1

E V I D E N C E (Rule 128 to Rule 133 as amended

by A. M. No. 19-08-15-SC)

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION
(Rule 128: General Provisions)

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
MENDOZA, J.:

1) In a naturalization proceeding, the appellant

Republic may present for the first time on appeal in the
CA documentary evidence which was not presented
and formally offered in the trial court. Under Section 4
of Rule 1, the rule on formal offer of evidence under
Section 34 of Rule 132 is not applicable to
naturalization proceedings. The only instance when
said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in
a naturalization proceeding is when it is "practicable
and convenient."
That is not true in the instant case. Reliance upon
the documents presented by the appellant Republic for
the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action considering
that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not
covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a
final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the such documents.
 2

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
MENDOZA, J.:

1) The private papers, including letters between

the husband and his paramours, forcibly taken by the
wife from the drawer of her husband are inadmissible
in evidence in the case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine filed by
the wife against her husband. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication
and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in
the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not

justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
 3

PEOPLE vs. YATAR, appellant.

G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PER CURIAM:

1) The taking of blood sample from the accused

and using the same in conducting DNA tests does not
violate the right of the accused against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution. The right of an accused against self-
incrimination is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of
guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
2) In People v. Rondero, although the accused
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him
and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation
for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.
2) Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to
warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of
the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
 4

(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on

which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
TATING vs. MARCELLA
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

1) While the sworn affidavit of a person long dead

is admissible in evidence, its weight is a different
matter. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that
affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they
are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.
2) In the instant case, the trial court committed
error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since the affiant has long been dead and is no longer
 5

available to take the witness stand, the trial court

should not have given probative value on the affiant’s
sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and another person was
simulated.
PEOPLE vs. SALAFRANCA
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) A piece of evidence may have multiple

admissibility. A person’s declaration, for instance, may
be admitted in evidence both as a dying declaration and
as part of the res gestae.
2) A dying declaration, although generally
inadmissible due to its hearsay character, may
nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is
made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an
impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as
a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a
criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim.
In the instant case, all the requisites for the
admissibility of a dying declaration were satisfied. The
declarant communicated his ante-mortem statement to
the witness, identifying the accused as the person who
had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, the
 6

declarant was conscious of his impending death, having

sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to
the witness, was then experiencing great difficulty in
breathing. The declarant succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which
occurred under three hours after the stabbing.
The declarant’s belief in the imminence of his
death can be shown by the declarant’s own statements
or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the
opinion of his physician. The declarant would have
been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying
declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which the declarant was the victim.
3) A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part
of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
In the instant case, the requisites for admissibility
of a declaration as part of the res gestae also concur.
Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to the
witness, the declarant was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by the accused. The
 7

declarant was then on board the taxicab that would

bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of the accused as the
assailant. His utterance about the accused as having
stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified the accused as the
perpetrator.
SCC CHEMICALS CORP. vs. CA
G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) Under Section 36 of Rule 130, hearsay

evidence is, as a rule, excluded and carries no probative
value. Where the adverse party, however, fails to object
to hearsay evidence, then the same is, by way of an
exception, admissible.
The rationale for the exception is to be found in
the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is the
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim
that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.
Since the right to cross-examine may be waived, the
repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness
is an implied waiver of such right.
2) A party's admission of the execution of the
promissory note at the pre-trial settles the question of
the genuineness of the signatures thereon. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at
pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
 8

admission. Under Section 4 of Rule 129, a judicial

admission requires no proof.
The party’s admission of the execution of the
promissory note also precludes him from invoking the
"best evidence rule". The adverse party need not
present the original of the promissory note as there was
already a judicial admission of its execution at pre-trial.
B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED (RULE 129)
LBP vs. BANAL
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice

of the contents of the records of other cases even when
said cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. They may only do so
"in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge
of the opposing party”.
2) The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before
a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
– During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any
 9

matter and allow the parties to be heard

thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request
of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case." (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions in
the instant case.
PEOPLE vs. KULAIS
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.

1) As a rule, courts cannot not take judicial notice

of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court,
or have been heard and are actually pending before the
same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases,
where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
In the instant case, however, although the court a
quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of a
witness in another case, since it did not use such
testimony in deciding the case, no error was committed.
Accused could not argue that he was denied due
process.
LAUREANO vs. CA & SINGAPORE AIRLINES
G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000
 10

QUISUMBING, J.:

1) In an action for damages, the party seeking the

application of a foreign law must prove it like any
factual allegation. Failing in that, the court shall apply
Philippine. Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign laws. The party that claims the applicability
of a foreign law to the case has the burden of proof.
MAQUILING vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:

1) By performing all the acts necessary to re-

acquire Filipino citizenship, including renouncing his
foreign citizenship, under the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003, a person is deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. The
court should apply the Philippine law regardless of
contrary provisions that a foreign law may provide.
PEOPLE vs. BAHARA
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
SERENO, J.:

1) Since prior to entering a plea of guilt to the

crime charged, the accused had already entered a plea
of guilt to another crime based on the same facts, had
made an extrajudicial admission of the crime charged
in a TV interview and a judicial admission of the same
in the pre-trial stipulation, determining whether the trial
 11

court conducted “searching inquiry” before the accused

entered a plea of guilt is no longer necessary.
2) It was ruled in the case of People v. Oden that
even if the requirement of conducting a searching
inquiry was not complied with, "the manner by which
the plea of guilt is made … loses much of great
significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the
person accused of the offense charged."
3) In People v. Nadera, the Court ruled that
convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are
set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.
REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 152375 December 16, 2011
BRION, J.:

1) Before a party can use the deposition taken at

the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court does not only require due observance of
its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a
condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules
on evidence." Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section
 12

47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the

deposition may be used in evidence.
2) Section 4 of Rule 23 provides that “at the trial x
x x, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible
under the rules of evidence, may be used against any
party who was present or represented at the taking of
the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any purpose if
the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that
the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred
(100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition; or
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or
(4) that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable,
in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
 13

On the other hand, Section 47 of Rule 130

provides that “the testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
3) A final order is one that disposes of the action
or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular
stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy
available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order,
however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves
something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved
party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
LIGTAS vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200751 August 17, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

1) To prove that he did not commit theft when he

harvested and sold abaca in an abaca plantation owned
by the complainant, the accused may present in
evidence the final and executory resolution of DARAB
declaring that there is tenancy relationship between him
and the complainant.
 14

2) A DARAB decision on the existence of a

tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on
courts if supported by substantial evidence. Findings of
fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial powers are entitled to respect if
supported by substantial evidence. Trial courts cannot
be expected to again weigh "the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment as to the sufficiency of evidence. This
doctrine on conclusiveness of judgment applies even in
criminal cases.
C. RULES ON ADMISSION (RULE 130)
1. OBJECT/REAL EVIDENCE (S1)
SALAS vs. MATUSALEM
G.R. No. 180284 September 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) A certificate of live birth identifying the

putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of
his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither
can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a
public instrument and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.
While baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of
 15

the administration of the sacraments on the dates so

specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence
of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child’s paternity.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together
with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity. Pictures showing the alleged father and
the mother inside the rented apartment unit allegedly
paid for by him have scant evidentiary value.
The handwritten notes of the alleged father and
mother showing their exchange of affectionate words
and romantic trysts are not sufficient to establish the
child’s filiation to the putative father as they were not
signed by him and contained no statement of admission
that he is the father of said child.
2) An illegitimate child is also allowed to establish
his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
3) Under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code, the
death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be
his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of parties
provided in Section 16 o Rule 3 applies.
 16

PEOPLE vs. MERCURY DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 212171 September 07, 2016
PEREZ, J.:

1) Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing

Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the
procedure to be followed in the custody and handling
of the seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.
 17

2) The last part of the aforequoted issuance

provides for the exception to its strict compliance.
Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect
chain of custody in the handling of evidence,
"substantial compliance with the legal requirements on
the handling of the seized item" is sufficient. Even if
the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the
items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
In other words, to be admissible in evidence, the
prosecution must be able to present through records or
testimony, the whereabouts of the dangerous drugs
from the time these were seized from the accused by
the arresting officers; turned-over to the investigating
officer; forwarded to the laboratory for determination
of their composition; and up to the time these are
offered in evidence. For as long as the chain of custody
remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the
procedural requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 were not faithfully observed, the guilt of
the accused will not be affected.
PEOPLE vs. MANUEL DELA ROSA
G.R. No. 230228 December 13, 2017
GESMUNDO, J.:
 18

1) Chain of custody means the duly recorded

authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of
seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
2) Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended
recently by R.A’. No. 10640, which became effective
on July 15, 2014, and it essentially added the
provisions contained in the IRR with a few
modifications, to wit:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody
and control of. the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with
an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
 19

inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the

place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer /team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the
apprehending team is now required to conduct a
physical inventory. of the seized items and photograph
the same in (1) the presence of the accused or the
persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
(2) with an elected public official and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service
or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the
present case, as the alleged crime was committed on
March 29, 2009, then the provisions of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply.
PEOPLE vs. JOEY SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 231383, March 07, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) Case law states that it is essential that the

identity of the prohibited drug be established with
moral certainty, considering that the dangerous drug
 20

itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the

crime. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt
on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution
has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same and account for each link in the chain of custody
from the moment the drugs are seized up to their
presentation in court as evidence of the crime.28
PEOPLE vs. EMMANUEL OLIVA
G.R. No. 234156 January 7, 2019
PERALTA, J.:

1) The prosecution bears the burden of proof to

show valid cause for non-compliance with the
procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate
observance thereto in such a way that, during the
proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in
acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations
from the requirements of the law. Its failure to follow
the mandated procedure must be adequately explained
and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the
rules on evidence. The rules require that the
apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in
their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the
steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized
item. A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required
where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule
since ·it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or
alteration.
 21

2. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (S2 TO S10)

ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. vs. LWV CONS.
CORP.
G.R. No. 217426 December 04, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
1) In an action for damages filed by a foreign
employer against the clinic which certified that an
applicant was fit for work for which reason the
employer hired him, a certification based on a medical
examination conducted more than three months later
showing that the employee was HCV positive for
which reason he had to be expatriated does not
necessarily prove that the defendant clinic was
negligent and therefore liable for damages.
Even assuming that the employee's diagnosis for
HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive
for the same does not convincingly prove that he was
already under the same medical state at the time the
defendant clinic certified more than three months
earlier that he was fit for employment. The plaintiff
employer must prove that there was already negligence
at the time the certification was issued, may it be
through evidence that show that standard medical
procedures were not carefully observed or that there
were already palpable signs that exhibits the
employee's unfitness for deployment at that time.
 22

PEOPLE vs. VIBAR

G.R. No. 215790 March 12, 2018
MARTIRES, J.:

1) A purported letter of the rape victim to the

accused saying that she was coerced to file the
complaint for rape against him is not admissible in
evidence if its due execution and authenticity were not
proved in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 132
which provides that “in order for any private document
offered as authentic to be admitted as evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (1)
by anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or (2) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker”. The authentication of
private document before it is received in evidence is
vital because during such process, a witness positively
identifies that the document is genuine and has been
duly executed or that the document is neither spurious
nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under
duress.
2) In the instant case, the accused did not present
any witness who testified that the alleged letter was
voluntarily and personally made by the victim nor did
he present any document from which her handwriting
could have been compared. The person who
purportedly handed to the accused the victim’s letter
was not presented in court to testify as to the
genuineness of the document.
a. The Best Evidence Rule
 23

MCMP CONST. vs. MONARK EQUIP’NT

G.R. No. 201001 November 10, 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) Before a party may present secondary evidence

to prove the contents of the original document
whenever the original copy has been lost, he must
prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution
of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its non-production in court;
and (3) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents.
WILGEN LOON vs. POWER MASTER, INC.
G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013
BRION, J.:

1) While photocopied documents are generally

admitted in evidence and given probative value in
administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and
fabrication should prompt the offeror to present the
original documents for inspection. It is incumbent upon
the offeror to present the originals, especially when the
alleged signatories claim that their signatures were
forged and they submitted their specimen signatures.
By not adducing the originals, the offeror effectively
deprived the adverse party of the opportunity to
examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence.
 24

DIMAGUILA vs. MONTEIRO

G. R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Section 3(d) of Rule 130 provides that when the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides
that when the original of a document is in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by
the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule
132 provides that the record of public documents may
be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody or the record.
2) In the instant case, certified true copies of the
cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of
claimants of the area covered by the map were
presented and testified to by two public officers. The
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified
true copies of original public records, fall under the
exception to the best evidence rule.
ROBIÑOL vs. BASSIG
A.C. No. 11836 November 21, 2017
TIJAM, J.:

1) In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof

rests upon the complainant and the proper evidentiary
 25

threshold is substantial evidence. To produce

substantial evidence, the best evidence rule must be
complied with. If the complainant intends to present a
photocopy of a document, a secondary evidence, he
must show that the original is unavailable as required
by Section 5 of Rule 130.

2) Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary

evidence to prove the contents of the original, the
offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its non-
production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror,
the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed.

3) Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers

are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely criminal.
They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. While these proceedings are sui
generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence
such as the best evidence rule may not be altogether
dispensed with.
b. Secondary Evidence
c. Parol Evidence Rule
LEOVERAS vs. VALDEZ
G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011
BRION, J.:
 26

1) The parol evidence rule provides that when the

terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the
written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon and no evidence of these terms can be
admitted other than what is contained in the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is
understood to have been waived and abandoned.
To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule,
the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence
modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the
failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intention of the
parties is either by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent
a meeting of the minds of the parties.
PARAS vs. KIMWA CONST. & DEV. CORP.
G.R. No. 171601 April 8, 2015
LEONEN, J.:

1) The parol evidence rule "forbids any addition

to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement
by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties,
varying the purport of the written contract."
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in
deferring to the contracting parties’ articulated intent.
 27

In choosing to reduce their agreement into writing, they

are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
employing specific — frequently, even technical —
language as are appropriate to their context. From an
evidentiary standpoint, this is also because "oral
testimony . . . coming from a party who has an interest
in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on
human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which
speaks of a uniform language."
2) The parol evidence rule, however, admits of an
exception. Provided that a party puts in issue in its
pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated in the
second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may
present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the agreement. The exception applies to both the
plaintiff and the defendant. If the defendant set up the
affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the
parties, then parol evidence is admissible to prove the
true agreement of the parties. Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a
party’s failure to timely object is deemed a waiver, and
parol evidence may then be entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally
imperative that the parol evidence sought to be
introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the
party presenting it, such as the existence of the flaw,
 28

true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms averred by

the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for
parol evidence to be admitted: first, that the existence
of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue
in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the
adverse party; and second, that the parol evidence
sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the
conclusion proposed by the presenting party.
PNB vs. PAS IMIO
G.R. No. 205590 September 02, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.:

1) Under the parol evidence rule, parol evidence

or oral evidence cannot be given to contradict, change
or vary a written document, except if a party presents
evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of a
written agreement and puts in issue in his pleadings: (a)
an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the
written agreement; (b) the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties; (c) the validity of the written agreement;
and (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
Such evidence, however, must be clear and
convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to
overturn the written agreement. Since no evidence of
such nature is before the Court, the documents
 29

embodying the loan agreement of the parties should be

upheld.
2) The rule that the appellate court must give
weight on the factual findings of the trial court is
hinged on the latter's firsthand opportunity to hear the
witnesses and to observe their demeanor during the
trial. However, when such findings are not anchored on
their credibility and their testimonies, but on the
assessment of documents that are available to appellate
magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on the
trial court’s factual findings finds no application.
d. Electronic Evidence
HEIRS OF SABANPAN vs. COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807 August 12, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J.:

1) The admissibility of evidence should not be

confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers
to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence
are to be considered at all, while probative value refers
to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves
an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence.
2) While in summary proceedings such as an
action for unlawful detainer affidavits are admissible as
the witnesses' respective testimonies, the failure of the
adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the
 30

facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still

bear the burden of proving their cause of action,
because they are the ones asserting an affirmative
relief.
TORRES vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011
PERALTA, J.:

1) A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic

pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no
way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a
sham pleading.
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not
considered as an electronic evidence under the
Electronic Commerce Act. The terms "electronic data
message" and "electronic document," as defined under
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic
evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an
original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not
admissible as electronic evidence.
2) Pleadings filed through fax machines are
inadmissible in evidence. In the instant case, the
petitioner, after receiving notice of dismissal from his
employer, PAGCOR, filed a motion for reconsideration
 31

by fax (facsimile transmission) within the period to

appeal the dismissal to CSC. The SC ruled that filing
by fax is improper and therefore did not toll the period
for filing an appeal to the CSC.
3) A facsimile or fax transmission is a process
involving the transmission and reproduction of printed
and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or
tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other
device that produces a printed record on paper referred
to as a facsimile.
PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS
G. R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014
ABAD, J.:

1) Under the SC’s Resolution applying the Rules

on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions, text
messages are admissible in evidence provided they are
testified to by a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge of them. The recipient of the
subject text messages would have personal knowledge
of such messages and is competent to testify on them.
SYHUNLIONG vs. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014
 32

REYES, J.:

1) For purposes of determining if there is

publication in libel, the general rule is that “writing or
texting to a person other than the person defamed is
sufficient to constitute publication. The person to
whom the letter or text message is addressed is a third
person in relation to its writer and the person defamed
therein. The rule applies even if the letter or text
message is sent to the wife of the complainant.
2) The foregoing rule does not apply if the letter or
text message is considered "privileged
communication”. Privileged communication is one
made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he
has a duty, to a person having a corresponding duty.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the person who made the communication
had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to
whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed
to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in
the communication are made in good faith and without
malice.
 33

3) In the case at bar, the accused sent the subject

text message to his former co-employee who earlier
told her of either the delay or denial by her former
employer of her claims for payment of salaries, benefits
and incentives. The accused expressed through the
subject text message her grievances to her former co-
employee. At that time, the accused’s former co-
employee was the best person, who could help her
expedite the release of her claims.
The accused’s text message falls within the ambit
of a qualified privileged communication since she "was
speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest
and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of her
former employer. Besides, "here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to
the party concerned.”
BARTOLOME vs. MARANAN
A.M. No. P-11-2979 November 18, 2014
PER CURIAM:

1) Ephemeral electronic communications are now

admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions.
"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to
telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom
sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the
communications or has personal knowledge thereof.
 34

2) In the present case, the text messages sent by

the respondent to the complainant were properly
admitted in evidence and accorded probative value. The
complainant, who was the recipient of the text
messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of
these text messages, identified the respondent as the
sender through the latter’s cellphone numbr. The
respondent herself admitted that her conversations with
the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that
the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s
cellphone from which the text messages originated was
hers.
BBB vs. AAA
G.R. No. 193225 February 9, 2015
REYES, J.:

1) Any question as to the admissibility of text

messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if
the party raising such issue admits authorship of the
subject messages. More so if he also admits ownership
of the cellphone number from which the text messages
were sent.
ASTORGA & REPOL LAW OFFICES vs.
SHERIFF VILLANUEVA
A.M. No. P-09-2668 February 24, 2015
ER CURIAM:

1) The content of the text messages sent by the

respondent, a sheriff, to the complainant and the
 35

circumstances within which they were made constitute

substantial evidence that would justify the finding of
administrative liability against the respondent. The
presentation of text messages sent by the complainant
to respondent is not necessary. Respondent’s text
messages sent to the complainant show an actual
evasion of duty to implement the Writ of Execution.
The contents of the text messages sufficiently prove his
manifest refusal to properly implement the Writ of
Execution.
2) In the instant case, the complainant was able to
present the text messages he received in his cellular
phone. He attached photographs of the screen of his
cellular phone, showing the messages as they were
received. He submitted respondent’s calling card that
contained the same phone number seen in the text
messages. Through this calling card, he was able to
prove that respondent was the source of the text
messages. Respondent never denied sending the text
messages to the complainant.
3. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE (R21-R54)
a. Qualifications.
b. Disqualifications
MARCOS vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO
G.R. No. 198240 July 3, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
 36

1) Since there is nothing in Sections 19 and 20 of

Rule 130 that disqualifies a handwriting expert from
testifying on his opinion, the court may not disqualify
her from testifying. The specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes
of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. It
is an established rule in statutory construction that an
express exception, exemption, or saving clause
excludes other exceptions.
2) Since PO2 Alvarez, a handwriting expert of the
PNP, can perceive and make known her perception to
others, she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of
the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
PEOPLE vs. GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

1) A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is

not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.
It is now universally accepted that intellectual
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a
valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and
reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. This is
the ruling in the case of People v. Trelles where the
trial court relied heavily on the testimony of the private
complainant, a mental retardate, regardless of her
"monosyllabic responses and vacillations between
 37

lucidity and ambiguity. The SC said a mental retardate

can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to
relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is
coherent, the same is admissible in court.
2) Modern rules on evidence have downgraded
mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness.
As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding
such a witness who may be the only person available
who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our
rules follow the modern trend of evidence. In a long
line of cases, the SC has upheld the conviction of the
accused based mainly on statements given in court by
the victim who was a mental retardate.
NOTE: Disqualification by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity under Section 21 of Rule
130 has been deleted under the 2019 Amendments.
i. Marital Disqualification
ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) The reasons given for the rule on marital

disqualification under Section 22 of Rule 130 are, as
follows:
a. There is identity of interests between husband
and wife;
 38

b. If one were to testify for or against the other,

there is consequent danger of perjury;
c. The policy of the law is to guard the security
and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic
disunion and unhappiness; and
d. Where there is want of domestic tranquility
there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.11
2) l disqualification rule was not applied. It was
shown that the marital and domestic relations between
the accused and the witness/wife are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace
and tranquility which may be disturbed. Such being the
case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at
protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
3) When the offense directly attacks, or directly
and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, the marital
disqualification rule no longer applies. Obviously, the
offense of arson committed by the accused by setting
on fire the house belonging to the wife’s sister where
they both lived in, directly impairs the conjugal relation
between him and his wife. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all
 39

the major aspects of marital life such as trust,

confidence, respect and love by which virtues the
conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
PEOPLE vs. HON. CASTAÑEDA
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
SANTOS, J.:

1) As an exception to the marital disqualification

rule, the wife may testify against her husband charged
with Falsification of Public Document when he
allegedly forged the signature of his wife in a deed of
sale, thereby making it appear that the latter gave her
marital consent to the sale of a house and lot belonging
to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth
she did not. The crime charged may be considered as a
criminal case for a crime committed by a husband
against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule
on marital disqualification.
2) When an offense directly attacks, or directly
and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception.
ii. Privileged Communication (S24)
JUDGE LACUROM vs. ATTY. JACOBA
A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006
CARPIO, J.:

1) The marital privilege rule, being a rule of

evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
 40

object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that

may be construed as implied consent.
ALMONTE vs. HON. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
MENDOZA, J.:

1) In the Ombudsman’s investigation of an

unsigned letter of complaint that several items in the
EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that the
allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal
purposes, the Ombudsman may properly subpoena the
plantilla and other personnel records as they are
relevant to the investigation. The Ombudsman and his
deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors
of the people" and as such they are required by it "to
act promptly on complaints in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporation.

2) The Ombudsman’s need for the documents thus

outweighs the claim of confidentiality of EIIB officials.
What is more, while there might have been compelling
reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was
asserted by, now, seven years later, these reasons may
have been attenuated, if they have not in fact ceased.
The agents whose identities could not then be revealed
may have ceased from the service of the EIIB, while
the covert missions to which they might have been
deployed might either have been accomplished or
 41

abandoned. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's duty

to investigate the complaint that there were in 1988
unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued
funding was received by its officials and put to illegal
use, remains.
SYHUNLIONG vs. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014
REYES, J.:

1) For purposes of determining if there is

publication in libel, the general rule is that “writing or
texting to a person other than the person defamed is
sufficient to constitute publication. The person to
whom the letter or text message is addressed is a third
person in relation to its writer and the person defamed
therein. The rule applies even if the letter or text
message is sent to the wife of the complainant.
2) The foregoing rule, however, does not apply if
the letter or text message is considered "privileged
communication”. Privileged communication is one
made in good faith on any subject matter in which the
communicator has an interest, or concerning which he
has a duty, to a person having a corresponding duty.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the person who made the communication
had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to
 42

whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed

to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to
furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in
the communication are made in good faith and without
malice.
3) In the case at bar, the accused sent the subject
text message to his former co-employee who earlier
told her of either the delay or denial by her former
employer of her claims for payment of salaries, benefits
and incentives. The accused expressed through the
subject text message her grievances to her former co-
employee. At that time, the accused’s former co-
employee was the best person, who could help her
expedite the release of her claims.
The accused’s text message falls within the ambit
of a qualified privileged communication since she "was
speaking in response to duty to protect her own interest
and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of her
former employer. Besides, "here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond that of conveying it to
the party concerned.”
iii. Death or Insanity/Dead Man’s Statute (S39)
RAZON vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

1) The dead man’s statute applies only to the

testimony of the plaintiff in a case he filed against the
 43

administrator or representative of the estate of a

deceased person for a claim he has against the estate of
such deceased person as to any matter occurring before
the death of such deceased person.
2) The dead man’s statute is not applicable in the
instant case because the subject testimony was given by
the defendant in a cased filed against him by the
son/administrator of a deceased person whose property
allegedly in the possession of the defendant was being
claimed by the son/administrator.
3) A testimony covered by the dead man’s statute
must be seasonably objected to by the adverse party
otherwise the court, in the exercise of its discretion,
may admit the same. The court cannot disregard
evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under
the rules but has been rendered admissible by the
failure of a party to object thereto.
Thus, the acceptance of an incompetent witness to
testify in a civil suit, as well as the allowance of
improper questions that may be put to him while on the
stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant.
He may assert his right by timely objection or he may
waive it, expressly or by silence. In any case the option
rests with him. Once admitted, the testimony is in the
case for what it is worth and the judge has no power to
disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been
excluded, if it had been objected to, nor to strike it out
on its own motion.
 44

SUNGA-CHAN vs. CHUA

G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

1) Two reasons forestall the application of the

"Dead Man's Statute" to the instant case. First,
petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against
respondents in their answer before the trial court, and
with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the
ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is
the rule that when the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the
counterclaim, the plaintiff may testify to occurrences
before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the
death of the deceased, said action not having been
brought against but by the estate or representatives of
the deceased.
Second, the testimony of the witness is not
covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" because she is not
"a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that
the plaintiff offered the testimony of the witness to
establish the existence of the partnership between the
defendant and the deceased. insistence that Josephine
is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an
assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means
"assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not
 45

the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of

action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of the plaintiff, not the plaintiff himself.
BORDALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 112443 January 25, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1) The dead man’s statute does not prohibit the

testimony of a witness as to any matter of fact which
did not come to his knowledge through his personal
dealings with the deceased person or communication
made to him by the deceased person. In the instant
case, since the testimony of the witness is based on
documents and not on his dealings and communications
with the deceased person, his testimony was properly
admitted by the trial court.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
SENATE OF THE PHIL. vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

1) Congress undoubtedly has a right to

information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow
the executive branch to evade congressional requests
 46

for information without need of clearly asserting a right

to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible. For “what republican
theory did accomplish…was to reverse the old
presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine
right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a
presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine
of popular sovereignty”.
Resort to any means then by which officials of the
executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have
merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire
into the operations of government, but we shall have
given up something of much greater value – our right
as a people to take part in government.
NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared

before respondent Committees and testified for about
eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National
Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project
awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner
disclosed that then Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
 47

him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the

NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President
Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed
further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions
relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific,
petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether
or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
2) Executive privilege is not a personal privilege,
but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It
exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a
particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is
to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of
candid, objective and untrammeled communication and
exchange of information between the President and
his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming
policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the
functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the
same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and
more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental
powers.
 48

3) Considering that the information sought

through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition
involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation,
with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the
view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not
only official, documented acts of the President but even
her confidential and informal discussions with her close
advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office,
this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of
subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted
congressional inquiries done with increased frequency
and great publicity. No Executive can effectively
discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense
and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the
President’s decision-making process, which inevitably
would involve her conversations with a member of her
Cabinet.
c. Testimonial Privilege
d. Admission of a Party (S27)
CONSTANTINO vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

1) "Privies" are those between whom an action is

deemed binding although they are not literally parties
to the said action. "Privity in estate denotes the privity
between assignor and assignee, donor and donee,
grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and
 49

remainderman or reversioner and their respective

assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote
vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one who
derives his title to the property in question by purchase;
one who takes by conveyance." A successor-in-interest
who derives his right from and is in the same position
as his predecessor in whose shoes he now stands. As
such successor, the privy’s situation is analogous to
that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago
Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz where this Court
held:

A privy stands exactly in the shoes of his

predecessor in interest and is bound by the proceedings
had in the case before the property was transferred to
him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as
he would, in any event, have been bound by the
judgment against his predecessor.
2) Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto
connotes that two or more people are at fault or are
guilty of a crime. Neither of the parties will be granted
relief when an illegal agreement has been made, and
both parties stand in pari delicto. Under the pari delicto
doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally
culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against
each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds
them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex
dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior
est conditio defendentis."
 50

CAMBE vs. OMBUDSMAN

G.R. Nos. 212014-15 December 6, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) For purposes of determining probable cause, the

testimonies of the whistleblowers who are shown to be
co-conspirators of the accused which the prosecution
submitted before the Ombudsman - are, in fact, the
most integral evidence against the accused since they
provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the
conspiracy in the commission of the crime based on
their personal knowledge. Whistleblower testimonies,
especially in corruption cases, should not be
condemned, but rather, be welcomed as these
whistleblowers risk incriminating themselves in order
to expose the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
Even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter
alios acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers'
statements as hearsay is bound by the exception
on independently relevant statements. "Under the
doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible
as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact."
 51

2) Probable cause can be established with hearsay

evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay. The substantial basis for crediting
the whistleblowers' testimonies, even if so regarded as
hearsay, rests on their key functions in JLN
Corporation as above-mentioned, as well as the
collective evidence gathered by the prosecution tending
to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his
alleged co-conspirators acted in concert to pillage his
PDAF funds.
e. Offer of Compromise (S28)
f. Confessions (S34)
- Judicial vs. Extra-judicial
PEOPLE vs. OPINIANO
G.R. No. 181474 July 26, 2017
LEONEN, J.:

1) An accused’s extrajudicial confession without

counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of
the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. In the
instant case, the accused was neither assisted by a
lawyer nor was his confession reduced into
writing. Further, when the police officers informed the
accused of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not say
anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a
valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel. Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution states that "these rights cannot be
 52

waived except in writing and in the presence of

counsel." The accused was merely told of his
Constitutional rights, but he was never asked whether
he understood what he was told or whether he wanted
to exercise or avail himself of such rights.
g. Previous Conduct (S35)
h. Hearsay Evidence Rule (S37 to S49)
PATULA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In a case for estafa filed by the company against

the accused, one of its saleswomen, the testimony of
the company’s auditor on the amounts actually received
by the accused from the customers and remitted by her
to the company is inadmissible for being hearsay
evidence because, by the witness’s own admission, she
did not have personal knowledge of the amounts
actually received by the accused from the customers.
This means that persons other than the witness based
her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by the accused and in the ledgers
held by the company corresponding to each customer,
as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the
customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness
who testified on the entries effectively deprived the
trial court of the reasonable opportunity to validate and
test the veracity and reliability of the entries as
evidence of accused’s misappropriation or conversion
 53

through cross-examination of the accused. The denial

of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of
misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2) Section 36 of Rule 130 states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her
own perception. The personal knowledge of a witness
is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A
witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded
to her as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of
her information.
If a witness is permitted to testify based on what
she has heard another person say about the facts in
dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The
weight of such testimony then depends not upon the
veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the
other person giving the information to the witness
without oath. The information cannot be tested because
the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and
cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
 54

Independently Relevant Statement

PEOPLE vs. AGUIRRE
G.R. No. 219952 November 20, 2017
TIJAM, J.:

1) To prove the charge of Qualified Trafficking in

Persons under Sections 3(a), 4(a) and 6 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9208, or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2003, in relation to violation of RA 7610, the
testimony of the minor private complainants as to what
the accused told them (they will be introduced to
foreigners who will pay and give them shabu for sex) is
not hearsay and therefore admissible. While it is true
that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own personal knowledge, a witness may
testify as to the fact that the accused made to her a
statement of a certain tenor, not to prove that the
statement is true but that it was made. In effect, the
witness will be testifying as a fact of her own personal
knowledge, the fact that the accused made to her a
certain statement. If credible, it may form part of the
circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the
accused. This is what is referred to as independently
relevant statement.
i. Exceptions:
Dying Declaration
PEOPLE vs. CALINAWAN
G.R. No. 226145 February 13, 2017
MENDOZA, J.:
 55

1) For a dying declaration to be deemed an

exception to the hearsay rule, the following conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause
and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the
declarant was conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.
In the instant case, the declarant stated in her
affidavit that she thought she could survive the attack.
She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was
optimistic of her recovery. In view of this, there seems
to be a doubt whether she was aware of her impending
death. Granting there is such doubt, declarant’s
statement, nevertheless, is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. In order
for a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the
following elements must concur: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statement was made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statement concerns the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
First, the stabbing incident constituted the
startling occurrence. Second, declarant never had the
opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating the
accused because she immediately identified him as her
attacker when the witness saw her shortly after the
 56

assault took place. Lastly, the declarant’s statement

concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing.
Declaration Against Interest
THE PEOPLE vs. BERNAL
G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997
ROMERO, J.:

1) In a case for kidnapping, the witness’s

testimony that victim told him that he was having an
illicit relationship with the accused's wife is admissible
in evidence as an admission against interest to prove
that the accused had a motive for the kidnapping of the
victim. This is in accordance with Section 38 of Rule
130.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or
moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to
assume that "declaration against interest" has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is,
pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.
2) A statement may be admissible when it
complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that
the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it
relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3)
that at the time he made said declaration the declarant
was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to
falsify and believed such declaration to be true."12
 57

In the instant case, the victim remained missing

since his abduction and was unable to testify. His
confession to the witness, definitely a declaration
against his own interest, since his affair with the wife
of the accused was a crime, is admissible in
evidence because no sane person will be presumed to
tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
Declaration About Pedigree
TISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997
REGALADO, J.:

1) The testimony of the witness/plaintiff that,

during her aunt/decedent’s lifetime, she categorically
declared that she (witness) was her (aunt/decedent)
niece is admissible in evidence as a declaration about
pedigree to prove the relationship between the
witness/plaintiff and the aunt/decedent/declarant.
A declaration about pedigree is admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Section 39 of Rule
130 subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the
declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the
subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown
by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not
only before the commencement of the suit involving
the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
 58

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second

and fourth elements. What remains for analysis is the
third element, that is, whether or not the other
documents offered in evidence sufficiently
corroborated the declaration made by aunt/decedent in
her lifetime regarding the pedigree of witness/plaintiff
or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other
than such declaration.
2) American jurisdiction has it that a distinction
must be made as to when the relationship of the
declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself,
or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it
must be supported by evidence aliunde.
The general rule is that where the party claiming
seeks recovery against a relative common to both
claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the
declarant to the common relative may not be proved by
the declaration itself. There must be some independent
proof of this fact. Such rule does not apply, however,
where recovery is sought to reach the estate of the
declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family.
3) There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate.8 And well settled is the
 59

rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked

collaterally.
Res Gestae

PEOPLE vs. SANTILLAN

G.R. No. 227878 August 09, 2017

1) In the prosecution for murder, the victim’s

daughter testified that when she saw her father who had
been stabbed in the back several times, she asked her
father who stabbed him and he answered that it was the
accused. The victim then vomited blood and fell to the
ground. The victim’s daughter and son tried to bring
him to the hospital but he died.

The victim’s post-mortem statement to his

daughter is admissible as a dying declaration. Although
generally inadmissible due to its hearsay character, a
dying declaration may nonetheless be admitted when
the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time
the declaration is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant
is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

All of the above requisites are present in this case.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to
the daughter/witness, identifying accused as the person
 60

who stabbed him. At the time of his statement, the

victim was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained multiple incise and stab wounds, one of
which being fatal, piercing deeply into the middle lobe
of his right lung, trachea and esophagus. Ernesto even
vomited blood, collapsed, and eventually died.
The victim/declarant would have been competent
to testify on the subject of the declaration had he
survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in
this criminal prosecution for murder in which the
declarant was the victim.
2) The victim’s statement may also be admitted as
part of the res gestae. A declaration or an utterance is
deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the
statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
The victim’s statement referred to a startling
occurrence, that is, him being stabbed by the accused.
At the time he relayed his statement to his
daughter/witness, he was wounded and blood oozed
from his chest. Given his condition, it is clear that he
had no time to contrive the identification of his
assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
 61

occurrence. Definitely, such statement is relevant

because it identified the authors of the crime.
Testimony or Deposition at a
Former Proceeding

PEOPLE vs. ORTIZ-MIYAKE

G.R. Nos. 115338-39 September 16, 1997
REGALADO, J.:

1) Under the rule on testimony or deposition at a

previous proceeding, the facts stated in the decision of
the MTC convicting the accused of estafa may not be
adopted and used in a subsequent case filed by the
same complainant in the RTC to prove the guilt of the
same accused for illegal recruitment. In the subsequent
illegal recruitment case, the prosecution did not offer
the testimony of its witness in the previous estafa case.
What was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as
a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal
recruitment was the previous decision in the estafa
case.
A previous decision or judgment, while admissible
in evidence, may only prove that an accused was
previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to
prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence
proving the commission of the crime, as said previous
decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a
basis for conviction in a subsequent case would
 62

constitute a violation of the right of the accused to

confront the witnesses against him.
Child Witness Rule
PEOPLE vs. IBANEZ
G.R. No. 197813 September 25, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

1) The testimony of a 12-year old girl regarding

the murder of her father two years earlier should not be
taken lightly if there is no showing that her mental
maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of
relating the incident truthfully. Under the Rules, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness also
provides that every child is presumed qualified to be a
witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof
lies on the party challenging the child's competence.
Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability
of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency
examination of a child.
2) In the instant case, the testimony of the 12-year
old witness was clear and convincing. The testimony
flows from a person who was present in the place
where the killing occurred. They are replete with
details sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to
 63

appellants. Her candid account of the incident, standing

alone, clearly established the components of the crime
of murder.
j. Opinion Rule (S51 to S53)
Expert Witness
LAVAREZ vs. GUEVARRA
G.R. No. 206103 March 29, 2017
PERALTA, J.:

1) The testimony of expert witnesses must be

construed to have been presented not to sway the court
in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in
the determination of the issue before it. Although.
courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies,
they may place whatever weight they may choose upon
such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the
case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial
court to decide, considering the ability and character of
the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the
side for whom he testifies, the fact that he might be a
paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he testifies, and
any other matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and
 64

when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert

opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem
of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of
the trial court whose ruling on such is not reviewable in
the absence of abuse of discretion.
2 Findings of fact made by a trial court are
accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal and, without a clear disregard of the evidence
before it that can otherwise affect the results of the
case, those findings should not be ignored. Absent any
clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness, or capriciousness
committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are
binding and conclusive upon the Court.18 Settled is the
rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, the
Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique, opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity that is unavailable to the
appellate courts, which simply rely on the cold records
of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even
conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence.
PEOPLE vs. DURANAN
G.R. No. 134074-75 January 16, 2001
MENDOZA, J.:
 65

1) Under Section 50 of Rule 130 (Opinion of an

Ordinary Witness), the testimony of the mother of the
rape victim, although not a psychiatrist, as to the
mental retardation of her daughter, is admissible. An
ordinary witness may testify on his/her opinion as to
the sanity or mental condition of a person, provided the
witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the
speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in
question. Generally, it is required that the witness
details the factors and reasons upon which he/she bases
his/her opinion before he/she can testify as to what it is.
As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: "A non-expert
witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity
of another, when based upon conversations or dealings
which he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness' own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed
facts, as the basis for his opinion.
k. Character Evidence (S54)
PEOPLE vs. DIOPITA
G. R. No. 130601 December 4, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:

1) In a prosecution for robbery with rape, the

defense evidence that the accused is a person of good
moral character, holding as he does the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous
 66

person, a responsible family man and a good Christian

who preaches the word of God, does not justify the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime of rape.
Similarly, his having attained the position of
"Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity
on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem
of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is
not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous good moral character and exemplary conduct.
The basic issue is whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any
peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime
in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the
evidence of good moral character of the accused is
unavailing.
D. BURDEN OF PROOF, BURDEN OF
EVIDENCE AND PRESUMPTION (RULE 131)
1. Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence
FEBTC vs. CHANTE
G.R. No. 170598 October 9, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) Burden of proof refers to two separate and quite

different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of non-
persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply
persuasion burden; and (b) the duty of producing
evidence, or the burden of going forward with the
 67

evidence, or simply the production burden or the

burden of evidence.
In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the
truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum
of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the
issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of
producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a
prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof
in its second concept passes from party to party as the
case progresses, while in its first concept it rests
throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of
the issue.
2) The party who alleges an affirmative fact has
the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the
fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party
who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either
side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts
from the responsibility of investigating and presenting
the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility
entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of
proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the
defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the
factual allegations of the complaint in the manner
required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if
he admits expressly or impliedly the essential
allegations but raises an affirmative defense or
 68

defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from

liability.
3) In civil cases, the quantum of evidence required
of the party having the burden of proof is
preponderance of evidence. Preponderant evidence
refers to evidence that is of greater weight, or more
convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to
it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.
4) The instant case involved the fraudulent ATM
withdrawals from the defendant’s current account
which far exceeded the latter’s balance. To recover
from the defendant the amounts unlawfully withdrawn,
plaintiff FEBTC should have relied on the strength of
its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of
defendant’s evidence. Its burden of proof required it to
preponderantly demonstrate two facts: first, that the
defendant’s ATM card had been used to make the
withdrawals, and second, that he had used the ATM
card and PIN by himself or by another person to make
the fraudulent withdrawals.
Having failed to prove these two aforecited facts,
the plaintiff bank could not recover from the defendant
any funds supposedly improperly withdrawn from the
ATM account. As a banking institution, plaintiff
FEBTC had the duty and responsibility to ensure the
safety of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It
could not avoid the duty or evade the responsibility
 69

because it alone should bear the price for the fraud

resulting from the system bug on account of its
exclusive control of its computer system.
2. Presumptions:
a. Conclusive Presumptions
IBAAN RURAL BANK vs. CA
G.R. No. 123817 December 17, 1999
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) One of the issues in the instant case is whether

respondent/mortgagor has two years or one year within
which to redeem the mortgaged property. While Act
3135 provides that the mortgagor has one year from the
registration of the certificate of sale within which to
redeem the mortgaged property, the sheriff unilaterally
indicated in the certificate of sale, a copy of which was
furnished to the petitioner /mortgagee bank, that the
redemption period expires two (2) years from the
registration of the sale. The respondent/mortgagor
offered to redeem the property within the two-year
period.
When petitioner/mortgagee bank was furnished
the copy of the Certificate of Sale, it received actual
and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its
contents. For two years, it did not object to the two-
year redemption period provided in the certificate.
Thus, it could be said that petitioner consented to the
two-year redemption period specially since it had time
to object and did not. When circumstances imply a duty
 70

to speak on the part of the person for whom an

obligation is proposed, his silence can be construed as
consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled
private respondents to believe that they had two years
within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse
of two years, petitioner is estopped from asserting that
the period for redemption was only one year and that
the period had already lapsed.
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts,
representations or admissions, or by his own silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on
such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts.
ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN
G.R. No. 128568 April 9, 2003
CORONA, J.:

1) Under Section 2(a) of Rule 131 (Conclusive

Presumptions), the lessees who signed a Contract of
Lease involving the house owned by the lessor
knowing full well that the lot on which the house was
build belonged to a third party cannot unilaterally
rescind or cancel the Contract of Lease and stop paying
rentals on the ground that the ownership of the lot on
which the house was built was transferred to another
third party.
 71

At the signing of the Contract of Lease, both

parties knew that their contract pertained only to the
lease of the house, without including the land. The
contract states: "1. That the lessor is the owner of a
building of mixed materials situated at xxx. At the time
of the perfection of the contract, the lessees, were
aware that the NHA, and not the lessor, owned the land
on which the rented house stood yet they signed the
same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms
thereof for five years and performed their obligations as
lessees for two years.
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract
for two years, the lessees are barred from alleging the
automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground
that the respondents lost ownership of the house after
Virgilio acquired title over the lot.
UNIV. OF MINDANAO vs. BSP
G.R. No. 194964-65 January 11, 2016
LEONEN, J.:

1) The act of an unauthorized officer (not

authorized by a board resolution) of the petitioner
university in mortgaging lots belonging to the school to
secure the personal obligations of the Chairman of the
Board of Trustees was ultra vires and did not bind the
petitioner university.
2) Corporate acts are presumed to be valid if, on
their face, the acts were within the corporation’s
powers or purposes. The question, therefore, is always
 72

whether there is a logical relation of the act to the

corporate purpose expressed in the charter. If that act
is one which is lawful in itself, and not otherwise
prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate
ends, and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of
those ends, in a substantial, and not in a remote and
fanciful, sense, it may fairly be considered within
charter powers. The test to be applied is whether the act
in question is in direct and immediate furtherance of
the corporation’s business, fairly incident to the
express powers and reasonably necessary to their
exercise. If so, the corporation has the power to do it;
otherwise, not.
3) Petitioner university did not have the power to
mortgage its properties in order to secure loans of other
persons. As an educational institution, it is limited to
developing human capital through formal instruction. It
is not a corporation engaged in the business of securing
loans of others.

4) Conclusive presumptions are presumptions that

may not be overturned by evidence, however strong the
evidence is. They are made conclusive not because
there is an established uniformity in behavior whenever
identified circumstances arise. They are conclusive
because they are declared as such under Section 2 of
Rule 131.
 73

On the other hand, disputable presumptions are

presumptions that may be overcome by contrary
evidence. Presumptions are not always true. If a
presumption is shown to be wrong by contrary
evidence, courts should not apply them.
b. Disputable Presumptions
ROSAROSO vs. SORIA
G.R. No. 194846 June 19, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:

1) The sale of a parcel of land which was

purportedly without consideration is presumed valid
and with consideration until it is shown by sufficient
evidence that it was, indeed, without consideration.
Under Section 3 of Rule 131, the following are
disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have
been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of
business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract. These presumptions
operate against an adversary who has not introduced
proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of
presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they
created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is
presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof
remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one
who has that burden is relieved for the time being from
introducing evidence in support of the averment,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence
unless rebutted.
 74

2) In the instant case, the respondents failed to

trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare
allegation that the sale was made without a
consideration, they failed to supply clear and
convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is
elementary in procedural law that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under the Rules of Court.
HEIRS OF TRAZONA vs. HEIRS OF CANADA
G.R. No. 175874 December 11, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:

1) While notarized documents enjoy the

presumption of regularity, including the genuineness of
the signatures therein, this presumption is disputable
and may be contradicted by evidence that is clear,
convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In the
instant case, clear and convincing evidence was
presented that was enough to overturn the presumption
of regularity of the assailed deed.
LUIS UY vs. LACSAMANA
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
CARPIO, J.:

1) Persons living together in apparent matrimony

are presumed, absent any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. If the
adverse party, however, is able to present sufficient
evidence to overcome the presumption of marriage,
 75

the onus probandi is shifted to the party claiming the

presumption. It becomes the latter’s burden to prove
the existence of the marriage.

Suppression of Testimony
PEOPLE vs. PADRIGONE
G.R. No. 137664 May 9, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

1) The non-presentation on the witness stand by

the prosecution of the rape victim who became insane
after the rape cannot be considered as suppression of
evidence. Under Section 3(e) of Rule 131, there is
disputable presumption that "evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced". Such
presumption, however, does not apply if (a) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the
suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely
corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is
an exercise of a privilege.
2) There was no suppression of evidence in the
instant. First, the defense had the opportunity to
subpoena the rape victim even if the prosecution did
not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed
to call her to the witness stand. Second, the rape victim
was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial
proceedings yet." The rape victim’s non-presentation,
therefore, not willful. Third, the rape victim was not the
only witness to the crime because her younger sister
 76

was also present and in fact witnessed the violation

committed on her sister.
3) Well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts
and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court because of its unique position
of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses' deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the
"furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or
full realization of an oath," all of which are useful aids
for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and
sincerity. The trial court's findings are accorded
finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may
have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and
which, if properly considered, would alter the results of
the case.
Official Duty
DE LOS SANTOS vs. COA
G.R. No. 198457 August 13, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) Absent any showing of bad faith and malice,

there is a presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties. However, this presumption must fail
in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated. For
instance, in Reyna v. CoA, the Court affirmed the
 77

liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding

their proffered claims of good faith, since their actions
violated an explicit rule in the Landbank’s Manual on
Lending Operations.
PEOPLE vs. BARTE
G.R. No. 179749 March 1, 2017
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) When there is failure to comply with the

requirements for proving the chain of custody in the
confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust
operation, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties no longer applies and the
prosecution must credibly explain such noncompliance.
Failing in this, the proof of the corpus delicti is
doubtful, and the accused should be acquitted for
failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2) Courts are cognizant of the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties of public
officers. This presumption can be overturned if
evidence is presented to prove either of two things,
namely: (1) that they were not properly performing
their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any
improper motive.
3) It is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust
operations are "susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion." The high possibility of abuse was precisely
the reason why the procedural safeguards embodied in
 78

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 have been put up as a

means to minimize, if not eradicate such abuse. The
procedural safeguards not only protect the innocent
from abuse and violation of their rights but also guide
the law enforcers on ensuring the integrity of the
evidence to be presented in court.
4) In the prosecution of the crime of selling a
dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven, to wit: (1) the identities of the buyer, seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, the essential requisites of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs that must be established are the
following, namely: (1) the accused was in possession of
the dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the dangerous drug.
Inasmuch as the dangerous drug itself constitutes
the very corpus delicti of both offenses, its identity and
integrity must definitely be shown to have been
preserved. This means that on top of the elements of
possession or · illegal sale, the fact that the substance
possessed or illegally sold was the very substance
presented in court must be established with the same
exacting degree of certitude as that required sustaining
a conviction. The prosecution must account for each
link in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug, from
the moment of seizure from the accused until it was
presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti. In
short, the chain of custody requirement ensures that
 79

unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of the

evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.
PEOPLE vs. CADIDIA
G.R. No. 191263 October 16, 2013
PEREZ, J.:

1) In cases involving violations of Dangerous

Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of
the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially
when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there
is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion thereon
deserves much weight and respect because the judge
has the direct opportunity to observe said witnesses on
the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or
not.
E. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE (R132)
1. Examination of Witnesses (S1 to S18)
PEOPLE vs. FABRE
G.R. No. 146697 July 23, 2002
VITUG, J.:

1) The cross-examination of a witness is a

prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the
truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made
on direct examination. The party against whom the
 80

witness testifies may deem any further examination

unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence
theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on
what would be believed is the perception of the court
thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give
full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct
examination merely because he is not cross-examined
by the other party.
Leading and Misleading Questions
PEOPLE vs. PEREZ
G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003
PER CURIAM:

1) As a rule, leading questions are not allowed.

However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years as it is usually
difficult for such child to state facts without prompting
or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax
the truth out of their reluctant lips. In the case at bar,
the trial court was justified in allowing leading
questions to the 6-year old rape victim as she was
evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of
events difficult, if not uncertain.
2) As explained in People v. Rodito Dagamos:
"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to
the courts in exercising control over the questioning of
a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect
on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the
 81

ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions

are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental
level of the child, (3) to protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child are allowed if the same will
further the interests of justice."
Impeachment
PEOPLE vs. CASTILLANO
G.R. No. 139412 April 2, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1) The credibility of the testimony of the

prosecution’s principal witness cannot be
impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination nor by her sworn statement given to the
police investigators if the transcripts and sworn
statement were neither marked and offered in evidence
by the accused nor admitted in evidence by the trial
court. If the transcripts and sworn statement were
offered and admitted by the court, the accused should
then confront the prosecution witness with her
testimony during the preliminary examination and her
sworn statement to the police investigators. The witness
should always be accorded a chance to explain the
purported inconsistencies as mandated by Section 13 of
Rule 132.
Reference to Memorandum
a. Present Memory Revived
 82

PEOPLE vs. PLASENCIA

G.R. No. 90198 November 7, 1995
VITUG, J.:

1) Under Section 16 of Rule 132, The use of

memory aids during an examination of a witness is not
altogether proscribed. Allowing a witness to refer to
her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.
In the instant case, the exercise of that discretion has
not been abused; the witness herself has explained that
she merely wanted to be accurate on dates and like
details.
b. Past Recollection Recorded
CANQUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999
MENDOZA, J

1) Under Section 10 of Rule 132, the

memorandum used to refresh the memory of the
witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be
admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness
has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed
memory. In other words, where the witness has testified
independently of or after his testimony has been
refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute,
such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be
corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly
by him. He cannot be more credible just because he
supports his open-court declaration with written
 83

statements of the same facts even if he did prepare

them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper
predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.
What is more, even where this requirement has
been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is
that such evidence must be received with caution, if
only because it is not very difficult to conceive and
fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true
when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise
from the admission of such evidence.
2) In the instant case, since the witness testified
that she was the one who made the entries in the
memorandum but did not have personal knowledge of
facts stated in the entries, the entries may only be
offered to prove not the facts stated in the entries but to
corroborate her testimony that she made the entries as
she received the bills on which the entries were based.
2. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF
DOCUMENTS (S19 – S33)
Classes of Documents
a. Public Documents
IWASAWA vs. GANGAN
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) Under Article 410 of the Civil Code, the books

making up the civil register and all documents relating
 84

thereto shall be considered public documents and shall

be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in
evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. The NSO custodian of the
records need not testify in court for the records to be
admissible. Proof of their authenticity and due
execution is not anymore necessary. Moreover, not
only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The facts
stated in public records are deemed established unless
sufficient contrary evidence is presented.
ASIAN TERMINALS vs. PHILAM INSURANCE
G.R. No. 181163 July 24, 2013
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1) The nature of documents as either public or

private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as
enumerated under Section 19 of Rule 132, are self-
authenticating and require no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court.
2) In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other
person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the
 85

solemnities prescribed by law, a private document

requires authentication.
Section 20 of Rule 132 provides that before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one
within the context of Section 21 of Rule 132; (b) when
the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable
document have not been specifically denied under oath
by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d)
when the document is not being offered as genuine.
3) In the instant case, Marine Certificate No. 708-
8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private
documents which Philam and the consignee,
respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since
none of the exceptions to the requirement of
authentication of a private document obtains in these
 86

cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence

for Philam without being properly authenticated.
b. Private Documents
Offer of Evidence
ALUDOS vs. SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285 June 18, 2012
BRION, J.:

1) Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of

Court, the court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same
is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.
Even if a document was mentioned in the
defendant’s answer and marked as an Exhibit in his
pre-trial brief but if it was not attached thereto and it
was not formally offered, the document cannot be
considered by the court.
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORP. vs.
FRANCIA
G.R. No. 194128 December 7, 2011
MENDOZA, J.:
 87

1) A formal offer is necessary because judges are

mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which
the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other
hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it
facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously
scrutinized by the trial court. Evidence not formally
offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a
party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on
appeal.
3. Offer and Objection (S34 to S40)
Tender of Excluded Evidence
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP. vs COM. OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 192576 September 11, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to

record some act of the court done at a former time
which was not then carried into the record, and the
power of a court to make such entries is restricted to
placing upon the record evidence of judicial action
which has actually been taken. The object of a
judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and determination of
 88

new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the

record, that has been previously rendered, to make it
speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial
action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as
to render a judgment which the court ought to have
rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render,
not to supply non-action by the court, however
erroneous the judgment may have been. The Court
would thus have the record reflect the deliberations and
discussions had on the issue. In this particular case it is
a correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The body
of the decision in question is clear proof that the fallo
must be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this
Court.
2) A decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final
judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this
postulate holds true whether the modification is made
by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in
the land. The orderly administration of justice requires
that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of
finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write
finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained
by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any
act, which violates such principle, must immediately be
 89

struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of

prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to
the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts,
but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers
had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the ruleon the immutability
of final judgments are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void
judgments. Nunc pro tunc judgments have been defined
and characterized by the Court in the following
manner:
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the
rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in
proper form on the record, the judgment that had been
previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to
correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment
which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the
one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction
by the court, however erroneous the judgment may
have been.
A entry in practice is an entry made now of
something which was actually previously done, to have
effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply
omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission
in the record of action really had, but omitted through
inadvertence or mistake.
 90

F. WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

(R133)
The Hierarchy of Evidence
i. Overwhelming Evidence
ii. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
PEOPLE vs. CALISO
G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In every criminal prosecution, the identity of

the offender, like the crime itself, must be established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first
duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to
prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the
commission of the crime can be established, there can
be no conviction without proof of identity of the
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.19
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive
and sufficient for conviction, does not always require
direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no
conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no
eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial
evidence can equally confirm the identification and
overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of
the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two
types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to
wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness
 91

to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by

circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is
last seen with the victim immediately before or after
the crime. The Court said:
. There are two types of positive identification. A
witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal
case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to
the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be
instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime,
he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance
when the latter is the person or one of the persons
last seen with the victim immediately before and
right after the commission of the crime. This is the
second type of positive identification, which forms part
of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken
chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion,
which is that the accused is the author of the crime to
the exclusion of all others.
2) A witness’ familiarity with the accused,
although accepted as basis for a positive identification,
does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to
the possibility of mistake. No matter how honest the
witness’s testimony might have been, her identification
of the accused by a sheer look at his back for a few
minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to
generate that moral certainty about the accused being
 92

the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable

circumstances showing him to be the killer. Her
identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities
of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule
out her being mistaken.
PEOPLE vs. PATENTES
G.R. No. 190178 February 12, 2014
PEREZ, J.:

1) The peculiar nature of rape is that conviction or

acquittal depends almost entirely upon the word of the
private complainant because it is essentially committed
in relative isolation or even in secrecy, and it is usually
only the victim who can testify of the unconsented
coitus. Thus, the long standing rule is that when an
alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
indeed been committed. Since the participants are
usually the only witnesses in crimes of this nature and
the accused's conviction or acquittal virtually depends
on the private complainant's testimony, it must be
received with utmost caution.
It is then incumbent upon the trial court to be very
scrupulous in ascertaining the credibility of the victim's
testimony. Judges must free themselves of the natural
tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming
to have been sexually abused and demanding
punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be
cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges
 93

should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is

to render justice according to law.1
2) A conviction in a criminal case must be
supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which
means a moral certainty that the accused is guilty; the
burden of proof rests upon the prosecution. In the case
at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden
of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of
the charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA
against her will using threats, force or intimidation.
The testimony of the offended party in crimes against
chastity should not be received with precipitate
credulity for the charge can easily be concocted. Courts
should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of
rape, especially where the sole evidence comes from an
alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and
whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be
cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape
victim undergoes as she seeks justice, they should
equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to
render justice based on the law.
Clear and Convincing Evidence
SUPREME COURT vs. DELGADO
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC October 4, 2011
PER CURIAM:

1) In an administrative case vs. several Supreme

Court personnel, the unsubstantiated denial of
 94

respondents falters in light of the direct and positive

statements of their co-respondent accusing them of
participation in the wrongful deed. The basic principle
in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear
and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the
affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.
GOVT. OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN.
REG, vs. HON. OLALIA
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the

standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. Former Chief Justice Puno proposed a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing
evidence" for granting bail in extradition cases. This
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and
will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
PEOPLE vs. FONTANILLA
 95

G.R. No. 177743 January 25, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In order for self-defense to be appreciated in a

prosecution for murder, the accused has to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself. Unlawful
aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense,
for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is
established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is
nothing to repel.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is
the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be
no justified killing in defense of oneself. The test for
the presence of unlawful aggression under the
circumstances is whether the aggression from the
victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an
imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused
must establish the concurrence of three elements of
unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a
physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c)
the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Preponderance of Evidence
 96

PCIB vs. BALMACEDA

G.R. No. 158143 September 21, 2011
BRION, J.:

1) In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of

proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more
worthy of belief than the evidence offered in
opposition. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant,
who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to
prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable
judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden
to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff.
For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is
not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the
plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if established,
will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim.
DELA LLANO vs. BIONG
G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013
BRION, J.:
 97

1) In an action for damages where the plaintiff

was diagnosed to have suffered a debilitating injury
called “whiplash” a month after the car where she was
a passenger was rammed by a dump truck driven by the
defendant, the burden of proving by preponderance of
evidence the proximate causation between the
driver/defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s whiplash
injury rests on the plaintiff. She must establish by
preponderance of evidence that defendant’s negligence,
in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash
injury, and without which her whiplash injury would
not have occurred. Failing in this, the plaintiff is not
entitled to her claim for damages.
Equipoise Doctrine
Substantial Evidence
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. REYES
G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011
LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:

1) The charge of misconduct against a public

officer is a serious charge, a "capital offense" in a
manner of speaking, which may cause the forfeiture of
one’s right to hold a public office. Therefore, said
charge must be proven and substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice.
It should be supported by competent evidence, by
substantial evidence.
 98

2) In the instant case, the evidence against the

respondent Reyes, the head of an LTO office, is
insufficient. In the complaint-affidavit filed by the
complainant, it was alleged that it was only co-
repondent Peñaloza who received the money and the
balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was
retained by him. Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit
could one find the name of respondent Reyes nor is it
alleged there that he was around when the complainant
handed to respondent Peñaloza the P1000.00. From the
evidence on record, it was, clearly, only respondent
Peñaloza all along. Nowhere in the record is Reyes’
complicity suggested or even slightly hinted.
xxxx
It does not appear on record that [Reyes] was the one
who ordered and received the "additional assessment".
Rather, it was Peñaloza alone who approached the
complainant, discussed about the "additional
assessment", and retained the balance of P 500 basing
on the complaint-affidavit filed by Acero.
The testimony of respondent Peñaloza who
implicated Reyes was a self-serving declaration
considering that he is the co-respondent in the
Ombudsman case filed by the complainant. Such a
declaration which was obviously made principally to
save his own neck should have been received with
caution. This vital objection to the admission of this
kind of evidence is its hearsay character and to permit
 99

its unqualified introduction in evidence would open the

door to frauds and perjuries.
RAMOS vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 203186 December 4, 2013
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

1) Judgments, final orders or resolutions of the

NLRC are reviewable by the CA not by petition for
review under Rule 43 but by petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The NLRC’s findings are said to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion when its
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.
2) As held in the case of Mercado v. AMA
Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., citing
Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., the CA only
examines the factual findings of the NLRC to
determine whether or not the conclusions are supported
by substantial evidence whose absence points to grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should
be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "in cases filed before
administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."
 100

Prima Facie Evidence

JESSE LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
NACHURA, J.:

1) Although a paternity action is civil, not

criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable,
and a proper showing of sufficient justification under
the particular factual circumstances of the case must be
made before a court may order a compulsory DNA test.
In cases in which paternity is contested and a party to
the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of
a court order for DNA testing.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that
the issuance of a DNA testing order remains
discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity
for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance
of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test
result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its
discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
2) The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to
guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and
use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides
the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for
 101

reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures,

protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the
admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as
the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to
ensure that the evidence gathered, using various
methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and
properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and,
more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA
analysis serves justice and protects, rather than
prejudice the public."
Probable Cause
PNB vs. TRIA
G.R. No. 193250 April 25, 2012
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) It must be emphasized at the outset that what is

necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused
is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that there
is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the
crime charged.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, are such facts as are sufficient to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
 102

person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is

to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused.
2) While discretionary authority to determine
probable cause in a preliminary investigation to
ascertain sufficient ground for the filing of an
information rests with the executive branch, such
authority is far from absolute. It may be subject to
review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse
of discretion.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) The requisites for the issuance of a search

warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.
2) Probable cause for a search warrant is defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought
 103

in connection with the offense are in the place sought to

be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by
the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would
justify conviction.
The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known
to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula and must
employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances
standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon
the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the
examination. A magistrate's determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was
substantial basis for that determination. Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge
brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in
the place sought to be searched.
Circumstantial Evidence
PEOPLE vs. ANTICAMARA
G.R. No. 178771 June 8, 2011
PERALTA, J.:
 104

1) Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of

collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to
reason and common experience. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the perpetrator.
CELEDONIO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 209137 July 1, 2015
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the

crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules
on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of
direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of
guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution
establishes the accused-appellant’s participation in the
crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that
he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted.
 105

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance;
2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
***