Daf Ditty Shabbes 146: Marit Ayin

1805 Livorno FIRST EDITION CHIDA Marit Ha'Ayin

R. Hayyim Yoseph David Azulai

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MISHNA: One may place a cooked dish into an empty pit on Shabbat so that it will be
protected from the heat, and similarly, one may place good potable water into a vessel and
place the vessel into bad, non-potable water so that the potable water will cool off. And one
may also place cold water out in the sun so that it will be heated. They also taught: Someone
whose garments fell into water while walking on the road may replace them and continue to
walk wearing them and need not be concerned about violating the prohibitions against
wringing or laundering. When he reaches the outer courtyard of a place where he can leave his
clothes, he spreads them in the sun to dry, but not opposite the masses, as they will suspect
him of laundering on Shabbat.

GEMARA: The Gemara is puzzled by the halakha that was taught about placing food in a pit: It
is obvious that it is permitted. The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Let us issue a decree

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prohibiting this due to concern lest one perform the prohibited labor of leveling holes in the pit
when he places the pot in it, it teaches us that no decree was issued due to this concern.

We also learned in the mishna: One may place good water into bad water on Shabbat in order
to cool it off. The Gemara says: It is obvious that it is permitted. The Gemara explains: It is
necessary to mention the latter clause of the mishna, which states that it is permitted to place
cold water out in the sun. The Gemara expresses surprise: This, too, is obvious. The Gemara
answers: Lest you say that we should issue a decree prohibiting this action, because perhaps
one will come to insulate it in hot ashes to warm it up, which also heats the water without
actually placing it on the fire, it teaches us that we do issue a decree in that case.

We learned in the mishna that one whose garments fell into water need not be concerned about
wringing or laundering the clothing and may replace them and continue walking, and then place
them to dry in the sun, but not before the masses. This is so that they will not suspect him of
laundering on Shabbat. In this regard, the Gemara cites that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav
said: Wherever the Sages prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even in
the innermost chambers where no one will see it, it is prohibited, as the Sages did not
distinguish between different circumstances. The Gemara says: We learned in the mishna that
one may spread them in the sun but not opposite the masses, which contradicts that principle.
The Gemara explains: It is a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: One may
spread them out in the sun but not opposite the masses. Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon
prohibit doing so, which is a precedent for the opinion that Rav Yehuda stated in the name of
Rav.

One whose clothes fell into water on the road may walk in them without concern. When he
reaches the outer courtyard, he may spread them out in the sun, but not in sight of the
people.

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If a person’s clothes become wet while walking on the road on Shabbat, she may not just squeeze
the water out of them because squeezing water out of something is prohibited on Shabbat. The
Mishnah teaches that she may continue to wear the clothes and if by walking or sitting she causes
the water to be squeezed out then it is a by-product of normal activity and it is not forbidden.

Others explain that the Mishnah teaches that she need not be concerned lest others think she
laundered her clothes on Shabbat. However, once she reaches the outer courtyard of the city,
meaning the first courtyard she finds, she should take off her wet clothes (obviously not if this will
leave her naked in public) and she may spread them out so that they may dry. She shouldn’t spread
them out so that others see what she is doing lest others think that she did her laundry on Shabbat.

Bartenura

Rambam commentary to Mishnah

Soo that people should not suspect her…

Yachin on Mishnah Shabbat 22:35

We do not worry about maris ayin: because of Kavod Ha’briyos …

The Mishnah presents activities that are permitted to maintain or enhance a food. Additionally,
the Mishnah discusses what a person may do if their clothing became wet on Shabbos.

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The Gemara clarifies the novelty of the first two rulings of the Mishnah.

Maris Ayin R’ Yehudah in the name of Rav declares: Whenever an activity is prohibited
because of maris ayin it is prohibited even if done in private.

The Gemara questions this principle from the Mishnah that indicates otherwise. R’ Yehudah in
the name of Rav is forced to admit that the issue is a dispute between Tanna’im.1

The term Maris Ayin, literally meaning "viewed by the eye", refers to any situation where an
activity is performed in a manner that is likely to arouse suspicions in an objective (if unlearned)
observer that a transgression is taking place.

Why hanging clothes to dry is Maris Ayin If one was permitted to hang clothes to dry on Shabbos,
an onlooker might conclude that they were laundered on Shabbos itself.

He might be led to believe that laundering is permissible on Shabbos. For this reason, the Sages
forbade hanging wet clothes on Shabbos.

It important to understand that wherever the principle of Maris Ayin is applicable, it is prohibited
even in the privacy of a concealed room (because it is difficult to always be certain that such
activities will not somehow be noticed by others).

In other words, whenever something is prohibited in public because of its Maris Ayin appearance,
that activity is prohibited even in private. Therefore, it is just as prohibited to hang wet clothes to
dry in a laundry room as it is to do so outdoors.2

Tiferes Yisroel

The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav: Any action that is prohibited in public
because it creates the appearance of wrongdoing is also prohibited in private. That is because the
Sages do not make distinctions in their decrees, because if the decree is in effect only when the
reason applies, it will not be observed.

Nevertheless, there are authorities who are lenient in cases in which the decree was issued to
prevent violation of rabbinic law. These authorities’ reason that in those cases, the Sages did not
prohibit actions performed in private in their decree.

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Daf Digest
2
The 39 Melachos, by Rabbi Dovid Ribiat, pages 717-720

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We see this conflict in the Gemara Beitza 9a, where there is a disagreement as to whether the concept
of marit ayin applies in private. Beit Shamai believes that marit ayin applies even in private, whereas Beit
Hillel believes that marit ayin does not apply in private.

MISHNA: Beit Shammai say: One may not carry a ladder, which was used for reaching
doves, from one dovecote to another. However, one may move it slightly so that he tilts it
from one window to another in the same dovecote. And Beit Hillel permit even carrying a
ladder from one dovecote to another.

GEMARA: Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said: This dispute applies only in a case where one moves
the ladder in the public domain, as Beit Shammai hold that one who sees someone carrying
his ladder will say to himself: He must need the ladder to plaster his roof, to prevent rainwater
from dripping into his house. In other words, an onlooker will suspect him of performing
prohibited labor on the Festival. And Beit Hillel hold that his dovecote proves about him that
he is not moving the ladder for the purpose of a transgression, as it is evident that he is placing
the ladder alongside the second dovecote, and everyone will understand his intention. However,
in the private domain, where one will not be observed by strangers, everyone agrees that it is
permitted.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav said: Wherever the Sages
prohibited an action due to the appearance of prohibition, even if one performs the act in his
innermost chamber, where no one will see it, it is prohibited. The Gemara answers: This is a
dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One whose clothes fell into water on
Shabbat or a Festival may spread them out to dry in the sun, but he may not do so opposite

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the masses, i.e., in a place where people can see him, lest they suspect him of laundering on
Shabbat. However, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon prohibit doing so even in private.3

The Appearance of Impropriety

Commenting on the Isa. Verse (33:15):

;‫ ְוֹדֵבר ֵמיָשׁ ִרים‬,‫טו ֹהֵל] ְצָדקוֹת‬ 15 He that walketh righteously, and speaketh uprightly; he that
‫ ֹנֵﬠר ַכָּפּיו‬,‫ֹמֵאס ְבֶּבַצע ַמֲﬠַשׁקּוֹת‬ despiseth the gain of oppressions, that shaketh his hands from
‫ ֹאֵטם ָאְזנוֹ ִמְשֹּׁמַﬠ‬,‫ִמְתֹּמ] ַבֹּשַּׁחד‬ holding of bribes, that stoppeth his ears from hearing of blood,
.‫ ְוֹעֵצם ֵﬠיָניו ֵמ ְראוֹת ְבָּרע‬,‫ָדִּמים‬ and shutteth his eyes from looking upon evil;
The Talmud (Makkot 24a) parses the Isaiah verse as applying to three situations:

“He who despises the gain of oppressions”; this is referring to one such as Rabbi Yishmael
ben Elisha, who refused to sit in judgment in a case involving one who gave him priestly gifts,
to avoid the appearance of impropriety.

“Who shakes his hands from holding of bribes”; this is referring to one such as Rabbi
Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, who, as explained above, refused to sit in judgment in a case
involving his sharecropper.

Rashi to I Sam 2:24

‫ֲאֶשׁר‬-‫ ֵאת ָכּל‬,‫ ָזֵקן ְמֹאד; ְוָשַׁמע‬,‫כב ְוֵﬠִלי‬ 22 Now Eli was very old; and he heard all that his sons
‫ ִיְשְׁכּבוּן‬-‫ ְוֵאת ֲאֶשׁר‬,‫ ִיְשָׂרֵאל‬-‫ַיֲﬠשׂוּן ָבָּניו ְלָכל‬ did unto all Israel, and how that they lay with the
.‫ ַהֹצְּבאוֹת ֶפַּתח ֹאֶהל מוֵֹﬠד‬,‫ַהָנִּשׁים‬-‫ֶאת‬ women that did service at the door of the tent of
meeting.

‫ ָלָמּה ַתֲﬠשׂוּן ַכְּדָּב ִרים‬,‫כג ַויּ ֹאֶמר ָלֶהם‬ 23 And he said unto them: 'Why do ye such things? for
,‫ִדְּבֵריֶכם ָרִﬠים‬-‫ ֲאֶשׁר ָא ֹנִכי ֹשֵׁמַﬠ ֶאת‬,‫ָהֵאֶלּה‬ I hear evil reports concerning you from all this people.
.‫ָהָﬠם ֵאֶלּה‬-‫ֵמֵאת ָכּל‬

‫טוָֹבה ַהְשֻּׁמָﬠה ֲאֶשׁר‬-‫ ִכּי לוֹא‬:‫ ָבָּני‬,‫כד ַאל‬ 24 Nay, my sons; for it is no good report which I hear
.‫ ְיהָוה‬-‫ ַמֲﬠִב ִרים ַﬠם‬,‫ָא ֹנִכי ֹשֵׁמַﬠ‬ the LORD'S people do spread abroad.

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Another example : fish blood, for example, according to the Torah law, the blood of an animal is forbidden to eat, but the blood
of a fish is permissible. However, according to the principle of marit ayin, it is forbidden to eat the blood of fish as an onlooker
may believe the blood being eaten is from an animal, and may thus believe that animal blood is allowed to be eaten

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Worried about his son’s reputation, Rashi adds:

That I hear being passed on by Hashem's people. The rumor which ‫'השם‬s people are spreading
about you, an expression similar to:

‫ ַוַיֲּﬠִבירוּ קוֹל‬,‫ו ַו ְיַצו ֹמֶשׁה‬ 6 And Moses gave commandment, and they caused it to be
-‫ ִאישׁ ְוִאָשּׁה ַאל‬,‫ַבַּמֲּחֶנה ֵלאֹמר‬ proclaimed throughout the camp, saying: 'Let neither man nor
‫ ִלְתרוַּמת‬,‫עוֹד ְמָלאָכה‬-‫ַיֲﬠשׂוּ‬ woman make any more work for the offering of the sanctuary.'
.‫ ֵמָהִביא‬,‫ַהֹקֶּדשׁ; ַו ִיָּכֵּלא ָהָﬠם‬ So, the people were restrained from bringing.

"and they proclaimed [‫ ]ַוַיֲﬠִבירוּ‬throughout the camp; meaning, they let out a rumor about you
which is not good. Although it was only a rumor, kohanim are held accountable even for an
appearance of impropriety.

Priestly behavior and the appearance of impropriety comes under scrutiny when receiving gifts
in Temurah 8b:

Mar Zutra said to them: But do you not hold like that which we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot
26b): Until when is an Israelite obligated to tend to a firstborn animal before giving it to the
priest? In the case of a small animal, a sheep or goat, thirty days, and in the case of a large
animal, one of a herd of cattle, fifty days. And if the priest said to the owner:

Give it to me within its period, the owner may not give it to him. And Rav Sheshet says: What
is the reason for this? Because it looks like a priest who assists at the threshing floor, as the
priest is assisting the Israelite by assuming the responsibility of tending to the firstborn.

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They said to Mar Zutra: There the circumstances of the matter prove that the priest accepted
responsibility to care for the animal in return for some benefit, and it has the appearance of
impropriety. Here, we purchased it for its fair market value, and there is no appearance of
impropriety.

According to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe, (Orach Chayim 1:96), marit ayin applies
only when "Someone thinks that I violated something, or he thinks that I inappropriately ate
something non-kosher. However, it does not include doing something permitted that people may
mistakenly think is forbidden due to the fact that they do not know the Jewish law."

Therefore, a permitted act which an onlooker might come to believe is a forbidden act being
performed, is a case of marit ayin and thus not allowed. However, an act which is allowed, which
an onlooker might believe is forbidden, is not a case of marit ayin.

He also claimed (Orach Chayim 243), According to the Shulchan Aruch, if something which was
prohibited in the times of the Talmud because of marit ayin is no longer a concern due to modern
day circumstances, the prohibition is cancelled.

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Even for a bath house or an oven: if he rents it out year after year and this matter is publicized
that the workers are not getting wages, rather they are rented, or similarly if the custom of the
place is that most people rent or stipulate that the profits go according to percentages, then it’s
permissible to rent it out to a non-Jew or to have profits go according to percentages. RAMA:
Even in a place where it is forbidden, if the Jew is hired to work the bath house or oven by a
Kootie, then he rents it out to a Kootie, it is permissible, since the property isn’t recognized to be
owned by the Jew. Similarly, if there is a bath house in living quarters and only those that live
there use the bath house, and they know that they hired a Kootie, then it is permissible. If one
transgressed and rented it out in a situation that is forbidden, some authorities say the rent money
is permissible, others say forbidden.

For example, in the times of the Talmud having soymilk, or non-dairy creamer, during the same
meal as meat would have been prohibited because it was likely to think that the person was in
violation of the laws of kosher. However, since it is well known today that people use non-dairy
creamer, there is no issue of marit ayin, and the prohibition is cancelled.

In his Igros Moshe (OC II:40)) defines maris ayin (literally, “appearance to the eye”) as the
prohibition against giving the impression that one is doing something wrong when it may influence
others to sin as well.

Chashad (literally, “suspicion”) is the prohibition of causing others to suspect one of wrongdoing,
even when it will not cause others to sin.

Although maris ayin is the more serious violation, the mere appearance of impropriety is also
forbidden.

This is derived from the verse:

‫ ְוַאַחר‬,‫כב ְו ִנְכְבָּשׁה ָהָאֶרץ ִלְפֵני ְיהָוה‬ 22 and the land be subdued before the LORD, and ye return
;‫ וִּמ ִיְּשָׂרֵאל‬,‫ ִוְה ִייֶתם ְנִק ִיּם ֵמ ְיהָוה‬--‫ָתֻּשׁבוּ‬ afterward; then ye shall be clear before the LORD, and
‫ִלְפֵני‬--‫ ַלֲאֻחָזּה‬,‫ְוָה ְיָתה ָהָאֶרץ ַהזּ ֹאת ָלֶכם‬ before Israel, and this land shall be unto you for a
.‫ְיהָוה‬ possession before the LORD.

Num 32:22
“And you shall be clean before Hashem and before Yisroel.”

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The tribes of Gad and Reuven wanted to remain on the east bank of the Jordan and not join the
other tribes in conquering the Land of Israel. Moshe encouraged them to be clean (to act
appropriately) “before G-d and before Yisroel.” “Before Yisroel” indicates that a person must be
concerned about human perception.

Tanchuma Num 32:22

Just as a man must be morally pure in the sight of heaven, so must he be above suspicion among
his fellowmen, as it is said: Then ye shall be clean before the Lord, and before Israel (Num. 3:22).

MISHNA: In the case of a city in which there is active idol worship, it is permitted to engage
in business transactions with gentiles who live outside of the city. If the idol worship is outside
the city, it is permitted to engage in business within the city.

What is the halakha with regard to traveling there, a place where a pagan festival is being
celebrated?

When the road is designated only for that place, it is prohibited to use the road, as onlookers
will assume that the traveler intends to join the festival.

But if one were able to travel on it to arrive at another place, it is permitted to use the road to
reach the place that is observing the festival.

The Mishnah (Avodah Zara 11b) states that one is not permitted to follow a path that is designated
as an entrance to a temple of idolatry.

RASHI

Rashi writes that this is because of chashad. Igros Moshe explains that maris ayin does not apply
in this case, because there is no concern that a Jew will be easily influenced to worship idolatry.

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Yet, it is still forbidden to take the path towards the idol because of chashad—arousing suspicion
about one’s own behavior.

The Mishna writes this in the context of the extent to which the treasurer of the Beit Ha-
mikdash must go to ensure that no one suspects that he is stealing funds.

The Mishna assumes that people will always suspect Moshe of pilfering the property of the
Temple: if he becomes rich, they will assume he stole; if he becomes poor, they will assume he
stole and was being punished by God for having stolen.

No matter his financial situation, people will look for reasons to accuse him of dishonesty. The
solution, according to the Mishna, is for him to avoid wearing anything in which he could hide
money:

The high school students who innocently took a selfie after Shabbat with Conan O’Brien had no
idea how that picture would be understood. When Conan wrote that he needed to take the picture
on his phone as the students did not have theirs due to Shabbat, they did not realize that would be
interpreted to mean that they had taken the picture on Shabbat itself.

This is especially poignant when so many politicians and celebrities have destroyed their careers
and reputations because of a single post on Facebook or Twitter. In many of those cases the people
were actually guilty of the indiscretion, but this phenomenon still highlights the power of social
media to destroy one’s public image. There are as many cases of people whose reputations were
destroyed due to a mistake over those same media. We will return to the relevant prohibitions
involved in using these media to destroy the lives of others, but in this essay, we will limit ourselves
to our obligations to protect our own images, even when we have done nothing that deserves
suspicion.4

4
Rav Jonathan Ziring: https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-09-marit-ayin-chashad-and-social-media#_ftn1

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In three baskets each of [the capacity of] three seahs they make the appropriation [of shekels]
from the chamber. And on them was inscribed: Aleph, Beth, Gimmel. Rabbi Ishmael says: Greek
was inscribed on them, alpha, beta, gamla. The one who made the appropriation did not enter the
chamber wearing either a bordered cloak or shoes or sandals or tefillin or an amulet, lest if he
became poor people might say that he became poor because of a sin committed in the chamber, or
if he became rich people might say that he became rich from the appropriation in the chamber.
For it is one’s duty to seem be free of blame before others as before God, as it is said: “And you
shall be guiltless before the Lord and before Israel” (Numbers 32:22), and it says:

‫ִהים‬x‫ ְבֵּﬠיֵני ֱא‬--‫טוֹב‬-‫ֵחן ְוֵשֶׂכל‬-‫ד וְּמָצא‬ 4 So shalt thou find grace and good favour in the sight of
.‫ְוָאָדם‬ God and man.

“And you will find favor and good understanding in the eyes of God and man” (Proverbs 3:4)5.

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The Yerushalmi (Shekalim 3:2) offers several other sources for this obligation, from Torah, Nevi’im and Ketuvim.

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The Chasam Sofer (Responsa Chasam Sofer, Volume 6, Likutim, #59) bemoans the difficulty
of this expectation:

[K]now that my whole life I have been troubled by the verse, "And you shall be clean before God
and Israel," and these two obligations we have: to be clean before God and clean before Israel
His nation. These are two paired riders on our backs.

However, it is much easier to fulfill the first obligation, meaning, in the eyes of God, then it is the
second, to fulfill one’s obligation to people. For they think strange thoughts and the weavers speak
of it by moonlight. Its punishment is quite severe, to no end, more than one who does not fulfill his
obligation to heaven, God forbid. This emerges from the Talmud at the end of Chapter Yom Ha-
kippurim (Yoma, Chapter 8) regarding desecrating God’s name, which has no atonement, such as
when a rabbi purchases meat but does not pay right away.

In our great iniquity, people commonly talk about how this studious person did such and such. It
is fluent in their mouths, even if it is just a suspicion. And in this case, even if the studious person
acted properly in the eyes of God as much as possible, but not carefully enough, such that some
drunkards made a mistake about him and wrote mocking songs about him, he has been caught in
their trap. Over this, all sufferers shall grieve, and the verse screams out:

-‫ ָבּאנוּ‬:‫ ְלר ֹאֵשׁנוּ‬,‫יב ִה ְרַכְּבָתּ ֱאנוֹשׁ‬ 12 Thou hast caused men to ride over our heads; we went
.‫ ָל ְרָוָיה‬,‫ָבֵאשׁ וַּבַמּ ִים; ַותּוִֹציֵאנוּ‬ through fire and through water; but Thou didst bring us out
unto abundance.
Psalm 66:12

And I have wondered many times if it is even possible that a person in the history of the world has
fully fulfilled this verse. Perhaps this idea is included in what King Shelomo said:

-‫ֲאֶשׁר ַיֲﬠֶשׂה‬--‫ ֵאין ַצִדּיק ָבָּאֶרץ‬,‫כ ִכּי ָאָדם‬ 20 For there is not a righteous man upon earth, that doeth
.‫ ְול ֹא ֶיֱחָטא‬,‫טּוֹב‬ good, and sinneth not.
Eccl 7:20

which means to say that even if his deeds were all good [in the eyes of God], it is impossible to not
sin in the second way, fulfilling the obligation [in the eyes of] people.

If the Chasam Sofer wrote this in his time, how much truer it is in the age of social media. All that
needs to happen is for someone to snap a picture that might be perceived as compromising, post it
to Facebook or Instagram, Tweet it, send it to a few friends, and countless strangers will doubt the
integrity of an innocent person.

If Halakha demands that we avoid being suspect even in such cases, how could anyone claim to
have fulfilled his obligation to keep his reputation clean in the eyes of humanity!

Marit Ayin vs Chashad

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Based on the ethos of this value, the Talmud in many places presents a rabbinic prohibition of marit
ayin, avoiding circumstances in which someone seems to violate a prohibition, even if in fact that
individual is doing no such thing.

Encyclopedia Talmudit (“Chashad”) notes that the cases in the Talmud seem to indicate that it
is prohibited to cause people to think that one is currently violating a sin, that one has violated a
sin in the past, or that one is going to violate a sin in the future.

OUR DAF Rav (Shabbat 146b) is cited as saying that these prohibitions are forbidden even in
private. However, in the Yerushalmi (Kilayim 9:1), this seems to be presented as a dispute. While
this Yerushalmi is cited by some Rishonim, the majority position, as recording in Shulchan
Arukh (OC 301:45) is in accordance with Rav. This, however, may be limited to marit ayin of
biblical, not rabbinic prohibitions.

One may wear clothes that got drenched with water without fear that one might
wring them. He should not spread them out to dry because of Maris ayin, lest people
say that they were laundered on Shabbos.

This is prohibited even within inner chambers where not visible to others. The Sages
only forbade spreading them out on Shabbos, but if one spread out laundered clothes
before Shabbos, one need not take them in on Shabbos.

Why would prohibitions done in private be prohibited out of concern for what people might
say? There is no one there to misinterpret it! Encyclopedia Talmudit summarizes the three
possibilities that emerge:

1. We are concerned that someone may indeed see these actions even in private.
2. We are concerned that if someone gets used to doing something in private, that person may
do so in public where someone will see him.
3. We apply the principle of lo pelug: once something is prohibited rabbinically, we forbid it
across the board.

Some Poskim, such as the Peri Chadash, argue that only those things which Chazal explicitly
prohibited because of marit ayin are prohibited. Anything else is permitted. Others, however,
argue that this is not the case.

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However, the Peri To’ar notes that even if we are lenient following the Peri Chadash, as the
Torah clearly cares about presenting ourselves in a way that does not cause others to believe we
are sinners, it is worth being stringent unless there is a compelling reason to be lenient.[9]

Chashad

Responsa Chesed Le-Avraham 1:21 cites Chavot Da’at, suggesting that chashad applies even
when the actions can be interpreted equally as permitted or forbidden. The formal prohibitions
of marit ayin is only introduced for things that seem more likely to be prohibited.

Chashad has positive obligations attached to it. For example, Shabbat 23a obligates one who has
two entrances to his courtyard to light Chanuka candles at both entrances, so no one will suspect
him of being derelict in his mitzva.

Rav Huna said: A courtyard that has two entrances requires two lamps, one lamp at each
entrance, so that it will be obvious that the residents of this courtyard light properly. And Rava
said: We only said this in a case where the two entrances face two different directions.
However, if they both face in the same direction one need not light at more than one entrance.
The Gemara clarifies Rava’s statement:

What is the reason for this? If you say that it is because those who see the entrance without a
lamp burning will harbor suspicion lest he does not kindle the Hanukkah light, whose suspicion
concerns us?

If you say that the concern is with regard to the suspicion of people who do not live in the city
and are unfamiliar with the courtyard’s tenants, even when both entrances face the same
direction let them be required to light at both entrances because visitors are unaware that there
are two entrances to that courtyard.

And if the concern is with regard to the suspicion of the residents of that city, even when the
two entrances face two different directions let them not be required to light at both entrances.
The local residents know that only one person lives in the courtyard and will assume that if he
did not light at one entrance he surely lit at the other.

The Gemara answers: Actually, say that it is because of the suspicion of the residents of that
city, and sometimes they pass this entrance and do not pass that one, and they say: Just as he
did not light in this entrance, in that second entrance he also did not light. In order to avoid
suspicion, it is preferable to light at both entrances.

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In a separate piece (Iggerot Moshe, OC 1:96), Rav Feinstein suggests that there are limits to this.

In cases in which one is doing something that doesn’t even look prohibited, but someone else
might think that it is prohibited due to a mistake, one does not have to be concerned. Thus, he feels
it is permitted for a man to drive to shul after lighting candles but before Shabbat has started, even
though women might think that it was prohibited as women generally do not perform melacha at
this point.

However, in highlighting the sensitivity the Torah has for maintaining one’s reputation, Rav
Feinstein committed not to do this after someone criticized him for it.

When things become accepted, evolution of Halachah

The Mishna (Kilayim 9:2) prohibits wearing wool garments that are mixed with silk. This is
because wearing sha’atnez, a mixture of wool and linen is biblically forbidden, and many people
cannot distinguish silk from linen.

Silk and floss-silk do not come under the prohibition of kilayim but are prohibited on account of
appearance. Mattresses and pillows do not come under the prohibition of kilayim, as long as his
flesh does not come into [immediate] contact with them. There is no [permissibility for the]
temporary [wearing] of kilayim. Neither may one wear kilayim even on top of ten [garments],
even for the purpose of evading taxes.

The Rema (YD 298:2),

however, writes that it is permitted nowadays, as silk is common, and people are aware that what
seems to be linen is probably silk and permitted.

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Bach (ibid.) and Shakh (ibid. 2) note that this is even true when the average person cannot
distinguish based on looking at the material; it is sufficient that silk is common and that there is a
ready explanation as to why the person is not violating sha’atnez.

Rav Asher Weiss states that the simple understanding of this is that we even waive those
prohibitions of marit ayin instituted by Chazal when the situation becomes such that there is no
longer any concern. While he notes that some disagree, this is the accepted position.

In the age of social media

Rav Ziring concludes: “What are the implications in the age of social media? Without getting into
all the details, the position of the Peri To’ar is particularly relevant. Even if one could make an
argument for why any specific act might be permitted, the thrust of the Halakha is that one should
try, even when not formally obligated, to avoid situations that may be interpreted as questionable.”

For some, the reason Chazal forbid actions even in private due to marit ayin is that there may
actually be someone watching. While this concern may have once been farfetched, it no longer is.
One may see no camera, but so many scandals have happened because someone was there to catch
a picture on his or her phone. That incriminating photo, whether it captures a real crime or not, can
and often will be spread across the world. One may never be able to delete it or erase it from the
internet or from people’s memory.

This is the reality of our world: being concerned about marit ayin in chadrei chadarim (chambers
within chambers, i.e. innermost rooms) is not just the halakha, but it is good advice.

The same goes for what we say, which can and often is taken out of context by people too lazy to
read everything we have said or written, or by those who are intentionally trying to “catch us” in
indiscretion. Similarly, knowing that whatever we write does not have our tone of voice
accompanying it, we must be careful about what we write, so that it will never be understood in

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an offensive manner, when that is not what was intended. We all know of how many fights,
personal or political, have been caused by misunderstood Tweets or Facebook posts.

As mentioned, this is important because we need to maintain our image as the good people that
we strive to be. More than that, however, as we have seen, some commentaries think these laws
are meant to protect others from violating sins as well. When people think we are violating sins,
they are more likely to mimic those sins, or similar ones.

Maharil Diskin and others believe that the obligation to judge people favorably stems from a
desire to ensure that society holds itself to high standards.

As people often strive to be as good, or only slightly better, than the person next door, the
perception that people are sinning weakens the communal resolve to be good. The categories
of marit ayin and chashad obligate us to avoid as much as possible damaging the communal self-
perception of righteousness. If we are not careful, and our images are used to make people think
that certain sins are commonplace, we have contributed to the collective lowering of expectations.

Many Poskim, however, have noted that we are more lenient in cases of compelling need. There
is admittedly a limit to what we can do to avoid becoming suspect. Try as we may, we can never
fully avoid the possibility that what we do may be misconstrued. While it is critical that we do our
best, we cannot cause ourselves psychological stress trying to ensure that no one, anywhere, will
be able to understand our innocuous words and actions in a negative light.

The fact that Poskim are willing to use this type of argument in cases where the potential for
misunderstanding is great lends credence to the intuition that there must be a limit to when we are
required to be concerned about the potential perception of our actions by others.

Similarly, once a plausible counter-explanation, not based on the assumption that we are sinning,
exists, many Poskim are willing to be lenient. As we saw, Rav Feinstein is willing to be lenient
and to allow married women to wear wigs, even though he knows that many married women do
not cover their hair, and thus there is a real concern that people would suspect the women in
question is not covering her hair.

A similar argument can be made for many things in life. We are all aware of countless cases in
which people’s lives have been destroyed by a misunderstood post on social media. We can expect
a certain level of understanding by others of this reality. We should, therefore, be able to engage
in normal activities, whenever the positive interpretation is not just possible, but the most plausible.

This standard, combined with the all the tragic cases of destroyed lives arising from
misunderstandings on social media, should encourage us to exert extra caution in everything we
do.
As the principal told his students, they may not have imagined what that selfie would cause, but
such a situation is not anomalous. We must expect that eventuality and do our best to avoid it. The
near impossibility of escaping any possible misunderstanding does not absolve us of our
responsibility to do our best.

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In advanced officer training school, I was introduced to Military Ethics.

Although medical ethics had been part of my education from medical school through fellowship
training, it had more to do with the maintenance of the integrity of the profession than personal
ethics.

The term medical ethics first dates back to 1803, when English author and physician Thomas
Percival published a document describing the requirements and expectations of medical
professionals within medical facilities. The Code of Ethics was then adapted in 1847, with
revisions made to the original document. The practice of Medical Ethics is widely accepted and
practiced throughout the world.

I will write on this another time. However, I do wish to highlight just how much impropriety was
accepted within the psychoanalytic community both in Europe and in the US.

I was first struck by the acceptance of indiscretions when studying the works of C.G. Jung and
meeting James Hillman who had a profound impact on me, He had been the chairman of the
department of advanced studies at the Jung institute in Zurich but had to leave under a cloud.

Alpert and Steinberg have studied the problem and the unique challenges posed to therapists
exposed to the most intimate details of their clients and the loss of boundaries in the therapeutic
encounter.6

6
https://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2017-15890-002.pdf

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21
Military Ethics and Conflicts of Interest

DoDD 5500.7, Standards of Conduct, provides guidance to military personnel on standards of

conduct and ethics. Violations of the punitive provisions by military personnel can result in
prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Violations of the punitive
provisions by civilian personnel may result in disciplinary action without regard to the issue
of criminal liability.

Military members and civilian employees who violate these standards, even if such violations do
not constitute criminal misconduct, are subject to administrative actions, such as reprimands. The
use of the term "DoD Employee" includes civilian employees and military members.

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Ethical Values

Ethics are standards by which one should act based on values. Values are core beliefs such as duty,
honor, and integrity that motivate attitudes and actions. Not all values are ethical values (integrity
is; happiness is not). Ethical values relate to what is right and wrong and thus, take precedence
over non ethical values when making ethical decisions. DoD employees should carefully consider
ethical values when making decisions as part of official duties. Primary ethical values include:

Commercial Dealings Involving DoD Employees

On or off duty, a DoD employee shall not knowingly solicit or make solicited sales to DoD
personnel who are junior in rank, grade, or position, or to the family members of such personnel.
In the absence of coercion or intimidation, this does not prohibit the sale or lease of a DoD
employee’s non-commercial personal or real property or commercial sales solicited and made in a
retail establishment during off-duty employment. This prohibition includes the solicited sale of
insurance, stocks, mutual funds, real estate, cosmetics, household supplies, vitamins, and other
goods or services. Solicited sales by the spouse or another household member of a senior-ranking
person to a junior person are not specifically prohibited but may give the appearance that the DoD
employee is using public office for personal gain. If in doubt, consult an ethics counselor. Several
related prohibitions in this area include:

• Holding conflicting financial interests

• Engaging in off-duty employment or outside activities that detract from readiness or pose
a security risk, as determined by the member’s commander or supervisor
• Engaging in outside employment or activities that conflict with official duties
• Receiving honoraria for performing official duties or for speaking, teaching, or writing that
relates to one’s official duties
• Misusing an official position, such as improper endorsements or improper use of nonpublic
information
• Certain post-government service employment

Accountability
DoD employees are required to accept responsibility for their decisions and the resulting
consequences. This includes avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. Accountability
promotes careful, well-thought-out decision-making and limits thoughtless action.

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An independent judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice. Equally important is the
confidence of the public in the autonomy, integrity and neutrality of our military judiciary as an
institution.

Army judges must strive to maintain the dignity of judicial office at all times and avoid both
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional and personal lives.

The enclosed Code, patterned after the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (2007), adheres to these principles while at the same time providing sound, clear and
reasonable guidance to judges faced with uncertainty as to what is acceptable behavior.
Adherence to this Code of Judicial Conduct will help ensure the greatest possible public
confidence in the independence, impartiality and competence of Army judges and the military
justice system.7

7
SCOTT C. BLACK Major General, USA The Judge Advocate General, 2008

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