Daf Ditty Succah 26: ‫ִמְצַטֵﬠר — ָפּטוּר ִמן ַהסּוָּכּה‬

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A book of discourses on the parsha and on holidays, it is considered a chassidic classic. It is marked by its particular focus on the
righteousness of Joseph and how he embodies the kabbalistic realm of yesod (foundation). The practical teaching that comes out
of this is the importance of controlling one's desires.

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One who suffers is exempt from performing the Mitzva of dwelling in the
Succah…

For the Mitzvah of Succah is a protection and a shield for Klal Yisroel, to save
them from all trouble and agony.

This is the (deeper) meaning of ‫ִמְצַטֵﬠר — ָפּטוּר ִמן ַהסּוָּכּה‬..

That through performance of the mitzva of Succah one will become

‫ ָפּטוּר‬meaning ‘exempt’ from the suffering..

Halacha

One who is suffering from sitting in the sukkah is exempt. For instance, if one
cannot sleep in the sukkah because of the wind, because of the flies buzzing,
because of the cold, or even because of a small amount of rain he is exempt.
Additionally, one is only exempt from the sukkah due to suffering if leaving the
sukka will help alleviate his suffering.2

2
Shulchan Aruch 640:4, Rama 639:2, 639:5, and 640:4

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The Sages taught in a baraita: Travelers who travel during the day are exempt from the mitzva
of sukka during the day and are obligated at night. Travelers by night are exempt from the
mitzva of sukka at night and obligated during the day. Travelers both during the day and at
night are exempt from the mitzva of sukka both during the day and at night. Those who travel
for a matter of mitzva are exempt both during the day and at night, because they are
preoccupied with the mitzva, even if they are not traveling at night, as in this recurring incident
involving Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna. The Gemara relates: When they would enter
the house of the Exilarch on the Shabbat of the Festival to hear his Festival homily, they would
sleep on the bank of the Sura River and not in a sukka. They said in explanation: We are ones
on the path to perform a mitzva and are exempt from the mitzva of sukka.

The Sages taught in a baraita: Guardians of the city who guard during the day are exempt
from the mitzva of sukka during the day and are obligated at night. Guardians of the city at
night are exempt from the mitzva of sukka at night and are obligated during the day. Those
who guard the city both during the day and at night are exempt from the mitzva of sukka
both during the day and at night.

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Guardians of gardens and orchards are exempt from sukka both during the day and at night.
The Gemara asks: And let them establish a sukka there in the garden and reside there. Why are
they exempt from the mitzva of sukka? Abaye said: The reason for the exemption is the verse: “In
sukkot shall you reside” (Leviticus 23:42), which the Sages interpreted to mean: Reside as you
dwell in your permanent home. Since preparing a sukka that is a fully equipped dwelling in the
orchard far from his house would involve considerable exertion, the mitzva does not apply to him.

§ It is stated in the mishna: The ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of sukka. The
Sages taught in a baraita: The ill person that they said is exempt from sukka is not only an ill
person whose condition is critical, but even an ill person whose condition is not critical, and
even one who feels pain in his eyes, and even one who feels pain in his head. Rabban Shimon
ben Gamliel said: One time I felt pain in my eyes in Caesarea, and the esteemed Rabbi Yosei
ben Ḥalafta permitted me and my attendant to sleep outside the sukka.

The Gemara comments: Rava conforms to his line of reasoning, as Rava said: One who suffers
in the sukka is exempt from the mitzva of sukka. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the
mishna that the ill and their caretakers are exempt from the mitzva of sukka? By inference,
with regard to an ill person, yes, he is exempt; with regard to one who suffers, no, he is not
exempt. The Sages say: With regard to an ill person, he and his caretakers are exempt; however,
with regard to one who merely suffers in the sukka, he is exempt, but his caretakers are not.

RASHI

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Steinzaltz

§ The mishna continues: One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the
sukka. The Gemara asks: And how much food is considered a casual meal? Rav Yosef said: It
is two or three egg-bulks of bread. Abaye said to him: But often, doesn’t a person suffice with
that measure of food, and then its legal status is that of a formal meal? Rather, Abaye said: A
casual meal is like the measure that a student of the academy of Rav tastes and then enters the
study hall to hear the lecture.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One may eat a casual meal outside the sukka, but one may not
take even a brief nap outside the sukka. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this
distinction? After all, sleeping in the sukka is an obligation just as eating in the sukka is an
obligation. Rav Ashi said: It is prohibited to nap outside the sukka due to a decree lest he fall
into a deep sleep.

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The Gemara comments that it is taught in one baraita: A person may take a brief nap with
phylacteries, but substantial sleep is not permitted. And it was taught in another baraita: Both
substantial sleep and a brief nap are permitted. And it was taught in another baraita: Neither
substantial sleep nor a brief nap is permitted.

The Gemara explains that this is not difficult: This baraita, where it is taught that even a brief
nap is prohibited, is in a case where one holds the phylacteries in his hands. It is prohibited to
sleep at all lest he drop them.

That baraita, where it was taught that a brief nap is permitted, is in a case where the phylacteries
are placed on his head. There is no concern during a brief nap lest he break wind or experience a
seminal emission. During deep sleep, that is a concern.

That third baraita, where it was taught that even substantial sleep is permitted with phylacteries,
is in a case where he removes the phylacteries and spreads a cloth over them and sleeps alongside
them.

Summary

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Daf Shevui writes:3

Our sugya deals with watchmen and whether they are exempt from the mitzvah of the sukkah.

People who are guarding the city generally can go home when they are not working. Therefore,
when they are out at the gates or walls watching the city, they are exempt. But when they are home,
they must sleep and eat in the sukkah. In contrast, people watching gardens and orchards are
outside of the city and don’t come home every day. Therefore, they are exempt all of the time, day
and night. In essence, they are always on the job.

The Talmud asks why the orchard or garden watchmen can’t just make a sukkah out in a field and
dwell there. Abaye explains that there is a midrash on the word “dwell” in the context of Sukkot.
The word “dwell” implies that your “dwelling” in the Sukkah should be like your “dwelling” in a
house. In talmudic times used to take out their furniture from the house, the bed, the mattress, and
put it in the sukkah and make it like their homes. Since the watchman can’t do this when he is out
in the field, he is exempt from the sukkah altogether.

Rava offers a different reason for why the watchman is exempt from the sukkah—it will impede
his job performance. If he goes into a sukkah, a place with walls, the thief will see that he is not
guarding the orchard and will take the opportunity to steal the produce.

As often happens, the Talmud asks why give two reasons for one halakhah? What is the practical
difference between the reason offered by Abaye and that offered by Rava? The difference is
expressed in a case where the watchman is out in the field, but his only duty is to watch a pile of
produce. In such a case he can build the sukkah and still guard the produce, so Rava would say
that he is liable to dwell in the sukkah. Abaye would say that since he still can’t bring his stuff out
there to the fields, he can’t “dwell” as he normally does, so he is exempt.

The next section goes on to discuss the next clause of the Mishnah, which exempted sick people
from dwelling in the sukkah.

This baraita teaches that one who is sick and would be discomforted by sleeping in the sukkah is
exempt from the mitzvah. Even if this pain is minor, he is exempt.

We should note that the psychology here is not of people looking for excuses to “get out” of being
in the sukkah, but rather the rabbis instructing people not to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah if it
causes them discomfort. The rabbis seem to be worried that people will do so even if it is painful

3
https://www.sefaria.org/Sukkah.26a.9?lang=bi&p2=Daf_Shevui_to_Sukkah.26a.6-19&lang2=bi

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for them; they do not seem to be concerned that people will use these halakhot as an excuse to get
out of sleeping in the sukkah.

The Talmud now cites two stories in which rabbis gave permission to other rabbis to not fulfill the
mitzvah of sukkah because of the discomfort there. R. Aha Bardela sleeps under a canopied bed
which is not allowed (if it has four posts—it forms a barrier to the Sekhakha) in the sukkah. Rav
allows him to do so because the canopy protects him from the gnats whose presence makes the
sukkah intolerable. R. Aha b. Ada’s sukkah is smelly, so Rava allows him to sleep outside the
sukkah altogether.

Rava’s permission to sleep outside the sukkah because of the stench is a result of his broader
belief—anyone who is in discomfort by being in the sukkah need not remain there!

However, the Talmud now thinks that Rava has gone a bit too far. The Mishnah exempted those
who are sick, not anyone with any discomfort.

The resolution is that there is a difference between the sick and those merely in discomfort. If
someone is truly sick, then he might need attendants with him. In such a case the attendants are
also exempt from being in the sukkah. But if someone merely feels discomfort, he is exempt if the
sukkah increases his discomfort. But even if he has attendants, they are not exempt. As long as
they do not feel discomfort in the sukkah, they are obligated to dwell there.

Our daf discusses what types of eating are allowed outside of the sukkah and what types of eating
can be done only in the sukkah.

The Talmud defines “casual” eating as a certain volume and not as a manner (i.e. eating while
standing up is casual, but sitting or reclining is formal). This leads to the question of how much
food can still be considered “casual eating.”

R. Joseph says that the volume of 2-3 eggs is considered casual eating. This would seem to me the
equivalent of a handful of pretzels, a piece of fruit, or something like that.
Abaye seems to have a smaller appetite. Two-three eggs might be enough for an entire meal (not
a super-sized meal, that’s for sure). So how can it be considered casual eating?
Therefore Abaye rules that casual eating is as much as a young student eats before he goes into the
learning session. This is evidently less than 2-3 eggs. In my opinion, Abaye may be referring not
just to the amount, but to the manner in which the food is eaten. Eating a small amount while
running into class is “casual.”

The main acts a person is supposed to perform in the sukkah are eating and sleeping. But while
casual eating is allowed outside the sukkah, casual sleeping is not. Why not? R. Ashi explains that
if one is allowed to “casually sleep”—i.e. nap—he might fall fast asleep. In other words, we can
protect ourselves against allowing “casual” eating to turn into “set” eating (at least we think we
can stop ourselves from eating), but with sleep, we cannot because we are asleep.

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One is not allowed to sleep a deep sleep in one’s tefillin. This is because tefillin require a “clean
body” and one cannot keep one’s body clean while sleeping (one is not supposed to flatulate while
wearing tefillin). Nevertheless, one is allowed to casually sleep while wearing tefillin. So, Abaye
asks, if we allow casual sleeping with tefillin and we are not concerned that he falls deeply asleep,
why not say the same with regard to sleeping outside of the sukkah.

R. Joseph b. Ilai says that this baraita refers to one who tells someone to wake him up if he falls to
fast asleep. In that way he can be assured that he won’t fall too deeply asleep. If he sets up an
“alarm clock” he can sleep in his tefillin.

R. Mesharshaya says that even one person watching over you to make sure you don’t fall fast
asleep is not enough. What if that person falls asleep as well!

Therefore R. Yohanan offers another interpretation to casual sleep. Casual sleep is not an amount
of time, it is a position. If one just puts one’s head between one’s knees, sort of like putting one’s
head down on a table, the sleep is casual. People don’t generally fall really fast asleep in such a
position. So, one can sleep that way with his tefillin on (and maybe outside of the sukkah as well).
Rava has an entirely different answer. He holds we are never concerned about someone falling fast
asleep. One can sleep casually in one’s tefillin without concern that he will fall into a deep sleep.
But when it comes to the sukkah, sleep is sleep. There is no “set” amount for sleep—any sleep
might be sufficient for a person. Therefore, one isn’t even allowed to nap outside of the sukkah.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:4

A braisa says that travelers are exempt from the sukkah only while they are traveling, while those
who are traveling for a mitzvah are totally exempt from sukkah. The Gemora illustrates this with
Rav Chisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna who would sleep on the riverbank when they went to the
exilarch on the Shabbos of Sukkos, explaining that they were in the course of performing a
mitzvah, and therefore exempt from sleeping in a sukkah. A braisa says that city guards are exempt
from sukkah while they are guarding (night or day), but guards of gardens and orchards are exempt
night and day. The Gemora asks why they don't build a sukkah where they guard. Abaye answers
that the verse mandates that we sit in a sukkah, teaching that it must be akin to our normal dwelling
pattern, and it is too difficult for the guard to bring all of his household items to the field, while
Rava says that guarding from an enclosed place will undermine his ability to guard, effectively
opening the field to thieves.

The Gemora explains that in a case of guarding a pile of produce, Abaye's reason would exempt
the guard, while Rava's wouldn’t, since he can see the whole pile from his sukkah

4
http://dafnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sukkah_26.pdf

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Discomfort in the sukkah

The Mishna stated that sick people and those who are tending to them are exempt. The braisa says
that this doesn't just includes someone who is deathly ill, but even one who is only suffering from
an eye ache or headache. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that he once had a pain in his eye when
he was in Caesarea, and the great Rabbi Yossi allowed him and those attending to him to sleep
outside of the sukkah. Rav allowed Rav Acha Bardela to sleep in a canopy bed in the sukkah,
which is tantamount to sleeping outside the sukkah, due to the discomfort he had from gnats. Rava
allowed Rabbi Acha bar Ada to sleep outside the sukkah to avoid the bad odor from the flooring
of the sukkah, consistent with Rava's ruling that one who is uncomfortable in sukkah is exempt.

The Gemora challenges this from the Mishna, which only says that the sick and those attending to
them are exempt, implying that discomfort alone is not enough to exempt someone. The Gemora
deflects this by saying that the Mishna taught the case of a sick person, since only in that case are
those attending to him also exempt, but someone who is uncomfortable is exempt, but those
attending to him are obligated. Snacks outside the sukkah The Mishna stated that one may eat a
snack outside the sukkah. The Gemora asks what is considered a snack. Rav Yosef says that 2 or
3 times an egg size is a snack, but Abaye challenges this, since often a person can eat that amount
and be satiated, making it a meal. Instead, Abaye says that a snack is the amount a Torah scholar
will quickly eat before going to his lesson (i.e., the size of one egg).

Sleeping vs napping

The braisa says that one may eat a snack outside the sukkah, but not take a small nap outside. The
Gemora asks why one may not take a nap outside, and Rav Ashi says that we are concerned that
the nap will turn into a deeper sleep. Abaye challenges this from a braisa which allows one to take
a small nap with tefillin on, but not go to sleep, indicating that we are not concerned that a small
nap will turn into regular sleep. Rav Yosef the son of Rabbi Ilai says that one may only nap with
tefillin on if he appoints someone to wake him, addressing the concern of a deeper sleep. Rav
Mesharshia challenges this, as we should be concerned that the one he appoints will fall asleep,
making him ineffective. Rather, Rabbah bar bar Chanah quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that a nap
with tefillin is only permitted if one places his head between his knees, a position in which one
cannot sleep deeply. Rava answers that any sleep can be sufficient to refresh someone, and
therefore is considered a form of dwelling, which must be in the sukkah. The reason one may not
sleep with tefillin is due to a concern of passing gas, which is only relevant in a longer sleep.

Stories about eating in and out of the sukkah

The Mishna says that one time they brought Rabban Yochanan ben Nuri a dish to taste, and they
brought Rabban Gamliel two dates and a bucket of water, and they requested that they be brought
to the sukkah. When they gave Rabbi Tzadok food less than an egg size, he took it with a cloth,
ate it outside the sukkah, and did not say a blessing after eating it. The Gemora asks why the
Mishna seems to be citing a story which contradicts the earlier statement that one need not eat a
snack in the sukkah. The Gemora explains that the Mishna is teaching that one may be strict, and
it is not considered haughty to do so, and therefore cites the stories about the Sages who requested

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to go to the sukkah for snacks. The Gemora suggests that the Mishna's mention of an egg size in
the story of Rabbi Tzadok disproves both Abaye, who says that an egg is a snack, and Rav Yosef,
who says a snack is a few eggs size. The Gemora deflects this, saying that the Mishna mentioned
the food being less than an egg because an egg would necessitate his washing his hands and saying
a bracha afterwards, but not because of the requirement of eating in the sukkah.

Stringencies

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated
to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban
Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it
was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be
stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so.

Mahretz Chayus raises a difficulty with this Gemara from the ruling of the Rema in Orach Chaim
639 who rules that one who is exempt from Sukkah and nevertheless sits in the Sukkah is referred
to as a hedyot, a commoner. It seems from the words of the Rema that acting in a stricter manner
is not viewed favorably. The Mahretz Chayus answers that the reason one should not be overly
strict with regard to himself is so he should not appear haughty. Thus, every situation must be
judged individually. Regarding the case of the Gemara where one eats a snack inside the Sukkah,
people will say that he is eating a little now but he intends to eat more at a later time and for that
reason he is sitting in the Sukkah. Regarding one who sits in the Sukkah while it is raining,
however, there is no room to justify his actions and therefore doing so is frowned upon.

Quoted from the Mishna

The Mishna states that if one eats food that measures less than the size of an egg, he is not obligated
to sit in the Sukkah. The Mishna relates an incident where they brought in front of Rabban
Yochanan ben Zakai and Rabban Gamliel food to taste and they would not taste the food until it
was brought into the Sukkah. The Gemara explains that this story indicates that if one wants to be
stringent on himself and eat even a snack inside the Sukkah, he is permitted to do so. The Gemara
in Yoma 79 cites this Mishna and concludes the citation by stating that the reason that the rabbis
ate in the Sukkah was not because the Halacha is like that. Rather, it was because the rabbis wanted
to be strict on themselves.

The Oneg Yom Tov writes that from the text of the Gemara it would seem that the conclusion is
part of the Mishna when in fact, it is an addition of the Gemara. The Oneg Yom Tov writes that
this is a rule throughout the Talmud that when a Gemara qualifies a statement of the Mishna, the
Mishna can be quoted with the addition of the Gemara as if the addition of the Gemara is part of
the Mishna. It is noteworthy that Tosfos in Yoma expresses the same idea as mentioned by the
Oneg Yom Tov. Reb Yeshaya Pik in his glosses to the Gemara in Yoma notes that it would seem
from the words of Tosfos that Tosfos did not have the same version of the Gemara that we have.
Our text explicitly states the words vetoni aloh, and a Baraisa taught concerning this Mishnah.
According to our version of the Gemara, there would be no proof to the concept expressed by
Tosfos and the Oneg Yom Tov.

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No More Night

The Gemara states that the sleep of Dovid HaMelech was as long as a horse, and a horse’s nap is
sixty respirations. The Zohar states that Dovid did not wish to sleep more than sixty respirations,
because sleep is one sixtieth of death, and Dovid did not wish to taste death.

Rabbi Yonasan Eibschutz writes in Ya’aros Devash that the Medrash states that when the angels
observed Adam HaRishon, they wished to declare on him kadosh, the Holy One i.e. that he was g-
dly and thus eternal. For this reason HaShem cast a slumber on Adam, to demonstrate to the angels
that Adam was mortal and would eventually die. Nonetheless, had Adam not sinned by eating from
the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Bad, he would have lived forever.

For this reason, writes Reb Yonasan, in the future there will only be day and no night, because the
purpose of night in this world is for sleep, and in the future the righteous will not experience death.
Since sleep is one sixtieth of death, in the future there will be no need for night.

Samaritans sitting under their Sukkah decorated with fruits and vegetables
during Sukkot holiday. Nablus, Palestinian territories, 2017/ (Yadid Levy)

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 A SUKKAH IN THE FIELD WHERE ONE WORKS

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:5

The Beraisa states that the watchmen of orchards and gardens are exempt from the Mitzvah of
Sukah. The Gemara asks that they should not be exempt; they should be required to build a Sukah
in the field where they sleep.

Abaye answers that the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" teaches that one is required to live in a
Sukah only in the manner in which he lives in a house. Since it is the manner of watchmen not to
live in a house (but to sleep in the field), they do not need to live in a Sukah during the festival.

Rava answers that the watchman is exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah because if he stays in a
Sukah, thieves will take advantage of his inability to guard the entire field from within the Sukah
and they will steal the crops.

The Gemara earlier quotes a Beraisa that says that travelers are exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah
while they are in transit. The Gemara there, however, does not ask why they are exempt, as it asks
here with regard to the watchmen of fields. Why does the Gemara not ask this question there?

In addition, the Beraisa that mentions the watchmen of fields and orchards also says that the
watchmen of a city are exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah, and yet the Gemara does not ask that
they should be required to build a Sukah in their place. The Gemara asks only about watchmen of
fields and orchards.6

It is clear that when the Gemara asks its question about the watchmen of fields, it is not aware of
the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru." The fact that Abaye introduces that principle in response
to the Gemara's question indicates that the Gemara was not familiar with this principle until now.
Accordingly, why does it not ask that the other people -- travelers and watchmen of cities -- should
be required to build a Sukah wherever they are?

The RITVA asks another question. According to Rava, why should one be exempt just because of
a fear that thieves will come and steal some fruit? A potential loss of money (or the inability to do
one's job properly) does not exempt one from the Mitzvah of Sukah. Since Rava, who argues with
Abaye, does not apply the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" in this case, the watchman should
be obligated to dwell in a Sukah despite the risk that some fruit might be stolen.

The RITVA explains that Rava agrees that there is a requirement of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru."
However, he does not apply it in this case in the same way that Abaye does. Abaye maintains that
"Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" suffices to exempt people such as watchmen from living in a Sukah. A
person who lives in any place where people usually live without furniture (such as a watchman
who lives in a field) is exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah, because dwelling in a place without

5
https://www.dafyomi.co.il/sukah/insites/su-dt-026.htm
6
As the Gemara implies when it asks, "v'lei'Avdi Sukah Hasam" -- i.e. "there, in the orchard"; see Rashi DH Pirtzah)

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furniture is not the type of "Taduru," residence, that the Torah commands for the Mitzvah of Sukah
(Rashi).7

Rava does not agree with this application of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru." Even if a person lives in a
place with no furniture, he is obligated to live in a Sukah during Sukos, because that is his normal
way of living, his way of "k'Ein Taduru." Rava agrees, however, that if one stands to lose money
as a result of living in a Sukah, or there is some other difficulty posed by living in a Sukah in that
place, then he is exempt because of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru." He would not live in a house under
such conditions.

Why does the Gemara not ask this question with regard to travelers and the watchmen of a city?
They, too, should be required to build a Sukah in their place and live in it during Sukos. Why does
the Gemara ask this question only with regard to watchmen of fields and orchards?

The answer is that the Gemara earlier was aware of the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru," which
exempts travelers and city watchmen from the Mitzvah of Sukah. However, at that point the
Gemara assumed that "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" teaches that during the time that a person normally
does not live in a house, he does not have to live in a Sukah; a guard who works during the day is
exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah during the day, but since he normally sleeps in his house at
night, he must sleep in a Sukah at night during Sukos.

However, in the case of orchard watchmen who guard the orchards both during the day and during
the night, at no time does the watchman stay in his home; he is a professional, full-time watchman
whose job is to stay in the field at all times (Rashi). Consequently, his residence in the field is akin
to an ordinary person's residence in a house, since that is how he lives throughout the year. Hence,
the Gemara asks that he should be obligated to live in a Sukah during Sukos because of "Teshvu
k'Ein Taduru."

Abaye answers that "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" does not mean that one must live in a Sukah during
Sukos the way he lives in a place the rest of the year. Rather, it means that one must live in a Sukah
during Sukos the way an ordinary person lives during the rest of the year.

Rava answers that since the watchman may suffer a financial loss by living in a way that is different
from the way he normally lives (in the open field), "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" does not apply. If,
however, he will incur no loss by living in a Sukah, then he is obligated to live in a Sukah in the
field because of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" (even though ordinary people do not live in the fields).
This is in contrast to the view of Abaye.

This approach still does not explain why the Gemara does not ask that city watchmen should be
required to build a Sukah. They, like orchard watchmen, live at their watch-posts throughout the
year, day and night. Why does the Gemara not ask this question in that case?

7
Alternatively, according to the Ritva, Abaye maintains that when one is in a place where a person normally eats or sleeps outside
of his house (such as in a field), he does not have to live in a Sukah.

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In the text of the Gemara of the RABEINU CHANANEL, RIF, RITVA, and ROSH, as well as in
the manuscripts cited by the DIKDUKEI SOFRIM, the words "ba'Yom uva'Lailah" -- "[city
watchmen who work] during the day and during the night" -- do not appear in the case of travelers
nor in the case of city watchmen.

The first time the Gemara mentions "during the day and during the night" is in the case of the
orchard watchmen. Travelers and city watchmen do not remain in their places during both the day
and night. Accordingly, there is no basis to ask that travelers and city watchmen should be
obligated to dwell in Sukos.8

A PICNIC DURING SUKOS

The Beraisa says that "Holchei Derachim" (travelers) are exempt from the Mitzvah of
Sukah. RASHI explains that they are exempt because of the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" -
- one is obligated to live in a Sukah during Sukos in the same manner that he lives in his house
during the rest of the year. Since, during the rest of the year, a person does not stay in his house at
all times, but he departs on business and pleasure trips (at which times he does not live in his
house), during Sukos he does not have to stay in his Sukah all the time, but he may go on a trip
without a Sukah.

This ruling is cited as the Halachah by the SHULCHAN ARUCH (OC 640:8). The MISHNAH
BERURAH (640:40) adds that if one can find a Sukah without difficulty during his trip, then he
is required to dwell in that Sukah. Also, if he travels only during the day but not during the night,
he is obligated to sleep in a Sukah at night.

The Acharonim, however, disagree about the extent of his obligation to sleep in a Sukah at night.
The LEVUSH rules that he is obligated only if he can find, in the town in which he lodges, a Sukah
that is already built, but if there is no Sukah (such as in a town with no Jews) he is not obligated
to build his own Sukah. In contrast, the MAGEN AVRAHAM rules that he is obligated to build
his own Sukah wherever he lodges. The Mishnah Berurah (in BI'UR HALACHAH) and others
side with the Levush, because one is not obligated to spend half the night building a Sukah in order
to sleep in it for the remainder of that night. Rather, one is required only to make an effort to find
a Sukah that is already built.

In practice, is one who departs on a trip during Sukos exempt from eating and sleeping in a Sukah?
Similarly, is one permitted to eat outside of a Sukah during a picnic outing?

(a) RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN zt'l (Igros Moshe OC 3:93) writes that when the Gemara says (and
the Shulchan Aruch rules) that travelers are exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah, it refers only to
those who travel for the sake of business. One who travels for pleasure, on the other hand,
is not exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah. Accordingly, one who goes on a picnic outing during
Sukos is obligated to eat in a Sukah, and if he does not eat in a Sukah he transgresses a Mitzvas
Aseh. Even though it is the normal manner for people to leave their homes to eat outside during

8
(It seems that the difference between orchard watchmen and city watchmen is that no city watchman risks his life to work at night
and sleep outside of the safety of the city walls.)

16
the rest of the year, the principle of "Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" does not permit one to leave the Sukah
to eat outside during Sukos.

Rav Moshe Feinstein supports this opinion from Rava's teaching that one who is "Mitzta'er" is
exempt from the Mitzvah of Sukah. This means that if one experiences more distress while inside
a Sukah than he would experience in the house (or anywhere outside of the Sukah), he is exempt.
"Teshvu k'Ein Taduru" teaches that just as a person leaves his house during the year when it is
uncomfortable for him there, so, too, he is not obligated to dwell in his Sukah during Sukos when
it is uncomfortable for him there. If it is true that one who goes on a picnic outing is exempt from
the Mitzvah of Sukah, then Rava should not have focused on the negative element (one who is
uncomfortable in the Sukah is exempt), but on the positive element -- one who enjoys being outside
of the Sukah more than he enjoys being inside is exempt.

Rav Moshe Feinstein also cites the Gemara in Menachos (41a) that states that a person should not
attempt to exempt himself from a Mitzvas Aseh (such as by wearing a garment that does not have
four corners so that he does not have to fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis). On the contrary, a person
should make effort to put himself in a situation in which he is obligated to perform a Mitzvas Aseh,
as the Gemara in Sotah (14a) relates with regard to Moshe Rabeinu, who requested permission to
enter Eretz Yisrael in order to be able to fulfill the special Mitzvos Aseh that are observed there
(Sotah 14a).

He concludes that one should not go out for a pleasure trip during Sukos to a place where there is
no Sukah.

(b) RAV YOSEF SHALOM ELYASHIV shlit'a (quoted in HE'OROS B'MASECHES SUKAH)
disagrees with the above view. He says that it is the normal manner for people to go out for pleasure
trips from their homes just as they go out for business trips. Since this is the manner in which one
lives in his home during the year (that is, he leaves his home occasionally for a trip), he may live
in the Sukah during Sukos in this manner as well. Hence, one should be permitted to leave his
Sukah to go out on a pleasure trip.

How does Rav Elyashiv understand the Gemara in Menachos that says that one should not attempt
to exempt himself from a Mitzvas Aseh? Rav Elyashiv explains that in the case of a pleasure trip
during Sukos, one is not exempting himself from the Mitzvah; he still has his Sukah. He simply is
living in it the way he lives in his house during the rest of the year. When one leaves his Sukah to
go on a pleasure trip, he does not forfeit the Mitzvah of Sukah. Rather, he is living in the Sukah
the same way he lives in his house.9
Perhaps the difference of opinion in this matter may be explained as follows. There are two
different types of pleasure outings. When a person travels in order to tour or visit certain places,
his trip is similar to a business trip in that he has a specific destination and objective. "Teshvu k'Ein
Taduru" exempts him from the Sukah during the trip. If he finds himself near a Sukah during his
trip, he must eat there (as the Mishnah Berurah writes), because that is what he would do during a
trip at any other time of the year -- if he would find a house in which he could eat, he would enter
the house and eat there.

9
When Rashi says that "Holchei Derachim" are those who go on business trips, he does not mean to limit the exemption to those
who go out on business. He mentions "business" merely as an example of why one would travel during Sukos.

17
A second type of pleasure outing is a trip that one takes merely to be outside, with no particular
destination. He may not exempt himself from the Sukah simply because he enjoys the outdoors
and wants to eat in the outside air. Such a case would be considered an attempt to exempt oneself
from a Mitzvas Aseh, because even if there would be a Sukah nearby when he picnics, he would
not want to enter it to eat. Moreover, since he specifically wants to eat outdoors, he not only does
the type of act that does not need a Sukah (such as touring), but he also does an act that shows that
he does not want a Sukah. By going on a picnic during Sukos, he shows that he specifically wants
to eat outside of the Sukah, and this is considered an insult to the Sukah. Such a person is instructed
to enjoy the outdoors during the rest of the year, but not during Sukos. The intent of the tourist, on
the other hand, is to travel in order to see the sites, but not to avoid sitting in a Sukah.

The ruling of Rav Elyashiv (the preeminent Posek in Eretz Yisrael) refers to the average Israeli,
who travels in order to reach a destination. The ruling of Rav Moshe Feinstein (the preeminent
Posek in America), on the other hand, addresses the Western phenomenon of picnicking in order
to experience the pleasure of being outdoors. Such an intent implies that one specifically seeks to
get out of the Sukah, and thus it is prohibited.

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:10

As we learned, the last Mishnah (25a) permitted eating a non-formal meal outside the sukkah. The
Mishnah on our daf records that when asked to taste the food that was being cooked
on Sukkot, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai insisted that it be brought into the sukkah, as did Rabban
Gamliel when he was brought two kotavot with water. In contrast to these Sages, the Mishnah also
tells of Rabbi Tzadok who would eat less than a ka-beitzah of food by wrapping it in a napkin and
eating it outside the sukkah without an after-blessing.

The Gemara objects that it seems odd to find that the Mishnah would bring stories of Sages who
insisted on eating even small amounts of food in the sukkah immediately after presenting the rule
that such foods can be eaten outside of the sukkah. The Gemara responds that the Mishnah is
teaching that such behavior is an accepted stringency, and that such behavior is not
considered yuhara – haughtiness.

Rabbi Aryeh Leib Yellin in his Yefei Einayim explains that there is no yuhara in this case because
it is not evident to people why he is not eating a small amount outside – perhaps he is simply not
hungry! In any case, there are people who even during the year will eat and drink only in their own
homes, so there is no clear indication that they have accepted this stringency upon them.

The Me’iri suggests that the reason these stories were placed together in the Mishnah was to
emphasize that stringency may be lauded, but leniency is also acceptable, as long as it is within
the framework of what halakha accepts, since we see that among the Sages of the Mishnah both
positions were considered normative.

10
https://www.ou.org/life/torah/masechet_sukkah2026/

18
Rabbi Tzadok’s behavior is subject to a difference of opinion between Rashi who says that he took
the food in a napkin because of his fastidiousness, while Tosafot explain that his religious devotion
was such that he treated all food as though it were teruma, so he refrained from touching food lest
it become ritually defiled. In any case, it is clear that the baraita tells Rabbi Zadok’s story in order
to emphasize that just as there were Sages who were stringent upon themselves, there were also
those who made a point of emphasizing that it was appropriate to stick to the letter of the law
without stringencies. In this story, Rabbi Tzadok was lenient with regard to sukkah, ritual hand
washing and the blessing after food.

I Love My Sukkah

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:11

Considering that one is supposed to live in one’s sukkah as one lives in one’s home one need spend
very little time in the sukkah. One “who writes books, tefillin or mezuzot, they and their
wholesalers and retailers and all who are involved in heavenly work, including those who sell
techelet” (Sukkah 26a) are exempt from the sukkah. Travelers and others whose work takes them
far from a sukkah i.e. a security guard, to cite the Talmudic example, or those who don’t feel well,
even those who are moderately uncomfortable need not dwell in the sukkah. And no need to worry
if the sukkah is too small - one can always eat in a more comfortable setting; hence the gemara’s
ruling that those participating in a sheva brachot [1]may eat outside of the sukkah.

11
https://torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/sukkah-27-i-love-my-sukkah

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Furthermore, the obligation to eat in the sukkah only applies to a full meal, consisting of bread.
One can snack - and the definition of a snack is quite inclusive; meat, fish, fruits and vegetables
all qualify - to one’s desire outside the sukkah. One may even eat small portions of bread outside
the sukkah - something the Mishna (Sukkah 26b) describes Rabbi Tzadok [2] as doing.
When all is said and done one is obligated to eat only one meal in the sukkah - the first night of
Yom Tov. For the rest of week, one may, if they choose to do so, subside on snacks. The Mishna
(ibid 27a) quotes the dissenting view of Rabbi Eliezer that one must eat fourteen meals in the
sukkah. Just as in one’s home one eats two meals a day [3] so too in the sukkah one should do the
same.
It is not only the amount that one must eat that sets Rabbi Eliezer apart. He maintains that one
must build a Sukkah prior to Sukkot and it must remain standing for seven days - a sukkah built
during chol hamoed would not be valid. Even more startling is his view that one can only fulfill
the obligation of dwelling in a sukkah in one’s own sukkah. One who eats in the sukkah of a friend
does not fulfill the mitzva of sukkah. Furthermore, one may not even use two of his own sukkot in
different locales. To those of us used to opening our sukkot to others this view is rather perplexing.
The mitzva of lulav is rooted in that of simcha, joy, “and you shall take on the first day the fruit of
a citron tree, branches of date palms ...and you shall rejoice before the Lord your G-d for seven
days” (Vayikra 23:40). Additionally, the four species of the “lulav” demonstrate our gratitude to
G-d for our material blessings. Neither joy nor gratitude can be observed by proxy. And this is
reflected in the unanimously agreed upon requirement that one must own their own own lulav.
Rabbi Eliezer apparently views the lulav and sukkah as one unit. The sukkah reflects our joy and
gratitude that G-d offers protection, that while this one week we are exposed to the elements we
have a roof over our head the other fifty-one weeks of the year. These two mitzvoth join together
in creating zman simchateinu.
The Sages on the other hand view these mitzvoth as distinct and even opposites [4]. As the
Rashbam (Vayikra 23:43) notes we are commanded to leave our homes specifically as we
celebrate our harvest lest we say “my strength and might of my hands made me all this
wealth” (Devarim 8:17). Our secure homes protect us only by the grace of G-d a message made
even more powerful if we are made to wander from sukkah to sukkah. We must simultaneously
rejoice in our blessing as we reflect on the precariousness of life.

[1] The notion of getting married between Yom Kippur and Sukkot might seem scary to many; yet until recently weddings were
much more informal and required much less planning. Rav Dovid Tzvi Hoffman (Melamed Lehoeil, 3:1) in addressing the question
of whether it is appropriate to get married during aseret yemi teshuvasays absolutely! noting that he himself was married then.
Being such a great mitzvah, it behooves us to do so before Yom Kippur.

[2] Undoubtedly even small amounts of food were quite filling for Rav Tzadok. The Talmud relates that he fasted for forty years
to try and avert the destruction of the Temple.
[3] In Talmudic times the societal norm was to eat two meals a day. The mitzva of oneg shabbat was observed by having three
meals. Interestingly the Gemara does not discuss how the sages exempt one form eating in a sukkah on the Shabbat of Sukkot.
Presumably the Mishna that requires only one meal is speaking on a Biblical level whereas the obligation to eat three (or any) meals
on Shabbat is rabbinic in nature.
[4] Most interesting is the Biblical presentation of these mitzvoth. The Torah tells us to celebrate Sukkot for seven days and records
the apparent conclusion of the five Biblical festivals with the phrase “these are the holidays that you shall proclaim a holy

20
assembly...aside from the Lord’s Shabbat” (Vaikra 23:38). Then, seemingly out of left field, we are told “but on the fifteenth day
of the seventh month when you gather in the crop” (v.39) you shall take the lulav, etrog hadas and arava. And yet it is only in this
section where we are actually commanded to dwell in the sukkah for seven days. It appears the answer to the question of whether
the lulav and sukkah are in essence one or two mitzvoth and whether they represent the same or opposite ideas is yes.

Sue Parker Gerson writes:12

On yesterday’s daf, we learned this in a mishnah:

One may eat and drink in the framework of a casual meal outside the sukkah.

At first blush, this ruling may seem surprising, as we have seen throughout this tractate that Jews
are commanded to treat our sukkahs as our homes during the week of the festival: sleeping,
studying, relaxing and eating in them. In order to resolve this dilemma, and to explain how and
when a light snack does not count as a full meal, the Gemara on today’s daf revisits the mishnah
in order to delineate what constitutes a casual meal.

Rav Yosef said: It is an amount of bread that has the volume of about two or three eggs. Abaye
said to him: But often, doesn’t a person suffice with that measure of food, and then its legal
status is that of a formal meal? Rather, Abaye said: A casual meal is like the measure that a
student of the academy of Rav tastes and then enters the study hall to hear the lecture.

According to the Gemara, there are two possible determining factors for whether the refreshment
one consumes should be categorized as a meal or just a nosh: quantity and circumstance.

Rav Yosef reasons that quantity is the determinant: If it’s just two or three egg-bulks of bread, it’s
a snack. (If you think you’ve heard this argument before, you’d be correct: The Gemara on Eruvin
83 features a dispute about the volume of bread required for a formal meal.) It follows that anything
smaller than that amount would not constitute a proper meal and would thereby fit our nosh
category.

But wait! Abaye raises an important point: Not everyone has the same appetite. For some people,
this small amount of food might in fact suffice to keep them going. Abaye instead introduces a
different criterion: the circumstances in which one consumes that refreshment.
With his suggestion that a nosh constitutes the amount of food that a student would grab on the
way to class, Abaye conjures up a vision that students of all ages can recognize: The lecture is
about to start, it’s going to be at least an hour before you see daylight again, and you’re already
(still?) hungry. In that moment, you’re not looking for a sit-down meal. You want something you
can grab with one hand while sprinting to class.

Abaye is speaking from experience. After all, the rabbis were both teachers and learners in the
academy. Arriving late was not even a consideration; making sure to get a snack on the way to
class was the goal. And presumably, such a student was also heedful of the mitzvot.

12
Myjewishlearning.com

21
With that example in our heads, we can now determine what it means to have just a nosh or a full
meal. If it’s both a full meal in terms of quantity of food as well as one you intend to relax over,
eat it in the sukkah. If it’s a small amount of food that can be eaten on the fly, it’s a nosh — and
you can consume it outside the sukkah without worrying that you missed a mitzvah (if not a meal).

Rabbi Johnny Solomon writes:13

Having previously been taught that ‘the sick and their attendants are exempt from the mitzvah of
sukkah’ (see Mishna Sukkah 2:4, 25a), and having previously been introduced to the principle that
‫‘ – מצטער פטור מן הסוכה‬someone who experiences discomfort by being in the Sukkah is exempt
from the duty of being in a sukkah’ (see Sukkah 25b), our daf (Sukkah 26a) explains that not only
is someone who is dangerously sick (‫ )חולה שיש בו סכנה‬exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah, but
even someone who is feeling unwell (‫)חולה שאין בו סכנה‬.

Moreover, we are also taught in our daf how Rav ruled that Rav Acha Bardela could sleep under
a canopy in the sukkah (thereby, not fulfilling the mitzvah of sukkah according to most opinions)
due to the mosquitoes, and that he also ruled that Rav Acha Bar Adda was exempt from the mitzvah
of sukkah due to a foul odour emanating from within the sukkah.

In terms of the situations when we apply the principle of ‫( מצטער פטור מן הסוכה‬someone who
experiences discomfort by being in the Sukkah is exempt from the duty of being in a sukkah), the
Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 640:4) rules that it applies to those ‘who cannot sleep in the
sukkah because of the wind, or because of flies, fleas, or anything similar, or because of a foul
odour.’

The Rema (ibid.), quoting the Trumat HaDeshen (Siman 92), then adds an interesting factor. What
if someone says that they don’t sleep as well in the sukkah as they do at home. For example, they
can’t stretch out in the same way that they do at home. Are they exempt? The Rema answers that
this is not defined as ‫מצטער‬.

However, the Chacham Tzvi (Siman 94) is perplexed by this ruling, asserting - and these are my
words - ‘a textbook definition of ‫ מצטער‬is not being able to sleep comfortably!’. However, in
considering this challenge from the Chacham Tzvi, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach says that the
Rema is correct. This is because a sukkah is a ‫ – דירת עראי‬a temporary dwelling - and to claim that
not sleeping so well in a temporary dwelling is ‫ מצטער‬misses the point. As he says ‘this level of
discomfort is part and parcel of the mitzvah of sukkah. It is as if the Torah directly tells you to
experience this level of discomfort’ (Halichot Shlomo: Moadim p. 168).

But how far does this go? And how much discomfort are we expected to tolerate while fulfilling
mitzvot? For one perspective on this important question, I would like to share a fascinating
question asked of R’ Auerbach (see Sefer Maadnei Shlomo: Moadim pp. 79-80) relating to the
principle of ‫מצטער פטור מן הסוכה‬:

13
www.rabbijohnnysolomon.com

22
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach was once approached by a Baal Teshuvah who described how his
family made fun of him and teased him about dwelling in a sukkah. This teasing caused him great
anguish, and he asked whether he was exempt from the mitzvah of sukkah as he was a ‫מצטער‬.

Rav Auerbach analysed this question, and he explained that this man’s situation is not comparable
to the case of the flies in the sukkah since the flies cause physical discomfort which stop a person
from entering a sukkah, whereas this man’s family is the cause of his discomfort which itself does
not directly stop him from dwelling in a sukkah.

Consequently, Rav Auerbach encouraged the man to meditate on the words of Rabbeinu Yonah
(in his ‘Yesod HaTeshuvah’), who writes that: ‘someone who is shamed for performing the
mitzvot should not put aside this mitzvah due to the shame. Instead, they should be bold and
should perform the mitzvah without paying attention to those who make fun of them’ and told
him that this too should be our approach to the mitzvah of sukkah.

Undoubtedly, there are some mitzvot which are physically hard for us, and there are certainly
occasions when such hardship means that we are exempt from their performance. At the same
time, the Arba Turim (Orach Chaim 1) opens by informing us that we should be as bold as a
leopard to serve our Creator, which means that while there may be times when people make light
of the mitzvot that we perform, we should not cease performing the mitzvot, but instead, should
be bold in our service of God.

Model sukkah, England, early 20th century

Unknown early 20th century

23
 Sukkot—Assessing Risk & Ritual, 5781

Aaron Alexander writes:14

One of my favorite talmudic passages from Tractate Sukkah, page 26a, reads:
– Statement: Guardians of gardens and orchards are exempt from sukkah dwelling both during
the day and at night.
– Challenge: Why can’t they just build a sukkah [in the garden or orchard], and dwell in it
there?!
– Response #1: Abaye quotes Leviticus 23:42 : “In sukkot shall you reside…” Reside as you
[normally] dwell. (In other words, move your home “stuff” into your new temporary dwelling
place.)
– Response #2: Rava said: A breach invites the thief. (If she is in the sukkah & unable to see the
entire field, a thief might know this and more easily plan & implement their theft.)
– Resolution: What is between them? How do their positions practically differ? The difference
is a case where she is guarding a pile of fruit. (Rava’s position: one could do that in a sukkah,
and is still, therefore, generally obligated.)

Here’s what’s happening: The general rule is that those who are preoccupied and unable to fulfill
the obligation of sukkah dwelling, are exempt. Their status as “involved” with another matter, like
an explicit mitzvah, or travel, or contracted work, alters what the Torah expects of them in certain
circumstances. I love this about halakhic determinations. They are so often consequential &
situational.

In this case, according to Abaye, guardians could never appropriately fulfill the sukkah obligation,
because being out in the fields wouldn’t allow for the ideal sukkah to be constructed and furnished,

14
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/sukkot-assessing-risk-ritual-5781/

24
one in which we displace the nicest things from our homes, like linens and dishes and the like, to
our sukkot. Therefore, any attempt at dwelling would fall short of what the Torah intends for us.

Rava doesn’t seem to be concerned about the overall nature of the home-styled sukkah obligation,
but rather he has a situational worry–in trying to observe the obligation in a less than ideal spot,
something bad may happen which could have been avoided.

The Netziv (R’ Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin, 1816 – 1893) sees a deeper dispute between these
Sages and their understanding of the Leviticus verse. He believes that according to Abaye, the
creation of home outside that somewhat mirrors the inside is a “mitzvah le’ikuva,” a necessary
condition for which if not fulfilled, the mitzvah itself… is never fulfilled. In other words, if one
can’t create such a mirrored outside home, the Torah’s demand on us will also have us falling
short.

But, says the Netziv, Rava sees it differently. He believes the obligation of sukkah, as prescribed
by Leviticus, is a “mitzvah be’alma,” more situational, to be fulfilled by simply getting inside of a
halachically built sukkah (3 walls, temporary roof) for a meal or sleep—whenever it can happen
without negative consequences. Which, according to Rava, in this situation, could not happen
because of potential theft.

The core disagreement framed by the Netziv between Abaye and Rava is relevant & instructive.
The idea of Torah creating an ideal to which we must all measure ourselves, equally, vs. an
understanding that while there may in fact be an optimal way to perform our obligations, not all
of us are in an equitable situation with which to do so—speaks to so much of life today. Especially
religious life in the Covid era.

25
For Abaye, the perfect over the good. For Rava, the good, or the possible, can transcend the perfect,
in the right circumstances—based on potential consequences. (See, for instance: conversations
about November 3 election.)

For Abaye, one standard for all to aspire toward. For Rava, we are each held to what’s actually
possible in any given moment, assuming it doesn’t create unnecessary risk. (Sound familiar?)

The right answer? Yes. Sometimes I find myself giving up if I can’t do it exactly the way I want.
And other times I do the best I can with what’s available to me.

The past seven months have proven this tension over and over again. Especially the High Holy
Days. Ideal? Desired? Probably not for most of us (though for some who already regularly
participatee virtually, much better). But we certainly Rava-ed to unexpected beauty.

Think about the shiva minyanim we’ve attended (or forgone) over zoom. Many of which we may
never have been able to previously attend. It’s not the same as showing up in person. It’s just not,
if also quite special. An Abaye world-view would have us wait until conditions are ideal to offer
the perfect, physically-present condolence. A Rava world-view asks us to determine what can be
done, and what the consequences may be if we don’t do it.

We’ve stretched ourselves so much to live Rava’s system with full hearts & optimism. And while
we can still dream of an Abaye world, while we can still pursue it, let’s also acknowledge that
most often we are doing the best we can with what we’ve got. And that we must protect ourselves
and others from danger, despite the potential loss of beloved rituals. And we can celebrate that,
too.

And, please, let’s all of us give others the benefit of the doubt. A Rava system asks us to respond
with humility to the ways in which we see others participating (or not). We can’t always know

26
from what or from whom they are protecting themselves, or even what choices another actually
has.

We’re all in this together, different from each other as we may be. We can’t ever forget that. And
this holiday is built for this moment.

Chol HaMoed Trips and the Sukkah

Rabbi Yair Hoffman writes:15

Most people didn’t discuss it before Sukkos, because they were busy preparing. They didn’t
discuss it on Sukkos because of hachana. And so, the discussion began tonight. The Chol HaMo‘ed

15
http://www.5tjt.com/chol-hamoed-trips-and-the-sukkah/

27
trip involves much more than the trip itself–it involves deciding where to go, who exactly goes,
and what to do when everyone gets there.

WHAT ABOUT THE SUKKAH?

Do we need to make arrangements for a sukkah in which to eat on the trip? Does it depend upon
the type of trip? The question, of course, only applies to the male members of the family, since the
women are exempt from the obligation to eat in the sukkah. It is a mitzvah for women to eat in the
sukkah, but they are not obligated to do so.

Also, technically, although one can be stringent and avoid eating anything outside of the sukkah,
the basic obligation is to eat one’s “set meals” in the sukkah. One may eat foods in an arai manner,
which means not in a set meal. Certain foods by definition are considered “set meal” foods, such
as a mezonos food (foods for which a mezonos berachah must be recited).

THE SOURCE – THE BRAISAH

There is a fascinating beraisa quoted in the Gemara in our daf Sukkah 26a: Travelers, holchei
d’rachim, who travel in the daytime are exempt from the obligations of sukkah during the day and
are obligated at night. Travelers who travel during the night are exempt at night and obligated
during the day.

The explanation for this beraisa is found in Rashi: The verse tells us “You shall dwell in sukkos”–
just as you dwell in your homes. Just as the entire year one does not refrain from traveling for
business purposes, so too during all the days of the holiday that are not Yom Tov the Torah did
not require one to avoid travel.

WHO IS INCLUDED IN HOLCHEI D’RACHIM?

28
The Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with this beraisa in Tractate Sukkah. The question arises,
however, as to who exactly is included in holchei d’rachim, travelers. Does it mean anyone? When
the family takes its annual trip to the amusement park, are we considered travelers? Unfortunately,
not so fast. Some poskim distinguish between a “pleasure” trip and a “true need” trip. Travelling
for Parnassah is always permitted. The issue is pleasure trips.

RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN – NO EXEMPTION FOR A PLEASURE TRIP

Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt’l (Igros Moshe, O.C. III No. 93), rules that one who takes a pleasure trip
is not included in the permissive clause of this beraisa in Sukkah. He rules that people are “holchei
derachim” only when traveling for a substantive purpose. Pleasure trips, in Rav Moshe Feinstein’s
perspective, are not considered substantive enough to exempt one from the mitzvah of Sukkah.

Rav Moshe did make an exception when it comes to traveling to Eretz Yisrael (or another country,
for that matter), when the traveler could not make the trip during another time. He writes (Even
HaEzer IV 32:8) that if one travels extensively for a short period of time and has no other time to
do so, it is not considered a pleasure trip, but rather a “true need” and is therefore permitted.

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt’l, is also quoted as ruling that Chol HaMo‘ed pleasure trips on
Sukkos do not exempt a person from the obligation to eat in a sukkah (see Sefer Succas HaShaleim,
p. 458). This is also the view of Rav Ovadiah Yosef, zt’l (Yechaveh Daas 3:47).

RAV ZILBER’S LENIENT VIEW

Rav Binyomin Yehoshua Zilber zt”l (1906-2008), author of the Az Nidberu (11:34), however, is
lenient and does exempt the pleasure traveler from eating in a sukkah, based on the aforementioned
beraisa. But he adds the caveat that when it is easily done, one should seek a sukkah.

29
WHAT DO PEOPLE DO?

The issue is thus the subject of debate among contemporary poskim. However, if one utilizes the
halachic concept of poik chazi mai amah devar–go out and see how the nation conducts itself–one
seems to see that the halachah is in accordance with the majority view as expressed by Rav Moshe,
Rav Shlomo Zalman, and Rav Ovadiah Yosef. Most men and young boys, when taking Chol
HaMo‘ed trips, do not pack a mezonos lunch. They generally only eat fruits and shehakols.

WHAT ABOUT A BRACHA?

There is another issue that this brings up, however. Even though most poskim seem to indicate that
one is obligated in the mitzvah of sukkah when on a pleasure trip, there is some debate on the
subject. This brings up the question as to whether the pleasure tripper recites a blessing when
eating in the sukkah, since, according to some authorities, he is technically exempt. One is tempted
to say that the situation should be no different than the custom of women according to Ashkenazic
Jewry: they are exempt, yet they still recite the blessing! If so, the same ruling should also apply
to men when they are exempt.

NO BLESSING WHEN ITS RAINING

Yet we do find that when it is raining heavily and one eats in the sukkah (aside from the first night),
the person eating in the rain should not recite the blessing, because he has the exemption of
mitzta’eir patur min hasukkah–if one is extremely uncomfortable, one is not obligated to eat in the
sukkah. This is based on the writings of Acharonim. For example, the Machatzis haShekel, in the
beginning of O.C. 639, writes that whoever is exempt from sukkah does not recite a blessing.

HERE IT IS DIFFERENT

30
It would seem, however, that in this case, it is significantly different, and one would still recite a
blessing. The Machatzis haShekel, cited earlier, may be referring to a case where the person is
exempt and is therefore not fully appreciating the mitzvah of Sukkah. In such a case, the blessing
perhaps should not be recited. When the person falls under the rubric of mitzta‘er–pained or in a
state of great discomfort–he cannot fully appreciate what the mitzvah is all about. Here, however,
he is fully appreciating it, in that he is seeking to perform it even when he technically does not
have to do so.

HOW DO WE APPRECIATE IT?

How do we fully appreciate the mitzvah of Sukkah? By realizing that Hashem is truly the One
watching over us constantly: that He did so while we were in the Midbar, with both real booths
and the Ananei haKavod, and that He still is watching over us constantly. Our faith, trust, and hope
lie solely in Him, and this will allow us to be oved Hashem b’Simcha!

31
 New Year’s greeting card, Moshe Efkovitz publisher, Achva. Avraham
Ettinger Collection//16

16
“Local Judaica: Judaica Artifacts Created in the Land of Israel, 1880-1967,” catalog of an exhibition curated by Nitza
Baharuzi-Baroz, Eretz Israel Museum, 336 pages, Also featured are pictures of various items of Judaica produced in the early
period (1906-1929) of the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design in Jerusalem – works that combine different styles by means of
traditional motifs (holy sites, symbolic figures of lions and so forth). These are followed by objects decorated with biblical motifs
and other items used for religious festivals and secular celebrations; among them are Hanukkah menorahs that combine the old
with the new. One menorah pictured in the catalog, for example, features a “biblical” figure and the figure of a soldier jointly
supporting the nine candles.

32
 Sukkah: A State of Mind

Rabbi Ron-Ami Meir writes:

“Mitz’ta’er”: A Definition
Comparing Sukkah to Tefilin
A Second Approach
Tying it All Together

“Mitz’ta’er”: A Definition

The Talmud in our daf cites the Amora, Rav, as declaring that a mourner is fully obligated in all
of the mitzvot of the Torah (with the exception of one, based on a special verse.) Next, Rav states
that a mourner must dwell in the Sukkah during the Festival of Sukkot. This second halacha
prompts the Gemara to exclaim: “That’s obvious!” In other words – after Rav’s initial statement –
obligating a mourner in all the mitzvot – why would we have thought that he would be exempt
from the mitzvah of Sukkah?

Had Rav not stated this second halacha, answers the Gemara, we may have actually thought that a
mourner is exempt from Sukkah. Why? A fundamental principle in Hilchot Sukkah is that one
who is suffering from being in the Sukkah – a “mitz’ta’er” – is exempt from the mitzvah; we may
have thus thought that a mourner, in his grief, falls into this category. According to the Gemara,
Rav’s special stress on the mourner’s obligation to dwell in the Sukkah clarifies that the exemption
of mitz’ta’er only applies to suffering that develops ” on its own”. The discomfort of the mourner
in the Sukkah does not develop “on its own”; rather, the mourner, says the Gemara, “is bringing
the suffering on himself, and he therefore has the obligation to place his mind at ease and calm
down [to allow himself to live in the Sukkah.]”

Rashi explains that suffering that “develops on its own” relates to discomfort stemming from the
Sukkah itself. Typical examples include: discomfort from the heat of the sun beating down on the
Sukkah, the cold temperature in the Sukkah, or a bad odor emitted by the structure’s leafy “schach”
roof. Since a mourner’s sensitivity is not directly related to the Sukkah’s temperature or odor, he
must put himself at ease so that he can perform the mitzvah.

Why should a mourner find the Sukkah so difficult to tolerate? Rabbeinu Asher (“Rosh”) explains
that such a person prefers the dark, secluded atmosphere of a house rather than the pleasant-open
air atmosphere of the Sukkah. Far from being objectively unpleasant – the Sukkah is “too pleasant”
an environment for the mourner! In other words, it’s the mourner’s delicate and unique emotional
state that transforms the Sukkah into a troubling place.

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Comparing Sukkah to Tefilin

Sukkah is not the only mitzvah in which the halacha stresses the mental/emotional situation of the
Jew. The Gemara in Menachot (36b) rules that a person donning Tefilin must not take his mind
off the mitzvah, and proves this by learning a “Kal V’chomer” from the requirement of the High
Priest (Kohen Gadol) to mentally focus on his “Tzitz” headdress. Rambam codifies this ruling in
his Mishna Torah, stating that a person in discomfort, or one whose mind is not at ease, is exempt
from the mitzvah of Tefilin – since it is forbidden to become distracted from the Tefilin while
donning them.

In response to the above halacha, Rabbeinu Manoach (cited by Kesef Mishna) states: Even though
with all other mitzvot, we require a person to put his mind at ease and perform the mitzvah, Tefilin
are different: it’s forbidden to wear them while mentally distracted. Kesef Mishna understands this
comment as an implicit challenge on the Rambam: How can Rambam exempt a “mitz’ta’er” from
Tefilin, if, after all, the Gemara in Sukkah states that such a person must calm down with the aim
of fulfilling the mitzvah of Sukkah?!

To this challenge, Rabbeinu Manoach responds: The mitzvah of Tefilin is different: Since it is
characterized by a special “distraction” prohibition, we don’t insist that he put his mind at ease.
Why? As much as he calms himself down, he won’t escape the fact that there is a special
prohibition of being distracted while donning Tefilin.

In other words, we cannot simply say in the case of Tefilin: “Let him calm down and perform the
mitzvah.” Once a Jew has become preoccupied and distracted, the halacha is wary of permitting
him to don the Tefilin; the very real possibility exists that he will again lose his concentration. No
such halachic prohibition – and therefore no such cautious approach – exists in the law of Sukkah.

A Second Approach

Another prominent scholar – R. Joel Sirkes in his work “Bayit Chadash” (Bach) – also grapples
with the apparent contradiction in the halacha. In contrast to Rabbeinu Manoach’s approach, Bach
understands the person in Rambam’s Tefilin scenario as being in a different mental state than the
one in the Sukkah scenario: Rambam, notes Bach, is dealing with a person who is simply unable
to put his mind at ease. Even if he succeeds at doing so for a moment, he quickly reverts to being
a “mitz’ta’er”. He therefore never escapes the status of someone who is distracted and therefore
exempt from Tefilin. In contrast, the “mitz’ta’er” of the Gemara in Sukkah is someone – whom –
with sufficient effort, can calm down.

Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg (Responsa “Tzitz Eliezer”) notes that according to Bach – were the
person in Rambam’s Tefilin scenario to ask whether he is obligated in Sukkah – we would tell him
that he is not. This would be our answer to him, despite the fact that his discomfort does not stem
from the heat of the Sukkah, nor the odor emitted by the schach.

34
At first glance, Bach’s approach seems to contradict the Gemara Sukkah (27a): “You must dwell
in Sukkot for seven days” says the Torah. Given the principle that we must treat the Sukkah like
our home for a week, we need only live in it as long as it allows us similar conditions, we are
accustomed to in our homes. Since we would not live in a house that has a leaky roof, or an
apartment that is uncomfortably cold – we are not expected to live in a Sukkah under cold or rainy
conditions. A person whose discomfort stems mainly from his own mental or emotional state, and
not from the Sukkah, however, is not exempt from the mitzvah to dwell in the Sukkah. (The
Gemara quoted earlier, as explained by Rashi reinforces this.) How could Bach, then, suggest that
a person unable to put his mind at ease – is exempt from both Tefilin and Sukkah? It is not the
Sukkah, but his own mental state, that is standing in the way!

Tying it All Together

In order to understand Bach’s ruling, Rabbi Waldenberg notes that the question of what exempts
a “mitz’ta’er” from Sukkah is a major disagreement between the Rishonim. Rashi, Rosh, and
Mordechai all rule that a person is exempt from Sukkah only when the discomfort stems from the
Sukkah itself. This is the view accepted by Remah in the Shulchan Aruch. The Maharik, in
contrast, states that a “mitz’ta’er” is exempt from Sukkah even if the discomfort is mainly a product
of his emotional state. Maharik cites our Gemara Sukkah (25a) – and notes that it was prepared to
exempt the mourner as a “mitz’ta’er” – but required him instead to put his mind at ease and dwell
in the Sukkah.

In other words, Maharik reads that Gemara differently than we suggested earlier: That “sugyah”
did not intend to definitively rule out a mourner’s state of mind as a relevant factor in defining
“mitz’ta’er”: It simply concluded that when the discomfort derives from the Sukkah itself, there’s
not much the halacha can demand of the Jew: if the Sukkah is too hot or wet, then the conditions
do not allow for the mitzvah of dwelling in the Sukkah to be fulfilled. If however, the mourner’s
state of mind is the issue, the halacha asks him to try to “get a hold of himself” before availing
himself of the exemption of “mitz’ta’er.” It follows, therefore, that both Maharik and Bach –
confronted with a person who is unable to relax, would rule that that he is exempt from Sukkah in
the same way as such a person is exempt from – and even forbidden to wear – Tefilin.

Rabbi Waldenberg suggests that underlying the contrasting approaches towards the Gemara – are
two contrasting views of the source of the exemption of “mitz’ta’er”. The mainstream view –
Rashi, Rosh, Mordechai, Remah – understands the verse “You must dwell in Sukkot for seven
days” as the basis of the exemption; we must treat the Sukkah like our home for a week, we need
only live in the Sukkah as long as it allows us similar conditions as a regular home. As noted
earlier, one whose discomfort stems mainly from his own mental or emotional state, and not from
the Sukkah, is not exempt from the mitzvah to dwell in the Sukkah.

The opposing view – that of Bach and Maharik – bases itself on the verse in Vayikra Chapter 23,
which states that we must dwell in Sukkot “So that your generations [after you] know that I caused
the Children of Israel to dwell in Sukkot when I took them out of the Land of Egypt.” This, says
Bach explicitly – indicates that the Torah wants us to experience a special religious/historical
awareness while dwelling in the Sukkah. A severe “mitz’ta’er” simply cannot attain this

35
consciousness, and is therefore exempt. It’s irrelevant, according to this view, whether the
unsettled state of mind is a result of the heat of the Sukkah, etc, or a personal state of anxiety not
rooted in the Sukkah. This explanation helps explain, as well, why Bach equated between the two
issues of Sukkah and of Tefilin. In Shmot Ch. 13, the Torah states that we must wear Tefilin “so
that the Torah of God should remain on your lips.” Here, as in the mitzvah of Sukkah, a special
awareness is required while performing the mitzvah. It is this special state of mind that exempts
the “mitz’ta’er.”

The Sukkah and the Mitztaer: A Revolutionary Concept

What are the conditions for exoneration from the mitzva of Sukkah?

Rabbi Dr. Chaim E. Schertz writes:17

In the observance of Jewish law there arise circumstances when the commandment, or the law,
cannot be fulfilled or observed. The general category which describes this condition is known
as Ones or a state of duress and total lack of personal control of the situation. In Rabbinic parlance,
this dictum is stated as Ones Rachmanah Patrah, i.e. the Torah absolves a person from personal
obligation when he is in a helpless situation.

There can be various conditions or various degrees which express this principle. One is excessive
effort or work (Tirda or Tircha) which stand in the way of observing the commandment. There is
also the issue of excessive monetary cost. There is also the issue of cost to health or risk to one’s
life. There can also be an issue of unavailable time or time already committed in the performance
of another commandment.

In the performance of the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah, the Rabbinic tradition added another
absolving factor called tzaar, which can be interpreted as either pain or emotional distress. This
exoneration from the mitzvah of dwelling in the sukkah seems to be unique among all other
absolutions. Analysis of this absolution from the obligation of the mitzvah of sukkah must be
attempted.

The underlying source for the rational of exonerating the mitztaer (one who has tzaar) is given to
us by the Tosafot. The Tosafot offers a logical analysis or interpretation of a braita that, on its
face, has nothing to do with the issue of mitztaer. The braita is based on a verse in Leviticus 23:43
which states: “you are to dwell (taishvu) in sukkot for seven days.” The Braita states:

You are to dwell as you [normally] live (taishvu k’ein taduru). From here they (Mishna) said:
all seven days a person makes his sukkah a permanent dwelling and his home a temporary

17
https://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/17622

36
dwelling. How? If he has beautiful utensils, he brings them into the sukkah; beautiful blankets,
he brings them into the sukkah; he eats, and drinks and visits in the sukkah. . . (Sukkah 28b)

The Tosafot Yom Tov explained that the basis of the interpretation of the Biblical verse that
dwelling should be like normal living is because the more direct way that the Torah could have
stated the verse is "you shall be" (tihiyu) in the sukkah. The term Taishvu, is really an indirect
way of stating the case. It thus implies the additional interpretation of Taduru. (Comment on
Sukkah, 26a)

This braita is not disputed by any Talmudic opinion. It however, in no way discusses the issue
of mitztaer. It is the Tosafot that applies mitztaer to the issue of taishvu k’ein taduru.

. . . Mitztaer which was . . . exempt from the sukkah . . .is from . . . taishvu k’ein taduru, you
shall dwell as you (normally) live. For a person cannot live in a place where he feels tzaar
(distress). (Tosafot “Holchei Drachim” Sukkah 26a).

The Talmudic authority that introduces the concept that a mitztaer is patur (exonerated) from
dwelling in the sukkah, is Rava. It is crucial that we analyze the circumstances where Rava uses
this principle in order to properly understand its components.

There are two cases in the Talmud which teach us much about mitztaer’s underlying
principles. The first case is the following:

. . . Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said in the name of Rav: a mourner is obligated in the (mitzvah of)
sukkah. (The Talmud asks) isn’t this obvious? (for a mourner is obligated in all the
commandments of the Torah) (The Talmud answers) I would have thought that since Rava says
that one in mental anguish is absolved from the sukkah (mitztaer patur min hasukkah) here
also (in the case of the mourner) he is also in mental anguish (so he should be patur from the
sukkah. Therefore) he (Rav) teaches us that the case of absolution applies when the tzaar comes
of its own accord, but here (in the case of the mourner) the source of the anguish lies in the
mourner himself . . . (Sukkah 25b.)

Rashi explains that in the case of the sukkah, the anguish which the individual feels
occurred because of the sukkah, “it is the sukkah which caused him the discomfort, as for example,
heat or cold or smell from the schach (vegetation that he used as covering)” ad locum. The source
of the tzaar lies in the nature of the sukkah and apparently not within the individual. If this is true,
then we are confronted by a great difficulty. Why do we altogether need the concept
of mitztaer? We can simply say that if the fault is in the sukkah, then it should simply become an
invalid sukkah (psula) and no one should be allowed to use it?

This becomes more apparent in the following Talmudic passage:

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Rava allowed Rabbi Acha bar Ada to sleep in a room outside of the sukkah because of the smell
emanating from the ground (of the sukkah) . . .Rava followed his reasoning for Rava said, mitztaer
patur min hasukkah. Sukkah 26a.

Rashi explained that the smell from the ground was caused by white earth (sircha degargushta)
(lyme? - C.H.) which was pounded into the ground of the sukkah (to make it harder). And Rashi
again comments, “for it is the sukkah which causes him the discomfort” ad locum. This again
leads us to ask, why then is not the sukkah disqualified for any use by anyone?

The Rabbenu Chananel gives us a hint at a possible answer. When it comes to the case of
the mitztaer,

. . .he alone is absolved, and even if he is discomforted only by a mosquito or bad smell and other
such things, he is absolved and certainly if he is discomforted by greater things than
those. (Sukkah 26a.)

Similar language is used by the Magid Mishna in his analysis of the Rambam. The Rambam states:

. . .The mitztaer is absolved from the sukkah, but not his servants. And what is a mitztaer? It is
one who is unable to sleep in the sukkah because of the wind, or flies and insects and things
like that, or because of the smell. (Mishneh Torah, Sukkah 6:2.)

The Magid Mishna comments that the Rambam’s comments are based on Rava’s comments, “and
there (Sukkah 26a) it is explained that a mitztaer is (absolved) due to something kal (light or
unimportant)” ad locum.

The terminology “kal” is not found in the Talmud. How is that determined and why is it necessary
to understand the concept of mitztaer?

This is directly dealt with by the Ran on his commentary on the Rif. The Ran states:

Sircha degargushta is white dirt which they used to pound into the ground of the sukkah, but
not to the point that the smell is repulsive to everyone. For if that is so, it would delegitimize the
sukkah . . .but in the case of mitztaer, we are dealing with him alone. (Ran on Rif p. 12.)

When we combine this interpretation of mitztaer established by the Ran with the one stated in the
Talmud by Rashi (Sukkah 25b and 26a) that it is the sukkah which discomforts the mitztaer, we
are forced to conclude that the principle of mitztaer creates a sukkah that is only invalid for him.

In all other cases either the sukkah is totally invalid for everyone, or the person, i.e., the one who
is sick, is totally absolved from the mitzvah itself. In this case, the sukkah is still valid for use, and
the mitztaer apparently is still liable to perform the mitzvah.

38
In light of the Ran’s analysis, it is difficult to understand the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch. The
Rama states in the name of the Tur:

. . .a person cannot state that “I am a mitztaer” except in a case that is the norm for people in
general to be mitztaer from that particular thing. . . Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Sukkah, 640:4.

If this is so, then again, we must ask: why is not the sukkah invalid for everyone?

The opinion of the Rama is reinforced by the Chayei Adam in almost identical language. Klal
147:18. The Mishna Brura adds the following caveat: The halakha of mitztaer only applies when
the person is, “an especially delicate person” (called an Anin) and that all delicate people in his
class are subject to the same tzaar. (Shulchan Aruch 640:4 note 29.)

In addition, the Mishna Brura indicates a second difficultly if the mitztaer is not part of a totally
separate class. If he were in a normal class of people, we would have to say, “even if he was
a mitztaer, his feelings should become null and subordinated to the mind of the majority.”
(Shulchan Aruch 640:4 note 28.)

It is the Biur Halacha that points out specifically the contradiction between the Shulchan Aruch
and the Ran. The Biur Halacha states:

According to my poor understanding, the understanding of the Ran is not so. For this is his
language, “in the case of the smell of the pounded earth; that it is not repulsive to all, for if it
were so, the sukkah itself would be invalid . . .but here we are dealing with him alone,” and in
truth, I do not understand the words of the Ran, for there (in the case of the pounded dirt) after
the fact (the sukkah) is not invalid as the Rambam and the Rosh noted. . .later on I discovered
that the Darchei Moshe pointed this out on the words of the Ran. . .perhaps he (Ran) is referring
to one who is of a delicate nature (an Anin). (Ad locum on Shulchan Aruch 340:4)

Both the Rama and the Chayei Adam, however, appear to insist the concept of mitztaer include
the proposition that all normal people be susceptible to the same tzaar. Neither utilize the concept
of Anin or indicate that the individual nullify or subordinate his feeling to that of the majority. This
ironically presents us with a possibility of reconciling the position of the Ran with the Shulchan
Aruch without utilizing the remote solution suggested by the Mishna Brura and the Darchei Moshe.

This reconciliation would maintain the normal usage of the term mitztaer, which is not restricted
to a specialized group, i.e. Aninin. This is important because Rava, who actually states the concept
of miztaer, makes no reference to an Anin and is not concerned about subordinating the individual
will to the opinion of the group. Neither are there references to Aninin in the cases of the Talmud
or in the interpretation of Rashi or the Rabbenu Chananel. It is the understanding of both
commentators that the tzaar was brought about by the sukkah and was not in the nature of the
person. Finally, the fact that the sukkah remains valid according to the Rambam and the Rosh
does not negate the Ran, but rather gives his opinion greater support.

39
What the Ran is actually stating is that all the afflictions or tzaar that discomfort the mitztaer in
fact afflict everyone else as well. If the discomforts were of greater severity, the sukkah would
become invalid for everyone. Conversely, if the individual had serious illness (choleh) he would
be absolved from any sukkah.

Here, however, the discomfort is not sufficient from keeping most people from using the sukkah,
and thus, the sukkah remains valid. Similarly, the tzaar is not sufficient to render the person truly
ill. Thus, he is not absolved from dwelling in a sukkah.

This is what the Rabenu Chananel and the Magid Mishna meant to indicate when they called the
factors in the sukkah which caused the tzaar or discomfort “light” (kal) or insignificant. The faults
in the sukkah even if more severe, still did not reach the level of importance to invalidate
the sukkah itself for all people.

The fact that the sukkah is still valid and the mitztaer is still liable to observe the mitzvah removes
the issues of Anin and subordination to the majority. As far as the mitztaer is concerned, this
particular sukkah interferes with the principle of taishvu k’ain taduru, and this is what exonerates
him. But he can still fulfill his obligation by using another sukkah.

In effect, the principle of taishvu k’ain taduru simply expands its latitude. Just as many people do
not necessarily like the homes they live in for various reasons, many may also not like the sukkah
which they have. Most, however, make do with what they have, while others find their homes
or sukkot so distasteful that they must have another one. When it comes to the sukkah, they
are patur or absolved from the one they have, but are still obligated to find or build another one
which is more suited to their liking.

The concept of subordination to the majority will cannot mean that everyone must have an
identical sukkah, just as not everyone has an identical house. The principle of taishvu k’ain
taduru means that everyone should have a sukkah that he wishes to make his permanent dwelling
during the festival of Sukkot.

This indeed is a revolutionary concept that the individual has the final say of what sukkah he
wishes to use to fulfill the mitzvah and can reject a sukkah which the Torah considers
permissible. This is based originally in his right to accept or reject his year-round permanent
home. The rights which the Torah grant him to select a home are the same rights which he has in
selecting a sukkah as long as the sukkah fulfills the Torah requirements. This is the true import of
the concept of taishvu k’ain taduru.

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 The Year of the Flying Sukkah (2008)

Debbie Shapiro writes:18

This story took place close to a decade ago. Although it’s about a flying Sukkah, it really began
about a week before the holiday, when the stores throughout Jerusalem were selling a new type of
Schach that could be used over and over again. Their advertisement ditty, “U’b’Sukkaseinu…”
played to a catch tune, blared throughout the streets of the city, and everyone, myself included,

18
https://www.ou.org/life/holidays/sukkot/the_year_of_the_flying_sukkah/

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found themselves humming it underneath their breath as they busily prepared for the upcoming
holiday.

“It’ll be so much easier for you to build your Sukkah with this new type of Schach,” I told my
husband. “And it won’t make such a mess in the house,” I added. Every year my husband, together
with our four boys, dragged the old, wilted palm branches that we used for schach up from the
bomb shelter where they were stored during the year. Somehow, as they maneuvered the schach
and Sukkah boards down the hallway, over the dining room table and across the living room, they
would manage to bang into at least one piece of furniture (to make sure that we’d never forget the
holiday), and leave a few wilted brown palm “droppings” on the floor.

This year, I had visions of a clean living room and a very calm and quiet erev Sukkot.

But my husband insisted on roofing our Sukkah with the old-fashioned palm branches. “We’ve
always used them, and we’ll continue to use them,” he said.

I was frustrated. But it wasn’t worth arguing about, and besides, he was the one who shlepped the
palm branches up from the bomb shelter and positioned them on the Sukkah roof.

So we ended up being the only family in our apartment building whose Sukkah was not roofed
with a new easy-to-use super-light bamboo rug.

Two days before Yom Tov, I received a phone call from the Chabad Chernobyl program. They
had airlifted children out of the area affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and brought them
to Israel for medical treatment — as well as their first taste of Yiddishkeit — and wanted us to
host two nine-year old girls for the entire eight days of the holiday. Of course we agreed. It would
be a privilege to introduce these youngsters to their heritage.

Olya and Katya had never seen a Sukkah before; as a matter of fact, they had never even heard of
Sukkot – or Shabbat, for that matter – before coming to Israel. Their eyes widened in amazement
and delight when, through a combination of sign language and a few Hebrew words we explained
that we actually eat and sleep in the Sukkah for the entire week!

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That evening, at the meal, the girls were delighted by the neighbors singing together in
stereophonic harmony, and giggled over our vain attempts to speak a few words of Russian.

Half-way through the soup, the weather suddenly changed. It wasn’t long before we could feel the
first drops of rain penetrating the palm branches above our heads. Then, without any warning, the
weather literally became vicious. The storm wind howled on all sides of us. We raced to the
window and stared outside in amazement. Just a few minutes before everything had been calm and
serene. Now, the trees were bending and… yes, that’s when we saw the first roof flying through
the air, accompanied to a rousing rendition of “Harachaman hu yakim lanu Sukkot Dovid
Hanofelet,” “May the All-merciful One rebuild the fallen Sukkah of Dovid” from the neighbor’s
now roofless Sukkah.

Within less than an hour the street was full of soggy bamboo rugs. Ruined decorations were strewn
everywhere. Ours was one of the few Sukkahs to survive the storm – and I was very grateful to
my husband for being so obstinate and old fashioned.

We tried to explain to our guests that this was not part of the usual Sukkot celebration, but they
seemed to think that flying schach and roofless Sukkot were the norm, and they loved every
moment of it!

When it was time for Olya and Katya to return to their dormitory at the end of the week, we felt
as if they were part of our family, and I believe the feeling was mutual. With their limited
vocabulary, they let us know that Sukkot with the Shapiros was an experience they would never
forget, and thanked us profusely. I told them that if they really want to show their appreciation,
they could do me one favor that would mean a lot to me, and to the entire Jewish people.

Olya and Katya’s interest was piqued. “What’s that?” they asked.

“Promise me that when you grow up, you’ll make sure to marry a Jewish boy,” I answered.

They could not promise.

I can only pray that the All-Merciful One rebuild His fallen Sukkah, quickly and in our days. Amen

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