RA 9262 should be liberally interpreted and the RPC shall serve as suppletory act.

Section 47 of RA 9262 in relation to Art 10 of the RPC may be invoked. Hence, Art
8 of RPC may be imposed. The in-laws may be covered in the issuance of TRO if
proven to have conspired with the husband.

Sharica Mari Go-Tan vs. Spouses Perfecto and Juanita Tan

G.R. No. 168852
September 30, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective
Order (TPO) against her husband,Steven, and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan
and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5),
and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004."

Respondents contend that they cannot be included in the charge since they are not among
the personalities liable as enumerated under the said law by virtue of “expresio unius est
exclusion alterius.”

Ruling:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner with regard to the inclusion of the respondent spouses.

A provision of the said law expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC
(Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262), which allowed legal principles developed in the RPC may be
applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
9262.

Citing jurisprudence, the court held that the “principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the
RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus,
the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators”.

Furthermore, Section 5 of R.A. 9262 recognizes the acts of violence against women and
their children may be committed by an offender through another

The maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application in the case at bar
since it is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction” and not of universal application
nor is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
when not plainly indicated.
However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be best decided after
fullblown trial on the merits.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 168852           September 30, 2008

SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.*

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution 2 dated
July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual background of the case:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were
married.3 Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6 against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of
Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004."

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9 granting petitioner's prayer for a
TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the

Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as
parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition 11 to respondents'
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of
violence.

On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12 dismissing the case as to

respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration 14 contending
that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.

On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration15 arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged
victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying petitioner's

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents
under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions
of the law.

Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-

IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions
of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under
Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and
respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that
respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete
resolution of the case.

On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is
not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."

While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim
by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of
the RPC, thus:

SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal

Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis
supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in
the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262,
in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary

penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise
known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain
any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the

RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,"
because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the
same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary

imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on
subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied suppletorily the principle of

conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.

With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may
be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC,
which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily.

Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy
or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all
the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. 23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
through another, thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through

another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to
the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following
acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
 (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman
or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman

or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to

animals or pets of the woman or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis

supplied)

In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further
acts of violence against the woman or her child may include

individuals other than the offending husband, thus:

SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this
Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing,

personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this
Act; 1avvphi1.net

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,

contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus:

SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and that this intent must be
effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio
alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
"ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it
conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which
is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance
of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents
to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is
an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It is
thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is
centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a
petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best
passed upon after a trial on the merits.

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise
in superfluity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March
7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* The present petition impleaded the Court of Appeals as respondent. Pursuant

to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the name of the Court of Appeals is
deleted from the title.
1
 Penned by Judge Romeo F. Zamora, records, p. 209.
2
 Id. at 501.
3
 Records, p. 21.
4
 Id. at 22.
5
 Id. at 23.
6
 Id. at 1.
7
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage

in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or child's movement or conduct:
 xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of

financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a

legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,

occupation, business or activity, or controlling the victim's own
money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common
money, or properties;

xxxx

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,

personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman
or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:

xxxx

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to

the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.
8
 Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES".
9
 Records, p. 26.
10
 Records, p. 36.
11
 Id. at 147.
12
 Id. at 209.
13
 Latin maxim meaning "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
(San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Phil. Transport and General Workers
Org. v. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ng
Manggagawang Pilipino, G.R. No. 171153, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA 125,
152).
14
 Records, p. 316.
15
 Id. at 376.
16
 Id. at 510 .
17
 Rollo, p. 8.
18
 60 Phil. 712 (1934).
19
 G.R. Nos. 90440-42, October 13, 1992, 214 SCRA 504.
20
 G.R. Nos. 129577-80, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA 572.
21
 G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA 431.
22
 G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673.
23
 Ladonga v. People, supra note 22; People v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505,
December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, 176; People v. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No.
128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA 448, 469; People v. Quinicio, G.R. No.
142430, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 252, 266.
24
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No.
160528, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 90, 101; Eugenio v. Drilon, 322 Phil. 112
(1996); Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President, 322 Phil. 6, 14 (1996);
Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50, 57 (1950); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145-
146 (1931).
25
 Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 47, 78; Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15,
1991, 202 SCRA 779, 792; Primero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 48468-69,
November 22, 1989, 179 SCRA 542, 548-549.
26
 Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction
Company, G.R. No. 169596, March 28, 2007, 519 SCRA 432, 441; Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004,
428 SCRA 79, 85.