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VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 671

People vs. Salvilla

*
G.R. No. 86163. April 26, 1990.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES,
RONALDO CANASARES, AND SIMPLICIO
CANASARES, BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-
appellant.

Criminal Law; Robbery; From the moment the offender gained

possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to
dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete.—It is no
defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no
opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken. That fact does
not affect the nature of the crime. From the moment the offender
gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no
opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is
complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Book II, 1981
ed., p. 594).
Same; Same; Failure to mention the taking in a sworn
statement would not militate against the credibility of the witness.
—It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen
the taking because the place was dark since the doors were closed
and there were no windows. It will be recalled, however, that
Rodita was one of the hostages herself and could observe the
unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the taking in her
sworn statement would not militate against her credibility, it
being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete and
inaccurate and does not disclose the complete facts for want of
inquiries or suggestions.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of the trial court, as to the
credibility of the witness, are entitled to great weight.—In the last
analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of
witnesses in respect of which the findings of the Trial Court are
entitled to great weight as it was in a superior position to assess
the same in the course of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No.
L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R.
No. L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Surrender of the accused was not

to be mitigating when he gave up only after he was surrounded by
the constabulary and police forces.—The “surrender” by the
Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements.
They were, indeed,

________________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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People vs. Salvilla

asked to surrender by the police and military authorities but they

refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were
completely surrounded and there was no chance of escape. The
surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when he
gave up only after he was surrounded by the constabulary and
police forces (People vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30
April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488,
29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not
spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure their
safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender,
the fact is that they did not despite several opportunities to do so.
There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs.
Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The crime of serious illegal
detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by
appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out their evil
design to stage a robbery.—Under Article 48, a complex crime
arises “when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.” The term “necessary means” does not connote
indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a “necessary
means” to commit another would be an indispensable element of
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase
“necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is committed to
facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor,
J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the crime of
Serious Illegal Detention was such a “necessary means” as it was

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selected by Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry

out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.

APPEAL from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Iloilo City, Br. 28. Gustilo, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the

Decision
**
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo
City, dated 29

_______________

** Penned by Judge Edgar D. Gustilo.

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People vs. Salvilla

August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and

his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all
surnamed Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of “Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and
Serious Illegal Detention” and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Information filed against them reads:

“The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA,

REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and
SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and
places of birth cannot be ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY
WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION (Art. 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction
with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said
accused, conspiring and confederating among themselves,
working together and helping one another, armed with guns and
handgrenade and with the use of violence or intimidation
employed on the person of Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimia
Choco and Rodita Hablero, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally take and carry away, with intent of gain, cash in
the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men’s wrist watches, one (1)
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Lady’s Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady’s Citizen wrist
watch and assorted jewelries, all valued at P50,000.00; that on
the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary Choco suffered
serious physical injuries under paragraph 2 of Article 263,
Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and
Reynaldo Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said
accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the New Iloilo
Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco,
owner/ proprietor of said Lumber Company, Mary Choco, Mimie
Choco, who is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero,
who is a salesgirl at said Company; that likewise on the occasion
of the robbery, the accused also asked and were given a ransom
money of P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by
aggravating circumstances of band, and illegal possession of
firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the
ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men’s wrist watches, two (2)
Lady’s wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live
grenade were recovered from the accused; to the damage and
prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of
P120,000.00.”

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The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as

follows:
On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four
accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time.
The plan was hatched about two days before. The accused
were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade.
When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita
Habiero, an employee thereat who was on her way out for
her meal break and announced to her that it was a hold-up.
She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant
Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and
his two daughters, Mary and Mimie, the latter being a
minor 15 years of age, and told the former that all they
needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his
daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he placed
P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and
handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded with
the four accused to leave the premises as they already had
the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused
Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of
Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and

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Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as

hostages.
At about 2:00 o’clock of the same day, the hostages were
allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating
while the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino
to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could
be released. Severino answered that he could not do so
because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.
In the meantime, police and military authorities had
surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major
Melquiades B. Sequio, Station Commander of the INP of
Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a loud
speaker and appealed to them to surrender with the
assurance that no harm would befall them as he would
accompany them personally to the police station. The
accused refused to surrender or to release the hostages.
Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City
arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with
the accused, which lasted for about four hours, Appellant
demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She
offered them P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty
of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused
agreed to receive the same and to release Rodita to be
accompanied by Mary Choco in going

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People vs. Salvilla

out of the office. When they were out of the door, one of the
accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a
key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram unlocked the
padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00,
which the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused. Rodita
was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.
Mayor Caram, Major Sequio, and even volunteer radio
news-casters continued to appeal to the accused to
surrender peacefully but they refused. Ultimatums were
given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and
military authorities decided to launch an offensive and
assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls,
Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo
and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a “macerated right
lower extremity just below the knee” so that her right leg
had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her
condition as “in a state of hemorrhagic shock when she was
brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major
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operations during the course of her confinement from April

13, 1986 to May 30, 1986.”
For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about
noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered
the lumber yard and demanded money from the owner
Severino Choco. He demanded P100,000.00 but was given
only P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office
of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused
kept Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office.
He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused
from getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and,
like the P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were
never touched by them. He claimed further that they had
never fired on the military because they intended to
surrender. Appellant’s version also was that during the
gunfire, Severino’s daughter stood up and went outside; he
wanted to stop her but he himself was hit by a bullet and
could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals
directed to them to surrender but that they gave
themselves up only much later.
After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of
conviction and sentenced each of the accused “to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law and to pay the costs.”

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People vs. Salvilla

Appellant Salvilla’s present appeal is predicated on the

following Assignments of Error:

“1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime

charged was consummated and in not holding that
the same was merely attempted.
“2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.”

Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.

The defense contends that “The complete crime of
larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt
requires asportation or carrying away, in addition to the
taking. In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three
consecutive stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the
carrying away or asportation. And without asportation the
crime committed is only attempted” (Memorandum for
Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
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There is no question that in robbery, it is required that

there be a taking of personal property belonging to another.
This is known as the element of asportation, the essence of
which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the
owner without his privity and consent and without the
animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97,
citing 5 C.J. 607). In fact, if there is no actual taking, there
can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of
another is an essential part of the crime of robbery.
Appellant insists that while the “giving” has been
proven, the “taking” has not. And this is because neither he
nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by
Severino nor the latter’s wallet or watch during the entire
incident; proof of which is that none of those items were
recovered from their persons.
Those factual allegations are contradicted by the
evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that
upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside
a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In
turn, accused Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and
wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from
Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the
amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the
padlocked door and that she thereafter gave the amount to
one of the holduppers. The “taking” was, therefore,

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People vs. Salvilla

sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-

31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch
were within the dominion and control of the Appellant and
his co-accused and completed the taking.

“The State established a ‘taking’ sufficient to support a conviction

of robbery even though the perpetrators were interrupted by
police and so did not pick up the money offered by the victim,
where the defendant and an accomplice, armed with a knife and a
club respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk
of a convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their
instructions and placed money from the register in a paper bag
and then placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men;
these actions brought the money within the dominion and control
of defendant and completed the taking.” (Johnson vs. State, 432
So 2d 758).

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“Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and

absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant,
constitutes asportation.” (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381;
State vs. Murray 280 SW 2d 809; Mason vs. Commonwealth, 105
SE 2d 149) [italics supplied].

It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused

had no opportunity to dispose of the personalties taken.
That fact does not affect the nature of the crime. From the
moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if
the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the
unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code
Annotated, Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).

“The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession

of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary
that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he
should have actually carried the property away, out of the
physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have
made his escape with it” (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods
vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs.
Clark, 160 P 2d 553).

Contrary to Appellant’s submission, therefore, a conviction

for consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in
order.
It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not
have seen the taking because the place was dark since the
doors were
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People vs. Salvilla

closed and there were no windows. It will be recalled,

however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and
could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to
mention the taking in her sworn statement would not
militate against her credibility, it being settled that an
affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and
does not disclose the complete facts for want of inquiries or
suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July
1987, 152 SCRA 570; People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337
[1951]).
The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino
would not lessen her credibility. The defense has not
proven that she was actuated by any improper motive in
testifying against the accused.
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In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers

around the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the
findings of the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it
was in a superior position to assess the same in the course
of the trial (see People vs. Ornoza, G.R. No. L-56283, 30
June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No.
L-38042, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).
Anent the second assignment of error, the “surrender” of
the Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in
their favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a
surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the
offender had not been actually arrested; (b) that the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to
his agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary (People
vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA
141).
The “surrender” by the Appellant and his co-accused
hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked
to surrender by the police and military authorities but they
refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they
were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be
mitigating as when he gave up only after he was
surrounded by the constabulary and police forces (People
vs. Sigayan, et al., G.R., No. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16
SCRA 839; People vs. Mationg, G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March
1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not
spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to
insure their
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People vs. Salvilla

safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to

surrender, the fact is that they did not despite several
opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to
speak of (People vs. Dimdiman, 106 Phil. 391 [1959]).
All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and
we find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido
Salvilla, established beyond reasonable doubt.
Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary
to turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved
and the penalty imposed by the Trial Court.
Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the
Information with “Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries
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and Serious Illegal Detention (“Art. 295, par. 3, in

conjunction with Art. 267, RPC”), and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. We agree with the Trial Court that a
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
has been committed such that the penalty for the more
serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267,
Revised Penal Code), or “reclusion perpetua to death,” is to
be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery
with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which is
reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48, a complex crime arises “when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other.” The
term “necessary means” does not connote indispensable
means for if it did then the offense as a “necessary means”
to commit another would be an indispensable element of
the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase
“necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is
committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624,
citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515). In this case, the crime of Serious Illegal Detention
was such a “necessary means” as it was selected by
Appellant and his co-accused to facilitate and carry out
more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.
The facts of this case differ from those in People vs.
Astor, et als. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149
SCRA 325) where the accused were convicted of Robbery
but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and
where it was held that “the detention is absorbed in the
crime of robbery.” For one, in Astor, there were two (2)
separate Informations filed, one for Robbery
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and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present

case, only one Information was filed charging the complex
offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already
been consummated and the detention was merely to
forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in
this case, where the detention was availed of as a means of
insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further, in
Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime
of robbery so that it was held therein:

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“x x x were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival

of the police at the scene of the crime, they would have not
anymore detained the people inside since they have already
completed their job. Obviously, appellants were left with no choice
but to resort to detention of these people as security, until
arrangements for their safe passage were made. This is not the
crime of illegal detention punishable under the penal laws but an
act of restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals by
peace officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People v. Uday, 55 Phil.
167, cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p.
1337). Where the victims in a robbery case were detained in the
course of robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of
robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the
detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery, and
although in the course thereof women and children were also
held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be held
guilty of robbery.”

In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only

incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to
commit the same. After the amount of P20,000.00 was
handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still
refused to leave. The victims were then taken as hostages
and the demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was
made as a prerequisite for their release. The detention was
not because the accused were trapped by the police nor
were the victims held as security against the latter. The
detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable
the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of
extortion for an additional amount. The police and other
authorities arrived only much later after several hours of
detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to
appellant and his co-accused to surrender, they adamantly
refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded
could be turned over to
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People vs. Salvilla

them. They even considered P50,000.00, the amount being

handed to them, as inadequate.
The foregoing features also distinguish this case from
those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint
was for no other purpose than to prevent the victims from
reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v.
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Gamboa, 92 Phil. 1085 [1953] where the victims were taken

to a place one kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate
the witnesses to the robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil.
1008 [1953]; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all
of which cases were cited in Astor, and where the victims
were only incidentally detained so that the detention was
deemed absorbed in robbery.
In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements
of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in
this case. The victims were illegally deprived of their
liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie), and a minor
(Minnie), a specified circumstance in Article 267 (3), were
among those detained. The continuing detention was also
for the purpose of extorting ransom, another listed
circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.), not only from the
detained persons themselves but even from the authorities
who arrived to rescue them.
It follows then that as the detention in this case was not
merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means
employed to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial
Court is proper.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,

concur.

Judgment affirmed.

Note.—Detention is absorbed if it is incidental to the

crime of robbery. (People vs. Astor, 149 SCRA 325.)

——o0o——

682

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