Rule 66

G.R. No. 88498 June 9, 1992

GENEROSO R. SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERITO L. SANTOS, respondents.

Facts:

The petitioner was designated as Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2, 1981. On November 14, 1986, petitioner Sevilla was
designated by then Minister Rogociano Mercado of the MPWH as acting District Engineer of
Pasay City.

Due to Sevilla’s designation in Pasay City, the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara,
appointed Nerito L. Santos as the new City Engineer of Cabanatuan City.

On February 3, 1987, Sevilla was removed from office (Pasay City). He then returned to
Cabanatuan City. On March 27, 1987, he filed a petition for quo warranto against Santos.

Issue:

WON the quo warranto petition has merit.

Held:

No. The petition is devoid of merit.

An "acting" designation is merely a temporary one which is good only until another

appointment is made to take its place (Austria vs. Amante. 79 Phil. 784). Hence, petitioner's
right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It
lapsed upon the appointment of Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of
Cabanatuan City on August 18, 1986.

An action for quo warranto may be commenced by "a person claiming to be entitled to a

public office or position usurpred or unlawfully held or exercised by another" (Sec. 6, Rule
66, Rules of Court). Petitioner's ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos' appointment as City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City, was not illegal for the petitioner's right to discharge the
functions of Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a permanent
appointment to the same office was made in favor of the private respondent, Engineer
Nerito L. Santos.
 Rule 67

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines had leased the property of Castellvi from the year 1947 on
a year to year basis. However, Castellvi later on refused to continue with the lease
agreement. On June 26, 1959, the Republic filed a complaint for eminent domain against
the property of Castellvi.

In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the
above-mentioned land, was Php 0.20 per square meter, or a total market value of Php
259,669.10. The defendants on the other hand alleged that the land being a residential land,
had a fair market value of Php 15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of Php
11,389,485.00.

The court appointed three commissioners to ascertain the value of the lands. On March
15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report recommending unanimously that the
lowest price that should be paid was Php 10.00 per square meter.

The Republic assailed the finding contending that the value should be counted from July 1,
1947, the year when the premises were first leased, since it was the time of “taking” of the
property.

Issue:

WON the contention of the Republic as to time of taking is correct.

Held:

No. The contention is incorrect. For taking to exists, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the
same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year. Castellvi also
received rental payments.

It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain
cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,  the "just compensation" is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when
the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957,
961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of
the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was
filed.
 G.R. NO. 157882 : March 30, 2006]

(DESAMA), , v. ELISEA GOZUN

On 3 March 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Rep. Act No. 7942 entitled,
"An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration, Development,
Utilization and Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

On 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with CAMC over a total land area of
37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area
is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.

On 7 September 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then
DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary
reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are
unconstitutional. Allegedly, the law and its implementing rules takes private property
without just compensation.

Petitioners add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical taking, at
the very least, the law establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners, occupants and
concessionaires of a mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use
of the property and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls within the
purview of eminent domain.

Traversing petitioners' assertion, public respondents argue that the law does contemplate
taking but it is a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety
and general welfare of the people.

Furthermore, CAMC FTAA do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial
enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal easement upon
surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area.

Issue:

WON there is taking and such taking is compensable under the power of Eminent Domain

Held:

Yes. There is taking and such taking should be compensable under the power of Eminent
Domain.

The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use
upon payment of just compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the
state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid.

A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a
property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious
to public welfare, or where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be
injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property
interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking.

While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or
possession of property, it need not always be the case. Taking may include trespass
without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the value of the
property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended
such as the establishment of an easement.

As shown by the foregoing jurisprudence, a regulation which substantially deprives the

owner of his proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public
use amounts to compensable taking. In the case under consideration, the entry referred to
Rep. Act No. 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are to be
considered as taking under the guise of Eminent Domain.

NOTES:

 The taking to be valid must be for public use. Public use as a requirement for the
valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is now synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. It includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use as traditionally
understood as "actual use by the public" has already been abandoned.

 The question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been settled in
the case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay 50 wherein the court declared
that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. Even as the executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations, the same cannot prevail over the court's findings.

 For taking to exists, the following requisites must concur:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 Rule 68

G.R. No. 190236, June 15, 2015

DENNIS MORTEL, Petitioner, v. MICHAEL BRUNDIGE, Respondent.

Facts:

On July 14, 2001, the petitioner Dennis Mortel obtained a loan of P185,000.00 from the
respondent Michael Brundige. To secure the payment of the loan, the petitioner executed in
favor of the respondent a real estate mortgage (Sanglang-Tira Agreement) over a one unit
apartment located at No. 1409 Sta. Rita, Olongapo City (subject property). Their agreement
provided, that the respondent shall reside free of rent in the subject property during the
duration of the agreement.

The respondent occupied the subject property however he was forced to leave due to
flooding and absence of water supply.

Upon maturity of the loan, the petitioner failed to pay his debt despite receipt of the
demand letter dated October 21, 2002. On April 11, 2003, the respondent filed against the
petitioner a complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage with the RTC of Olongapo City.

The petitioner admitted the existence of the real estate mortgage (Sanglang-Tira
Agreement); the respondent's demand letter dated October 21, 2002; and the Certificate to
File Action. He also admitted that his obligation with the respondent was not paid but
claimed that the latter abandoned the subject property in violation of their agreement.

Issue:

WON the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage is valid despite the alleged violation of the
agreement

Held:

Yes. The Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage is valid. In an action for judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, the factual issues to be resolved are: whether or not the debtor-mortgagor was in
default, and whether the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage.8

It is a settled rule that when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold
with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation.

In the present case, the petitioner tacitly admitted his default in the payment of his
obligation.