site assessment Extremely significant effect 5
extinction of fire on the Very significant effect 4
emergence of
Significant effect 3
combustible gas (such as
CO) Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 349

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

39 Type of agent (used The influence of type of 0.0047 Based on site assessment Extremely significant effect 5
in fire agent on the emergence of Very significant effect 4
extinguishment) flammable gas
Significant effect 3
Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1
40 Existence of winds The influence of winds on 0.0047 Based on site assessment, WS B 0.2 m/s 5
(Wind speed, WS) natural ventilation obtained from ventilation 0.2 m/s \ WS B 1.5 m/s 4
survey
1.5 m/s \ WS B 3.3 m/s 3
3.3 m/s \ WS B 5.4 m/s 2
5.4 m/s \ WS B 10 m/s 1
41 Barometric pressure The influence of barometric 0.0045 Based on site assessment, BP difference between inlet 5
(BP) pressure on natural obtained from ventilation and outlet about 0 Pa
ventilation survey 0 Pa \ BP B 5 Pa 4
5 Pa \ BP B 15 Pa 3
15 Pa \ BP B 25 Pa 2
BP difference between inlet 1
and outlet about 25 Pa
42 Pressure Sparks can come from and 0.0041 Based on site assessment Very often 5
are a potential heat source Often 4
for explosion
Occasionally 3
Rarely 2
Very Rarely 1
43 Sulphur Sulphur content of coal 0.0038 Based on site assessment, Total sulphur (TS) [ 2% 5
Nalbandian (2010) (dominated by pyritic
sulphur)
1.5% \ TS B 2% 4
1.0% \ TS B 1.5% 3
0.1% \ TS B 1% 2
TS B 0.1% 1
44 Static electricity Sparks can come from static 0.0032 Based on site assessment Very often 5
electricity and are a Often 4
potential heat source for
Occasionally 3
explosion
Rarely 2
Very rarely 1
45 Position of void The effect of void position 0.0030 Methane distribution in Extremely significant effect 5
in the CRT on methane tunnels (Pratama 2016; Very significant effect 4
trapping Kusuma 2016b; Juanzah
Significant effect 3
2017) based on site
condition Insiginificant effect 2
No effect 1
46 Exhaust fan Whether the exhaust fan are 0.0022 Based on site assessment Not functioning 5
properly functioning to Few functioning 4
reduce dust
Sufficient functioning 3
Sufficient—fully functioning 2
Fully functioning 1

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350 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 2 continued
No. Factor Description Weighted References Risk value
value
Range Value

47 Electronic devices Incendiary sparks produced 0.0021 Based on site assessment Very often 5
by electronic devices Often 4
Occasionally 3
Rarely 2
Very rarely 1
48 Type of fluid (used The effects of type of fluid 0.0017 Based on site assessment Extremely significant effect 5
in dust spraying) used for dust spraying Very significant effect 4
Significant effect 3
Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1
49 Non fireproof The effect of non-fireproof 0.0014 In general, three types of Extremely significant effect 5
composition on materials are used for Very significant effect 4
flammable gases mine conveyor belts,
Significant effect 3
produced namely, styrene-
butadiene rubber (SBR), Insignificant effect 2
neoprene (NP) and No effect 1
polyvinylchloride (PVC)
(McPherson 2012)
50 Spraying pressure The effects of spraying 0.0004 Based on site assessment Extremely significant effect 5
pressure on dust spraying Very significant effect 4
Significant effect 3
Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1
51 Type of nozzle The effects of type of nozzle 0.0002 Based on site assessment Extremely significant effect 5
on dust spraying Very significant effect 4
Significant effect 3
Insignificant effect 2
No effect 1
52 Diffusion coefficient The effectiveness of dilution 0.0046 Methane gas diffusion Very small diffusion 5
of methane coefficient related with coefficient (dilution is very
ventilation condition in ineffective)
CRT (Juanzah 2017) and Small diffusion coefficient 4
based on site condition (dilution is ineffective)
Enough diffusion coefficient 3
(dilution is good)
High diffusion coefficient 2
(dilution is effective)
Ideal diffusion coefficient 1
(dilution is very effective)

Table 3 CRT explosion risk classification based on total risk rating comparison to the double-fan-path with zigzag fan posi-
tions, and single-fan-path configuration. This is shown by
Class Total risk rating Risk classification
the average air velocity measured inside and in the outlet of
1 0 B TRR \ 100 Very low the tunnel: 0.70 m/s for a single-fan-path; 0.77 m/s for a
2 100 B TRR \ 200 Low double-fan-path with zigzag fan positions; and 1.01 m/s for
3 200 B TRR \ 300 Medium a double-fan-path with straight line fan positions, as shown
4 300 B TRR \ 400 High in Fig. 7. Relatively higher air velocity is more effective at
5 TRR C 400 Very high reducing the methane gas concentration inside the CRT
than lower air velocity.

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 351

2m
16 cm 16 cm

16 cm

16 cm

0.4 m
Inlet
Outlet
6m
Jet Fan Axial Fan
Coal Feeder Methane Release
Methane Sensor

(a)

2m
16 cm 16 cm

16 cm

16 cm

0.4 m
Inlet
Outlet
6m
Jet Fan Axial Fan
Coal Feeder Methane Release
Methane Sensor

(b)

2m
16 cm 16 cm
16 cm

16 cm

0.4 m
Outlet Inlet

6m
Jet Fan Axial Fan
Coal Feeder Methane Release
Methane Sensor
(c)

Fig. 5 Schematic side view of CRT physical model with differences in jet fan configurations. a Single-fan-path configurations (plan view).
b Double-fan-path with zigzag fan positions (plan view). c Double-fan-path with straight line fan positions (plan view)

Inlet

Outlet

Fig. 6 Laboratory physical model of CRT

The indication of methane dilution in CRT was repre- 0.089–0.094 m2/s for a double-fan-path with zigzag fan,
sented by the effective dispersion coefficient (E), that the and 0.110–0.122 m2/s for a double-fan-path with straight
bigger dispersion coefficient, the lower concentration of line fan positions (details are shown in Table 4). These
methane gas at the outlet, and vice versa. The methane result are in good agreement with the field measurement
dispersion coefficients in the CRT laboratory physical assessment results, that were represented indirectly by fine
model which were estimated by concentration–time coal dust concentrations assessed in real CRT conditions.
matching curves: 0.078–0.089 m2/s for a single-fan-path,

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352 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 4 Dispersion coefficient (E) of methane gas-air in CRT

Physical model
Jet fan Dispersion coefficient, E (m2/s)
configuration
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
L/min L/min L/min L/min L/min

Single 0.087 0.078 0.089 0.087 0.087

Zig-zag 0.094 0.089 0.091 0.092 0.089
Double 0.120 0.122 0.110 0.119 0.118

2 Case study

To apply the risk assessment methods that have been devel-

oped, assessments were conducted in two CRTs in Indonesia,
namely the CRT in Mine A and the CRT in Mine B. The type
of coal and CRT dimensions are similar between these two
CRTs. However, the ventilation conditions and coal stockpile
conditions (stockpile height and storage time) are different;
specifically, Mine A has more unfavorable conditions related
to explosion risk than Mine B.
Significant data have been collected and various mea-
surements have been carried out to assess the explosion
risk of CRT. Field measurement activities were conducted:
temperature measurements on the coal stockpiles to eval-
uate the coal spontaneous combustion factor, measurement
of coal dust concentration and air velocity inside the CRT
tunnels to evaluate the effectiveness of ventilation system
for reducing coal dust concentration in the tunnels (Figs. 8,
9 and 10). The measurements of temperature on the coal
stockpile were conducted using APPA 51 device, with
K-type thermocouple (measurement range of - 50 to
1300 C with resolution of 0.1 C). Coal stockpile has

Fig. 7 Average air velocity measured in the CRT physical model.

a Single-fan-path configurations. b Double-fan-path with zigzag fan Fig. 8 Temperature measurement on coal stockpile located above the
positions. c Double-fan-path with straight line fan positions CRT

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 353

2.1 Explosion risk assessment of CRT in Mine

A and Mine B using developed AHP method

The CRT in Mine A is 250 m in length and 4 m in width

and height. In this CRT, there are some equipment such as
a conveyor, coal valve, fan, and deluge system. Three jet
fans (Type: Conexa JVF-550AX, 500 W, nozzle diameter:
250 mm, air flow: 0.69–0.97 m3/s) are used in the tunnels
area, with distance between the fans of about 83 m. The
CRT operates to transfer coal from the stockpile to a coal
barge at the rate of 2000 tons of coal per hour. The CRT is
in constant operation hence the cleaning of the CRT is
difficult to conduct. Monitoring facilities are inadequate to
Fig. 9 Dust sampling inside the CRT check the concentration of methane and CO gas. The score
for the risk assessment of the CRT in Mine A, as shown in
Table 6, is 375.68, which is categorized as ‘‘High Risk’’.
The CRT in Mine B has the same dimensions and
equipment as the CRT in Mine A. However, there are 12 jet
fan units installed, with the distance between the fans about
21 m. This CRT also operates to move coal from the
stockpile to the coal barge at a rate of 2000 tons of coal per
hour. The operation is not continuous, hence cleaning of
the CRT is easily conducted. Monitoring facilities are
inadequate to check the concentrations of methane and CO
gas. The score for the risk assessment of the CRT in Mine
B, as shown in Table 6 is 295.78, which is categorized as
‘‘Medium Risk’’.
AHP risk assessment results shows a good agreement
with the site assessment, in that the CRT in Mine A is
Fig. 10 Air velocity measurement inside the CRT relatively unfavourable for safety conditions compared to
Mine B. The difference between the scores is 79.9, which is
variation of The measurements of air velocity were con- relatively large and shows clear differences, especially
ducted using vane anemometer (Dwyer 8904 Rotary Vane related to the effectiveness of the ventilation conditions and
Thermo- Anemometer, velocity range of 0.4–30 m/s, and coal production condition, which create larger amounts of
accuracy of ± 0.2 m/s). The coal dust conditions were methane and coal dust in Mine A than in Mine B.
estimated by visual observation. The field measurement
results are described in Table 5.

Table 5 Comparison of the field measurement results in Mine A and Mine B

No. Parameters Mine A Mine B

1 Coal Average temperature for coal stored for 1 day in stockpiles Average temperature for coal stored for 1–3 days in
spontaneous was 31.8 C, and for coal stored for 21 days was stockpiles was 34.8 C. The indication of coal
combustion 51.8 C. There were also an indication of coal spontaneous combustion in Mine B stockpiles have not
spontaneous combustion in Mine A stockpiles found because the coal storing time is relatively short in
comparison with Mine A
2 Ventilation Average velocity on the CRT was Average velocity on the CRT was estimated: 1–1.5 m/s
system estimated: 0.5—0.75 m/s
3 Coal dust There was an indication that coal dust cloud was There was an indication that coal dust settled in floor, pipe
established in Mine A. Improvement of the coal dust and steel near the coal chute gate. Coal dust cloud have
management will be needed to reduce the coal dust not found. That showed the ventilation system have been
explosion risk diluted the coal flying-dust. However, the heavier coal
dust particle were settled down and need to be water
sprayed and managed regularly

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354 N. P. Widodo et al.

Table 6 Risk assessment results of CRT in Mine A and Mine B

No. Factor Weighted value Mine A Mine B
Value Risk rating Value Risk rating

1 Spontaneous combustion 0.099 5 49.5 3 29.7

2 Normal air 0.0825 5 41.25 5 41.25
3 Total resistance 0.0569 4 85.76 2 42.88
4 Specifications of fan 0.0538
5 Distance between fan 0.0522
6 Number of fan 0.0515
7 Monitoring facilities 0.0468 5 23.4 5 23.4
8 Monitoring procedures 0.0262 4 10.48 3 7.86
9 Unstable conditions around the tunnel 0.0378 2 7.56 2 7.56
10 Coal properties 0.0365 3 10.95 3 10.95
11 Coal production level (related to methane concentration in CRT) 0.0355 5 17.75 4 14.2
12 Time period of coal in stockpile 0.0222 4 8.88 3 6.66
13 Humidity 0.0315 2 6.3 2 6.3
14 Addition of inert gases 0.0275 2 5.5 2 5.5
15 Gases 0.0248 2 4.96 2 4.96
16 Fire 0.0206 4 8.24 4 8.24
17 Coal production level (related to coal dust concentration in CRT) 0.0199 5 9.95 4 7.96
18 Design of tunnel 0.0189 2 3.78 2 3.78
19 Total moisture 0.0187 3 5.61 3 5.61
20 Cable systems 0.0182 2 3.64 2 3.64
21 Size of void 0.0174 4 6.96 4 6.96
22 Friction 0.0165 3 4.95 3 4.95
23 Monitors layout 0.0139 4 5.56 3 4.17
24 Monitoring staff 0.0131 4 5.24 3 3.93
25 Volatile matter 0.0128 4 5.12 4 5.12
26 Fireproof 0.0128 4 5.12 4 5.12
27 Heat 0.0124 3 3.72 3 3.72
28 Number of void 0.0096 4 3.84 4 3.84
29 Electric motors at conveyor belt 0.0091 3 2.73 3 2.73
30 Dust particle coagulation due to RH 0.0089 2 1.78 2 1.78
31 Monitoring tools 0.0069 4 2.76 4 2.76
32 Combustion 0.0069 5 3.45 1 0.69
33 Ash content 0.0064 4 2.56 4 2.56
34 Coal size in stockpile 0.0061 4 2.44 4 2.44
35 Ambient temperature 0.005 3 1.5 3 1.5
36 Electric motors at fan 0.0049 2 0.98 2 0.98
37 Flame temperature level 0.0047 2 0.94 2 0.94
38 Time to extinction 0.0047 2 0.94 2 0.94
39 Type of agent (used in fire extinguishment) 0.0047 2 0.94 2 0.94
40 Existence of winds 0.0047 2 0.94 2 0.94
41 Barometric pressure 0.0045 2 0.9 2 0.9
42 Pressure 0.0041 2 0.82 2 0.82
43 Sulfur 0.0038 4 1.52 4 1.52
44 Static electricity 0.0032 2 0.64 2 0.64
45 Position of void 0.003 4 1.2 4 1.2
46 Exhaust fan 0.0022 4 0.88 4 0.88
47 Electronic devices 0.0021 2 0.42 2 0.42

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Analysis of explosion risk factor potential on coal reclaim tunnel facilities by modified… 355

Table 6 continued
No. Factor Weighted value Mine A Mine B
Value Risk rating Value Risk rating

48 Type of fluid (used in dust spraying) 0.0017 2 0.34 2 0.34

49 Non fireproof 0.0014 4 0.56 4 0.56
50 Spraying pressure 0.0004 2 0.08 2 0.08
51 Type of nozzle 0.0002 2 0.04 2 0.04
52 Diffusion coefficient 0.0046 5 2.3 2 0.92
Total risk rating 375.68 295.78

Table 7 Risk assessment on CRT in Mine A and Mine B using checklist method
No. Factors that affect CRT explosion Site conditions Explanation
CRT in Mine A CRT in Mine B

1 Fuel
1.1 Combustible gases V V
1.2 Dust V V Dust concentration in the CRT in Mine A is
higher than that in Mine B
1.3 Methane V V Methane concentration in the CRT in Mine A is
higher than that in Mine B
2 Oxygen
2.1 Planned of air V V
2.2 Unplanned of air V V
3 Ignition
3.1 Electricity V V
3.2 Chemically V V
3.3 Physically V V
4 Confinement
4.1 Design of tunnel V V
4.2 Unstable condition V V
5 Dispersion
5.1 Ventilation system V V The ventilation system of the CRT in Mine B is
more efficient than that in Mine A
5.2 Diffusion coefficient V V
5.3 Design of tunnel V V
6 Monitoring system
6.1 Monitoring tools V V
6.2 Monitoring facilities V V Monitoring system in Mine B is
more sufficient than that in Mine A
6.3 Monitoring staff V V
6.4 Monitoring procedures V V
6.5 Monitors layout V V

2.2 Explosion risk assessment of CRT in Mine deductive technique derived from the risks encountered
A and Mine B using checklist method previously and provides a convenient means for manage-
ment to rapidly identify possible risks by using either a
To assess the effectiveness of the AHP method, the series of questions or a list of topics to be considered
checklist method was used to compare CRT conditions in (Merna and Al-Thani 2008).
Mine A and Mine B. The checklist method has been used Table 7 shows a risk assessment performed using the
in practice by engineers to observe the safety conditions of checklist method to assess the risk of explosion in CRT.
working areas such as CRTs. The checklist method is a The factors observed in the checklist referred to the

123
356 N. P. Widodo et al.

structure of AHP especially in the third hierarchy (Fig. 4), Prassetyo, Ph.D. of Institut Teknologi Bandung, Indonesia, and Prof.
which can be directly observed in the CRT facility. From Kyuro Sasaki in Kyushu University, Japan for valuable suggestions to
the research.
the analysis, the checklist shows that conditions in both
CRTs have the same risk of the explosion. In addition, the Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
CRT in Mine A is generally less safe than the CRT in Mine Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
B, which can be distinguished qualitatively by professional tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
judgement as shown in the explanation column in Table 7. appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
The checklist method can identify the potential hazards and link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
the degree of risk qualitatively, however, the method can- made.
not identify important factors which have to be taken into
account to reduce the explosion risk levels and that can be
quantified in the developed AHP method. References

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