Motion To Disqualify Lorna J LaMotte Esq
Motion To Disqualify Lorna J LaMotte Esq
Motion To Disqualify Lorna J LaMotte Esq
ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x NOTICE OF CROSS-MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSELORS: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed supporting affidavit and memorandum of law, Michael Krichevsky moves for an order to Disqualify Lorna LaMotte, Esq., attorney for Elena Svenson (SVENSON), in this action on the following grounds: a) Ms. LaMotte additionally appeared in this action as an expert real state fact witness for SVENSON, thereby creating a conflict of interest in violation of advocate-witness
Rule 3.7 of NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (NYRPC) LAWYER AS WITNESS; b) Ms. LaMotte additionally appeared in this action as unsworn fact witness for SVENSON, thereby creating a second conflict of interest in violation of Rule 3.7 of NYRPC and in contempt of these rules; c) KRICHEVSKY will call Ms. LaMotte as witness during the trial; d) Ms. LaMotte violated Rule 3.1 of NYRPC MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS; e) Ms. LaMotte violated Rule 3.3 of NYRPC CONDOR FOR THE TRIBUNAL; f) Ms. LaMotte violated Rule 4.1 of NYRPC TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS; g) Ms. LaMotte substantially aiding and abetting commission of perjury by defendant SVENSON; h) Ms. LaMotte personally obstructing Justice and access to the court for KRICHEVSKY. The hearing will be held by Bankruptcy Judge Honorable Elizabeth S. Stong of this Court at the Courthouse located at 271 Cadman Plaza East, at Courtroom 3585, Brooklyn, NY 11201, on the day of February, 2013, at 10 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, or as soon thereafter
as counsel can be heard; and for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper. TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to FRCP, all answering papers, if any, shall be served at least seven (7) days before the return date of this motion.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 27, 2013 ______________________________ Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718) 687-2300 [email protected]
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: , 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER OF: ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY LORNA LAMOTTE, ESQ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, under penalty of perjury says: 1. I am the plaintiff (KRICHEVSKY) in the within action. 2. I make this affidavit in support of my motion to disqualify attorney Lorna LaMotte. 3. The facts stated in this affidavit are within my personal knowledge, and if called on as a witness, I could competently testify thereto. 4. On May 17, 2013, Ms. LaMotte filed her motion to dismiss SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT (docket number 79). 5. In this motion in 61 and below, Ms. LaMotte provides the law and facts, and argues on behalf of her client, SVENSON, that a conversion cause of action must be dismissed because, inter alia, $2800 amount of rent is adequate consideration. 6. Assertion that $2800 amount of rent is an adequate consideration is an expert fact witness testimony. This testimony is very prejudicial to me because (1) the lawyer might appear to vouch for her own credibility; (2) the lawyer's testimony might place me in a difficult position when I have to cross-examine her as lawyer-adversary and attempt to impeach her credibility; (3) I fear that the testifying attorney distorted the truth as a result of bias in favor of her client; and (4) when an individual assumes the role of advocate and witness both, the line between argument and evidence may be blurred, and the jury or judge confused. 7. This proceeding has shown and I feel personally that Ms. LaMotte is not cooperative, ethical and motivated by animus and hostility toward me. 8. I have a right and have no choice, but to cross-examine Ms. LaMotte as an expert fact witness in order to impeach her testimony. I plan to bring my own expert witness to rebut her testimony. Ms. LaMotte, as expert witness, cannot cross-examine my witness and if she attempts to, I object to it already. 9. Ms. LaMotte in her motion to dismiss uses such terms as level of education, level of specificity and level of reliance without any supporting law or objective measurement of her level. She testifies as unsworn FACT witness that SVENSON was unable to go to school, take care of parties child, home and to do business without my cooperation and knowledge that SVENSON did not attend her medical school. I have to cross-examine Ms. LaMotte on that issue.
10. I contemplate to bring my own witnesses to impeach her testimony. One is a Russian immigrant of similar to SVENSON age, who became a medical doctor in America, mother of 2 kids, while taking care of the home, husband, dog and helping old parents. The other, mother of one kid and similarly situated as SVENSON, who in about 5 years became a high income practicing licensed psychologist and practices today. These women have one major thing in common they are not gold diggers they really, really, really went to medical school. 11. There are many others similar unsworn statements of facts masked as arguments, which for the sake of brevity and simplicity of the issues involved, I would not mention here, but do not waive and object. I, Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, under penalty of perjury declare that the foregoing is true and correct. Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 28, 2013 _________________________ Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: , 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER OF: ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 1201229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY LORNA LAMOTTE, ESQ INTRODUCTION 1. Attorneys have always been held in common law civilly liable for engaging in conduct violative of their fiduciary duties as officers of the courts, despite the existence of
professional rules under which the attorneys could also have been disciplined. To prevent attorney from continuous breach of fiduciary duties and/or engaging in unethical conduct against adversaries, injunctive relief will lie where there is no adequate remedy at law. 2. American Bar Association rules of professional conduct fully accepted in New York and called New York Rules of Professional Conduct. Federal courts in New York, including this bankruptcy court, accepted these rules and following them too: Attorneys appearing before this Court must abide by the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Rules"). Rule 3.7(a) addresses the situation where an attorney may be a witness. Commonly referred to as the "advocate-witness" rule Decker v. Nagel Rice LLC, 716 F. Supp. 2d 228 - Dist. Court, SD New York (2010). 3. This motion is timely and KRICHEVSKY complied with following law in the case Marco v. Dulles, 169 F. Supp. 622 - Dist. Court, SD New York 1959 "A motion to disqualify is of an equitable nature. A party making such a motion should do so with reasonable diligence and promptness after the facts have become known to it. ARGUMENT: Disqualification of attorneys is mandatory when there is conflict of interest in violation of advocate-witness rule 4. KRICHEVSKYs affidavit of prejudice attached to this motion incorporated herein. It states that Ms. LaMotte additionally appeared in this action as an expert real state FACT witness for SVENSON, thereby creating a conflict of interest in violation of advocate-witness Rule 3.7(a) of NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (NYRPC) LAWYER AS WITNESS; 5. Ms. LaMotte appeared in this action as unsworn fact witness for SVENSON, thereby creating a 2nd conflict of interest in violation of Rule 3.7 of NYRPC. 6. The adequacy of $2800 amount of rent in KRICHEVSKYs claim for conversion, inter alia, is ultimate fact on which one of the elements of claim rests. Therefore, he will litigate the
issue vigorously. 7. In the case of XAIR ITALY SPA v. AVIATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Dist. Court, ED New York (2011) the court stated: The Second Circuit has identified four risks that threaten to harm the integrity of the judicial process if an attorney is permitted to be both witness and advocate in a single proceeding: "(1) the lawyer might appear to vouch for his own credibility; (2) the lawyer's testimony might place opposing counsel in a difficult position when she has to cross-examine her lawyer-adversary and attempt to impeach his credibility; (3) some may fear that the testifying attorney is distorting the truth as a result of bias in favor of his client; and (4) when an individual assumes the role of advocate and witness both, the line between argument and evidence may be blurred, and the jury confused." Murray, 583 F.3d at 178. This final risk has been identified by the Second Circuit as the "most important" concern when the advocate-witness rule is violated. Ramey v. District 141, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 378 F.3d 269, 283 (2d Cir. 2004). 8. Another plaintiffs concern is expressed in XAIR ITALY SPA v. AVIATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Dist. Court, ED New York (2011) as follows: He could not challenge Gallagher's account of a conversation between them without creating the risk that the jury would treat his argument as an unsworn assertion of fact. The resulting confusion "could undermine the integrity of the judicial process." Murray, 583 F.3d at 178. Accordingly, Bridgeman is disqualified from serving as Air Italy's trial counsel[emphasis added] CONCLUSION 9. Ms. LaMotte should be disqualified. To be fair, KRICHEVSKY proposes the court to provide the following solution to this situation, which found in Ramey v. DISTRICT 141, INTERN. ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, 378 F. 3d 269 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit (2004) where the court stated: in other words, the remedy where an attorney is called to testify may be to disqualify the attorney in his representational capacity, not necessarily his testimonial capacity. See 27 Wright & Gold, supra, 6012, at 176, 183. WHEREFORE, plaintiff moves this Hon. court to disqualify Ms. LaMotte from her representational capacity, leave Ms. LaMotte as witness, and order SVENSON to hire new
attorney to represent her; and for other relief, which this court may feel just and proper. Dated: Brooklyn, New York July 28, 2013 ______________________________ Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718) 687-2300 [email protected]
Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11224 Phone: 718-687-2300 Email: [email protected] Lorna J LaMotte Law Offices of Lorna J. LaMotte PLLC 65 Broadway Suite 839 New York, NY 10006 July 28, 2013 Dear Ms. LaMotte, I presume that because you did not submit any affidavit of your client in any motion or reply in this case as I requested before, you are continuously testifying in this case as unsworn fact witness without firsthand knowledge in violation of attorney-advocate rules of N.Y.R.P.C. Our interaction with each other and the court is a commercial contract with terms described in N.Y.R.P.C, F.R.C.P., in your attorneys oath when you finished law school, in your court officers oath when you received your admission to practice law in New York courts, and other applicable rules of court. I presume that you took personal commercial responsibility to me in case of breach of contract and/or fraud upon the court in this case. In order for me to be able intelligently and in good faith reply to your opposition to my motion for leave to amend my second amended complaint, I need you to answer my REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS and INTERROGATORIES enclosed in this letter. Sincerely, Michael Krichevsky, pro se Enclosures