VICKY C. TY, Plaintiff-Appellee VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Accused-Appellants
VICKY C. TY, Plaintiff-Appellee VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Accused-Appellants
VICKY C. TY, Plaintiff-Appellee VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Accused-Appellants
if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for
her mother, and to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was
compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and
issue the checks to effect her mother's immediate discharge.
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty
of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand
pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each
case."15
CA- In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty's defenses
of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospital's
knowledge of her checking account's lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22
makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special
offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable
consideration for the issuance of the checks as they were issued in
payment of the hospital bills of Ty's mother.
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate
court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of Appeals wherein this Court
declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P.
22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness,
with due regard to the protection of the social order.
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ISSUES
1) Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to
warrant her exemption from criminal liability.
RULING
The petition is without merit.
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following
requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the
fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater
than or at least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is
of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed
to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for
ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It
should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will
but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave
no opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real
and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checksa
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could
be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable
fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all
its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say
that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners
flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the
fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of
all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required
prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated
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checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with
the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks
without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to
whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation. As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,
"what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the
fact of its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their
issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22."
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused
by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with
such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays
the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been
paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for
insufficiency of funds. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a
conviction.
HELD
The instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY
of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the
amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article
39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private
complainant, Manila Doctors' Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten
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