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 American Society of Safety Engineers
Middle East Chapter
7th Professional Development Conference & Exhibition
Kingdom of Bahrain, March 18-22, 2006

ASSE-MEC-0306-38

Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities

P. Hoorelbeke, TOTAL Petrochemicals HSE, C. Izatt, Ove Arup & Partners, J.R. Bakke, J. Renoult, and
R.W. Brewerton, GexCon AS

ABSTRACT people were killed and 439 injured. The explosion

demolished a block 350 m by 100m.
The paper describes an approach to predicting gas
explosion loads and response which has been developed for On the 23th of March 2005 a devastating explosion
offshore installations and which only recently has been occurred in a refinery at Texas City. At least 15 people
adapted to onshore petrochemical facilities. were killed and more than 70 injured.

The paper consists of three parts: The generic probability of a devastating explosion in a
petrochemical/refinery process unit lies in the order of 5 10-
5
Part 1: An overview of vapour cloud explosion hazards in per year – 5 10-3 per year depending on the type of unit
petrochemical onshore facilities and a discussion of [3]. The operating experience in steamcracking plants in
modeling approaches. Western Europe for instance for the period 1975 – 2004 is
1514 unit.years. In that period there have been 7 major
Part 2: A probabilistic explosion risk analysis for a explosions in these crackers which gives a generic average
petrochemical facility, based on the CFD code FLACS, probability of 4.6*10-3 explosions per unit.year. It is
where the focus is on determining risk of escalation in a obvious that this is a generic average figure which is
future unit from explosions in an existing unit. characteristic for the population (1514 unit.years) and not
necessarly for one particular unit. However it helps us to
Part 3: An MDOF response analysis is presented for assess the risks of these type of operations and activities.
selected equipment (a loop reactor and a raised vessel)
based on the loads predicted in the probabilistic analysis. 1.2 Vapor cloud explosions onshore

1. INTRODUCTION Petrochemical onshore installations can be characterised as Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
follows in relation to VCE hazards:

1.1 Historical evidence of VCE hazards • Large congested areas. An overall typical congested
volume of a petrochemical unit could be 150 m x 80 m x
The offshore industry has a relatively recent vapour cloud 15 m
explosion (VCE) explosion history: The Piper Alpha
explosion [1] on the 6th of July 1988 was one of the first • Large quantities of flammable materials. A typical major
major devastating explosions offshore. There were 226 vapour cloud can contain 10 – 50 tons of flammable
people on the platform at the time of the accident; only 61 products
survived.
• Several zones with dense congestion, see figure 1.1.
Onshore Hydrocarbon industry has a much longer vapour .
cloud accident history: On the 29th of July 1943 a release
occurred from a rail car in a chemical plant at 1.3 VCE approach in onshore industry
Ludwigshaven[Error! Reference source not found.]. The
rail car contained 16,5 te of a mixture of 80% butadiene and The major concern for onshore installations has been the
20% of butylene. A vapour cloud formed and ignited. 57 offsite risk. The Seveso legislation puts emphasis on

P. Hoorelbeke, Director Health & Safety, TOTAL Petrochemicals HSE, sa Petrofina nv 52, rue de l'Industrie; B-1040 Bruxelles, C. Izatt,
Ove Arup & Partners, 13 Fitzroy Street, London W1T 4BQ, UK, [email protected] , www.arup.com, J.R. Bakke, Technical Director
, J. Renoult, and R.W. Brewerton, GexCon AS, P.O. Box 6015 Postterminalen, N-5892 Bergen, Norway, www.gexcon.com,
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 2

accident prevention (for onsite and offsite people) and simulator FLACS is used for all simulations [4], [5]. It is
effective mitigation for off site people. planned to install a new propylene unit (PPnew) next to the
present unit (PPold). The purpose of the analysis is to evaluate
the risk for escalation in PPnew from an explosion in PPold.

Figure 1.1A congested area of an onshore unit

Simple methods (TNT equivalent, ME, Baker Strehlow, etc.)

allow good (i.e. conservative) predictions for damage potential
in the far field.

In the explosion region and the near-field, however, simple

methods are not sufficient and CFD models like FLACS are
required to predict overpressures with a sufficient degree of
accuracy. Differences between these methods are illustrated in
Figure 1.2.

Accurate prediction of the explosion loads in the near field is

however of paramount priority in order to avoid undue
exposure of personnel near hazardous installations and to
prevent domino effects between nearby equipment
installations.

Use of simple spacing rules between nearby units has shown to Figure 1.1 Comparison of overpressure vs. distance between
be misleading (e.g. Skikda accident in 2004). For large simple methods and FLACS simulations [3]
integrated petrochemical plants or refineries it is recommended
to challenge spacing rules by advanced modelling. The probabilistic explosion risk assessment has comprised of
the following main tasks:
Advanced modelling (CFD, MDOF) gives realistic answers to
vital questions which often cannot be adressed with simple 1. Import a Microstation 3D model of the PPold unit
models (e.g. drag loads on pipes, how to re-enforce supporting into FLACS, and complete the model with
structures, etc.). Oversimplification may lead to conservative anticipated congestion to account for the lack of
results without any possibility of understanding how risks can details.
be made acceptable. In the case studied, simple models 2. Make a copy of the PPold unit to represent the future
announced the problem while the combination of CFD and PPnew unit.
MDOF brought the solution i.e. identification and 3. Perform ventilation simulations for 12 different wind
quantification of the measures that had to be taken to avoid directions in order to establish the ventilation
escalation due to structural failures. conditions in the PPold unit.
4. Perform dispersion simulations with varying leak
The remaining part of this paper illustrates how advanced conditions and ventilation conditions in order to
methods for prediction of explosion loads and response can establish the potential gas cloud build-up in the
be applied for an onshore facility PPold unit.
5. Perform explosion simulations in the PPold unit with
varying gas cloud sizes, gas cloud locations and
EXPLOSION RISK ANALYSIS Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
ignition locations and calculate blast loads in the
This part of the paper describes the results from an explosion future PPnew unit.
risk assessment performed in a propylene unit. The CFD
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 3

6. Perform explosion simulations in the PPnew unit and

calculate blast loads in PPold. 1.4 Geometrical model
7. Calculate the ignition frequency based on a time
dependent ignition model. The geometrical model of the PPold propylene unit was
8. Calculate the explosion risk on various equipment in transferred from a Microstation 3D model to FLACS. The
both the PPold and the future PPnew units. model was updated with anticipated congestion in order to
account for lack of details in the Microstation model. The
The probabilistic explosion risk assessment has been unit is about 100m long and 50m wide.
performed in accordance with the guidelines given in
NORSOK Z-013, Annex G [6]. NORSOK is applied for The FLACS model of PPold was then duplicated to
gas and oil installations on the Norwegian continental shelf, represent the future PPnew propylene unit. The duplicated
and the methodology described in this paper was developed PPnew unit was translated 101m north of the PPold unit.
on the basis of NORSOK requirements. Simpler explosion Figure 0.2 shows both PPold and the future PPnew units.
analysis methods are not acceptable according to
NORSOK.

Figure 0.2 PPold and future PPnew propylene units

1.5 Input and assumptions in the analysis Wind direction frequency

1.5.1 Statistical weather data 346-015

20
316-345 016-045
The wind statistics indicate 3 predominant wind directions 15
(see Figure 0.3), wind from 60°, 240° and 300°. Within a 22.2% 23.3%
range of ±30°, these 3 wind directions represent 82% of the 286-315 10 046-075

total wind direction frequency. These 3 directions were 5

used as a basis for the dispersion analysis.
256-285 0 076-105

1.5.2 Leak sources

34 isolatable segments were identified in the PPold 226-255 106-135

propylene unit. Each segment is associated with a specific 36.5%
main piece of equipment. For each segment, the total mass
196-225 136-165
available for release, the leak frequencies for 3 hole sizes,
and the associated gas release rate for each hole size are 166-195

given.
Figure 0.3 Frequency for wind direction
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 4

Due to a limited number of simulations to be performed, after leak start. The personnel should normally have left the
not all segments can be studied individually. The segments unit, but people might still be present around the unit to
were grouped in 6 release locations which were used as a evaluate the situation. For other ignition sources, it has been
basis for the dispersion analysis. assumed that after a relative long period of exposure, if a
flammable gas cloud has not been ignited the probability of
Several gas mixtures are found in the PPold unit, however ignition should be reduced.
only propylene, the most abundant gas in the unit, was used
in the analysis. 1.5.4 Explosion scenarios

In the PPold and the future PPnew units, the potential

The leak frequencies are distributed over 8 different leak
explosion loads from several gas cloud sizes have been
categories and 6 release locations in the explosion risk
investigated.
analysis.
In the probabilistic assessment, GexCon have used the
For each release location there is more than one segment explosion loads from the smallest gas cloud category, e.g. 4%
with the potential for generating a flammable cloud from an filling, as representative for all clouds from 0.1% to 4% filling.
accidental leak. In order to keep the work at a manageable Similarly the results from a gas cloud filling 15% will be used
level, one representative segment (the largest) has been as representative for all clouds filling 7% to 15% of the unit.
picked for each release location. This is conservative.

1.5.3 Ignition modeling 1.6 Ventilation simulations

FLACS wind simulations for 12 wind directions have been

The Time Dependent Ignition Model (TDIM) [7] has been performed, and the resulting flow rate inside the PPold unit
applied for the probabilistic explosion analysis. The basis was calculated (see Figure 0.4). The simulations were
for the model is a number of recorded leaks, where most of performed for an external wind speed of 3.5 m/s.
the leaks were small and with mean duration estimated to 5
minutes.
Air changes per hour w ith 3.5m/s external w ind
0
Ignition intensities are separated into two classes, 210
330 30
continuous and discrete ignition sources: 180

• Continuous ignition sources will ignite flammable 150

gas as soon as it reaches the source. 300

120
60
• Discrete ignition sources can ignite a combustible 90

gas cloud at any moment. 60

30

Ignition intensities are grouped by types of source (hot 270 0 90

work, pumps, compressors, generators, electrical

equipment, other equipment, other and personnel). For hot
work, it is the number of hours per year that is relevant. For
240 120
pumps, compressors and generators, it is the number of
active sources that is taken into account. For the rest,
exposed deck areas are used. 210 150

Gas alarm will be activated upon detection and it has been 180

assumed that ignition intensities associated to personnel will be Figure 0.4 Ventilation conditions in PPold– Air
reduced 5 minutes after leak start (i.e. the personnel has Changes per Hour at 3.5 m/s external wind
normally evacuated the unit).
Based on the assumption that there is a linear correlation
For continuous ignition intensities, the ignition sources between the external wind speed and the internal flow rate,
associated to personnel and hot work will not contribute any the internal flow rate is calculated for all other wind speeds.
more 5 minutes after leak start. Other ignition sources are not
reduced upon gas detection, but will not be active anymore
1.7 Dispersion simulations
once the gas cloud has reached a steady state (typically within
a few minutes).
1.7.1 Investigated scenarios
For discrete ignition intensities, the ignition sources are still
active as long as flammable gas is present in the unit. For 288 dispersion simulations were performed in order to
personnel, the ignition sources are reduced to 50% 5 minutes establish representative gas clouds likely to be generated for
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 5

various wind and release conditions. Using the frozen cloud Figure 0.5 illustrates the average and the maximum sizes of
assumption, 1440 scenarios were estimated. the equivalent stoichiometric gas clouds for different leak
rates. The maximum gas cloud generated has an equivalent
1.7.2 Results stoichiometric volume of 27000m3 (38% filling of the unit)

The main results from the dispersion simulations are

summarised in the following graphs. The dispersion Figure 0.6 shows the inverse cumulative frequency of gas
simulations are used to calculate the frequency of ignited cloud size. The release scenarios have been linked with the
gas cloud using the time dependent ignition model. leak and wind frequencies to produce this graph.

Equivalent stoichiometric gas clouds

from dispersion simulations
30000
Average
27030
Maximum
25000

20000
Volume (m3)

16745

15000

9648
10000
7251
6204
3796
5000
2528
1925 2220
684 1055
17 421 51 150 422
0
0.75 1.5 3 6 12 24 48 96
Leak rate (kg/s)

Figure 0.5 Average and maximum equivalent stoichiometric gas clouds from the dispersion simulations

Inverse cumulative frequency of gas cloud size

1.0E+00
5.39E-01

1.0E-01
Cumulative frequency (per year)

1.0E-02

1.0E-03

1.0E-04

1.0E-05

1.0E-06

1.0E-07
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
Equivalent stoichiometric volume (m3)

Figure 0.6 Inverse cumulative frequency of gas cloud size

1.8 Explosion simulations 1.8.1 Investigated scenarios

ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 6

A total of 59 explosion simulations have been performed in gas cloud sizes, gas cloud locations and ignition locations.
the PPold propylene unit as part of the probabilistic The investigated scenarios are summarised in the Table
assessment, these were repeated in the future PPnew unit. below.
The explosion simulations have been performed for varying
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 7

Table 0.1 Investigated explosion scenarios in the PPold and future PPnew propylene unit

Gas cloud Size (l x w x h) Volume % filling of Amount of gas Net volume of cloud
category (m) (m3) unit (kg) (m3)*
1 15 x 15 x 15 3375 4% 254 3120
2 19 x 19 x 15 5415 7% 411 5140
3 29 x 25 x 15 10875 15% 837 10270
4 33 x 33 x 15 16335 22% 1255 15380
5 36 x 50 x 15 27000 36% 2067 25370
50 x 50 x 15
6 37500 50% 2870 35250
100 x 25 x 15
7 100 x 50 x 15 75000 100% 5740 70490
* The net volume is the real size of the cloud, i.e. the total volume minus the volume blocked by
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 8

equipment.

In the PPold unit, gas cloud categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 were PPold and future PPnew units. Points have also been
located at 6 different locations, with ignition in the centre of located in open spaces at different height levels both in
the cloud and at the south edge (except for gas cloud PPold and the future PPnew units, to monitor the dynamic
category 1 which was only ignited in the centre). pressure (or drag value).

In the future PPnew unit, gas cloud locations and centre 1.8.3 Results from explosion simulations
ignition locations were kept, but the clouds were ignited at
the north edge instead of the south edge. Overpressure and duration combinations for all pressure
monitor points and allcloud sizes ranging from 4% to 100
1.8.2 Measurements % are shown in Figure 0.7 and Figure 0.8. These are for
explosions in PPold. The highest overpressures correspond
Based on client requirements, local pressure measurements to the largest gas clouds. Similar results were produced for
have been performed on a range of equipment, both in the the explosion simulations in PPnew.

Figure 0.7 Pressure vs. pulse duration in the PPold unit

Figure 0.8 Pressure vs. pulse duration in the future PPnew unit
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 9

1.9 Explosion risk calculations

1.9.1 Frequency of ignited gas cloud
The large variation in overpressure (and pulse duration)
illustrated in the previous section clearly indicates that it is Once the ignition intensities are processed with the
necessary to determine the likelihood of the different dispersion simulations, the frequency of ignited gas clouds
overpressure levels, which closely corresponds to is determined. The results are illustrated in Figure 0.9.
performing an assessment of cloud size frequency.

Frequency of ignited gas clouds

1.00E-02

Leak 1
Leak 2
1.00E-03
Leak 3
Leak 4
Leak 5
1.00E-04
Cumulative frequency (n/y)

Leak 6
Total

1.00E-05

1.00E-06

1.00E-07

1.00E-08

1.00E-09
1 2 3 4 5 6
Gas cloud category (-)

Figure 0.9 Inverse cumulative frequency of ignited gas clouds

The total frequency of ignited gas clouds in the PPold Table 0.3 Drag values in the PPold and future
propylene unit is 1.99 10-3. The average ignition probability PPnew units
is 0.37%. 10-4 overpressures 10-5 overpressures
Measurement PPold PPnew PPold PPnew
1.9.2 Explosion risk in PPold height (m) unit unit unit unit
2.5 0.56 0.01 1.60 0.04
The results from the explosion risk calculations are given in
Table 0.2 for selected elements. The results are expressed 12.5 0.40 0.01 0.68 0.03
as the 10-4 and 10-5 overpressures, both in the PPold and
future PPnew units. 1.9.3 Explosion risk in PPnew

Table 0.2 Local pressures in the PPold and The results from the explosion risk calculations are given in
future PPnew units Table 0.4 and Table 0.5. The results are expressed as the 10-
4
10-4 overpressures 10-5 overpressures and 10-5 overpressures, both in the PPnew and PPold
Equipment PPold PPnew PPold PPnew units. It has been assumed that the frequency of ignited gas
ID unit unit unit unit cloud in PPnew is similar to PPold.
D302 0.47 0.19 0.89 0.32
R201-R202 2.71 0.11 3.29 0.16 Table 0.4 Local pressures in the future PPnew and
PPold units
10-4 overpressures 10-5 overpressures
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 10

Equipment PPnew PPold PPnew PPold conservative choice. More representative

ID unit unit unit unit (smaller) segments could be more appropriate to
D302 0.84 0.06 2.14 0.12 use.
R201-R202 3.35 0.11 10.15 0.22 • Blowdown, following ESD, has not been
considered. With blowdown, the segments would
be emptied more quickly and the gas clouds
Table 0.5 Drag values in the future PPnew and would be exposed to ignition sources for a
PPold units shorter time.
10-4 overpressures 10-5 overpressures • Decay of leak rate following ESD has not been
included, leading to large clouds being exposed
Measurement PPnew PPold PPnew PPold
longer to ignition sources.
height (m) unit unit unit unit
2.5 0.93 < 0.01 2.31 0.02 2. RESPONSE ANALYSIS Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
12.5 0.82 < 0.01 1.42 0.02
In order to better understand the risk of secondary
explosions and escalation, finite element analyses were
1.10 Discussion of explosion risk analysis carried out to determine the global dynamic response of the
D302 tank and the R201-R202 reactor loop structures to the
The ventilation analysis shows good ventilation in the 10-4 probability blast scenario. The non-linear, dynamic,
PPold propylene unit, which was to be expected due to the explicit finite element (FE) code LS-DYNA [8] was used
very open configuration and the low degree of congestion for these Multi-Degree-Of-Freedom (MDOF) analyses.
of the unit. Due to the nature of the analyses, geometric non-linearity
(i.e. large displacements) was intrinsically included in the
From the dispersion analysis, it is seen that leaks up to calculations. Only the primary components of the
6kg/s only generate relatively small clouds with an structures were modelled explicitly. The foundations for
equivalent stoichiometric gas volume below 2600m3. This the structures were assumed to be rigid and immovable.
is in accordance with the open configuration of the unit Gravity loading was included in both of the models and was
allowing good ventilation. applied in a staged analysis, with gravity applied to the
structures prior to the application of the blast load.
For leaks above 12kg/s however, the size of the equivalent
stoichiometric gas clouds increases significantly, with a 2.1 D302 Tank Structure
maximum of 27000m3 (38% filling of the unit) for a 96kg/s
release. As the propylene gas is heavier than air, it stays The D302 tank structure consisted of a large tank,
close to the ground giving the possibility for large clouds to approximately 11.5m long and 3.5m wide, sat on steel
be formed. saddles and reinforced concrete supports, as shown in
Figure 3.1.
High pressures can be obtained in both PPold and PPnew,
especially for gas clouds filling 36% or more of the unit.
For those clouds, deflagration to detonation transition
(DDT) is not unlikely. The pressures generated decay quite
rapidly with distance, so that the blast pressures in the other
unit are much lower, but still a possible risk of escalation
for the largest gas clouds (from 36% filling) exists.

Overpressures associated to the 10-4 frequency in the PPold

unit are relatively high. These pressures correspond to the
explosion of a gas cloud filling 15% of the unit. The 10-4
blast overpressures in the PPnew unit are lower.

Several conservative assumptions have been made in this

analysis, and the following modifications to the analysis
could reduce the calculated explosion risk:

• The representative segment size for each leak Figure 3.1 – D302 Tank Model
location is the largest of all segments associated
to a leak location. Most of the segments are The R201-R202 reactor loop structure consists of the R201-
much smaller and this is therefore a very R202 reactor loops, which sit on the A201 concrete
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 11

structure. The adjacent I201 steel structure, containing the The application of the various blast loadings on the
D202 tank, is also supported by the A201 reinforced structures was based on the methods given in [9] and [10].
concrete structure along one of its column lines. The model For relatively small structural elements (less than 1m in
is shown in Figure 3.2. width and depth) the blast load on the rear face is almost in
phase with (but is in the opposite direction to) the load on
The reactor pipes were considered to be rigidly connected the front face (i.e. the pressures on the front and rear faces
to the floor of the A201 concrete structure. The D202 tank equalise very quickly). Therefore, the blast pressures apply
was also considered to be rigidly connected to the adjacent a relatively low net load to the structural elements. This
supporting beams within the I201 structure. applies to open structures, such as the R201-R202, A201
and I201 structures. The loads on these structures are
2.3 Blast Loadings mainly due to the drag pressure. The D302 tank is
relatively large and so the blast pressure time-histories were
The loading information for the blast scenario consisted of directly applied. For the smaller D202 tank, a combination
blast and drag pressure time-histories at various locations of the blast and drag pressures were applied.
around the structures. For conservatism, a load factor of
1.5 was used for the pressures from the blast. 2.3.1 Loading – D302

The relatively large dimensions of the surfaces of the D302

tank structure result in the blast pressures, rather than drag
pressures, being the main loading. The blast loading
pressure time histories, shown in Figure 3.3, were applied
directly to the surface of the structure; the blast wind drag
load was relatively small.

Figure 3.3 – Blast pressures time-histories around D 302

Tank

It was assumed that the blast pressure on the front and rear
faces of the concrete support structures corresponded to that on
the front and rear faces of the tank. A further increase of 10%
(in addition to the factor of 1.5) to the blast pressures was
applied to allow for the increase in surface area due to the
presence of insulation and the increase in the loading due to
secondary structures and pipes (primarily on top of the tank).

2.3.2 Loading – R201-R202 and I201 Structures

The R201-R202 reactor loop structures and the I201

structure are relatively open structures. Therefore, the main
loading is derived from the drag pressures. For increased
conservatism, at each elevation level, the drag pressure with
the largest impulse was applied to all of the structural
elements at that elevation (see Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.2 – R201-R202 Reactor Loop Model
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 12

of the components. Where the stresses were found to

exceed the yield stress, an elastic-perfectly plastic material
model was used (i.e. no strain-hardening). Yield stresses
were based on the minimum allowable by the standards.
Although typical properties are generally much higher, the
minimum properties were assumed for conservatism. Strain
rate effects were not included in the models.

2.4.2 Concrete Properties

Initial linear-elastic analyses indicated that the bending

moments due to the blast loading in the reinforced concrete
Figure 3.4 – Drag Pressure Time-Histories for supports for the D302 tank and the concrete columns in the
R201-R202 Reactor Loop Structures A201 structure would exceed their cracking moments (the
The loads on the structure were calculated using the drag point at which the concrete starts to crack), but remain
pressures time-histories, estimates of the projected area of within the ultimate capacities of the sections.
each component and a drag coefficient for each component.
Drag coefficients of 1.2 and 2.0 [11] were used on circular This meant that a reduced EI value for the section would be
and rectangular cross sections, respectively. required to reasonably represent its stiffness. The concrete
sections were analysed to estimate the moment-curvature
The increase in the blast loading due to the secondary relationship for the section for large deflections. It was
components was accounted for by applying an approximate, then necessary to adjust the Young’s modulus so as to
but conservative, factor (in addition to the 1.5 factor) to the produce the effective EI value of the section that
loading on the primary structure. corresponded to the bending moments imposed by the blast
loading. This was achieved by using an iterative process.
2.3.3 Loading – D202 Tank
2.5 Inertia Distribution
The loading on the D202 tank consisted of both blast and
drag pressure loading, applied simultaneously. The drag Since the models were only required to represent the global
loading was calculated as for the other components within response of the structures, the secondary structures, stairs,
the model, using a drag coefficient of 1.2. etc. were not modelled explicitly. However, the mass of
these secondary items was included by adding their mass to
The blast loading is effective in the time period between the primary structure. In most cases, overall estimates of
when pressure has built up on the front face and when this these masses were made, since the large number of these
has been equalised on the back face. The time-history for items meant that detailed information was not available.
the nearest blast pressure measurement location was
considered to approximately represent the ‘side-on’ blast The densities of the components were factored to account
pressure. Using the methods given in [9] and [10], this was for the masses of the tank and pipe contents and the
used to approximate a resultant blast pressure time-history, secondary masses associated with the structures (insulation,
taking into account both the ‘reflected’ pressure off the outer plating, pipes, platform on top, fireproofing, etc.).
front of the tank and the equalisation of the blast pressure
on the front and back faces of the tank. 2.6 Discussion of Response Analyses Results Formatted: Bullets and Numbering

The conservatively estimated blast loading represented 2.6.1D302 Tank Model

approximately 75% of the total load on the D202 tank,
while the drag loading represents the remaining 25%. The displacements of the tank structure during and
following the blast were relatively low. The displacements
2.4 Material Properties (shown in Figure 3.5) along the length of the tank
(longitudinally, approximately in the direction of the blast)
2.4.1 Steel Properties reached about ±7mm and about ±3mm laterally, across the
tank. These displacements were largely as a result of the
The steel used in the structures was either SA-516-Gr.70 rigid body motion of the tank with all of the deformation
steel or grade S235JRG2 carbon steel. Material properties concentrated in the saddles and concrete support structures.
for these steels were derived from [12] and [13].

Since the structures generally remained elastic, a basic

linear-elastic material model was employed for the majority
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 13

Figure 3.5 – Dynamic Displacements of D302 Tank Figure 3.6 – Displacement at top of R201-R202 Loop
Structure
The stresses in the D302 tank were generally very low with
some small stress concentrations around the connection with The peak bending moments in the loop reactor pipes, shown in
the saddle. Within the saddle structure, the highest stresses Figure 3.7, were well within their elastic capacity, with
were observed in the vertical stiffening ribs and in the utilisation factors of about 20%.
reinforcing plate forming the saddle connection to the tank.
These stresses in the D302 tank and saddle structure were well The reactor loop pipes were also subjected to ‘push-pull’ axial
within the minimum yield of the material (i.e. the material forces, as the structure swayed back and forth. However, both
remains elastic). of the loop reactor pipes remained in compression with
relatively low axial stresses.
The stresses in the concrete supports for the D302 Tank were
relatively low and it is expected that only small cracks might
develop during the blast. However, these cracks are likely to
close-up again since there was no yielding of the
reinforcement.

The connection between the steel saddles and the reinforced

concrete supports were made through 4 bolts for each saddle.
Using the results from the FE analysis, it was shown that the
forces in this connection detail would not produce significant
tensile or shear stresses in the bolts. Therefore, failure of this
connection detail is not considered to be likely.

Therefore, the tank is expected to return to its original position

once the blast has passed and structural failure of any part of
the D302 tank structure is considered unlikely.

2.6.2 R201-R202 Reactor Loop Structures

Figure 3.7 – Bending Moments in R201-R202 Loops
The largest displacements in the R201-R202 reactor loop Reactor Structure
occur at the top of the structure during a sway response to
the drag impulse loading. The displacements here are up to The bracing members spanning between the reactor pipes were
±33mm, as shown in Figure 3.6, corresponding to 1 in 2000 subjected to bending as the reactor tower swayed. However,
or 0.05% of the height of the structure. The fundamental the bending moments in these cross members were well within
sway mode of around 0.75Hz and some higher frequency their minimum elastic capacity, with utilisation factors of
modes are both evident. about 20%. The shear forces in the reactor loops and the
bracing members were also low.

The R201-R202 reactor loop structure remained elastic under

the drag loading. It displayed neither signs of instability
nor any indication that the structural integrity was
compromised.
ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 14

2.6.3 I201 Structure with D202 Tank 2.6.5 Relative Movement between R201-R202 and I201 Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
Structures
The I201 structure is a shorter and stiffer structure than the
R201-R202 structure and responds to the blast loading with The relative displacements between the R201-R202 reactor
a higher frequency response. The peak deflections were loop structure and the I201 structure are important as a
about 12mm at the top of the I201 structure, as shown in number of pipes are connected to both structures. Figure
Figure 3.8. The overall structural response of the I201 3.9 shows the relative displacements between the top of the
structure corresponds to a frequency of about 4Hz. I201 structure and the R201-R202 structures at the same
elevation (i.e. the region of maximum relative
displacement). This shows that the maximum relative
displacement between the two structures was about 15mm.

Figure 3.8 – Displacement at Top of I201 Structure

The D202 tank is only supported on the I201 structure

through the relatively flexible floor beams. This support is Figure 3.9 – Relative Displacement between R201-R202
not located at the vertical centre of the tank and so the and I302 Structures
combined blast and drag loading on the D202 tank 2.7 Conclusions of Response Analyses
produced a rocking motion of the tank relative to the I201
structure. The peak relative displacement between the It was concluded that structural failure of the D302 tank,
D202 tank and the I201 structure at the upper level was the R201-R202 and I201 structures and the D202 tank due
found to be about 22mm. However, it is anticipated that to the blast loading is unlikely. All of the structural
any contact between the D202 tank and the I201 structure elements are expected to remain elastic with no permanent
would only damage the outer shell of the tank covering the deformation to the primary structures resulting from the
insulation and it is unlikely that this would cause any blast. Therefore, it is unlikely that there would be any
significant damage to the pressure vessel. escalation or “domino” effects due to a structural failure.
The response analyses only simulated the global response
The highest loads in the I201 structure were in the region of of the structures. Although the displacements of the
the D202 tank support, due to the rocking motion of the structures would not cause any significant damage to the
D202 tank. However, no yielding or plasticity is expected structures themselves, there is the possibility that these
in the I201 structure. displacements would cause damage to some of the pipes
within the structures (or pipes that cross-over from one
2.6.4 A201 Concrete Structure structure to another). The potential for damage or leaks in
these pipes due to the relative displacements of the
The maximum displacement of the A201 structure was structures or their performance under blast loading has not
about ±3mm. The concrete columns experienced been evaluated within the scope of this work.
significant bending moments and push-pull forces during
the swaying of the R201-R202 reactor loops. The peak
bending moment in the columns were at the base of the 3. CONCLUSIONS Formatted: Bullets and Numbering
columns, as shown in Figure 3.7. The column sections are
expected to crack with these loads, but the demand was The situation till say 5 years ago was:
well within the ultimate capacities of the sections. Any
cracks are likely to close-up afterwards since there was no • Simple methods allowed to cope with the main concerns
yielding of the reinforcement. All of the columns remained (i.e.offsite risk assessment)
in compression throughout the dynamic response. • Onshore hydrocarbon process industries did not make the
same profits as offshore facilities and advanced
technologies (3D modelling) were considered expensive
 ASSE-MEC-0306-38 Vapor Cloud Explosion Analysis of Onshore Petrochemical Facilities 15

Even today there is still an important gap between This illustrates one of the benefits of using more advanced
explosion research (theoretical and experimental and precise tools, namely that a more precise analysis may
investigations) and application of this research in the plants. reduce the conservatism typically associated with simpler
methods. Its use contributes to a more representative
CFD and MDOF analyses, compared to the use of simple assessment of risk and the effect of risk reducing measures.
methods, typically generate information which is more Hence both protection level and type of protection may be
realistic, more accurate and less conservative. This leads to optimised based on precise analyses of cost as well as
a better understanding of behaviour as well as assessment benefit
of risks. They also enable the user to more accurately
quantify the effects of mitigation measures.
REFERENCES
An advanced analysis may well take more time and cost 1. Cullen, Lord W.D. (1990), "The Public Inquiry into the
more than a simpler one, but it also generates a more Piper Alpha Disaster". Department of Energy, UK,
complete picture of the issues involved and often gives October 1990.
information that is not available from simpler methods (like
drag forces, location of maximum pressures, how to re- 2. Lenoir E.M. and Davenport, J.A., A Survey of Vapor
Cloud Explosions: Second Update, Process Safety
enforce supporting structures etc). This may be crucial
Progress (Vol 12, No. 1), January 1993
because questions like how do we re-enforce to make the
project acceptable, exist. Whether from a scientific point of 3. Hoorelbeke P, Vapor Cloud Explosion Hazards in
view the answer is "better” may in some cases almost be Petrochemical Installations, VUB, 2004
irrelevant – it is the fact that necessary information is
provided by the advanced method that is important. 4. Bakke, J.R. and Hansen, O.R. (2003) Probabilistic
Analysis of Gas Explosion Loads, FABIG Newsletter,
The present study can be viewed as a verification exercise, Issue No. 34, January 2003
where the purpose is to determine what level of damage is (www.gexcon.com/index.php?src=download/Probabilist
likely for loads having a probability of being exceeded of ic_analysis_of_gas_explosion_loads-FABIG.pdf)
10-4 per year. 5. FLACS Newsletters,
(www.gexcon.com/index.php?src=flacs/newsletter.html
The analysis shows that very high explosion overpressures
are seen for large gas clouds. However, a probabilistic 6. )NORSOK Standard Z-013 Risk and emergency
assessment of explosion loads in conjunction with the preparedness analysis, Annex G Procedure for
application of proper risk acceptance criteria to determine probabilistic explosion simulation.
dimensioning overpressures leads in most cases to design 7. DNV Technical report JIP Ignition Modelling: Time
loads significantly less than the worst case loads found in Dependent Ignition Probability Model, Report no. 96-
most analyses. Often predicted damage levels are tolerable, 3629, Rev. 04, Det Norske Veritas
as seen in the present analysis.
8. Livermore Software Technology Corporation. LS-DYNA
If unacceptable damage is predicted based on the 10-4 load Keyword User’s Manual, Version 970. April 2003.
levels, the effect of mitigation measures may be evaluated 9. Kinney, G.F. and Graham, K.J., Explosive shocks in air,
using the same methodology. Their implementation may Springer-Verlag, New York, 1985.
then be considered based on an assessment of cost and
contribution to risk reduction. 10. Design of Blast Resistant Buildings in Petrochemical
Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1997.
It is often local effects of measures (like changes in 11. Baker, W.E., Cox, P.A., Westine, P.S. Kulesz, J.J. and
confinement) that lead to the global overpressure reduction, Strehlow, R.A., Explosion hazards and evaluation,
hence predictive methods need to account for these local Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, 1983.
effects. Simple methods are therefore often not suitable
when effects of different measures need to be quantified. 12. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code, Section VIII,
One then has to resort to tools that resolve local effects, i.e. Division 1: Design and Fabrication of Pressure Vessels,
CFD-codes like FLACS. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1998.
13. Hot rolled products of non-alloy structural steels –
In the case of the present MDOF analysis, one of the main Technical delivery conditions. BS EN 10025:1993.
benefits was that the advanced analysis showed that
escalation due to structural failures was unlikely, whereas
the simple methods indicated that there might have been a
problem.

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