No. L-65848.

 May 24, 1985.*

HERNANDO C. LAYNO, SR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, and THE HONORABLE TANOD BAYAN, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Sandiganbayan; Public Officers; Anti-Graft Act; Election

Law; Preventive suspension for an unreasonable length of time of an elective town mayor by the
Sandiganbayan constitutes an unconstitutional application of the Anti-Graft Act.—Petitioner is a duly
elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986.
Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandigan-

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* EN BANC.

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537

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

bayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the
full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor, He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in
the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice.
For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively
or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if
there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a
due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold
office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he
the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of
the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice
Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason
and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Indefinite preventive suspension of a public official violates the

“equal protection clause” and shortens his term of office.—There is likewise an equal protection
question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government
Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable
for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: “In all
cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.” It
may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national
government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary.
According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: “To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer
appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be
the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution and the Civil Service law.” Further: “In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of
office could be shortened and he could in effect, be re-

538

538

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

moved without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the
Constitution.” Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a
suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a
charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so
would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.

PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Cecilio L. Pe for petitioner.

     The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,1 suspending
from office any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
such statute, is assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on the ground that it is violative
of the constitutional presumption of innocence.2 Petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr., is the duly
elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. He was accused in an information filed by
respondent Tanodbayan “of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his
official and/or administrative duties” for “knowing fully well that he has no

_______________

1 Republic Act No. 3019 (1060). Its Section 13 reads as follows: “Suspension and loss of benefits.—
Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.”

2 According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, * * *.”

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539

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

authority, he suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan
members3 from participating and exercising their official functions” as such thus causing them injury
“consisting of the salaries due to said officials not [being] received by them.”4

The information against petitioner was filed by respondent Tanodbayan with respondent
Sandiganbayan on May 17, 1983.5He was charged with violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 3019 as amended.6 Petitioner was then arraigned on October 3, 1983, and he pleaded not
guilty.7 There was earlier submitted as far back as August, 1983 with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Suspend Accused Pendente Lite.8Notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to such motion,
respondent Sandiganbayan suspended him on October 26, 1983.9 Accordingly, on October 3, 4 and
5, 1983, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings and received evidence of the
prosecution.10 It was further alleged that respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Divison) set the case
for further hearings on January 11, 12, and 13, 1984.11

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3 The three Sangguniang Bayan members are Atty. Paquito Arjona, Sr., Bienvenido Tamayo, and
Federico S. Moreno.

4 Petition, par. 4.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 reads as follows; “Corrupt practices of public officers.—
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporation charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”

7 Ibid, par. 5.

8 Ibid, par. 6.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid, par. 7.

11 Ibid.

540

540

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

In the resolution issued by this Court on January 5, 1984, respondents were required to file an
answer within ten days from notice. That was done. There was on the whole admission that the facts
were as alleged. Respondents denied, however, that the law is as set forth in the petition. More
specifically, it was asserted that the order of the Sandiganbayan “suspending petitioner pendente
lite does not violate the latter’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent.”12 Such a presumption
“is a guaranty that no person shall be convicted of a crime except upon his guilt [being] established
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”13Accordingly, such suspension “does not impair petitioner’s
foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a penalty or a criminal punishment, because it
was not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction or as a result of judicial
proceeding.”14Further: “The suspension is merely a precautionary or preventive measure issued
even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the fair and just trial of the case.”15
The plea for restraining order was not granted by this Court. Thereafter the memoranda by both
parties were submitted. Before a decision could be rendered on the merits, there was an urgent
motion to lift the order of suspension filed on February 13, 1985 stressing the need for a resolution
of such question. This Court, after dealing on such motion as well as on the merits of the case, is of
the view that this petition need not be resolved by a ruling on the validity of the provision on
mandatory suspension. It suffices at this stage that this Court rules that there is an unconstitutional
application of the assailed provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

1.A succinct statement of the doctrine on unconstitutional application was set forth in Pintacasi v.
Court of Agrarian Relations16 in these words: “A law may be valid and yet susceptible to the charge
of its being unconstitu-

_______________

12 Answer, Special and Affirmative Defenses, par. 7.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 L-23704, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 20.

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VOL. 136, MAY 24, 1985

541
Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan

tionally applied.”17 This is one such case.2.Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he
would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was
elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of
the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability
must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for
an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such
a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on
the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as
mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outran the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.

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17 Ibid, 23. Cf. Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu, 20 Phil. 111 (1911); United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil.
245 (1915); Bestida v. City Council of Baguio, 53 Phil. 553 (1929); People v. Cruz, 54 Phil.
24 (1929); Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948); Manila Race Horse Trainers v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil.
60(1951); Manila Lighter Trans, v. Mun. Board, 98 Phil. 872 (1956); American Bible Society v. City of
Manila, 101 Phil. 286(1957); Ah Nam v. City of Manila, L-15502, 109 Phil. 808 (1960); Pampanga Bus
Co. v. Mun. of Tarlac, L-15759, Dec. 30, 1961, 3 SCRA 816; People v. Soria, L-18982, Jan. 31, 1963, 7
SCRA 242; De Leon v. Mun. of Calumpit, Bulacan, L-26906 & L-26907, Nov. 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 531.

542

542

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganhayan

3.Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner. Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive
suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the
duration thereof: “In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the
start of said suspension.”18 It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies
equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon, Executive
Secretary.19 According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: “To adopt the theory of respondents that an
officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended
indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be
the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution and the Civil Service law.”20 Further: “In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term
of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.”21 Clearly then, the policy of the law
mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case,
the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection
guarantee.4.Hence the conclusion reached by the Court as to the un-

_______________

18 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, Section 63 (2), last sentence. The first sentence reads as follows:
“Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the
continuance in office of the respondent influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.”

19 116 Phil. 348 (1962).

20 Ibid, 351-352.

21 Ibid, 352.
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543

Layno, Sr. vs. Sandiganhayan

constitutional application of the mandatory suspension as applied to petitioner in accordance with

the circumstances of thiscase.

WHEREFORE, this certiorari petition is granted and the preventive suspension imposed on petitioner
Hernando C, Layno, Sr. is set aside, thus enabling him to assume once again the functions of
municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, without prejudice to the continuance of the trial of the
pending case against him in the Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

     Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la

Fuente and Alampay, JJ.,concur.

     Cuevas, J., did not take part.

     Concepcion, Jr. and Plana, JJ.,are on leave.

Petition granted.

Notes.—The Constitution itself allows suspension for cause as provided by law and the law provides
that an employee may be suspended pending an investigation, or by way of penalty (Sections 694
and 695, Revised Administrative Code). (Austria vs. Auditor General, 19 SCRA 79.)
Under the Constitution, the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over “x x x offenses committed by
public officers x x x in relation to their office as maybe determined by law.” (De Jesus vs. People, 120
SCRA 760.)

——o0o——

544

544

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sea-Land Service, Inc. vs. NLRC

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