THIRD DIVISION

JUDGE ADORACION G. G.R. No. 165276

ANGELES,  
Petitioner,  
   
- versus -  
  Present:
HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting  
Deputy Executive Secretary for  
Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. CORONA, J., Chairperson,
FLORES, Senior Deputy Executive CHICO-NAZARIO,
Secretary, Office of the President; VELASCO, JR.,
Former DOJ SECRETARY NACHURA, and
HERNANDO B. PEREZ (now PERALTA, JJ.
substituted by the Incumbent DOJ  
Secretary RAUL GONZALES);  
Former PROV. PROS. AMANDO  
C. VICENTE (now substituted by  
the Incumbent PROV. PROS.  
ALFREDO L. GERONIMO);  
PROS. BENJAMIN R. CARAIG, Promulgated:
Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL November 25, 2009
T. VISTAN,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
 
DECISION
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
Before this Court is a Petition for Review,[1] under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the February 13, 2004 Decision[2] and September 16,
2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019.
 
The facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner and likewise adopted by the
CA, are as follows:
 
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen
(14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was
entrusted to the care of the former by the girls grandmother and petitioners sister
Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of
four.
 
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a
good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and
happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and
wrote the latter letters.
 
Petitioners love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother
respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latters family who were
regular beneficiaries of the undersigneds generosity. Michael would frequently
run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day
subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
 
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner
for his failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely
reprimanded over the phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any
kind would be extended to him and that he was no longer welcome at petitioners
residence.
 
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April
1999 by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioners custody.
Michael used to have free access to the undersigneds house and he took the girl
away while petitioner was at her office.
 
In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend
Ines Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto,
Bulacan to confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed
that he brought the girl to the residence of her maternal relatives in Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan. Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the
assistance of the 303rd Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in
Malolos, Bulacan to locate the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and
Ruben Fred Ramirez accompanied petitioner and her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan
where they coordinated with police officers from the said place. The group failed
to find the girl. Instead, they were given the run-around as the spouses Ruben and
Lourdes Tolentino and spouses Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with
the false information that Maria Mercedes was already brought by their brother
Carmelito Guevarra and the latters wife Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
 
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271
of the Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against
Michael Vistan, the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra
spouses, all maternal relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.
 
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long
arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his
half-sister Maria Mercedes.
 
From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow,
shuttled back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as
in Manila and Quezon City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He
eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN in Quezon City where he made her recite
a concocted tale of child abuse against herein petitioner hoping that this would
compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge which she earlier filed.
 
In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to
the DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
 
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get
himself off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had
deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical,
emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which
were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
 
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts
of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the
Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She
likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael
and Maria Mercedes.
 
In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R.
Caraig recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but
recommended that only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The
charge of Violation of PD 1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to
uphold the petitioners complaint against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic)
remained.
 
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation
of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA
7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for
Violation of PD 1829.
 
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was
denied in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
 
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18
May 2000. She also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000.
 
 In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
acting for the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. The
undersigneds Motion for Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise
denied by then DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15
October 2001.
 
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the
Office of President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for
reconsideration was denied before said forum anchored on Memorandum
Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.[4]
 
 
On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review[5] before the CA assailing
the Order of the Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of the
President erred in not addressing the merits of her petition by relying on
Memorandum Circular No. 58, series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the
constitutionality of the memorandum circular, specifically arguing that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because it diminishes the
power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.[6] Moreover, petitioner contended that
the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint against
respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829[7] (PD
No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 7610[8] (RA No. 7610).[9]
 
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.[10]
 
 
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine
of qualified political agency, to wit:
 
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt
petitioners case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of
the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself.[11]
 
 
Moreover, the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not
warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No.
1829.[12] Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when it dismissed the
complaint for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not attended by grave
abuse of discretion.
 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated September 16, 2004.
 
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors,
to wit:
 
1.      THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE
PROVISIONS OF MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
 
2.      THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT
OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
 
3.      THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF R.A.
7610 (CHILD ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICHAEL VISTAN.[14]
 
 
The petition is without merit.
 
Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without
any basis in law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58
is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President
and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered
power.[15] This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to
the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the
purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our
jurisdiction.
 
 Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.[16] The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in
upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it
merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,[17] this Court has recognized
and adopted from American jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified political
agency, to wit:
 
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one
purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of
judicial searchlight, and that is,the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy
political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings,
Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op.,
Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without
minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated
otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme
Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is
required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[18]
 
Memorandum Circular No. 58,[19] promulgated by the Office of the President
on June 30, 1993 reads:
 
 In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines
enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review
by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the
Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases are
reiterated and clarified.  
 
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases
shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
 
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within
the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.

 
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits
of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in
order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the
Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the
extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or
abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion[20] is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power
and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to
delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially
that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
 
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No
less than the Constitution provides for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
hisponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
 
x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under
the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts
which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him
in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of
any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art.
 VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec.
11, idem).[21]
 
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our
fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.[22] The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive
exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.[23] The list is by no
means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question
is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.[24]
 
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the
Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be
considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated.
Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as
Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose
upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by
the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of
the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of
Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
 
In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,[25] this Court discussed the predicament of imposing
upon the President duties which ordinarily should be delegated to a cabinet
member, to wit:
 
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the
decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by
the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the
governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of
Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk
and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. 
 
 If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise
every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from
running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed
activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing
among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless
times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and
more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents.  This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very
existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in
running the government.[26] 
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioners
position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the President,
notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292),
the Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the
governments principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the
governments prosecution arm and administers the governments criminal justice
system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the
correctional system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise.[27] These are
known functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch
and, thus, within the Chief Executive's power of control.
Petitioners contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the
Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the
President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated
by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.[28] Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by
the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular
has the approval of the President.
 
Anent the second ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit.
 
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of
PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows:
 
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of
processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x
 
Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground
obstructed the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest.[29]
 
This Court does not agree.
 
There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner.
Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had
disposed of the said issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the
position taken by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on "obstruction of
justice, in the wise:
 
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue
that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re:
"obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal
case is committing another offense of obstruction of justice if and when the
warrant of arrest issued for the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life
or returned unserved after its life and that the accused should be charged
therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter
charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved during its life or returned
unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another or a second charge
of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And if the warrant
of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of
"obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus,
petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of
justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested
or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as
contrary to the intent and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x[30]
 
 
As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner,
do not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of
PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented
by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of
the accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a
commission of another offense of obstruction of justice.[31]
 
Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide
that it is applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself.
[32]
 Petitioner thus contends that where the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.[33]
 
 
Again, this Court does not agree.
 
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that
penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. [34] Courts must
not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it.
No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too,
no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within
them.[35] Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.[36]
 
Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not
the offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In
any case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may
be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the case at bar.
 
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA No.
7610. Said Section reads:
 
Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation
or responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development,
including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period.
 
 
On this note, the Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the
Investigating Prosecutor to file the information for violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI, of RA No. 7610, gave the following reasons:
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information
for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The affidavit
of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found
happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the company
of her relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can
her joining the brother be prejudicial to her with such statement?[37]

 
Said finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
 
This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig
Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez et. al,[38] where this Court emphasized the
executive nature of preliminary investigations, to wit:
 
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court
is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the
public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the
Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice
ample latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the
Secretary of Justices findings and conclusions on the matter of probable
cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will
prevail only if they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public
respondents resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[39]
Were the acts of the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with
grave abuse of discretion?
 
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act not at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.[40]
 
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their conclusion
of lack of probable cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself.
The reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and sufficiently. Was their
reliance on the victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This
Court does not think so.
 
While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by
respondent into executing the affidavit,[41] this Court finds no conclusive proof
thereof. Besides, even if their reliance on the victims affidavit may be wrong, it is
elementary that not every erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of discretion.
[42]
 As such, this Court will not interfere with the said findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation
is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and ultimately on the Secretary of
Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that this Court will not pass upon absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision
and September 16, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76019 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
 
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
 
ATTESTATION
 
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2]
 Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and
Regalado E. Maambong, concurring, id. at 31-46.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 19.
[4]
 Id. at 32-36. (Emphasis supplied.)
[5]
 Id. at 47-61.
[6]
 Id. at 8.
[7]
 PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS, January 16, 1981.
[8]
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, June 17, 1992.
[9]
 Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[10]
 Id. at 46.
[11]
 Id. at 40-41.
[12]
 Id. at 43.
[13]
 Id. at 20-29.
[14]
 Id. at 7.
[15]
 Id. at 8.
[16]
 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463 (1939).
[17]
 Id.
[18]
 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 464. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19]
 Reiterating and Clarifying the Guidelines Set Forth in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983)
Concerning the Review by the Office of the President of Resolutions Issued by the Secretary of Justice Concerning
Preliminary Investigations of Criminal Cases.
[20]
 Rollo, p. 8.
[21]
 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 462-463.
[22]
 Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 505, 534.
[23]
 Id.
[24]
 Id.
[25]
 Id. at 505.
[26]
 Id. at 532. (Emphasis supplied.)
[27]
 Title III, Justice, Chapter 1, GENERAL PROVISIONS:
1.        Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government with a
principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the
crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; implement the laws on the
admission and stay of aliens, citizenship, land titling system, and settlement of land problems involving
small landowners and members of indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free legal services to
indigent members of the society.
2.        Section 2. Mandate. - The Department shall carry out the policy declared in the preceding section.
3.        Section 3. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following
powers and functions:
4.        (1) Act as principal law agency of the government and as legal counsel and representative thereof,
whenever so required;
[28]
 Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 463.
[29]
 Rollo, p. 11.
[30]
 Id. at 42-43.
[31]
 Id. at 43.
[32]
 Id. at 12.
[33]
 Id.
[34]
 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 208, citing People v. Subido, 66 SCRA 545 (1975). People v. Yu Jai,
99 Phil. 725 (1956); People v. Terrado, 125 SCRA 648 (1983), and other cases.
[35]
 Id., citing U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 (1917) and U.S. v. Madrigal, 27 Phil. 347 (1914).
[36]
 Id.
[37]
 Rollo, pp. 83-84. (Refer to handwritten annotation.)
[38]
 G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774.
[39]
 Id. at 777.
[40]
 Estrada v. Desierto, 487 Phil. 169, 182 (2004).
[41]
 Rollo, p. 13.
[42]
 Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 40, at 188.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144261-62. May 9, 2001]

PRUDENTE D. SOLLER, M.D., PRECIOSA M. SOLLER, M.D., RODOLFO

I. SALCEDO, JOSEFINA B. MORADA, MARIO M. MATINING, and
ROMMEL M. LUARCA, petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises the issue of the
propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan[1] in Criminal Cases Nos. 25521
and 25522 both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D. Soller, Preciosa M. Soller,
Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca wherein petitioners are
charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under P.D. No. 1829. The grounds for petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations
against them are that only petitioner Prudente D. Soller occupied a position classified as Grade
27 and higher and because the offenses charged were not committed by him in violation of his
office as Municipal Mayor of Bansud, Oriental Mindoro.
It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was
shot and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a
motorcycle together with petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a
medical clinic located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and
his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. The incident was reported to
and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining. An autopsy was conducted on the same
night on the cadaver of Jerry by petitioner Dr. Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner
Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the petitioners by
the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy
to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b)
concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when
in truth he had only one; and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening
around his wound when in truth there was.
Petitioners spouses Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and
claimed, among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it
was there where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente
Soller, who is also a doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the
Municipal Health Officer, to assist in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing
which required male strength, and that Mrs. Macabaels consent was obtained before the
autopsy. The two (2) police officers denied having planted three (3) shells at the place where the
shooting took place.
The Office of the Ombudsman recommended the filing of an Information for Obstruction of
Justice (Violation of P.D. 1829), and two (2) Informations[2] were filed with the Sandiganbayan
which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522. The two (2) informations
respectively read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 25521

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO
MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA,
of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D.
1829, committed as follows:

That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
Health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal
the brain of JERRY MACABAEL with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and
availability as evidence in the investigation of criminal case for murder against the
accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 25522

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer, I, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon, hereby accuses PRUDENTE SOLLER, PRECIOSA SOLLER, MARIO
MATINING, ROMMEL LUARCA, RODOLFO SALCEDO, and JOSIE MORADA,
of committing the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of
Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D.
1829, committed as follows:

That on or about March 14, 1997, prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above name accused, all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal
health Officer, SPO II, PO 1, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, respectively, all of said
municipality, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and criminal give false and fabricated information in the autopsy
report and police report to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agency, from
apprehending the offender by reporting that there are several gunshot wounds in the
body of the victim, JERRY MACABAEL and that there is no tattooing (blackening)
around the wound of the said victim when in truth and in fact, there is only one
gunshot wound and there is tattooing (blackening) around the wound which would
indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of the herein respondents
spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the offenses charged; this motion was opposed by respondent People. In its
assailed Order dated April 14, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash on
the ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one (1) of the
accused public officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that official,
then the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. The
Order stated that the accused is the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident took
place and, therefore, any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a
criminal offense committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense also
in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this Court.
Motion for Reconsideration of the above order was filed on the premise that it is not among
the functions of the mayor to conduct autopsies so that any misdeed, if indeed there was any,
could not be an offense which would put him under the jurisdiction of the court. Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, the Sandiganbyan ruling that:

The enumeration of the functions of the mayor indicate very clearly that he is the
primary executive and, therefore, necessarily the primary peace officer of the
municipality, for which reason, any action on his part which deviates from that
function is an office-related offense. In this particular instance, the accused is charged
for having cooperated or co-participated with another public official of lower rank in
the same municipality in the supposed falsification of the results of an
autopsy. Additionally, even if the functions of an autopsy were totally unrelated to
any of the administrative or executive functions over which the mayor may have
supervision and, more specially, control, the fact of the matter is that the jurisdiction
of the Court covers not only the offenses committed by the officials of Grade Level 27
or higher as the principal accused but even where such officials are also accused
together with some other public officials who may be at a level below Grade Level 27
in connection with the performance of their duties.
In this instance, accused Mayor Prudente D. Soller, Sr. who occupies a position at
Grade Level 27, is co-accused with his wife, the Municipal Health Officer who
occupies a position at Grade Level 24, so that, necessarily, the offense attributed to
the lower ranking officer elevates the entire case to this Court primarily because
somebody over whom this Court has jurisdiction, the Mayor, is accused together with
the lower ranking officer.[3]

Hence, this petition alleging that-

RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 25521 and
25522.[4]

Citing Section 4 of P.D. 1606 as amended, which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioners claim that for an offense to fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the offense must have been committed by the officials enunciated in paragraph
(a) in relation to their office, i.e. it should be intimately connected with the office of the offender,
and should have been perpetrated while the offender was in the performance of his official
functions. Moreover, these requisites must all be alleged in the information. Petitioners assert
that in the subject criminal cases, the Informations do not contain factual averments showing that
they committed the acts charged in relation to their office, i.e., the acts charged are intimately
connected with their respective offices and were perpetrated by them while they were in the
performance of their duties and functions.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, posits that even if the offense charged
was not committed by the accused while in the performance of his official functions, the same
could still be considered done in relation to his office if the acts were committed in line of
duty. Respondents position is that an offense may be considered committed in relation to office if
it arose from misuse or abuse of public office or from non-performance of an official duty or
function; thus the offense of falsifying autopsy and police reports is office-related considering
that among the duties and functions of the municipal mayor in the exercise of general
supervision and control over all programs, projects, services and activities of the municipal
government, is that he shall ensure that all executive officials and employees of the municipality
faithfully discharge their duties and functions. The fact that the informations do not allege that
the acts charged were committed by petitioner Prudente Soller while he was in the performance
of his official functions or duties is not a fatal defect, as the conclusion of law that his acts are in
violation of his duties as municipal mayor could necessarily be deduced from the informations.
Petitioners, in their Reply, reiterate that the factual averments in the Information were fatally
defective in view of the absence of any specific allegation that would indicate that the crimes
charged were committed by the defendants in line of duty or in the performance of their official
functions.
 The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of
the law should be inquired into.[5] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly
from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied. For this
purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law at the time of the
commencement of the action.[6]
The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on May 25, 1999 charging
the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders as defined and penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. The applicable
statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606 as last amended by the Republic Act No.
8249. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as amended provides insofar as pertinent:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime

committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

xxx xxx xxx

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as
provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.

xxx xxx xxx
 In Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,[7] this Court held that the Municipal Mayor, who occupies
Salary Grade 27 in the hierarchy of positions in the government under Republic Act No. 6758
and the Index of Occupational Services. Position Titles and Salary Grades, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as
committed in relation to their office as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted Section 4.
As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,[8] this Court has interpreted the requirement that an offense
be committed in relation to the office to mean that the offense cannot exist without the office or
that the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined and punished in Chapter
Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code (referring to the crimes committed by the
public officers). People vs. Montejo[9] enunciated the principle that the offense must be intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance,
though improper or irregular of his official functions. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Concepcion said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in (the)
abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that -

xxx the offense therein charged is intimately connected with (the accuseds) respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance though improper or
irregular, of their official functions.Indeed (the accused) had no personal motive to
commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.[10]

The cited rulings in Montilla vs. Hilario and in People vs. Montejo were reiterated in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou,[11] Republic vs. Asuncion,[12] and Cunanan vs. Arceo.[13] The case of Republic vs.
Asuncion categorically pronounced that the fact that offense was committed in relation to the
office must be alleged in the information:

That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office,
must, however, be alleged in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over a case under Section 4 (a) (2).This allegation is necessary because of
the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information.[14]

For this purpose what is controlling is not whether the phrase committed in violation to
public office appears in the information; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
is the specific factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between
the discharge of the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged in order
to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.[15]
In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522 quoted
earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their
offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection
between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the
offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was
committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is
included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended. Although the petitioners
were described as being all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health
Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife, there was no allegation that the offense of
altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,
authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder
(Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report
and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the
offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function. Indeed the
offenses defined in P.D. 1829 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a
private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense. Moreover, the
Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police
and autopsy report would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein
petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller. Thus there is a categorical indication that the
petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have
committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal
Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.
A cursory reading of the duties and functions of the Municipal Mayor as enumerated in
Section 444 of the Local Government Code will readily show that the preparation of police and
autopsy reports and the presentation and gathering of evidence in the investigation of criminal
cases are not among such duties and functions, and the broad responsibility to maintain peace
and order cannot be a basis for construing that the criminal acts imputed to petitioner Mayor fall
under his functions as Municipal Mayor.[16] What is obvious is that petitioners spouses probably
acted as the parents of the alleged assailant and if at all, were motivated by personal reasons
rather than official duty.
Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately
connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses
charged in the subject criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged orders are SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[1] 
First Division composed of Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena and Associate Justices Catalino R. Castaeda,
Jr. and Gregory S. Ong.
[2] 
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[3] 
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[4] 
Petition, p. 15.
[5] 
Quiazon, Camilo, Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993, p. 36.
[6] 
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747; People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212.
[7] 
316 SCRA 65.
[8] 
90 Phil. 49.
[9] 
108 Phil. 613.
[10] 
At p. 622.
[11] 
227 SCRA 627.
[12] 
231 SCRA 211.
[13] 
242 SCRA 88.
[14] 
At p. 232.
[15] 
Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA 298.
[16] 
See Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 680.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON.
IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134,
Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE,
State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL;
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed
rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government
prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati,
Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously,
willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said
Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a
warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss
the case and expunge the information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge
Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was)
probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the
Information on the grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator
Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December
1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same
occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for
alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed
meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the
"complexed" rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution
for all the component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred
by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for
violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while
the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515
[1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court
the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of
rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in
the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which thatHernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes
rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex crime
of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which
states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine

ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel
Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest
and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held
at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p.
3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan
conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel
soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully
armed, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed December
coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include
the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829.
Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and
independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under
PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing
was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component
thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held
in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive.(p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a
complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that
acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in
the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104
Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient
of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a
separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity
may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment,
or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing
opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held
guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime
or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is

punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the
same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part
and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery,
kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant
case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance
of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan
is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same
act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of
conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must
now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in
Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor

the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and
convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary element or ingredient in the
crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with other persons in a
separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

 [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further
now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the
Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an
alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash
the information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the
doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED
FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the
rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in this
case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866
because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must
make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion
case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot
complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for
rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a
case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a
friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form
part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his
being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon
the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in
Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan
Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-
Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Medialdea, J., took no part.

Fernan, C.J. and Paras, J., are on leave.

 

Footnotes

1 Recently made the subject of a similar petition for certiorari and modified by the
Supreme Court into an information for the simple crime of rebellion in G.R. Nos.
92163 & 92164, June 5,1990.

2 The doctrine relied upon was set down in treason cases but is applicable to
rebellion cases. As Justice McDonough opined rebellion is treason of less magnitude
(U.S. v. Lagnoasan, 3 Phil. 472, 484, 1904).

3 Justice Isagani A. Cruz and Abraham F. Sarmiento that PD 1866 is unconstitutional

and should be struck down as illegal

per se. Justice Sarmiento stated in his separate dissent that PD 1866 is a bill of
attainder, vague and violative of the double jeopardy clause, and an instrument of
repression.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 131492. September 29, 2000]

ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU

LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V.
DIZON, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was
killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994.  In
a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P.
Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for
assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the
request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the
NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of
Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station
for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
 Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a
certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did
not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the
suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and
Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. [1] However, criminal charges
were filed later against the two student suspects. [2]
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging
petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, [3] which makes it
unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information[4] was filed against them, alleging that:

That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-
named accused, namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice
Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO - Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL.
EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of
their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and
committing the crime in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with
each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully,
knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of
FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects
involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student
and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying
the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing
said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another
principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the
above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects
were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the
suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the

dismissal of the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum,
dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special
Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence
this petition forcertiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's
office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
 I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT
WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT
WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS
AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO
CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE
RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL
WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the
student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether
there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.  We
answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made
except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be made
even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The
arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the
students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The
question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed
and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan
were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts
gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought
to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. [6] They invoke the ruling in People v.
Tonog, Jr.[7] in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under
Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just
been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course
of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.

In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who
later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching
the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the
crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of
the maong pants taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this
case. First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's
invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused,
on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for
which reason the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same
day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had "just been
committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four
days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact
which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime.  What they
had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of
the arresting officers:

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule
113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.[8]

Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near
the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest
Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing
anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the
contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part
in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect
allow them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause
that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make.  The law
authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if
the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to
the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil
liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can
order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural
requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant
was illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829,
1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:

From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to
suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of
Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise. It must be remembered
that these SJ members were positively identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably
prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do
not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of
Dennis Venturina.

Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from
arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be
effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby
averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While this justification may,
at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable
ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous
crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two
eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the
clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay
the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively
identified.

To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless
arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on
their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the
quasijudicial authority to rule on this matter. Of course, there are various remedies
under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order
to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice
to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting
NBI agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a
manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law
enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members
pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.[9]

The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspects were guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in
the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the
attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, 5. Regardless
of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without
warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts could decide
the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested in flagrante
delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in
recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December
12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who
were then at the U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the
warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P.
officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of
students on campus.

Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause
to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating
Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender
a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and
that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section
1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of
knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students
had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an
investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the
accused with Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the
accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.
[10]

Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No.
1829:

SEC. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly
or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:

....

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction;

The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. [11] But as has
been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of
criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution." [12] As we
held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:[13]

Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained
either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court
ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:

a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.
Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.
Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);

c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);

e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);

f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109
Phil. 1140);

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);

h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-
G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);

i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128
SCRA 577);

j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash
on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438); and

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1,
1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had
a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted
arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the
guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had
asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to
disregard constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners
resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor
failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day. [14] Hence, the
information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension
of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students
and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. [15] The student suspect
mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel
Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners
prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas
surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial.  In
the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have
validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a
warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their
inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them
by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before
making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands.That they
chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their
responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public
clamor to bring to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures
faced by law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results
without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that the need to enforce the law
cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable cause for
the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records. They cannot
be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no
other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman from proceeding
with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider
petitioners' challenge to P.D. No. 1829, 1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional
adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
such as the application of a statute or general law. [16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are
hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a
result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan
is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] 
Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
[2] 
Resolution dated Aug. 4, 1997, p. 5; Rollo, p. 52.
[3] 
Annex A; Memorandum dated May 18, 1995, p. 1; Rollo, p. 37.
[4] 
Annex C; Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[5] 
Petition, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[6] 
Comment, p. 12; Rollo, p. 81.
[7] 
205 SCRA 772, 778 (1992).
[8] 
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 709 (1991).
[9] 
Annex B; Memorandum dated September 8, 1997, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 43-44.
[10] 
Resolution dated August 4, 1997, pp. 6-9; Rollo, pp. 53-56.
[11] 
Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).
[12] 
Id., p. 448.
[13] 
298 SCRA 196, 214-215 (1998).
[14] 
Resolution dated May 18, 1995, p. 2; Rollo, p. 38.
[15] 
Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[16] 
Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).

TO STRICTLY PENALIZE OFFENSES

AGAINST THE PROPER ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE:
A CRITIQUE OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1829 “PENALIZING
OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS”
 
by

Allan Verman Y. Ong

 

 
“The things that will destroy us are: politics without principle; pleasure without
conscience; wealth without work; knowledge without character; business without
morality; science without humanity; and worship without sacrifice.” [1]

-          Mahatma Gandhi

 
 Introduction: Tracing the Roots of the Crime of Obstruction
of Justice
 

At an early date, the punishment of acts of obstructing the due administration of justice was recognized

as absolutely essential to the existence of courts and their efficiency in performing the functions for

which they were created.  The great object for the existence of courts is the ascertainment of truth, and

this can only be done fairly and impartially when all persons having knowledge of the transactions at

issue are allowed to come before the courts for examination without hindrance from anyone.  Thus,

under American penal law, the obstruction of the administration of justice is an indictable offense under

the common law, and by statute in most states. [2] 

            In the Philippines, Presidential Decree 1829 “Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and

Prosecution of Criminal Offenders” was enacted into law on January 16, 1981.  Upon its enactment, it

was noted that crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the

government to effectively contain them [3] and that there was a need to discourage public indifference or

apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders. [4]  Therefore, it was necessary

to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension

and prosecution of criminal offenders.[5]

            Despite the admirable purpose of the statute, which was to serve to bridge a huge gap in Criminal

Law, there is a dearth of jurisprudence on PD 1829.  The Supreme Court has only adjudicated four cases

applying the law of PD 1829.  This paper analyzes the law against obstruction of justice, presents a

survey of the cases where the Supreme Court makes its pronouncements applying the law, and gives a

critique of the law, theorizing why the Supreme Court seems to have been hesitant in the application

thereof.  American jurisprudence, which has developed a wealth of case law on this matter, will be used

for its illustrative value, to supplement the lack of Philippine jurisprudence on the matter.
 I. PD 1829: Penalizing Acts that Constitute Obstruction of
Justice
 

The general meaning of “obstruction of justice” denotes an interference with the orderly administration

of law, impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in court or those who have duties or power of

administering justice therein.[6]  PD 1829 penalizes any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs,

impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of

criminal cases by committing any of the following nine acts.  These acts will be discussed separately on

enumeration.  Note that if any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he

shall in addition to the penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding

public office.[7]

 
(a)                        preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the
commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation,
deceit, intimidation, force or threats;[8]

Under this subsection, the act of obstructing the communication of information relating to the

matters mentioned above is proscribed.  The prohibition pertains to the use of means such as bribery,

misrepresentation, intimidation, force, or threats of force.  Thus, under American jurisprudence, it is

illegal to cause a person to inform falsely, if the accused believes that an official proceeding or

investigation is pending or about to be instituted.  A call to another requesting that he give false

information to the police is not constitutionally-protected speech, and is punishable as obstruction of

justice.  Allegations that the defendant, intending to obstruct justice, unlawfully sought to induce others,

in connection with an investigation, to mislead the investigation and not tell the investigators the true

and complete facts support a conviction for obstruction of justice. [9]

 PD 1829 provides that if any of the acts mentioned in the law is penalized by any other

law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.[10]  But this act does not seem to

be penalized under Philippine penal law.  The act of giving false testimony is penalized under the

Revised Penal Code[11] as well as the act of refusing to answer.[12]  But there is no other law

which penalizes this same act.

 

(b)                        altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object,
with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any
investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases;[13]   

Under American jurisprudence, one who knowingly and willfully impedes a lawfully conducted

police investigation of a crime by secreting, suppressing, or destroying evidence, knowing that it is being

sought by investigating officers, may be prosecuted for the crime of obstruction of justice.  Some states

specifically make it a crime to destroy evidence with the intent to impair its availability as evidence in an

investigation or official proceeding.  Tampering with evidence pertains to the destruction or

concealment of any book, paper, record, instrument of writing, or other matter or thing about to be

produced in evidence and is not limited to written evidence but can extend to the destruction of

contraband narcotics, as the term “object” encompasses an unending variety of physical objects. [14]

(c)                        harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order
to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;[15]

The Revised Penal Code penalizes, as accessories, those who, having knowledge of the

commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices,

take part, subsequent to its commission, by three acts: 1) profiting or to assisting the offender to profit

by the effects of the crime, 2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery and 3) harboring, concealing or assisting in the

escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions, or

whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of

the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. [16]

            The third type of accessory is central to the analysis presented in this paper.  Under the Revised

Penal Code, there are two classes of accessories contemplated under the third type of accessory:

1.      Public officers who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the

principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public
functions; and

2.      Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the

author of the crime – guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.  [17]

Thus, the Revised Penal Code does not penalize a person who harbors, conceals or assists in the

escape of an author of a crime other than those specifically enumerated therein – treason, parricide,

murder, or an attempt on the life of the President.  Various crimes such as kidnap for ransom,

destructive arson, qualified rape, and crimes related to prohibited drugs, are of the same gravity [18] with

the crimes listed under Art. 19 of the Code.  But the Code does not penalize private persons who harbor,

conceal or assist in the escape of the author of crimes such as kidnap for ransom.

However, PD 1829 penalizes under the present subsection penalizes the act of harboring or

concealing, or facilitating the escape of any person he knows or has reasonable ground to believe or

suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution

and conviction.  Here, there is no specification of the crime to be committed by the offender for criminal

liability to be incurred for harboring, concealing, or facilitating the escape of the offender, and the

offender need not be the principal – unlike paragraph 3, Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.   Thus,
although the subject acts may not bring about criminal liability under the Revised Penal Code, it may still

be punishable under this particular subsection of PD 1829.  Such an offender if violating Presidential

Decree No.  1829 is no longer an accessory.  He is simply an offender without regard to the crime

committed by the person assisted to escape, and he is penalized as a principal.   So in the problem, the

standard of the Revised Penal Code, the person who helps the criminal escape is not criminally liable

because crime is kidnapping, but under Presidential Decree No. 1829, the person who gives such aid is

criminally liable.

            Under paragraph 3, Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, in the case of a civilian who harbors,

conceals, or assists the escape of the principal, the RPC requires that the principal be found guilty of

certain specified crimes.  The paragraph uses the particular word “guilty.”  So this means that before the

civilian can be held liable as an accessory, the principal must first be found guilty of the crime charged,

either treason, parricide, murder, or attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive.  If the principal is

acquitted,  the civilian who harbored, concealed or assisted in the escape did not violate Art. 19 of the

RPC.  That is as far as the Revised Penal Code is concerned.  But not Presidential Decree No. 1829.  This

special law does not require that there be prior conviction.  It is a malum prohibitum, so there is no need

for guilt, or knowledge of the crime.

            It is interesting to note that this particular act does not seem to be penalized under American

jurisprudence on obstructing justice. 

(d)                        publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution
or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the
same purpose or purposes;[19]

This particular act seems to be penalized also under the Revised Penal Code.  Art. 178 penalizes

the act of using fictitious names for purposes of concealing a crime, evading the execution of a judgment

or causing damages.  The same articles also penalizes any person who conceals his true name and other
personal circumstances.  The illegal use of a fictitious name under this article must be for the three said

reasons, otherwise, if the damage concerns private interest, the offense may be punishable as estafa

through the use of a fictitious name.[20]

However, PD 1829 applies only where the person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes,

frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal

cases by committing any of the mentioned acts.  Art. 178 which penalizes the use of fictitious name and

the concealment of true name of a person to allow himself, not another person as provided in PD 1829,

to conceal a crime, to evade the execution of a judgment or to cause damage.   So PD 1829 and Art. 178

of the RPC do not seem to penalize the same offense.  However, the wording of this particular

subsection seems to imply that the acts must be done to evade a sentence on oneself.  There is  yet no

case of the Supreme Court which clarifies this apparent duplicity.

However, it is interesting to note that the penalty provided for in PD 1829 is prision

correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both.  In turn, the

penalty provided for in Art. 178 is arresto mayor and a fine not to exceed 500 pesos.  It thus appears

that the penalty is more stringent in PD 1829.  So should a person be penalized under this subsection

rather than Art. 178, the convicted person can be made to suffer a greater penalty.

(e)                        delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court
orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;[21]    

American law on obstructing justice makes it a crime to obstruct the exercise of rights or

performance of duties under federal court orders.  Although certain acts that violate the statute may

also constitute criminal contempt, the statute is designed to reach the actions of non-parties who are

beyond the traditional reach of the contempt sanction.  To support a conviction, there must be proof

that the defendant had actual knowledge of the court order and intentionally obstructed justice.   It is to
be noted that a state court has noted that a person who obstructs an officer that is attempting to carry

out a court decree may be convicted of obstructing the due course of justice, and not just of obstructing

an officer in the execution of process, since the officer is acting in this situation as part of the judicial

machinery.[22]  The same observations apply to Philippine penal law.

(f)            making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the
course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;[23]
 

Furnishing false information includes withholding information or providing information that

intentionally misleads.  A misrepresentation statute applies to the concealment of true facts as well as

to the assertion of what is false. [24]  A suspect who gives a false identification to a police officer impedes

the course of an investigation, and violates a statute dealing with obstruction of an officer in the

discharge of his duty.[25]  Under American jurisprudence, falsification of evidence with corrupt intent is

an endeavor to obstruct justice.  A state statute dealing with presentation of false documents for the

purpose of misleading a public servant deals only with the use of false documents in court, not with the

use of a genuine document as part of the support of a false alibi. [26]

A false information statute may require that the information be given with the intent to prevent

the prosecution and with knowledge that the information was untrue.  This intent need not be proved

by direct evidence but can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.  Three elements are

required to convict one under a false reporting statute.  There must be a false statement to a peace

officer, it must be given with the intent to impede an investigation, and the investigation must be of an

actual criminal matter.[27]

(g)                        soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining

from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;[28]

 
            This act seems to fall under the definition since the offense can only be committed by one who is

responsible for the prosecution of a criminal offender, and on account of a benefit, abstains from,

discounts or impedes the prosecution thereof.  To wit, direct bribery is committed by any public officer

who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official

duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or

through the mediation of another. [29]  This particular subsection of PD 1829 is similar to paragraph three

of Art. 210 on Direct Bribery, which penalizes the public officer when the act of bribery constitutes the

act of refraining from doing something which it was his official duty to do.  The penalty to be imposed

upon the public officer shall be prision correctional  in its maximum period to prision mayor in its

minimum period and a fine not less than three times the value of such gift. [30]  In addition to this, Art.

210 imposes the penalty of special temporary disqualification.  The provision shall apply to assessors,

arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other person performing public duties. [31] 

            Given that the act penalized in this subsection is similar to paragraph three of Art. 210, what shall

be the penalty imposed?  PD 1829 imposes the general penalty of prision correccional in its maximum

period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both.  This penalty is lighter than that given under

Art. 210 on bribery.  Therefore, the accused shall be imposed the penalty provided for under Art. 210,

whether he is prosecuted under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code, or under PD 1829.

(h)                        threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person,
honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such
person from appearing in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a
condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the
investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;[32]    

Under American jurisprudence, it is made an offense by federal statute for one to influence,

obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede, by means of threats of force or by

any threatening letter or communication, the due and proper administration of the law under which any
pending proceeding is being had before a federal department or agency. [33]  Under PD 1829, the acts are

punishable are likewise not limited to criminal investigations. 

It has been indicated that the act must be calculated to obstruct the administration of the law to

constitute a violation of the statute.  However, the obstruction need not be successful as one who

endeavors to obstruct a proceeding may be convicted.  There is also no requirement that the means

used to obstruct justice be per se  illegal.[34]  This appears to be applicable as well under PD 1829, since

this subsection does not require that the wrong inflicted on the person to prevent such person from

appearing in an investigation or proceeding must constitute a crime.  American jurisprudence likewise

provides that although most instances when there was obstruction of justice have been based on acts of

bribery, subornation of perjury, falsification of documents, threats, and the like, a corrupt attempt to

influence a pending administrative proceeding may also include the use of legitimate arguments for

concealed or falsified ends, such as asking an investigator for a favor that would benefit the target of an

investigation, without disclosing that the request was made in return for a cash payment by the target.
[35]

This act is not punishable elsewhere in Philippine penal law and it is only PD 1829 which

penalizes the said act.  Art. 143 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the commission of acts tending to

prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies, but the criminal act contemplated in this subsection

pertains to those participants who were supposed to aid in the investigation, and not the members of

Congress themselves.

(i)                giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies
from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating
information from the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of
background information and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead
the investigator or to the court.[36]

 
 The acts penalized under this subsection seems to be similar to those penalized under

subsection (c) of the same PD 1829, since that subsection penalizes harboring or concealing, or

facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has

committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and

conviction.[37]  Under American law on obstruction of justice, these such acts are penalized under other

acts that constitute obstruction of justice.  These include unlawfully obtaining and using unreleased

grand jury transcripts and attempts to transmit or sell transcripts of secret grand jury testimony to

persons under investigation, an agreement between co-defendants that one co-defendant would absent

himself as to cause a mistrial, persuading a co-defendant to absent himself from trial in order to

improperly secure its postponement and such acts constitute the crime of obstruction of justice. [38]

            However, it is not a crime under American jurisprudence to advice the recipient of a letter from a

prosecutor not to comply with the prosecutor’s request to come to court and enter a plea, since the

obstruction of justice statute should not be used to give to the attorney’s notes or verbal requests the

quality of process.  And associating with a person whose conditions of probation forbid such association

does not come within the meaning of the federal obstruction of justice statute. [39]

II. Jurisprudential Pronouncements on PD 1829: A Dearth of

Pronouncements
 

Despite the admirable purpose of the statute and its interstitial nature which is to bridge

certain gaps in the law, there has hardly been PD 1829 which have reached the Supreme

Court.  There are four cases reported where the accused was charged of PD 1829.  These cases are

as follows.

A. Enrile v. Amin
 
In the case of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Hon. Omar U. Amin,[40] Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with

rebellion complexed with murder in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for activities connected with

the December 1989 coup d’ etat, and he was charged to be a co-conspirator of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio

“Gringo” Honasan.  Government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of

Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.  The information charged Enrile for

willfully and knowingly obstructing, impeding, frustrating or delaying the apprehension of Honasan by

harboring or concealing him in his house. 

            Petitioner Enrile claimed that the pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and

frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their

alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 precluded the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or

concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.  Both the RTC and the CA denied him relief

on this ground and he filed a petition for certiorari  with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court invoked its ruling in the case of People v. Hernandez[41] where the Court laid

down the doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed

on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an

activity that constitutes rebellion.  The Court observed:

This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be

charged with the complete crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to
be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different
offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.

x x x x x x x x x

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner

entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and
comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel
 Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do
anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of
such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and
conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

x x x x x x x x x

x x x [T]he factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute

or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the
violation under Presidential Decree No.1829. Under the Department of
Justice resolution there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with
murder and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate
and independent prosecutions for "harboring and concealing ' Honasan
and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of
component elements is readily apparent. [42]

Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and quashed the information.  The Court held that

since petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan,

being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other

purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. It was

motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion.           

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts – it is described as a vast movement of men and

a complex net of intrigues and plots and jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of

the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of

rebellion.  In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component

or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made

the basis of a separate charge.

The Court noted the prosecution’s theory that harboring or concealing a fugitive is

punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is

specious in rebellion cases.  All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,

which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become

absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in

themselves.  Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on

his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of

rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of

rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

 

B. People v. Elias Lovedioro

 

In the case of People v. Elias Lovedioro, [43] an off-duty policeman was walking when a man suddenly

walked beside him fired a gun at the policeman's right ear and killed the policeman. The man who shot

Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay

on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.   A

witness identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro.   Elias Lovedioro y

Castro was charged and convicted in the Regional Trial Court for the crime of Murder under Article 248

of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant claims that the lower court erred in holding him liable for murder and not

rebellion.  He claims that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's

Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of

subversive ends," should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135

of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as look-

out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the

commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and

should therefore have been meted only the penalty of  prision mayor by the lower court.
 The Solicitor General in turn avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as

rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the

policeman was for "political and subversive ends."

            The Supreme Court held that the gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising

against the government.  By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes

involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds.   One aspect

noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law,

absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored

in the case of People v. Hernandez,[44] thus:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the

political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If
a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and
parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political
character of the latter.
 
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it
becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act
was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act
should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive

falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the
accused, better than any individual, knows.
 
            Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime-

alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the law's

relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. The Court said that the ruling in Enrile v. Amin[45] was

instructive in this regard.  The Supreme Court observed and ruled:

x x x This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion

and violation of P.D. 1829 could be tried separately  14 (on the principle
that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a
special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged,
though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of
rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was
charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided
on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the
prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a
separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact
decided, the Court said:

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however

constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must
not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.  

[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is

not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel
Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the
motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed
with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it
should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of
being punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should

be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the
 act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not,

by and of itself, suffice.  The burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political

motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information.  It must be

established by clear and satisfactory evidence.

 

C. People v. Medina and Carlos

 

PD 1829 was applied only tangentially in the case of People v. Medina and Carlos. [46]  In this case, Jaime

B. Medina and accused Virgilio Carlos were apprehended by members of the Narcotics Intelligence and

Suppression Unit (NISU) under the Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP-NARCOM) for

selling Methamphetamine hydrochloride without authority of law.  The two were brought before

Assistant City Prosecutor Lillian H. Ramiro for inquest.  Carlos denied any involvement in the transaction

by claiming that he merely accompanied appellant to the place of the sale, while Medina stated that he

was only supposed to buy the regulated drug at the agreed price of P250,000.00 when the policemen

arrived and arrested them. Appellant added that, at his request, Carlos merely drove the car used by

them.

            They were however charged in an Information where they were alleged to have conspired and

confederated together and mutually helped each other, not having been authorized by law to sell,

dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully

sell or offer for sale 306.71 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.             

The court below rendered judgment holding that appellant conspired with accused Carlos in the

illegal sale of 306.71 grams of shabu. As the trial court appreciated the presence of craft, fraud or

disguise as aggravating circumstances against herein appellant, he was sentenced to suffer the supreme

penalty of death. In the same decision, an alias warrant of arrest was issued by the court for the arrest

of accused Virgilio Carlos.

Medina sought the reversal of the ruling, saying that the lower court erred in finding a conspiracy

between him and Virgilio Carlos.

            The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court.  It held that in the case at bar, appellant

was not merely present in a passive manner at the scene of the crime as he contends. He definitely took

an active participation in the sale of the shabu. He was positively identified as the driver of the car

carrying accused Carlos and the regulated drugs. When the duo arrived at the agreed place, appellant

went down to check if the buyer brought the money while Carlos waited inside the car. Then, upon

learning that the poseur-buyer had the money, appellant signaled to his companion indicating such fact.

No other conclusion could follow from appellant's actions except that he had a prior

understanding and community of interest with Carlos. His preceding inquiry about the money

and the succeeding signal to communicate its availability reveal a standing agreement between

appellant and his co-accused under which it was the role of appellant to verify such fact from the

supposed buyer before Carlos would hand over the shabu. Without such participation of

appellant, the sale could not have gone through as Carlos could have withdrawn from the deal

had he not received that signal from appellant. It is undeniable, therefore, that appellant and his

co-accused acted in unison and, moreover, that appellant knew the true purpose of Carlos in

going to the restaurant.

            But the lower court considered the ruling sentencing the appellant to death due to its

appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or disguise. The Supreme Court found that

a comprehensive search in the records of this case do not reveal these circumstances:

The reason for this can be found in the very rationale adopted
by the lower court in appreciating the said circumstances against
appellant in the dispositive portion of its decision. The court stated that
craft, fraud or disguise led to the escape and non-arrest of Virgilio
Carlos, hence it apparently imputes the same to appellant.

 
 While we share the trial court's disgust over the still
unexplained escape of accused Carlos, we cannot approve its attribution
to herein appellant as the author of such craft, fraud or disguise or even
that the same should aggravate his liability in the present case. For,
even assuming ex gratia argumenti that appellant had a part in the
release of Carlos, it is obvious that the aggravating circumstances
involved do not pertain to the offense charged in the information and
are completely unrelated to the crime of illegal sale of shabu.

The court a quo should have borne in mind that the charge

against appellant is for illegal sale of shabu and not for obstructing the

apprehension and prosecution of a criminal offender or, for that matter,

perjury.    In fact, if such circumstances in themselves constitute

punishable crimes, or are included by the law in defining a crime and

prescribing the penalty therefor, they cannot be considered as

aggravating circumstances. 

To be considered as an aggravating circumstance and thereby

resultantly increase the criminal liability of an offender, the same must
accompany and be an integral part or concomitant of the commission of
the crime specified in the information; and although it is not necessarily
an element thereof, it must not be factually and legally discrete
therefrom. Besides, it is highly problematical whether the Spanish legal
concept of astucia, fraude and disfraz, adopted in our Revised Penal
Code, can find application at all to the dismissal of the case against
Carlos.[47]

In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in considering

against herein appellant the supposed aggravating circumstances of craft, fraud or disguise. The

violation of Section 15 subject of the amended indictment was consequently committed without any

aggravating circumstance.
            The Supreme Court here verified that acts punishable under Presidential Decree No. 1829 cannot

be construed or constituted as mere aggravating circumstances, if indeed they were present in the

case.  They are penalized under the law as liable under PD 1829 and they must be made liable as such.

D. Soller v. Sandiganbayan
 

The most recent case applying PD 1829 is Prudente D. Soller v. Sandiganbayan and People. [48]   This was a

case for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus  raising the issue of the propriety of the assumption of

jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Prudente D.

Soller, Preciosa M. Soller, Rodolfo Salcedo, Josefina Morada, Mario Matining and Rommel Luarca”

wherein petitioners are charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal

Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829. 

It appears that in the evening of March 14, 1997, Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot

and killed along the national highway at Bansud, Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together

with petitioner Soller’s son, Vincent M. Soller.  His body was brought to a medical clinic located in the

house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the

Municipal Health Officer.  An autopsy was conducted on the same night on the cadaver by petitioner Dr.

Preciosa Soller with the assistance of petitioner Rodolfo Salcedo, Sanitary Inspector, and petitioner

Josefina Morada, Rural Health Midwife.

A complaint was later filed against the petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the

Office of the Ombudsman charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal

shootout of Jerry Macabael by:

(a)    altering his wound ;

(b)   concealing his brain;

 (c)    falsely stating in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had

only one; and

(d)   falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his wound when in

truth there was.

Petitioners Soller denied having tampered with the cadaver of Jerry Macabael, and claimed,

among others that Jerry Macabael was brought to their private medical clinic because it was there

where he was rushed by his companions after the shooting, that petitioner Prudente Soller, who is also a

doctor, was merely requested by his wife Preciosa Soller, who was the Municipal Health Officer, to assist

in the autopsy considering that the procedure involved sawing which required male strength, and that

Mrs. Macabael’s consent was obtained before the autopsy. 

But two Information were indeed filed with the Sandiganbayan charging the petitioners

for criminally alter and suppress the gunshot wound and conceal the brain of Jerry Macabael

with intent to impair its veracity, authenticity, and availability as evidence in the investigation of

criminal case for murder against the accused Vincent Soller, the son of herein respondents.
            Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan had no

jurisdiction over the offenses charged.  The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash on the

ground that the accusation involves the performance of the duties of at least one of the accused public

officials, and if the Mayor is indeed properly charged together with that official, then the Sandiganbayan

has jurisdiction over the entire case and over all the co-accused. 

            The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious.  The court held that the rule is that in order to

ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held

to exist.  It cannot be presumed or implied.  For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the

court is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action.
            The Court found:

The action here was instituted with the filing of the Informations on
May 25, 1999 charging the petitioners with the offense of Obstruction
of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders as defined and
penalized under Section 1, Paragraph b of P.D. 1829. 

x x x x x x x x x

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions

corresponding to salary Grade “27” or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as provided by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, amended.

The Supreme Court observed that the bone of contention here is whether the offenses charged

may be considered as committed “in relation to their office” as this phrase is employed in Section 4 of

PD 1892.

As early as Montilla vs. Hilario,[49] the Supreme Court interpreted the requirement that an

offense be committed in relation to the office to mean that “the offense cannot exist without the office”

or “that the office must be a constituent element of the crime.” [50] People vs. Montejo[51]enunciated the

principle that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated

while he was in the performance, though improper or irregular of his official functions. 

In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos.  25521 and 25522 quoted

earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in relation to their

offices.  Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the intimate relation/connection

between the commission of the offense charged and the discharge of official functions of the
offenders, i.e. that the obstruction of and apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders was

committed in relation to the office of petitioner Prudente Soller, whose office as Mayor is

included in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) of P.D. 1606 as amended.  Although the petitioners

were described as being “all public officers, then being the Municipal Mayor, Municipal Health

Officer, SPO II, PO I, Sanitary Inspector and Midwife”, there was no allegation that the offense

of altering and suppressing the gunshot wound of the victim with intent to impair the veracity,

authenticity and availability as evidence in the investigation of the criminal case for murder

(Criminal Case No. 25521) or of giving false and fabricated information in the autopsy report

and police report to mislead the law enforcement agency and prevent the apprehension of the

offender (Criminal Case No. 25522) was done in the performance of official function.  Indeed

the offenses defined in P.D. 1892 may be committed by any person whether a public officer or a

private citizen, and accordingly public office is not an element of the offense.  Moreover, the

Information in Criminal Case No. 25522 states that the fabrication of information in the police

and autopsy report “would indicate that the victim was shot by Vincent Soller, the son of herein

petitioners spouses Prudente and Preciosa Soller”.  Thus there is a categorical indication that the

petitioners spouses Soller had a personal motive to commit the offenses and they would have

committed the offenses charged even if they did not respectively hold the position of Municipal

Mayor or Municipal Health Officer.

            Consequently, for failure to show in the informations that the charges were intimately connected

with the discharge of the official functions of accused Mayor Soller, the offenses charged in the subject

criminal cases fall within the exclusive original function of the Regional Trial Court, not the

Sandiganbayan.  So the petition was granted and the orders were set aside for being void for lack of

jurisdiction.

III. Analyzing the Seeming Non-Use of the Law

 
PD 1829’s purposes are admirable and the acts they penalize should truly be proscribed in order

for the efforts of law enforcers to bear fruit.  Persons who obstruct the acts of administration of

justice do not harm society as much as the acts of the criminal who is sought to be brought to

justice.  Nevertheless, it is necessary for there to be a meaningful exercise of law enforcement,

for citizens not to hamper the acts of law enforcers.

            The provision of PD 1829 which has been used in the cases has been that in subsection

(c) of Section 1 of the law which penalizes the act of harboring, concealing, or facilitating the

escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed

any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and

conviction.  But the cases surveyed reveal that there has hardly been any conviction even under

this act of obstructing justice, even as it appears to be the most commonly committed

ground.  There can be two reasons for the seeming non-use of this provision of the law.  The first

is that the criminals who are themselves in conspiracy with each other do not obtain aid from

those who are not in conspiracy with them.  Thus, they do not need third persons who have not

participated in the crime to aid them in their escape.  The second is that the cultural norms that

move Philippine society has made it common, or even accepted, that relatives will harbor,

conceal or facilitate the escape of other relatives who have committed crimes, regardless of the

criminal nature of the act, because of the strong filial bonds that exist among families.  Because

perhaps of this ground, law enforcement agencies hardly use this ground to penalize those who

help out other relatives, since such persons would merely be doing what is “natural” for them

under the given circumstances. 

            But this is dangerous, because law enforcement agencies have no choice as to the law

which they are to enforce, or even the fact of whether or not to enforce a particular piece of

legislation.  The act of drafting legislation is in the realm of another political body and the

Executive is mandated to apply the law, as it is found.  The fact that PD 1829 has not been

prosecuted may reveal the reasons why the high rates of criminality have not been abated,

despite the efforts of law enforcement agencies. 

            The other acts penalized under PD 1829 which would preventing witnesses from testifying in any

criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by

means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats; [52] or altering, destroying,

suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,

authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official

proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal

cases.[53] Such acts are logically those which are performed in the course of the prosecution of a

criminal.  It would be inconceivable that these acts have never been performed in the course of criminal

trials in the Philippines.  But the fact still remains that hardly has any case been tried and reviewed in

the Supreme Court regarding PD 1829, the law which penalizes such acts which constitute the

obstruction of justice. Does this mean that litigation has descended to such a level that these acts which

should actually constitute obstruction of justice are no longer prosecuted, because both sides – the

prosecution and defense – routinely resort to them anyway, and anyone who complains of such acts by

the other party would be asking for relief from the court with unclean hands?

Conclusion: A Law Whose Time Has Come

 

PD 1829 is essential to the effective functioning of the courts and the effective action of law

enforcement agencies.  If the pillars of the criminal justice system are to attain the ends by which

they were created for, it is necessary that society does not thwart the efforts of the criminal

justice system in providing a solution for crimes. 

            The law on obstruction of justice is a law which is actively used in American courts to

prosecute those individuals who impede the administration of justice by the performance of

certain acts.  It is inconceivable that these same acts are not performed in the Philippines.  But

despite of this inconceivability, there are hardly any cases elevated up to the Supreme Court

which charges persons for violations of PD 1829.  The law that prohibits obstruction of justice is

good law even up to the present time as the government intensifies its campaign against
crime.  In order to do so, private citizens and other third parties must not deter in the arrest,

prosecution and trial of these persons who are charged with crimes.  This is no recommendation

that the government do everything in order to convict.  Rather, this is merely a call on citizens

not to impede in the just prosecution of criminal cases.  PD 1829 seeks to penalize such behavior

that constitutes the obstruction of justice when private citizens are remiss in this duty which they

owe to other members of society. 

            But the good aims of the law cannot be met when there has been an observed non-use of

the law.  Has this arisen out of the reluctant of public officers to involve themselves in charging

other with crimes which they find that they themselves could have committed in the first

place?  This cannot be the case because justice should be blind, in order for it to be fair.  And to

be fair, law enforcement agencies have to be hard hearted in order to bring about the ends that is

contemplated by all criminal laws, that of bring order to society, for the betterment of all that

belong to that society. 

 

[1]
 Mahatma Gandhi, “Seven Blunders of the World That Lead to Violence,” available at http://www.quincy.edu/~
hardeja/flag.html (last accessed Aug. 27, 2003).
[2]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 1.
[3]
 PD 1829, Whereas Clauses ¶ 1.
[4]
 Id. ¶ 2.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 2 (citing People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 17 NW2d 187; People v. Somma,
123 Mich App 658, 333 NW2d 117, Shackelford v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky 51, 214 SW 788).
[7]
 PD 1829, Sec. 2.
[8]
 Id. Sec. 1 (a).
[9]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 34.
[10]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 ¶ 2.
[11]
 Revised Penal Code, Art. 180 penalizes false testimony against a defendant, Art. 181 penalizes giving of false
testimony favorable to the defendant, Art. 182 penalizes the giving of false testimony in civil cases, Art. 183
penalizes the giving of false testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation, and Art. 184 penalizes the
offering of false testimony in evidence.
[12]
 Florenz Regalado, Criminal Law Compendium 387-88 (2003).
[13]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (b).
[14]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 43.
[15]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (c).
[16]
 Revised Penal Code, Art. 19.
[17]
 Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code 558-59 (14d ed. 1998).
[18]
 Republic Act 7659, “An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for That
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes,” imposes the
penalty of death on all these crimes, to wit, treason, parricide, murder, kidnap for ransom, destructive arson,
qualified rape, and crimes related to prohibited drugs.
[19]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (d).
[20]
 Regalado, supra note x, at 379.
[21]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (e).
[22]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 26.
[23]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (f).
[24]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 40.
[25]
 Id. (citing State v. Latimer, 9 Kan App 2d 728, 687 P2d 648.
[26]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 24.
[27]
 Id. § 41.
[28]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (g).
[29]
 Revised Penal code, Art. 210 ¶ 1.
[30]
 Id. ¶ 3.
[31]
 Id. ¶ 4.
[32]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (h).
[33]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 43.
[34]
 Id. (citing US v. Vixie 532 F2d 1277).
[35]
 Id. (citing US v. Mitchell 372 F Supp 1239).
[36]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (i).
[37]
 Id. Sec. 1 (c).
[38]
 58 AmJur 2d Obstructing Justice § 27.
[39]
 Id.
[40]
 G.R. No. 93335, Sept. 13, 1990.
[41]
 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
[42]
 Enrile v. Amin, supra.
[43]
 G.R. No. 112235, Nov. 29, 1995.
[44]
 99 Phil. 515, 535-536 (1956).
[45]
 189 SCRA 573 (1990).
[46]
 GR 127157, July 13, 1998.
[47]
 Id.
[48]
 G.R. No. 144261-62, May 9, 2001.

[49]
 90 Phil. 49.
[50]
 As defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven of the Revised Penal Code, (referring to the crimes
committed by the public officers). 
[51]
 108 Phil. 613.
[52]
 PD 1829, Sec. 1 (a).
[53]
 Id. Sec. 1 (b).