Alfonso Miguel B.

Romero
Criminal Law 1

5200018

People of the Philippines v. Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta

G.R. No. L-47722 , July 27 1943

Facts:

(Source:https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1943/jul1943/gr_l47722_1943.htm
l)

 Anselmo Balagtas was a convict who escaped from a detention facility in Nueva
Ecija, allegedly with his paramour named Irene Requinea. Accordingly, an order
was sent out to the Philippine Constabulary soldiers to capture him whether dead
or alive.
 Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta (the accused) were deployed to effect the
capture and when they found Balagtas’ alleged whereabouts, they were directed
to a room where Balagtas and his lover Irene were allegedly at.
 When they went inside, they saw Irene and a man sleeping with his back turned
towards the door. Immediately, Oanis and Galanta shot successive bullets at the
man without even ascertaining his identity, causing Irene to wake up and then
faint after seeing her lover killed. The victim was in fact not Balagtas but one
Serapio Tecson, Irene’s lover.  
 As a defense the accused contended Innocence by using the defense of Mistake of
Fact citing the case of U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488. They should not be
prosecuted of murder as they have made an honest mistake in determining that
the victim was Balagtas when they fired at him. Citing the case of U.S. vs Ah
Chong, they point out that the circumstances presented themselves similarly
which caused them to believe that the man Irene was with was in fact Balagtas.
Issue:

 Whether or not the accused are guilty of murder?

Holding:

 Yes the accused are declared guilty of murder with mitigating circumstances.

Reasoning:  

 The latin maxim, Ignorantia facti excusat, applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness
 appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed.
 The case of U.S. vs Ah Chong does not apply. In the cited case, the accused was
compelled by circumstances which made him take immediate action and said
circumstances being the facts that led him to believe a robber was opening the
door to the room which caused him to act on instinct and protect himself. In this
case, such circumstances are absent considering that the victim was asleep with
his back facing the door, when he was successively shot with bullets by the
accused who didn’t bother to determine with clarity if he really was Balagtas or
not. The accused were therefore careless in effecting their duties.
 Under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, clearly expresses that the accused
may use the justifying circumstance provided the following requisites are present,
1) That the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right and 2.) That the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office.
 In the case at hand however, the second requisite is not present since the injury is
unnecessary as this could have been prevented if the accused only ascertained
 with definiteness whether the man they shot at was in fact the man they were
ordered to capture.

Vicky C. Ty v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004

Facts

(Source:
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2004septemberdecisions.php?id=742
)

 Vicky Ty, was accused of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, in RTC-Manila.
 Petitioner issued 7 worthless checks, each in the amount of P30,000, to settle the
hospital bills payable to Manila Doctors Hospital. The checks were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank, Metrobank, for “Account Closed” and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, Ty failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital
the amount of the checks or to make arrangement for full payment of the same.
This is a consolidated case, and Ty pleaded not guilty.
 Vicky Ty’s mother, Chua Lao So Un, was confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital
from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. With the total bill amounting to
P657,182. Ty signed the Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment. Ty’s
sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May
1992, incurring hospital bills amounting to P418, 410.55 equating her total
payables to P1,075,592.95. To assume payment, Ty signed a promissory note
which states that she will pay in installment. She then opened an account and
drew several postdated checks against Metrobank.
 Vicky Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a
greater injury. Claiming that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release
for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not
discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. The “debasing treatment” affected her
 mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that her mother contemplated
suicide if she would not be discharged.
 The RTC of Manila found Ty guilty of seven 7 counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term of six months per count or
a total of 42 months.

 Vicky Ty, then  appealed to the Court of Appeals, that there is clear and
convincing evidence that she was forced to or compelled in the opening of the
account and the issuance of the subject checks, the checks were issued under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater
evil or injury and the evidence showed there was absence of valuable
consideration for the issuance of the checks.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC, which modified the
sentence to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double
the amount of the check, in each case without any imprisonment
Issue

 Whether or not Vicky Ty is guilty of 7 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa No.

22?

Holding

 Yes, she is guilty of 7 counts of violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22. Except for
the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a
greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best
determined by the trial court. And the trial court had in fact discarded the theory
of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly. These arguments are a mere
rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals.

Reasoning

 In the case at hand, the fear of Ty was not real and imminent. The fear should be
based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. A mere threat
of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.
 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will
but against his will as well.
 Vicky Ty alleged that she was compelled to issue the checks for fear that her
mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide which it is not the
uncontrollable fear defined by law. There was no showing that the mother’s
illness was so life threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital
suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce an apprehension of her
death.
 Vicky Ty’s claim on justifying circumstance of state of necessity found on Article
11 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court did not find the law to be
applicable in this case. As the law prescribes that the presence of three requisites
to exempt the actor from liability under this paragraph that the evil sought to be
avoided actually exists, that the injury feared be greater than the one done to
avoid it and that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it.

 Petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Ty guilty of

violating BP 22 is affirmed with modifications to the penalties imposed.

People of the Philippines v. Taneo

G.R. No. 37673, March 31, 1993

Facts:

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1933/mar1933/gr_l-
37673_1933.html )

 Potenciano Taneo lived with his wife in his parent’s house in the barrio of
Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte.
  On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao.
 Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he
suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried
to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.  Defendant also attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded
himself.
 Potenciano’s wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a
result of her wound. and also the fœtus which was asphyxiated in the mother’s
womb.

Issue

 Whether or not the Poenciano Taneo is criminally liable?

Holding

 No, the court finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with
which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government
insane asylum.

Reasoning

 The day before the commission of the crime, Taneo had a quarrel over a glass of
“tuba” with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla. On the day of the
commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and
early in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache, in which, made him
necessary to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep.
 He dreamed that Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held
his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies
were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room.
At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded.
Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded
himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody
 that came his way. The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have
any trouble with his wife, but that he loved her dearly.
 The court took into consideration the fact that the apparent lacks motive for
committing a criminal act, does not necessarily mean that there are none, but
that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into the depths of one’s
conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our
observation.

People of the Philippine Islands v. Josefina Bandian

G.R. No. 45186, September 30, 1936

Facts

(Source:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1936/sep1936/gr_45186_1936.html )

 Around 7 A.M. of Jan 31, 1936 Valentin Aguilar, Bandian’s neighbor, saw her go
to a thicket about 4 or 5 brazas or from her house, apparently to respond to a call
of nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go far for that
purpose. A few minutes later, she emerged but her clothes were stained with
blood. She was staggering and showing signs of being unable to support herself.
Valentin ran towards Josefina, after seeing her very weak and dizzy. He helped
her go to her house and placed her in her own bed. Valentin asked her what
happened and she said that she’s very dizzy. 
 Valentin called Adriano Comcom to help them and he requested to get bamboo
leaves to stop the hemorrhage that came upon Josefina.
 Adriano saw the body of the newborn baby near the path adjoining the thicket
were Josefina had gone earlier. He informed Valentin of it and was told to bring
the baby to ask Josefina if it was hers or not. She said yes.
 Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental
Misamis, was informed of the incident. He went to the house of Josefina and
found her lying in her bed, still bleeding. He declared that Josefina gave birth in
 her house and her bed and that after giving birth, she threw her child into the
thicket for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from Luis Kirol, the person she
had been living martially but the child was not his. Dr. Nepomuceno also said
that Josefina admitted that she killed her child.
 The Office of the Solicitor General contended that Josefina may be guilty only of
abandoning her minor which is a violation of Article 276 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, which in turn, resulted to the death of the minor who was allegedly
abandoned.

Issue

2 Issues arose from this case:

 Whether or not the court erred in taking into consideration, to convict her, her
alleged admission that she had thrown away her newborn baby. Yes
 Whether or not the court erred in holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to Reclusion Perpetua with costs. Yes

Holding

 The court found that the prosecuting attorney and the lower court who gave
absolute credit to the uncorroborated testimony of Dr. Nepomuceno was
contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by Josefina. There is
no evidence how the child died.
 Further, evidence did not show that Josefina did so willfully and consciously or
imprudently abandoned her child which caused the child’s death. She had no
cause to kill or abandon it, to expose to death, because her affair with a former
lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place 3 years
before the incident.
 Dr. Nepomuceno affirmed that the wounds of the baby were not caused by the
hand of a person but were caused by the bites of animals, pigs that usually
roamed in the thicket.
 Further, if the facts and the testimonies of Valentin and Adriano were added, the
Court also held that it’s clear how the truth was far from the conclusions and
 affirmations of Dr. Nepomuceno. Josefina denied having made any admission to
him and that from the time she became pregnant, she continuously had fever.
 With her young age, illness, and being a primipara or a woman who is giving
birth for the first time, at 23 years of age, she had experience an inconvenient and
difficult childbirth. She is inexperienced and uneducated so as to attend to her
condition. Moreover, as a laborer, with a salary of only 25 cents like her husband,
the Court held that she could be undoubtedly unaware of her childbirth, or if she
was aware, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or
dizziness, which were considered lawful or insuperable to take her child from the
thicket where she had given birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to
the danger of dying.
 Moreover, the Court held that her act of going to the thicket to respond a call of
nature, notwithstanding that she had fever for a long time was perfectly lawful. If
her doing so caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in the same place
and abandoning it, not because of her imprudence or any other reason than that
she was overcome by dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed
beacuse it happened by accident, with no fault or intention on her part. Law
exempts her from liability found in Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code.

People of the Philippines v Rafael Balmores Y Caya

G.R. No. L-1896, February 16, 1950

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1950/feb1950/gr_l-
1896_1950.html)

Facts:

 Rafael Balmores y Caya, was charged, for the crime of estafa through falsification
of a security. It was alleged that Balmores tore off the bottom of a genuine 1/8
unit (crosswise) Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket so the real number on
such ticket was removed and was substituted by Balmores with the number
 07400. This number is actually the winning number of the sweepstakes for which
the winner is entitled to receive P350.
 However, he was not able to perform all the acts of execution, which in turn
would produce the crime of estafa, through falsification of a security, this is
because Bayani Miller, the employee, to whom the ticket was presented,
immediately discovered the falsification and in turn caused Balmores’s
apprehension.

Issue:

 Whether or not there is an impossible crime committed, considering that the

falsification of the ticket was very apparent? No.

Holding:

 The recklessness and clumsiness of Balmores in falsifying the ticket did not make
the crime impossible under Art. 4 Par. 2. Examples of impossible crimes are as
follows trying to kill another by putting an arsenic substance in the latter’s soup
but it turns out the substance was just common salt or when one tries to murder a
corpse.
 Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not
prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to
consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to
whom it was presented for payment had not exercised due care.
 Upon further analysis, the real offense of Balmores was the attempt to commit
estafa, but technically and legally, he has to suffer for the serious crime of
falsification of a government obligation. He was sentenced to imprisonment of
prision mayor in its maximum period (10yrs and 1day to 12yrs).

People of the Philippines v. Hernandez

G.R. No. L-23916, October 14, 1925

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1925/oct1925/gr_l-23916_1925.html )
Facts:

 On or about February 26, 1925, Mr. Domingo Hernandez, 70, is alleged to have
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of force and by intimidating to kill
with a knife, did then and there lie with and have carnal knowledge with Conrada
Jocson. Condrada, 12, is the granddaughter of Domingo’s wife.
 The aggravating circumstances are that accused is the husband of the
grandmother of Conrada and the crime was committed with grave abuse of
confidence, inasmuch as the offended and the accused were living in the same
house.
 Domingo maintains that he was intoxicated at the time and therefore did not
know what he was doing. However, testimony of witnesses for the prosecution
said he did not show any signs of intoxication at the time of the commission of
the crime or immediately afterwards.
 In view of the aggravating circumstances found in the appeal, from frustrated
rape and a sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, crime became
consummated rape with penalty of 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal with accessory penalties prescribed by law.

Issue:

 Whether or not the crime of rape was consummated? Yes

Holding:

 The crime was frustrated, the court seems to have been of the opinion that there
can be no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen. This
view is not in accordance with the weight of authority; in fact, it is contrary to
practically all modern authorities.
 The judgment appealed from is therefore modified by finding the defendant
guilty of the consummated crime of rape and, in view of the aggravating
circumstances mentioned in the information, the penalty imposed upon the
defendant is hereby increased to seventeen years, four months and one day of
 reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellant.

Reasoning:

 Citing the case of  State vs. Johnson (91 Mo., 439), the court held that “finding
the hymen intact is not always proof that no rape has been committed, nor of
virginity; for the cases are not rare where the hymen had to be removed after
impregnation and in order to permit delivery.”
 In this case, the physician who examined the offended party immediately after
the commission of the crime, found that the labia and the opening of the vagina
was inflamed together with an abundance of semen. However, the hymen was
intact and it also appeared on evidence that the defendant lay on top of the child
for over 15 minutes and continued his effort of penetration during that period.
The child also testified that the defendant succeeded in a partial penetration and
the she felt intense pain.

People of the Philippines v. Celestino Bonoan y Cruz

G.R. No. L-45130, February 17, 1937

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/feb1937/gr_l-45130_1937.html )

Facts:

 On December 12, 1934, Celestino Bonoan y Cruz met Carlos Guison, on Avenida,
Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom’s Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was
at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, I will kill you.
Beech turned around and saw the Bonoan withdrawing his right hand, which
held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, I will pay you, but
 Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on
the left side. The assault was also witnessed by policeman, Damaso Arnoco, who
then rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife.
Guison, was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died two days
after the accident.
 On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the Bonoan. The
defense counsel objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant
was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopathic
Hospital.
 Dr. Joson Toribio and Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienists of the
Psychopathic Hospital submitted their reports stating that the Bonoan was not in
a condition to defend himself. Thus, the case was suspended until January 21,
1936, when Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be
discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was considered a
recovered case.
 The Court of First Instance of Manila, upon arraignment, Bonoan pleaded not
guilty and trial ensued. After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of
murder, and held that the Bonoan, was not insane at the time of the murder on
the theory, that the insanity was only occasional or intermittent, and not
permanent or continuous. Bonoan was sentence to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P 1,000, and to pay the costs.
 Bonoan appealed to the Supreme Court, on the ground, that the court a quo erred
in not considering defendants insanity, as exempting circumstance.
Issue:
 Whether or not Bonoan was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
Yes
Holding:
 The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and Bonoan is acquitted. In
conformity with paragraph 1 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other
hospital for the insane as may be designated by the Director of the Philippine
 Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of
Manila shall otherwise order or decree.
Reasoning:
 In our country, we follow the first and stricter view. Insanity, to be considered as
a form of defense, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, when the
commission of a crime is established, if not, conviction follows. In other words,
proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act, should be clear and
satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity.
 The prosecution, may had the burden, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime, but sanity is presumed, thus when a
defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the
burden of establishing that fact rests upon him.
 The Supreme Court, further provided, that in order to ascertain a person’s mental
condition, at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind, a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct
testimony, is not required, nor is specific acts of derangement essential to be able
to established insanity as a form of defense. Mind can only be known by outward
acts.
 Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come
to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing,
suffice. (People v. Bascos)
 Bonoan, killed Guison, because he owed him 55 centavos and would not pay,
however, he bought the knife for 55 centavos in Tabora Street, and that for two
days, he had been watching for Guison in order to kill him.
 Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine, that in the type of dementia
præcox, the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In
these people, homicidal attacks are common, because of delusions that they are
being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken.
People of the Philippines v. Mamerto Narvaez
G.R. No. 33466-67, April 20, 1983
(Source:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1983/apr1983/gr_l_33466_67_1983.html)

Facts:
 Mamerto Narvaez was found guilty of homicide by shooting Davis Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia. Around 2:30 P.M. of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus
Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and
Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased
Davis Fleischer.
 At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his
house, were being chiseled, he arose, and there he saw the fencing going on. If the
fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his house
and the bodega of his rice mill.
 So he addressed the group, saying Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house
and if possible we will talk it over — what is good, addressing the deceased Rubia,
who is appellant’s compadre.
 The deceased Fleischer, however, answered “No, gademit, proceed, go ahead”.
Narvaez apparently, lost his equilibrium, and he got his gun, and shot Fleischer,
hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both
Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting.

Issue:

2 issues arose from this case:

 Whether or not the act of Narvaez is in defense of his person, and of his rights,
and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability. No
  Whether or not Narvaez is also liable for subsidiary imprisonment, should he be
unable to pay the damages imposed. No

Holding:

 The Supreme Court held that Narvaez is found guilty of two counts of Homicide.
Appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 4 months of arresto
mayor, to indemnify the heirs without subsidiary imprisonment.

Ruling:

 Under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, requires a person convicted of

prision correccional, or arresto mayor and fine who has no property with which
to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one
(1) day for each P 2.50.
 However, the amendment introduced by Republic Act 5465 on April 21,
1969, made the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, applicable to
fines only, and not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
 Considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In Re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc

G.R. No. L-32485, October 22, 1970

(Source:
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1970/oct1970/gr_3
2485_1970.php )
Facts:

 This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming
to be a duly a recognized and existing non-stock and nonprofit corporation.
Petitioner prays for a determination of the validity of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6132
(The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act) and a declaration of petitioner’s rights
and duties thereunder.
 Section 8. Prohibited Acts. In addition to and supplementing prohibited acts
provided for in the Revised Election Code, in the election of delegates:
 (a)   No candidate or delegate to the convention shall represent or allow himself
to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic,
religious, professional or other organization or organized group of whatever
nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of
his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly, material
or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.
 Kay Villegas Kami Inc. has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology
and program of government. Petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by
supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its
ideology.
 Kay Villegas Kami Inc. impugns only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the
grounds that it violates the due process clause, the right of association, and
freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

Issue:
 Whether or not Section 8(a) of RA 6132 is an ex-post facto law. No

Holding:

 The prayer of the petition is hereby, denied and paragraph 1 of Section 8(a) of
R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional.

Reasoning:
  The Supreme Court elaborated that an ex post facto law is one which:
- Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act.
- Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
- Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed.
- Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense.
- Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful
- Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

 From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex-post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect.
 While it is true that Section 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No.
6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed
after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto.
 There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Sections 8(a) and 18, or
any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval.
On the contrary, Section 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its
approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.

People of the Philippines v. Wong Cheng

G.R. No. 18924, October 19, 1922

(Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1922/oct1922/gr_l-
18924_1922.php)

Facts:

Wong Cheng, is accused, of having illegally smoked opium aboard the foreign
merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality, while said vessel, was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer,
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. The latter granted the
demurrer and dismissed the case.

Issue:

 Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over a crime, like
the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters. Yes

Holding:

 The order, appealed from is revoked, and the cause, ordered remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special
finding as to costs.

Reasoning:

 There are two fundamental rules on under International Law:

 French rule which states that crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects
the peace and security of the territory; and
 English rule which is based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory
they were committed.
 Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this
 matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United
States.
 We have seen that, the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel, in
transit was held by this court, not triable by our courts. Because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law, to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines,
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession
in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not bring about in the
said territory. Those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence, such a
mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
 But to smoke opium, within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly, a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.

The United States v. Ah Sing

G.R. No. L-13005, October 10, 1917

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1917/oct1917/gr_l-
13005_1917.html )

Facts:

 Ah Sing is a Chinese, and he is employed as a fireman, on the steamship Shun

Chang. The Shun Chang, is a foreign steamer, which arrived at the port of Cebu
on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon.
 The defendant, bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the
steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from
Saigon to Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium,
and that he had purchased it in Saigon.
 The Court of First Instance in Cebu, found that Ah Sing is guilty, in violation
of Section 4 of Act No. 2381 or the Opium Law, and sentenced him to two years
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300.
Issue:

 Whether or not the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands been proven? Yes

Holding:  

 Ah Sing is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence
of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the
judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Reasoning:

 Under Section 4 of Act, No. 2881 which states that “Any person who shall
unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands”. The
word import and bring are considered to be synonymous terms, in which the
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a
port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. The
importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the
bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the
Custom House.
 Thus, the Court, expressly held that any person who unlawfully imports or brings
any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is
found under this person’s control on a vessel which has come direct from a
foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands.
Applied to the facts in the case at hand, it would be absurd to think that the
accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for
the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that
the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better
explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended
this opium, to be brought into the Philippine Islands.

The United States v. Look Chaw aka Luk Chiu

G.R. No. L-5887, December 16, 1911

(Source:
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1911decemberdecisions.php?id=272)

Facts:

 Around 11 and 12 am, on August 19, 1909, several persons, among them Messrs.
Jacks (chief of port) and Milliron (internal revenue agent), went aboard the
steamship, Erroll. The steamship, docked in the Port of Cebu, to inspect and
search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack and
afterwards in the hold, another sack of opium. The hold, in which the second sack
was found, was under the defendant’s control, who, moreover, freely and of his
own will and accord admitted that the two sacks belonged to him. He admitted
that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hongkong with the intention of
selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz.
 It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it
came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu.
 The Court of First Instance of Cebu filed a complaint for illegal possession of
opium, was filed against defendant. The defense moved for a dismissal of the
case, on the grounds that, the court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the
facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The court ruled that it did not
lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district,
on the wharf of Cebu.The court sentenced the defendant to five years’
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10, 000. From this judgment, the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction because the offense
was committed in an English ship. No

Holding:
  The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction

Reasoning:

 As defined by the Opium Law, the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not
constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality.
 The rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land.
 As it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the
crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent
jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger v. Manuel Moran

G.R. No. L-44896, July 31,1936

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1936/jul1936/gr_l-
44896_1936.html)

Facts:

 Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger, was duly accredited, as honorary consul of Uruguay

at Manila. He was subsequently charged, in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
with the crime of falsification of a private document.
 He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both, under the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the Philippines the
Court of First Instance, had no jurisdiction, to try him, because the Supreme
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense.
  His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition
with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking
cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

Issue:

 Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of
the Philippines. No

Holding:

 The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is not exclusive.

 The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and
that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

Reasoning:

 This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled, that a

consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or
minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country, to which he is
accredited. The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. The
Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but
merely provides that:
 The Supreme Court, shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction, as may be
possessed and exercised, by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution. The original jurisdiction of this court
 shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises
whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
exclusive.
 The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived
from Section 17 of Act No. 136 which provided that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto. Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari,
mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of
First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure.
 It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was
not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the
Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases
is not exclusive.

The United States v Philip K. Sweet

G.R. No. 448, September 20, 1901

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1901/sep1901/gr_448_1901.html )

Facts:

 A criminal complaint was filed against Sweet which was not clearly stated in the
case. Philip K. Sweet was an employee of the United States military authorities in
the Philippine Islands at the time of its alleged commission, and the victim was a
prisoner of war in the custody of the US Military. The offense made by Sweet, is
 punishable under Article 418 of the Penal Code now in force by arresto mayor
and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas.
 Under Section 56(6) of Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission
provides that Courts of First Instance (CFI) are given original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months’ imprisonment or a
fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed. The offense was therefore
cognizable by the court below.
 Sweet then appealed to the Supreme Court raising the following grounds that an
assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not
an offense under the Penal Code and if it is considered as an offense under the
Code, nevertheless the military character of the accused at the time of its
commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction because Sweet was
an employee of the United States military authorities in the Philippine Islands at
the time of its alleged commission.

Holding:

 No, the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction.

 The order of the court is affirmed with costs to the appellant.

Reasoning:

 Sweet did not cite any provision in the legislation of Congress and local
legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the US
Military, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the CFI and we are not aware of
the existence of any such provision.
  What is applicable therefore is the general principle that the jurisdiction of the
civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the
accused, a principle firmly established in the law of England and America.
 This principle prevails under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by
express legislation to the contrary.
 Sweet’s claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by
him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if true, be
available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but
cannot under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the
case.

People of the Philippine Islands v. Basilio Borinaga

G.R. No. 33463, December 8, 1930

(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1930/dec1930/gr_l-
33463_1930.html )

Facts:

 Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, Harry H. Mooney, an American and a resident

of the municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with, one Juan Lawaan, for the
construction of a fish corral. Basilio Borinaga, was associated, with Lawaan in the
construction of the corral.
In the Morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to
Mooney’s shop, and tried to collect from him the whole amount fixed by the
contract, notwithstanding that only about two-thirds of the fish corral had been
finished. Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon at that time. Lawaan then
warned him that if he did not pay, something would happen to him. Mooney
 answered that if they wanted to do something to him they should wait until after
breakfast, inasmuch as he had not yet taken his breakfast. Lawaan and company
left. Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: “I will stab this Mooney, who
is an American brute.”
 On the Evening of March 4, 1929, Mooney was in the store of neighbor Perpetua
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of Perpetua, his back being to the
window. Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw, Basilio Borinaga,
from the window strike with a knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the
knife lodged in the back of the chair on which Mooney was seated. Mooney fell
from the chair, as a result of the force of the blow, but was not injured.
 Borinaga, ran away towards the market place. He was heard to say that he did not
hit the back of Mooney but only the back of the chair. Hardly ten minutes after
the first attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so
because Mooney and Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight
on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again that same night, Borinaga was
overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to give another
blow because of the flashlight.
 The point of the knife was subsequently, on examination of the chair, found
imbedded in it. Borinaga was sued, for frustrated murder in Court of First
Instance in Leyte. He was convicted and sentenced to fourteen years, eight
months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusión temporal, with the accessory
penalties and the costs

Issue:

 Whether the facts constitute as frustrated murder or simply an attempt to

commit murder as defined in the Revised Penal Code. Frustrated Murder

Holding:

 The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Reasoning:

 The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts
of execution, attended the attack.
 Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant completely.
The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from
further acts. What is known as the subjective phase of the criminal act was
passed.
 No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of the accused to establish a
lesser crime than that of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton
disregard of the sanctity of human life fully meriting the penalty imposed in the
trial court.

People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Salvilla

G.R. No. 86163, April 26, 1990

(Source:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/apr1990/gr_86163_1990.html)

Facts:

 On April 12, 1986 around noontime, Bienvenido Salvilla together with Reynaldo,
Ronaldo and Simplicio Canasares, staged a robbery, at the New Iloilo Lumber
Yard. They were armed with homemade guns, and a hand grenade. On their way
inside the establishment, they met Rodita Hablero, an employee there, who was
on her way out for her meal break, and informed her that it was a hold-up. They
went inside the office and the petitioner pointed his gun at Severino Choco, the
owner, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimia. They informed Severino, that all
they needed was money.
 Severino asked Mary to get a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000 cash (P5000
according to the defense) and handed it to the petitioner. Simplicio Canasares
took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his 2 daughters
and Rodita were kept inside the office. According Salvilla, he stopped Severino
from getting the wallet and watches.

Around 2:00 P.M. of the same day, the Salvilla told Severino to produce
P100,000, so he and the other hostages can be released. Severino told him it
would be hard to do that since banks are closed because it was a Saturday. The
police and military authorities, had surrounded the lumber yard. Major
Melquiades Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with
the accused and appealed to them to surrender. The accused refused to
surrender and release the hostages.
 Rosa Caram, Officer-In-Charge Mayor of Iloilo City, joined the
negotiations. Appellant demanded P100,000, a coaster, and some
raincoats. Caram offered P50,000 instead. Later, the accused agreed to
receive the same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary in going out of
the office. One of the accused gave a key to Mayor Caram and with the key, Mayor
Caram unlocked the door and handed to Rodita P50,000, which Rodita gave to
one of the accused.
 Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office. The police and
military authorities decided to assault the place when the accused still wouldn’t
budge after more ultimatums. This resulted to injuries to the girls, as well as to
the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary’s right leg had to be
amputated due to her injuries. The appellant maintained that the money, wallet
and watches were all left on the counter and were never touched by them. He also
claimed that they never fired on the military because they intended to surrender.
 The Regional Trial Court of Ilo-ilo ruled that Salvilla and his co-accused
Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed Canasares are  guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of “Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and
 Serious Illegal Detention” and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Issue:

2 Issues arose from this case:

 Whether or not the crime charged was consummated, and not merely attempted.
No

 Whether or not the appellant’s claim of voluntary surrender, may be considered,

as a mitigating circumstance. No

Holding:

 The judgement of the Regional Trial Court of Ilo-ilo is affirmed.

Ruling:
The First Issue

 No. Three stages of robbery/theft: (1) the giving, (2) the taking, (3) the carrying
away or asportation (the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner
without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi).
 The crime is consummated, when the robber acquires possession of the property,
even if for a short time, and it is not necessary, that the property be taken into the
hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away,
out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made
his escape with it.
 From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit
had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. It is
no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to
dispose of the personalties taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the
crime.
The Second Issue

 No. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: 1.) that the

offender had not been actually arrested; 2.) that the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority or to his agent; and 3.) that the surrender was voluntary.
 The “surrender” by the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these
requirements. Surrender of the accused was not to be mitigating when he gave up
only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and police forces. Their
surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure
their safety.

People of the Philippines v. Amado Daniel

G.R. No. L-40330, November 30, 1978
(Source
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/nov1978/gr_40330_1978.html )

Facts:

 Margarita Paleng, was a 13-year old native of Mountain Province and she was
boarding at a house located at Baguio City, as she is then a first-year high school
student at the Baguio Eastern High.
 On September 20, 1965, around 3 P.M. in the afternoon, she had just arrived in
the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus. The accused, a co-passenger, followed her
up to her boarding house and succeeded in having carnal knowledge by
threatening her with a dagger. Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered,
he was already gone.  
 The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him, the
terrible misfortune, which befell her. She was immediately brought, to the Baguio
General Hospital, where she was examined. Then they proceeded to the Police
Department. The Chief of Police, accompanied them to the Health Center, where
 she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter, submitted his
medical report, certifying that the defloration was recent. Margarita and her
father, gave their respective statements before the police authorities. She signed
her criminal complaint which was prepared by the Fiscal’s Office of Baguio.
 Amado Daniels defense is that he and Margarita, were acquainted with each
other since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus. The
incident in September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter’s
consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the
first time having occurred inside a shack. He promised Margarita that he would
marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him.
 The Court of First Instance of Baguio ruled that Daniel was found guilty and he
was sentenced to suffer prision mayor, and to pay the costs. His motion for
reconsideration and request for new trial was denied.
 The Court of Appeals found Daniel guilty of rape. However, the sentence imposed
upon the accused by the Court of First Instance of Baguio is not in accordance
with law. RA No. 4111 provides that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law of
rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all
criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment.
 Thus, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court and in a
Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed.

Issue:

 Whether or not there was an aggravating circumstance of dwelling, considering

that it was not the victim’s house but merely her boarding house? Yes

Holding:
  Judgment of the Court of First Instance, convicting Amado Daniel for the crime
of rape as charged is affirmed. Sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of
P12,000.00 and pay the costs.
 The correct penalty is death pursuant to Article 335 of the RPC. However, for lack
of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to be
applied.

Reasoning:

 Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room
constituted for all intents and purposes a “dwelling” as the term is used in Article
14(3), Revised Penal Code.
 It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or
dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home the
sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

People of the Philippine Islands v. Lol-Lo and Saraw

G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922
(Source: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/feb1922/gr_l-
17958_1922.html )

Facts:

 On or about June 30,1920, two boats left Matuta for Peta. Both are in Dutch
possession. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o’clock in the
evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East Indies.
 There the boat was surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The
Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of
 the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by
methods too horrible to be described.
 All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would
submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored.
 Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were
Lol-lo who also raped one of the women and Saraw. At Maruro the two women
were able to escape. Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South
Ubian, TawiTawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
 There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the
Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands because the crime was committed outside the country.
 After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of
them to life imprisonment cadena perpetua.

Issue:

 Whether or not, the Court of First Instance of Sulu, has jurisdiction over the
offense? Yes
 Whether or not, the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with the crime of piracy
are still in force in the Philippine Islands after it was ceded, by Spain to the US.
Yes

Holding:
  In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed,
and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of
the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time
and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the 26 th Judicial
District.

Reasoning:

 Pirates, In law, are hostes humani generis, which is latin for enemy of mankind.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may
be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be
found or into which he may be carried.
 The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is
against all so may it be punished by all.
 Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile
limit of a foreign state, for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes.

People of the Philippines v. Filomeno Camano

G.R. No. L-36662-63, July 30, 1982
(Source:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1982/jul1982/gr_l_36662_63_1982.html )

Facts:

 On February 17, 1970, Filomeno Camano, while drunk, stabbed the victim,
Godofredo Pascua, twice using a bolo, while the latter, was walking alone, along
the barrio street, almost in front of the store of Socorro Buates. The victim,
Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds, for which he died
instantaneously.
  Camano, looked for and found Mariano Buenaflor, leaning at the gate of the fence
of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his
head stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and
after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued
hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave
him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest above the nipple causing
instant death. Buenaflor sustained eight wounds in total.
 After killing the two victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently
surrendered upon demand of peace officers for him to surrender. At the police
station he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was hidden by him under
the table of his house and thus was recovered by the police. Still stained with
human blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade. He also
admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. However, when
he was asked to sign a statement, he refused.
 Motive, was provided, by witness who said Camano, had ill feelings, towards the
two because three years ago, the two, refused to tow his boat using Buenaflor’s
boat. All were living by the seashore and were apparently fishermen. At trial, he
and his lone witness insisted that it was the other way around and that the two
victims ganged up on him and that he acted in self-defense.
 The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur held that, for the killing of
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano, was charged,
under two separate informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident
premeditation and treachery and was found guilty, sentenced to death. Hence,
mandatory SC review.

Issue:
 Whether or not intoxication should be appreciated as mitigating circumstance
instead of aggravating as the trial court did. Yes

Holding:
  The Court modified the penalty to be imposed. The offense being attended by the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to
offset it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. 
 The Supreme Court applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant to
suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, in each case.

Ruling:

 There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if

accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to
commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it
must be indubitably proved.
 A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating
drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a
matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and
undermines will-power making its victim a potential evildoer. The records of
these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of
intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every now and then.
 Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor
intentional, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is
aggravating if habitual or intentional. To be mitigating, it must be indubitably
proved.

Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Jaime Salazar

G.R. No. 92163, June 5,1990
(Source: https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1990junedecisions.php?
id=552 )
Facts:
 On February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader, Juan Ponce Enrile, was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim, of the National
Bureau of Investigation, on the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Salazar of
the RTC-Quezon City. Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio,
and Gregorio Honasan were charged with the crime of rebellion, with murder and
multiple frustrated murders, allegedly committed, during the period of the failed
coup attempt, from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile, was then
taken to, and held overnight, at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed
in the arrest warrant.
 The following morning on February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioner has committed a complex crime, arising from an
offense, being a necessary means to commit another, which is referred in the
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code? No

Holding:

 The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce
Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging
simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right.
  The Court’s earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed,
by said respondent, for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied,
with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Reasoning:

 Murder and arson are crimes inherent when rebellion is taking place. In the RPC,
rebellion is just a single crime under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and
there is no reason to complex it with other crimes inherent in its commission.
Thus, Article 48 applies only when there are two crimes committed and not when
there is only one such as in this case. The OSG contends that this case does not
fall within the Hernandez ruling because the information in Hernandez charged
murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion.  
 Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General, would distinguish between the complex
crime arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another,
which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 and is the subject of the
Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime arising from a single act constituting
two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
 In the absence of aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty cannot be
imposed on Enrile. However, Article 48 states that an accused can be punished
the maximum penalty even without a single aggravating circumstance.
 This is contrary to the principle that penal statutes should be decided liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state. Article 48 was enacted to favor
the accused, not of sentencing him/her to a penalty more severe than what is
proper when the acts were punished separately.