Martin 2018 Dea
Martin 2018 Dea
Martin 2018 Dea
ABSTRACT
Purpose – This paper analyses the performance of Spanish banking entities between
2009 and 2013, a period marked by the reform of the banking system with a large
number of mergers and integrations.
Findings – The results show that most of the entities have improved their performance
from the production approach. However, from the intermediation approach, the
efficiency of the sample has deteriorated, which raises questions about the sustainability
of the traditional banking business when the current credit restriction strategy is long
lasting.
Practical implications – The comparative analysis demonstrates that, after the deep
reforms carried out in Spain, the banking entities maintain similar efficiency rankings to
those they had at the beginning of the period analysed. This shows that the reform has
created new groups that operate adequately, avoiding the closing of institutions. Despite
the better rationalisation of the available resources, the outlook for Spanish banks
remains unclear in the current macroeconomic context, which does not favour the
banking business.
The Spanish financial system underwent an uncontrolled growth during the first decade
st
of the 21 century. During this period, financial entities (especially savings banks)
expanded throughout the country, opening new branches even in zones outside their
core area and the volume of bank loans rose to unsustainable figures. Most of this
money was obtained from overseas wholesale markets to fund the real estate sector.
With the global economic crisis, and the burst of the Spanish housing bubble, the
savings banks became indebted and had a high percentage of credits on their balance
productive capacity, based on the growth of promoters and builders loans, with high
default risks, was not well-assessed at the time. Excessive borrowing in wholesale
markets, which caused a significant weakening of the core capital of savings banks, and
the high default ratio in Spain, led to their balance sheets being flooded with property
In this paper, we study this transformation process of the Spanish banking sector from
the point of view of the efficiency of the entities. Our objectives are, first, to evaluate
whether the reforms implemented have led to a better performance of the system and,
second, to identify the entities that have shown a better behaviour in this process. To do
so, we carry out a comparison of the efficiency of Spanish banking entities in 2009 and
2013, applying the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist index to
analyse efficiency changes. Unlike prior studies dealing with bank efficiency, we have
efficiency, the production and the intermediation approach. Thus, the results are
expected to provide a more comprehensive view of the effects of the restructuring of the
Spanish banking sector on the entities’ performance. The analysis sheds light on the
effectiveness of the strategy adopted by the Spanish regulator that may be relevant to
assist other countries whose banking systems are facing similar situations.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we develop the context of the
study. The third section describes the effect of banking mergers on efficiency. The
fourth section explains the research methodology and data used in the analysis. The fifth
section presents the empirical results. The discussion is contained in the sixth section
2. Context
At the end of the decade, so many savings banks were threatened by insolvency that the
financial sustainability of the whole system was at risk. In response to this situation, the
trust in the system. Among the measures adopted, the following can be highlighted:
- Reform of the legal regime of savings banks (Royal Decree-law 11/2010) to enhance
their capitalization and the professionalization of their governing bodies. Later, the Law
26/2013 on savings banks and banking foundations established that savings banks had
to transfer their financial activity to a credit institution and enter into a banking
foundation transformation agreement if they had a value of more than 10,000 million
euros in total consolidated assets or a market share of more than 35% in deposits in their
1
Autonomous communities .
- Increase of core capital requirements through Basel III, aimed at strengthening the
solvency of financial entities by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage.
1
Autonomous communities is the official Spanish name for regions.
As a result, the Spanish financial sector has undergone a conversion process of its
17 in 2013 (See Appendix 1). In this process, Spanish savings banks have proven to be
the weakest part of the national financial system (Parejo et al., 2011). The vast majority
of the 45 savings banks that existed in 2009 have been nationalized or acquired by
commercial banks (losing importance in the long term, as in other European countries):
only 2 small savings banks and 4 groups remain. Autonomous communities have lost
their influence over the savings banks, which the Spanish central government now
controls.
Another important factor, in addition to the restructuring of the banking system is the
legal form of Spanish savings banks. They were private foundations and could not issue
capital. However, entities resulting from the integration process can increase their
equity by issuing capital in financial markets. This leads to the improvement of the core
capital that, in a banking entity, is made up of nominal capital and reserves and defines
its solvency level. A higher core capital indicates that an entity has a higher equity
compared to risk-weighted assets. These assets include deposits from central banks (no
risk) and industrial interests with a high risk. Savings banks investments in real estate
were not risk controlled and supervised. With consolidation, it is expected that entities
control their risk exposure by investing less aggressively in non-hedgeable risks. Banks
should hedge any risk at fair-market values and hold capital for absorbing risks which
The scope and framework of this study can be explained by the changes that have taken
place in the Spanish banking sector in recent years. In this section, we analyse the
factors that contribute to explaining the effect of mergers on the efficiency of Spanish
banking entities.
synergies and lowers costs through economies of scale (Williamson, 1968). M&A
among banking entities are very frequent around the world and, currently, the banking
sector is using them as a strategy for achieving larger size and being more competitive
(Vander Vennet, 2002; Khan, 2011; Alhasan and Asare, 2016). Consolidation will be
sustainable in the long run only if it increases efficiency or does not reduce efficiency
substantially (Berger et al., 2001). However, more care should be taken in terms of the
creation of excessive market power from M&A. According to Berger and Humphrey
(1994), increased market concentration in the United States may lead to slightly less
favourable prices of some deposit and loan accounts for consumers as well as a decrease
in banking efficiency because bank managers enjoy some of the benefits of market
power, such as reduced effort levels. These authors assert that this is not likely to occur
favourable prices for consumers and greater efficiency. In any case, country-specific
factors, such as different banking regulations and the different managerial strategies
implemented by banking entities to face the new challenges, are important determinants
In the last five years, a wave of consolidation has transformed the Spanish banking
industry. The financial crisis has intensified this process and acquisitions have been
considered a means to prevent bank failures. The ability to correctly calculate the risk of
each institution is crucial for good banking supervision and the stability of the financial
competitive and less risky than a smaller one. When an entity is less risky, it obtains
funding in the interbank credit market with better economic conditions. Since the main
activity of a bank is based on capturing customer money to lend to other customers, the
entity that gets more and cheaper funding in the interbank market will be able to pay a
lower interest rate, which will generate a higher margin. Net interest income is the most
commissions and other concepts) and has a direct relationship to efficiency. In line with
this, Maudos et al. (2002b) find higher levels of inefficiency in revenues than in costs
and analyse the importance of size to explain the inefficiencies in the revenue side of
banking. It is important to take into account that the resulting entity will be less risky if
it designs a restructuring strategy that includes the reduction of operating expenses such
buildings. Currently, banks are decreasing staff costs and making labour force
expenses that have been reduced are the rents of branches, custodial fees, security costs,
The growth of Spanish banking entities was achieved by opening branches, which
generated high overheads. In the crisis period, branches became non-profitable and have
burdened the income statement, the opposite of what was intended. As consequence, it
was necessary to close offices and to reduce personnel and other costs. If the entity is
large, for instance, merged entities, increasing the number of offices does not lead to
entity is oversized, it should reduce its costs, trying to maintain the business achieved in
the expansionary phase. If banking entities are able to keep their number of clients
despite closing branches, gains emerge from savings in staff and rental costs. However,
Ausina, 2002; Carbo et al., 2003) as the evolution of income also influences this
magnitude.
Although the integration process is taking place to obtain long-term synergies and
increases performance (Bernad et al., 2013), results about the benefits derived from
We have used the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyse the factors that
2
of 17 entities in 2009 and 2013 . The DEA technique is a non-parametric method based
on linear programming that was developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and Banker et al.
(DMU), which are organizations where several inputs and outputs are taken into
account. It compares the inputs and the outputs of DMUs by establishing a frontier of
qualified as efficient if no other DMU can produce more outputs by using an equal or
smaller quantity of inputs, or if no other DMU can use fewer inputs to produce an
equivalent or higher quantity of outputs. DEA coefficients give an idea of the theoretical
maximum quantity of inputs that could be reduced without affecting the output level
(for instance, a coefficient X means that it would be possible to obtain the same output
with a saving of (100 – X) % of inputs). When the coefficient is 1.00 the DMU is
comparatively efficient, i.e. the DMU optimizes its resources to obtain the output.
2
For 2009, the study considers the sum of the amounts of the input/output variables of the entities that
form the banking groups of 2013.
There are two main alternatives for measuring banking activity, namely, the production
approach and the intermediation approach. The first considers banking institutions as
producers of services for their customers. The intermediation approach expands the
according to the time value of money, basically in earning assets. It considers banking
particularly the intermediation approach (Illueca et al., 2009), but there is, as far as we
know, no research that considers both approaches. In this study, we adopt this dual
perspective.
For the production approach, the number of branches and the staff have been included
as inputs in the model. As outputs, we include the amount of deposits, loans and
negotiable securities. Authors such as Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Grifell-Tatje and
Lovell (1996), Fried et al. (2003), Prior (2003), Kumbhakar et al. (2011) and Camanho
and Dyson (2005) have followed the production approach or have included these
variables in their studies. For the intermediation approach, the inputs are the amount of
deposits and interest and charges paid. As outputs, we include loans, interest and fees
received and the inverse of impairments. The intermediation approach with these inputs
and outputs has been used by Maudos et al. (2002a), Carbo et al. (2003), Cuesta and
Zofío (2005), Illueca et al. (2009), Williams et al. (2011) and Pina et al., (2016), among
others.
After running the DEA model, we have calculated the Malmquist index for the period
2009 to 2013. The Malmquist index makes use of distance functions to measure
where D represents the distance function and the value of M is the Malmquist index.
The first ratio measures the productivity change from period t to period (t + 1) using
period t technology as a benchmark. The second ratio measures the productivity change
value greater than one indicates productivity decline, and M equal to 1 corresponds to
stagnation.
In this section, the results obtained using the DEA and Malmquist methodology are
presented. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the
analyses. As can be seen, all the indicators, except for the negotiable securities,
experienced a significant decline in terms of their mean during 2009-13, evidencing the
banking activity downturn in this period. The growth in the volume of negotiable
securities is mainly due to the intensive purchase of public debt. Spanish Government
bonds held by Spanish banks increased from 165,000 million euros in 2011 to 300,000
million euros in 2013 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013). The other positive figure is the
42% reduction over the period of the impairments of financial assets. The statistical
magnitudes (std dev, max and min) reflect the great heterogeneity of the Spanish
banking system, particularly the differences between the biggest and smallest entities.
As can be seen, the results of the constant returns to scale (CRS) model in 2009 show
that Banco Santander, Bankia and Bankinter constitute the efficient frontier. So, neither
the size nor the nature of banking entities are per se factors that explain differences in
efficiency because the efficient DMUs are a big bank (Banco Santander), a savings bank
(Bankia) and a small bank (Bankinter). However, the three least efficient DMUs –below
60%– are the smallest entities in the sample. All the other entities obtain efficiency
scores between 70% and 86%. The analysis of efficiency with the variable returns to
scale (VRS) model shows similar results to the CRS model and, as a consequence, the
scale efficiency (CRS/VRS) is close to 100% for most entities, which indicates that they
are operating on an appropriate scale and that size is not the cause of their inefficiencies,
with the exceptions of Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent. Both these entities, the two
remaining saving banks in the sample, show a low efficiency scale, which suggests that
Bankinter and Bankia are the only entities that obtain the maximum efficiency score in
2013. Although, by this year, all the banks had reduced both the number of branches
and the number of employees, Bankinter has significantly increased the amount of its
deposits and loans while the efficiency of Bankia is based on the variable negotiable
higher than the rest. It should be highlighted that the increase of the resources of Bankia
after the merger was mainly due to the public financial assistance it received. Bankia
was recapitalised in 2012 with more than €20bn of public money from the FROB. In the
other entities, the decrease of branches and staff was accompanied by lower deposits
and loans, except for Banco Popular, Banca March and Banco Sabadell whose deposits
increase. As a consequence, there is a wider gap in 2013 than in 2009 between the
efficiency of Bankinter and Bankia and the rest, which have scores of lower than 85%.
In contrast to 2009, the VRS model for 2013 shows significant differences in Banco
Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Bankia and Caja Pollença, which obtain a score of 100%,
while others obtain similar scores to the CRS model. As a consequence, the evaluation
Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Popular, Sabadell, Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent
whose inefficiency can be explained by their size. For the other entities, inefficiency is
due to other causes. Scale inefficiencies arise for 5 of the 6 biggest Spanish financial
Finally, the Malmquist index, which shows the evolution of the efficiency, reveals that
all entities have improved their productive efficiency in the period analysed, especially
Banca March, Caja3 and Caja Pollença. During this period, financial entities drastically
reduced the number of branches and staff to save costs and compensate for the
The analysis of efficiency with the CRS model shows that Banco Santander, Bankia,
Banco Sabadell, Bankinter and Caja Pollença are the most efficient entities in 2009.
Once again, the results indicate that the size and the nature of entities are not factors that
explain inefficiency. In this model, the maximum score obtained by one of the smallest
entities, Caja Pollença, indicates that a company can be small and efficient when it
manages its resources adequately. Unicaja and Caja3 obtain the lowest scores (around
65%), which indicates that these entities are not able to profitably transform deposits
into loans. The VRS model confirms the results from the CRS model, except that
BBVA now obtains a score of 100%. Similar to the production approach, the scale
efficiency is close to 100% for most of the entities. So, the size of each entity is
Banco Popular, Banco Sabadell, Caja Pollença and Caja Ontinyent are the efficient
DMUs in 2013. Among the less efficient entities, Banco Santander, BBVA, La Caixa
and Bankia obtain a score of around 60%, which is 30% less than the efficiency they
obtained in 2009. These results show that the bigger Spanish banks have not run their
especially low for Banco Santander, BBVA and La Caixa. This indicates that these
entities do not operate with an optimum scale and their size may be encumbering their
efficiency.
The Malmquist index for the intermediation approach presents higher scores than for
the production approach. This indicates that the efficiency of the sample in the period
2009-2013 has deteriorated considerably and that the traditional banking business
6. Discussion
This paper studies the effect of bank consolidation on the efficiency of Spanish banking
entities. To analyse how the process of mergers in Spain has influenced efficiency, we
have run two DEA models (production and intermediation approaches) for 2009 and
2013 and calculated the Malmquist index for both approaches. Our findings indicate
that the efficiency of banks from the production approach improved in the period 2009-
2013, the period in which the mergers took place, but it did not improve from the
intermediation approach. These results show that the performance of the financial
addressed from different approaches. Although there is a vast literature analysing the
efficiency of financial institutions, most studies focus on just one of these dimensions,
giving only a partial view of their performance. The experience of the Spanish banking
system reveals that production and intermediation are different and independent aspects
of the activity of financial entities. The analysis of the restructuring of the Spanish
banking system that began after its collapse in 2009 leads to different conclusions
From the point of view of the services production activity of entities (production
efficiency), the reforms undertaken have contributed to improving the efficiency of the
system, encouraging a more rational allocation of inputs and outputs. The extraordinary
expansion of most of the financial entities in the years prior to the crisis led to an excess
of capacity in the Spanish banking industry (Carbó and Rodríguez, 2016). Thus, the
restructuring of the Spanish financial system was necessary to rebalance the supply and
banking industry during the 90s, when the number of banks and saving banks fell from
around 80 to 51, did not lead to significant improvements in their efficiency (Fuentes
and Sastre, 1999). This is coherent with the hypothesis of Palomo and Sanchis (2010)
who argue that mergers are more successful when they are underpinned by reasons of
economic rationality and not when they respond to the growth and expansion of the
financial entities, as was the case in the 90s. The consolidation process initiated in 2009
has increased the concentration of the banking industry, enabling financial entities to
reduce the number of employees and branches by concentrating part of their operational
activity in central departments. At the same time, the public aid of around 60,000
million euros that was injected into the banks and the purchase of part of their toxic
assets and non-performing loans by the Spanish “bad bank” (SAREB), created in 2012,
have contributed to cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets and to underpinning the
banking business. Furthermore, the reforms in the Spanish banking system seem to have
been well-planned because, with few exceptions, the entities maintain similar rankings.
From the point of view of the intermediation activity (intermediation efficiency), the
results show a decline in the productivity of all financial entities during the period
analysed. This means that the efficiency of the sample has fallen and that the traditional
banking business (granting credit and capturing deposits) has been run inefficiently. So,
the measures implemented in the Spanish banking system have proven to be ineffective
or, at least, not sufficient to revitalise the financial system and to make the entities
banks and it seems clear that new reforms will be needed. There are some factors which
may help explain the increasing pressure on the banking industry and the consequent
delay of a return to profits for many financial institutions at European level and,
particularly, in Spain. First, the current prolonged period of low interest rates has a
negative impact on the profitability of banks because it diminishes their margins and
banks have to take higher risks to increase profits (Bachiller et al., 2016). The negative
impact of this current low interest rate environment is more severe in banking systems
that, like the Spanish, have a high degree of reliance on the traditional banking model.
For the smallest banks in Spain, it is even more difficult to compensate for these lower
margins with other activities (Ocaña and Faibiscenko, 2016). Nevertheless, the results
of this study do not corroborate this perspective because four of the biggest banks show
the worst performance evolution. Second, the stricter financial regulation imposed by
the central banks with the aim of increasing the transparency and solvency of banks may
be having a negative impact on their capacity to augment credit flows and productive
investments. Moreover, as the European economy is still weak, banks are more cautious
when analysing risks. This indicates that the improvement in solvency has been to the
detriment of profitability. Finally, the drastic deterioration of the Spanish economy
during the period analysed, with an unemployment rate rising from 13.8% in 2008 to
the rate of non-performing loans grew from 4.97% in 2009 to 13.77% in 2013 and bank
lending fell into a vicious circle of less funding, less demand and greater arrears.
The analysis shows that neither the size nor the nature of the banking entities are per se
factors that explain differences in efficiency because the efficient DMUs include a big
bank (Banco Santander), a savings bank (Bankia) and a small bank (Bankinter). So, a
company can be small and efficient if it manages its resources adequately, that is, if it is
7. Conclusions
The efficiency of banking entities has multiple dimensions and not all of them are
necessarily correlated. Therefore, studies that analyse efficiency must limit the scope of
The comparative analysis undertaken demonstrates that, despite the deep reforms
carried out in Spain, the efficiency of the banking sector maintains a similar ranking to
that which it had at the beginning of the period analysed only from the point of view of
the production approach. This shows that the reforms have acted proportionately
through the banking system, avoiding the closing of institutions. Furthermore, entities
that do not operate on an optimum scale can be profitable, for instance, when they offer
specialized treatment for specific niche markets. So, the future performance of Spanish
banking groups will depend on their capacity to promote a profitable business and select
been carried out to save costs and not to increase market share or eliminate competitors’
power. However, at the same time, the strong contraction in the main activity of the
financial institutions, granting credits, has led to a decrease in efficiency from the point
interest rates and high default rates, has affected the profitability of the banking
business. This will have to be corrected to maintain the sustainability of some entities
and, in the case of Bankia, to pay back the financial aids given by Europe. Meanwhile,
This study identifies some interesting implications for policymakers; because, when
considering the process of banking mergers to strengthen this sector, economic issues
other than growth and expansion criteria should be taken into account. Some questions
that arise for future research are the influence of the regulation on the performance of
banking entities and the analysis of the banking sector after transnational mergers. The
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%
2009 2013 VARIATION
Mean max min std dev Mean max min std dev 2009-13
Branches 2,220 8,597 21 2,302 1,413 5,647 20 1,576 -36%
Staff 12,909 39,557 87 12,617 9,059 30,437 80 9,96 -30%
Deposits
(thousands €)
77,758,455 240,156,183 289,16 79,050,045 67,565,156 207,374,182 380,8 69,375,894 -18%
Loans
93,849,407 303,241,679 274,87 99,680,666 64,636,930 215,120,571 291,91 73,379,320 -31%
(thousands €)
Securities
29,254,240 125,585,781 42,062 39,540,268 34,273,227 137,470,951 55,131 44,191,448 17%
(thousands €)
Interest paid
(thousands €)
2,968,900 9,757,704 9,126 3,200,658 1,791,765 7,614,325 7,732 2,281,591 -40%
Interest
income 5,749,300 18,185,211 19,803 6,269,711 3,712,605 12,506,649 19,615 4,065,603 -35%
(thousands €)
Impairment of
financial
assets
1,850,705 11,582,068 1,704 2,907,325 1,064,718 4,196,919 2,125 12,683,303 -42%
(thousands €)
Source: Author’s elaboration from Spanish banking association annual reports
Table 2: Coefficients of technical efficiency and Malmquist Index (Production approach)
Technical Technologic
CRS VRS CRS/VRS CRS VRS CRS/VRS Malmquist
change al change
Banco Santander 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 85,31% 100,00% 85,31% 1,172 0,821 0,963
BBVA 86,47% 100,00% 86,47% 69,71% 100,00% 69,71% 1,240 0,708 0,878
La Caixa 73,20% 73,20% 100,00% 58,90% 100,00% 58,90% 1,243 0,706 0,878
Bankia 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 1,000 0,862 0,862
Banco Popular 70,85% 70,95% 99,86% 60,69% 87,71% 69,19% 1,167 0,689 0,804
Banco Sabadell 76,38% 84,07% 90,85% 53,17% 79,07% 67,24% 1,437 0,683 0,980
Banca March 54,98% 58,32% 94,27% 61,20% 64,18% 95,36% 0,898 0,682 0,613
Bankinter 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 1,000 0,967 0,967
Unicaja 72,12% 72,52% 99,45% 58,41% 58,68% 99,54% 1,235 0,664 0,820
Kutxa 82,83% 83,63% 99,04% 69,46% 69,51% 99,93% 1,192 0,678 0,809
Ibercaja 77,20% 78,05% 98,91% 69,87% 70,56% 99,02% 1,105 0,696 0,769
Caja 3 73,74% 75,27% 97,97% 77,67% 79,62% 97,55% 0,949 0,718 0,682
Liberbank 80,40% 80,96% 99,31% 56,25% 56,31% 99,89% 1,429 0,664 0,949
Banco Mare Nostrum 78,36% 78,78% 99,47% 65,37% 65,56% 99,71% 1,199 0,680 0,815
Nova Caixa Galicia 80,08% 80,55% 99,42% 73,69% 74,25% 99,25% 1,087 0,711 0,772
Caja de Ahorros de Pollença 44,14% 100,00% 44,14% 39,97% 100,00% 39,97% 1,104 0,664 0,733
Caja de Ahorros y M. P. de Ontinyent 46,98% 68,37% 68,71% 36,75% 63,21% 58,14% 1,278 0,696 0,890
Appendix 1
2009 2013
Banesto
SANTANDER
Banco Santander
BBVA
Banco de Valencia
Bancaja
Banco Popular
Banco Sabadell
Bankinter BANKINTER
Cajasur KUTXA
Ibercaja IBERCAJA