E V I D E N C E

A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

 Ong Chia vs. Republic

 Zulueta vs. CA
 People vs. Yatar
 Tating vs. Marcella
 People vs. Salafranca

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he
found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four
children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen
under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after
stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law,
stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate
his testimony.

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed Petitioner’s
qualifications which was also later on affirmed by the CA. The appellate court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in
the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. .
. This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names
to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the
applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the
public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that
the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her
three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the
Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income.

[Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal
of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere
"scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value]

ISSUE: WON the court may consider admission of evidence which has not been formally offered pursuant
to Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

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RULING: The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which
provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only
instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable
and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for
the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering
that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently,
a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the
reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford
the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He
could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all
the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of
his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition,
but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the
petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. This is
allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such
requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the
background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on
his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization
shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with
the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to
be denied.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta, wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin, entered the clinic of
her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action
below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. Afte trial, RTC
rendered judgment for private respondent. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made
final and petitioner. Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using
or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not documents and/or correspondence taken by one spouse without the consent
of the owner spouse may be used by former against the latter as evidence in an action for
disqualification to practice a profession

HELD: NO. The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety

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or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to
do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

PEOPLE vs. YATAR

GR NO. 150224 May 19,2004

FACTS: Kathylyn Ube was staying in the house of her grandmother Isabel Dawang in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga on June 30, 1998 with her first cousin- Judilyn Pas-a. Judilyn left Kathylyn in the house at around
9:00 am. The former was going to work at the farm, but before she left Kathylyn informed her that she’s
either going to Tuguegarao or just stay at home, wash some clothes, and go to the house of their aunt
Anita.

Joel Yatar is a former inhabitant of Isabel Dawang’s house. On the same date, Joel was informed that his
wife Luz was leaving him due to their constant bickering. Around 10:00 AM that day, he was seen by Anita
Wania and Beverly Deneng at the back of the house allegedly getting lumber so he can deliver them to the
house of his mother. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn chanced upon Joel descending from the second floor and running
towards the back of the house. He was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants. At 1:30 pm, Judilyn
again saw Joel but this time he was already wearing a black shirt and blue pants.

When Isabel came home that night, she saw that all the lights in her home was turned off. She called
Kathylyn but she didn’t respond. When she reached the ladder going to the second floor of the house she
noticed that the door was tied with a rope. She tried to grope in the dark for a knife, but instead she felt a
cold and rigid body. She looked at the body and saw that it was the body of Kathlyn. She called for help
and Judilyn came. Judilyn gave Isabel a flashlight and they saw that not only was Kathylen naked, her
intestines were protruding out of her stomach.

The police were called to investigate and they discovered that the victim’s underwear, pants, bag, and
sandals were beside her body; they also found a white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the
house. Joel was taken into custody and he was charged with Rape with Homicide. The RTC convicted
Yatar of Rape with Homicide with a sentence of Death. The case was directly filed with the Supreme Court
for automatic review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not DNA test is admissible evidence.

2. Whether or not DNA testing violates a person’s right to remain silent and his right against self
incrimination.
3. Whether or not DNA testing conducted by the prosecution is unconstitutional on the ground that
the resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
HELD:

1. Yes.
DNA is a molecule that encodes that

In Daubert vs Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could
be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine Law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
RELEVANT AND RELIABLE SINCE IT IS REASONABLY BASED ON SCIENTIFICALLY VALD
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN GENETICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY.

2. No.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion but against testimonial compulsion. The right against
self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused as an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but
as part of object evidence.

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We ruled in People vs Rondero that although accused appellant insisted that hair samples were forcible
taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair
samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood, and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People vs Gallande, where immediately after the
incident the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of the counsel, we ruled
that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit
to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense which he is accused.

3. No.
No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance, and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law
refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight
of the evidence presented.

NENA LAZALITA TATING vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA

G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007

FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner
Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favour of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the
name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due
thereon for the years 1972, 1973 , 1975 to 1986 and 1988. However, the land remained in possession
Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she actually no intention of
selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer the title over the
subject property in favour of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for
the purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure
any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs . In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos
informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December
28, 1977 and as a consequence , they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the
subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply . Efforts to settle the case amicably proved the
futile.

Hence, her sone filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
RTC decided in favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.

HELD: The court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead,
the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioiner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a
trust relationship was created between them.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and
not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust
relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, as REVERSED AND SET ASIDE . The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012

FACTS: Johnny Bolanon (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July
31, 1993, after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his
uncle, Rodolfo B. Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to
PGH. On their way to the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told
him that it was Salafranca who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident. At
around 2:30am, despite receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

ISSUE: Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

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RULING: Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court
has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the incident bore all
the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.

Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be admitted when
the following requisites concur:
a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;
b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending
death;
c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and
d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide , murder or parricide in which the
declarant is a victim.

All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as the person
who had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his impending death. Bolanon
died in the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after the
incident. Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence when
the following requisites concur:
a) The principal act, the res gestae is a starling occurrence;
b) The statement are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise
c) The statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances

The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave the identity of
the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to contrive his identification.
His utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The statement
was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator. Hence, such circumstances are qualified
as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for having borne the requisites of the both principles.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE

INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO HALILI

FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and vice
president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI)
in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of
2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12,
1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the
maturity date.

SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but
notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.

SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and
Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note
upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of
consideration.

The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the
dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:

1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has
jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant have each the
capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation
dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were both received by
the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the
latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note
last December 13, 1983 for the amount of P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were liable to
the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC
was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the

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case was deemed submitted for decision. On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in
favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required
by law.
3. Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.

HELD: The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as he
testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36.Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay
evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where
a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The rationale for this exception is
to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-
examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver
of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other
party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its
right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter
of hearsay evidence.

2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private respondent
Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.

3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was already a
judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and receipt of the demand
letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of
these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the
contrary or proof of payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was
thus committed by the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation

B. WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

 LBP vs. Banal

 People vs. Kulais
 Laureano vs. CA
 Maquiling vs. COMELEC
 People vs. Baharan
 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL

and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares
of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of
6.2330 hectares was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988.

The Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner, made the valuation of the property. Respondents rejected
such valuation of petitioner, hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the
PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the
PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.

The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondent’s property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial
notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same
to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

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On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court. The Landbank’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier
mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.

(Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in another
case (Rodriguez Case) pending before it and applied the same to the present case without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties.)

RULING: Yes. The CA erred in affirming the trial court’s valuation of the land. Well-settled is the rule that
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They
may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not
obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian
Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of
a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon. “After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative
or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAILON KULAIS

G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001

FACTS: On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government agencies, organized
themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects in Zamboanga City. The group was
stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them. The group alighted from their Cimarron
jeep where they were divested of their personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain
by the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos.

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. Commander Falcasantos also
ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00
in exchange for twenty (20) sets of uniform. On February 3, 1989, the victims were released after
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money, in a total amount of P122,000.00. The
RTC found 7 out of the 9 accused guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of kidnapping
a woman and public officer, including herein Appellant, Kulais. On appeal, Kulais questioned the RTC’s
taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who
allegedly was the team leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants
in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can validly take judicial notice of a witness testimony in another case,
also pending before it.

HELD: True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and are
actually pending before the same judge. This is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has
the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

However, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did
not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap
victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected
to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention
of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the
case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their version of what had happened
on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to prosecution
witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or
dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to prosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the
witnesses testify, prosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by a sense of justice, of
duty and of truth.

Contrarily, defense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of alibis. The individual
testimonies of the nine accused dwelt principally on what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29,

7
1990. None of the accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February
3, 1989, when prosecution evidence showed positively seven of the nine accused were keeping the five or
six hostages named by prosecution evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN

G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000

FACTS: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24
years old, was on her way home from work, when suddenly a man appeared from behind, looped his arm
around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. She got a good look at the man, who
turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to
divest her of her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring
and P1,000.00 cash. With the full moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the items
on the right pocket of his shorts. Thereafter, Diopita also succeeded in raping Dominga.

After the incident, Dominga was brought to the precint and later on examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara
at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes." PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was
on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case, and later on a police
line up of four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were presented to Dominga for identification.
Dominga readily pointed at Diopita and the police then had him try on the recovered slipper from the crime
scene; it easily fitted him. Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were released.
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00
oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses
for an informal Bible session.

The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the Robbery with Rape.

On appeal, the defense, among others, tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position
of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous
person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged on the account
of his supposed good moral character as testified by his witnesses.

HELD: No. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his
part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must
be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to
convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

Appellant also argues that his witnesses are Jehovahs Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing
people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. But as ruled by the trial court,
“alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to get confused
as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in
the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session
supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with
which it may be concocted and fabricated.”

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by
the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying,
and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the
court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES BANAL

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares
of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land consisting of
6.2330 hectares was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988.

8
The Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner, made the valuation of the property. Respondents rejected
such valuation of petitioner, hence a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the
PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation. Dissatisfied with the Decision of the
PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.

The RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondent’s property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial
notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same
to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.

On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial
court. The Landbank’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier
mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.

(Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production figures in another
case (Rodriguez Case) pending before it and applied the same to the present case without conducting a
hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties.)

RULING: Yes. The CA erred in affirming the trial court’s valuation of the land. Well-settled is the rule that
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even
when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. They
may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the opposing party,” which are not
obtaining here.

Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian
Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of
a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:

“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.—During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon. “After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative
or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.”

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.

FACTS: In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated costcutting measures which resulted to
Laureano’s termination. Plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible
avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only 2 months notice and 1 month salary.
Aggrieved, plaintiff instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case
for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services here in the Philippines. SAL allege that since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract and/or documents
executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat
shall have jurisdiction.

The trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court is correct in applying PH laws, notwithstanding that the other
party to the case is a foreign entity.

HELD: The trial court rightly ruled on the application of Philippine law, thus: “Neither can the Court
determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the Singapore Laws because of the
defendant’s failure to show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden
of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.”

MACQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013

9
The use of a foreign passport after taking the oath of allegiance and executing an affidavit of renunciation
under Republic Act No. 9225, or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,"is a positive
act showing the applicant's continued possession of a foreign citizenship. While it does not divest him of
his reacquired Filipino citizenship, it negates his qualification to run for an elective post or be appointed to
a government position. This, in a nutshell, is the ruling in the 2013 case of Maquiling vs. Comelec, et. al.
(G.R. No. 195649), penned by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

FACTS: In the Maquiling case, it has been established that private respondent Rommel Arnado is a natural
born Filipino citizen. Subsequently, however, he was naturalized as a US citizen, thereby losing his Filipino
citizenship. In July 2008, with the intention for repatriation, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines. His application was approved. In April 2009, he again took an oath of allegiance and
executed an affidavit of renunciation of his US citizenship. In November 2009, he filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in a certain town in Mindanao.

In April 2010, another mayoralty candidate (and also private respondent), Linog Balua, sought the
disqualification and/or the cancellation of Arnado’s cerficate of candidacy. Apparently, Arnado used his US
passport in entering and leaving the Philippines between the period April 2009 and June 2009, July 2009
and November 2009, January 2010 and March 2010. Balua presented as evidence a computer-generated
travel record and a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).

ISSUE: Can our local court take judicial notice of Foreign Laws by mere publication?

HELD: In so declaring that Arnado is disqualified from holding public office and even from being a candidate
during the 2010 elections, C.J. Sereno explained:

“Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date
he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation
he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented
himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.”

“While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.

“When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he “absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.”
“We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.”

With that, C.J. Sereno passionately said:

“The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only
to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and
a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.”

“Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the
right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no

The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which must be presented as public
documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official publication thereof.”—Respondent
cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the United States as having the effect of
expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and
thus claims that he was divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport after executing his
Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws, which
must be presented as public documents of a foreign country and must be “evidenced by an official
publication thereof.” Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to be considered in
deciding a case.

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 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAHARAN, KHADDAFY JANJALANI, et. al.
G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011

FACTS: On 14 February 2005, at around 6:30 to 7:30 pm, an RRCG bus was about to move out of the
Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop when the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus.
The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, the two sat away from each other – one sat two seats
behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers
inside the bus. He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the
person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers, the latter looked dumb
struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew
more concerned when the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point,
Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was
going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching,
with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales
admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious characters to the police.

As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted
on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus,
because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually,
the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and
ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing
the bus.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly
before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group – Abu Solaiman – announced over radio
station DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day “gift” for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some
time after the incident, confessing his participation in the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. In another
exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive
devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad,
and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group – namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad,
Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other “John” and
“Jane Does” – were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf
in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and
explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and
that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro
Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.

HELD : No. Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the
prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the
testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales
positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside
the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered
away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had given
accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused
Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their
respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive television
interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentine’s
Day bombing.

It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only
when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making
the testimony admissible as to both conspirators.

11
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and IMELDA R. MARCOS
G.R. No. 155832 December 7, 2010

FACTS: Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written
authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging
to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda
Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG
Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners. The
Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts (
such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had
conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two
signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Rest house was sequestered; and that she intended to delay
proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it
was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

HELD: No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be
issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies
an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The
Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2
PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would
warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the
property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine
of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the
sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot
Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

C. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY
 People vs. Mallilin
 People vs. Pagaduan
 Salas vs. Matusalem
 People vs. Posing
 People vs. Gani

UNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 172953 April 30, 2008,
553 SCRA 619, 632

FACTS: On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch
52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4
February 2003

Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Petitioner entered a negative
plea. At the ensuing trial, the evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure
conducted by the police operatives pointing out that the petitioner was framed up by Esternon.

The trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. In his Appeal Brief filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner called the attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his
house was conducted.

On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the appellate court. Hence, the
instant petition which raises

12
ISSUE: Whether or not there were irregularities in the manner by which the search of the petitioner’s house
was conducted

HELD: Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The
chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

It is thus essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The “chain of custody” requirement
performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.

Presumption of Regularity

The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and
which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed
under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIMON PAGADUAN y TAMAYO

G.R. No. 179029 August 12, 2010

FACTS: In an buy-bust operatin leaded by PO3 Almarez, the appellant was arrested for the sale of shabu
to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) who posed as a
buyer of shabu in the amount of P200.00.

At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory examination (Exh. "C").The
appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained. Two days later, or on
December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized
plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando Dulnuan. Police
Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an
examination on the specimen submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. "B").

The defense claimed that the appellant was apprehended as a result of an illegitimate entrapment
operation.

The RTC, in its decision of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of the crime charged. The appellant
appealed to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the appellant despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.

HELD: After due consideration, the court resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecution’s failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police
complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement
of this Act.

Requirement under Section 21

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21, paragraph
1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation,physically inventoryand photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the illegal drug's unique
characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or

13
substitution either by accident or otherwise.The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing
that the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms.

From the foregoing exchanges during trial,No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were
taken in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on cross-examination, was unsure and could not give a
categorical answer when asked whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.At
any rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the records.

EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses,
as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown
to have been preserved.

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police
to conduct the required physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs.

The "Chain of Custody" Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.

The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a
reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the appellant were the same drugs that were brought
to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence
of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime – the corpus delicti – has
not been adequately proven.In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating reasonable doubt on the appellant’s criminal liability.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellant’s conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.It cannot, by
itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case, the failure of the
apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain
of custody requirement of this Act effectively negates this presumption.

NARCISO SALAS vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

FACTS: On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso
Salas in RTC ofCabanatuan City.

Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her,
petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as
well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Petitioner filed his answer 4 with special
and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the
delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in
exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his
right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s
evidence.

14
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to the CA
arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him the right to introduce evidence on his
defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and
ordering him to give monthly support.

By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved
that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

HELD: YES. Both the trial court and appellate court committed an effort ruling that Christian Paolo is an
illegitimate child of the petitioner.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 38
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner
is the father of Christian Paulo.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUPER POSING Y ALAYON

G.R. No. 196973, July 31, 2013

FACTS: Accused-appellant RUPER POSING y ALAYON was charged with the crime of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Sections 5 and 11 respectively, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Upon arraignment, Posing
entered a plea of “not guilty” on both charges.

The trial court found Posing GUILTY of violation of both Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165.
On appeal, the accused-appellant, contended that the trial court gravely erred when it failed to consider the
police officers’ failure to comply with the proper procedure in the handling and custody of the seized drugs,
as provided under Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165, which ultimately affected the chain of custody of the
confiscated drugs.

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that although the requirements
under Section 21 of R. A. No. 9165 has been held to be mandatory, non-compliance with the same, does
not necessarily warrant an acquittal. In addition, it was averred that the police officers are entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Finally, the accused-appellant did not
interpose any evidence in support of his defense aside from his bare denial.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs.
2. Whether the integrity of the evidence was preserved in the course of the investigation and trial.

HELD:

1. YES. Both the trial and the appellate court agree that the illegal sale of shabu was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs
under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity
of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the

15
 payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.

2. YES. In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody requirements that must be met in
proving that the seized drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2)
witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
item.

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses that the integrity
of the seized item was preserved every step of the process.
Further, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict compliance with the procedural aspect of
the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.

As held in People v. Llanita40 as cited in People v. Ara:

RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance
as to the chain of custody rule. x x x We have emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural
requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing
of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of
drugs in a buy-bust operation.

PEOPLE vs. GANI

711 SCRA 78

FACTS: On May 5, 2004, Si Saul received information from a confidential informant that accused-appellant
Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking for a buyer of shabu. Si Saul agreed to meet the
informant and accused-appellant Normina for negotiation at the Pearl Manila Hotel but eventually met at
Jolibee beside Pearl Manila Hotel, just in front of the NBI Headquarters. Accused-appellant Normina initially
offered to sell 500 grams of shabu to Si Saul. Si Saul reported back to NBI Headquarters to tell his superior
and they coordinated with the PDEA. Si Saul was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given the
marked money consisting of two P1,000.00 bills, with several P20.00 bills in between, to make it appear
that the money was worth One HUNDRED Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), the purchase price agreed
upon by Si Saul and accused-appellant Nomina for the shabu.

After the exchange of money and shabu , SI Saul lighted a cigarette, which was the pre-arranged signal to
the rest of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated. When SI Saul already saw the
buy-bust team members approaching, he grabbed accused-appellant Asir’s hands and introduced himself
as an NBI agent. Accused-appellants were arrested and duly advised of their constitutional rights. During
the search incidental to accused-appellants’ arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants’
possession two other sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-appellant Asir’s .45 caliber pistol, and
the motorcycle. The buy- bust team and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall.

The evidence for the defense consisted of accused-appellants’ testimonies. Both denied the crime charged
against them and claimed that they were the victims of extortion. They were charged only because they
failed to produce the money demanded from them.

RTC ruled against the accused-appellants. They appealed the RTC’s judgment to the Court of Appeals.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the
Supreme Court.

In their Brief, accused-appellants assert that the prosecution failed to comply with the rules on the custody
of seized drugs provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. According to accused-appellants,
there is no showing that the inventory and picture-taking of the shabu were conducted in their presence, as
well as in the presence of a representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official, immediately after accused-appellants’ arrest and seizure of the shabu purportedly
sold by them. When accused-appellants were brought by the buy-bust team to the barangay hall following
their arrest, there was already a typewritten inventory report for signature by the barangay officials, which,
accused-appellants surmise, was already prepared at the NBI Office. It is likewise not clearly established
where and when the markings on the plastic sachets of shabu were made. Accused-appellants reason that
the suspicions regarding the actual conduct of an inventory of the shabu allegedly sold by them could have
been avoided had the prosecution presented the testimonies of the barangay officials who signed the
inventory report.

ISSUE: W/N the rule on the chain of custody of the seized shabu has been substantially complied with.

16
RULING: The Court finds the appeal bereft of merit. The combined testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence of the prosecution produced a detailed account of the buy-bust operation against accused-
appellants and proved all the essential elements of the crime charged against them.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1)
the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as
evidence.

The Court further finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the chain of
custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. Jurisprudence has
decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and
to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render the
seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the
said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

 Citibank Mastercard vs. Teodoro
 Loon vs. Power Master, Inc.
 Dimaguila vs. Monteiro

CITIBANK MASTERCARD VS. TEODORO

G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003

FACTS: Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one of the cardholders of the petitioner Citibank, N.A.
Mastercard. On January 25, 1995, respondent's obligations stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and
service charges. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection. During the hearing, petitioner presented
several photocopies of sales invoices or charge slips to the total amount of P24,388.36. Thereafter, the
Municipal Trial Court rendered judgment ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the amount of P24,388.36,
plus interest and the penalty fee. On appeal, it was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court. The Court
of Appeals, however, reversed and set aside the said decision by ruling that the photocopies of the sales
invoices or charge slips were incompetent proofs of the obligation of respondent. Hence, this petition for
review.

ISSUE: Whether the photocopies of sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial are admissible in
evidence?

HELD: No. The petition has no merit. The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its
case based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal
amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court
were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still have had little
probative value. The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible
because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondent's obligation was not
established.

WILGEN LOON et al. vs. POWER MASTER, INC., et al.

G.R. No. 189404 December 11, 2013

FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned the
petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in various PLDT offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the
petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their
officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were
not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays.
They further averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the
petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action. They claimed
that the respondents relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.

Respondents did not participate in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and
May 21, 2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents’ behalf. 5 The respondents’
counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001.6 However, the
respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces of evidence in their defense despite their
knowledge of the pendency of the case.

17
The LA awarded the petitioners salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month
pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated that the burden of proving the payment of these money
claims rests with the employer. The LA also awarded attorney’s fees in favor of the petitioners, pursuant
to Article 111 of the Labor Code.

However, the LA denied the petitioners’ claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays.
The LA concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have been dismissed from employment
because they did not show any notice of termination of employment.

Both parties appealed the LA’s ruling with the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC affirmed
the LA’s awards of holiday pay and attorney’s fees. However, it allowed the respondents to submit
pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they had been deprived of due
process. The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious
misconduct and willful disobedience.

The NLRC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. The
CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent’s sufficiently proves the allegations sought to be proven.

HELD: NO. The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. Why the
respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at the
earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents
fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give
probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery
and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for
inspection.35 It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where
the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the
petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the
originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals
raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.

It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition that "[i]t is of common knowledge that
there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures." The NLRC cannot take judicial
notice that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves
disown the signatures in the respondents’ assailed documentary evidence. The NLRC’s position is
unwarranted and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.

Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the employees. This conclusion is consistent
with the rule that the employer’s cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on
the weakness of the employee’s evidence.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA
vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014

FACTS: On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro, along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa
and Clarita Nobleza filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against the Dimaguilas,
together with the Borlazas, alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The Monteiros anchored their
claim on a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila.

The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property had long been partitioned
to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, with Perfecto becoming owner of the southern half and Vitaliano
owning the northern half. The defendants claim that they are Vitaliano’s heirs and further averred that the
Monteiro’s claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s orders which denied several of
their motions and the proceedings were suspended while such petition was pending. The CA upheld the
RTC’s orders and, upon resumption of the proceedings, the spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave
to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which was granted by the RTC.

The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the defendants’ allegation of a partition and aver that a
third of Perfecto’s share was sold to them through a “Bilihan”; and that, upon their attempt to take
possession of that portion, they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it.

The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their original answer that the
subject property was actually divided into northern and southern halves, replacing it with a division “into two
and share and share alike.” This resulted to an admission of a co-ownership, contrary to their original
position. According to the Dimaguilas, the “Bilihan” also violated Article 1485 of the Civil Code for not
specifying the metes and bounds of the property sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale was still
void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the property.

18
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of Liliw,
Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been partitioned into
southern and northern portions. The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from denying this
partition and the “Bilihan” document was regular and authentic absent any evidence to the contrary.

The Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision. A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioners but it was denied, hence, this appeal under Rule
45.

ISSUES:

1) Whether there was a partition of the subject property; and

2) Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the subject property was sold to the respondent
spouses.

HELD:

The petition is DENIED. Both aforementioned issues are answered in the affirmative.

The Supreme Court points out that to determine whether there was a partition and a sale of the 1/3
portion of the property requires an evaluation of the evidence. This entails a question of fact which is beyond
the ambit of Rule 45 upon which this petition is based. On this ground alone, the petition could be denied.
However, the Supreme Court delved into the concepts of evidence to put the case to rest.

Preponderance of evidence; definition

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case
by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side, synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Admissions; contradiction

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the
palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to
them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence.
Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppels

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners’ admission and so amended their original
complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the
petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be
sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If
anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.

Best Evidence Rule

Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original
is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same
Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody or the record.

Hearsay Rule

Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty
of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience
and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in
the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of the
performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the
department tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore,
clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as
they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule
and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

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PAROLE EVIDENCE

 Ortanez vs. CA
 Lapu-Lapu Foundation vs. CA
 Leoveras vs. Valdez

RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Inocentes sold 2 parcels of land in QC to Ortanez for a consideration of P35,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively. Inocentes received the sums of money BUT failed to deliver the Ortanez the TCT.
Inocentes refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and
petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.

Ortanez filed an action for specific performance before the RTC Inocentes’ evidence: private respondent
Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although
such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Ortanez timely objected to the oral testimony
of Oscar. RTC overruled the objection. RTC dismissed Ortanez’s complaint Despite petitioner's timely
objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule,
the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim. Ortanez appealed to CA. CA affirmed RTC Ortanez filed a Rule 45 before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the subject parol evidence was correctly admitted to establish the alleged oral conditions-
precedent to a contract of sale, considering that the deeds of sale are silent on such conditions.

HELD: No. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents' oral testimony
on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could
be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the
general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced
to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms
can be admitted other than the contents thereof . Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only
repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned
by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject
to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.

Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement
Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may
be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In
the former, the contract sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing
the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this
case, made no reference to any pre- conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as
absolute in its own terms.

Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document,
other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.

Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent
of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance: "[W]here the written contract is so
ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a
mere reading of the instrument.

Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties.

LAPULAPU FOUNDATION, INC. AND ELIAS TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 126006. January 29, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Elias Tan, then President of the co-petitioner Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four
loans from the respondent Allied Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts
of P100,000 each.

The entire obligation amounted to P493,566.61 and despite demands by the respondent Bank, the
petitioners failed to pay the same. The respondent Bank filed with the RTC of Cebu City, a complaint
seeking payment by the petitioners, jointly and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61. The trial court ruled

20
in favor of the petitioner requiring defendants Elise Tan and Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. to pay jointly and
solidarily to the plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation the amount of P493,566.61.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of the court a quo. The appellate court disbelieved petitioner Tans
claim that the loans were his personal loans as the promissory notes evidencing them showed upon their
faces that these were obligations of the petitioner Foundation, as contracted by petitioner Tan himself in
his official and personal character. Applying the parol evidence rule, the CA likewise rejected petitioner
Tans assertion that there was an unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank that he would
pay the loans from the proceeds of his shares of stocks in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Finally, like the
court a quo, the CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity in holding the petitioners
jointly and solidarily liable.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in applying the parol evidence rule
HELD: NO. In disclaiming any liability for the loans, the petitioner Foundation maintains that these were
contracted by petitioner Tan in his personal capacity and that it did not benefit therefrom. On the other hand,
while admitting that the loans were his personal obligation, petitioner Tan avers that he had an unwritten
agreement with the respondent Bank that these loans would be renewed on a year-to-year basis and paid
from the proceeds of his shares of stock in the Lapulapu Industries Corp.
As a corollary, the parol evidence rule likewise constrains this Court to reject petitioner Tans claim
regarding the purported unwritten agreement between him and the respondent Bank on the
payment of the obligation. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. These
promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978
and May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit.
Nowhere was it stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or rolled-over annually
until paid from the proceeds of petitioner Tans shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this
purported unwritten agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the
promissory notes.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. No such
allegation had been made by the petitioners in this case.

MODESTO LEOVERAS vs. CASIMERO VALDEZ

G.R. No. 169985 June 15, 2011

FACTS: Maria Sta. Maria and Dominga Manangan were the registered owners - three-fourths (¾) and one-
fourth (¼) pro-indiviso, respectively - of a parcel of land. Sta. Maria sold her three-fourths (¾) share to
Benigna Llamas. The sale was duly annotated at the back of OCT No. 24695. When Benigna died in
1944,she willed her three-fourths (¾) share equally to her sisters Alejandra Llamas and Josefa Llamas.
Thus, Alejandra and Josefa each owned ½ of Benigna’s ¾ shares. Alejandra’s heirs sold their
predecessor’s one-half (½) share (roughly equivalent to 10,564 square meters) to the respondent, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Also, Josefa sold her own ½ share (subject property) to the
respondent and the petitioner, as evidenced by another Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent and the
petitioner executed an Agreement, allotting their portions of the subject property. The petitioner and the
respondent executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the subject property. The parties took possession
of their respective portions of the subject property and declared it in their name for taxation purposes.

The respondent asked the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan on the requirements for the transfer
of title over the portion allotted to him on the subject property. To his surprise, the respondent learned that
the petitioner had already obtained in his name two transfer certificates of title.

The respondent filed a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages against the
petitioner, seeking the reconveyance of the 1,004-square meter portion (disputed property) covered by TCT
No. 195813, on the ground that the petitioner is entitled only to the 3,020 square meters identified in the
parties’ Agreement.

The respondent sought the nullification of the petitioner’s titles by contesting the authenticity of the
petitioner’s documents. Particularly, the respondent assailed the Benigna Deed by presenting Benigna’s
death certificate. The respondent argued that Benigna could not have executed a deed, which purports to
convey 4,024 square meters to the petitioner, in 1969 because Benigna already died in 1944. The
respondent added that neither could Sta. Maria have sold to the parties her three-fourths (¾) share in 1969
because she had already sold her share to Benigna in 1932.

The petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and for a declaration that he is the lawful owner of
the parcels of land covered by his titles.

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The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC by ruling against the authenticity
of the Benigna Deed and the Affidavit. As the totality of the evidence presented sufficiently sustains [the
respondent’s] claim that the titles issued to [the petitioner] were based on forged and spurious documents,
it behooves this Court to annul these certificates of title. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reconveyance of the parcel of land covered by the TCT No.
195813 to the Respondent.

HELD: NO. We rule that the respondent adequately proved his ownership of the disputed property by virtue
of the (i) Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Josefa in favor of the parties; (ii) the parties’ Affidavit of Adverse
Claim; and (iii) the parties’ Agreement, which cover the subject property.

The petitioner does not dispute the due execution and the authenticity of these documents, particularly the
Agreement. However, he claims that since the Agreement does not reflect the true intention of the parties,
the Affidavit was subsequently executed in order to reflect the parties’ true intention.

The petitioner’s argument calls to fore the application of the parol evidence rule ] i.e., when the terms of an
agreement are reduced to writing, the written agreement is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon
and no evidence of these terms can be admitted other than what is contained in the written
agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

To avoid the operation of the parol evidence rule, the Rules of Court allows a party to present evidence
modifying, explaining or adding to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, as
in this case, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.
The failure of the written agreement to express the true intention of the parties is either by reason of mistake,
fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, which nevertheless did not prevent a meeting of the minds of the
parties.

By fraudulently causing the transfer of the registration of title over the disputed property in his name, the
petitioner holds the title to this disputed property in trust for the benefit of the respondent as the true
owner; registration does not vest title but merely confirms or records title already existing and vested.
The Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of
others. Hence, the CA correctly ordered the reconveyance of the disputed property, covered by TCT No.
195813, to the respondent.

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

 Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa

 Torres vs. PAGCOR
 Ang vs. Republic
 People vs. Enojas
 Syhunliong vs. Rivera

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO COMORPOSA ET AL.

G.R no. 152807 August 12, 2003

FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged that the disputed
property was owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of petitioners; that Marcos' son Adolfo, for humanitarian
reasons, allowed respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez' land without paying any rental. On May
7, 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises but the latter refused to
vacate the same and claimed that they wewre the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors
of the premises.

MTC rendered judegment in favor of petitioners. on appeal, RTC reversed the said decision. Affirming the
RTC, the CA upheld the right of the respodents as claimants and possessors. The CA lend credence to the
Certification issued by the DENR's community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was proof
that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any
person. Therefore, respondents after sufficiently proving their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better right to possess alienable and
disposable land of ther public domain.

Hence, this Petition, petitioner avers that CA gravely abuse his discretion in giving weight to the CENR
Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certification issued by a public officer bearing a facsimile signature is inadmissible
in evidence.

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HELD: The rule stated in Garvida v. Sales Jr. that - "Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered
originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic" is not applicable in the instant case.

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR
Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida.
The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by
mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certificayion. In fact, the DENR regional director has
acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998. If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was
under the former a direct control and supervision.

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES vs. PAGCOR

G.R. No. 193531 December 14, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of PAGCOR. On the basis of an alleged
intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila,
which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot
machine customers, PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit conducted an investigation. The CIU
discovered the scheme of CMR padding. Based on the investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot
machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified
the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein
petitioner.

On May 4, 2007, the CIU served petitioner with a Memorandum of Charges for dishonesty, serious
misconduct, fraud and violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses where
the penalty imposable is dismissal. On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges was issued to
petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty. Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within
72 hours from receipt thereto why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed.

On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any
involvement or participation and asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him. On August
4, 2007, petitioner received a letter from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel dismissing him from the service. On
September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman for
illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. PAGCOR filed its Comment wherein it
alleged, among others, that petitioner failed to perfect an appeal within the period and manner provided by
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law. On June 23, 2008, the CSC, treating
petitioner's complaint as an appeal from the PAGCOR's decision dismissing petitioner from the service,
issued Resolution No. 081204 denying petitioner's appeal.

In so ruling, the CSC found that the issue for resolution was whether petitioner's appeal had already
prescribed which the former answered in the positive. The CSC did not give credit to petitioner's claim that
he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period prescribed by the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in
CSC. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the twin resolutions issued by the CSC. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the CSC's dismissal of the appeal for being filed beyond
the reglamentary period.

HELD: NO. Clearly, a motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a
motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the
postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case
of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the
movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal therefrom. Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the
motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before
August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In
fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by
certifications issued by PAGCOR employees. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a
letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter
reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is
not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the
motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and
ruled that:

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 x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining
on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading. x x x

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic
Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the
question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic
documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act, and We said:

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010

FACTS: Complainant Irish Sagud and accused Rustan Ang were sweethearts. However, Irish broke up
with him when she learned he had taken a live-in partner whom he had gotten pregnant. Rustan convinced
her to elope with him for he did not love the woman whom he was about to marry, but Irish rejected the
proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan managed to get hold of it and send her text
messages.

Irish received through multimedia message a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with her face
superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was one of the
numbers used by Rustan. After she got the obscene picture, she received text messages from Rustan
threatening her that he will spread the picture he sent through the Internet.

Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the
picture and text message. She asked him to meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his motorcycle
and walking towards Irish, the police intercepted and arrested him. The police seized his cellphone and
several SIM cards.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

HELD: Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section
1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived
such ground for objection.

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS, et.al

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

FACTS: PO2 Gregorio testified that around 10:30 pm, he and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity
of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in a shop near
the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached taxi and asked the
driver, Enojas, for his documents. Enojas showed the officers the documents but were doubtful as to its
veracity, hence, the officers asked Enojas to come with them to the police station for further questioning.
Enojas voluntarily went with the two officers. Upon reaching 7-11, they stopped because PO2 Pangilinan
has to relieve himself there.

While PO2 Pangilinan approaches the door of the store, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it
out with them. He shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape, but someone fired
at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at the
armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibee
outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but
the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On
returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.

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Responding to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call, suspecting that accused Enojas was involved in the attempted
robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind.
P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Cambi to monitor its incoming messages. PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito
testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas,
communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in
the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused
Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between
Enojas and some of his co-accused.

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the accused
opted to instead file a trial memorandum for their defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an
acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were
inadmissible, not having been properly identified. The RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty
of murder qualified by evident premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused. The
CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the
several accused planned the crime before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the text messages are admissible in evidence in this case.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that as to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them
in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal
actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.

The prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for
the conviction of all the accused.

RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG vs. TERESITA D. RIVERA

G.R. No. 200148 June 4, 2014

FACTS: Syhunliong is the President of BANFF while Rivera used to be the accounting manager of BANFF.
About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to be effective
on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until March of the same year
to complete the turn over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded
her. Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining salaries,
benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check
representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong. Rivera
sent the following text message to one of the official cellular phones held by Lumapas: I am expecting that[.]
[G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay ko. I don’t deserve this [because] I did my
job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning. Kailangan
release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di
na kami abot sa labor. Subsequently, Rivera filed before the NLRC a complainat against Syhunliong for
underpaid salaries, etc. totaling P698 thousand. Pending the resolution of the said labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel on 4/16/2007. RTC ruled in favor of Syhunliong. On appeal,
the court of appeals ruled in favor of Rivera hence this petition. [andaming issue na pinresent si Syhunliong
pero hindi na diniscuss ni SC kasi nga prescribed na daw]

ISSUES:
1. W/N the action for liber is already prescribed
2. W/N the text message is considered a privileged communication

HELD:
1. Yes, Syhunliong filed his complaint against Rivera more than one year [Articles 90 and 91 of
the RPC provides a 1-year prescriptive period for instituting actions for LIBEL] after the
allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas. from the moment the State has lost or waived
such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the same
be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint.

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 2. Yes, In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person
who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication,
or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to
whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of the
latter's claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera expressed
through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time, Lumapas was the
best person, who could help expedite the release of Rivera's claims. Rivera's text message
falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication since she "was speaking in
response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of an intent to injure the reputation"45
of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of
conveying it to the party concerned.”

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

Disqualificaitions
 Marcos vs. Heirs of Andres Navarro

LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS vs. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR. et al.
G.R. No. 198240 July 03, 2013

FACTS: Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several parcels of land
including a 108.3997-hectare lot located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were survived by
their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their
only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.

Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive ownership of the subject
lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through
Assistant Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting
expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s signature on the affidavit and the submitted
standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. Thus, the sisters sued
the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before the RTC of Masbate.

Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC granted respondents’ motion and
disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be
hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.

The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion. Aggrieved, the sisters filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however, dismissed their petition. The CA likewise denied their
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.

HELD: No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v. Republic of
the Philippines, we said that a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.–Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22
disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or
insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to
others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since
she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents’ motion to disqualify
her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for
disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of
her testimony. Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

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 SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.–The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that Tamani’s signature was forged after
considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied
forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an
unpracticed observer.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is
hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the
circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the RTC ruling.

Mental Capacity or Immaturity

 Peopls vs. Golimlim

PEOPLE vs. GOLIMLIM

GR NO. 145225 APRIL 2, 2004
FACTS: Salvador Golimlim was found guilty by the RTC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon for the crime of Rape. The
private complainant Evelyn Canchela was his niece and a mental retarde. Golimlim condented that the
accusations against him were not true because her mind is not normal and her testimony cannot be given
credence because of her mental state.
ISSUE: whether or not Evelyn is not disqualified as a witness despite her mental incapacity.
HELD: Yes. The court held that even if Evelyn is a mental retard does not disqualify her as a witness nor
render her testimony bereft of truth.
In People vs. Trelles, where the the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private
complainant's testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations beteeen lucidity and
ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retarde or feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectu
weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is not valid objection to the competency of a witness so long
as the latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of matter testified to.
It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retarde can be a witness, depending on his or her ability
to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
From the meticolous scrutiny of records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn's testimony.
Evelyn could give spontaneous and consistent answers to the same but differently framed questions under
conditions which do not inhibit her from answering.

Marital Disqualification
 Alvarez vs. Ramirez
 People vs. Castaneda

MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005

FACTS: Respondent Susan Ramirez, is the complaining witness in a criminal case for arson pending before
the Regional Trial Court. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza
G. Alvarez, sister of respondent. The private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as
the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Subsequently, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on
marital disqualification. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the
trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses.

The trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and
deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in to file with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The
Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial
court.

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Issue: Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband?

Ruling: Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. – During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct
descendants or ascendants."

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions, both in civil actions
between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support
of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent
danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all
the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal
relationship survives and flourishes. At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying
the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the
right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as
stated by this Court in Francisco), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity."

People vs. Castañeda

G.R. No. L-46306 Feb. 27, 1979

FACTS: Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document. The document
falsified was a Deed of Sale of house and lot. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.

On or about the 19th day of May, 1979 in the Municipality of San Fernando, Pampanga, Benjamin falsified
a Deed of Sale of a house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana,
making it appear that his wife, Victoria, gave her consent on the said sale.

At the trial, prosecution called the wife to the witness stand. Defense moved to disqualify her as a witness
invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution defended its stand resting on the
exception to that rule, stating that it is a “criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.”
Notwithstanding such opposition, the respondent Judge granted the motion of the defense, disqualifying
Victoria.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case
committed by a husband against the wife, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

HELD: The case is an exception to the rule on marital disqualification. When an offense directly attacks, or
directly or vitally impairs, the conjugal relation then it clearly comes into the exception to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal procedure for a crime committed by one
against the other. Had the sale of the house and lot been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could
have been charged to the husband. It is the husband’s breach of his wife’s confidence that gave rise to the
offense, which promoted the wife to file the complaint. The Court said “Therefore with more reason the
exception must apply since the one directly prejudiced is not a third person but the wife herself” who is a
party to the conjugal property. It is undeniable that act had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the
conjugal relation, which is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with
the Office of Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition which
seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against her husband. The actuations of the
wife underscore the fact that the marital and domestic relations between her and the husband have become
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed.

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Death or Insanity (Dead man’s Statute)
 Razon vs. CA
 Sunga-Chan vs. Chua
 Bordalba vs. CA

RAZON vs. CA
G.R. No. 74306; March 16, 1992

FACTS: Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon et al. organized the E. Razon, Inc. In April 1966, Stock
Certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T.
Chuidian. On the basis of the shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, his son Vicente
Chuidian, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were paid
compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T.
Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock
over the said shares cancelled.

Razon alleges that after organizing the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon distributed shares of stock previously
placed in the names of the withdrawing nominal incorporators to some friends including Juan T. Chuidian.
Stock Certificate No. 003 upon instruction of the late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was personally delivered
by Chuidian on July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was himself an
associate of the Chuidian Law Office. Since then, Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even
during the lifetime of the late Chuidian. By agreement of the parties delivered it for deposit with the bank
under the joint custody of the parties. Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under Stock Certificate No. 003 were
delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the
shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the
owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof until such time as he was paid
therefor by the other nominal incorporators/stockholders.

ISSUE: WON Razon’s testimony is covered by the Dead Man’s Status, thus inadmissible.

HELD: NO. In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant
Razon(petitioner herein) to the effect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente
Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan
Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the
deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the
administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly
owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case
was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner
as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent
is deemed to have waived the rule.

It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the
rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto.

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO T. CHUA

G.R. No. 143340. August 15, 2001
FACTS:
1. On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth
Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia),
daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for Winding
Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
2. Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution
of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and
Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS
APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship
3. Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of
Shellite without respondents consent.

29
4. Despite respondents repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding
up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply. Petitioner Lilibeth
allegedly continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
5. On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zambaonga del Norte had
jurisdiction over the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
6. On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent.
7. On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
8. On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner this
petition wherein petitioner relies upon the following ground:
 The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that there existed a
partnership between respondent Lamberto T. Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga
upon the latters invitation and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets
and business were taken over by petitioners.
9. Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a
partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacintos death. In the absence of
any written document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argue that
these courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine,
to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacintos death. To support this argument, petitioners
invoke the Dead Mans Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
that provides:
10. Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his alter ego,
Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto),
now represented by petitioners.

ISSUE: WON petitioners may invoke the Dead Man’s Statute or Survivorship Rule under Section 23, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court
HELD: Petition DENIED, CA Affirmed.
The crucial issue to settle then is whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute applies to this case so as to
render inadmissible respondents testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.[9] But before this rule can be
successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person
or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such deceased
person or before such person became of unsound mind.[10]
Two reasons forestall the application of the Dead Mans Statute to this case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim[11] against respondent in their answer before the
trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute.[12] Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or
administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.[13] Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying
as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought
against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.[14]
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the simple
reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted. Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence
of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners insistence that Josephine is the alter ego
of respondent does not make her an assignor because the term assignor of a party means assignor of a
cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has
arisen.[15] Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
Petitioners reliance alone on the Dead Man’s Statute to defeat respondents claim cannot prevail over
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between
respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well,

30
the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the
formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial. By the weight of judicial
precedents, a factual matter like the finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and
Jacinto cannot be inquired into by this Court on review. [17] This Court can no longer be tasked to go over
the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and
the appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or
the other.[18] It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of
respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the
documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility of the evidence
at the time that such evidence was offered.[19]

Privileged Communication
 Chan vs. Chan
 Lacurom vs. Jacoba
 Samala vs. Valencia
 Almonte vs. Vasquez
 Syunhilong vs. Rivera (see p.34)

JOSIELENE LARA CHAN vs. JOHNNY T. CHAN

G.R. No. 179786 July 24, 2013

FACTS: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144 a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan, the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed that
Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally
deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him
to undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.

Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To save their
marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly
held him by both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got worse when the
police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated crime and released her only after the case against
her ended. By then, their marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny attached to
his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from "methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following
up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request
was accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the records sought by subpoena duces
tecum.

Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient
privilege.The RTC sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of certiorari before the CA. The CA denied
Josielene’s petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the
privileged character of the physician-patient communication.

HELD: NO.

SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent
of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s
consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the
patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body,
enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any
fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired
between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.
The right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed
are "not privileged."

31
 Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it
is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130
states that the physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined" regarding
their professional conversation. The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only
the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results
of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.
Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the
equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the
patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

LACUROM vs. JACOBA

A.C. No. 5921 March 10, 2006

FACTS: The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro

R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).

The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor

of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court.

The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing the earlier judgments
rendered in favor of Veneracion.

Veneration’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition) dated 30 July
2001 (30 July 2001 motion). HERE, plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting
remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she
should not be held in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion.

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with
imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he
should not be held in contempt. Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition,
wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements
implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence. Judge Lacurom later rendered a
decision finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Courts Ruling

The issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. YES.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion.
Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.

x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges

scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to
be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with
legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object
timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This waiver
applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

32
 No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required
of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary
and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created
a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves
by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

CLARITA J. SAMALA vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Clarita J. Samala against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for Disbarment on
the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b)
knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases
in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes.

a. On serving as counsel for contending parties – Canon 21

The fact that respondent filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,"
is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said case.
Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of his
client is required. Respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband,
in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits
a corresponding sanction from this Court.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also
after the relation of attorney and client has terminated. The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either in the
same case or in a different but related action. A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly,
to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge
must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of
conflict of interests which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn
his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, but the same will not
exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK.

b. On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence – Canon 10

Respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted was already cancelled in
lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership. What is decisive
in this case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the
fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name
of Alba.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by
respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January
8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's intent in
trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact that said title was already
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

33
c. On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees – Dismissed for lack of
sufficient basis

The act of respondent of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand,
and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless it can be
clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of his client and
his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute
the right of his client.

d. On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children – Canon 1, Rule 1.01

The Court found respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children. During the
hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by TeresitaLagmay who are all over 20 years of
age, while his first wife was still alive. In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than
enough to hold him liable on the charge of immorality.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral
delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct
has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several cases, the Court
did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality
of the community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and
that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

In sum, the Court found respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia guilty of misconduct and violation of Canons
21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended him from the practice of law for
three years.

COMMISSIONER ALMONTE vs. HON. VASQUEZ

FACTS: An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee of the EIIB, was sent to
the Secretary of Finance and Office of the Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of
funds from the savings of unfilled plantilla positions by the Chief of Budget Division. Petitioner Jose T.
Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and
Fiscal Management Division. They denied the allegations. Jose Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the
Ombudsman’s office asked to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a
subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of their witnesses,
as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIB’s Accounting Division, ordering him to bring “all
documents relating to Personal Service Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary)
for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.”

Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted by the Ombudsman since no affidavit was
filed against petitioners) and the subpoena duces tecum, which was denied, since it was directed to the
Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In addition, Ombudsman ordered Chief of the Records Section
of EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel
Service Funds for 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988,
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

ISSUE/S: Whether or not all documents relating to personal services funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” are classified and, therefore
beyond the reach of public respondent’s subpoena duces tecum

HELD: NO. There is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB, nor is there any law or regulation which considers personnel records
of the EIIB as classified information. Even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively
privileged, this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction.
However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a
confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself.

RATIO:
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." COA Circular No. 88-293, provides that the "only item of expenditure which should
be treated strictly confidential" is that which refers to the "purchase of information and payment of rewards."
It reads: “The only item of expenditure which should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under
the category of classified information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of rewards.
However, reasonable records should be maintained and kept for inspection of the Chairman, Commission
on Audit or his duly authorized representative. All other expenditures are to be considered unclassified
supported by invoices, receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to reasonable inquiry by the

34
Chairman or his duly authorized representative.” It should be noted that the regulation requires that
“reasonable records” be kept justifying the confidential or privileged character of the information relating to
informers. There are no such reasonable records in this case to substitute for the records claimed to be
confidential.

ADMISSIONS

 Constantino vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino

 People vs. Gandia
 Doldol vs. People
CONSTANTINO vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTATINO
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013

FACTS: The case stemmed from the properties belonging in the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. On one
hand are Oscar Constantino et al, the grandchildren of Pedro Sr. (brothers of Pedro Jr.) while on the other
side are the descendants of Pedro Jr. Both parties executed separate extrajudicial settlement for two
subject lots wherein it appeared that they have excluded each other claiming to be the only heirs of Pedro
Sr. in each lot. Subsequently, the descendants of Pedro Jr. contested the agreement which pertained to
the lot for Oscar Constantino et al. They asked for the nullification of the agreement as it allegedly deprived
them of part ownership over the property which they occupied. For their part, Oscar Contantino et al alleged
that it was the agreement of both parties to exclude each other on the properties in two separate
extrajudicial settlement. The RTC found both parties to be in pari delicto and hence did not uphold the
cause of action of the heirs of Pedro Jr. The Court of Appeals on the other hand held that the subject
property under the extrajudicial settlement which pertained to the heirs of Pedro Jr. is not within the estate
of Pedro Sr. but that of Pedro Jr.

It explained that the lot was distributed among the heirs of Pedro Jr. is a property belonging to Pedro Jr.
although there was a typographical error in that the name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as
Pedro Constantino. The CA held that it was clear from the reading of the document that a typographical
error was committed because the four (4) children of Pedro Jr. were specifically identified. Further, during
the presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate
children. The respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the lot unto themselves to the exclusion of
all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the document pertained to a different property
and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it was erroneous for the trial court to declare the
parties in pari delicto.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was erroneous for the CA to disregard the stipulations and admissions during the
pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based

HELD: Yes. The records show that apart from the statement that the parcel of land subject matter of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., no other evidence was
offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to the respondents’ claim, merely relied on the alleged
typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CA’s conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro
Jr. and that of their children, which the CA considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr.
and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. The CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the
respondents during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land covered by the Tax
Declaration belongs to Pedro Sr. Based on the records, the respondents stated in the pre trial conference
that the subject lot was “previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. and was transferred to Maria
Constantino”.

Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by
Pedro Sr. of the subject lot covered which was transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro
Jr. Such that, in one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether
or not the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing
the legal infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"– an issue earlier mentioned. Judicial
admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one
of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become
binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.
Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it
must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. The general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is
shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he
made such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before
and during the trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the lot, respondent when placed on the stand,
offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr. The assertion of denial
is simply a self-serving declaration unsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the stipulations made

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during the pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on
which they based their right over the property subject matter thereof.

DOLDOL vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164481 September 20, 2005

FACTS: Conrado C. Doldol is the Municipal Treasurer of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan.

Conformably to the Memorandum dated April 6, 1995 of the Provincial Auditor, a team of State Auditors
conducted an audit of the cash and cash account of petitioner. The first audit covered the General Fund,
Special Education Fund and Trust Fund in his custody for the period of November 30, 1994 to June 8, 1995
and discovered that he had a shortage of P1,134,421.54.

The State Auditors then conducted another audit of the said account, this time covering the period of June
8, 1995 to July 19, 1995. They discovered that Doldol incurred an added cash shortage of P149,905.92.
The State Auditors demanded the immediate restitution of the missing funds, and directed him to submit
within 72 hours a written explanation why he incurred such shortages. Doldol failed to respond on both
cases.

Doldol then wrote the Provincial Treasurer requesting that a re-audit be conducted on his cash and cash
account, taking exception to the findings of the State Auditors. Instead of pursuing his request for a re-audit,
Doldol opted to refund the missing funds. On September 15, 1995, he remitted P200,000.00 to the Acting
Municipal Treasurer for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 436756. Doldol promised to pay the
balance of his shortage, as follows: P200,000.00 on October 31, 1995, andP884,139.66 on or before
November 30, 1995. However, he reneged on his promise.

Two informations for malversation of public funds were then filed against Doldol in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Carlos City. The trial court convicted the accused of the crimes charged. On appeal, the CA
rendered judgment affirming the appealed decision. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner’s defense
The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that the public funds were for his personal
use. And the charges against him were premature because the audit of his accountabilities had not yet
been completed. Hence, the prima facie presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code does not apply.
To bolster his claim and exculpate his criminal liability, he cites the doctrine laid down in Dumagat
v. Sandiganbayan wherein the court acquitted the accused of the crime of malversation of public funds,
holding that [s]ince the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same cannot be made the basis for
holding petitioner liable for malversation.

ISSUE: WON the partial restitution of the petitioner of the cash shortage is considered an implied admission
of misappropriation of the missing funds.

HELD: Yes. The ruling of the CA on this matter is correct. as guided by Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules
on Evidence, the CA held that said payment, particularly when taken in conjunction with appellants
commitment to gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of compromise which must
be treated as an implied admission of appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to
his personal use.

CONFESSIONS
 Ladiana vs. People
 People vs. Ulit
 People vs. Sayaboc
 Tanenggee vs. People

LADIANA vs. PEOPLE

393 SCRA 419 DECEMBER 4, 2002

FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now
PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is
primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position
confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed
to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban,
Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San
Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a
firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and
neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.

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Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. “Kaya itong si Kapitan San
Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin;
sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng
pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan”

ISSUE: Whether or not there the statement of petitioner is an admission or confession.

HELD Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as
follows:

“SEC. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. “SEC. 33. Confession.—The declaration of an accused acknowledging his
guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.” In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a
statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged.

In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they were made by
mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission was made in a jocular,
not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner
never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In
addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the
declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY

G.R. Nos. 131799-801 February 23, 2004

FACTS: Ulit was charged with qualified rape of his niece LUCELLE SERRANO ULIT before RTC Makati.
He changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. RTC then convicted him. Automatic review ensued

ISSUE: Whether Ulit’s conviction should be set aside, considering how his plea of guilty was taken by the
RTC

HELD: NO.

First, the trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from not guilty to that of
guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do so.

Second, it appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the appellant opted not to avail
himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation and refused to execute a waiver under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code. The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay
while detained at the barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and
March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when
he was brought to the Office of the Public Prosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo
inquire about the circumstances and the appellant’s reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver.

The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay in evidence to
prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant
objected thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing
the same.

Third, the trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when
he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted
by counsel, whether he had waived his right thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Fourth, the trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape committed in November
1996, when in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, he confessed to having raped the victim only in February 1997
and March 2, 1997. The appellant did not admit having raped her in November 1996 as alleged in the
Information in Criminal Case No. 97-385. The trial court did not even inquire from the appellant who
prepared and typed his Sinumpaang Salaysay and if the contents of his statement were explained to him
before he signed the same.

Fifth, the trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple terms so as to be
understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape; (b) the circumstances of relationship and
the minority of the victim; and (c) that his plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for
the crime in light of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Sixth, it was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he would be civilly liable to the
victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages and P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

Seventh, neither did the trial court inquire from the appellant’s counsel whether the meaning and the
consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a language or dialect known to and
understood by him.

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Eight, the trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age, educational attainment
and socio-economic status.

Ninth, the trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and circumstances surrounding the
incident of qualified rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 97-385.

Lastly, the appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal Case No. 97-385 in spite
of his plea of guilty. As a rule, this Court has set aside convictions based on pleas of guilty in capital offenses
because of the improvidence thereof, and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment.
However, where the trial court receives, independently of his plea of guilty, evidence to determine whether
the accused committed the crimes charged and the precise degree of his criminal culpability therefor, he
may still be convicted if there is ample proof on record, not contingent on the plea of guilty, on which to
predicate conviction.

In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided to change his plea. In
fact, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion that the evidence it had presented be considered proof
of the degree of culpability of the appellant. It is, thus, incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the
evidence adduced by the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 97-385 is sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the appellant’s guilt for qualified rape.

In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court is guided by the following considerations:
(a) that an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime which usually
involves two persons, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c)
that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. It, likewise, bears stressing that in all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SAYABOC y SEGUBA (419 SCRA)

G.R. No. 147201. January 15, 2004

Facts: Before the Court is the decision of 9 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 2912 finding appellant Benjamin Sayaboc guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and (2) finding
appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso guilty
as accomplices in the crime of homicide.

On December 2, 1994, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and the
accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph Galam y Antonio, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against
him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent,
independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the
entire proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police Commission,
which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

Issue: won the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of accused sayaboc
when it was taken without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel nor by an effective and
vigilant counsel.

Held: YES. Sayaboc’s extrajudicial confession cannot be used in evidence in this case.

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.

Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this
presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements
safeguarding an accused’s rights during custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially
when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any
fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating
environment that is inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to
have been given voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders
the confession valueless and inadmissible.

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Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing of information
of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
In People v. Jara, the Court explained:

The stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated
has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together
with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired,
punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving
up of a right is missing.

The right to be informed requires "the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle." It should allow the suspect to consider the
effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one
like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had
already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for
another offense.

TANENGGEE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

FACTS: Carlos Tanenngee was a manager of a branch of Metropolitan Bank and was charged with five
counts of estafa for forging the promissory notes which he caused to appear to be executed by a long
time client of the bank. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an
administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a
written statement in the form of questions and answers. In said interview, Tanenggee admitted having
committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds
of the loan were secured or personally received by him although it should be the client of the bank who
should receive the same. All the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document
voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him. Among others, Tanengge alleged that said
written statement was taken in violation of his rights under the Constitution, particularly of his right to
remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.

The Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals admitted the written statement of Tanenggee and found him
guilty of Estafa.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written
statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the
same was taken.

HELD: No. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the
OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. While it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the
questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of
the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner
during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have
been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. The right to
counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation."

It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary. Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the
contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent
details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime
could furnish.

CONDUCT AND CHARACTER

 People vs. Santos
 People vs. Nardo
 RP vs. Heirs of Alejaga

PEOPLE VS. SANTOS

G.R. No. 146030. December 3, 2002

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FACTS: Albert Bautista and Glicerio Cupcupin were riding a jeep driven by the latter; The jeep was on a
stop in the corner of Yangco and Estrella street, in Navotas where armed men arrived and shot Glicerio
causing his death and injuries against Albert Bautista. Albert managed to run and identify Raul Santos and
Mario Morales. At the time, Police Aide Victorino Bohol was on duty and witnessed the incident; Bohol ran
towards headquarters and reported what was going on.

Both Bautista and Bohol manifested a sworn affidavit and positively identifying the accused in the
headquarters where Santos was apprehended. Cpl. Patood of the Navotas Police conducted an
investigation on Santos who admitted to the killing but was not embodied in a written instrument as there
was no counsel at such time. The trial court then convicted Raul Santos; Santos then filed an appeal
assigning the following errors:

ISSUES:

1) The lower court erred in holding that accused’s identification by prosecution’s witnesses was
‘positive’ and, therefore it erred when it rejected accused’s defense of alibi; and,
2) The lower court erred in considering one of the two cases filed against accused in holding also
for his guilt.
3) The lower court erred in convicting the accused

HELD:

Appellant argues in the first error that the lapse from May to October coupled with the brief, limited
and obstructed view which the prosecution witnesses had of the gunmen at the time of the shooting, casts
serious doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the identification by the witnesses.

In People v Jacolo, Et Al “While evidence as to the identity of the accused as the person who
committed the crime should be carefully analyzed, …where the conditions of visibility are favorable and the
witness does not appear to be biased against the man on the dock, his or her assertions as to the identity
of the malefactor should normally be accepted. And this is more of where the witness is the victim or his
near-relative, as in this case, because these (people) usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants.”

Appellant further argues that (1) he was not afforded his right to counsel in the course of the police
line-up, at the police station where he was identified by the prosecution. Accused was under custodial
investigation a stage which the police suspected him of involvement in the ambuscade appellant’s argument
is that identification was “tainted” and inadmissible.

In Gamboa v Cruz “There is no real need to afford a suspect the service of counsel at police line-
up” The customary practice is the witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course of a police line-
up and who gives a statement to the police, rather than the accused who is not questioned at all at that
stage. There is nothing in the record which shows that in the course of the line-up, the police investigators
sought to extract any admission or confession from appellant Santos.

Appellant’s second contention is that there had been “improper suggestiveness” amounting to an
uncounseled confession. The words “Iyan po” does not constitute an improper suggestion as appellant was
identified successively. Appellant Santos assails the credibility of Bautista and Bohol citing inconsistencies
on their statements made in affidavits. Close examination shows that supposed inconsistencies adduced
by appellant Santos are either non-existent or clearly minor and inconsequential in character. The supposed
inconsistencies do not detract from the basic facts that Bohol was in apposition to see and did see the
ambush and the shooting, as well as Bautista. The well entrenched principle is that minor inconsistencies
in the testimony of a witness tend to strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the witness as they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

Appellant now contends the affidavit of Ronaldo Guerrero was hearsay evidence considering that
the prosecution did not present Ronaldo Guerreo as a witness during trial. Appellant waived hearsay
character by failure seasonably to object to the admission of the affidavit.

PEOPLE VS NARDO

FACTS: On February 24, 1996, Lorielyn who has 14 years old at that time, at about 1:30 pm was ordered
by her father, accused-appellant, Alfredo Nardo to get his cigarette in his bedroom which she obliged. When
Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father followed her and from behind began mashing her breasts and
had sexual intercourse with her. The victim began to fight back however, the accused pointed a knife at her
and threatened to kill the whole family.

When her mother arrived, she saw her daughter crying but her daughter kept her silence.

On March 19, 1996, she was again approached by the accused and told her that they are going to
play tonight near the river which she understood that her father wanted to have another sexual intercourse.

The victim left the house that day and went to her aunt, Carol, and stayed there overnight. The
next day, Leonel, her brother was sent by her father to fetch her but she refuses.

On March 22, 1996, her aunt asked her what was her problem and replied that her father had raped
her. Immediately, Carol called the police to report the incident which led to the filing of the complaint.

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 During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were
cited wherein the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave the
house. The defense also presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness which describes
the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.

RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim Lorielyn and disregarding
the evidence for the defense

HELD: No. Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale
was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Needless to
say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when
a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were
cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents’ permission to leave the
house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: “Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.” While lying may
constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to
be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one’s own father of the sordid
crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.

Accused-appellant argues that the trial court should have given credence to his witness, Atty.
Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar. Atty. Gonzales, however, took the witness stand
not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his capacity as accused-appellant’s employer. As
such, no special privilege should be accorded him by the trial court by reason only of his being a member
of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should
be treated as one.

Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find nothing which
would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt. While there may be some inconsistencies
in the testimony of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her
credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do not affect
the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.
Besides, a rape victim cannot be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed
against her virtue.

RP VS. HEIRS OF ALEJAGA, SR.

FACTS: December 28, 1978: Respondent Felibe Alejaga Sr. filed with the District Land Office of Roxas
City a Free Patent Application of a parcel of land. (.3899 hectares, Roxas City)

Efren Recio, Land Inspector, submitted the necessary report regarding the application. (Investigation "
Verification Report) March 14, 1979: The District Land Officer (DLO) approved the application and the
issuance of a Free Patent to the applicant. It was then forwarded to Register of Deeds for the registration
and issuance of a OCT. Thereafter, Original Certificate of Title and a Free Patent No. (VI-2) 3358 was
issued to Alejaga.

April 4, 1979: The heirs of Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director of Lands of Manial for the investigation
of DLO (conducted by Isagani Cartagena) in Roxas for the irregularities in the issuance of a title of a
foreshore land in favor of Alejaga. After investigation, the Land Management Bureau of Manila requested
the Director of Lands to cancel the Free Patent and the corresponding OCT. In the meantime, Alejaga
obtained a NACIDA loan. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on the questioned land in favor
of PNB.

April 18, 1990: The government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against respondent Alejaga, the PNB of Roxas
City and defendant Register of Deeds of Roxas City covering Free Patent Application of the land. While the
case was pending, Alejaga died and was substituted by his heirs. RTC ruled against responding saying that
the OCT and Patent were obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. Hence, null and void. CA reversed
RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud or misrepresentation in the grant of the free patent and certificate
of title based on the testimonies of the witnesses?

41
RULING: Petitioner argues that it has proven fraud in the issuance of Respondent Alejagas free patent and
Certificate of Title. It also avers that Respondent PNB has failed to file a timely Notice of Appeal.

On the other hand, the Alejagas contend that they have acquired a vested right over the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. P-15 by virtue of their proven open, actual, exclusive and undisputed possession of
the land for more than 30 years. At the outset, we must immediately clarify that the records show receipt
by Respondent PNB of a copy of the Decision on October 27, not on October 3, 1993 as alleged by
petitioner. Further, the bank filed its Notice of Appeal on November 9, 1993, within the 15-day reglementary
period. In addition, we must point out that the essential issue raised in this Petition -- the presence of fraud
-- is factual.

As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters. However, the instant case falls under one of
the exceptions, because the findings of the CA conflict with those of the RTC and with the evidence on
record. We begin our resolution of this issue with the well-settled rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake
in a transaction bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people
who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many
different ways. Thus, the law requires that it be established by clear and convincing evidence.

In the case before us, we find that petitioner has adduced a preponderance of evidence before the trial
court, showing manifest fraud in procuring the patent. This Court agrees with the RTC that in obtaining a
free patent over the lot under scrutiny, petitioner had resorted to misrepresentation or fraud, signs of which
were ignored by the Court of Appeals.

First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the procedure laid down by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an
investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true. Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to
present their claims. Note that this notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to
be conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau of Lands.

In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent was dated and filed on December 28,
1978. On the other hand, the Investigation " Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio
of the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated December 27, 1978. In that
Report, he stated that he had conducted the necessary investigation and verification in the presence of the
applicant. Even if we accept this statement as gospel truth, the violation of the rule cannot be condoned
because, obviously, the required notice to adverse claimants was not served.

Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation allegedly conducted by Recio
were precipitate and beyond the pale of the Public Land Act. As correctly pointed out by the trial court,
investigation and verification should have been done only after the filing of the application. Hence, it would
have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own investigation and verification on December 27,
1998, a day before Felipe Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. It must also be noted that while
the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not dispute the fact that it preceded the
filing of the application.

Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted is not sustained by the
Verification " Investigation Report itself, which bears no signature. Their reliance on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does not appear on
the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption that an investigation and verification of the
parcel of land was actually conducted. Strangely, respondents do not proffer any explanation why the
Verification " Investigation Report was not signed by Recio. Even more important and as will later on be
explained, this alleged presumption of regularity -- assuming it ever existed -- is overcome by the evidence
presented by petitioner.

Third, the report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted. In that
report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and ocular inspection
of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may be considered as
independently relevant.

A witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or
bad faith -- and the formers statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating
the hearsay rule. Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-
examination, the Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes
part of his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions
and conclusions are not hearsay.

On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by Recio may be considered as independently
relevant. The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they were actually
made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a)
constitutes a fact in issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such fact.

Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his testimony
was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court. Based on the foregoing badges of

42
fraud, we sustain petitioners contention that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud
is a ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title.

The invalidity of the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in consequence
thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the former.Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the
issuance of the Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud.

HEARSAY EVIDENCE

 Patula vs. People

 Espeneli vs. People

PATULA VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 164457 APRIL 11, 2012

FACTS: Patula was a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. and was accused of Estafa for
allegedly failing to turn over the collected sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company
under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said
company. The prosecution presented two witnesses, the manager of the store who testified on the duties
and responsibilities of Patula and auditor Guivencan of the company who testified on her findings.
Guivencan testified that she conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanga and Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of her audit that
the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied
from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office. The
difference was stipulated in her written report to the manager. The prosecution offered various documents
consisting of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment,
(b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the
receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan
herself. The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives.

In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, Patula’s counsel interposed a continuing objection on the
ground that the figures entered in the exhibit and their derivatives, were hearsay because the persons who
had made the entries were not themselves presented in court. RTC, stating that inasmuch as Patula had
opted “not to present evidence for her defense” the Prosecution’s evidence remained “unrefuted and
uncontroverted,” found Patula guilty of estafa. Patula went straight to the Supreme Court via Petition for
review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the list of customers covered by Patula with
difference in record is not hearsay.

HELD: Yes, the trial court erred in not finding the list hearsay hence inadmissible. Guivencan conceded
having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customersor remitted
by petitioner to Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and
their derivatives, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each customer, as well as on
the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on
the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and
reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion through cross-
examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or
conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid
of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a
witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a
witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that
purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts
in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court
and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon
the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness
without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

43
 ESPENELI VS PEOPLE

FACTS: An Information charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC.

The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon, a 49-year old Senior Desk
Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his
house in Imus, Cavite by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting
car. Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

The group of Atty. Orly Dizon of the National Bureau of Investigation arrested and took into custody one
Romeo Reyes for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty.
Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent
Dave Segunial interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby
Reyes claimed that on December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes board a red car while
armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that “ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Subsequently, Reyes posted bail and was released on February
14, 1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI Agent Segunial testified on
these facts during the trial.

The victim’s widow, Sabina Berbon likewise testified. According to her, sometime in the third week of
February 1997 Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them
from any untoward consequence that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death
of Sabina’s husband. Sabina gave him the total amount of P1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying
for the witness protection program. This was affirmed on the witness stand by Sabina’s brother, Bartolome
Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.

Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao, testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons
who came to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the
photographs presented to him by the police officers. Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence
for his defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. As no action whatsoever
was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for decision.

The trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder

Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant, however, to the Court’s
pronouncement in People v. Mateo, the case was ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition through a Resolution dated.

The CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. It ratiocinated that since none of the
prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating
circumstance as the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information. In view
thereof, the CA found petitioner guilty only of homicide instead of murder.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Reyes
should be stricken out for being hearsay and inadmissible?

HELD: The Petition is devoid of merit

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility
of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of
a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of
the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement,
was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such
statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter
of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known
as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.d

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter
confided to him that he heard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon”
and that he saw the two armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car, cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunial’s testimony was
not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February
10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer
of the witness’ oral testimony. Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself candidly admitted that he is
incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes’ statement. Verily then, what the prosecution sought to
be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily
to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently
relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and
falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the
hearsay rule does not apply. Moreover, the written statement of Reyes is a notarized document having

44
been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of the NBI. As such,
it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima
facie evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza, a notarized document enjoys a prima
facie presumption of authenticity and due execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to overcome such
presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes’ sworn statement as testified
to by NBI Agent Segunial.

DYING DECLARATION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CESARIO MONTANEZ and DANIEL SUMAYLO

G.R. No. 148257 March 17, 2004 (425 SCRA 675)

FACTS: On the night of July 20, 1993, while walking home from fishing with his brother Edmundo and
brother-in-law Joven Hintogaya, Perlito Ollanes was shot near his house in Brgy. Pangabuan, Tangub City,
Misamis Occidental. On the verge of death, the victim told Edmundo (who heard the gunshot and arrived
at the scene of the crime) that he was shot by the accused Cesario Montanez, using a long firearm. Perlito
died while on the way to the hospital. Accused was charged by the City Prosecutor for the crime of murder
for the death of Perlito and the case was raffled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 16 in Tangub
City. During the pendency of the proceedings, Daniel Sumaylo gave a sworn statement (corroborated with
an affidavit executed by Sumaylo’s mother) that he was the one who killed Perlito, allegedly upon orders
by Alfredo Ollanes because the victim had impregnated his cousin Maricia Ollanes. The RTC, due to an
Amended Information filed due to Sumaylo’s admission of the killing, rendered judgment finding Montanez
guilty of murder and Sumaylo for homicide. Montanez (now the appellant) appealed the decision, saying
that there was no proof of conspiracy between him and his co-accused and that his mere presence in the
crime scene did not render him liable as an accomplice for the killing of Perlito.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in rendering judgment finding the accused Cesario Montanez guilty
of murder.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled against the accused-appellant and modified the decision.

Perlito’s statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying declaration. The statement is highly
reliable, having been made in extremity when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of
survival is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did not make a statement that he was at
the brink of death, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly
afterwards may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the victim with full
realization that he was in a dying condition.

The barefaced fact that Daniel Sumaylo pleaded guilty to the felony of homicide is not a bar to the appellant
being found guilty of murder as a principal. It bears stressing that Sumaylo plea-bargained on his re-
arraignment. Even if the public prosecutor and the father of the victim agreed to Sumaylo’s plea, the State
is not barred from prosecuting the appellant for murder on the basis of its evidence, independently of
Sumaylo’s plea of guilt.
Neither is the appellant entitled to acquittal merely because Sumaylo confessed, after the appellant had
rested his case, to being the sole assailant. The trial court disbelieved Sumaylo’s testimony that he alone
killed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the killing. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment of the trial court. It bears stressing that when Sumaylo testified for the appellant on surrebuttal,
he declared that he did not know who killed the victim. He even declared that the appellant did not kill the
victim. However, he made a complete volte-face when he executed an affidavit and testified that he alone
killed the victim and that the appellant was not at all involved in the killing. We are convinced that Sumaylo’s
somersault was an afterthought, a last-ditch attempt to extricate the appellant from an inevitable conviction.

APPEAL DENIED, JUDGMENT MODIFIED ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY 25,000 PESOS AS

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM.

DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE
G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997
FACTS: On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda,
Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral
suffering.

45
Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses’ allegedly illusory
testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does
not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to determine
and prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused
from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of
disposing of their victims bodies.
The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two
companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and
neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two
companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to check if a certain person was
still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the latters presence was
confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the
billiard hall with Bernals companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both
Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were
drinking at Tarsings Store on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few
minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and asked for Payat. When
Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified
men.
Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January
1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even
gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again
because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife’s infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to
contemplate revenge.
We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the witnesses’ testimonies have adequate value to justify the conviction?
HELD: Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred
that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.s
revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant
to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or
his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant
is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the
time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest;
and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.[12]
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to
Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is
admissible in evidence, because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient
to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarinos forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and
defense counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda,
Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself. This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established rule that the findings of
fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent
reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility of witnesses.

DECLARATION AGAINST PEDIGREE

TISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
276 SCRA 582, G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

FACTS: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora
Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the
said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to
inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to
prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for
being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

46
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.

HELD: The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may
be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived,
since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered
a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable
to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that
such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made
ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

FAMILY REPUTATION

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had
been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however,
FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's
daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood,
had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that
of his family. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial
declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.

ISSUE: Whether or not MONINA is an illegitimate child of Francisco

HELD: Carefully evaluating appellant’s evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter
of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCO’s] controversion thereof, we find more weight in the former. The
positive testimonies of [MONINA] and her witnesses all bearing on [FRANCISCO’s] acts and/or conduct
indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have
not been successfully refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed
[MONINA’s] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by [MONINA’s]
witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired them from their employment. Needless to state,
[FRANCISCO’s] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINA’s]
testimonial evidence.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various
forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

RES GESTAE

 People vs. Lobrigas

 People vs. Villarico
 People vs. Palanca

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS, et. al.

G.R. No. 147649. December 17, 2002.*

FACTS: The victim Felix Taylaran was a regular farmhand of Castor Guden. On February 19, 1996, he
asked for permission not to work for it was raining and he had to go to the store of Teodorico Mante. At
4:00 p.m., Felix returned to Castor Guden’s house with bruises on his face and injuries all over his body.

47
He told Castor that he was mauled by accused-appellant Frank Lobrigas, accused Marlito Lobrigas and
Teodorico Mante at the store. Felix spent the night in Castor’s house and left the following morning to go
to the seaside house of Lorie Aguilar, his cousin, to heal his wounds in the salt-water. However, the next
day, Felix Taylaran died.

Rosa Taylaran Solarte, daughter of the victim, testified that a day after the mauling, her father came to her
house and told her that he was beaten up by Frank Lobrigas, Marlito Lobrigas and Teodorico Mante. He
told her that he was in pain and felt weak. He then went to the house of Lorie Aguilar apparently to
recuperate.

Dr. Tito Miranda of the Municipal Health unit of Loon, Bohol conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim
and concluded that the immediate cause of death was internal hemorrhage caused by the severe beating
and mauling on the chest portion of the victim’s body.

On the other hand, accused-appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and
alleged that he was asleep at the time the incident took place. He admitted that he was at the store of
Teodorico Mante having a drinking spree with his companions, Dennis Palma, Mario Granderos, Marlito
Lobrigas and Rufo Creta, Jr. They were later joined by the victim, Felix Taylaran. When Felix had too much
to drink, he became rowdy and drew his knife. This was snatched from him by Mario Granderos and turned
over to Mante, who was a barangay councilman. Mante admonished Felix and accused-appellant told him
to go home. When Felix left, Mante and Marlito Lobrigas followed him. Accused-appellant stayed behind
and lay down on a bench outside the store until he fell asleep. He only learned about the mauling incident
later from Mario Granderos.

Accused-appellant likewise denied that he left his house to evade arrest. He claimed that he did not know
about the charge against him. He did not leave his house for one month after the incident upon his father’s
advice, for he might be investigated by the police. He went to Cebu City on March 10, 1996 to work at
Southern Island Hospital. When he came home months later to attend the fiesta celebration on May 15,
1996, it was then that he came to know of the case filed against him. Then on May 18, 1996, he was
arrested and detained at the Municipal Jail of Loon. Two months and four days later, he left his cell as the
door was opened by a co-prisoner and nobody was guarding them at that time. After trial, the court a quo
rendered judgment and finds herein accused Frank Lobrigas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER, as charged, qualified by the circumstance of abuse of superior strength as the victim was an
old man of seventy six years of age. Thus, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua in accordance with Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls. He is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as actual, exemplary and
moral damages put in one.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the victim declared to Castor Guden immediately after the incident
that accused-appellant and two others mauled him can be considered as part of the res gestae.

HELD: YES. A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these
requisites concur in the case at bar. However, the declaration made by the victim to his daughter does not
satisfy the second requirement of spontaneity because they were made a day after the incident and the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence was no longer present.

Nevertheless, we hold that Rosa Solarte’s testimony on what her father told her constitutes independent
relevant statements distinct from hearsay, and are thus admissible not as to the veracity thereof, but as
proof of the fact that they had been uttered. Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only
the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The
hearsay rule does not apply, hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making
of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

PEOPLE VS VILLARICO
G.R. No. 158362 April 4, 2011

FACTS: Villarico et al. were charged and convicted for the Murder of a certain Haide Cagatan. During trial,
the prosecution was able to present the sister-in law and the father of the victim, both of whom positively
identified Villarico et al, as the perpetrators of the crime. In their testimony, they actually saw the defendants
at the time of the shooting because it took place in their house (in the kitchen). Both of them testified that
by their position near the kitchen, they were able to see clearly all of the accused outside their nipa hut. In
addition, the mother of the victim who was in the sala at that time testified that right after she heard
gunshots, Haide called out for help and exclaimed that it was “Berting” who had shot him. Shortly after he
was rushed to the hospital, the victim died. All of the accused pleaded not guilty and offered an alibi. The
RTC found all of them guilty of homicide but this was modified by the Court of Appeals and ruled that they
committed Murder. Upon appeal, the accused contends that the prosecution has failed to prove the identity
of the assailant as the testimony of the mother of the accused did not actually saw “Berting” shoot Haide.

ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the mother of Haide who did not
see the actual shooting.

48
HELD: No. The court was correct admitting the testimony of the mother of Haide. The statement of Haide
to his mother that he had just been shot by the group of Berting – uttered in the immediate aftermath of the
shooting where he was the victim – was a true part of the res gestae.

The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular
litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae includes
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after
the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity
for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as
to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any
premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part
of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The requisites concurred herein. Firstly, the principal act – the shooting of Haide – was a startling
occurrence. Secondly, his statement to his mother about being shot by the group of Berting was made
before Haide had time to contrive or to devise considering that it was uttered immediately after the shooting.
And, thirdly, the statement directly concerned the startling occurrence itself and its attending circumstance
(that is, the identities of the assailants). Verily, the statement was reliable as part of the res gestae for being
uttered in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. BALMACEDA AND RAMOS

G.R. No. 158143, Sept 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 33

FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Antonio Balmaceda,
the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. PCIB alleged that Balmaceda, by taking advantage
of his position, fraudulently obtained and encashed (31) Manager’s checks.

PCIB impleaded Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s
alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager’s checks
to 34.

Balmaceda was declared in default. In defense, Ramos denied any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme.
He argued that he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling fighting
cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. He admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment
for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source
of Balmaceda’s money.

The RTC ruled in favor of PCIB. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding
that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent
manipulations

ISSUE: Whether or not PCIB had sufficient evidence to prove that Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in
perpetrating the scheme to defraud PCIB

HELD: No. PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latter’s scheme to defraud the Bank. However,
PCIB’s pieces of evidence are not sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof that it carries as plaintiff.

On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he
filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos
the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit
in Balmaceda’s fraud.

A number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged
them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would
justify his separate treatment from the others.

The evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own when he applied for the

49
Manager’s checks against the bank account of one of PCIB’s clients, as well as when he encashed the
fraudulently acquired Manager’s checks.

Mrs. Elizabeth Costes, the Area Manager of PCIB at the time of the relevant events, testified that
Balmaceda committed all the acts necessary to obtain the unauthorized Manager’s checks – from filling
up the application form by forging the signature of the client’s representative, to forging the signatures of
the payees in order to encash the checks.

Mrs. Nilda Laforteza, the Commercial Account Officer stated that it was Balmaceda who forged Ramos’
signature on the Manager’s checks where Ramos was the payee, so as to encash the amounts indicated
on the checks. These testimonies clearly dispute PCIB’s theory that Ramos was instrumental in the
encashment of the Manager’s checks.

Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and
is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight
of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. (See Encinas v. National Bookstore)

The party, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue has the onus to
prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment, subject to the overriding rule that the burden
to prove his cause of action never leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one
that is not merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but one which, if
established, will constitute an "avoidance" of the claim.

CA decision is affirmed.

ENTRIES IS OFFICIAL RECORDS

 Lao vs. Standard Insurance

 Sabili vs. COMELEC

RUDY LAO vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC.,

G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003

FACTS: Petitioner Rudy Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck with Plate No. FCG-538. The truck was insured
with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum
of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to his goods.
While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. the insured truck bumped another truck, with Plate No.
FBS-917, also owned by petitioner Lao. The latter truck was running ahead of the insured truck and was
bumped from the rear. The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the
damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident, were placed at P35,000 more or
less.
Petitioner filed a claim with the insurance company for the proceeds from his policy. However, the claim
was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter,
it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper drivers license at
the time of the accident. The restriction[4] in Leonardo Anits drivers license provided that he can only drive
four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed
more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the authorized driver clause[5] of the insurance policy.
Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel
who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive vehicles
such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle
Accident Report[7] wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie
Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident
or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.
Hence, petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the RTC decision
was affirmed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not police blotter is admissible and should be given probative value as evidence
HELD: We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted
as they form part of official records.[20] Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance
of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative
value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence.[21] Although police blotters are
of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent
evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who
made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made

50
on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest
about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the
investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.
Petitioner also assails the credence given by the trial court to the version of the respondents vis--vis the
testimonies of the witnesses. Time and again we have reiterated the settled doctrine that great weight, and
even finality, is given to the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial
courts.[23] We find on this score no reason to overturn such conclusions.

SABILI VS COMELEC
670 SCRA 664 G. R. NO. 193261

FACTS: When Sabili filed his Certificate of Candicay for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated
therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010
elections, he had been twice elected as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batangas.
During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas,
but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed
his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.

Florencio Librea filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to
Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification” against him before the
COMELEC. He alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and
likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident
of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections. Sabili, to
prove his residence in Lipa, presented among others the Certificate of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain, Dominador Honrade.

Despite garnering the highest number of votes in the Mayoralty elections, Sabili was ruled to be disqualified
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not take into consideration the certificate of residency executed by
the baranggay captain on the ground that it was not notarized. Hence, upon the petition for review with the
Supreme Court, another certificate was submitted which has been duly notarized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in not considering the certificate of Residency executed by
the baranggay captain

HELD: Yes. We disagree with the COMELEC’s treatment of the Barangay Captain’s Certification and find
the same tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Even without being sworn to before a notary public,
Honrade’s Certification would not only be admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due
consideration. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 44. Entries in official records.—Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc.
The Supreme Court explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official
records to be admissible in evidence:

a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an
updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is recognized that “it
is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay.” Anent the third
requisite, the Barangay Captain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him
to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary. Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the
COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrade’s Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not
notarized.

COMMERCIAL LISTS
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND
MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA)
G.R. No. 127598. February 22, 2000

51
FACTS: In the Decision promulgated on January 27, 1999, the Court directed the parties to execute a
Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms and conditions contained in the unaffected
portions of the Secretary of Labor’s orders of August 19, 1996 and December 28, 1996, and the
modifications set forth above.

Dissatisfied with the Decision, some alleged members of private respondent union (Union for brevity) filed
a motion for intervention and a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. No new arguments were
presented for consideration of the Court. Nonetheless, certain matters will be considered herein, particularly
those involving the amount of wages* and the retroactivity of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
arbitral awards.

In the original case, the private respondent union relies in the All Asia Capital report that MERALCO earned
net income for 1996 is 5.7 Million in which the petitioner refutes contending that it is only 5.1 Million which
should be the basis for wage increase.

ISSUE: Whether or not the All Asia report is a proper evidence to conclude on the amount of net income of
Meralco?

HELD: No. The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position regarding the
wage issue can not be an accurate basis and conclusive determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section
45 of Rule 130 Rules of Evidence provides:

"Commercial lists and the like. - Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them therein."

Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical may be admitted only "if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied
upon by them therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited report is a mere
newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it is but an analysis or opinion which carries
no persuasive weight for purposes of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither
did anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally rely on news items such
as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was presented that the publication was regularly prepared
by a person in touch with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Absent
extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible. In the same manner, newspapers
containing stock quotations are not admissible in evidence when the source of the reports is available. With
more reason, mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular, the source of
the report in this case can be easily made available considering that the same is necessary for compliance
with certain governmental requirements.

Nonetheless, by petitioner’s own allegations, its actual total net income for 1996 was P5.1 billion. An
estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated that petitioner’s net operating income for the same year
was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting
the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected
net operating income. The P5.7 billion which was the Secretary’s basis for granting the P2,200.00 is higher
than the actual net income of P5.1 billion admitted by petitioner. It would be proper then to increase this
Court’s award of P1,900.00 to P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award

*Pertinent to our topic is issue as to the amount of wages in the CBA arbitral awards

TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE
G.R. Nos. 115338-39 September 16, 1997

FACTS: Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar
del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the
offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges.

Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the only
one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to
testify as they were then abroad.

Based on Marasigan's testimonies alone, the prosecution sought to prove that although two of the three
complainants in the illegal recruitment case were unable to testify, appellant was guilty of committing the
offense against all three complainants and, therefore, should be convicted as charged.

52
On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited the
complainants for overseas employment and claimed that the payments made to her were solely for
purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate as she had connections with a travel agency.

The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court found the prosecution's
evidence more credible. On December 17, 1993, judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant
of both crimes as charged.

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of
of the MTC of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa
promulgated on July 26, 1993, 23 rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same
circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with
two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.

In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court
stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case
before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own
findings of facts and as its reationale for the conviction in the case before it.

[Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is erroneous. It is her view that
in the prosecution of a case for such offense, at least three complainants are required to appear as
witnesses in the trial and, since Marasigan was the only complainant presented as a witness, the conviction
was groundless.]

ISSUE: WON the grounds for convicting the accused of illegal recruitment in large scale was sufficient in
evidence.

RULING: The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple illegal recruitment
which provides a lower penalty. The Court finds the arguments of the Solicitor General meritorious
and adopts his position.

The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as ". . . any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not . . .
."

Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. —

(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. . . .
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an
offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

. . . Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.

It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is

determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be
convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of
the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to
illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the same Code.

The the Solicitor General submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting
appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa committed against
Generillo and Del Rosario.

He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the Parañaque
court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as
it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo
and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize
as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence
be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had
the opportunity to cross-examine him.

53
 xxx xxx xxx

It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following provision
of Rule 130:
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a
witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination;
and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying.

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or
produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony
is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. The previous
testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious.

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the
Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous
proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants
Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence,
and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous
decision in the estafa case.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused
was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime
charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as
said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case
would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

HENCE:

1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal recruitment, as defined
in Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to serve an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to reimburse Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.

CHILD WITNESS RULE

PEOPLE VS IBANEZ
706 SCRA 358 GR 197813

FACTS: On 29 Aug 2004, Wilfredo Atendido y Dohenog (Wilfredo) was invited by Alfredo to a drinking
session with Jesus and Edwin making them a party of four. Rachel, Wilfredo’s daughter, an adolescent at
the time, was underneath the house (silong in the vernacular) of a neighbor, three (3) meters away from
the place where Wilfredo and his companions were ostensibly in merrymaking.

Rachel saw her father step away from the group to urinate. While Wilfredo relieved himself, Edwin snatched
a t-shirt from a nearby clothesline, and hooded the t-shirt over the head and face of Wilfredo. Robbed of
vision as his head was fully covered, Wilfredo was wrestled and pinned down by Edwin, while Alfredo boxed
the left side of Wilfredo’s chest. Jesus, armed with a long iron bar, swung at and hit Wilfredo in the head.
Terrified, Rachel stood immobilized as she watched the attack on father. Thereafter, she saw her mother,
Rowena, running out of their house and crying for help.

Rowena asked for help to bring Wilfredo to the hospital. However, Wilfredo did not reach the hospital alive
and was pronounced dead on arrival. The three accused were charged with murder before the RTC. Edwin
and Alfredo pleaded not guilty. Jesus, on the other hand, remained at large. Thereafter, trial ensued. The
defense mainly of Edwin and Alfredo, proffered an altogether different version of the events. The two
accused-appellants pointed to Jesus as the sole culprit, proclaimed their innocence and professed to being
at the scene of the crime only because of their curiosity for what had occurred.

RTC held that the accused were guilty which was affirmed by CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rachel was a competent witness considering that she is a mere child.

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HELD: Yes, the SC ruled that Rachel’s testimony cannot be taken lightly simply because she was a mere
child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her testimony in court. There is no showing that
her mental maturity rendered her incapable of testifying and of relating the incident truthfully.

With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this
presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competence. Only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion
of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.12 Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on Rachel’s
lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome the clear and
convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

EXPERT WITNESS

 People vs. Abriol

 Bautista vs. CA
 Avelino vs. People

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et al.

G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001

FACTS: Accused was charged and convicted of murder by the trial court. On appeal, appellants argue that
the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence against them is weak, ambiguous, and inconclusive. Specifically,
appellants contend that the testimony of P/Inspector Lempel Caser, the prosecution’s ballistics expert,
clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments such as the micrometer, goniometer,
and pressure barrel. (2) He is not conversant with “the required references concerning ballistics,"
particularly books on the subject by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically determine the caliber
of a bullet." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that
his opinion that the test bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene
of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Caser’s failure to take the necessary photographs to
support his findings.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert witness which was given credence of the trial court may be
assailed on appeal on the ground of incompetence

HELD: An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject matter of
the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on questions on which he proposes to express
an opinion." There is no definite standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness
must possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors be present: (1) training
and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of
authorities or standards upon which his opinion is based. The question of whether a witness is properly
qualified to give an expert opinion on ballistics rests with the discretion of the trial court.

In the instant case, P/Inspector Caser qualifies as a ballistics expert. He is a licensed criminologist, trained
at the Ballistics Command and Laboratory Center in Fort Boniface, in the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Carme, and in the National Bureau of Investigation. He had previously testified as an expert witness in at
least twenty-seven (27) murder and homicide cases all over the country. An expert witness need not
present comparative microphotographs of test bullets and cartridges to support his findings. Examination
under a comparison microscope showing that the test bullet and the evidence bullet both came from the
same gun is sufficient. Moreover, the ballistician conclusively found similar characteristic markings in the
evidence, test cartridges and slugs.

RUTH BAUTISTA VS CA
GR No. 143375 July 6, 2001

FACTS: Cesar Morelos owned a parcel of land in along Maceda St, Sampaloc, Manila. Carlos sold this
parcel of land to Laura Morelos during his lifetime the deed of sale between them was notarized by Luis De
Guzman. The title to the lot was then transferred to Laura. Cesar died of Cardiac Arrest on April 15, 1982.
After his death. Fermando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar, filed a complaint for nullity
of the deed of sale executed between Cesar and Laura on the ground that the signature of Cesar was not
his. During trial he presented Francisco Cruz, Chief Examiner of PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, and
Major Moringe, Chief of the Fingerprint Division of PC-INP both testified that the signature of Cesar
appearing on the Deed did not match other specimen of his signature. The RTC dismissed the complaint
and held that the deed was valid. CA reversed the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive and can be a basis to nullify a
notarized deed of absolute sale.

55
HELD: No. It is well-settled that a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity
and due execution as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this
legal presumption, evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant to establish
that there was forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract.

As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, we held that due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of the forged
documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to
questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in
examining or comparing handwriting.

Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such
testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny; he cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America, we held that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined
solely upon its general characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature.
Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops,
shades, that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the formers authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the
benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that
must be taken into consideration, such as the position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which
the paper where the questioned signature is written, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of
pen and paper used. These play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless,
therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial
competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to
characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between a questioned handwriting and an authentic one.

AVELINO VS PEOPLE
701 SCRA 477 GR 181444

FACTS: On October 5, 2000, Chairman Hispano was shot by three men while driving his owner type jeep
at Tondo Manila. The incident was witnessed by Alfredo Manlangsang. According to the witness he was
not able to identify the two assailant but was able to recognized the third assailant as Bobby Avelino when
the latter pulled his bonnet down to his chin.

The accused denied the accusation and presented as evidence the testimonies of PO2 Galang, Adonis
Bantiling and SOCO PSI Cabamongan. Moreover, the accused advance the defense of denial and alibi.

RTC held the accused guilty which was upheld by the CA.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not giving credence to the testimony of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as
regard the position of the gun men.

Held: No, the CA was correct in not giving credence to the opinion of SOCO PSI Cabamongan as regards
the position of the gunman when the latter shot Hispano. Cabamongan asserted that the gunman was on
board the owner-type jeep when Hispano was shot, which is opposed to Manalangsang’s testimony.
However, case records reveal that Cabamongan was presented as an ordinary witness. Hence, his opinion
regarding the location of the gunman in relation to the place where the empty shells were found is
immaterial.

Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires expertise, and (b)
the witness has been qualified as an expert.27 In this case, counsel for the petitioner failed to make the
necessary qualification upon presenting Cabamongan during trial.

ORDINARY WITNESS
PEOPLE VS DURANAN
G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001

FACTS: Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental age
was not proven. He argues that under the Revised Penal Code, an essential element for the prosecution
for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant’s mental age to determine if her
mental age is under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to

56
the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be
waived.

HELD: The contention has no merit.

The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be received in evidence regarding the mental
sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and
mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are,
is competent to testify on the matter.

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of
the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the factors and reasons upon which
he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: “A non-
expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity of another, when based upon conversations
or dealings which he has had with such person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his
mental condition, with the witness’ own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion.

CHARACTER EVIDENCE

PEOPLE vs. DEOPITA

436 SCRA 794

FACTS: Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man appeared from behind,
looped his arm around her neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man dragged her
through the banana plantation towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look at the man, who turned out
to be Rafael Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings. Thereafter,
Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga. After having his way with her, Diopita
threatened Dominga not to tell anyone about the incident or else he would shoot her. Dominga was able to
report the incident to the police and gave the description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. A
colored white/yellow, size 10 slipper was found in the scene of the crime. In a police line-up, Dominga
readily pointed to Diopita which was further bolstered by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper,
it easily fitted him. In his defense, Diopita posed the alibi that he was at an informal Bible session of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses at the time of the crime. The trial court convicted Diopita stating that alibi is a weak
form of defense. Among Diopita’s arguments is that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime
charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position of “Ministerial
Servant” in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a
responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God. The conviction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court , ratiocinating that the fact that Diopita is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position
of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity
on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone
who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of
his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction
must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt
beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than
sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

57
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO
G.R. No. 119072. April 11, 1997

FACTS: Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with rape in an information for having carnal knowledge
with one AAA, a pregnant woman, against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice. The
complainant and her mother BBB were to attend a dance. At about ten (10) o'clock in the evening of that
day AAA saw her cousin CCC at the dance and she asked him to drink beer with her. CCC got drunk and
fell asleep.
Accused Edualino approached her and offered her a glass of beer. AAA noticed that Edualino was drunk
so she accepted the glass. She then felt dizzy after drinking the beer. Edualino then dragged her towards
a grassy area where no people were present. The accused then forced himself on top of her and
succeeded in raping her while she was in a semi-unconscious state.
Prosecution witness DDD testified that she saw the accused in the act of raping AAA in the grassy area
near the store of a certain Sgt. Edep and the house of a certain Mrs. Adier. She was able to identify the
accused and called her aunt EEE, the victim's mother, but when they returned, the accused immediately
left when he noticed their presence.
A physician at the District Hospital, testified that he examined AAA who alleged that she was sexually
abused. The medical certificate stated that “No sperm cell exam done; hymenal opening admits easily 2
fingers, it can admit an average size penis in erection without laceration.
The trial court rendered a decision and found accused, Edualino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. The conviction of accused-appellant is now before this Court on automatic review.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant for the crime of rape instead of upholding
his innocence based on the evidence and the law

HELD: NO. Accused-appellant raises the issue of the character of complainant AAA. He argued that a
responsible and decent married woman, who was then three (3) months pregnant, would not be out at two
(2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent Filipina ask a man to accompany her to
drink beer. It is contended that complainant merely concocted the charge of rape to save her marriage
since her husband had found out that she was using drugs and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle
of herself when she tried to seduce accused-appellant while she was under the influence of drugs and
alcohol.
At the outset of this discussion, it should be pointed out that the moral character of a rape victim is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The Court has ruled that prostitutes
can be the victims of rape.
In the present case, even if accused-appellant's allegations that the victim was drunk and under the
influence of drugs and that she (the victim) cannot be considered a decent and responsible married woman,
were true, said circumstances will not per se preclude a finding that she was raped.
Accused-appellant cannot successfully argue that no rape occurred because no medical examination was
conducted to confirm the presence of spermatozoa in her private parts. The Court has repeatedly held that
a medical examination of the victim is not a prerequisite in prosecutions for rape. A person accused of rape
can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing
and otherwise consistent with human nature and the course of things.
After a careful and thorough study of the records of the case, the Court is convinced that the constitutional
presumption of accused-appellant's innocence has been overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Accused-appellant in a final attempt to absolve himself argues that the charge of rape was concocted by
the victim to save her marriage.
The Court cannot believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was raped in an attempt to
conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. We fail to understand how a false rape
story can save a marriage under the circumstances averred by accused-appellant.

PEOPLE vs. PEDRIGONE

G.R. No. 137664. May 9, 2002

Facts: For the act of bestiality committed by Roberto Padrigone against the sixteen year-old Rowena
Contridas by sexually abusing her in front of her fourteen year-old sister and his three co-accused which
incident resulted to the mental disorder of the victim, the trial court convicted Padrigone of the crime of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, Pedrigone assails the procedural
irregularities committed by the prosecution and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE by not presenting Rowena when the she should have had her sane moments.
As a consequence, the trial court deprived Pedrigone of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she
was allegedly declared before the Chief of Police that it was only Pedrigone who raped her which
declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction.

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Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand can be considered suppression
of evidence?

Held: No. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced does not apply if:

1. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;

2. the suppression was not willful;
3. it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
4. the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.

Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.

FIRST: The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecutor did not present her
as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand.

SECOND: Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition and thus,
cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The non-presentation therefore, of Rowena was not willful.

THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the
violation committed on her sister.

People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Fabre

G.R no. 146697 July 23, 2002

Facts:

Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter,
Marilou Fabre.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother
and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along
with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal
complaint signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence,
countered with the testimony of the accused himself.

On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for
the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity of a testimony which was
not subjected to cross-examination by the adverse party.

Held:

The answer is in the negative. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party
against whom the witness is called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of
the statements of a witness made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies
may deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence therefore
adduced or thereafter be adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon.
Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination
merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.

G.R. No. 122899 June 8, 2000

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and G.T.P. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

BUENA, J.

Facts

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The subject property is a parcel of land in Diliman, Quezon City consisting of six hundred ninety (690)
square meters originally owned by businessman Tomas Chia under Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
16753 (106901) of the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City. Saddled with debts and business reverses, Mr.
Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation
(hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK
secured by the subject property.

Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP,
went to the METROBANK branch in Quiapo, Manila sometime in the last week of August 1980 to inquire
on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of
account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August, 1980.

The deed of sale 2 and the memorandum of agreement 3 between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were
eventually executed and signed on 04 September 1980 in the office of Atty. Atienza. Twelve (12) days
later, or on 16 September 1980, Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one
hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71), 4 for
which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment.

This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject
property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file on October
17, 1980 an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia.

In answer to the complaint, Mr. Chia denied having executed any deed of sale in favor of respondent
GTP involving the subject property. Petitioner for its part justified its non-release of the real estate
mortgage (1) upon the advise of Mr. Chia that he never executed any sales agreement with respondent
GTP, and (2) by the fact that there are other loans incurred by Mr. Chia which are also secured by the
subject property.

After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court on 11 December 1990 granting the reliefs
prayed for by respondent GTP as plaintiff, viz:

WHEREFORE, after a careful and thorough study of the record, this Court holds that in view of the facts
contained in the records, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants,
ordering —

1. Defendant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. to execute the release or cancellation of the real estate
mortgages executed by the deceased defendant Tomas Chia and his wife, defendant Vicenta Chia, over
the property described in TCT No. 106901 of the registry of deeds for Quezon City;

2. Defendants to surrender or deliver the owner's duplicate copy of said TCT No. 106991; and,

3. Defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit.

The counterclaims set up by both defendants are dismissed.

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a Decision dated 24 October 1994 6 reversing the trial
court's 11 December 1990 judgment, ruling in the main that the one hundred sixteen thousand four
hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) paid by respondent GTP to petitioner
METROBANK did not extinguish the real estate mortgage inasmuch as there are other unliquidated past
due loans secured by the subject property.

With this unfavorable turn of events, respondent GTP, on 07 November 1994, 7 filed before respondent
Court of Appeals a "motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer to require.

METROBANK to furnish appellee (GTP) of the alleged unpaid balance of Mr. Chia." At the rescheduled
date of oral arguments on 08 March 1995 where METROBANK was supposed to bring before the
respondent Court the current statement of the mortgage debt of Mr. Chia secured by the deeds of
mortgage sought to be released, METROBANK's counsel did not appear; only the lawyers of respondent
GTP and Mr. Chia appeared. Thus, the Court required GTP's counsel to file a memorandum in lieu of oral
arguments in support of its motion for reconsideration. 8 GTP filed its memorandum on March 17, 1995 9
to which a reply memorandum was filed by METROBANK on April 10, 1995. 10

On 03 July 1995, 11 the now assailed amended decision was rendered reconsidering the original 24
October 1994 Decision and thus affirming the 11 December 1990 judgment of the regional trial court.
Respondent Court of Appeals took a second hard look at the evidence on hand and seriously considered
METROBANK's refusal to specify any unpaid debt secured by the subject property, in concluding anew
that "the present case for specific performance is well-grounded, absent indubitable showing that the
aforesaid amount of P116,416.71 paid by appellee on September 16, 1980 did not suffice to pay in full
the mortgage debt assumed under the Deed of Absolute Sale, with assumption of mortgage, it inked with
the late Tomas Chia. There is therefore merit in its motion for reconsideration at bench." Petitioner
METROBANK is now before us after its motion for reconsideration of the 03 July 1995 amended decision
was denied by respondent Court of Appeals per Resolution of 04 December 1995.

Ruling

We find no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision.

60
We quote with favor the following pronouncements of respondent Court of Appeals in the Amended
Decision, thus:

. . . . In the case under scrutiny, we are convinced that We erred in reversing the appealed judgment
despite the finding that subject property covered by TCT 106901 — Quezon City had been sold, in a
manner absolute and irrevocable, by the spouses, Tomas Chia and Vicenta Chan, to plaintiff-appellee,
and on September 16, 1980, the latter complied with its contractual obligation thereunder by paying the
total mortgage debt it assumed, amounting according to Metrobank itself, to P116,416.71, as of
September 16, 1980.

All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so rule, that whatever debts
or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with Metrobank after September 4, 1980, without the conformity of
plaintiff-appellee, could not be adjudged as part of the mortgage debt the latter so assumed. We are
persuaded that the contrary ruling on this point in Our October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair and
unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt
thereon, the latter inquired from Metrobank about the exact amount of the mortgage debt involved.

The stipulation in subject Deeds of Mortgage that mortgagors' debts subsequently obtained would be
covered by the same security became inapplicable, when mortgagor sold to appellee the mortgaged
property with the knowledge of the mortgagee bank. Thus, since September 4, 1980, it was obvious that
whatever additional loan mortgagor got from Metrobank, the same was not chargeable to and collectible
from plaintiff-appellee. It is then decisively clear that Metrobank is without any valid cause or ground not
to release the Deeds of Mortgage in question, despite full payment of the mortgage debt assumed by
appellee. 13

Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim
that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." In Maneclang vs. Baun, 14 this
Court enumerated the requisites for estoppel by conduct to operate, to wit:

1. there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;

2. Just as decisive is petitioner METROBANK's failure to bring before respondent Court of Appeals
the current statement evidencing what it claims as "other unliquidated past due loans" at the
scheduled hearing of 8 March 1995. It was a golden opportunity, so to speak, lost for petitioner
METROBANK to defend its nonrelease of the real estate mortgage. Thus, the following
pronouncements of this Court in Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et. al, 18
speaking thru Mr. Justice Ricardo Francisco, 19 find rightful application, viz. —
3. It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which imposes a
liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from its very nature must
overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if produced would operate to his prejudice,
and support the case of his adversary. . . .
4. No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it exists,
which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as conclusive that the fact
does not exist.
5. Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the ultimate fact
that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the proof, with an
opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may well be taken as admitted with all the
effect of the inferences afforded. . . .
6. The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to
divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction upon his silence,
and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as claimed by the opposing party.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino, RONALD
CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, RONALD CASTILLANO alias
Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003

This is a murder case of one Diosdado Volante filed against Jaime Castillano Jr. and Sr., and Ronald
Castillano. The altercation of the parties to this incident begun when Diosdado did not consent and even

61
asked herein Jaime Castillano Sr. from the latter’s indiscriminate firing of his gun. Diosdado was a farmer
in a barangay in Camarines Sur in a farmland just meters away from the farmland of Jaime Castillano Sr.
The animosity even worsened and deepened which led to the alleged plan of killing Diosdado by the father
and two sons, all surnamed Castillano. Such plan was realized on that fateful night of July 8, 1996. However,
upon the attempt of the accused to flew, they were accosted during a check point in that place with their
bags with them. Just to save them all from being imprisoned, Ronald, solely admitted to have killed
Diosdado but alleged self-defense. Trial court convicted Ronald and Jaime Jr. while exonerating Jaime Sr.
On appeal, appellant Jaime Jr. avers that the testimony of Luz Volante was inconsistent with her testimony
during preliminary investigation in the trial court and her sworn statement before the police investigators.

Whether or not Luz’s testimony in open court can be impeached by her own testimony during preliminary
investigation – No, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the
prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination
before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason
that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants
nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony
during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not,
therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads: How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statement. - Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of
the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements,
and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before
any question is put to him concerning them. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before
the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting
of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the
predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-
examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency
between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made. In this case, the
appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn
statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies between her present testimony
and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even
mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching
her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the
trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by the court.

G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999

ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

Facts:

Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. She had contracts with the government and in connection with these projects, petitioner
entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation for supplying materials
in the construction sites. When Sucor billed Canque, it amounted to P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of
3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered
and services rendered by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay
the amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight
in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. Hence, on September
22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the
sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.

During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez, and
Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper. Petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony. On June 22, 1988, the

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trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus
interest at 12% per annum, and costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial court's' reliance on private respondent's
Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, §37 13 of the Rules of Court. Hence, this
appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in admitting evidence as entries in the course of in the
private respondent’s book of collectible accounts considering that the person who made said entries
actually testified in this case but unfortunately had no personal knowledge of said entries?

Ruling:

We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission
of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other
way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent
evidence to show such delivery.

Private respondent cites Rule 130, §37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question
constitute "entries in the course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects.
This provision reads: Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty. The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction
of the following conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable
to testify; 2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. The entrant
was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were made in his professional
capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and 5. The entries
were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third
requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the
account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and
marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court. Necessity is given as a ground for
admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence.

Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she
made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts
stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for
(such) functions." The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e.,
that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the company's project
engineer. The entries made by Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer
and that she faithfully recorded the amounts stared therein in the books of account. Whether or not the bills
given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact
that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented during trial. The
rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus: [W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts entered by him, and the person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as
to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have
intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.

People vs. Plasencia

G.R. No. 90198, November 7, 1995 Ponente: Vitug, J.
Presentation of Evidence; Reference to Memorandum
FACTS:
Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joselito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with
homicide for stabbing and killing one Hermino Mansueto.

Francisca Espina is the prosecution's lone witness who came and testify against the accused-
appellants. One accused-appellants argued as to the credibility of the Espina because of her alleged
inconsistencies and faults the trial court for allowing the witness to glance at the notes written on her palm
while testifying.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of notes may be allowed while testifying in court.

HELD:
Yes. The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not alltogether proscribed. Sec.
16, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court states:

"Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum-

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A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, anything written or recorded by himself
or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time
when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in
such case the writing or record must be produced and may be inspectef by the adverde party, who may, if
he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify
from such writing or record, though he may retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear
that the writing or record correctly stated the trasaction when made; but such evidence must be received
with caution." (Emphasis supplied).

Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case,
the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself explained that she merely wanted
to be accurate on date and like details.

G.R. No. 92740 March 23, 1992

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL ILANO AND
FELIPA JAVALERA, respondents.

Facts:

Plaintiffs Jaime Ramos, Nilda Ramos, Erlinda Ilano, Milagros Ilano, Daniel Ilano and Felipe Javalera, are
officers of the Negros Telephone Company who held confirmed tickets for PAL Flight No. 264 from Naga
City to Manila on September 24, 1985, scheduled to depart for Manila at 4:25 p.m.

Plaintiffs claim in their Complaint that they went tot he check-in counter of the defendant's Naga branch at
least one (1) hour before the published departure time but no one was at the counter until 30 minutes
before departure, but upon checking -in and presentation of their tickets to the employee/clerk who
showed up, their tickets were cancelled and the seats awarded to chance passengers; plaintiffs had to go
to Manila by bus, and seek actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees for breach of
contract of carriage.

Defendant disclaim any liability, claiming that the non-accommodation of plaintiff on the said flight was
due to their having check-in (sic) late for their flight. It is averred even if defendant is found liable to the
plaintiffs such liability is confined to, and limited by, the CAB Economic Regulations No. 7 in conjunction
with P.D. 589.

The trial court rendered judgment finding defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage in bumping-off
the plaintiffs from its F264 flight of September 25, 1985, PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the oral testimony of the plaintiffs or the documentary evidence presented by PAL should
prevail.

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Held:

Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party in a case is required to prove his affirmative
allegations. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible
than that of the other party

The case at bar presents a simple question of fact: Whether or not the private respondents were late in
checking-in for their flight from Naga City to Manila on September 24. 1985. It is immediately apparent
from the records of this case that the claims of the parties on this question are dramatically opposed. As a
rule, the determination of a question of fact depends largely on the credibility of witnesses unless some
documentary evidence is available which clearly substantiates the issue and whose genuineness and
probative value is not disputed (Legarda v. Miaile, 88 Phil. 637, 642). The exception to the rule now runs
true in this case.

We reverse. This case once more illustrates Our power to re-weigh the findings of lower courts when the
same are not supported by the record or not based on substantial evidence.

It is significant to note that there were no other passenger who checked-in late after the private
respondents (TSN, November 23, 1987, p. 13). In the absence of any controverting evidence, the
documentary evidence presented to corroborate the testimonies of PAL's witnesses are prima
facie evidence of the truth of their allegations. The plane tickets of the private respondents, exhs. "1,"
"2," "3," "4," (with emphasis on the printed condition of the contract of carriage regarding check-in time as
well as on the notation "late 4:02" stamped on the flight coupon by the check-in clerk immediately upon
the check-in of private respondents) and the passenger Manifest of Flight PR 264, exh. "5," (which
showed the non-accommodation of Capati and Go an the private respondents) are entries made in the
regular course of business which the private respondents failed to overcome with substantial and
convincing evidence other than their testimonies. Consequently, they carry more weight and credence.

A writing or document made contemporaneously with a transaction in which are evidenced facts
pertinent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more
reliable proof and of greater probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such facts
based upon memory and recollection (20 Am Jur S 1179, 1029 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of
Court in the Philippines Annotated, 1973 Edition, Volume VII, Part II, p. 654).

Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform
language (Spouses Vicente and Salome de Leon v. CA., et al., G.R. No. 95511, January 30, 1992). This
dictum is amply demonstrated by the diverse allegations of the private respondents in their complaint
(where they claimed that no one was at the counter until thirty (30) minutes before the published
departure time and that the employee who finally attended to them marked them late, Records, p. 2) and
in their testimonies (where they contended that there were two different PAL personnel who attended to
them at the check-in counter. TSNs of November 17, 1986, pp. 41-45 and of May 18, 1987, pp. 5-6).
Private respondents' only objection to these documents is that they are self-serving cannot be
sustained. The hearsay rule will not apply in this case as statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main transaction as to form a part of it, and which
illustrate, elucidate, qualify or characterize the act, are admissible as apart of the res gestae.

Go vs People
677 SCRA 213
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012

FACTS: Go et al were criminally charged with “Other Deceits” under the RPC for mortgaging a chattel with
Highdone Ltd. et al misrepresenting the same to be the first mortgage where the truth is it already had a
prior mortgage. Consequently, damages were sustained by the company.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9,
2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.

Subsequently, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping,
alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
MeTC granted the motion but this was nullified by the RTC on the ground the rule on taking of depositions

65
of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the
Rules of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which
is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him
face to face. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals held because no rule of procedure expressly disallows
the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every
opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the
oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition
of the witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules on deposition may be applied suppletorily in the criminal case

HELD: No. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered
Under Section 15, Rule 119. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a
public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his
manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial
evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized
to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state
or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court
where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the
deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section
15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of
Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through
live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding at the hearing,
rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and
criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under
Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.

However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination of an unavailable
prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de Manguerra,
as follows:

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply
to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.Considering that
Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason
to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130601. December 4, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN, accused-
appellant.

At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit, 24 years old,
was on her way home from work, when suddenly a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her
neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die. She got a good look at the man, who turned out
to be accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of
her belongings - ladies watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash. With
the full moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the items on the right pocket of his
shorts. Thereafter, Diopita also succeeded in raping Dominga.

After the incident, Dominga was brought to the precint and later on examined by Dr. Floranne Lam-Vergara
at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for spermatocytes." PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was

66
on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a follow-up on the case, and later on a police
line up of four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were presented to Dominga for identification.
Dominga readily pointed at Diopita and the police then had him try on the recovered slipper from the crime
scene; it easily fitted him. Thus, Diopita was detained while the others were released.
The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between 8:30 to 12:00
oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and fellow Jehovahs Witnesses
for an informal Bible session.

The trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the Robbery with Rape.

On appeal, the defense, among others, tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have
committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position
of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous
person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged on the account
of his supposed good moral character as testified by his witnesses.

Held:

No. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the
conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial
Servant" in his faith is no guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his
part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his
previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must
be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to
convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

Appellant also argues that his witnesses are Jehovahs Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing
people who would never lie as to his whereabouts at the time in question. But as ruled by the trial court,
“alibi is a weak defense because it can easily be fabricated that it is so easy for witnesses to get confused
as to dates and time. The precision with which the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in
the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session
supposedly arrived is, at best, self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with
which it may be concocted and fabricated.”

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently performed by
the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying,
and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not reflected in the records. Hence, the
court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.

SPOUSES ALCARAZ VS. TANGGA-AN

G.R. No. 128568

April 9, 2003

Facts:

The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and
mother of the rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located at Premier Street,
Hipodromo, Cebu City to the petitioner spouses. The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy
of the said residential building and did not include the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot
was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA). Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound
themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000 beginning November 22, 1991.
However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent. Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in
the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated demands by respondents to pay the rentals in arrears and to
surrender the possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused to vacate the same.
Respondents sought to repossess the property for their own use and benefit.

On the other hand, the petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot on which
the house stood was transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an. Virgilio Tangga-an is
the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of the other
respondents. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125657 was consequently issued in the name of Virgilio
Tangga-an. According to the petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the

67
house resulted in the cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses.
Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents
since the latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.

In ruling in favor of the respondents, the MTC held that the petitioner spouses clearly violated the contract
of lease due to non-payment of rent. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA denied
the Petition for Review and affirming the judgments of the courts a quo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent because of the
change in the ownership of the land on which the rented house was built.

RULING: We find no merit in petitioners’ arguments.

The main question therefore is still the lawful possession of the subject premises by the petitioner spouses.
To resolve it, a discussion of the ownership issue is necessary.

Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it;

xxx xxx xxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from
alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the
house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

We also note that the petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval. Due to
the change in ownership of the land, the petitioner spouses decided to unilaterally cancel the contract
because Virgilio supposedly became the new owner of the house after acquiring title to the lot. They alleged
that there was no reason anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased
to be the owner of the house. But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to
extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of the terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a contract
is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect. What the petitioner spouses should have done
was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to litigate their claims and to deposit the
rentals in court.

The petitioner spouses aver that their payments to Virgilio beginning November, 1993 were payments made
in good faith to a person in possession of the credit, in consonance with Article 1242 of the Civil Code. This
therefore released them from their obligation. They claim that Virgilio collected the rentals in his capacity
as a co-owner. Being a son of Virginia, he was also entitled to the rent of the subject house. We disagree.
Virgilio collected the rentals not as a co-owner but as the alleged sole owner of the subject house. The
petitioner spouses themselves admitted that Virgilio claimed sole ownership of the house and lot. It would
be incongruous for them to now assert payment in good faith to a person they believed was collecting in
behalf of his co-heirs after admitting that they paid rent to Virgilio as the sole owner thereof.

Hence, for violating of the terms of the lease contract, i.e., payment of rent, respondents can legally demand
the ejectment of the petitioner spouses.

FEBTC vs Chante
707 SCRA 149
GR 170598

Facts: Robert Mar Chante (Chan), was a depositor of FEBTC. FEBTC issued him an ATM Card. The
card, known as a "Do-It-All" card to handle credit card and ATM transactions, was tagged in his current
account.

As a security feature, a PIN, known only to the depositor, was required in order to gain access to the
account. With the use of the PIN, Chan could then deposit and withdraw funds from his current account
from any FEBTC ATM facility, including the MEGALINK facilities of other member banks that included the
Philippine National Bank (PNB).

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FEBTC alleged that on May 4 and 5, 1992, Chan had used his card to withdraw funds totaling P967k from
the PNB-MEGALINK ATM at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. Such amount withdrawn was more than
the outstanding balance of Chan’s current account. FEBTC added that at the time of the ATM withdrawal
transactions, there was an error in its computer system known as "system bug" whose nature had allowed
Chan to successfully withdraw funds in excess of his current credit balance of P198k; and that Chan had
taken advantage of the system bug to do the withdrawal transactions.

FEBTC filed a complaint to recover the over withdrawn amount (P770k). It alleged that the ATM transactions
in question would not be processed unless the PIN, which was known only to Chan as the cardholder, had
been correctly entered, an indication both that it was his ATM card that had been used, and that all the
transactions had been processed successfully by the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion
Hotel with the use of the correct PIN.

Chan denied the liability and claims that he did not make such withdrawals and further claims that it could
possibly an inside job.

RTC ruled in favor of FEBTC and held Chan liable for P770k based on the acts of the latter of issuing a
check amounting to his available balance in the current account.

On appeal, CA reversed the decision.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not FEBTC was able to discharge the burden of proof.

Held. No, the fact that Chan’s account number and ATM card number were the ones used for the
withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he should be deemed to have made
the withdrawals.

Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts, namely: (a) the risk of
non-persuasion; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, In its first concept, it is the duty to establish the
truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at
which the issue arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any
subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof
in its second concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests
throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.

The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact
is not evidence of it.13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.

G.R. No. 123817. December 17, 1999.

IBAAN RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR. and MRS. RAMON
TARNATE, respondents.

Spouses Cesar and Leonila Reyes were the owners of 3 lots. On March 21, 1976, the spouses mortgaged
these lots to Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. The spouses the sold the lots with assumption of mortgage of the bank
to Spouses Tarnate. Spuses Tarnate failed to pay the loan and the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the lots.
The Provincial Sheriff conducted a public auction of the lots and awarded the lots to the bank, the sole
bidder. The certificate of sale stated that the redemption period expires two (2) years from the registration
of the sale ( October 16, 1979). On September 23, 1981, Spouses Tarnate offered to redeem the foreclosed
lots and tendered the redemption amount of P77,737.45. However, petitioner Bank refused the redemption
on the ground that it had consolidated its titles over the lots.

Spouses Ternate filed a complaint to compel the bank to allow their redemption of the foreclosed lots. They
alleged that the extrajudicial foreclosure was null and void for lack of valid notice and demand upon them.

The bank opposed the redemption, contending that the private respondents had no right to redeem the lots
because they were not the real parties in interest; that at the time they offered to redeem on September 23,
1981, the right to redeem had prescribed, as more than one year had elapsed from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale on October 16, 1979.

The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Spouses Ternate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Ternate can question the validity of the foreclosure sale?

HELD: No, When petitioner received a copy of the Certificate of Sale registered in the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City, it had actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. For two
years, it did not object to the two-year redemption period provided in the certificate. Thus, it could be said
that petitioner consented to the two-year redemption period specially since it had time to object and did not.
When circumstances imply a duty to speak on the part of the person for whom an obligation is proposed,
his silence can be construed as consent. By its silence and inaction, petitioner misled private respondents
to believe that they had two years within which to redeem the mortgage. After the lapse of two years,
petitioner is estopped from asserting that the period for redemption was only one year and that the period

69
had already lapsed. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his
own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not The Bank can prohibit the redemption of the spouses?

HELD: No, Petitioner is a banking institution on whom the public expects diligence, meticulousness and
mastery of its transactions. Had petitioner diligently reviewed the Certificate of Sale it could have easily
discovered that the period was extended one year beyond the usual period for redemption. Banks, being
greatly affected with public interest, are expected to exercise a degree of diligence in the handling of its
affairs higher than that expected of an ordinary business firm.

Disputable Presumption

Rosario vs Soria
699 SCRA 232
GR194846

Facts: Spouses Luis Rosaroso (Luis) and Honorata Duazo (Honorata) acquired several real properties in
Cebu City. The couple had nine (9) children namely: Hospicio, Arturo, Florita, Lucila, Eduardo, Manuel,
Cleofe, Antonio, and Angelica. On April 25, 1952, Honorata died. Later on, Luis married Lourdes Pastor
Rosaroso (Lourdes).

Hospicio, Antonio , Angelica and Cleofe (Petitioners) alleged the Luis, with full consent of his second wife,
Lourdes, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (First Sale) over six (6) parcel of land (Lot 8, 19, 22, 23, 5665
and 7967) in Cebu on 04 Nov 1991.

Petitioners further alleged that on 23 Aug 1994, Lucilla and Laila, daughter of Lucilla, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale (Second Sale), by virtue of SPA from Luis, over three (3) parcel of Lot in favor of Meridian
Realty Corporation (Meridian) despite the first sale. Such SPA was accomplished by affixing Luis’
thumbmark and despite the latter being sick, infirm, blind, and of unsound mind.

On January 16, 1995, a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages was filed by Luis,
as one of the plaintiffs, against his daughter, Lucila, Lailaand Meridian.

Lucilla and Laila submitted that the petitioners were estopped from questioning the validity of the second
sale because of their failure to effect the registration and annotation of the first sale.

Meridian claimed that they were buyers in good faith.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners because it held that when Luis executed the second deed of sale he
was no longer the owner of the properties.

On appeal, CA reversed and held that the first sale was void due to lack of consideration.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the first sale was valid.

Held: Yes, the first sale was valid.

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private
transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3)
there was sufficient consideration for a contract. These presumptions operate against an adversary who
has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima
facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the
time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the
place of evidence unless rebutted.

In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that
the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up
this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.

The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on
the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign
the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase
price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self-serving and would not amount to a clear
and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that
there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.

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Heirs of Trazona vs Heirs of Canada
712 SCRA 300
GR 175874

Facts:
Cipriano Trazona owned an untitled parcel of land in Minglanilla Cebu referred to as Lot 5053-H.

In 1949, Dionisio Canada bought the adjacent lot from Pilar Diaz. It was later found that Dionisio had
encroached on a small portion of Lot 5053-H but no ejectment was filed by Cipriano during his lifetime.
Cipriano died on 1982, since then his son Hermogenes cultivated the lot 5053-H. On March 1992,
Hermogenes died.

The controversy arose when the Heirs of Cipriano Trazona (Petitioners) found out that the tax declaration
was cancelled and another one was issued in favor of Dionisio on June 1996 by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated 27 June 1956 supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio.

Petitioner field a Complaint against Heirs of Dionisio (Respondents) for quieting of title, annulment of deed
of sale, recovery of possession and ownership among others. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Sale was
a forgery. Respondent in their Answer alleged that that assailed deed was genuine document.

Petitioner presented a document examiner of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII as their witness. He
testified that according to his comparative analysis of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed and
standard signatures on other documents, Cipriano’s signature on the deed in question was a forgery.

Respondents presented Dionisio’s son Gorgonio, who testified that he was present when the assailed deed
was executed.

RTC ruled in in favor of the petitioner and held that the deed was a forgery based on the discrepancies of
Cipriano’s signature on other document presented.

On appeal, the CA reversed and held that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their
allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery.31 The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the
presumption of authenticity and due execution.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner were able to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed.

Held: Yes, the petitioners were able to overturn the presumption.

It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution.
Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is
disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.

The SC found clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the
assailed deed to wit:

1. Testimony of the document examiner that the signature was forged

2. The independent observation of the RTC that the signature was forged
3. Cipriano had cultivated the land and regularly paid its taxes
4. The witness of the respondents admitted that the fruits of the land were enjoyed by the repondents
5. There were irregularities in the issuance of Ciprianos residence certificate indicated in the assailed
deed

Delos Santos vs COA

703 SCRA 501
GR 198457

Facts:
In October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the Second District of Cebu City
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC
or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating
to the hospital the amount of P1,5M from his PDAF to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients
under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).

Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations offorgery and falsification of prescriptions and
referrals for the availment ofmedicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004,petitioner
Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created a fact-findingcommittee
to investigate the matter.

71
Beatriz M. Booc (Booc), State Auditor IV, who was assigned to audit the hospital, came up with her own
review of the account for drugs and medicines charged to the PDAF of Cuenco and recommended an
investigation due to irregularities on prescriptions and fictitious patients. Such was affirmed by the fact
finding committee of Delos Santos.

Consequently, a Special Audit Team (SAT) was formed to conduct a special audit with respect to the finding
of Booc. Examination by SAT showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were
mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment
documents which were found to be falsified. Hence, the SAT disallowed the payments amounting to P3M
and held Delos Santos and other officials of VSMMC solidarily liable therefor.

Delos Santos appealed to COA and alleged that they are only a passive entity in the disbursement of funds
and invoke good faith in the performance of their duties but it was denied.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Delos Santos should be held solidarily liable.

Held: Yes, because of her negligence as to failure to monitor disbursement.

Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of an explicit rule
that was violated.

Petitioners’ neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF facilitated the validation and
eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by
both the VSMMC and Dell Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne by the referral slips and
prescriptions related thereto. Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the
irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented from processing
falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF. Verily, petitioners cannot escape
liability for failing to monitor the procedures implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco
always reminded them that it was his money. Neither may deviations, from the usual procedure at the
hospital, such as the admitted bypassing of the VSMMC social worker in the qualification of the indigent-
beneficiaries, be justified as a welcome relief to the already overworked and undermanned section of the
hospital.

People vs Cadidia
707 SCRA 494
GR 191263

Facts:
On 31 July 2002, Hadji Socor Cadidia while at MIA on her way Butuan City undergone frisking procedure
upon arrival at the departure area. The said procedure was conducted by Marilyn Trayvilla, a Non-Uniform
Personel of the PNP. The latter noticed something unusual and thick at the buttocks of Cadidia. Upon
inquiry of Trayvilla the accused respond that it was her sanitary napkin. Not convinced, Trayvilla and co-
employee Leilani Bagsican brought the accused to the comfort room to check. Upon checking they found
two sachets of shabu. The sachets were turned over to SPO3 Musali Appang.

Due to the incident Cadidia was charged for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The prosecution presented the testimony of Trayvilla corroborated by Bagsican and SPO3 Appang.
Moreover, the two sachets confiscated were identified as shabu by Forensic Chemist Reyes.

On defense, the accused claimed that upon arrival she was brought by Trayvilla and Bagsican to the comfort
room. The two frisked her but failed to recover anything. Thereafter, the two women asked for money as
they allegedly found two sachets of shabu. Hence, the accused called her relative and asked to bring P200k
but her relative were only able to raise P6k which the two policemen found unacceptable.

Further, the accused contended that the prosecution witnesses have contradicting statements as to who
asked the accused to bring out the contents of the underwear and that Bagsican claims that the sachets of
shabu was placed inside her blazer contrary to Appang’s statement that Bagsican and Trayvilla handed the
sachets to him immediately after recovering such from the accused.

The RTC found the accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witness despite
of its inconsistencies and contradictions.

Held: No, because the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not negate the
eyewitnesses’ positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. As long as the
testimonies as a whole presented a coherent and believable recollection, the credibility would still be

72
upheld. What is essential is that the witnesses’ testimonies corroborate one another on material details
surrounding the commission of the crime.

In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the
incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Further, the evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose conclusion
thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge has the direct opportunity to observe said
witnesses on the stand and ascertain if they are telling the truth or not. Applying the foregoing, we affirm
the findings of the lower court in the appreciation of facts and credibility of the witnesses.

Iwasawa vs Gangan
705 SCRA 669
GR 204169

Facts:
Yasuo Iwasawa (Petitioner) is a Japanese national who contracted marriage with a Filipina named, Felisa
Custodio Gangan (Respondent) in 2002. The latter introduced herself as single and never married that’s is
why the petitioner decided to marry her later that year.

On 2009, the petitioner, through respondent’s confession, found out that the latter was already married as
early as 1994 with one Raymund Arambulo. This prompted petitioner to file a petition for the declaration of
his marriage with private respondent as null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one,
based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The petitioner presented the following pieces of evidence: 1. Marriage Certificate between petitioner and
respondent dated 2002; 2. Marriage Certificate between respondent and Raymund Arambulo dated 1994;
3. Death Certificate of Arambulo dated 2009 and; 5. Certification from NSO stating that there were two
entries of marriage recorded pertaining to the respondent.

The prosecutor admitted the authenticity and due execution of the documents.

The RTC denied the petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It held that petitioner failed to prove
the existence of the prior marriage as the latter has no personal knowledge with regard to the existence
othe prior marriage and a a stranger to the preparation of the marriage certificate.

Issue: Whether or not testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due
execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could be accorded
evidentiary weight.

Held: No, the testimony of the NSO records custodian is not necessary because the document presented
were all public documents.

There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents.1âwphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.

As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity
and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover,
not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein
remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the
contrary.

Asian Terminals vs Philam Insurance

792 SCRA 88
GR 181163

Facts:
On April 15, 1995, Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors Corporation (Universal Motors) 219
packages containing 120 units of brand new Nissan Pickup Trucks from Japan to Manila. The shipment,
which had a declared value of US$81k or P29.4M, was insured with Philam against all risks.

The carrying vessel arrived at the port of Manila on April 20, 1995, and when the shipment was unloaded
by the staff of ATI, it was found that the some of packages were in bad order. The Turn Over Survey of
Bad Order Cargoes dated April 21, 1995 identified two packages, as being dented and broken.

On May 11, 1995, the shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc., and delivered to
the Universal Motors’ warehouse in Mandaluyong City. Upon the request of Universal Motors, a bad order

73
survey was conducted on the cargoes and thereafter the latter declared the packages as total loss due to
the extent of the damages.

On August 4, 1995, Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages in the amount of P644k against
Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained
unheeded, it sought reparation from and was compensated in the sum of P634k by Philam. Accordingly,
Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt dated November 15, 1995 in favor of Philam.

On January 18, 1996, Philam, as subrogee of Universal Motors, filed a Complaint for damages against
Westwind, ATI and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the RTC. Philam formally offered the
Marine Certificate and Subrogation Receipt as documentary evidence which Westwind and ATI objected
for being hearsay as they were not authenticated by the person who executed them.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly and
severally, the sum of P634k with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, P158,989.28 by way of attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation.

On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC with modification by reducing the amount of liability to
P190k.

Hence, Westwind, Philam and ATI filed their separate appeals which were consolidated.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in admitting the marine certificate and subrogation receipt as
admissible.

Held. No, because the two documents were authenticated by Philam upon presenting

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.

In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person
without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or
agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules except when it is excused by reason of being an ancient document, its
genuineness and authenticity was not specifically deniedor admitted by the adverse party and the
documents were not offered as genuine.

Indubitably, Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents, said documents may
not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.

Contrary to the contention of petitioners ATI and Westwind, however, Philam presented its claims officer,
Ricardo Ongchangco, Jr. to testify on the execution of the Subrogation Receipt. As regards, Marine
Certificates, because it was merely identified by Philam’s witness.

Aludos vs Suerte
673 SCRA 413
GR 165285

Facts:
On January 1969, Lomises Aludos acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls
in the Hangar Market in Baguio City.

On September 8, 1984, Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the
transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls (Stall Nos. 9 and 10) for the amount of
P260k.

Johnny gave a down payment of P45k to Lomises, who acknowledged receipt of the amount in a document
executed on the same date as the agreement. Another payment was made by Johnny on 1984 amounting
to P23k. However, before Johnny could settle the remaining balance, Lomises backed out from the
agreement and returned the payments of Johnny amounting to P68k through the latter’s parents in 1985.

Johnny protested the return of his money and insisted on the continuation of the agreement. Limoses
refused hence Johnny filed a complaint before the RTC for specific performance. Limoses in his defense
alleged that the true agreement was one of loan and not of sale.

RTC held that the agreement was void for lack of consent from the Baguio government and ordered
Limposes to returned to Johnny the amount paid by the latter with interest.

On appeal, CA held that there were to agreement one is for the assignment of the leasehold right and the
other was for the sale of improvements on the market stalls. It affirmed the finding of the RTC that the
agreement was void and remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of value of improvement
existing at the time of execution of the agreement.

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Limoses filed for MR contending that there can be no valid sale of improvements because the lease
agreement between Limoses and Baguio government, supposedly marked as Exhibit A, provides that any
improvement will be ipso facto become properties of City of Baguio.

CA denied after finding that Exhibit A was merely a permit issued bby the City Treasurer of Baguio and that
the contract between Limoses and City of Baguio was not formally offered as evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the CA was correct in rejecting the evidentiary value of the lease contract between
Limoses and Baguio City as it was not formally offered as evidence.

Held:
Yes, because under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and
until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the
same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight."

Although the contract was referred to in Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2"
in his pre-trial brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985 lease contract
"surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. What was formally
offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio
City market and nothing else. In other words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that
any and all improvements in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.

Westmont Investment Corporation vs Francia Jr

661 SCRA 787
GR 194128

Facts:

In 1999, Amos Francia Jr was enticed by the manager of Westmont bank to invest with WestCorp as it
offers 3% to 5% higher interest rate than the regular bank rate. Due to the promise, Amos Francia Jr
together with her sibling Benjamin Francia (respondents) invested P1.4M and P2.4M respectively.

When the investments matured, Wincorp wasn’t able to return the investment and its corresponding
interest due to lack of funds and instead the latter rolled-over the fund for another 34days and indicated in
the confirmation advices that the fund were borrowed by Pearl Bank.

Despite lapse of the 34days Wincorp wasn’t able to return the funds and interest. Hence, the respondents
field a collection case against Wincorp and Pearlbank before the RTC.

After the testimony of Amos Francia, Jr., the respondents filed their Formal Offer of Evidence. Pearlbank
filed its Comment/Objection, while Wincorp did not file any comment or objection. After all the exhibits of
the Francias were admitted for the purposes they were offered, the Francias rested their case.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Wincorp attached documents when it filed an MR with the RTC but
such was denied.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC with modification as to the rate of interest.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the documents attached by Wincorp in their MR can be given probative value
despite absence of formal offer.

Held: No, the documents of Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole reason
that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court because to consider them
at this stage will deny the other parties the right to rebut them.

Section 34 of Rule 132 provides that, “The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."

A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge
to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand,
this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates
review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial
court. Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a party litigant. Neither
may it be taken into account on appeal.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not
been offered shall be excluded and rejected.

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1-PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.DELFIN CALISO
G.R. No. 183830, Oct 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 666

FACTS:

The records show that the deceased victim died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river.
The immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering.

Soledad Amegable, the lone eyewitness, had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished
cries of a girl pleading for mercy. The lush bamboo growth in the area made it difficult for Amegable
to see what was going on. She also testified that she subsequently heard sounds of beating and
mauling that soon ended the girl’s cries. She then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was
happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw
a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number “11” mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body into
the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee -high muddy water and stood over her body.
That the man later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper wate r; that he next jumped into the
other side of the river, that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face because
he always had his back turned towards her; that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Delfin
Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their
barangay several times prior to the incident. She also narrated that after the man fled the crime
scene, she went straight to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that h er
husband instantly reported the incident to the barangay chairman.

The Regional Trial Court held Caliso guilty of murder instead of the crime charged. The Court of
Appeals affirmed Caliso’s conviction. The CA ruled that Amegable made a positive identific ation of
Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun
had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by
any object at the time that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5,
1997 was positive and reliable.

HELD:

No.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is
entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted.

The decision promulgated by the CA on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE f or
insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

A witness' familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does
not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest Amegable's testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer
look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral
certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable circumstances showing
him to be AAA's killer.

Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it
did not rule out her being mistaken. Amegable's recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants
bearing the number "11" did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such
pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence.

DOCTRINE:

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the
constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of
positive identification in People v. Gallarde, to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness
to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused
is last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime.

2-People of the Philippines v Felimon Patentes

G.R. No. 190178, February 12, 2014, 716 SCRA

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FACTS

The present case involves eight sets of information for Forcible Abduction with rape filed by private
complainant AAA against appellant Felimon Patentes.

The prosecution alleged that on Dec 5, 1998, at about 11:00am, AAA boarded a bus for Bansalan,
Davao City. While seated at the rear portion of the bus, appellant suddenly sat next to her.
Subsequently, appellant was able to force AAA to go with him in his residence in Hacienda Heights in
Davao City. She was allegedly dragged upstairs, tied to a sewing machine, and was forced to smoke
something, causing AAA to feel light and dizzy. This prevented AAA from fighting back when appellant
removed her clothes, and mounted her to insert his penis into her vagina. For 8 days, AAA remained in
appellant’s house. On the 8th day, to free her from her predicament, AAA convinced appellant that she
will marry him. They went back to AAA’s house to discuss marital plans with AAA’s family. AAA
confessed and recounted her ordeal to her mother. The mother accompanied AAA to the police, where
AAA was also examined by a doctor, Dr Cruz. In his testimony, Dr Cruz noted the vaginal canal was
negative for spermatozoa.

In his defense, appellant contended AAA agreed that he accompanied her to Bansalan on Dec 5, 1998.
After going around Davao City, AAA allegedly refused to return home because she was fed up with her
mother, who often called her “buntog” or prostitute. AAA stayed in appellant’s house for 7 days, together
with appellant’s parents, siblings and other relatives. Appellant and AAA slept in the same room and had
consented sexual intercourse. Throughout, AAA’s stay, she was free to roam around the house and
even helped in the chores. They agreed to set the wedding date on May 27, 1999. When they went to
AAA’s house to discuss the marital plans on Dec 14, 1998, AAA’s mother rejected the proposal because
of the appellant’s social standing.

Two witnesses, appellant’s neighbor,Leonora Gerodio, and a common friend, testified that they saw AAA
in appellant’s house at least twice during the period Dec 5-12, 1998. Both witnesses also declared that
the couple discussed their marital plans to them on separate occasions.

After the trial, the lower court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) count of forcible
abduction, with Rape, and (7) counts of Rape. Appellant elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court with modification with regard to damages. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not AAA’s testimony, side by side with the prosecution’s evidence, can stand the test of
credibility to sustain the conviction of the accused

HELD

No.

The numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant have created reasonable doubt.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant must be
upheld considering that the evidence brought forth in trial falls short of the quantum of proof to support a
conviction

The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of establishing with moral certainty the truthfulness of the
charge that appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will using threats, force or intimidation.

Contrary to the prosecution’s claim that AAA was dragged, tied, mauled, slapped and boxed, the
medical certificate revealed no telltale sign of the prosecution’s allegations. It has to be noted that the
medical examination was conducted the day after AAA’s supposed escape from appellant. As shown by
the medical certificate, AAA had no external signs of physical injuries, save for a kiss mark

The actuations of AAA after the alleged rape is totally uncharacteristic of one who has been raped. It is
contrary to normal human behavior for AAA to willingly go with her abusers’ mother, and worse, live with
her abuser’s entire family for 8 days sans any attempt to escape. Instead of escaping, AAA visited
appellant’s neighbor. Instead of sharing her “ordeal” to be rescued by her friend Wilma, AAA inexplicably
failed and instead described the details of her marital plans.

The CA decision is reversed and set aside. Apellant Felimon Patentes is acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

DOCTRINE

A conviction in criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means moral
certainty that the accused is guilty.

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3-SUPREME COURT vs. Eddie Delgado, Joseph Madeja, Wilfredo Florendo
A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October 4, 2011, 658 SCRA

FACTS:

On2June2011,SupremeCourtAssociateJusticeandSecondDivisionChairpersonAntonioT.Carpio
causedthetransmittaloftwo(2)sealedAgendatotheOfficeofClerkofCourtcontainingtheitemized
listsofcasestakenupbytheCourt’sSecondDivisionduringitssessions,aswellasthehandwritten
marginalnotesofJusticeCarpioshowingthespecificactionsadoptedbythedivisiononeachcaseitem. This was
ordered to be photocopied.

AfterhavingtheAgendaphotocopiedinduplicates,itwaslaterfoundoutthatoneoftheduplicatecopies of the
Agenda had missing pages. Thus, an initial investigation was held.

Duringtheinitialinvestigation,Delgadocandidlyadmittedduringtheinitialinvestigationthathetook
pages58,59and70fromoneofthecopiesofthe30May2011Agenda.However,Delgadoalso
disclosedthatheremovedthepagesfromthesubjectAgendaonlyasafavortoJosephLawrence Madeja and
Wilfredo A. Florendo.

Fortheirpart,respondentsMadejaandFlorendoadmittedduringtheinitialinvestigationthattheyasked
forand,infact,obtainedthemissingpagesinthe30May2011Agenda.BothrespondentsMadejaand
FlorendoattestedthatcourtemployeesfromotherDivisionshadbeenrequestingforcopiesofthe
Agenda,towhichtheywereinclinedtoaccedeinexchangefortokenslike“pang-merienda”or“ pamasahe.”

TheOfficeofAdministrativeServiceconductedaformalinvestigationonthematter.Intheirwritten
explanationsaswellasstatementsduringtheformalhearings,bothrespondentMadejaandFlorendo
adamantlydeniedhavingmadeanyadmissionduringtheinitialinvestigationregardingtheircomplicityin
theremovalofthemissingpagesinthecopyofthe30May2011Agenda.Theysubmitthatthereisno
actualevidencethatshowsthattheyhaveknowledgeoforinvolvementintheactionsofrespondent
Delgado.Delgadoinhisstatementduringtheformalhearings,ontheotherhand,stoodbyhis admissions
during the initial investigation.

TheOfficeofAdministrativeServiceaffirmedthefindingsmadeduringtheinitialinvestigationand
recommended that the respondents be dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial of respondents Madeja and Florendo can prevail over the testimony of their
co-respondent Delgado

HELD:

The evidence point out that respondents Madeja and Florendo, indeed, connived with respondent
Delgado in removing the three (3) pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. The denial of
respondents Madeja and Florendo, in a complete turnaround from an earlier ad mission, is
unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and consistent statements of respondent
Delgado.

Respondent Delgado’s statements, not only in the initial investigation but also in the formal
investigation, were unwavering in their implication of respondents Madeja and Florendo.
Respondent Delgado categorically identified respondents Madeja and Florendo as the persons
who induced him to remove several pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda and thereafter
obtained them

It was never shown that respondent Delgado was motivated by any ill will in implicating
respondents Madeja and Florendo. As a witness, the credibility of respondent Delgado remained
unsullied. His statements are worthy of belief.

The unsubstantiated denial of respondents, therefore, falters in light of the direct and positive
statements of respondent Delgado.

Respondents Delgado, Madeja, and Florendo were dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits.

DOCTRINE

The basic principle in Evidence is that denials, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence,
cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of truthful witnesses.

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4-Government of Hongkong Special Admin Region represented by Philippine DOJ v Hon.Felixberto
Olalia and Juan Antonio Munoz

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA

FACTS

Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent” and seven counts of the offense of “conspiracy to defraud”.

An Order of Arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila against Muñoz in lieu of the
request received by the Department of Justice (DOJ) from the Hong Kong Department of Justice for his
provisional arrest. On the same day of the issuance of the warrant, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) arrested and detained him.

Upon petition of Muñoz, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared the Order of Arrest void. The Supreme
Court (SC), however, sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz. This became final and
executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK-SAR) filed with the RTC Manila a
petition for the extradition of Muñoz. In response, Muñoz filed a petition for bail. The same was denied
for the reason that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a high
“flight risk”. Muñoz filed a motion for reconsideration which the court granted. The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, in turn, filed an urgent motion to vacate the said order granting bail but it was
denied.

Hong Kong-SAR alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting Muñoz to bail,
that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right
to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

Muñoz on the other hand contends that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extraditee and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
one’s liberty.

ISSUE:

What is the standard of proof in granting or denying bail in deportation cases?

HELD:

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail
can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial
evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is
to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction.

In his Separate Opinion in the case of Government of United States of America v. Purganan, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According
to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence.

The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

5-People of the Philippines vs Alfonso Fontanilla

G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA

FACTS

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut
Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood
called bellang. Olais fell facedown to the ground but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of
stone. Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and TirsoAbunan,
the sons-in-law of Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their
father-in-law to a medical clinic, where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.

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Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been standing on the
road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in the
stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his
fists, striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs;
that he had thus been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side
of the victim’s head, causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the
scene for his house upon seeing that Olais was no longer moving.

The RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged. It rejected Fontanilla’s plea of self-defense. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE

Whether or not Fontanilla was able to prove self defense by clear and convincing evidence

HELD

No.

In this case, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of Olais. Having thus
admitted being the author of the death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, and he would be held criminally liable unless he
established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He should discharge the burden by relying
on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, would not be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing.

Nonetheless, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of
the proceedings.

In this case, Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did
not commit unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and,two, Fontanilla’s act of hitting the victim’s head
with a stone, causing the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable
response to the victim’s fistic attack and kicks.

The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and
number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel
an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the
determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision.

DOCTRINE:

When an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal injuries on
the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear evidence the justifying circumstance that would
avoid his criminal liability.

7-Dra.Leila Dela Llana v Rebecca Biong

G.R. No. 182356, Dec 4, 2913, 711 SCRA

FACTS

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00pm, Juan Dela Llana was driving a car for his sister, Dra Dela Llana
who was seated at the front passenger seat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial
Hospital when the signal light turned red. A dump truck driven by Joel Primero containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s
rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Dra. dela Llana obtained minor injuries. Joel’s
employer was Rebecca Biong.

Dra.dela Llana’s health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm.
Sheconsulted with different doctors. She underwent an operation wherein it released the impingement of
thenerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession despite the
surgery.Dra.dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages alleging that she lost the mobility of her arm as a
result of thevehicular accident and claimed medical expenses and an average monthly income since
June 2000.

In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as
noreasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. She pointed
outthat Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest one month and one week from the date of the

80
vehicularaccident.At the trial, Dra.dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a
hostile witness.

Dra.dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. Toprove
her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla. The
medicalcertificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her
clinicalhistory and physical examinations.

Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got stuck. In defense, Rebecca
testifiedthat Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular
accident.She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
andsupervision of Joel.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llana’swhiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling. It
held thatDra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and
herwhiplash injury by preponderance of evidence

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dra Dela Llana was able to establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligent
acts was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury

HELD

No. Dra.delaLlanamustfirstestablishbypreponderanceofevidencethethreeelementsof quasi-delict before

it can be determined Rebecca’s liability as Joel’s employer. The elements necessary to establish a
quasi-delict case are:(i) damages to the plaintiff; (ii) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or
by some person for whose acts the must respond, was guilty; and (iii) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages.

Dra.dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence. In the present case, Dra.dela
Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car; (2) the
medical certificate dated November 20, 2000; and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these
pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In
other words, Dra.dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by
which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established.

The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision. The medical certificate
cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence. It is a basic rule that evidence which has
not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments. Interestingly,
Dra Dela Llana merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court, claiming that Joel’s reckless
driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even
assuming that she is an expert in neurology, no weight can be given to her opinion that Joel’s reckless
driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence.

CA decision and resolution is affirmed. Petition is denied for lack of merit.

DOCTRINE

In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by preponderance of evidence
orgreater weight of credible evidence. Mere allegations are not evidence.

8-Zacaria Candao, Abas Candao, and Israel Haron v

People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 186659-710, Oct 19, 2011, 659 SCRA

FACTS

In Special Audit Office Report No. 93-25, it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the
depository accounts of the (ARMM) agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of Israel
B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan
criminal cases for malversation of public funds against the following ORG-ARMM officials/employees:
Zacaria A. Candao (Regional Governor), Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao
(Executive Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago (Cashier). They were charged with violation of Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code.

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Heidi L. Mendoza, COA State Auditor IV testified that their expanded audit disclosed the illegal
withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of ORG-ARMM involving 52 checks issued
without the required disbursement vouchers. Specifically, their attention was caught by the fact that the
Report of Checks Issued by the Deputized Disbursing Officer showed that the subject 52 checks have
no assigned voucher numbers.

The Sandiganbayan found Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria A.
Candao and Abas A. Candao who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine
equivalent to the amount of the check in each case.

In their petition for review on certiorari, Candao et al contended that the Sandiganbayan should have
applied the “Equipoise Rule” which would have resulted in the acquittal of the accused-petitioners.

ISSUE

Whether or not the equipoise rule finds application in this case

HELD

No.

The Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in holding that the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima facie evidence of misappropriation
arising from Haron’s failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM
funds. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire amount withdrawn,
during the expanded audit or any time thereafter. There is therefore no merit in petitioners’ argument
that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule.

The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction.

This is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence
that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand,
specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds.

As to the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the Sandiganbayan correctly
ruled that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to effect the illegal withdrawals and
misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds. In this case, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao
were co-signatories in the subject checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers. Their
signatures in the checks, as authorized officials for the purpose, made possible the illegal withdrawals
and embezzlement of public funds in the staggering aggregate amount ofP21,045,570.64.

Petition for review on certiorari is denied. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

DOCTRINE

Under the equipose rule, when there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party
having the burden of proof loses.

9-Office of the Ombudsman v Antonio Reyes

G.R. No. 170512, Oct 5, 2011, 658 SCRA

FACTS

JaimeB.AceroexecutedanaffidavitagainstAntonioReyesandAngelitoPeñaloza,whowerethe
TransportationRegulationOfficerII/ActingOfficer-in-ChargeandClerkIIIoftheLTO.Heallegedthat Reyes
and Peñaloza exacted money from him to pass his examination for driver’s license.

For his part, Peñaloza ostensibly admitted the charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he
incriminated
Reyesthereinasthemastermindoftheillicitactivitycomplainedof.Tocorroboratethisallegation,
PeñalozasubmittedtheaffidavitsofAmperandValdehueza.AmperwasaformerLTOemployeewho
allegedlyhadfirst-handknowledgeofthepracticeofReyesofimposingandpocketingadditionalfees;
whileValdehuezadeclaredthathewasanapplicantforadriver’slicensewhowaslikewisemadetopay
thesaidadditionalfeestoReyes.On theotherhand,Reyes’counter-affidavitrepudiatedthe allegations of
Acero, insisting that it was Peñaloza who illegally took the amount of P500.00 from Acero.

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TheOfficeoftheOmbudsman-MindanaoruledthatReyeswasguiltyofgravemisconductandfinding
Peñalozaguiltyofsimplemisconduct.TheCourtofAppealsgrantedthepetitionofReyesandreversed the
judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
the Office of the Ombudsman avers that its findings of fact are entitled to great weight and must be
accorded full respect and credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was sufficiently proven by substantial
evidence

HELD

Yes. CA decision and resolution is reversed and set aside

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. In administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a
party. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.

In thiscase,theOmbudsmanadjudgedReyesguiltyofgravemisconductafterfindingthat
Reyes,beingthentheHeadofOfficeoftheLTOinMambajao,Camiguin,illegallyexactedmoney
fromAceroinexchangefortheissuanceofadriver’slicensetothelatter,notwithstandingthat
Acerodidnotpasstherequisitewrittenexaminationtherefor.Section27ofRepublicActNo.
6770mandatesthatthefindingsoffactbytheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanareconclusivewhen supported by
substantial evidence.

In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. However, whil e it is not the function
of the Court to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an exception thereto lies as
when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the cardinal principles, which
include among others, that the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. In the present case, the
aforementioned requirement was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence
offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him
guilty of grave misconduct.

DOCTRINE

In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is necessary to establish

the case for or against a party.

10-Xavier Ramos v BPI Family Savings Bank and/or Alfonso Salcedo

G.R. No. 203186, Dec 4, 2013, 711 SCRA

FACTS

RamoswasemployedbyBPIFamilyandeventuallybecameitsVice-PresidentforDealerNetwork
Marketing/AutoLoansDivision.Duringhistenure,aclientnamedTrezitaB.Acostaenteredintoand
obtainedseveralautoandrealestateloansfromBPIFamilywhichweredulyapprovedandpromptly paid.

AcostapurportedlysecuredanotherautoloanfromBPIFamilyintheamountofP3,097,392.00forthe
purchaseofaToyotaPradovehiclewhichhadremainedunpaid.Asitturnedout,Acostadidnot authorize nor
personally apply for the subject loan, rendering the transaction fraudulent.

BPIFamilydiscoveredthat:(a)apersonmisrepresentedherselfasAcostaandsucceededinobtaining
thedeliveryofaToyotaPrado;(b)RamosreleasedthesedocumentswithoutthepriorapprovalofBPI
Family’screditcommittee;and(c)Ramoswasgrosslyremissinhisdutiessincehissubordinatesdidnot
followthebank’ssafetyprotocols.Asaconsequence,BPIFamilylostP2,294,080.00,whichamountwas divided
between Ramos and his three other subordinates.

RamosexecutedaRelease,WaiverandQuitclaimagreeingtoreleasethebankfromanyclaimor
liabilitywithrespectto,interalia,hisseparationpayorretirementbenefits.Later,Ramosfileda

83
complaintforunderpaymentofretirementbenefitsandnon-paymentofovertimeandholidaypayand premium
pay against BPI Family before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

TheLaborArbiterdismissedRamos’scomplaint,rulingthatthedeductionmadeonhisretirement
benefitswaslegalandevenreasonablesinceRamoswasnegligentinrunninghisdepartment. O n a pp e al ,
the NLRCreversedtheLA, ruling that the deduction complained of was “illegal and unreasonable”,
inthattheallegednegligencecommittedbyRamoswasnot substantially proven as he was not expected to
personally examine all loan documents that pass through
hishandsandthedeductiondoesnotfallundertheexceptionsprescribedunderArticle113oftheLabor
Codeonallowabledeductions.TheCAaffirmedthefindingofnegligenceonthepartofRamos,holding
thatRamoswasremissinhisdutyasheadofDealerNetworkMarketing/AutoLoansDivisioninfailingto determine
the true identity of the person who availed of the auto loan under the name "Trezita Acosta".

ISSUE

Whether or not BPI Family was able to substantially prove the imputation of negligence against Ramos

HELD

No. As correctly observed by the NLRC, BPI Family was not able to substantially prove its imputation of
negligence against Ramos.

The requirement that the NLRC’s findings should be supported by substantial evidence is clearly
expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that "in cases filed before
administrative or quasi- judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."

In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
in finding that the deduction made from Ramos’s retirement benefits was improper. Well-settled is the
rule that the burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.

BPI Family failed to establish that the duty to confirm and validate information in credit applications and
determine credit worthiness of prospective loan applicants rests with the Dealer Network Marketing
Department, which is the department under the supervision of Ramos. In fact, these responsibilities lie
with the bank’s Credit Services Department, namely its Credit Evaluation Section and Loans Review and
Documentation Section, of which Ramos was not part of.

Ramos merely followed standing company practice when he issued the PO and ATD without prior
approval from the bank’s Credit Services Department. In fact, BPI Family adopted the practice of
processing loans with extraordinary haste in order to overcome arduous competition with other banks
and lending institutions, despite compromising procedural safeguards.

Petition is granted. CA decision is set aside.

DOCTRINE

In labor disputes, the NLRC’s findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when its
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.

11- JESSE U. LUCAS,vs.JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 20011, 650 SCRA

FACTS

JesseU.Lucas,filedaPetitiontoEstablishIllegitimateFiliation(withMotionfortheSubmissionof Parties to
DNA Testing) before the RTC.

Petitioner Jesse narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy, migrated to Manila from
Davao. Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus. An intimate relationship developed between
the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant. On March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse. The
name of Jesse's father was not stated in the certificate of live birth. Howeve r, Elsie later on told
Jesse that his father is Jesus. When the relationship of Elsie and Jesus ended, Elsie refused to
accept Jesus’ offer of support and decided to raise Jesse on her own. While Jesse was growing up,
Elsie’s attempts to introduce Jesse to Jesus were all in vain.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, theRTCissuedthe Sept 3, 2007 Order setting
the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition.

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After Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration, theRTCdismissedthecase.The court held that before
petitioner can present evidence of paternity and filiation, he must establish the four procedural aspects
of a traditional paternity action: (1) a prima facie case; (2) affirmative defenses; (3) presumption of
legitimacy; and (4) physical resemblance between the putative father and the child . The court
observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present.The court opined
that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any
affirmative defenses.

JesseseasonablyfiledamotionforreconsiderationwhichtheRTCresolvedinhisfavor. This time, the RTC

held that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. Thecourtalso dismissed respondent
Jesus’argumentsthatthereisnobasisforthetakingofDNAtest,andthatjurisprudenceis still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence.

Aggrieved, Jesus elevated the matter to the CA. TheCAdecidedthepetition for certiorari in favor of
Jesus. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jesus, as no
summons had been served on him. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed
when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE

Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD

No.

A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this
initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a
paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility
of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of
probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.

The issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Petition is meritorious. CA decision is reversed and set aside.

12-Philippine National Bank vs Amelio Trio and John Doe

G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA

FACTS

Respondent Amelio C. Tria was a former Branch Manager of petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB),
assigned at PNB’s MWSS branch in Quezon City. On November 1, 2004, Tria retired as PNB-MWSS’
Manager under PNB’s regular retirement plan.

On February 2, 2005, Zaida Pulida, a MWSS employee in charge of C/A No. 244-850099-6, was reconciling
the records of MWSS and PNB, when she inquired about a debit entry dated April 22, 2004 to C/A No. 244-
850099-6 in the amount of PhP 5,200,000. PNB-MWSS Sales & Service Head Geraldine Veniegas verified
that PhP 5,200,000 was indeed debited and was encashed using Manager’s Check No. 1165848 in favor
of Atty. Rodrigo A. Reyes. Pulida notified Veniegas that MWSS did not apply for the issuance of the
manager’s check payable to Atty. Reyes. Upon verification with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, it was
discovered that there was no Rodrigo A. Reyes included in its membership roster. Further, upon inspection
of the PNB-MWSS microfilm copy of Manager’s Check No. 1165848, it was shown that the check was
negotiated and encashed at the PNB-Circle on April 26, 2004 and was annotated with “ok for payment per
confirmation and approval of PNB MWSS” by Tria on the dorsal portion of the check.

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PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion, sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft.
Following a preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on August 15, 2006
stating that Tria’s identification of the payee did not consummate the payment of the Manager’s Check.
Rather, it was held, the consummation of the payment occurred during PNB Circle Branch SSO George
Flandez’ approval of the encashment. A motion for reconsideration of PNB was denied. The DOJ
subsequently ruled against PNB’s petition for review and a motion for reconsideration thereafter dismissed
PNB’s petition for review.

PNB sought recourse before the CA which decided in favor of Tria. The CA ruled that probable cause
against Tria and Atty. Reyes was not established since the employees of PNB made the encashment after
their own independent verification of C/A No. 244-850099-6. Further, the CA deferred to the DOJ’s
determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court as it is an executive function and
ruled that the resolutions were not reversible as PNB was unable to show that these resolutions of the
DOJ were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. PNB thus questions the CA decision by the instant
appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the determination, by the DOJ, of probable cause,for the filing of an information in
court,can be reversed

HELD

Yes.

While discretionary authority to determine probable cause in a preliminary investigation to ascertain

sufficient ground for the filing of an information rests with the executive branch, such authority is far from
absolute. It may be subject to review when it has been clearly used with grave abuse of discretion. And
indeed, grave abuse of discretion attended the decision to drop the charges against Tria as there was
more than probable cause to proceed against him for qualified theft.

It must be emphasized at the outset that what is necessary for the filing of a criminal information is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused is guilty of the acts imputed on him, but only that
there is probable cause to believe that he is guilty of the crime charged.

The acts of Tria and the relevant circumstances that led to the encashment of the check provide more
than sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause to file an information against him and John
Doe/Atty. Reyes for qualified theft. In fact, it is easy to infer from the factual milieu of the instant case the
existence of all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the crime of qualified theft.

Petition is granted. CA decision is reversed and set aside. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is ordered to file an information charging Amelio Tria and Atty Reyes/John Doe for Qualified Theft.

13-RUBEN DEL CASTILLO vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012. 664 SCRA

FACTS

Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police officers headed
by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of September 13,
1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St., Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant
to petitioner.

In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly
del Castillo, the house of petitioner was searched, including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly
ran for cover. Police who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay
tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were
subjected to laboratory examination, the result of which proved positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section
16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of
the charge against him in the Information. Petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter

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affirmed the decision of the RTC. After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the
CA, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search warrant, considering that SPO1
Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal
sale of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same search warrant.
The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash
the search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did
not introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his
assertion or representation.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was probable cause to issue said search warrant

HELD

Yes.

A magistrate's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great
deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.

Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched.

A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists for the issuance of the
search warrant. The Supreme Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the
judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant.

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify.

14- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA and FERNANDO CALAGUAS
FERNANDEZ a.k.a. LANDO CALAGUAS
G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011

FACTS

About 3:00am, May 7, 2002, househelper AAA and driver Abad Sulpacio were sleeping in their
employer’s house located in Rosales, Pangasinan. Their employer, Conrado Estrella and his wife, were
out of the house at that time. At that time, AAA was jolted from sleep and observed about (6) persons
enter the house, who she identified later as accused Dick Tañedo, Marvin Lim, Bert Tañedo, a certain
Fred and appellants Alberto Anticamara alias “Al Camara,” and Fernando Fernandez alias “Lando
Calaguas.”

The group later took AAA and Abad to the fishpond owned by the Estrellas. Eventually, Sulpacio was
shot and buried in a secluded place. AAA was held captive and raped for (27) days.

On June 4, 2002, AAA managed to escape and report the incident to the police. Subsequently, Lando,
Al, Dick Tado (at large), Robert Tado (at large), Marvin Lim (at large), Necitas Ordeza-Tado and Fred
Doe (at large) are charged with the crimes of Murder and of kidnapping, in two separate informations

The Rosales Pangasinan RTC acquitted Necitas for insufficiency of evidence.Lando and Al, as principal
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 4498-R and of
the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not Al and Lando are guilty of murder, eventhough there was no direct eyewitness in the
killing of Sulpacio

HELD

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Yes.

The prosecution adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the
identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.Thus, although no one directly saw the actual killing of
Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from
the house of the Estrellas, tied and blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was
repeatedly shot and buried.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is
such to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken
together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of
Sulpacio.

The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:

1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were
sleeping inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several
persons entered to rob the place;

2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and
heard the latter uttering “somebody will die”;

3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad
Sulpacio who was blindfolded and with his hands tied;

4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim,
Roberto Tañedo, Alberto Anticamara and Fred;

5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy.
San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;

6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by
Lando, Fred, Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her
in the vehicle;

7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): “Make a decision
now. Abad has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this

Doctrine

A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

15-People of the Philippines v Maritess Alolod, Efren de Ocampo, Elmer De Ocampo, and Edwin De
Ocampo

G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA

FACTS

TheProvincialProsecutorofSultanKudaratchargedtheaccusedMaritessAlolod,EfrenDeocampo, Edwin
Deocampo, and Elmer Deocampo with double murder before the RTC.

Prosecution evidence showed that Sps Melanio and Lucena Alolod adopted accused Maritess. Maritess
had 2 children with her lover, Efren De Ocampo, who was never allowed to set foot on her parent’s
house since they loathed him.

In May 1988, couple MelanioandLucena Alolod,suddenlywentmissing.AnnalizaRelles, a grand niece of

the Sps Alolo,noticedtheabsenceoftheoldcouple.OnlyMaritessandhertwochildrenwerethere.
MaritesstoldAnnalizathatherparentshadleftforavacation.

GeneritaCaspillostayedattheAlolodresidencetokeepthemcompany because according to Maritess, her

father (Melanio) suffered a stroke and had to be brought to Cotabato for medical

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treatment.ByJunetheSps Alolod’sgrandchildrenwhowouldstay at their house for school, began arriving.
They observed the frequent presence of the Deocampo brothers in the house. They saw Efren wearing
Melanio’s wristwatch.

In August 1988,
Maritessandherchildren,togetherwiththeDeocampobrothers,lefttheAlolodhousetoliveatSitio Gila-
gila,BarangayKuya,SouthUpi,Maguindanao.WhentheAlolodspousesdidnotreturntotheir
home,theirrelativesstartedlookingforthem.Theyfoundoutthatthemissingcoupledidnotgotoeither
DavaoorCotabatoortotheirrelativesinIloilo.Theirclothesandotherpersonaleffectswerestillinthe
house.Suspectingthatsomethingwasamiss,thecouple’srelatives,FranciscoEstarisandJoelRelles,
searched the house for clues. Finally, on October 9, 1998,
Francisconoticedaportionofthelandplantedwithcamote.Franciscofoundtheplaceunlikelyfor camote
sinceitwasshadedfromthesun.Franciscodugupthesuspectedspot.Theretheyfoundthedecomposing
bodiesofMelanioandLucena.Basedonthepost-mortemreport,Melaniowasstrangledwithawire; Lucena
was stabbed.

On May 10, 2001, TheRTCfoundthefouraccusedguiltyofmurder.While the case was on appeal, Maritess

and Edwin withdrew their appeal. The CA affirmedthedecisionoftheRTC. Edwin later withdrew, leaving
Efren as the sole accused-appellant in this case..

ISSUE

Whether or not accused Efren was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on
circumstantial evidence

HELD

The rule of evidence that applies when no witness saw the commission of the crime provides:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt

In this case, the circumstantial evidence abound.

(1) Efren had always been banned from the old couple’s house because they strongly disapproved his
relationship with Maritess, their adopted daughter so he had no business being around that house;

(2) The old couple were enjoying good health before the evening of May 27, 1998, as recalled by
neighbor Magadalena Ato;

(3) On May 28 they were suddenly gone from the house, meaning that they were killed on the night of
May 27 or early morning of May 28;

(4) On the night of May 27, Demetrio Nebit, the security guard at nearby Salaman Institute saw Efren
and Edwin standing on the school side of the fence next to the old couple’s house. They even tried to
conceal themselves in the school toilet. The next day, the guard discovered that the fence wire had
been cut;

(5) At about 2:00 a.m. of May 28, Victor Ato, a neighbor and husband of Magdalena Ato, heard the
sound ofa woman sobbing and what seemed like the butchering ofa pig. At the break of dawn, Victor
saw Efren in the Alolod kitchen;

(6) From then on Efren and his brothers frequented the old couple’s house, with Efren wearing the old
man’s watch;

(7) Maritess definitely lied about her adoptive parents going to Cotabato City and subsequently to
Davao City for medical treatment when people started looking for them. They were of course buried in
the garden;

(8) A witness heard Efren instructing Maritess to plant more camote on a pile of red soil beside the
house; and

(10) The bodies of the old couple were found underneath those plants.

The decision of the CA is affimed.

DOCTRINE:

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The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably leads to one fair conclusion: the
accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others.

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