SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 248130. December 2, 2020.]

PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. y BADAJOS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J : p

The Case
This Petition for Review assails the following issuances of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41105 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Prudencio Ganal, Jr. y Badajos":
1) Decision 1 dated March 27, 2019, affirming the trial court's
conviction of petitioner for homicide but mitigated by passion and
obfuscation and voluntary surrender; and
2) Resolution 2 dated July 2, 2019, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
The Charge
By Information dated July 5, 2013, Prudencio Ganal, Jr. (petitioner) was
charged with homicide for the death of Julwin Alvarez (Julwin), thus:
That on or about May 20, 2013 in the Municipality of Baggao,
Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused PRUDENCIO GANAL y Badajos armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot JULWIN ALVAREZ Y JAVIER
thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused his death. HESIcT

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3,
Tuguegarao City. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." 4
Proceedings before the Trial Court
Petitioner admitted the killing but invoked self-defense and defense of
relative. Hence, the order of trial was reversed.
Defense's Version:
The testimonies of Barangay Captain Sherwin Mallo, Mario Ubina
(Ubina), Florante Orden Castillo, Jr. (Castillo), Prudencio Ganal, Sr. (Ganal,
Sr.), Erlinda Ganal, PO3 Erick Marcelino (PO3 Marcelino) and petitioner
showed that about 7 o'clock in the evening of May 20, 2013, Castillo and
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 Ubina were drinking Ginebra Kuatro Cantos in petitioner's house in Santor,
Baggao, Cagayan. By 9:30 o'clock in the evening, petitioner's neighbor
Angelo Follante (Angelo), arrived uninvited and insisted to join the drinking
session. Petitioner refused because Angelo was already very drunk. Angelo
then challenged petitioner to a fight but the latter advised him to just go
home. Angelo got enraged and picked up stones to throw at petitioner but
Ubina was quick to take the stones away. Petitioner eventually prevailed on
Angelo and the latter left. Petitioner and his companions then resumed
drinking. 5
Thirty (30) minutes later, stones were hurled at the roofs of the
adjacent houses of petitioner and his father, Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to
check and saw Angelo together with his uncle Julwin — the deceased. The
two were in the middle of the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr.
approached and asked them to go home because his wife was suffering from
hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care
if Ganal, Sr.'s wife died, he would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal,
Sr. tried to pacify the two, assuring them that they would settle whatever
problem they had the following day. 6
Julwin, then holding palm-sized stones in both hands, managed to push
open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him with a
stone in the chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks and
passed out. 7
Petitioner, from the main door of his house, saw what happened.
Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and holding two (2) stones,
advanced towards him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got his gun,
and fired a warning shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had regained
consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran away but Julwin continued
advancing towards him. When Julwin was about two (2) to three (3) meters
away from him, petitioner thought that the victim was intent on killing him.
Petitioner fired at Julwin, who in turn, pointed a finger at him, threatening to
kill everyone inside the house. Afraid that Julwin would make good on his
threat, petitioner fired all the rounds in his gun. Julwin fell within a meter
from petitioner's door. 8
Petitioner borrowed the cellphone of his mother Erlinda Ganal and
called the Baggao Police Station. He asked assistance from PO3 Marcelino
and committed to surrender himself. When the police officers arrived,
petitioner admitted he killed Julwin, turned over his gun, and voluntarily
surrendered. 9
The Prosecution's Version
In the evening of May 20, 2013, feast day of the patron saint of Santor,
Baggao, Cagayan, Angelo dropped by petitioner's house. On his way to
petitioner's house, Angelo had in his pockets stones, around 2 inches in
diameter, for driving away dogs along the way. When petitioner saw the
stones, he ordered Angelo to surrender them and went to get his gun.
Petitioner showed the gun to Angelo and told the latter to go home if he did
not want any trouble. 10
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 Instead of going home, Angelo went to Julwin's house. He saw Julwin
sitting on a rocking chair outside the house. After telling Julwin what
happened, Angelo momentarily went inside the house but when he returned
outside, Julwin was nowhere to be found. Angelo went out to look for Julwin
and saw the latter walking toward petitioner's house and go through the
slightly opened gate. Thereafter, petitioner and Julwin had a confrontation.
Suddenly, petitioner shot Julwin in the chest. Angelo ran away in fear and
heard three (3) more shots. Petitioner followed him so he ran to the house of
one Gilbert Narag. Angelo later went back to Julwin's house when he heard
that the latter's body was brought there by the police. The post mortem
examination showed that Julwin died due to "severe hemorrhage secondary
to multiple gunshot wounds and lacerations." 11 TAIaHE

Amelia Alvarez, Julwin's wife, claimed that she incurred P114,000.00 for
the wake and burial, P24,000.00 of which was for the funeral service as
evidenced by the Contract of Service issued by St. Claire Funeral Homes. The
remaining P90,000.00 was spent on groceries, pigs, tomb construction,
transportation and funeral mass, which were not duly receipted. Julwin was a
security guard at Candice Grocery in Tuguegarao City with a monthly salary
of P5,000.00 until he resigned in December 2012. He also farmed corn on
land less than a hectare in size with two (2) croppings. If lucky, his harvest
was around 70-100 cavans, otherwise, it was less than 70 cavans. 12
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Judgment 13 dated December 19, 2017, the trial court found
petitioner guilty of homicide. It did not give credence to petitioner' s claim of
self-defense on the ground that the force he employed was not
commensurate to Julwin's supposed unlawful aggression. The nature and
number of wounds (5 bullet wounds and 2 lacerations) revealed petitioner's
intent to kill. More, there was no incomplete self-defense because petitioner
failed to present clear and convincing evidence that there was unlawful
aggression on Julwin's part. Nor did it give credence to petitioner's claim of
defense of property because the force employed by petitioner was not
reasonably necessary. Petitioner could not also avail of defense of
uncontrollable fear because he was unable to show that Julwin's actuations
reduced petitioner to a mere instrument devoid of free will and acting
merely out of compulsion. 14
The trial court credited petitioner "passion and obfuscation" and
"voluntary surrender" but not "vindication of a grave offense," imposed the
corresponding penalty, and granted civil indemnity and damages. 15 Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused
PRUDENCIO GANAL y Badajos, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of HOMICIDE and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
it hereby sentences him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from
six (6) years prision correccional maximum as minimum to
ten (10) years of prision mayor medium as maximum; and
2. To pay the heirs of Julwin Alvarez y Javier the amounts of:
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 a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and,
c. P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 16

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of
conviction. In the main, he argued that the three (3) justifying circumstances
of self-defense, defense of ascendant, and lawful defense of property rights
should have been appreciated. Julwin was unlawfully aggressive towards his
father, Ganal, Sr., pushing his way through the gate while carrying palm-
sized stones in his hands and having a knife tucked in his waistband. Despite
firing a warning shot, Julwin still continued advancing towards him while
threatening to kill everyone in the house. The exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury can also be appreciated in
his favor. In the alternative, incomplete self-defense may also be considered.
17 cDHAES

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), through Assistant Solicitor

General Diana Castañeda-De Vera and Associate Solicitor Alexis Joseph
Noble, essentially countered that there was no unlawful aggression on
Julwin's part and the means employed by petitioner to repel the imagined
attack was not reasonable and commensurate to the supposed threat. 18
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By its assailed Decision 19 dated March 27, 2019, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in full.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied
through its assailed Resolution 20 dated July 2, 2019.
The Present Petition
Petitioner seeks to reverse, via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
verdict of conviction for homicide rendered against him by the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. He faults the courts below for disregarding
the alleged clear evidence that it was Julwin who initiated the unlawful
aggression when he smashed a large stone on his father's chest and shouted
he would kill petitioner and his family. He asserts that he only shot Julwin
when, even after his warning shot, the latter persisted in attacking him and
his family. Thus, he insists that the justifying circumstances of self-defense
and defense of relatives should be appreciated in his favor.
Ruling
We acquit.
Petitioner invokes the first and second justifying circumstances under
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. — The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
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 the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same
degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil
degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed
in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further
requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
We note that petitioner's primary invocation is self-defense and his
claim of defense of relative should be deemed subsumed therein. As it was,
petitioner witnessed up close how Julwin threw stones onto the roofs of his
and his father's houses, pushed his way through the gate, knocked
petitioner's father unconscious, hitting the latter with a large stone on the
chest, shouted threats that he would kill petitioner and his family, and
advanced toward petitioner even after petitioner had already fired a warning
shot. Clearly, petitioner was immediately put on the defensive when Julwin
started disturbing the peace of his home and posing a risk to his safety and
that of his family.
To successfully claim self-defense, an accused must satisfactorily
prove these elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. 21 ASEcHI

The first element, unlawful aggression, is present here. People v.

Nugas 22 explains the nature of unlawful aggression, thus:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial
element of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without
unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of
oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression
under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the
victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined
or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack
or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or
assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material
unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual
or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that
positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is
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 impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with
intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to
attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to
his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. (Emphasis supplied)
Actual or material unlawful aggression contemplates the offensive act
of using physical force or weapon which positively determines the intent of
the aggressor to cause the injury. Here, Julwin committed a series of
offensive acts that patently revealed his intent to harm petitioner.
The test is whether the aggression from the victim puts in real peril the
life or personal safety of the person defending himself or herself; the peril
must not be an imagined threat. Here, the attendant circumstances
indubitably speak of the real and palpable peril posed by Julwin on the lives
and limbs of petitioner and his father. The peril was certainly far from fiction
or imaginary.
Stones were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent houses of petitioner
and his father, Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to check and saw Angelo in the
company of his uncle Julwin — the deceased. The two were in the middle of
the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr. approached and asked them to go
home because his wife was suffering from hypertension and should not be
disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if Ganal, Sr.'s wife died, he
would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the two,
assuring them that they would settle whatever problem they had the
following day. 23
Julwin, then holding palm-sized stones in both hands, managed to push
open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him with a
stone on the chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks
and passed out. 24
Petitioner, from the main door of his house, saw what happened.
Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and holding two (2) stones,
started to advance toward him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got
his gun, and fired a warning shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had
regained consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran away but Julwin
just continued moving closer and closer to petitioner who then was
constrained to shoot him once. But still Julwin did not retreat. He just kept
moving closer, this time even threatening to kill everyone inside petitioner's
house. Responding to the situation, petitioner then used up all the four (4)
bullets on Julwin who, as a result, fell dead just within a meter from
petitioner's door. 25
The third element of self-defense, lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself or herself, is also present here. 26 In
fact, both the prosecution and defense were one in saying that it was Julwin
who went to petitioner's house and instigated the incident.

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 As for the second element, reasonable necessity of the means
employed, we disagree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and
hold that the same is likewise present. People v. Olarbe 27 extensively
discussed how courts may determine the reasonable necessity of the means
employed: ITAaHc

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger,

the courts should not demand that the accused conduct
himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat
of fatal harm. He had no time to reflect and to reason out his
responses. He had to be quick, and his responses should be
commensurate to the imminent harm. This is the only way to
judge him, for the law of nature — the foundation of the
privilege to use all reasonable means to repel an aggression
that endangers one's own life and the lives of others — did
not require him to use unerring judgment when he had the
reasonable grounds to believe himself in apparent danger of
losing his life or suffering great bodily injury. The test is
whether his subjective belief as to the imminence and
seriousness of the danger was reasonable or not, and the
reasonableness of his belief must be viewed from his
standpoint at the time he acted. The right of a person to take
life in self-defense arises from his belief in the necessity for
doing so; and his belief and the reasonableness thereof are to
be judged in the light of the circumstances as they then
appeared to him, not in the light of circumstances as they
would appear to others or based on the belief that others
may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the
danger and the necessity to kill.
The remaining elements of the justifying circumstances were
likewise established.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
unlawful aggression does not mean absolute necessity. It must be
assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons
that can easily be made in the calmness of reason. The law
requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. In each
particular case, it is necessary to judge the relative necessity,
whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules
of rational logic. The accused may be given the benefit of any
reasonable doubt as to whether or not he employed rational
means to repel the aggression.
In determining the reasonable necessity of the means
employed, the courts may also look at and consider the number of
wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim
can indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the
victim and may belie the reasonableness of the means adopted to
prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. x x x
The courts ought to remember that a person who is
assaulted has neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of
mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used.
For, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act
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 upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a
person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty
of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law for the
consequences. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not
material commensurability, viz.:
It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means
employed does not imply material commensurability between
the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is
rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter
the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to
which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more
than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm
done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, though petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and two (2)
lacerations on Julwin, the number of wounds alone should not automatically
lead to the conclusion that there was a determined effort on petitioner's part
to kill the victim. Petitioner was overcome by the instinct of self-preservation
on seeing that Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his
father unconscious for getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict
injury on petitioner — he brought two (2) large stones and knife for the
purpose. CHTAIc

Faced by a determined and prepared foe, petitioner, who was simply

drinking with his friends, suddenly found himself in a situation where he had
to defend himself and his family from serious harm or even death. Notably,
petitioner first tried to simply scare off Julwin by firing a warning shot. Julwin
was unfazed and still continued to advance toward him with malevolent
intent. And even after petitioner shot Julwin, the latter did not even falter but
instead threatened to kill petitioner and his family. How does one react to
such a terrifying situation? Petitioner must have thought that his actions
were so futile because Julwin was still standing there and shouting threats.
Petitioner, at that instant, must have felt he had to end it once and for all —
kill or be killed. So, he shot Julwin four (4) more times until the latter felt just
a meter away from him. To repeat " the right of a person to take life in self-
defense arises from his belief in the necessity for doing so; and his belief
and the reasonableness thereof are to be judged in the light of the
circumstances as they then appeared to him, not in the light of
circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that
others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger
and the necessity to kill."
Indeed, petitioner must be exonerated for he had acted only in self-
defense.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 27, 2019 and Resolution dated July 2, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR NO. 41105
of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
PRUDENCIO GANAL, JR. is ACQUITTED of HOMICIDE on ground of the
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 justifying circumstance of self-defense. cHDAIS

SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, ** Lopez and Rosario, *** JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, * J., is on official leave.

Footnotes
* On official leave.
** Acting Chairperson vice Senior Associate Justice Perlas-Bernabe.
*** Designated additional member per S.O. No. 2797, dated November 5, 2020.
1. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (retired Member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Germano Francisco D. Legaspi
and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin, all members of the Special 13th Division,
rollo, pp. 32-44.
2. Id. at 46-47.
3. Id. at 32.
4. Id. at 63.

5. Id. at 63-64.
6. Id. at 64.
7. Id. at 64-65.
8. Id. at 65.
9. Id. at 65-66.

10. Id. at 33.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 34.
13. Id. at 61-74.
14. Id. at 66-71.

15. Id. at 71-72.

16. Id. at 73-74.
17. Id. at 50-58.
18. Id. at 77-88.

19. Supra note 1.

20. Supra note 2.
21. See People v. Dulin, 762 Phil. 24, 36 (2015).

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 22. 677 Phil. 168, 177-178 (2011).
23. Supra note 6.
24. Id.
25. Supra note 8.

26. Supra note 21.

27. G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018.

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