Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC G.R. No.

221697 & 221698 – 700 (2016) – citizenship of foundling

DOCTRINE: SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

FACTS:

 Poe was found as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by one Edgar Militar
 She was reported as a foundling with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo and was given a Foundling
Certificate and a Certificate of Live Birth
 When Poe was 5 years old, FPJ and Susan Roces filed a petition to adopt her with the MTC of
San Juan City
 It was later found out that the lawyer who handled Poe’s adoption filed to secure from the OCR-
Iloilo a new
 Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name and the name of her adoptive parents
• This was fixed in 2006
 At 18, Poe registered to vote in San Juan City
 A few years later she was also issued a passport
 Initially, she pursued a degree in Developmental Studies in UP but continued her studies in
Boston College as a Political Studies major
 In 1991, she married Daniel Llamanzares, a dual-citizen of the PH and US
 They returned to the US two days after their wedding
• Poe has 3 children (eldest was born in the US, two youngest born in the PH)
 In 2001, Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and obtained a US passport
 In 2004, Poe returned to the Philippines with her second child to support FPJ’s Presidential bid
• It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest child
• She returned to the US with her two daughters shortly after the elections
 In a few months after returning to the US, Poe rushed back to the PH upon learning of her
father’s deteriorating medical condition
• After her father died, she stayed for a few months to take care of the funeral
arrangements and the settlement of her father’s estate
 According to Poe, because of her father’s death, she and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the PH sometime in the first quarter of 2005
• Poe already quit her US job in early 2004
 Finally, Poe came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005
• Without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
• Children immediately followed
• Husband stayed in the US a bit to complete pending projects and sell their home
 Poe and her children initially stayed with her mother until Poe and Daniel purchased a condo
unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place in San Juan during the second half of 2005
 • Poe’s children began attending school in the PH
 On 14 February 2006, the Poe made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of
the family’s remaining household belongings
• She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
 In late March 2006, Daniel officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family’s change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.
• House was sold
• Daniel quit his job and came to the PH to work
 In early 2006, Poe and Daniel acquired a 509squaremeter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
where they built their family home
• Still where the couple and their children are residing.
 On 7 July 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003
• Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire
 Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
minor children on 10 July 2006
 Again, Poe registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.
• She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport
 On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Poe as Chairperson of the MTRCB.
 Before assuming her post, Poe executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in
Pasig City on 20 October 2010 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.
• Following day, Poe submitted the affidavit to the BI and took her oath as the MTRCB
Chair.
• From this point on, Poe stopped using her US passport
 On 12 July 2011, Poe executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an
“Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.”
 she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that
she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson with the intent, among others, of relinquishing
her US citizenship
• In the same questionnaire, the Poe stated that she had resided outside of the U.S.,
specifically in the PH, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present
 On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with the COMELEC her COC for Senator for the 2013 Elections
• She answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of residence in the
Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
• She obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed a senator
 Poe obtained a Philippine Diplomatic passport
 On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections
 • In her CoC, she declared that she is a naturalborn citizen and that her residence in the
PH up to theday before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.
• Attached an Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship subscribed and sworn to
before a
 notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015
• This case is triggered by filing of several COMELEC cases against her
 She lost all of those cases before the COMELEC, both Division and MR before the En Banc

ISSUES/HELD:

(MAIN ISSUE) What is the law’s treatment of foundlings? – Natural-born citizens

 As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.

 While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
 There is need to examine the intent of the framers of the Constitution
o The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
 The 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings only because their number was not enough to
merit specific mention
 Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect
that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed
the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
 Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
o These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather,
the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
o Inter-Country Adoption Act, Domestic Adoption Act, and SC’s Rules on Adoption all
expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted.
 Respondents argue that: the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts
to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best.
o SC: erroneous argument
o Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
 “Having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen.
 In this case, the determination of foundling status is done by the
authorities, not the child
  the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship ofthe child.
 the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien
father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
 Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
o International law becomes part of domestic law through transformation or
incorporation
 Transformation – requires domestic law
 Incorporation – generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
 “Generally accepted principles of international law” include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law and general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations
 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
o Implicit is belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it
 “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles
“established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles
which are “basic to legal systems generally,” such as “general principles of
equity” and “general principles against discrimination” (embodied in UDHR,
ICCESCR, and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Convention against Discrimination in Education, Convention
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation”)
o SC has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State
o PH has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ICCPR
o Common thread of UDHR, UNCRC, and ICCPR is that they
 oblige the PH to grant nationality from birth and
 ensure that no child is stateless
 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws and
the 1961 UN Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, while unratified by the PH, contain
certain principles that are generally accepted principles of international law
o Art. 14 of 1930 Hague Convention… – principle that a foundling is presumed to have the
nationality of the country of birth.
 o Art. 2 of UN Convention on Reduction of Statelessness – principle that a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found
 PH is a signatory to the UDHR which affirm Art. 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention through Art.
15(1)
 Art. 2 of UN Convention on Reduction… merely gives effect to Art. 15(1) of the UDHR
o In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified
the “International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in
the said convention was nonetheless binding as a “generally accepted principle of
international law.”
 Despite the fact that only 16 of the 20 states required for the Convention to
come into force had ratified the instrument
 Essentially, “generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on
international custom, but also on “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as
the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
o Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen.
o 42 of those follow the jus sanguinis regime
o only 36 are parties to the Convention on Statelessness (26 are not signatories to the
Convention)
o During the oral arguments, the Chief Justice pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries
surveyed (87.83%) foundlings are recognized as citizens
o These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been
born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.
 Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution.

Did Poe’s repatriation under RA 9225 result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship? – YES.

 COMELEC ruled that it did not in disregard of consistent jurisprudence

 Bengson III v. HRET: repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A natural-
born citizen will be restored in his prior status as a natural-born Filipino citizen
 Also all the other cases that talk about repatriation under RA 9225
o Sobejana Condon v. COMELEC where we described it as an “abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship.”
o Parreño v. Commission on Audit, which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, where we said
that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his naturalborn
citizenship.
  The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as implying
“that naturalborn citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from
birth.”
 R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired.
o Congress saw it fit to decree that naturalborn citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost.
o The requirement that natural-born status must be uninterrupted was already rejected in
Bengson III v. HRET

Did COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when they ruled for
the cancellation of Poe’s COC? – YES.

 Issue before the COMELEC was whether or not COC of Poe should be denied due course or
cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material
representation.
 The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from
going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such
issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
 The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.
 The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the
Vice President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by
the Constitution. (HRET, SET, and PET)
o There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can COMELEC be the judge of the qualification of candidates for President? – NO.

 The lack of legal provisions for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule
 Three reasons to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining the
qualifications of a candidate before the election:
o First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office.
o Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates’ eligibility, e.g., his citizenship
or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office.
 Contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy
o Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
 Presently, the COMELEC rules require a declaration by final judgment of a competent court that
the candidate sought to be disqualified is “guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering
 from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution” before a candidate can be
disqualified
 General Rule : a COC cannot be cancelled or denied due course on the ground of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative finding that he
or she is not qualified.
o XPN: selfevident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
confessions
 In this case, the COMELEC essentially ruled that since foundlings are not mentioned in the
enumeration of the 1935 Constitution, they cannot be citizens.
o This borders on bigotry
 Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that Poe possesses
blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when “it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable,” proceeded to say that “she now has the burden to present evidence to prove
her natural filiation with a Filipino parent.”
 However, Poe’s blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is Demonstrable
o presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law
 Family Code has chapter on Paternity and Filiation
o there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a naturalborn Filipino.
o Burden of proof to show that Poe was not a Filipino citizen was on respondents
o Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

Factual issue is whether or not Poe’s parents are Filipinos (not who her parents are)

 Under Rules of Evidence, collateral evidence is allowed when it tends in any reasonable degree
to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue
 To this end, OSG offered official statistics from the years 1965 – 1975 the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278.
o The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural
born Filipino was 99.83%.
 Other circumstantial evidence:
o Poe’s parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City
o She has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
 There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
o All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
 overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child
born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if
not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.
 That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4
of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
o To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm