1

Art. 2 Effectivity of Laws apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
1. Tanada vs Tuvera assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 

- Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, Ruling: The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated

- petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public

officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of (presidential issuances) various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

- Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and

publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the
people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.-

- Respondent’s contention: Respondents further contend that publication

in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances
in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable(necessary)
for their effectivity. 

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days

following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

- The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's

construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

- (the law did not say that there is no need to publish if the date is already
indicated).

Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official

Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all

important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of
the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed
by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines
shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

- The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general

public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

- The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of

general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
 2

2. De Roy vs CA 1. Atienza vs Brillantes, Jr.

Petitioner: De Roy Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los
Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and
Resp: Bernal Family (owner of tailoring shop) for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license.
- This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of
file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
their motion for reconsideration. Article 40 of said Code provides:

- It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the marriage void.
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA
208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does
not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
- Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
a motion for reconsideration may be filed. Such a motion may be filed
only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
requested Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
- Petitioners’ contention: that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non- true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
- Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
- It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

2. Carlos vs Sandoval

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Art 4 Prospectivity of Laws Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
 3

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be
marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating: benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
marriages. -

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
(Underscoring supplied)
however, only a party who can demonstrate  "proper interest"  can file the
same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to other actions,  must be prosecuted or defended  in the name of the real party-
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The in-interest  and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.: Badayog,  the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their
stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects
of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can
decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone
are the engineers of their marital life.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a

demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the
deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the 3. Cheng vs Sy
regular courts
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7,
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy forissuingtoher
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within PhilippineBankofCommerce(PBC)CheckNos.171762and71860for
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became P300,000.00each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonoured
effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.: Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January20,1999,filed
againstrespondentstwo(2)casesfor violationofBatas Pambansa Bilang(BPBlg.)
22
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages
under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for
application.22 (Underscoring supplied) failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent “Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is purely‘civil,’not
Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, criminalinnature.”4
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place
Later, theMTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer,theBPBlg.22cases
initsOrder5datedFebruary 7,2005onaccountofthefailureofpetitionertoidentify
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did not makeany
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the pronouncementastothecivilliabilityofaccused respondents
time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
 4

FILING OF CIVIL CASE OnApril26,2005,petitionerlodgedagainst

respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint for
collectionofasumofmoneywithdamages(CivilCaseNo. 05112452) based on
the same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks
previously subjectoftheestafaandBPBlg.22cases. IntheassailedOrder7dated
January2,2006,theRTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction,ratiocinatingthatthecivilactiontocollectthe amountof
P600,000.00withdamageswasalreadyimpliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22
cases in light of Section 1, paragraph(b)ofRule111oftheRevisedRulesof
Court.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied

4. Carolino vs Senga
—
- On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter 5 addressed to the AFP Chief of
ISSUE: Staff asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay.
- In a letter reply,6Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and Gratuity
“Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias that his loss of
Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 5797 on the RulesandGuidelinesin Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of
thefilingandprosecutionofcriminalcases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the the AFP Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5, 2005; and that he could
present case where the avail of re-entitlement to his retirement benefits and the restoration of
his name in the AFP Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying with
natureoftheorderdismissingthecasesforbouncingchecksagainst the respondents the requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual Citizenship
was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identifyboththeaccused Act.
(respondentsherein)?”10 - Petitioner’s Contention:
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the
PETITONER’S CONTENTION: petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 reinstatement of his pension and benefits from the AFP under RA 340 as PD
cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised RulesonCriminal 1638 was not applicable to him.
ProcedurepromulgatedonDecember1, 2000shouldnotapply,asitmustbegiven - Petitioner contends that her husband's retirement from the active service
onlyprospective application. She further contends that that her case falls in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions of RA No. No. 340 as PD No.
within the following exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in RA No. 340
to the criminal action is deemed institutedwiththelatter— that disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving retirement
benefits after acquiring foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on benefits is such that one is entitled to them for services already rendered
and not for those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due
CriminalProcedurestates— petitioner's husband under RA No. 340, is an acquired right which
cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638 does not
“Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.— expressly provide for its retroactive application.
- Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on
xxx September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided
that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
(b) ThecriminalactionforviolationofBatasPambansaBlg.22 shall be deemed It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservationtofilesuchcivilaction effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some
separatelyshallbeallowed. legal provisions;17 that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature
to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
Note.—Whenapartyfilesacriminalcaseforviolationof BatasPambansaBlg.
implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be
22,hiscivilactionforrecoveryofthe amount of the dishonored check is
resolved against retrospective effect. 18 These principles also apply to
impliedly instituted therein pursuant to Section 1(b) of Rules 111 of the
amendments of statutes.
2000

Rules on Criminal Procedure. - PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive
application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact,
Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take
effect upon its approval. As held in Parreno v. COA,19 there is no
question that PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since PD
No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and
separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those
who were in the service at the time of its approval. 20 Conversely, PD No.
1638 is not applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979.
The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act
continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to
such amendment
- Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or
pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of
service.22 Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the
conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving
his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated.
Petition granted.

Art 6 Waiver of Rights – Requisites regarding valid waivers

 5

1. Famanila vs CA Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei, who died intestate
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the
services of petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent, Barbership Administrator of the estate
Management Limited.
In his Comment/Opposition, 7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate
California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1,
the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness and he Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents
subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime
sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been
settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios'
accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
dated February 28, 1991 financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and
her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC liabilities.
OCW Case No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability benefits, share
in the insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on
certification against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim
Issue: waived right VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE SINCE executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate
PETITIONER’S CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not
MAKING THE SAME VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE. have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration
as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
freely because he was permanently disabled and in financial constraints
whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A claiming their successional rights
vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil
Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar
influence or fraud.16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
vices of consent, the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18 leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable.
However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate consent In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release
and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for
consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
has not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the subject document, any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the
the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically
the agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing. mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by
petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any violation of law or Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by
public policy. their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance
left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal
terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their
benefit that legally pertains to them.  wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an
alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect
Petition denied. the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release
and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional

relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there
is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.17

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
2. Guy vs CA
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a
Petition denied.
petition for letters of administration 5 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei(a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
6
 7

3. Otamias vs Republic, AFP, PGMC The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel Otamias was not contrary
to law; it was in accordance with the provisions on support in the Family
- Petitioner Edna Mabugay-Otamias (Edna) and retired Colonel Francisco Code. Hence, there was no reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize
B. Otamias (Colonel Otamias) were married on June 16, 1978 and had its validity.
five (5) children
- Petition granted.
- Edna filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias before the
Provost Marshall Division of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 4 Edna
demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of Colonel Otamias'
retirement benefits

- But the husband can only commit 50% of my retirement benefits to be

pro-rated among my wife and five (5) children;

- 7
 The Deed of Assignment was considered by the parties as a
compromise agreement

- The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006. 11 Edna alleged that
"the A[rmed] F[orces] [of the] Philippines] suddenly decided not to
honor the agreement"12 between Colonel Otamias and his legitimate
family

- that it could not act on Edna's request to receive a portion of Colonel

Otamias' pension "unless ordered by [the] appropriate court."

- whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the AFP Finance
Center cannot be directed to automatically deduct the amount of support
needed by the legitimate family of Colonel Otamias;

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.cralawred

The concept of waiver has been defined by this Court as:

a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of
its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of
such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming
it.67cralawred

[T]he doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule
that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any
alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him
or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest
in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights
of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is
recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the
community at large[.]68 (Emphasis in the original)cralawred

- When Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of Assignment, he effectively

waived his right to claim that his retirement benefits are exempt from
execution. The right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his retirement benefits does
not infringe on the right of third persons, but even protects the right of
his family to receive support.

In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be considered as the law

between the parties, and its provisions should be respected in the
absence of allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or defrauded in
executing it. The general rule is that a contract is the law between parties
and parties are free to stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.69ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 8

Art 9 Duty of Courts - To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first
name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where
1. Silverio vs Republic they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be
presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature
- November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex,
it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but the conferment of that privilege.
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted - It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the branch of government, Congress.
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had
in fact undergone the procedure. - Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of
happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No
- From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
- 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no by the courts.
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration. - Petition denied.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.

- Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his
birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Ruling

- The petition lacks merit.

- A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex

Reassignment

- Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex

. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and
the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

- In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change
of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction
as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar
concerned, assuming it could be legally done

- But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex

reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

- It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or
court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to
engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

- In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to

do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based.
 9

Article 14 Penal Laws, Obligatory We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer
liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v.
1. Del Socorro vs Wilsem San Luis,49 to wit:

- Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman - As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further,
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. - In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
- According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
gave support to the son, Roderigo. international law and to treaty stipulations."

- petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of - On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed
of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction
which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No.
9262 is a continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at
- WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not
do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an prescribed.
alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
- Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the
19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we
R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the jurisdiction over the case.
obligor’s nationality
- Petition granted.
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

- x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those

advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he
is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a
parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.

Issue

- Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under

R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child

- In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.

- In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the

Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to

support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice
to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
 10

Article 15 Nationality Theory - law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
1. Van Dorn vs Romillo offended spouse, and nobody else

- petitioner (Alice Reyes Van Dorn) is a citizen of the Philippines while - In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity
private respondent (Romillo) is a citizen of the United States; that they of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and,
were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist
established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; bring the action would be determined by his
that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
Dorpn. subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.

- private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P - American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. prosecution for adultery.

- Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of - a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had "no community property - In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
- For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines. insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons
- Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the -
divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.

- It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of

the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

- Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

- To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner

has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. PeGr

2. Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

- petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private

respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married
before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in
the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila
where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling

- private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in

Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983

- respondent filed two complaints for adultery

 11

3. Recio vs Recio is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien - Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it
proven according to our law on evidence. was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
The Facts petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia
- Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. 4 They lived - Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, 5 a decree the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens,
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
Australian family court. their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him
- On June 26, 1992, respondent (Rederick Recio) became an Australian to Philippine personal laws.
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by
the Australian government.6 Petitioner (Grace Garcia-Recio)– a Filipina Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
– and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In their application for a Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." 8 respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio Respondent's contention is
- On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent
- On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending – respondent On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, reads:
Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
Issue: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent
necessity to take up the rest. may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to
remarry according to his national law
The Court's Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious.
Legal capacity: Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
First Issue: respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
- Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
- Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign capacity to contract the second marriage
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof
of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) 4. Quita vs CA
the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
failed to establish these elements. - FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with
- A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A
respective national laws.27
- Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
- A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A.,
proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
"aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national - Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the
law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by lower court's decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 
- Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree
is a public document – a written official act of an Australian family -  Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's
execution.Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married
first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in
 12

San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine

jurisdiction.

- We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the

time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce.

- The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when

their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

- Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's

citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment however from
petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent.

- She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes
taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the
original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of
new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When
asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954. 19 

- Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was

obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a
reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the
time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted
by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in
ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

- We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial

court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from
Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship
was already resolved by the trial court.

- She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage
of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of
the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20

- As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her

counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition
be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit.

- For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also
be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 

- The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the

subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the
issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties
belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

 13

5. Elmar Perez vs CA attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order.
- Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig 5 twice on May 16,
1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central - WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the
second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon
City

- Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from

the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First
Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic

- Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint

petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican
Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of properties between
Tristan and Lily.

- On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State
of Virginia in the United States 7 and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.8

- During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree

issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the
marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law

- On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lily

- Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its

discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily.

- The petition lacks merit.

- When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily
obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them.

- It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.19 

- Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will

be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights
and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.

- Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or

abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce
decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.20

- When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code21which took effect on
August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage
was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal
interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.

Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the
indispensable requirement of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of
the order granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-intervention was
 14

6. San Luis vs San Luis unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
- Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 - Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
Felicisimo. assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
- Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, - As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further,
- 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, - To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 has to be considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
1992. be just

- petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first - She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss  justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)

- He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the - This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
- On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10of the petition. On February spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to cast obloquy on the other." 56
dismiss.
- Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
- Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She (Linda brother of Rodolfo) Dorn  applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went still in effect
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. - Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn  case involved a marriage
- Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her remarry under Philippine law

- It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the - Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served
citizen
- Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
Issue: whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
letters of administration. remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
- The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently - However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired
by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus: - It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and
that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
- In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799: custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
- "The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the by the seal of his office. 71
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
 15

- With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Associates.
Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California
which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with - The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit
the said law. As stated in Garcia,  however, the Court cannot take as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73 subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY.
JUAN with the RTC
- Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and - The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
- Petition denied. became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA

Issue

- The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain

the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the
first marriage

- Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

- The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force
at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained
Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
7. Lavadia vs Heirs of Luna
- From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10,
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the been recognized in the Philippines
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
- It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree
subsequent marriage
dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
- ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997.
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife,
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom
he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Parañaque,

- In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)

children

- After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and

EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February
1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered
into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION
AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT"

- ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with

EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with
SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987

- After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
 16

8. Noveras vs Noveras

- David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married

on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in
California, United States of America (USA) where they eventually
acquired American citizenship
- Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce
- In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their
marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees
of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.
- In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US
citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia
obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in
June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to
Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a
petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties
- The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no
sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country."
- This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven
as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign
decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
- The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence.
Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
- Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof
- Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the lower
courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the
recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
- Petition is denied.
 17

9. Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to
which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. 14 Thereafter, the
- respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by respondent
Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national
- Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the - WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information
titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in possession of do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
- Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Kang and Orion - Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
- The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article
Under Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under
made with the consent of both spouses R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
- It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
obligor’s nationality
subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located
- This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioner’s
relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person
making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the - x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those
law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
actually made, his capacity is undoubted hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he
- On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a
principally by the national law of the spouses. 26 However, the party parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded Issue:
and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. 27 He
is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum - .,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
- Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property child under Philippine law;
shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the
conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean law, Ruling
provided it is proven as a fact
- Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article
approachor processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a 19534 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31 of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
- Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. 32 In other applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to
of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is family rights and duties.36
married to Hyun Sook Jung.
- We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. 33 In Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
or community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as
invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
execution of the Dacion en Pago provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
- Petition denied. principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law,
i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
10. Del Socorro vs Wilsen country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

- Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age. respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

- According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. 40 In the present case,
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
gave support to the son, Roderigo. support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the
- petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
same.
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2)
of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
 18

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their
child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.43

- In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the

Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. 44 Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
- the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce
decree was issued
 19

Article 16 Law Governing Real and Personal Property

1. Orion Savings Bank vs Suzuki

 20

Article 19 Principle of Abuse of Rights, Elements

1. Far East Bank vs Pacilan Jr.

2. Uypitching vs Quiamco

3. Cebu Country Club vs Elizagaque

4. Calatagan Gold Club vs Celemente, Jr.

5. Ardiente vs Javier, et al

6. Sesbreno vs CA, Veco, et al

7. Saladaga vs Astorga

8. Coca Cola Bottlers vs Bernardo (Includes 20, 21, 28)

 21

Article 21 Acts Contrary to Morals

1. Buenaventura v CA
 22

Art 22 Unjust Enrichment

1. Filinvesr vs Ngilay

2. Gonzalo vs Tarnate, Jr.

 23

Art 26 Acts not constituting Criminal Offense but shall produce a cause of
Action for Damages

1. Castro vs People
 24

Art. 27 Liability of Public Servant or Employee

1. Ledesma v. CA and Delmo

2. Campugan v. Tolentino, Jr
 25

Arts. 29-35 Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense

1. People v. Bayotas

2. Frias v. San Diego-Sison

 26

Art. 36 Prejudicial Question

1. Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan

2. Beltran v. People

3. Pasi v. Lichauco

4. Yap v. Cabales

5. Dreamwork v. Janiola

6. Pimentel v. Pimentel

7. Consing, Jr. v. People

 27

Art. 37-42 Juridical Capacity/Capacity to Act - Restrictions, Modification -

Personality spring from birth

1. Quimiguing v. Icao

2. Continental Steel v. Montano

 28

Art. 44 Juridical Persons

1. Mayor v. Tui