Iso 14224 2016 PDF
Iso 14224 2016 PDF
Iso 14224 2016 PDF
Petroleum, petrochemical
and natural gas industries —
Collection and exchange of
reliability and maintenance
data for equipment
(ISO 14224:2016)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016 BRITISH STANDARD
National foreword
This British Standard is the UK implementation of EN ISO
14224:2016. It supersedes BS EN ISO 14224:2006 which is
withdrawn.
The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical
Committee PSE/17/67, Reliability engineering and technology
committee.
A list of organizations represented on this committee can be
obtained on request to its secretary.
This publication does not purport to include all the necessary
provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct
application.
© The British Standards Institution 2016.
Published by BSI Standards Limited 2016
ISBN 978 0 580 90387 8
ICS 75.200; 75.180.01
Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from
legal obligations.
This British Standard was published under the authority of the
Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 31 October 2016.
Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication
Date Text affected
EUROPEAN STANDARD EN ISO 14224
NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM October 2016
English Version
CEN members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this
European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references
concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CEN
member.
This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by
translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management
Centre has the same status as the official versions.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and
United Kingdom.
© 2016 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. EN ISO 14224:2016 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
EN ISO 14224:2016 (E)
European foreword
This document (EN ISO 14224:2016) has been prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 “Materials,
equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries” in
collaboration with Technical Committee CEN/TC 12 “Materials, equipment and offshore structures for
petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries” the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an
identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by April 2017, and conflicting national standards shall be
withdrawn at the latest by April 2017.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights.
According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the
following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Endorsement notice
The text of ISO 14224:2016 has been approved by CEN as EN ISO 14224:2016 without any modification.
3
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
Contents Page
Foreword...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................v
Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. vi
1 Scope.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 1
2 Normative references....................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
3 Terms and definitions...................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
4 Abbreviated terms............................................................................................................................................................................................18
5 Application...............................................................................................................................................................................................................20
5.1 Equipment coverage......................................................................................................................................................................... 20
5.2 Time periods........................................................................................................................................................................................... 20
5.3 Users of this International Standard.................................................................................................................................. 20
5.4 Limitations................................................................................................................................................................................................ 21
5.5 Exchange of RM data........................................................................................................................................................................ 22
6 Benefits of RM data collection and exchange........................................................................................................................23
7 Quality of data.......................................................................................................................................................................................................25
7.1 Obtaining quality data.................................................................................................................................................................... 25
7.1.1 Definition of data quality........................................................................................................................................ 25
7.1.2 Planning measures....................................................................................................................................................... 25
7.1.3 Verification of quality................................................................................................................................................ 26
7.1.4 Limitations and problems...................................................................................................................................... 27
7.2 Data collection process.................................................................................................................................................................. 27
7.2.1 Data sources....................................................................................................................................................................... 27
7.2.2 Data collection methods.......................................................................................................................................... 28
7.2.3 Organization and training...................................................................................................................................... 28
8 Equipment boundary, taxonomy and time definitions...............................................................................................29
8.1 Boundary description..................................................................................................................................................................... 29
8.2 Taxonomy.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 30
8.3 Timeline issues..................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
8.3.1 Surveillance and operating period................................................................................................................. 32
8.3.2 Data collection periods............................................................................................................................................. 33
8.3.3 Maintenance times....................................................................................................................................................... 34
9 Recommended data for equipment, failures and maintenance........................................................................35
9.1 Data categories..................................................................................................................................................................................... 35
9.2 Data format.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 35
9.3 Database structure............................................................................................................................................................................ 36
9.3.1 Description.......................................................................................................................................................................... 36
9.3.2 Logical structure............................................................................................................................................................ 36
9.3.3 Database architecture............................................................................................................................................... 37
9.4 Equipment data.................................................................................................................................................................................... 38
9.5 Failure data.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 40
9.6 Maintenance data............................................................................................................................................................................... 42
9.6.1 General................................................................................................................................................................................... 42
9.6.2 Maintenance categories........................................................................................................................................... 42
9.6.3 Reporting maintenance data............................................................................................................................... 43
Annex A (informative) Equipment-class attributes............................................................................................................................46
Annex B (normative) Interpretation and notation of failure and maintenance parameters.............. 176
Annex C (informative) Guide to interpretation and calculation of derived reliability and
maintenance parameters...................................................................................................................................................................... 205
Annex D (informative) Typical requirements for data................................................................................................................ 229
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2. www.iso.org/directives
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received. www.iso.org/patents
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information
The committee responsible for this document is Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment
and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO 14224:2006), which has been technically
revised. The main changes are:
— Clause 3 — several new definitions;
— Clauses 8 and 9 — changes in some figures and tables;
— Annex A — new equipment classes;
— Annex B — associated new and aligned failure modes;
— Annex C — some changes and new subclauses, e.g. C.3.4 and C.7;
— Annex D — new subclause D.5;
— Annex E — new KPIs;
— Annex F — alignment with ISO/TR 12489:2013.
This corrected version of ISO 14224:2016 incorporates various editorial corrections.
Introduction
This International Standard has been prepared based on the previous edition (ISO 14224:2006),
experience gained through its use, and know-how and best practices shared through the international
development process.
In the petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, great attention is being paid to safety,
availability, reliability and maintainability of equipment. The industry annual cost of equipment
unavailability is very large, although many plant owners have improved the availability of their
operating facilities by addressing this challenge. A stronger emphasis has recently been put on cost-
effective design and maintenance for new plants and existing installations among more industrial
parties. In this respect, data on failures, failure mechanisms and maintenance related to these industrial
facilities and its operations have become more important. It is necessary that this information is used
by, and communicated between, the various parties and its disciplines, within the same company or
between companies. Various analysis methodologies are used to estimate the risk of hazards to people
and environment, or to analyse plant or system performance. For such analyses to be effective and
decisive, equipment reliability and maintenance (RM) data are vital.
These analyses require a clear understanding of the equipment’s technical characteristics, its operating
and environmental conditions, its potential failures and its maintenance activities. It can be necessary
to have data covering several years of operation before sufficient data have been accumulated to
give confident analysis results and relevant decision support. It is necessary, therefore, to view data
collection as a long-term activity, planned and executed with appropriate goals in mind. At the same
time, clarity as to the causes of failures is key to prioritizing and implementing corrective actions that
result in sustainable improvements in availability, leading to improved profitability and safety.
Data collection is an investment. Data standardization, when combined with enhanced data-
management systems that allow electronic collection and transfer of data, can result in improved
quality of data for reliability and maintenance. A cost-effective way of optimizing data requirements
is through industry co-operation. To make it possible to collect, exchange and analyse data based on
common viewpoints, a standard is required. Standardization of data collection practices facilitates the
exchange of information between relevant parties e.g. plants, owners, manufacturers and contractors
throughout the world.
1 Scope
This International Standard provides a comprehensive basis for the collection of reliability and
maintenance (RM) data in a standard format for equipment in all facilities and operations within the
petroleum, natural gas and petrochemical industries during the operational life cycle of equipment. It
describes data collection principles and associated terms and definitions that constitute a “reliability
language” that can be useful for communicating operational experience. The failure modes defined in
the normative part of this International Standard can be used as a “reliability thesaurus” for various
quantitative as well as qualitative applications. This International Standard also describes data quality
control and assurance practices to provide guidance for the user.
Standardization of data collection practices facilitates the exchange of information between parties, e.g.
plants, owners, manufacturers and contractors. This International Standard establishes requirements
that any in-house or commercially available RM data system is required to meet when designed for
RM data exchange. Examples, guidelines and principles for the exchange and merging of such RM data
are addressed. This International Standard also provides a framework and guidelines for establishing
performance objectives and requirements for equipment reliability and availability performance.
Annex A contains a summary of equipment that is covered by this International Standard.
This International Standard defines a minimum amount of data that is required to be collected, and it
focuses on two main issues:
— data requirements for the categories of data to be collected for use in various analysis methodologies;
— standardized data format to facilitate the exchange of reliability and maintenance data between
plants, owners, manufacturers and contractors.
The following main categories of data are to be collected:
a) equipment data, e.g. equipment taxonomy, equipment attributes;
b) failure data, e.g. failure cause, failure consequence;
c) maintenance data, e.g. maintenance action, resources used, maintenance consequence, down time.
NOTE Clause 9 gives further details on data content and data format.
The main areas where such data are used are the following:
1) reliability, e.g. failure events and failure mechanisms;
2) availability/efficiency, e.g. equipment availability, system availability, plant production availability;
3) maintenance, e.g. corrective and preventive maintenance, maintenance plan, maintenance
supportability;
4) safety and environment, e.g. equipment failures with adverse consequences for safety and/or
environment.
This International Standard does not apply to the following:
i. data on (direct) cost issues;
ii. data from laboratory testing and manufacturing (e.g. accelerated lifetime testing), see also 5.2;
iii. complete equipment data sheets (only data seen relevant for assessing the reliability performance
are included);
iv. additional on-service data that an operator, on an individual basis, can consider useful for operation
and maintenance;
v. methods for analysing and applying RM data (however, principles for how to calculate some basic
reliability and maintenance parameters are included in the annexes).
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO 20815:2008, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Production assurance and
reliability management
3.1
active maintenance time
duration of a maintenance action, excluding logistic delay
Note 1 to entry: Technical delays are included in the active maintenance time.
Note 2 to entry: See Figure 4 and Annex C for a more detailed description and interpretation of maintenance
times. See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figure 5.
Note 3 to entry: A maintenance action can be carried out while the item is performing a required function.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-07-04, modified – Notes 2 and 3 to entry have been added.]
3.2
active repair time
effective time to achieve repair of an item
Note 1 to entry: See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figures 5 and 6.
Note 2 to entry: See also definition of “mean active repair time (MART)” in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.34, that is
defined as “expected active repair time”.
3.3
availability
ability to be in a state to perform as required
Note 1 to entry: See Annex C for a more detailed description and interpretation of availability.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-01-23, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.4
boundary
interface between an item and its surroundings
3.5
common cause failures
failures of multiple items, which would otherwise be considered independent of one another, resulting
from a single cause
Note 1 to entry: Common cause failures can also be common mode failures.
Note 2 to entry: The potential for common cause failures reduces the effectiveness of system redundancy.
Note 3 to entry: It is generally accepted that the failures occur simultaneously or within a short time of each other.
Note 4 to entry: Components that fail due to a shared cause normally fail in the same functional mode. The term
common mode is therefore sometimes used. It is, however, not considered to be a precise term for communicating
the characteristics that describe a common cause failure.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-18, modified – Notes 3-6 to entry have been added.]
3.6
common mode failures
failures of different items characterized by the same failure mode
Note 1 to entry: Common mode failures can have different causes.
Note 2 to entry: Common mode failures can also be common cause failures (3.5).
Note 3 to entry: The potential for common mode failures reduces the effectiveness of system redundancy.
Note 2 to entry: See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figures 5 and 6, which illustrate terms used for quantifying
corrective maintenance.
Note 2 to entry: See also definition of “critical dangerous failure” and “critical safe failure” in ISO/TR 12489:2013,
3.2.4 and 3.2.7, respectively.
3.10
cycle
operation and subsequent release/reset
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-444:2002, 444-02-11]
3.11
degraded failure
failure that does not cease the fundamental function(s), but compromises one or several functions
Note 1 to entry: The failure can be gradual, partial or both. The function can be compromised by any combination
of reduced, increased or erratic outputs. An immediate repair can normally be delayed but, in time, such failures
can develop into a critical failure if corrective actions are not taken.
3.12
demand
activation of the function (includes functional, operational and test activation)
Note 1 to entry: See C.1.3 for a more detailed description.
Note 2 to entry: Annex F.3 gives a list of safety critical equipment which are subject to periodic testing.
Note 3 to entry: See also relevant definitions in ISO/TR 12489:2013: “mean time to demand (MTTD)” is defined
in 3.1.38, “failure due to demand” is defined in 3.2.13, and “demand mode of operation safety system” is defined
in 3.3.1.
3.13
design life
planned usage time for the total system
Note 1 to entry: It is important not to confuse design life with the ‘mean time to failure’ (MTTF), which is
comprised of several items that might be allowed to fail within the design life of the system as long as repair or
replacement is feasible.
3.15
down state
unavailable state
internally disabled state
internal disabled state
<of an item> state of being unable to perform as required, due to internal fault, or preventive
maintenance
Note 1 to entry: Down state relates to unavailability of the item.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-02-20, modified – Notes 3 and 4 to entry have been added.]
3.16
down time
time interval during which an item is in a down state
Note 1 to entry: The down time includes all the delays between the item failure and the restoration of its service.
Down time can be either planned or unplanned (see Table 4).
Note 2 to entry: Mean downtime is in IEC 60050-192, 192-08-10, defined as the ‘expectation of the down time’.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-02-21, modified - Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.17
downstream
business category most commonly used in the petroleum industry to describe post-production
processes
EXAMPLE Refining, transportation and marketing of petroleum products
3.18
equipment class
class of similar type of equipment units (e.g. all pumps)
Note 1 to entry: Annex A contains equipment-specific data for the equipment covered in this International
Standard.
3.19
equipment data
technical, operational and environmental parameters characterizing the design and use of an
equipment unit
3.20
equipment type
particular feature of the design which is significantly different from the other design(s) within the same
equipment class
3.21
equipment unit
specific equipment within an equipment class as defined by its boundary
Note 1 to entry: Equipment unit is given at level 6 of the equipment taxonomy classification with taxonomic levels
shown in Figure 3.
3.22
error
discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or
theoretically correct value or condition
Note 1 to entry: An error within a system can be caused by failure of one or more of its components, or by the
activation of a systematic fault.
Note 2 to entry: An error can be caused by a faulty item, e.g. a computing error made by faulty computer
equipment.
Note 3 to entry: In this International Standard, error is also specifically used for software and human errors.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-02, modified – Notes 2 and 3 to entry have been added.]
3.23
failure
<of an item> loss of ability to perform as required
Note 1 to entry: A failure of an item is an event that results in a fault of that item: see fault (3.22).
Note 2 to entry: A failure of an item is an event, as distinct from a fault of an item, which is a state [source:
ISO/TR 12489:2013].
Note 3 to entry: This concept as defined does not apply to items consisting of software only.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-01, modified – Notes 2 through 4 to entry have been added.]
3.24
failure cause
root cause
set of circumstances that leads to failure
Note 1 to entry: A failure cause can originate during specification, design, manufacture, installation, operation or
maintenance of an item.
Note 2 to entry: See also B.2.3 and Table B.3, which define failure causes for all equipment classes.
3.26
failure due to demand
failure occurring on demand
Note 1 to entry: See further details in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.2.13.
Note 2 to entry: Classification of failure impact on taxonomy levels 4 and 5 (see Figure 3) is shown in Table 3. See
also C.1.10.
3.29
failure mechanism
process that leads to failure
Note 1 to entry: The process can be physical, chemical, logical, or a combination thereof.
Note 2 to entry: See also B.2.2 and Table B.2, which define failure causes for all equipment classes.
Note 2 to entry: Analysis might require data collection to be established on different taxonomy levels, see Table 3.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-17, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.31
failure on demand
failure likely to be observed when a demand occurs
Note 1 to entry: Failure on demand includes the failures occurred before the demand and the failures due to
the demand.
Note 2 to entry: See also C.6 on testing for hidden failures in safety systems.
Note 4 to entry: See ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.15 for definition of the probability of failure on demand (PFD).
Note 5 to entry: Different failure modes are used to reflect failure on demand (see the tables in B.2.6).
Note 2 to entry: See also definition of failure rate in IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-05-06 (instantaneous failure rate).
Note 2 to entry: A fault is often a result of a failure of the item itself but the state can exist without a failure (see
ISO 20815:2008, 3.1.14).
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-04-01, modified – Notes 2 and 3 to entry have been added.]
3.34
generic reliability data
reliability data covering families of similar equipment
Note 1 to entry: See Annex D.5 and Table D.5.
3.35
hidden failure
failure that is not immediately evident to operations and maintenance personnel
Note 1 to entry: Equipment failures that occurred at an earlier point of time, but were first observed at demand,
fall into this category. Such failures are first revealed when the relevant functionality is tested (activated).
3.36
human error
discrepancy between the human action taken or omitted and that intended
EXAMPLE Performing an incorrect action; omitting a required action.
Note 1 to entry: Discrepancy with intention is considered essential in determining human error (see [303]).
Note 2 to entry: The term “human error” is often attributed in hindsight to a human decision, action or inaction
considered to be an initiator or contributory cause of a negative outcome such as loss or harm.
Note 3 to entry: In human reliability assessment human error is defined as any member of a set of human actions
or activities that exceeds some limit of acceptability, this being an out of tolerance action or failure to act where
the limits of performance are defined by the system (see [298]).
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-03-14, modified – Notes 1 through 5 to entry have been added.]
3.37
human fatigue
loss of physiological and psychological function as a result of extended wakefulness, heavy work,
excessive stimulation, illness or stress
Note 1 to entry: Human fatigue can be related to some of the failure causes in Table B.3, e.g. operating error.
Note 2 to entry: In some applications, an item in an idle state has some functioning subsystems, and is therefore
considered to be operating.
Note 3 to entry: The non-operating time comprises the idle time, the stand-by time and the externally disabled time
3.39
idle time
time interval for which the item is in an idle state
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-02-15]
3.40
incipient failure
imperfection in the state or condition of an item so that a degraded or critical failure might (or might
not) eventually be the expected result if corrective actions are not taken
Note 1 to entry: The recording of incipient failure requires some criteria for when a fault of this nature requires
registration as opposed to a state/condition where no corrective actions are required.
3.41
indenture level
level of subdivision of an item from the point of view of maintenance action
3.42
integrity
ability of a barrier to function as required when needed
Note 1 to entry: See 3.1.2 in ISO/TR 12489:2013 for definition of safety integrity.
Note 2 to entry: There are different definitions of integrity: plant, asset, system, pipeline, well (see ISO 16530-1:—
, 2.73), mechanical, safety (see ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.2), structural and technical.
3.43
item
subject being considered
Note 1 to entry: The item can be an individual part, component, device, functional unit, equipment, subsystem,
or system.
Note 2 to entry: The item may consist of hardware, software, people or any combination thereof.
Note 3 to entry: In this International Standard, the common term “item” is used on all taxonomy levels 6 to 9 in
Figure 3. See also 3.30, which defines a specific item level.
Note 2 to entry: See also ISO 20815:2008, Table 2 for the purpose of production assurance.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-01-09, modified – Notes 1-2 to entry have been added.]
3.46
logistic delay
delay, excluding administrative delay, incurred for the provision of resources needed for a maintenance
action to proceed or continue
Note 1 to entry: Logistic delays can be due to, for example, travelling to unattended installations, pending
arrival of spare parts, specialists, test equipment and information, and delays due to unsuitable environmental
conditions (e.g. waiting on weather).
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-07-13, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.47
maintainability
<of an item> ability to be retained in, or restored to a state to perform as required, under given
conditions of use and maintenance
Note 1 to entry: Given conditions would include aspects that affect maintainability, such as: location for
maintenance, accessibility, maintenance procedures and maintenance resources.
Note 2 to entry: Maintainability can be quantified using appropriate measures. See IEC 60050-192:2015,
192-07-Maintainability and maintenance support: measures.
Note 3 to entry: See Annex C for a more detailed definition and interpretation of maintainability.
3.52
maintenance impact
effect of the maintenance on the plant or equipment’s function(s)
Note 1 to entry: On the equipment level, two classes of impact are defined: critical and non-critical. On plant level,
three classes are defined: total, partial or zero impact.
3.53
maintenance man-hours
accumulated duration of the individual maintenance times used by all maintenance personnel for a
given type of maintenance action or over a given time interval
Note 1 to entry: Maintenance man-hours are expressed in units of hours.
Note 2 to entry: As several people can work at the same time, man-hours are not directly related to other
parameters like the “mean time to repair” and “mean down time”.
3.54
maintenance plan
structured and documented set of tasks that include the activities, procedures, resources and the time
scale required to carry out maintenance
Note 1 to entry: See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.4.6.
3.56
maintenance supportability
supportability
<of an item> ability to be supported to sustain the required availability with a defined operational
profile and given logistic and maintenance resources
Note 1 to entry: Supportability of an item results from the inherent maintainability (3.47), combined with factors
external to the item that affect the relative ease of providing the required maintenance and logistic support.
Note 2 to entry: See Annex C for further details regarding the interpretation of maintainability.
3.58
mean number of cycles
expected number of cycles per time unit
Note 1 to entry: See also C.3.4.
3.59
mean active repair time
MART
expected active repair time
Note 1 to entry: The MART is the expected effective time to repair.
Note 2 to entry: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-05-13 defines mean operating time between failures (abbreviated by
MTBF or MOTBF) as “expectation of the duration of the operating time between failures”.
3.61
mean overall repairing time
MRT
expected time to achieve the following actions:
• the time spent before starting the repair; and,
• the effective time to repair; and,
• the time before the item is made available to be put back into operation
Note 1 to entry: See ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figures 5 to 7.
Note 2 to entry: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-05-11, defines MTTF as ”expectation of the operating time to failure”.
[SOURCE: ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.29, modified – Notes 1 through 3 to entry have been added.]
3.63
mean time to repair
MTTR
expected time to achieve the repair of a failed item
Note 1 to entry: See further details in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.31.
Note 4 to entry: In actual life the detection time is either 0 (immediately revealed failures) or unknown (failures
detected by tests). Only MRT and MART can be collected.
3.64
mean time to restoration
MTTRes
expected time to achieve the following actions:
a) the time to detect the failure; and,
b) the time spent before starting the repair; and,
c) the effective time to repair; and,
d) the time before the component is made available to be put back into operation
Note 1 to entry: See further details in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.32.
Note 3 to entry: See also definition of “mean overall repairing time” and “mean active repair time” in
ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.33 and 3.1.34, respectively.
[SOURCE: ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.32, modified – Notes 1 through 4 to entry have been added.]
3.65
midstream
business category involving the processing, storage and transportation sectors of the petroleum
industry
EXAMPLE Transportation pipelines, terminals, gas processing and treatment, LNG, LPG and GTL.
3.66
mobilization time
time to get all necessary resources available to execute maintenance
Note 1 to entry: Time spent before starting the maintenance is dependent on access to resources e.g. spare parts,
tools, personnel, subsea intervention and support vessels.
3.67
modification
combination of all technical and administrative actions intended to change an item
Note 1 to entry: Modification is not normally a part of maintenance, but is frequently performed by maintenance
personnel.
Note 2 to entry: Care is needed in the collection and analysis of RM data to distinguish between maintenance due
to failures and maintenance due to equipment modification.
3.68
non-critical failure
failure of an equipment unit that does not cause an immediate cessation of the ability to perform its
required function
Note 1 to entry: Non-critical failures can be categorized as “degraded” or “incipient” (see separate definitions on
degraded failure and incipient failure).
Note 2 to entry: The term “critical” does not have the same meaning in ISO/TR 12489:2013 as in this International
Standard; see further details in F.4.1.
3.69
operating state
<of an item> state of performing as required
Note 1 to entry: See also Table 4.
Note 2 to entry: Operating time includes actual operation of the equipment or the equipment being available for
performing its required function.
Note 4 to entry: The point in time of start-up time can differentiate depending on item subject to data collection,
and could start from time of installation, time of commissioning, or time of start of service/production/injection.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-02-05, modified – Note 1 to entry has been amended and notes 2
through 4 to entry have been added.]
3.71
opportunity maintenance
maintenance of an item that is deferred or advanced in time and is performed when an unplanned
opportunity becomes available
3.72
performance objective
indicative level for the desired performance
Note 1 to entry: See further details in ISO 20815:2008, 3.1.32 and Annex F.
Note 2 to entry: See ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.4.8, 3.4.9 and 3.4.10 for further details.
3.76
planned maintenance
scheduled maintenance
planned preventive maintenance
maintenance carried out in accordance with a specified time schedule
Note 1 to entry: Scheduled maintenance can identify the need for some corrective maintenance action.
3.78
preventive maintenance
PM
maintenance carried out to mitigate degradation and reduce the probability of failure
Note 1 to entry: See also condition-based maintenance, and planned (scheduled) maintenance.
Note 3 to entry: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-10-02 defines redundancy as “provision of more than one means for
performing a function”.
3.81
reliability
ability of an item to perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval
Note 1 to entry: The term “reliability” is also used as a measure of reliability performance and can also be defined
as a probability; see ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.8.
Note 3 to entry: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-01-24 defines reliability as “ability to perform as required, without
failure, for a given time interval, under given conditions”.
Note 4 to entry: The examples of equipment specific data in Annex A list technical and operational conditions
that can cause differences in equipment reliability performance.
3.82
reliability data
data for reliability, maintainability and maintenance support performance
[SOURCE: ISO 20815:2008, 3.1.42]
3.83
required function
function or combination of functions of an item that is considered necessary to provide a given service
3.84
safety critical equipment
equipment and items of permanent, temporary and portable equipment playing an important role in
safety systems/functions
3.85
safety critical failure
critical dangerous failures that are undetected
EXAMPLE Failures revealed by periodic tests.
Note 1 to entry: Critical dangerous failures are in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.2.4 defined as “dangerous failure leading
to the complete inhibition of the safety action (i.e., leading to a dangerous situation for the protected system)”.
Note 2 to entry: See also Annex F, and specifically F.4.1. regarding the indicator “failure fraction”.
Note 2 to entry: Systems with safety functions are defined in ISO/TR 12489:2013, Annex A. These systems are
also cross-related in Table A.3.
[SOURCE: ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.1.7, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.87
software error
erroneous result produced by the use of software product
EXAMPLE Bad code in a computer program resulting in an error.
Note 1 to entry: See Table B.2 for list of relevant equipment failure mechanisms.
Note 2 to entry: See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, B.3, and Note 5 to entry 3.2.17 (Systematic failure) in
ISO/TR 12489:2013.
3.88
subunit
assembly of items that provides a specific function that is required for the equipment unit within the
main boundary to achieve its intended performance
3.89
surveillance period
interval of time (calendar time) between the start date and end date of RM data collection
Note 1 to entry: See Annex C for further details.
Note 2 to entry: Surveillance time in data collection is a part of the total accumulated operating time (see
definition of operating time).
3.90
systematic failure
failure that consistently occurs under particular conditions of handling, storage or use
Note 1 to entry: See also Annex F.
Note 3 to entry: Reliability data covers random and systematic failures as described in ISO/TR 12489:2013,
Figure B.5.
Note 2 to entry: Normally includes the system for which it belongs. The systems covered are shown in Table A.3.
Note 4 to entry: The equipment is allocated to a tag for only so long as it occupies that function and location. See
also footnote b in Table 5.
3.92
taxonomy
systematic classification of items into generic groups based on factors possibly common to several of
the items
3.93
trip
shutdown of machinery from normal operating condition to full stop
Note 1 to entry: Trip: The shutdown is activated automatically by the control/monitoring system:
• real trip The shutdown is effectuated as a result of a monitored (or calculated) value in the control system
exceeding a pre-set limit;
• spurious trip Unexpected shutdown resulting from failure(s) in the control/monitoring system or
error(s) imposed on the control/monitoring system originating from the environment or people.
3.94
turnaround
revision shutdown
planned event wherein an entire process unit is taken off stream for revamp or renewal
Note 1 to entry: See also ISO 20815:2008, Table G.1.
3.95
uncertainty
<of a quantity> inability to determine accurately what is or will be the true value of a quantity
Note 1 to entry: Uncertainty can have different meanings within reliability data collection and exchange. It can be
used as a measure of variability within a population, which is a type of uncertainty often referred to as stochastic
(or aleatory) uncertainty. Uncertainty can also have a subjective meaning (epistemic uncertainties).
3.96
up state
available state
<of an item> state of being able to perform as required
Note 1 to entry: Up state relates to the availability performance of the item.
[SOURCE: IEC 60050-192:2015, 192-02-01, modified – Notes 1 and 2 to entry have been added.]
3.97
up time
time interval during which an item is in an up state
Note 1 to entry: See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figure 3.
3.98
upstream
business category of the petroleum industry involving exploration and production
EXAMPLE Offshore oil/gas production facility, drilling rig, intervention vessel.
4 Abbreviated terms
NOTE Some specific abbreviations used for equipment types (e.g. BOP) and units (e.g. kW) are not included
in this clause, but covered within each clause/sub-clause where they are used. There are also some abbreviations
used in the document (see e.g. Table D.1), which are not included in this clause.
CM condition monitoring
MI maintainable item
PM preventive maintenance
QA quality assurance
QN quality notification
WO work order
5 Application
Manufacturers/designers: Use of RM data to improve equipment designs and learn from past ex-
perience.
Authorities/regulatory bodies: A format for communicating any RM data on an individual event basis or
as otherwise required from the operating company. This International
Standard is, for example, vital for authorities addressing safety equipment
reliability.
Consultant/contractor: A format and quality standard for data collection projects and analyses
of safety, reliability or maintenance aspects commonly performed by
contractors/consultants for the asset owners (e.g. oil companies).
While others, such as developers of computer-maintenance-management software, can find this
International Standard to be useful, the primary users are expected to be owners and/or operators
who should find the data to be collected readily available within their operating facilities.
5.4 Limitations
Through analysis of data, RM parameters can be determined for use in design, operation and
maintenance. This International Standard does not provide detailed descriptions of methods for
analysing data. However, it does give recommendations for defining and calculating some of the vital
RM parameters (Annex C) and reviews the purposes and benefits of some analytical methodologies
for which data can be used. Such analytical methodologies and application areas can be found in other
International Standards, and relevant International Standards have been exploited for the purpose of
identifying and co-ordinating the RM data requirements (see Annex D).
Although cost data are important in establishing priorities for improvement opportunities and are
frequently included in the analysis of reliability performance, cost data (parameters) are not specifically
included in this International Standard. Most facilities track the costs of maintenance (man-hours),
equipment replacements, capital improvements, business interruption and environmental events. These
data may be maintained in the computerized maintenance management information system (CMMIS).
When costs are required for setting the analysis of reliability in an economic perspective or performing
calculation of life cycle costing, the user should obtain that information from the appropriate sources
within the operating facility or company.
Due to the variety of uses for RM data, requirements for data in a data collection programme should be
adapted to the expected application(s). Credible analysis results are directly related to the quality of
the data collected. While this International Standard does not specify detailed quality measures, data
quality control and assurance practices are outlined to provide guidance for the user.
The technical information gathered to describe the equipment and its location within a plant, facility
or system is, in this International Standard, not meant to be exhaustive and complete like the overall
plant technical information system, but rather used to identify and explain variables for the purposes
of the analytical functions. Use of common technical terms is, however, recommended and linked to life
cycle information-system and equipment technical standards. Even though this International Standard
describes how to record maintenance activities for the purpose of equipment reliability and availability
optimization, this International Standard is not meant to act as a standard to specify in detail how
maintenance programmes are documented.
The technical status of equipment and degradation of equipment performance can be recorded through
condition-monitoring systems, which requires details beyond the equipment data covered in this
International Standard. However, this International Standard contains RM data elements that can be
used in such condition-monitoring systems.
This International Standard is not meant to be a software specification of such database systems but
can, in general, be complied with to facilitate and improve the industry RM data exchange.
• Value of data: In some cases, it is useful to define a “value measure” for an amount of reliability
data. This can be the case in joint industry projects where several contributors are supposed to
contribute with an equal “value” of data. Two approaches may be used:
— calculating the actual cost of collecting the data;
— value the data by combining the population with aggregated surveillance time.
Figure 1 — Typical feedback of analysis from collected reliability and maintenance data
Industry and business value elements of utilizing this International Standard are summarised below:
• economic aspects:
— cost-effective design to optimize CAPEX,
— cost-effective operation to optimize OPEX,
— improved profitability (reduced revenue loss),
— LCC/whole-life management,
— reduced cost of insurance;
• general aspects:
— “being able to operate” (operatorship license),
— life extension of capital equipment,
— improved product quality,
— better (data-based) equipment purchase,
— better resource planning;
• safety and environmental aspects:
— improved personnel safety,
— reduced catastrophic failures,
— reduced environmental impact,
— improvement of safety procedures and regulations (e.g. extend test interval based on RM
performance),
— compliance with authority requirements;
• analytical:
— higher-quality data,
— larger population of data,
— improved decision-making,
7 Quality of data
Confidence in the collected RM data, and hence any analysis, is strongly dependent on the quality of the
data collected. High-quality data are characterized by the following:
a) completeness of data in relation to specification;
b) compliance with definitions of reliability parameters, data types and formats;
c) accurate input, transfer, handling and storage of data (manually or electronic);
d) sufficient population and adequate surveillance period to give statistical confidence;
e) relevance of the data to the need of the users.
The following measures shall be emphasized before the data collection process starts.
— Define the objective for collecting the data in order to collect data relevant for the intended use.
Examples of analyses where such data may be used are quantitative risk analysis (QRA); reliability,
availability and maintainability analysis (RAM); reliability-centred maintenance (RCM); life cycle
cost (LCC); safety integrity level (SIL) analysis. (See also Annex D.)
— Investigate the source(s) of the data to ensure that relevant data of sufficient quality are available.
Sources cover inventory/technical equipment information, RM event data and associated plant
impacts.
— Define the taxonomical information to be included in the database for each equipment unit (see
Clause 8).
— Identify the installation date, population and operating period(s) for the equipment from which
data can be collected.
— Define the boundaries for each equipment class, indicating what RM data are to be collected (see
Clause 8).
— Apply a uniform definition of failure and a method of classifying failures (see Clause 9).
— Apply a uniform definition of maintenance activities and a method of classifying maintenances (see
Clause 9).
— Define the checks used in data quality verification (see 7.1.3 and 7.1.9). At a minimum, the following
shall be verified.
1) The origin of the data is documented and traceable.
2) The data originate from similar equipment type, technology and operating conditions.
3) The equipment is relevant for the purpose (e.g. not outdated models).
4) The data comply with definitions and interpretation rules (e.g. definition of failure).
5) Recorded failures are within the defined equipment boundary and surveillance period.
6) The information is consistent (e.g. consistency between failure modes and failure impact).
7) Data are registered in the correct format.
8) Sufficient data are collected to give acceptable statistical confidence, e.g. not biased by outliers.
(See recommendations for calculating confidence limits in C.3.2.)
9) Operating and maintenance personnel are consulted to validate the data.
— Define a priority level for the completeness of data by a suitable method. One method of weighting
the importance of the different data to be collected is by using three classes of importance in
accordance with the following classification:
— HIGH: compulsory data (coverage ≈ 100 %)
— MEDIUM: highly desirable data (coverage > 85 %)
— LOW: desirable data (coverage > 50 %)
— Define the level of detail of RM data reported and collected and link it closely to the production and
safety importance of the equipment. Base prioritization on safety, production performance and/or
other severity measures.
— Prepare a plan for the data collection process (see 7.2), e.g. schedules, milestones, data collection
sequence for installations and equipment units, surveillance periods to be covered (see 8.3.1), etc.
— Plan how the data will be assembled and reported and devise a method for transferring the data
from the data source to the reliability data bank using any suitable method (see 7.2).
— Train, motivate and organize the data collection personnel, e.g. interpretation of sources,
equipment know-how, software tools, involvement of operating personnel and equipment experts,
understanding/ experience in analysis application of RM data, etc. Ensure that they have an in-
depth understanding of the equipment, its operating conditions, this International Standard and the
requirements given for data quality.
— Make a plan for quality assurance of the data collection process and its deliverables. This shall,
as a minimum, include procedures for quality control of the data and recording and correcting
deviations (see 7.1.3).
— It is recommended to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of the data collection by running a pilot
exercise before the main data collection phase is started and to revise the plan if necessary.
— Review the planning measures after a period of using the system (see 7.2.3).
During and after the data collection exercise, analyse the data to verify consistency, reasonable
distributions, proper codes and correct interpretations in accordance with the planning measures (see
7.1.2). This verification-of-quality process shall be documented and may vary depending on whether
the data collection is for a single plant or involves several company or industry facilities. When merging
individual databases, it is imperative that each data record has a unique identification.
Assess the quality of data being collected as early as feasible in the data collection process in accordance
with the planning measures (see 7.1.2). A suitable procedure is an assessment by the data collector, who
shall be provided with guidelines for what quality measures should be focused on in accordance with
the planning measures. The main objective of this early assessment is to look for any problems that
require the planning measures to be immediately revised to avoid unacceptable data being collected.
Personnel other than those having collected the data shall verify the quality of each individual data
record and the overall reliability pattern reflected by the sum of individual events in accordance with
the planning measures (see 7.1.2).
Some of the problems and limitations to be aware of, when obtaining quality data are summarized in
Table 1.
The facility CMMIS constitutes the main source of RM data. The quality of the data that can be retrieved
from this source is dependent on the way RM data are reported in the first place. Reporting of RM data
according to this International Standard shall be allowed for in the facility CMMIS, thereby providing a
more consistent and sound basis for transferring RM data to equipment RM databases. Other sources
of information can be spread across several different systems (computers, files, books, drawings), for
example, feedback on data collection results, involvement in QA processes. Adequate or proper use of
information fields in facility CMMIS will stimulate reporting quality, etc.
Such data collection creates reliability data sources for various applications, as classified in Table D.5:
1) generic data;
2) operator/company specific data;
3) manufacturer data;
4) expert judgement;
5) human error data.
The typical data collection process consists of compiling data from different sources into one database
where the type and the format of the data are pre-defined. The most common method is as follows.
a) Address all the data sources that are available, and extract the relevant “raw” data into an
intermediate storage. If the information is contained in a computerized database, use any suitable
methods for extracting the relevant information; viz. extraction of targeted information by specific
software methods or printing reports with desired information.
b) Interpret this information and translate it into the type and format desired for the target database.
In most cases, this is done by manual interpretation.
c) Transfer the data from the source(s) to the reliability data bank using any suitable method. Suitable
“off-the-shelf” software can be used to transfer data from one database to another with the desired
“language” conversion done by software algorithms. This is only feasible as long as a conversion
algorithm, sufficiently robust to make a confident conversion, can be defined. These methods do
require some extra effort upfront and, therefore, are only cost-effective for large quantities of
data or repetitive data collection of the same category. It may also be used for maintenance when
transferring data from one CMMIS to another.
d) Data collection methods significantly impact the cost-benefit analysis for data collection and shall,
therefore, be carefully planned and tested before the main data collection process is started.
Data collection may be done either within the company using internal resources or as a task done by
more specialized companies or personnel. As data are, by nature, “historical”, it evidently takes some
time before sufficient data are accumulated to draw valid conclusions based on statistics only. The
cost-benefit analysis for collecting data can take some time to become evident but annual tracking of
equipment performance captures a useful history.
Data collection can require skills from several categories, viz. IT, reliability/statistics, maintenance,
operation and data collection. Key personnel shall be familiar, in particular, with the data collection
concept and any specific software for the data collection activity, and, to a reasonable extent, know the
technical, operational and maintenance aspects of the equipment for which data are collected. Proper
training of key personnel on these issues is necessary in order to obtain quality data. The personnel
who check the quality of the data shall be different from those performing the data collection. Data
collectors shall, as a pre-requisite, know this International Standard and should give feedback as
appropriate.
Before data collection starts, it is useful to do a pilot exercise to check the available population, the
quality of source information and the feasibility of the data collection methods. This serves as a model
for what can be achieved within a given time and budget.
A system for dealing with deviations encountered in the data collection process, such as ambiguous
definitions, lack of interpretation rules, inadequate codes, etc., shall be established and problems solved
as soon as possible. It can be a major task to correct corrupt data after many data have been collected.
A data collection exercise shall also provide feedback by summarizing and evaluating all quality lessons
learned during the planning and execution of the data collection effort. Recommendations shall then be
fed back to the relevant personnel for improvement on definitions, maintenance systems (e.g. CMMIS-
systems) and the data collection process and personnel.
Due attention shall be paid to the location of the instrument elements. In the above example, the central
control and monitoring items are typically included within the “control and monitoring” subunit, while
individual instrumentation (trip, alarm, control) is typically included within the appropriate subunit,
e.g. lubrication system.
The boundary diagram shall show the main lower-level items and the interfaces to the surroundings.
Additional textual description shall, when needed for clarity, state in more detail what shall be
considered inside and outside the relevant boundary (see the Example associated with Figure 2 where
e.g. the driver of the pump is outside the boundary). When referring to this International Standard, it
is vital that any deviation from the boundaries given in this International Standard, or new boundaries
not given by this International Standard, be specified.
Boundaries shall avoid overlapping among different equipment classes. For example, when collecting
data on instruments as separate equipment units, one shall avoid including those instruments that are
also included within the boundaries of other equipment units on which data are being collected. Some
overlapping can be difficult to avoid; however, such case(s) shall be identified and treated appropriately
during the data analyses.
Recommended boundary diagrams for some selected equipment units are given in Annex A.
8.2 Taxonomy
The taxonomy is a systematic classification of items into generic groups based on factors possibly
common to several of the items (location, use, equipment subdivision, etc.). A classification of relevant
data to be collected in accordance with this International Standard is represented by a hierarchy as
shown in Figure 3. Definitions of each segment are provided below, in addition to examples of different
business streams and equipment types, as illustrated in Table 2.
Levels 1 to 5 represent a high-level categorization that relates to industries and plant application
regardless of the equipment units (see level 6) involved. This is because an equipment unit (e.g. pump)
can be used in many different industries and plant configurations and, for analysing the reliability of
similar equipment, it is necessary to have the operating context. Taxonomic information on these levels
(1 to 5) shall be included in the database for each equipment unit as “use/location data” (see Table 2).
Levels 6 to 9 are related to the equipment unit (inventory) with the subdivision in lower indenture levels
corresponding to a parent-child relationship. This International Standard focuses on the equipment
unit level (level 6) for the collection of RM data and also indirectly on the lower indenture items, such
as subunits and components. The number of subdivision levels for the collection of RM data depends on
the complexity of the equipment unit and the use of the data. A single instrument might need no further
breakdown, while several levels can be required for a large compressor. For data used in availability
analyses, the reliability at the equipment-unit level can be the only data required, while an RCM analysis
and root-cause analysis can require data on failure mechanism at the component/maintainable item, or
parts, level. This International Standard does not specifically address level 9.
It is necessary that RM data be related to a certain level within the taxonomic hierarchy in order to be
meaningful and comparable. For example, a failure mode shall be related to the equipment unit, while
a failure mechanism shall be related to the lowest achievable level in the item hierarchy. Table 3 gives
guidance on this.
Regarding items on different hierarchy levels, many items may be found on different levels in the
taxonomic hierarchy, depending on the context or the size of the item. For instance, valve and pump
are equipment classes, but may also be maintainable items in a gas turbine. The valve is typically a
maintainable item subsea and an equipment unit topside. Due care should be taken to avoid double-
counting failure events when RM data are collected on such equipment.
For some systems it may be relevant to apply RM data collection also on Level 5 (system level, see Table
A.3). Although many of the same principles as used for equipment data collection on Level 6-8 may
apply, these should be used carefully as there could be large differences between the individual systems
selected for the data collection.
The equipment surveillance period is typically used as the time period for determining time-related
reliability parameters, e.g. MTTF, component life, etc. For many equipment units, the operating, or
in-service, period is less than the surveillance period due to maintenance, sparing of equipment or
intermittent operation of the equipment (e.g. tank-transfer pumps).
When equipment is in an idle state or in “hot” standby, i.e. being ready for immediate operation
when started, it is considered to be operating (or “in-service”) by the definitions in this International
Standard. Equipment on standby, which would require some activities to be performed before being
ready for operation (“cold” standby) is not considered to be in an operating state. The various time-
period definitions are illustrated in Table 4.
Data may also be collected for actual preventive maintenance if one wants the full picture of down
time caused by all maintenance actions (see Table 4). Periods when equipment is deliberately taken
out of service for an extended period, or is being modified, are not considered to be relevant for data
collection.
The surveillance period may also cover several states in the life of the item. For example, in the subsea
environment, equipment can be installed and functioning, i.e. a barrier to the escape of downhole
hydrocarbons, but the well might not start producing for several months. Failures can occur on the
equipment during this phase, requiring it to be repaired with a potential delay to start-up. Likewise,
equipment can fail during a refinery turnaround, which is not a “production” phase, again requiring
repair and possible delay to start-up.
Prepar- Active Reserve a “Modifica- Unde- Prepara- Repair Shut-down, Run- Start- Run- Hot Idle Cold
ation preventive tion b tected tion and/ (item being operational down up ning e stand- stand-
and/or mainte- faults g or delay worked on) c problems/ by by
delay nance restrictions
(item etc. d
being
worked
on) f
a Means that item is available for operation, but not required for some time. Does not include items considered as “spare parts” or items taken
out of service on a more permanent basis.
b Modification can change the reliability characteristics of an item and can, therefore, require that the collection of reliability data for the
surveillance period be terminated before the modification and be re-started with a new surveillance period after the modification.
c Includes fault diagnosis, repair action and testing (as required).
d Shutdown of machinery (trip and manual shutdown), see definition of trip (3.93) and also C.1.8.
e Running is the active operational period for equipment in oil & gas production systems. For drilling and workover systems, this is not sufficient
since there are many different operational phases. The operational phases for drilling could include: Running, drilling, tripping, set casing; and, the
phases for workover could include: well equipment removal, replace completion string, replace casing string, and various workover activities.
f Includes testing
g It is difficult to determine downtime associated with undetected faults. These faults are eventually revealed by test or demand.
h See also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figures 5, 6, and 7.
Depending on use and feasibility, data may be recorded for the whole equipment lifetime or for shorter
intervals. The latter is common due to both cost and obtaining the data within a reasonable time frame.
As shown in Annex C, the lifetime of many items is assumed to follow the so-called “bathtub” curve.
If only the RM data for the steady-state operating part of an item are required, data collection shall
start after the burn-in period is considered to have ended. The length of this period can vary among
equipment categories from no burn-in to several months. Data recorded during the steady-state
operating period often follows, or is assumed to follow, the exponential lifetime curve (constant failure
rate). For some equipment, it is also useful and essential to collect data from “day one” in order to
accumulate experience on burn-in failures. In this case, data collected from what may be considered as
an initial burn-in period shall be distinguished from data collected from the subsequent steady-state
operating period.
The length of the data collection period shall be balanced against the expected failure rate, size of
population and access to data. For equipment of high importance (safety) and equipment where one
knows that few failures normally occur (subsea), a longer surveillance period is desirable (e.g. the whole
lifetime history). It is even useful to collect data for equipment with no failures during the surveillance
period because, by observing no failures in a given period, it is possible to estimate the failure rate by
“censoring” the data. Methods within statistics shall be used to estimate the confidence of the data
(upper/lower confidence limits), as shown in Annex C.
While the surveillance period is just an interval in the calendar time between two specific times and
can, therefore, be defined exactly, operating time is not always that straightforward to determine. For
some rotating equipment, the operating time is recorded on a counter and can be read exactly. For
other equipment, this might not be true. Hence, it is often necessary to estimate operating time based
on knowledge from the operating and/or maintenance staff. As the “true” failure rate for an item shall
be calculated based on actual operation, high priority should be given to collecting or estimating this
parameter.
Two main calendar times during maintenance are recommended to be collected, viz. down time and
active repair time. The difference between the two is illustrated in Figure 4. For further information
on breakdown of the downtimes, see also ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figures 5 to 7, and ISO 20815:2008,
Figure I.5.
Down time includes the calendar time from the time the equipment is stopped for a repair until it is
reconnected to its intended service after having been tested.
Active maintenance time” is the “active corrective maintenance time” then see ISO/TR 12489:2013,
Figure 5, where “active corrective maintenance time” consists of the “active repair time” (MRT) and the
“technical delay. Active maintenance time is the calendar time during which maintenance work on the
item is actually performed. Hence, active repair time cannot normally be greater than the down time.
However, exceptionally, active repair time can be greater than down time if the maintenance can be
performed with the equipment unit operating. Note that the operational time required to run down the
equipment before repair and start-up up after the repair is not considered to be part of the down time.
Mobilization time is part of the preparation and/ or delay.
NOTE See relevant definitions regarding maintenance times in Clause 3.
9.3.1 Description
The data collected shall be organized and linked in a database to provide easy access for updates,
queries and analysis. Several commercial databases are available that can be used as the main building
blocks for designing a reliability database. Two aspects of organizing the structure of data shall be
addressed as described in 9.3.2 and 9.3.3.
The logical structure defines the logical links among the main data categories in the database. This
model represents an application-oriented view of the database. The example in Figure 5 shows a
hierarchical structure with failure and maintenance records linked to the equipment unit (inventory).
Records describing preventive maintenance (PM) are linked to the inventory description in a many-
to-one relation. The same applies for failures, which additionally have related corrective-maintenance
records linked to each failure record. Each record (e.g. failure) may consist of several attributes (e.g.
failure date, failure mode, etc.).
This defines the design of the database as to how the individual data elements are linked and addressed.
The following four model categories are commonly available, ranked from lowest to highest complexity
and versatility:
Hierarchical model: Data fields within records are related by a “family tree” relationship. Each
level represents a particular attribute of data.
Network model: This is similar to the hierarchical model; however, each attribute can have
more than one parent.
Relational model: The model is constructed from tables of data elements, which are called relations.
No access path is defined beforehand; all types of manipulation of the data in
tabular form are possible. The majority of database designs use this concept.
Object model: The software is considered as a collection of objects, each of which has (1)
a structure and (2) an interface. The structure is fixed within each object
while the interface is the visible part that provides the link address between
the objects. Object modelling enables the database design to be very flexible,
extendable, reusable and easy to maintain. This model seems to be popular
in new database concepts.
Table 5 (continued)
Data Data Taxonom- Business category (examples)
category ic level a Upstream Midstream Downstream Petro-
chemical
(E & P) (refining)
Equipment class 6 Pump Compressor Heat ex- Heater
(see Annex A) (*) changer
Equipment Type 6 Centrifugal Centrifugal Shell and tube Fired
(see Annex A) (*)
Equipment identification/ 6 P101-A C1001 C-21 H-1
Location (e.g. tag num-
ber) (*) b
Equipment description 6 Transfer Main com- Reactor Charge heater
(nomenclature) pressor effluent
Equipment Unique equipment identifi- 6 12345XL 10101 Cxy123 909090
b
attributes cation number
Manufacturer’s name (*) c 6 Johnson Wiley Smith Anderson
Manufacturer’s model 6 Mark I CO2 GTI SuperHeat A
designation g
Design data relevant for 6-8 Equipment- Equipment- Equipment- Equipment-
each equipment class and specific specific specific specific
subunit/component as
applicable, e.g. capacity,
power, speed, pressure, re-
dundancy, relevant stand-
ard(s) (see also Annex A)
Normal operating state/ 6 Running Active stand- Intermittent Running
Mode (*) by
Operation
Initial equipment commis- 6 2003.01.01 2003.01.01 2003.01.01 2003.01.01
(normal
sioning date
use)
Start date of current ser- 6 2003.02.01 2003.02.01 2003.02.01 2003.02.01
vice (*)
Surveillance time, h (cal- 6 8 950 8 000 5 400 26 300
culated) (*)
Operational time, h d 6 7 540 675 2 375 22 870
(measured/calculated)
Number of periodic test 6-8 4 2 2 4
demands during the
surveillance period as
applicable (*)e
Number of operation- 6-8 4 5 11 3
al demands during the
surveillance period as
applicable (*)e
Total wells drilled during 4 42 N.A. N.A. N.A.
surveillance period (*)f
Operating parameters as 6 Equipment- Equipment- Equipment- Equipment-
relevant for each equip- specific specific specific specific
ment class; e.g. ambient
conditions, operating
power (see Annex A)
Table 5 (continued)
Data Data Taxonom- Business category (examples)
category ic level a Upstream Midstream Downstream Petro-
chemical
(E & P) (refining)
Additional Additional information in 6 Specify as Specify as Specify as Specify as
information free text as applicable needed needed needed needed
Source of data, e.g. P & ID, 6 Specify as Specify as Specify as Specify as
data sheet, maintenance needed needed needed needed
system
a See definitions in Figure 3.
b A specific individual equipment unit has an “Unique equipment identification number” (serial number),
and this may be required for documenting potential change-out at the equipment level. The tag number identi-
fies the equipment function and its physical location. If the equipment is replaced with, e.g. an overhauled unit,
the tag number (and part number) remains the same, but the serial number changes. Operator and equipment
supplier may have different “Unique equipment identification number” for same specific equipment unit. See also
ISO 15926-2:2003, E.3.3 which describes this relationship in more detail.
c Manufacturer may be relevant for lower hierarchical levels, i.e. level 7 and 8.
d Equipment may be subject to different operational phases, such as for example for equipment used in
drilling operations
e See further information on number of demands in C.1.3.
f This applies only to drilling related equipment classes.
g Equipment classes, subunits or maintainable items within some equipment classes can have the need to
have a separate information field in the equipment specific data (Level 6-8 in the taxonomy in Figure 3) to reflect
the technology generation, to distinguish between older and new technology in reliability data collection and
analysis.
(*) indicates the minimum data that shall be collected.
The minimum data needed to meet the objectives of this International Standard are identified by (*) in
Table 6. However, the addition of certain other data categories can significantly improve the potential
usability of the RM data; see Annex D.
9.6.1 General
Figure 6 shows the main maintenance categories in more detail. Table B.5 presents the main types of
maintenance activities commonly performed.
NOTE 3b — Predetermined maintenance, see EN 13306:2010, 7.2; 4c — Periodic test (as defined in 3.74) to
detect potential hidden failures; 4e — In this International Standard, the term “scheduled service” is used, since
it is meant to cover minor and major life-prolonging service activities; 4g — Deferred maintenance should also
include planned corrective maintenance, i.e. where run-to-failure is the chosen failure management strategy.
As a minimum for recording the reliability of an item, it is required that the corrective maintenance to
correct a failure shall be recorded.
Analysing failure data requires attention if there are many repetitive failures on same equipment or
critical failures on production critical equipment. This can include performing a root cause analysis,
based on the underlying failure characteristics (failure mode, failure cause and failure mechanism).
Improvements may be required to prevent recurrence, extend service life or improve ability to detect
the failures earlier.
It is recommended that the recording of the actual preventive maintenance (PM) be done essentially in
the same way as for corrective actions. This can give the following additional information:
— full lifetime story of an item (all failures and maintenance);
— total resources used on maintenance (man-hours, spare parts);
— total down time and, hence, total equipment availability, both technical and operational; see
Annex C;
— balance between preventive and corrective maintenance.
Recording PM actions is useful mainly for the maintenance engineer, but is also useful for the reliability
engineer wanting to record or estimate the availability of equipment. A lifetime analysis takes into
account not only failures but also maintenance actions intended to restore the item to “as-good-as-
new” condition. PMs are often performed on a higher indenture level (e.g. “package” level); hence there
might not be any data available that can be related to the items on the lower indenture level (subunit,
maintainable item). It is necessary to consider this restriction when defining, reporting and analysing
PM data.
During the execution of PM actions, impending failures can be discovered and corrected as part of the
PM activities. In this case, the failure(s) shall be recorded as any other failure with the subsequent
corrective action done, even though it initially was considered to be a PM-type activity. The failure-
detection method shall, in this case, be considered as the type of PM being done. It is, however, realized
that some failures, generally of minor character, can be corrected as part of the PM and not recorded
individually. The practice on this can vary among companies and should be addressed by the data
collector(s) in order to reveal the possible type and amount of failures being included within the PM
program.
A final option is to record the planned PM programme as well. In this case, it is possible to additionally
record the differences between the planned PM and the PM actually performed (backlog). An increasing
backlog indicates that control of the conditions of the plant is being jeopardized and can, in adverse
circumstances, lead to equipment damage, pollution or personnel injury. Establishing the maintenance
concept (for the purpose of PM programme during pre-operation) for various equipment categories and
associated equipment classes should benefit from the use of this International Standard.
Condition-based maintenance (CBM) is important for some type of equipment category: e.g. rotating.
Consideration of condition monitoring for predictive maintenance purposes should also utilise the
failure and maintenance data reflected in this International Standard. The availability of the conditional
monitoring system in itself and operational procedures are also important to gain benefit of CM.
Table 7 shows a summary of data to be collected and possible added value for different data categories.
Annex D contains a more detailed survey of data requirements for various applications.
Table 8 (continued)
D a t a Data to be recorded Description a
category
Active maintenance time d (*) Time duration for active maintenance work being done on
the equipment (see also definitions in Table 4)
Maintenance Down time d (*) Time duration during which an item is in a down state (see
times also Table 4 and Figure 4)
Maintenance delays/problems Prolonged down time causes, e.g. logistics, weather, scaf-
folding, lack of spares, delay of repair crew
Remarks Additional information Give more details, if available, on the maintenance action
and resources used
a Records to be entered for both corrective and preventive maintenance, except where shown.
b For corrective maintenance, the subunit maintained is normally identical to the one specified on the
failure event report (see Table 6).
c For subsea equipment, the following apply:
— type of main resource(s) and number of days used, e.g. drilling rig, diving vessel, service vessel;
— type of supplementary resource(s) and number of hours used, e.g. divers, ROV/ROT, platform personnel.
d This information is desirable for RAM and RCM analyses. It is currently infrequently recorded in the
maintenance-management systems. It is necessary to improve the reporting of this information to capture rea-
sons for long down times.
(*) indicates the minimum data that shall be collected.
Annex A
(informative)
Equipment-class attributes
supervisory instrumentation of more general use (e.g. SCADA-systems) should not, as a rule, be
included;
e) Proper use of P&ID when defining items within the equipment class boundary.
In A.2.2 to A.2.10 examples of boundary diagrams for different equipment classes are presented.
This list is not exhaustive for the equipment categories covered by this International Standard, but
includes examples on how taxonomies may be defined for typical equipment found in the petroleum,
petrochemical and natural gas industries.
The equipment categories in Table A.4 have various functions, and is mean to categorize the prioritized
equipment classes covered in this standard, e.g. principal operations like rotating, mechanical, and
electrical; whereas others are process application groups, e.g. drilling, subsea production, and utilities.
Note that ISO 19008:2016 has a classification system used for standard cost coding, where Physical
Breakdown Structure (PBS) and Code of Resources (COR) also address systems listed in Table A.3 and
equipment listed in Table A.4, respectively.
Figure A.1 — Process technology function blocks in the oil and gas value chain — Level 3
A.2.2.2 Compressors
Figure A.2 shows the boundary definition for compressors. Inlet and outlet valves, and the compressor
driver with connected auxiliaries, are not included within the boundary. Driver units are recorded as
separate inventories (electric motor, gas turbine or combustion engine) and the failures on the driver, if
recorded, should be recorded separately for the driver. A number in the compressor inventory shall give
a reference to the appropriate driver inventory.
Compression is normally done in stages where a number of subunits are connected into a train.
A compressor train is considered as one inventory. Each compressor train can consist of up to four
compressor stages. Recompression trains on an offshore oil platform normally perform compression
in four stages. Each compression stage is usually performed by one compressor unit (casing) but in
some cases one compressor unit can perform two stages. Each compressor (stage) normally contains
several impellers that are the physical assembly of rotating blades that raise the pressure one step in
the compressor unit.
If there are subunits that are common to the driver (e.g. a gas turbine) and the driven unit (i.e. the
compressor), these are regarded as a part of the driven unit. For compressors with common lubrication-
oil and seal-oil systems, failures should, as a general rule, be assigned to the subunit that is assumed to
be the one most affected. Otherwise, the failure should be assigned to the lubrication-oil system.
NOTE This boundary drawing shows a typical layout frequently used for mechanical drive or power
generation. However, gas turbines can be configured in different ways with regards to the layout of some
subsystems. The compressor and the turbine can be mechanically coupled, single-shaft GT. Other alternatives
are when one or more parts of the turbine are mechanically decoupled (multi-spool GT).
A.2.2.6 Pumps
Key
T1 turbine stage 1
T2 turbine stage 2
NOTE Driven units other than recompressors (e.g. pumps or generators) are also outside the boundary.
A.2.3.1 Cranes
Key
1 boundary
2 crane base (u/s slew ring)
a Power supply.
b Communication signal in/out.
NOTE The boundary drawing illustrates one type of crane commonly used offshore. Several other categories
exist, viz. traversing cranes, gantry cranes etc. It is necessary to adapt the taxonomy for these categories to each
category.
The boundary definition applies to hydrocarbon- (HC-) fired heaters and boilers. The layout of heaters
and boilers can vary considerably; however, they all apply the same principle supplying energy to heat
or boil a medium. The energy can be supplied through combustion of hydrocarbons, through supply of a
high‑temperature medium (e.g. steam) or by electricity.
The heater and boiler components may vary significantly in design, but will typically include a
vessel/shell in which the heating process is performed. For heaters and HC-fired boilers, a burner device
and an exhaust system are included. Unlike most boilers, the heaters contain a tube coil through which
the medium being heated flows.
For HC-fired heaters and boilers, the fuel-control valve is inside the equipment boundary, while the
fuel-conditioning equipment (e.g. scrubbers) and ESD/PSD valves are outside the boundary.
Inlet, outlet, pressure-relief and drain valves are specifically excluded. Valves and instruments included
are those locally mounted and/or which form a pressure boundary (e.g. block valves, calibration valves,
local indicators/gauges).
A.2.3.5 Piping
The piping boundary definition will include all facilities to transfer and control fluid between pieces
of rotating equipment, mechanical equipment and tanks, including also vent and drain lines to the
environment. However, instrument tubing for pneumatic or hydraulic control is excluded.
A.2.3.6 Winches
A.2.3.7 Turrets
Key
1 boundary 6 anchor winches
2 swivel 7 riser
3 riser termination 8 mooring lines
4 production manifold 9 anchors
5 ship
A.2.3.8 Swivels
Key
a Make-before-break switch.
A.2.4.3 Switchgear
Switchgear have a wide application offshore and onshore for the distribution and protection of high
and low voltage power systems. The classification includes both high voltage (>1KV) and low voltage
(<1KV) applications. High voltage boards can be air insulated or gas insulated, as shown in Table A.62.
It should be noted that low voltage switchgear also includes distribution boards.
Single phase, three phase and direct current applications are included in the scope.
A Variable Speed Drive Systems (VSDS), or Adjustable Speed Drive Systems (ASDS), is intended
to provide power to electric motor(s) such that the speed or torque of the motor(s) may be varied.
Frequency Converters, also known as Variable Frequency Drive System (VFDS), are applicable for AC
electric motors. The VSDS can consist of a frequency converter if it is an AC type VSDS.
VSDS have considerable application in the oil and gas industry ranging from the simple speed control of
a HVAC system to the speed control of a subsea pump in a subsea processing system.
Note that the equipment class “Frequency converters” is thus related to the equipment classes “Electric
motor” (A.2.2.4), “Power transformers” (ref. A.2.4.2), “Subsea electrical power distribution” (A.2.6.5)
and “Electrical submersible pumps” (A.2.7.6) described elsewhere in this International Standard. For
example, a VSD driven electric motor driving a compressor will need to include different equipment
classes when reliability data collection or estimation is done. Note that a subsea frequency converter
however, is a maintainable item for the equipment class “Subsea electrical power distribution” (ref.
A.2.6.5).
The figure below shows a typical configuration for a Variable Speed Drive System. The equipment class
Frequency converters is given in Figure A.22. Figure A.22 is shown to illustrate how the Frequency
converters fit in the VSDS and the dependencies on other components, like equipment classes Power
transformers (see A.2.4.2) and Electric motors (see A.2.2.4).
Key
a Not applicable for all fire and gas sensors.
Field input devices such as fire and gas detectors are usually connected to a fire and gas control
logic unit (CLU), which is not included in the boundary of fire and gas detectors (see Figure A.19).
Monitoring/interface units may be used between detector and CLU, and this is part of the fire and
gas detectors. The purpose of these units is, among others, to monitor the detectors, their interface
connections and cables, analysing the incoming data by different algorithms and initiating fault or
alarm signals. The basic principle of data communication between field equipment and such interface
systems can be based on multiplexing and sequential polling of data.
Input devices are, in general, sensors that convert process parameters into an electrical signal that can
be monitored. Typical main categories of input devices are the following:
— transmitter: converts process parameter, e.g. pressure, into proportional electrical signals,
typically 4 mA to 20 mA or 0 V to 10 V (see IEC 60381-2);
— transducer: converts process parameters, e.g. pressure, into proportional electrical signals,
typically unamplified output;
— switch: converts process parameters, e.g. pressure, typically into on/off electrical signals.
NOTE This boundary drawing does not apply for switches and pushbuttons.
Moderately corrosive/erosive (oil/gas not defined as severe, sea water, occasionally particles).
Severely corrosive/erosive [sour gas/oil (high H2S), high CO2 content, high sand content].
b See IEC 60079 (all parts).
A.2.5.4 Valves
NOTE The valves described in the taxonomy classification given in Table A.77 do not apply for valves used
for specific upstream purposes like subsea valves and valves used in downhole completion. These valves are
covered in the specific sub-clauses in Annex A on this type of equipment. Wellhead and X-mas trees (dry) are,
however, considered as topside valves.
Moderately corrosive/erosive (oil/gas not defined as severe, sea water, occasionally particles).
Severe corrosive/erosive [sour gas/oil (high H2S), high CO2 content, high sand content].
b Primary actuation principle:
1 single-acting = actuation force by gas (air) or hydraulic fluid for either opening or closing the valve;
2 double-acting = actuation force by gas (air) or hydraulic fluid for both opening and closing the valve;
3 actuation by line/process pressure or actuation by gravity = no actuation apart from possible backup actuation.
Moderately corrosive/erosive (oil/gas not defined as severe, sea water, occasionally particles).
Severe corrosive/erosive [sour gas/oil (high H2S), high CO2 content, high sand content].
b Primary actuation principle:
1 single-acting = actuation force by gas (air) or hydraulic fluid for either opening or closing the valve;
2 double-acting = actuation force by gas (air) or hydraulic fluid for both opening and closing the valve;
3 actuation by line/process pressure or actuation by gravity = no actuation apart from possible backup actuation.
A.2.5.5 Nozzles
Moderately corrosive/erosive (oil/gas not defined as severe, sea water, occasionally particles).
Severe corrosive/erosive [sour gas/oil (high H2S), high CO2 content, high sand content].
A.2.5.6 Lifeboats
The lifeboats addresses lifeboats mounted on offshore oil & gas facilities, and also drilling rigs. Note
that lifeboats, in Arctic areas, are not addressed in this International Standard.
The diving technical equipment within self-propelled hyperbaric lifeboats is not covered by this
International Standard, but by NORSOK U-100:2015.
Note that there are two types of Free fall lifeboats, drop or skid.
A.2.6 Subsea
Key
a Sensors mounted on the Subsea X-mas tree, but covered by subunit sensor in Table A.87.
A.2.6.3 Risers
Note that the equipment class Dry tree risers (e.g. for dry well completion riser tie-back when TLP’s and
SPAR’s) riser are listed as a separate equipment class in Table A.4, but is not covered by the equipment
class Risers in A.2.6.3.
Electrical power distribution system specifically excludes subsea control system power distribution.
Electrical power distribution is dedicated for distribution to subsea processing equipment (e.g.
multi-flow pumps, water injection pumps, and compressors) with power requirements in range MW.
The electric power to control and instrumentation is part of the equipment class “Subsea production
control” - see A.2.6.1.
If the electric power comes directly from onshore, the subunit “Static power cable” in A.2.6.5 will apply,
and would be similar as subunit “Static power cable” in an equipment class “Submarine power cable”
used for providing power from shore to offshore facility (and may have an associated dynamic power
cable, if an offshore floating facility). The topsides power distribution equipment will in the former case
be located onshore. The equipment class “Submarine power cable” is not currently included in this annex.
b Similar components as for the Static umbilical Subunit for equipment class Subsea production control equipment class.
d Note regarding the level of detailing. A subsea frequency converter includes subsea penetrators, and can contain contactors. However,
precision needs to be dealt with in use for reliability data collection or estimation. Subsea frequency converter can be of type “pressure
compensated” or “non-pressure compensated”.
e The maintainable item Switchgear will also include parts subsea protective devices.
f Subsea penetrators are either electrical (LV power/signal), electrical (HV) or fibre-optic penetrators. This needs to be reflected for
equipment specific data on maintainable item level.
g Note the difference between subsea transformer as maintainable item (Level 8) and topsides Power transformer
(Equipment class – level 6, as given in A.2.4.2).
h Applies if subsea static power cable tie-back to fixed installation.
i This MI may be given further special detailed attention in reliability data collection or estimation by using Annex A.2.4.1 UPS.
j Subsea power jumper inside the subunit “Subsea power distribution equipment” can only be electrical (HV). However, inside an “overall
subsea power distribution system”, also LV power/signal jumper (being electrical (LV power/signal)), or fibre-optic jumper exist.
These two maintainable items appear in the taxonomy for “Subsea production control” in Table A.87, and possibly others would also
be relevant, e.g. hydraulic/chemical lines may sometimes be also part of the dynamic and static power cable. Rather than introducing
more subunits in Table A.99, one can use those components (appearing in various subunits) in Table A.87 that is in this case relevant for
subsea power in conjunction with a reliability data collection. Note also that LV power/signal lines in dynamic & static umbilicals are not
part of the equipment class “Subsea electrical power distribution”, but in the Annex A.2.6.1 “Subsea production control”. If subsea power
cable also includes (is bundled with) hydraulic/chemical lines and power/signal lines, it is recommended to register data onto the subsea
power cable.
k Generally, it is important to be aware of that some maintainable items (e.g. subsea penetrator and pressure compensator) in Subsea
EPD can appear as parts (Level 9) in different MIs. Attention to this matter is needed in reliability data collection and estimation. Subsea
contactor is for example not included as a maintainable item, as this would require also other components like current transformer,
voltage transformer that are part of larger units like a subsea frequency converter or a switchgear
l The topside power distribution equipment (*) is not further subdivided as it will be covered by other equipment classes defined in this
International Standard. It should be noted that equipment classes Frequency converter (topsides - ref. A.2.4.4)” and Power transformer
(topsides- ref A.2.4.2) are such equipment (*), the configuration of power transformer depends on if subsea power transformer is used
subsea. Equipment class Switchgear (which would include topsides protective device) is also part of such equipment (*). In addition, reac-
tive compensation equipment will exist when long subsea power cable to offshore facility or power directly from shore.
m The control and monitoring associated with subsea electric power distribution equipment is included in the subunit. This comes in
addition to the local control and monitoring for e.g. subsea pumps – see A.2.6.4.
n The Subsea power connector is sometimes called the HV connector, and can be dry or wet mate. Note that the electrical (LV power/sig-
nal), and fibre-optic connectors used for Subsea Power Distribution are covered by these maintainable items in Subunit “Subsea distribu-
tion module” in the taxonomy for equipment class “Subsea production control” in Table A.87.
o During data collection precision is required to ensure sufficient information is captured enabling differentiation between failures
affecting single fibre and failures affecting multiple fibres/bundle of fibres.
In this International Standard, it is distinguished between the valves used on subsea equipment and
the topside valves, such as used on Surface wellheads and X-mas trees. The collection of RM data for
the subsea valves should reflect the characteristics of the valves based on the so-called valve design
class (i.e. type of valve; corresponds to equipment type in Table A.77) and the valve application (i.e. the
function of the valve). Examples of subsea valve applications are given below:
— Flowline isolation: Subsea valves which isolates infield flowline system, e .g. a valve located on a
PLEM or a T-connection.
— Manifold isolation: Subsea valve located on a production/injection manifold and which has a barrier
function, e.g. a branch valve or a header valve.
— Pipeline isolation: Valves which isolates the pipeline transportation system, and valves could be
located subsea or onshore.
— HIPPS: See definition in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.6.3.
— SSIV: See definition in ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.6.4.
Well completion equipment in this context refers to equipment below wellhead level. All major
completion equipment items are included, from tubing hanger at the top end to equipment at the bottom
of the well.
The following subunits are defined for well-completion equipment:
a) Casing
The casing subunit is included to store information on individual casing string maintainable items and
associated casing failures. The casing maintainable items represent full lengths of individual casing
sections and do not represent individual items threaded into the casing string. Sealing elements that
are designed to seal off against leakage of hydrocarbons between the various sections of casing string
(casing pack-offs) are not included. Also included in the casing subunit are maintainable items which
are set inside the wellbore to isolate the wellbore from potential leakages of well effluents and which
cover the entire wellbore. Casing external cement and or other material which is set casing externally to
isolate against flow of well effluents/formation fluids is also considered as casing maintainable items.
b) Completion string
Completion string maintainable items are defined as items that are all integral parts of the conduit
(“string”) used for production or injection of well effluents. The string is built by screwing together a
variety of equipment subunits.
c) Insert
The insert subunit consists of maintainable items which can be attached (set) inside the completion
string. A typical example is the combination of a lock and wireline-retrievable downhole safety valve
set inside a safety valve nipple.
d) Downhole power/control/monitoring
The downhole control/power/monitoring subunit consists of maintainable items which are used to
provide power, control or monitoring functions to maintainable item(s) which are categorized under
other well completion subunit(s).
An example of data collection format with associated data field definitions and registration alternatives
is shown for Downhole safety valves in A.2.7.5.
Table A.107 contains general completion equipment. This equipment is also applicable for shale gas/oil
completions.
Table A.107 contains general completion equipment. This equipment is also applicable for SAGD
(Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage) completions. Guidelines for evaluating casing connections for high-
temperature post-yield applications (such as SAGD) are given in Thermal Well Casing Connection
Evaluation Protocol (TWCCEP) in ISO/PAS 12835:2013.
Well deployed pumps entitled “Electrical submersible pumps” (ESP) can have different applications:
a) onshore well;
b) topsides well (dry tree completion);
c) subsea well (subsea well completion);
d) seafloor (Caisson, e.g. seafloor boosting pump);
e) horizontal pump system (HPS), ESP used to fulfil a pump function topsides/onshore.
All above applications are addressed in ISO 15551-1:2015, except HPS, which is addressed in API RP 11S.
Hydraulic submersible pumps (HSP) is another type of pump located downhole, primarily for subsea,
but is not covered in this International Standard. Likewise, Progressive Cavity Pumps (PCP) are located
downhole, but only in onshore applications and is not covered in this International Standard. Some
further technical details are given in ISO 15136-1:2009.
The seafloor ESP (item 4) is in principle similar to a subsea pump described in equipment class Subsea
pumps (in A.2.6.4), but it is recommended to use this A.2.7.6 for RM data collection for the seafloor ESPs.
The classical or conventional installation is illustrated in Figure A.37 where the ESP unit is run on the
tubing string and is submerged in well fluids. The electric submersible motor is at the bottom of the
unit and is cooled by the wellstream passing by its perimeter. It is connected to the seal section. On top
of the seal section a pump intake or gas separator/handler is situated which allows well fluids to enter
the centrifugal pump and, at the same time, can remove/handle free gas from the wellstream.
Liquid is lifted to the surface by the multistage centrifugal pump, the heart of the ESP system.
Motor Power is transmitted to the submersible motor by clamping a specially constructed three-phase
ESP electric power cable to the production tubing. This cable needs to be of rugged construction to
prevent mechanical damage, and able to retain its physical and electrical properties when exposed to
hot liquids and gasses in oil wells.
ESP pumps are commercially available in different capacities from 100 to around 120,000 bpd of liquid
production rate and in outside diameters from around 3 inches up to 12 inches.
5000 Psi of lift or equivalent kinetic energy can be created by an ESP.
Operational data that should be collected for well-completion equipment are listed in Table A.117. The
data are well-specific and provide a generic reference to the working environment for all equipment in
the well. The production/injection data should be collected on a monthly basis.
A.2.8 Drilling
A top drive (frequently also referred to as a power swivel) is a piece of equipment that serves the
following functions:
— rotating the drill string (formerly undertaken by the rotary table);
— providing a conduit for drilling mud (formerly undertaken by the rotary swivel);
— disconnecting/connecting pipe (formerly undertaken by the iron roughneck);
— closing in the drill pipe by an integrated kelly valve (formerly undertaken by the kelly valve in
connection with the rotary table);
— lifting/lowering drill string by use of standard elevator (formerly undertaken by the hook by using
same kind of elevator).
Top drives may be either electrically or hydraulically driven. If they are hydraulically driven, several
hydraulic motors are normally used.
Elevator links and elevators are not regarded as a part of the top drive (standard drilling equipment).
There are two main types of blowout preventers used for drilling operations:
— subsea BOPs are used for drilling from a floating unit; this BOP is fixed to the seafloor wellhead;
— surface BOPs are used for land operations or for structures that are fixed to the seafloor.
In principle, a surface BOP is similar to a subsea BOP, and is described separately in A.2.8.3. The main
differences are related to the control of the BOP functions and that the surface BOP, in general, has
fewer functions than the subsea BOP. In addition, a subsea BOP has a flexible joint at the top to allow
variation in the riser angle.
In addition a subsea BOP has a flexible joint at the top, connecting to the drilling riser (or completion
riser), allowing variation in the riser angle
In normal drilling operations, the drilling-fluid pressure is higher than the reservoir pressure. This
prevents an uncontrolled influx of formation fluids to the well bore.
The reservoir pressure can, from time to time for various reasons, exceed the drilling-fluid pressure.
This results in an uncontrolled influx of formation fluids to the well bore. The main function of the BOP
is, then, to close in the wellbore in order to circulate drilling fluid with a higher density to regain the
hydrostatic control of the well.
The BOP can also be used for other purposes, such as testing casing, testing leak-off pressure, squeeze
cement, etc.
The example of Subsea BOP taxonomy given in Figure A.40 relates to subsea-mounted BOPs used for
drilling.
A subsea BOP typically consists of the following main components (also table on equipment
subdivision below):
a) one or two annular preventers that seal around any tubular in the well;
b) three to six ram preventers that, depending on dressing, can seal around various pipes in the well,
shear pipe and seal an empty hole;
c) Two (2) connectors, one connecting the BOP to the wellhead, called the wellhead connector, and the
LMRP connector connecting the LMRP to the BOP and making it possible to disconnect the LMRP
from the BOP;
d) four to ten choke-and-kill valves that can be operated in order that the contained pressure in the
BOP can be observed, pressurized fluid circulated out of the well and pressurized fluid pumped in
the well.
The equipment class “Surface blowout preventers (BOP)” are specific for land operations or for
structures that are fixed to the seafloor, and are too a large extent similar to the subsea BOP equipment
subsea. Hence parts of the example shown for subsea blowout preventers is also applicable to surface
blowout preventers, except for specific subsea maintainable items listed in A.2.8.2.
In principle, a surface BOP is similar to a subsea BOP. The main differences are related to the control of
the BOP functions and that the surface BOP, in general, has fewer functions than the subsea BOP.
The main function of the Surface BOP is to close in the wellbore in order to circulate drilling fluid with a
higher density to regain the hydrostatic control of the well. The Surface BOP can also be used for other
purposes, such as testing casing, testing leak-off pressure, squeeze cement, etc.
The example of Surface BOP taxonomy given in Figure A.41 relates to surface-mounted BOPs used for
drilling.
A Surface BOP typically consists of the following main components (also table on equipment
subdivision below):
a) one or two annular preventers that seal around any tubular in the well;
b) three to six ram preventers that, depending on dressing, can seal around various pipes in the well,
shear pipe and seal an empty hole;
c) a main connector that connects the BOP to the wellhead;
d) four to ten choke-and-kill valves that can be operated in order that the contained pressure in the
BOP can be observed, pressurized fluid circulated out of the well and pressurized fluid pumped in
the well.
Surface well control equipment is relevant for the following well interventions:
— coiled tubing;
— wireline;
— snubbing.
The principles for data collection and exchange defined in this International Standard can also be
applied for such equipment.
Note that the Surface well control equipment is all topsides or onshore located equipment. In case
subsea well intervention takes place (where e.g. surface tree is covered in Table A.128), there will be
interfaces on top of this surface tree, and this equipment class in this section provides further details.
Note that subsea and surface BOPs are listed in A.2.8.2 and A.2.8.3.
The following three equipment classes are mentioned separately in Table A.4, but due to similarities
they are combined in this section, and equipment type classification in the table below should therefore
be used in reliability data collection for such surface well control equipment:
— coiled tubing, surface well control equipment;
— wireline, surface well control equipment;
— snubbing, surface well control equipment.
Table A.127 — Type classification - Surface well control equipment (for well intervention)
Equipment class — Level 6 Equipment type
Description Code Description Code
Surface well control equipment (for well intervention) WC Coiled tubing W1
Snubbing W2
Wireline W3
Figure A.42 — Boundary definition - Surface well control equipment (for well intervention)
Table A.128 — Equipment subdivision - Surface well control equipment (for well intervention)
Equipment Surface well control equipment (for well intervention)
unit
Subunit Temporary Well Dynamic Lateral Control and
connection and Intervention pressure isolation monitoring
high pressure BOP seal valve
extension
Maintainable Sealing surface Ram assembly Sealing ele- Valve, process Prime mover
items ment isolation
Sealing element Sealing element Solenoid control
Hydraulic cir- Valve, utilit y valve
Shearing ele-
cuit isolation
ment Pilot controlled
valve
Hand actuator
Accumulator
Electronics mod-
ule
Hydraulic cou-
pling
LV power/signal
connector
Relief valve
Shuttle valve
Filter
Pump
Hydraulic fluid
tank
Reliability data collection for ‘Subsea well intervention’ may be performed on three modes of operation,
which may have slightly different taxonomy formats. These are:
a) riserless well intervention (RLWI);
b) open water intervention;
c) Thru-BOP/Drilling riser intervention.
RLWI for executing subsea wireline operations is comparable to the wireline operations done using
surface well control equipment as described in A.2.9.1.
This International Standard presents equipment specific data for b) open water intervention, and this is
thus assigned the equipment class OI, see below.
Other intervention tools appearing as part of this International Standard such as running tools for
flow control module, SCM and valve retrievals on the subsea production facility are not covered in this
taxonomy; see equipment class “Subsea intervention”.
5) EDP/WCP Process isolation valves could for instance be PIV, RV or XOV. Note that process isolation
valves may require to cut.
6) Shear (/seal) valve is typically a shear (seal) ram.
7) Heave elimination is usually performed through elevator and top drive motion compensator or
heave compensated crane. Slick joint position and function shall be clarified.
8) Note that Table A.4 has “Drilling and completion riser” as an equipment class that would cover the
workover riser.
9) The Workover Control System (WOCS) is different and should therefore be analysed separately.
This is done by the introduction of two new subunits, ‘Topside control & monitoring’ and ‘Subsea
control & monitoring’, which are always associated with the well intervention taxonomies and
should not be confused with the “Subsea production control” equipment class.
10) Safety joint (equipment class Subsea pipelines) and Stress joint (equipment class Dry tree risers)
can be different from WO safety / stress joints
A.2.10 Marine
Jack-up units used in the oil and gas industry can be divided into two main groups, drilling jack-ups and
service jack-ups.
A.2.11 Utilities
No examples are included in Annex A.
NOTE Utilities can include anything from single equipment units (e.g. pumps) to more complex assemblies
(packages).
Depending on the application, data can be collected on single-unit level and the reliability estimated
by calculating the total reliability for the utility assembly. Alternatively, data can be collected for the
complete utility system as a whole. It is necessary to establish the taxonomic definition defined or
adapted to the selected alternative.
A.2.12 Auxiliaries
No examples are included in Annex A.
Annex B
(normative)
Subdivision codes for failure mechanisms and failure causes, e.g. numbers 1.1, 1.2, etc., should be
preferred before the general category failure code, e.g. 1, and so on (see Tables B.2. and B.3).
How failure mode, failure mechanism and failure cause are related to different taxonomy levels is
shown in Table 3.
Failure mechanism is also related to the failure cause (see B.2.3); the latter aimed at revealing the
underlying root cause of the failure.
Six categories of failure mechanism are identified in Table B.2, together with subdivisions and related
codes to be used in data bases.
B.2.3.1 General
The objective of these data is to identify the initiating event (“root causes”) in the sequence leading up
to a failure of an equipment item. Five categories of failure cause are identified in Table B.3 together
with sub divisions and related codes to be used in databases.
The failure causes are classified in the following categories:
1) design-related causes;
2) fabrication/installation-related causes;
3) failures related to operation/maintenance;
4) failures related to management;
5) miscellaneous.
As for failure mechanism, the failure cause can be recorded at two levels depending on how much
information is available. If the information is scarce, only a coarse classification, i.e. codes 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5, can be possible, while a more detailed subdivision code number can be recorded if more information
is available.
Failure causes are commonly not known in depth when the failure is observed and, in order to reveal
the root cause of a failure, a specific root cause analysis can be useful. This is in particular relevant for
failures of a more complex nature and where the failure is important to avoid due to its consequences.
Examples are failures with serious safety and/or environmental consequences, abnormally high failure
rates compared to the average and failures with a high repair cost.
Due care is required so as not to confuse failure mechanism (describing the apparent, observed cause of
failure) with failure cause (describing the underlying or “root” cause of a failure).
Common cause failures are already defined in other standards, such as IEC 61508:2010 and
ISO/TR 12489:2013. RM data collection shall take such failures into account. How to deal with common
cause failures depends on the taxonomy level (ref Figure 3) where the collection is done and the level on
which the common cause failures occur. If a common cause failure occurs on the same level as the data
collection or any level above, the failure should be registered for each individual item. However, only
one of the items should be selected where the actual failure cause is described. This item should be the
first or most severely affected, if this is possible to identify. Otherwise, this item is selected randomly.
For all the other failed items, the failure cause should be labelled with “common cause”.
For example, if a failure on a subsea umbilical reveals that all cores have been wrongly configured
(design error), and data is collected on maintainable item level, in this case the individual umbilical
lines, the following procedure is recommended: Record one failure for each of the umbilical lines,
which typically consist of power/signal lines and hydraulic/chemical lines. For only one of these, record
the failure cause as “design error”. For all the others, record the failure cause as “common cause”. On
topside equipment units, common cause failures can typically occur for driver/driven unit, or parallel
configurations of rotating equipment. In those cases, the method as described shall apply.
If there is more than one failure on any level below the unit where data is collected, only one failure
shall be recorded. However, the record shall indicate that several units on a lower hierarchical level
have been affected. If contaminated lubrication oil causes damage on several subunits, there is only one
failure to be recorded on the equipment unit. The subunit failed, shall either be labelled “several” or
show a list of all affected subunits.
Sometimes, seemingly simultaneous failures are actually consequences of each other. According to
ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.2.14, this is not a common cause failure. Consequently, only the first (initiating)
failure shall be recorded. An example of this is malfunctioning of the lube oil pump and subsequent
bearing failure due to overheating. In this case, the failure shall only be recorded on the lubrication
subunit.
See also information in F.3.2 with respect to common cause failures and relations to systematic failures.
For corrective maintenance, this information describes the type of restoration action that was
performed. In general, the predominant restoration activity should be coded when several activities
are involved. The code categories “repair”, “replace”, “overhaul” and “modify” should have a priority
relative to the code categories “refit” and “adjust” when a combination of the two categories are
involved (e.g. repair consisting of “repair” and “refit” should be coded as “repair”). If there are several
repair activities involved, none of which is predominant, the code “combined” may be used.
“Modify” means a modification of the original equipment unit where the original design has been
altered or the item in question replaced with one of a different type/make. If the modification is of
significant character, it is not considered as a maintenance action, but may be carried out by, or in co-
operation with, the maintenance staff. A “repair” is meant to be an action to correct a single failure or
a few failures, normally on-site. “Overhaul” means a comprehensive repair of several failures, or one
major failure requiring extensive work, or complete refurbishment of an equipment subunit. Typically,
such maintenance is undertaken in a workshop.
If the complete equipment unit has been replaced with a new and/or modified one, it is recommended
to rewind the time parameters (e.g. operating time) for this unit. This does not apply if the equipment
unit is of low complexity and a complete replacement is considered as a normal part of the maintenance.
For preventive maintenance, this information describes the type of preventive action being performed.
In general, the most predominant maintenance activity should be coded when several activities are
involved. If there is no predominant task, again this should be coded as “combined” and additional
information on the various activities listed in a free-text field if provided.
NOTE These maintenance codes do not, as such, reflect the effectiveness of the maintenance action as to
restoring the condition of the item (e.g. “good-as-new” or “bad-as-old” condition).
Note that some examples apply to only some of the equipment classes in the table they appear. See also
Table 3, and note some of the failure modes may apply on other levels.
NOTE The failure mode codes in Tables B.6 to B.15 are issued as part of Annex B, but are also shown in an
Excel document that is available at http://standards.iso.org/iso/14224. This facilitates the use and application of
these codes by the users of this International Standard. Some of the tables have notes that are not shown in the
Excel document.
on demand
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance X X X X X X X
INL Internal leakage Leakage internally of process or utility fluids X X X X X X
LOO Low output Delivery/output below acceptance X X X X X X X X
NOI Noise Abnormal noise X X X X X X X X
OHE Overheating Machine parts, exhaust, cooling water X X X X X X X X
PDE Parameter deviation Monitored parameter exceeding limits, e.g. high/ X X X X X X X X
low alarm
PLU Plugged/ choked Flow restriction(s) X X X X X X
SER Minor in-service Loose items, discoloration, dirt X X X X X X X X
problems
STD Structural deficiency Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion) X X X X X X X X
STP Failure to stop on Doesn’t stop on demand X X X X
demand
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X X X X X X
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode X X X X X X X X
UST Spurious stop Unexpected shutdown X X X X X X X X
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
187
188
Equipment class code CR HE HB PI VE WI TU SW TA
Description Examples Heat
Failure Heaters Pres-
ex- Winch- Storage
mode Cranes and Piping sure Turrets Swivels
chang- es tanks
code boilers vessels
ers
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
FLP Failure in lightning protection Failure in grounding, insufficient roof thickness, etc. X
system
FRO Failure to rotate Failure to rotate X X X X
FTD Failure to disconnect Failure to disconnect upper connector X
FTI Failure to function as intended General operation failure X X X
FTS Failure to start on demand Failure to start on demand X X
LBP Low oil supply pressure Low oil supply pressure X
LOA Load drop Load drop X X
LOB Loss of buoyancy Loss of buoyancy in idle position X X
LOO Low output Performance below specifications X
MOF Mooring failure Mooring failure X
NOI Noise Excessive noise X X X X
OHE Overheating Overheating X X X X
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X X X X X X X
PDE Parameter deviation Monitored parameter exceeding limits, e.g. high/ X X X X X X X X X
low alarm
PLU Plugged/ choked Flow restriction due to contamination, objects, X X X X X X
wax, etc.
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
189
Table B.8 — Electrical equipment — Failure modes
190
Equipment class code UP PT FC SG
Description Examples Unin-
Fre-
ter- Power
Failure quency
rupti- trans- Switch-
mode con-
ble form- gear
code vert-
power ers
ers
supply
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
AIR Abnormal instrument reading Wrong oil level indication, False alarm, faulty instrument indication X X
BRD Breakdown Serious damage X
DOP Delayed operation Delayed response to commands X
ELU External leakage - utility medium Leakage of oil leakage, lubricant, cooling water X X X
ERO Erratic output Oscillating, hunting, instability X X
FOF Faulty output frequency Wrong/oscillating frequency X
FOV Faulty output voltage Wrong/unstable output voltage X X
FTC Failure to close on demand Circuit breaker/switchfuse/disconnector/bus tie fails to close when demanded X
FTF Failure to function on demand Doesn’t start on demand, or failure to respond on signal/ activation, or does not X X X
respond to input commands
Auxiliary function, subsystem, monitoring or control device fails to operate X
when demanded
FTI Failure to function as intended Response not as expected X
Protection device/ circuit breaker/ switch fails to clear a fault on the circuit X
FTO Failure to open on demand Circuit breaker/switchfuse/disconnector/bus tie fails to open when demanded X
FTR Failure to regulate Fails to control the load, poor response to feedback X
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance X
INL Internal leakage Oil leakage, Leakage internally process or utility fluids X X
LOO Low output Delivery/output below acceptance X
NOI Noise Abnormal noise X
OHE Overheating Machine parts, exhaust, cooling water X X X
OHE Overheating Too high internal temperature X
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X X
PDE Parameter deviation Monitored parameter exceeding limits, e.g. high/low alarm X X X
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
191
Table B.9 — Safety and control equipment — Failure modes
192
Equipment class code FGA FGB IP CL VA NO LB
Description Examples Con-
Failure Fire Gas Input
trol Noz- Life-
mode detec- detec- devic- Valves
logic zles boats
code tion tion es
units
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
FTC Failure to close Doesn’t close on demand X
on demand
FTF Failure to function Failure to respond on signal/activation X X X X X
on demand
FTO Failure to open Doesn’t open on demand, stuck closed or fail to open fully X X
on demand
FTS Failure to start Doesn’t start on demand X
on demand
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance X X X X X
INL Internal leakage Leakage internally of process or utility fluids X X
LCP Leakage in closed position Leak through valve in closed position X
LOA Load drop Unintended drop/launch of a lifeboat X
LOO Low output Delivery/output below acceptance X X X X X X
NOI Noise Abnormal or excessive noise X X
NOO No output No output X X X
OHE Overheating Machine parts, exhaust, cooling water, etc. X
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X X X X
Fails to operate as demanded, false alarm, premature closure/ X X
stop, unexpected operation/fails to operate as demanded
STD Structural deficiency Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion), reduced X X X
integrity
STP Failure to stop on demand Doesn’t stop on demand X
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode X X X X X X
UST Spurious stop Unexpected shutdown X
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
193
Table B.9 (continued)
194
Equipment class code FGA FGB IP CL VA NO LB
Description Examples Con-
Failure Fire Gas Input
trol Noz- Life-
mode detec- detec- devic- Valves
logic zles boats
code tion tion es
units
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
• others: Additionally, some failure modes related to low/high output, adjustments and overhauls will typically be found in the log books.
NOTE 2 Failure coding for gas detectors:
High output e.g. reading 10 % LEL to 20 % LEL without test gas; reading above 80 % LEL on test gas.
Low output e.g. reading between 31 % LEL to 50 % LEL upon test gas (assuming a nominal set point of 65 % LEL).
Very low output e.g. reading between 11 % LEL to 30 % LEL upon test gas.
No output e.g. reading less than 10 % LEL upon test gas.
ELU External leakage - utility Hydraulic oil, lubrication oil, barrier oil, coolant, water, etc. X X X X X X X
medium
FCO Failure to connect Failure to connect connector X X X X
FTC Failure to close on demand Doesn’t close on demand X X
FTD Failure to disconnect Failure to disconnect connector X X X X
FTF Failure to function on Failure to respond on signal/activation X X X
demand
FTL Failure to lock/unlock Doesn’t lock or unlock when demanded, failure to connect or X X X
disconnect, failure to release SCM from its mounting base
FTO Failure to open on demand Doesn’t open on demand X X
HIO High output Overspeed/ output above acceptance X
HTF Heating failure Loss of ability to provide heating X
IHT Insufficient heat transfer Lack off or reduced ability to transfer heat from hot temper- X X
ature areas, such as power transformers or power supply
electronics
ILP Internal leakage - Leakage process medium going through heat coils or similar. X
process medium
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
195
196
Equipment class code CS XT SP PR EPD SV SL
Description Examples Subsea Subsea
Subsea
well- elec- Subsea
Failure pro- Subsea
head Subsea trical pres-
mode duc- Risers pipe-
and pumps power sure
code tion lines
X-mas distri- vessels
control
trees bution
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
SET Failure to set/retrieve Failed set/retrieve operations X X X X X X
SPO Spurious operation Fails to operate as demanded, false alarm, premature X X X X X
closure/stop, unexpected operation/fails to operate as
demanded
STD Structural deficiency Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion) X X X X X
Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion, decay)
UBU Global buckling Upheaval or lateral buckling X
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode X X X
NOTE Although not a requirement of this International Standard, it is recommended that, for subsea equipment, failure modes are also recorded at a lower hier-
archical level, e.g. “maintainable item”.
FTC Failure to close on demand Does not close upon demand signal X X
Valve(s) fail to close on demand
FTF Failure to function on demand Failure to respond on signal/activation X
FTO Failure to open on demand Does not open on demand X X
Valve(s) fail to open on demand
FTS Failure to start on demand Doesn’t start on demand X
HIO High output Overspeed/output above acceptance X
ILP Internal leakage - process medium Leakage internally of process fluids X
ILU Internal leakage - utility medium Leakage internally of utility fluids X X
INL Internal leakage Leakage internally of process or utility fluids X
LCP Leakage in closed position Leakage through valve exceeding acceptance criteria when closed X
LOO Low output Delivery/output below acceptance X
OHE Overheating Machine parts, exhaust, cooling water X
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X
Specify in comment field
PCL Premature closure Spurious closure of valve without command X
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
197
PDE Parameter deviation Monitored parameter exceeding limits, e.g. high/low alarm X
Table B.11 (continued)
198
Equipment class code ESP SS XD
Description Examples Surface
Electri-
Down- well-
Failure cal sub-
hole head
mode mers-
safety and
code ible
valves X-mas
pumps
trees
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
PLU Plugged/ choked Partly or full flow restriction due to hydrate, scale, wax, etc. X X
SPO Spurious operation Fails to operate as demanded X X
Undesired valve opening / closure
STD Structural deficiency Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion) X X
Reduced integrity
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode X X X
UST Spurious stop Unexpected shutdown X
VIB Vibration Abnormal vibration X
WCL Well-to-control-line communication Influx of well fluids into valve control line X
FTF Failure to function on demand Failure to respond on signal/activation (e.g. failure to shear) X X
FTO Failure to open on demand Doesn’t open on demand X X
FTS Failure to start on demand Failure to start top drive X
HIO High output Output torque above specifications X
INL Internal leakage Leakage internally of process or utility fluids X X X
LCP Leakage in closed position Leakage through a valve (e.g. ram-valve) in closed position X X
LOO Low output Output torque below specifications X
NOI Noise Excessive noise X
OHE Overheating Overheating X
OTH Other Failure modes not covered above X X X
PLU Plugged / Choked Choke or kill line plugged X X
POD Loss of functions on both pods Both pods are not functioning as desired X
SET Failure to set/retrieve Failed set/retrieve operations X X
SER Minor in-service problems Loose items, discoloration, dirt X X X
SPO Spurious operation Unexpected operation X X X
STD Structural deficiency Material damages (cracks, wear, fracture, corrosion) X X X
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
199
Table B.12 (continued)
200
Equipment class code TD SB DB
Description Examples Subsea Surface
Failure blowout blowout
Top
mode pre- pre-
drives
code venters venters
(BOP) (BOP)
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
STP Failure to stop on demand Failure to stop top drive or incorrect shutdown process X
UNK Unknown Too little information to define a failure mode X X X
VIB Vibration Excessive vibration X
© ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
Annex C
(informative)
C.1 Interpretation rules for commonly used failure and maintenance parameters
C.1.1 General
Though this International Standard does not cover data analysis in the broad sense, this annex
includes some recommended interpretation rules and basic calculation formulas commonly used
when analysing reliability and maintenance data. For a more in-depth assessment of this subject, we
recommend textbooks on the subject and some of the standards listed in the Bibliography at the end of
this International Standard. For the qualification of new technology, refer also to textbooks on expert
judgements, e.g. Cooke (1992).
In addition to the definitions given in Clause 3, Annex C gives some interpretation rules for commonly
used terms encountered in data collection and projects.
ISO/TR 12489:2013 does also provide useful information regarding various reliability and maintenance
parameters for use in reliability modelling and calculation.
C.1.2 Redundancy
Redundancy may be applied as follows:
a) passive (cold) standby: redundancy wherein part of the means for performing a required function
is needed to operate, while the remaining part(s) of the means are inoperative until needed;
b) active (hot) standby: redundancy wherein all means for performing a required function are
intended to operate simultaneously;
c) mixed: redundancy where a part of the redundant means “is on standby” and another part is
“active” (example: three means, one active, one in hot standby, one in cold standby).
EXAMPLE 1 Redundancy can be expressed as a quantitative measure, viz. equipment redundancy factor (ERF).
(See also definition of redundancy in Clause 3 and distinction between “hot” and “cold” standby versus
“up time/down time” in 8.3.1).
For redundant systems, parts can fail without a failure of the system. This should be taken into account
when estimating required spare parts and repair capacity (where these failures are counted) and
estimates of availability (where these failures are not counted).
(
P B | A ) (
=P A∩B ) ( ) ( )
/ P A = P B (C.1)
( ) ( ) ( )
P A �∩ �B �= �P A ��
⋅ P B (C.2)
When two events have the above property, that means that they behave independently from each other
and they are said to be stochastically independent.
Independent failures are, of course, a particular case of independent events.
( ) ( ) ( )
P A �∩ �B �≠ �P A ��
⋅ P B (C.3)
Therefore, when the dependencies are not taken under consideration, the results are underestimated.
As they are no longer conservative, this cannot be acceptable, especially for safety studies. This is why
the concepts of common cause failure and common mode failure have been introduced.
Components that fail due to a shared cause normally fail in the same functional mode. The term
common mode is, therefore, sometimes used. It is, however, not considered to be a precise term for
communicating the characteristics that describe a common cause failure.
C.1.8 Trips
Shutdown of machinery refers to the situation when the machinery is shut down from normal operating
condition to full stop. Two types of shutdown exist.
a) Trip (see definition in 3.93).
b) Manual shutdown: The machinery is stopped by an intended action of the operator (locally or from
the control room).
For some equipment, spurious stop is defined as a failure mode (i.e. UST, see Table B.15) that can be
either a real trip or a spurious trip depending on cause.
d) Equipment lifetime analysis, such as Weibull analysis, is recommended on equipment types having
five or more common mode failures with severity levels I to XII.
NOTE Common causes of failures can be classified as follows.
1) Infant-mortality failures (Weibull-shape parameter β < 1,0) are usually induced by external circumstances
and are typically due to poor installation, solid-state electronic failures, manufacturing defects, misassembly,
or incorrect start‑up procedures.
2) Random failures (β = 1,0) most often result from human errors, foreign-object failures or computational
errors in the Weibull analysis (e.g. combining data from different failure modes, combining common failure
modes from differing equipment types, etc.). Random failures are best addressed by improved predictive-
maintenance programmes (more rigorous condition monitoring).
3) Early wear-out failures (1,0 < β < 4,0) can occur in the normal design life of the equipment and most often
include low cycle fatigue, most bearing failures, corrosion and erosion. Preventive maintenance resulting
in repair or replacement of critical components can be cost effective. The period for overhaul is read off the
Weibull plot at the appropriate β life.
4) Old age wear-out failures (β ≥ 4,0) most often occur outside the normal design life. The steeper the slope (β),
the smaller the variation in the times to failure and the more predictable the results. Typical failure modes
with old age wear include stress corrosion, erosion, material property issues, etc. Preventive maintenance
to replace parts that produce significant failures can be cost effective. The period for overhaul is read off the
Weibull plot at the appropriate β life.
C.2 Availability
C.2.1 Normalized definition
See definition in 3.3.
Note the distinction between the terms availability and reliability;
— availability: item working at a given instant (no matter what has happened before);
— reliability: item working continuously over a whole period of time.
“Availability” characterizes a function that can be interrupted without any problem and “reliability,” a
function that cannot be interrupted over a whole period of time.
A(t) = PS(t) (C.4)
∫ A (t ) dt (C.5)
1
Am =
(t 1,t 2) t2 − t1
t1
— “Steady state” (or asymptotic) availability, Aas, is the limit of the mean availability for a given mission
when the time period goes to infinity, as given by Formula (C.5) (see also ISO/TR 12489:2013,
3.1.17):
1
Aas = lim
t →∞ t ∫ ()
A t dt (C.6)
These definitions show clearly the difference between the various “availabilities,” specifically:
a) for the pointwise availability, we are interested only in the fact that the item works well when it is
required (no matter if it has failed at some previous moment, provided it has been repaired since
and has not failed again);
b) for the mean availability, we are interested in the same, but averaged over a given period of time.
This corresponds to the ratio of the effective working time over the whole duration under interest.
Note that in most, but not all, of the cases, after a certain time, the pointwise availability reaches an
asymptotic value called “steady state” availability, which is equal to the above “steady state availability”.
EXAMPLE For a simple repairable item with only two reliability parameters [failure rate (λ; see C.3) and
repair rate (μ)], the pointwise availability is equal to Formula (C.7):
()
A t =1−
λ
λ + µ
{ ( ) }
1 − exp − λ + µ t (C.7)
When t goes to infinity, we obtain the asymptotic value, as given by Formula (C.8), which is also the
steady state availability:
µ
Aas = (C.8)
λ + �µ
This availability is the “technical” or “intrinsic” or “inherent” availability of the item (see also C.2.3.2).
The interest of the availability concept within the application areas of this International Standard is
the relationship existing between data collected in the field and the mathematical meaning of the mean
availability over a given period.
When planning to collect measures and estimates of mean availability (the term “availability” is defined
in Clause 3, see also 7.1.2), two types of mean availability and the sum of the two should be considered.
a) Operational availability, Ao, is given by Formula (C.9):
where
MUT is the mean up time, estimated by using the actual up time observed in the field;
MDT is the mean down time, estimated by using the actual up and down times observed in the field.
b) Intrinsic availability, AI, is given by Formula (C.10):
AI = MTTF / (MTTF + MTTRes) (C.10)
where
MTTRes is the mean time to restoration, estimated by using the active maintenance times observed
in the fields; see Table 4 and Figure 4;
MTTF is the mean time to failure, estimated by using the actual up times observed in the field.
c) Mean elapsed time between failures, METBF, is given by Formula (C.11):
METBF = MTTF + MTTRes (C.11)
AI and Ao are not equivalent, except when MDT is equal to MTTRes. Generally, AI is of interest to
reliability engineers, while Ao is of interest to maintenance people.
These estimations explain why the unit of availability is expressed as the proportion of time(s) the item
is in the up state.
Be aware that though MDT, which is made of several delays (detection, isolation, spare parts, stand-by,
repair duration, re-instatement, etc.), and MUT, which is normally close to the MTTF, the operational
availability depends on the combined aspects of the reliability performance, the maintenance
performance, the maintainability performance and the maintenance support performance. Therefore,
this is not an intrinsic property of the item itself but a property of that item within the context (the
whole installation, procedures, maintenance policy, etc.) where it is used.
Depending on the interest of the user, only a part of the down time may be considered. Extra delays due
to required external resources other than maintenance resources may be excluded from the estimation
in order to perform a more intrinsic estimation, such as given in Formula (C.12):
A1 = MTTF / (MTTF + MTTRes) (C.12)
µ
Am = (C.13)
λ+ µ
In the same way, the time spent for preventive maintenance can be included or not in the evaluations.
The above single formula for evaluating the two reliability parameters, λ and μ, is not sufficient. It is
necessary to evaluate λ and μ separately based on the observed MTTF (or MUT) for the failure rate, and
the observed MTTRes (or MRT, a part of the MDT) for the repair rate.
As the amount of data collected increases, the estimations become closer and closer to the true
mathematical values. The uncertainties can be managed through classical statistical analyses.
It is quite common to define the operational availability based on the down time related to the sum of
both corrective and preventive maintenance. The term “technical availability” is also sometimes used as
an alternative to “intrinsic availability.” In the latter case, down time related to corrective maintenance
only shall be included in the calculations. The operational availability per year, Ao,y, and the technical
availability per year, AT,y, can then be calculated as given in Formulas (C.14) and (C.15), respectively:
Ao, y =
(
8760 − t C + t P ) (C.14)
8760
8760 − t C
AT , y = (C.15)
8760
where
The “failure rate” is a classical reliability parameter, denoted by the Greek letter, λ (lambda). The
failure rate is sometimes linked to the reliability parameter “failure frequency” (or “average failure
frequency”), denoted by the letter w and also called the (average) unconditional failure intensity. See
definitions of the two terms in Clause 3.
The average failure frequency is an average frequency, w, of failure (i.e. a number of failures per unit of
time). It is easy to calculate an estimator, ŵ , of this frequency from historical RM data by dividing the
number of observed failures, n, of the considered item by its cumulative working time (operational
time) during the same period of time, as given by Formula (C.16):
ˆ = n / ΣTTF (C.16)
w i
where
TTFi is the ith time to fail (i.e. ith duration of functioning observed from the field).
NOTE 1 w is a function of time t and it asymptotically approaches 1/ MTTF.
In Formula (C.16), TTFi means the ith “time to fail” (i.e. the ith duration of functioning) observed from
the field. So, this is actually the estimator of 1/MTTF for a repairable item (component/system). This w
is usually a function of time t, but asymptotically it approaches 1/TTFi.
In practice, the term ∑TTFi in Formula (C.16) is often replaced by the total operational time of the units
investigated; see the example below.
NOTE 2 Formula (C.16) is true only if an exponential failure distribution (constant hazard rate for the system)
is assumed. In case a component does not have constant hazard rate, the asymptotic rate for the system is not
reached until after several changes of the component (renewal process). Such an interpretation means that the
number of failures over a (long) time period (0, t) “on the average” is equal to w × t. Or, more generally: if a
number of items with the same constant average “failure frequency,” w, are observed over a total operational
time, t, then the mean number of failures observed over this period asymptotically equals w × t.
EXAMPLE An average failure frequency of 3 × 10-4 failures per hour means that on the average 30 failures
will occur during an operational period of 100 000 h. It is emphasized that we are talking here about repairable
units, i.e. units that are repaired immediately after failure.
In the above example, we state that in the long run the mean elapsed time between two failures of a unit
equals 1/w = 3 333 h, which is also equal to the sum of MTTF and MTTRes (valid only for repairable
items, and provided the item is as good as new after repair).
=> valid only for repairable items It is important not to confuse this TTFi of 3 333 h with expected time
to failure. Since the average failure frequency is assumed constant, the probability of a failure is the
same from 0 h to 100 h, from 3 300 h to 3 400 h and from 9 900 h to 10 000 h.
The term “failure rate” (or Vesely failure rate, see e.g. ISO/TR 12489:2013) is sometimes (e.g. in text
books) used synonymously with the term “hazard rate.” Also, this rate is generally a function of time,
t, (since the start of operation of the unit). Then, λ (t)dt is the probability that the item fails between
t and t + dt, provided it has been working all over [0, t]. This function, λ (t), then defines the lifetime
distribution of the units (i.e. the statistical distribution of the time to first failure). This distribution can
also be expressed in terms of the probability, F(t), that the item will fail before it has been operating a
time, t, as given in Formula (C.17):
F(t) = 1 - R(t) (C.17)
where R(t) is the probability that the item will survive a time period, t.
Nevertheless, it can be demonstrated mathematically that when the hazard rate, λ(t), is constant over
time, t, then the average failure frequency (w) and failure rate (λ), both have the same estimator as
given in Formulas (C.16) and (C.17). In that case, we can use the term “failure rate” without causing too
much confusion (but we still have two different interpretations).
The assumption that the failure rate (hazard rate) is constant (= λ) over the whole life of the concerned
item means that the probability of the item to survive a period, t, is given by Formulas (C.18) and (C.19):
R(t) = exp(-λ × t) (C.18)
In the general situation, the hazard rate, λ(t), of the item’s lifetime is often assumed to reflect three
periods: early failures, useful life and wear-out failures (see Figure C.1). During the early failure period,
the λ(t) is normally decreasing, during the useful life it is more or less constant and during the wear-out
period it is increasing, i.e. the curve, λ(t), has the so-called bathtub form (see Figure C.1).
If early failures are treated separately and units are taken out of service before they arrive at wear-out,
the assumption of constant hazard rate can be reasonable. This estimator gives no information on the
form of the hazard-rate curve. Assuming that the hazard rate is constant, this is also an estimator for
the constant hazard rate. If a constant hazard rate is assumed where wear-out failures are present in the
components or spare parts, the reliability is underestimated for low operating time and overestimated
for high operating time. With regards to the time to first failure, TFF, the constant hazard rate estimate
is totally misleading. Nevertheless, a more sophisticated statistical analysis can be performed to
determine if the hazard rate is decreasing, constant or increasing and to evaluate the parameters with
another reliability model such as Weibull for components or the Power law for repaired systems.
In that case, it is necessary to take into consideration the various durations of the TFFs.
The standard methods for estimation of a constant failure rate based on the observed number of
failures over a given time of operation are described in C.3.2 and C.3.3.
n
λ̂ = (C.20)
τ
where
τ is the aggregated time in service, measured either as surveillance time or operating time.
Note that this approach is valid only in the following situations:
— The number of failures for a specified number of items with the same constant failure rate, λ, are
available for a given aggregated time, τ, in service;
— At least one failure is observed (n ≥ 1) over time, τ.
In “classical” statistical theory, the uncertainty of the estimate may be presented as a 90 % confidence
interval with a lower limit, LLower, and an upper limit, LUpper, as given by Formulas (C.21) and (C.22),
respectively:
1
LLower = z 0, 95;ν (C.21)
2τ
1
LUpper = z 0, 05;ν (C.22)
2τ
where
z 0,95; v is the upper 95th percentile of the χ2-distribution (chi-square) with ν degrees of freedom;
z 0,05; v is the lower 5th percentile of the χ2-distribution (chi-square) with ν degrees of freedom.
NOTE 1 The chi-square distribution can be found in most textbooks on statistics or in e.g. SINTEF (2009).
EXAMPLE Assume that n = 6 failures have been observed during an aggregated time in service
τ = 10 000 hours. The failure rate estimate, , expressed as failures per hour as given in Formula (C.20), is
calculated as
n
λ̂ = = 6 ⋅ 10 −4
τ
The 95 % confidence interval, from Formulas (C.21) and (C.22), is calculated as
1
z 0, 95; 2N,
2τ
1
2τ
(
1
z 0, 05; 2 N + 1 = )
20 000
z 0, 95; 12,
1
20 000
(
z 0, 05; 14 = 2, 6 ⋅ 10 −4 , 11, 8 ⋅ 10 −4
)
The estimate and the confidence intervals are illustrated in Figure C.2.
Figure C.2 — Estimate and 95 % confidence interval for the example calculation of the failure rate
Most of the time, a sample is constituted of items which come from different installations with different
operational and environmental. We are here dealing with heterogeneous data, corresponding to
different kind of equipment.
Such data are clustered into k classes, which are assumed to be homogeneous. So, a heterogeneous
sample is the combination of several more or less homogeneous samples.
Starting from data assumed to be clustered into k (homogeneous) classes, each class is represented by
some index i with i = 1, · · · , k in the following. For the ith class, the following data is assumed available:
— the class size mi , which stands for the number of equipment in the ith class,
— the total number ni of failures for all the equipment of the ith class,
— the cumulated operational time τi for all the equipment of the ith class.
In order the failure rate estimate λ̂ i to take into account the data of all classes (ni , t i )1 ≤ I ≤ k (and not
only (ni, t i )), a Bayesian approach is next proposed. The variation of the failure rate between classes
may be modelled by assuming that the failure rate is a random variable with some distribution given by
a probability density function π(λ).
The mean failure rate is then:
∞
∫
θ = λ ⋅ π λ dλ (C.23) ( )
0
And the variance is:
∞
∫ (λ − θ ) ( )
2
σ 2
= ⋅ π λ dλ (C.24)
0
m=
∑ i =1ni , (C.25)
k
∑ i =1τ i
k
S1 = ∑τ i , (C.26)
i =1
k
S2 = ∑τ i
2
, (C.27)
i =1
(ni − mτ i )
k 2
V = ∑ τi
, (C.28)
i =1
S1
( (
V* = V − k −1 m ) )
S 12 − S 2
, (C.29)
k
1 ni
µ=
k ∑τi , (C.30)
i =1
k 2
ni
V =
1
k −1 τ ∑
− µ , (C.31)
i =1 i
b) Derive to compute E t and V t :
{ }
V t = max V ∗ , V (C.32)
k
1 1 ni
Eˆt = ∑ mˆ (C.33)
k 1 τ
∑ i =1 mˆ i =1 + Vˆt i
τi
+ Vˆt
τi
c) Estimates for (á, â) are next derived through:
ˆ Eˆt
β = , (C.34)
Vˆt
αˆ = βˆEˆt (C.35)
Γ ε Γ ε
qαˆ + n ,1/2 qαˆ + n ,1/2 1 −
i 2; i 2
(
2 β +τi
ˆ
) (
2 βˆ + τ i
)
C.3.3 Estimation of failure rate with zero failures — Bayesian approach
C.3.3.1 General
NOTE The Bayesian approach is not always accepted by safety authorities (e.g. in the nuclear field).
The classical approach described above has difficulties when the observed number of failures is zero.
An alternative approach which handles the situation with zero failures is to use a Bayesian approach
with non-informative prior distribution. When n failures have been observed during time, t, the failure
rate estimate, , in the posteriori distribution is given by Formula (C.37):
2n + 1
λ̂ = (C.37)
2t
which, in the case with zero failures, reduces to Formula (C.38):
1
λ̂ = (C.38)
2t
n + 0, 7
λˆ = (C.39)
t
C.3.3.3 Advantages
where ξ is the expected number of cycles per time unit. It is, however, important to use the model on
the right hand side of the formula, since it will respond to possible changes in the expected number of
cycles. See also definition of mean number of cycles in 3.58.
Since ‘cycles’ is the most common term in this regard, it has also been used here. It can, however, be
replaced by the term, ‘demand’, which is explained in C.1.3. The collected information on demands
can thus be used to calculate the MCTF, which can be interpreted as mean start-ups to failure, mean
activations to failure, etc., depending on the equipment. The Mean Cycles To failure (MCTF) is defined
in 3.57.
C.4 Maintainability
C.4.1 General
Several normalized definitions of the concept of “maintainability” exist in normalization documents
(see also 3.47), specifically
— ability, under given conditions, of an item to be maintained in or restored to, over a given period
of time, a state where it is able to perform its function when the maintenance is achieved under
prescribed conditions, procedures and means;
— measure of the ability of an item to be maintained in or restored in specified conditions when the
maintenance is achieved by personnel with a specified level of skill and using prescribed procedures
and resources at all the prescribed levels of maintenance and repair.
There is a probabilistic version of “maintainability”, similar to that for the concepts of reliability and
availability, as follows:
probability that an item can be restored to a condition within a prescribed period of time when
maintenance is performed by personnel having specific skill levels using prescribed procedures and
resources.
See also C.5.5.2 regarding the use of downtime terms normally related to corrective maintenance time,
i.e. mean time to restoration (MTTRes) and mean overall repairing time (MRT).
() (
M t = P RT ≤ t (C.41) )
where
RT is the active time to repair item S, i.e. the time from failure detection to restoration;
() ( )
M t = 1 − exp − µ ⋅ t (C.42)
where μ is the so-called repair rate, which is equivalent to the hazard rate and which is designated
MTTRes.
Note that, depending on what we actually want to evaluate, the whole down time, a part of it or only the
active maintenance time can be used as RT in Formula (C.41).
The repair rate, μ, is a reliability parameter that allows the evaluation of the probability that the
item is repaired within a certain delay after having failed (this is the probabilistic version of the
“maintainability” of the item).
This parameter plays a role for the TR (time to repair) analogous to that of the failure rate for the TTF
(time to failure).
The estimate is given by Formula (C.43):
n 1
µ= = (C.43)
∑RTi MRT
where
This parameter can be used to evaluate the maintainability of the item using an exponential law as
given in Formula (C.44):
() ( )
M t = 1 − exp − µ ⋅ t (C.44)
More sophisticated probabilistic laws are often used for modelling repairs. In these cases, the repair
rate becomes a non-constant μ(t) and the simple estimate in Formula (C.44) no longer applies. For
example, it is necessary to take into consideration the length of the various RTis in order to evaluate the
parameter of a log-normal law.
An indicator of the maintainability performance is the MRT (mean overall repairing time) of the
concerned item. This MRT is the part of the mean down time (MDT) due to the repair itself. It can be
estimated from the sum of the observed “times to repair” (from data feedback) divided by the number
of repairs, as given in Formula (C.45):
RTi
MRT = ∑ n
(C.45)
NOTE When the analytical form of M(t) is known or has been chosen, a link can be made between the
parameters of the exponential law and the MRTs estimated from the field.
The estimation in the classical case, when Formula (C.44) holds and when μ, the so-called “repair
rate,” is constant, is easy. As the amount of data collected increases, the estimation becomes closer and
closer to the true mathematical values. The uncertainties can be managed through classical statistical
analyses.
For more complicated repair laws (e.g. log-normal), it is necessary to take into consideration the length
of the various observed TTFs and to do a statistical fitting.
When planning to collect data (see 7.1.2), it is necessary to consider the various methods of recording
down times (see Table 4 in this International Standards, and also Figures 5 to 7 in ISO/TR 12489:2013)
and the appropriate parts of the down time to be included need to be chosen. Depending on what is
done, several parts of the down time can be included within the MRT.
The general expression for the mean elapsed time between failures, METBF, can be expressed as given
in Formula (C.46):
METBF = MUT + MDT (C.46)
where
MUT
is the mean up time;
MDT
is the mean down time.
where
METBFs are calculated and used for different purposes (for item and equipment, service, site, etc.).
The “item” and “equipment” are of interest mainly to reliability engineers and the others to the
maintenance people.
This parameter, mean time to fail, MTTF, is linked to the failure rate, λ, of the concerned item by
Formula (C.48):
MTTF = 1 / λ (C.48)
where λ is the failure rate, and is valid only for constant failure rates.
Rigorously, this parameter concerns only the first failure of a new item before any maintenance task
has been performed. If the repair is perfect, i.e. the repaired item is “as good as new”, MTTF is exactly
the same as MUT.
Take care to understand this term and be aware that in practice, MTTF and MUT are often confused
(see definition of MUT). See also definitions of failure frequency and failure rate (in Clause 3), which are
similar terms often used to describe the occurrence of failures.
NOTE MTTF is normally associated with the assumption of an exponential distribution (e.g. a constant
hazard rate). MTTF is also used for other distributions as, for example, the normal distribution or the Weibull
distribution. Formulas (C.46) to (C.48) are valid only for the assumption of an exponential distribution for both
METBF and MTTF. Further, it is a prerequisite that all the time is measured in the same time dimension (global or
local time).
This parameter, mean overall repairing time, MRT, is linked to the repair rate, μ, of the concerned item
by Formula (C.49):
MRT = 1 / µ (C.49)
The name MRT is generally related only to the active corrective maintenance time that is a part of the
down time, but depending on the study, it can range from the active corrective maintenance time to
the whole down time. In that case “restoration” can be used instead of “repair”. In the general case,
however, “down time” is greater than “active maintenance time”. See also in ISO/TR 12489:2013, Figure
5, and 3.1.31 (Mean time to repair; MTTR), 3.1.32 (mean time to restoration; MTTRes), 3.1.33 (mean
overall repairing time; MRT) and 3.1.34 (mean active repair time; MART).
If preventive maintenance is also included in addition to the corrective maintenance (repair) dealt
with above, the mean time to maintain, MTTM, expressed in hours, can be calculated as given in
Formula (C.50):
(t mc ) (
⋅ M c + t mp ⋅ M p ) (C.50)
MTTM =
(Mc + Mp )
where
tmc is the total elapsed corrective maintenance or repair time, expressed in calendar hours;
tmp is the total elapsed preventive maintenance time, expressed in calendar hours;
requirements based on this. This approach is in line with the standards IEC 61508:2010 (all parts) and
IEC 61511:2016 (all parts).
— cost-benefit availability
Under some circumstances, the consequence of a safety-system failure in a hazardous situation can be
reduced to economic consequences only. It is, then, appropriate to establish the preventive maintenance
programme by optimizing the total costs by weighing the cost of preventive maintenance against the
cost of safety-system failure; see ISO 15663:2000/2001 (all parts).
There is a need to collect data with regards to both failures occurred before the test (true hidden
failures), and those failures occurring because of the test (e.g. cycle failure, human error, unavailability
during test).
2LPFD
τ = (C.51)
λ
where
LPFD is the upper accepted limit for average probability of failure on demand;
τ λ γ
PDFavg = λ + + (C.52)
2 µ µτ
where
(
τ opt = 2γ / λ ⋅ µ ) (C.53)
See ISO/TR 12489:2013 (e.g. 3.1.16) for further details on availability calculations.
Mathematically, this idea can be formulated by the approximation in Formula (C.54) for total
expected cost:
1 C
E(C T ) = λ fto ⋅ τ ⋅ f ⋅ m (C.54)
2 τ
where
λfto is the average failure rate for failure mode “fail to operate”;
Cf is the difference in cost between the consequences of the hazardous situation when the safety
system works and when it does not work;
(
τ = 2C m / λ fto ⋅ f ⋅ C f ) (C.55)
Annex D
(informative)
D.1 General
There are different areas of application of RM data and it is necessary to consider carefully the
collection of data (see Clause 7) so that the types of data are consistent with the intended purpose. The
types of analyses considered are listed in Table D.1, which also refers to other relevant international
and industry standards.
Surveillance period 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 —
Accumulated operating 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 —
period
Number of demands 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 —
Operating mode 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 —
Common cause failure 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 Derived parameter; can be esti-
rate (frequency) mated by extracting data with
failure cause “Common cause”,
see Table B.3
Confidence intervals 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Derived parameters; see Annex C
Set of spare parts 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
a For definition of codes/abbreviations A1, QRA, etc., see Table D.1.
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
231
Table D.3 — Failure data to be recorded
232
Data to be recorded a Type of analysis to be applied to the data recorded Comments
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
QRA RBI SIL ESIA LCC PA AA RCM SPA FME SDA STR RCA MRP 6Σ FTA MPA PNA
Equipment unit 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 The equipment unit, subunit
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
Failure impact on plant 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 ”
operation
Failure date 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 Essential parameter for all
lifetime analyses, e.g. TTT-plot
Weibull, etc. Not recommended
to discard.
External leakage rate 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Hole sizes and leakage vol-
umes may be additional data
requirements in QRA, and in-
terfaces/ traceability between
accidental event databases and
RM databases can be beneficial
in some cases.
Failure rate 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 Derived value; see Annex C
(frequency)
Common cause failure 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 Can be identified as one specific
rate (frequency) failure cause (see C.1.6)
Confidence interval 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Derived value; see Annex C
a For definition of codes/abbreviations A1, QRA, etc., see Table D.1.
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
ISO 14224:2016(E)
233
Table D.4 — Maintenance data to be recorded
234
Data to be recorded a Type of analysis to be applied to the data recorded Comments
A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
QRA RBI SIL ESIA LCC PA AA RCM SPA FME SDA STR RCA MRP 6Σ FTA MPA PNA
Maintenance category 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 —
ISO 14224:2016(E)
BS EN ISO 14224:2016
Maintenance activity 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 —
Down time 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 —
Active maintenance time 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 —
Maintenance man-hours, 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 —
per discipline
M a i nt en a nc e m a n- 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 —
hours, total
Date of maintenance 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 —
action
Maintenance impact on 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 —
plant operations
Lead time 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 —
Spare part 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 —
Repair workshop cycle 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 See Annex E, Table E.3,
time KPI no. 27
Maintenance tools 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 —
Repair rate 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 Derived value; see Annex C
Test efficiency 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 Derived value defined as the
fraction of failures discovered
on test
Confidence interval 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Derived value; see Annex C
Priority of the repair 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 —
Test interval 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 —
a For definition of codes/abbreviations A1, QRA, etc., see Table D.1.
It is a weakness in the industry that too little attention is given to the quality of the input data. Therefore,
undertaking the qualification of reliability data found in data sources is vital for the credibility of the
results in risk decision making. ISO 20815:2008, Annex E, gives further advice on this qualification topic.
1. Generic data:
Generic data are often (but not necessarily), see Table D.5 based on operational experience from a
number of installations and a number of comparable equipment types, such as e.g., flame detectors from
different vendors. In such case the generic data reflect some kind of average expected field performance
for the equipment type under consideration.
At early project stages generic data is often selected due to lack of detailed information as all equipment
features decisions have not yet been made. However at later project stages one should preferably apply
valid application or equipment specific data – if well documented and considered relevant.
2. Operator/company specific data
Authorities require that the companies keep control of their safety barriers throughout the entire
lifecycle of an installation. Consequently, it is often required for the operators to collect installation
specific failure data during maintenance and operation. During modification analyses such data are
of particular relevance for the purpose of documenting the performance history of given equipment.
However, since the statistical confidence in data from only one installation can often be poor (or all
potential failure events cannot have occurred so far at the installation), reliability analyses are seldom
based on such data alone. However, for some equipment where the number of installed units is high,
e.g., fire and gas detectors, it can be relevant to apply installation specific data only.
3. Manufacturer data
It is often stated by the analyst that supplied manufacturer data are significantly “better” than
comparable generic data (i.e., lower failure rates). This can have several reasons, such as varying
equipment quality, failure modes included and the definition of equipment boundaries. Another
important aspect, however, is that failures due to environmental stress, due to mal-operation,
installation failures, maintenance errors, etc. have frequently been excluded from the manufacturer
data. This is understandable since manufacturers are in the business of selling and does not want to
include failures that can be attributed to factors external to the equipment itself. Also, if the vendor
charges for failure analysis this is a disincentive to return the failed components. Another aspect is the
fact that feedback from the operators using the equipment can be poor (especially beyond the warranty
period) and in such case it is difficult for the manufacturer to establish a good failure rate estimate.
Consequently, using data from manufacturers can involve too low failure rates and as such needs to be
carefully considered. It is therefore advisable to deploy the principles of this International Standard to
strengthen the quality of the data and the communication on these matters.
When using manufacturer data the reliability engineer should remember to add failures due to connection
blockage which are often included in field experience data but excluded from manufacturer data.
4. Expert judgement data
The use of experts to estimate reliability data requires qualification of that the expert is an equipment
expert, and understands the methods being used in reliability data estimation. This International
Standard provides good guidance on such matters, even though not all type of equipment is covered.
If experts are used it would also be beneficial to undertake independent reviews and also be conscious
in how reliability data are being communicated, e.g., number of observable events for a given fleet of
equipment units at an installation for a certain period of time would be more practical than estimating
failure rates in 10-6 per hrs. Separate methods exist for expert data analysis.
5. Human error data
Observations or other information can be used to quantify the failed human interactions:
— generic data (look-up tables);
Annex E
(informative)
E.1 General
Reliability and maintenance (RM) data can be used for developing and managing key performance
indicators (KPIs) and for compiling Benchmark information. The objective of both Benchmarking and
KPIs is to assist in the management of business improvement. This Annex gives some examples of KPIs,
which can be extended, as deemed necessary, using the taxonomy classification in Figure 3. (Some of
the principles described below are based on NPRA, 2002 and Hernu, 2000).
Figure E.1 — Process for using KPIs and benchmarking for improving business performance
The process depicted in Figure E.1 is a simplified version of how KPIs can be developed.
KPIs should be aligned to the objectives of the organization using them and, thus, the organization is free
to define the KPIs in whatever way best contributes to the improved performance of the organization.
Improvement is an essential ingredient of successful companies. Performance indicators and
benchmarking can be highly effective in identifying and improving areas of greatest opportunity.
For each of the activities in the process represented in Figure E.1 a brief description is given in the list
items a) to e).
a) Benchmark performance:
Use is made of benchmarking data to determine the performance of the organization in key areas. These
benchmarks can then be used for comparison, usually external, against organizations in the same or
similar industry, or against organizations in different industries that have similar business processes.
However, measuring performance gaps with the better performers in a peer group is only half the value
of benchmarking. Analyses that can be made of differences of plant profile, practices and organization
(the causal factors) explaining these performance gaps are also invaluable knowledge for benchmarking
study participants.
b) Identify areas for improvement:
Based on the external benchmarks and the objectives of the organization, areas for improvement can
be identified. The areas for improvement are not necessarily the areas where the performance is poor
against the other benchmarks, as the areas of poor performance might not correspond with the areas
that are critical for the business objectives.
In addition, benchmarking is a tool to prove the business case for the necessary up-front management
commitment and investment of the resources to be mobilized for the successful implementation of
a performance-improvement project. Benchmarking can be conducted inside the company, within
the industry or across industries (as long as the same business process is being dealt with). In the
former case, a “best of the best” networking-type process is effective in performance upgrades. Use
of benchmarking within an industry allows a company to recalibrate its performance targets and to
re-examine the justification of historic policies and practices in the light of those of the better industry
performers.
c) Develop KPIs for improvement
In the areas where improvement is desired, KPIs should be developed. Each KPI should have a targeted
performance level. The KPI and target should, where possible, be specific, measurable, achievable (but
require stretch), realistic and time-based (i.e. can track performance improvement over time). The
frequency at which the KPI is measured is determined by a realistic expectation of the amount of time
required for any corrective action to have an impact on the performance level. Thus, one does not want
to measure and analyse the parameters when there is no change from one measurement to the next,
but it is necessary to balance this against not measuring often enough, resulting in the situation that
parameters can be out of control for long periods. In addition, it is necessary to consider the time, cost
and resources needed to develop, maintain and manage the KPIs, as this also determines how many
robust KPIs can be used.
d) Measure KPI
The KPI should be measured and reported, where possible, within existing systems. In addition to
measuring the KPI, it is necessary to compare the result against the target and to identify any causes
for deviations.
e) Take corrective action
The causes for deviations should be addressed and corrective actions performed, and the process
should be repeated many times.
This Annex focuses on the use of KPIs and Benchmarking by Operating Organisations but the same
process can also be adopted, as is encouraged to be, by the wider supply chain. For example, Equipment
Manufacturers could adopt similar measures to report design and actual performance of their products,
improving equipment selection and helping to ensure sustained production (or system) availability and
HSE performance of the production facilities. Consistent definitions, boundary definitions, and data
quality as defined in this standard are essential to improve data collection in this area.”
Align them to the organisation’s objectives for the facility (or operations), identify areas for
improvement, collect and analyse the data and implement improvements in order to achieve the
organization’s planned objectives.
b) Initiate a benchmarking study and document processes by referring to peer groups (see E.3.7) that
are more productive or efficient than yours.
c) Identify best practices and implement them.
E.3.2 General
Benchmarking is most useful where there is an existing statistically significant sample population. It
is necessary that those individuals involved in the exchange of information understand the inherent
limitations imposed by the data they collect and the database where it is stored. For example, depending
on the type, load, speed, mounting method, lubricant formulations, contamination levels, etc., a given
bearing can last anywhere from 18 months to 40 years; therefore, knowing the average MTTF of all
bearings in a given plant would be of only limited usefulness to a reliability engineer. For company A,
who is operating with a MTTF of 18 years, to approach the reliability of company B who is operating
with a MTTF of 40 years, it is necessary that there be an underlying knowledge of all of the differences
in the design and operating conditions. The development of best practices cannot occur where there is
not already a sound knowledge of engineering principles.
A frequent misuse of benchmarking is to consider it merely as a scorecard, that is to say, for looking
backward to measure past success or failure, rather than as a map to guide forward progress to achieve
goals and continue improvement.
E.3.7.1 General
The selection of the peer group against which a participating plant compares its performance data is
important. If this peer-group selection is well made, personnel in the plant will have confidence that it
has the same performance opportunity as the better-performing plants in the group. Furthermore, use
of a suitable method of analysis of physical causal factors, of plant characteristics and of maintenance
practices within the group provides explanations of variations in performance that have greater
validity.
When a plant’s performance is seen to be poor compared with its peer group, the gap can be due both to
differences in the plant’s physical features (even within the same peer group) and also to differences in
the practices and organization of the site. The characteristics of both categories of causal factor should
be benchmarked using a suitable method of benchmarking, so that the relative weight of each can be
judged and realistic targets set.
A peer group’s distinguishing factor is a feature of a plant that affects one or several aspects of
performance and is common and intrinsic to the group of plants and also that a plant cannot change in
the short/medium term.
The two peer-group distinguishing factors that have been found most significant in studies on reliability
and maintenance are
— process family: for reasons of equipment types, process severity (corrosivity, toxicity, etc.) and
maintenance complexity;
— geographic region: for reasons of prevailing labour hourly costs, employment and
contracting practices, safety and environment-protection norms, climate, management culture and
industrialization level of the region.
18) Cor- 4 to 6 Number of Top Quartile < 6 man weeks. Ensure number of Asset Manager
rective hours work hours of corrective
Tracked monthly Operations
maintenance recorded for maintenance is
workload corrective under control. Maintenance
maintenance.
a Other/more KPIs can be useful depending on industry and application.
b See Table E.2.
c CM is sometimes used as an abbreviation for corrective maintenance, but in this document CM refers to Condition
monitoring
Annex F
(informative)
F.1 General
The purpose of this Annex is to make the user of this International Standard aware of some specific
definitions and classifications applied for safety critical equipment. IEC has developed the functional
safety standards IEC 61508:2010 (all parts) and IEC 61511:2016 (all parts), which have been
implemented by many industries including the natural gas, petroleum and petrochemical industries.
The general principles described in IEC 61508:2010 (all parts) and IEC 61511:2016 (all parts) have been
further developed by national initiatives into guidelines and analysing methods for use in the petroleum
industry, for example in (The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association, 2016).
ISO/TR 12489:2013 provides guidance to reliability modelling and calculation of safety systems and is
an essential document when equipment reliability data covered by this standard is used. An overview
is given in F.2.
As part of this overall purpose, a recommended list of failure definitions for some safety systems and
components is given in Table F.1.
F.3.2 SIS failure mode classification in reliability data collection and analysis
IEC 61508:2010 (all parts) introduces a failure classification that is adapted to SIS. Here the failures are
first divided into the two categories:
— random failures (see also definition in 3.79);
— systematic failures (see also definition in 3.90).
The random failures of components are in IEC 61508:2010 further categorized into these failure
mode groups:
— dangerous detected (DD);
— dangerous undetected (DU);
— safe detected (SD);
— safe undetected (SU).
Collected reliability data may not contain historic failure mode events within all these four categories,
and this will require caution and assumption when establishing failure rates for such “zero failure
history”. The physical equipment behaviour with respect to the failure modes that apply for a certain
component is also vital to understand, to ensure proper allocation of failure data onto these four
categories, whereof some perhaps need to be zero.
When collecting reliability data for SIS, two topics should be emphasised:
— common cause failures (see C.1.6 and ISO/TR 12489:2013, 3.2.14)
— test interval (periodic) for identifying dangerous undetected (DU) failures
F.3.3 Downtime issues related to SIS reliability data collection and analysis
Downtime issues are important in reliability data collection and analysis of SIS. ISO/TR 12489:2013,
Figures 5 to 7 provide definitions and guidance on such matters, but some specific remarks are
given below.
Clause 3 defines the terms “mean overall repairing time (MRT)”, related to the repairs of failures after
they have been detected. Another used term is “mean time to restoration (MTTRes)”, which includes
both the fault detection and the repair times.
In any case, MTTRes = MFDT + MRT. The “mean fault detection time” (MFDT) of the dangerous detected
failures (e.g. detected by diagnostic tests) is generally negligible compared to the MRT, and it is
reasonable to assume that MTTRes and MRT have the same numerical values for dangerous detected
failures.
also underlying level), “critical” is one of the three failure impact classes (critical, degraded and
incipient). Thus, this term here is related to the degree of the failure itself.
— The non-critical failures are the degraded + incipient failures as defined by this International
Standard.
— ISO/TR 12489:2013: The term “critical” is related to the effect of the failure on the safety function.
It characterizes a failure completely disabling a safety instrumented function.
— In the context of functional safety, the non-critical failures are those which do not disable the
related SIF.
Let us consider a SIF implementing two redundant equipment items A and B:
— according to this International Standard, the dangerous failure of item A can be critical, degraded
or incipient independently of the state of item B;
— according to ISO/TR 12489:2013, the dangerous failure of item A is critical only if
— it is critical according to this International Standard and
— item B already has had a dangerous critical failure according to this International Standard.
Therefore, due to the above issues, the term critical and non-critical failures will thus require caution.
The analyst needs to carefully consider which failure modes of the equipment are relevant with regards
to the reliability analysis of the safety function. In this context the relevant items within the equipment
boundary necessary for the safety function needs to be covered (i.e. detection, decision and action).
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[134] IEC/TR 61508-0:2005, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems - Part 0: Functional safety and IEC 61508
[135] IEC 61508-1:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems - Part 1: General requirements
[136] IEC 61508-2:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems - Part 2: Requirements for electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems
[137] IEC 61508-3:2010, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems - Part 3: Software requirements
[159] IEC 62271-100:2008, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear — Part 100: Alternating current
circuit-breakers
[160] IEC 62271-102:2001, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear — Part 102: Alternating current
disconnectors and earthing switches
[161] IEC 62271-200:2011, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear — Part 200: AC metal-enclosed
switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above 1 kV and up to and including 52 kV
[162] IEC 62508:2010, Guidance on human aspects of dependability
[163] IEC 62551: 2012, Analysis techniques for dependability — Petri net techniques
[164] IEC 62740: 2015, Root cause analysis (RCA)
[165] EN 13306:2010, Maintenance — Maintenance terminology
[166] API RP 7C-11F, Recommended Practice for Installation, Maintenance, and Operation of Internal-
Combustion Engines
[167] API RP 11S, Recommended Practice for the Operation, Maintenance and Troubleshooting of Electric
Submersible Pump Installations
[168] API RP 14B, Design, Installation, Repair and Operation of Subsurface Safety Valve Systems,
Sixth Edition
[169] API RP 17B, Recommended Practice for Flexible Pipe, Fifth Edition (May 2014)
[170] API RP 17H, Remotely Operated Tools and Interfaces on Subsea Production Systems, Second
Edition, 2013
[171] API RP 554, Part 1, API Recommended Practice 554, Part 2: Process Control Systems — Process
Control Systems Functions and Functional Specification Development, Second Edition
[172] API RP 554, Part 2, API Recommended Practice 554, Part 2: Process Control Systems — Process
Control System Design, First Edition
[173] API RP 554, Part 3, API Recommended Practice 554, Part 3: Process Control Systems — Project
Execution and Process Control System Ownership, First Edition
[174] API RP 580, Risk-Based Inspection, Second Edition
[175] Spec API 5CT, Specification for Casing and Tubing
[176] Spec API 6A, Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment, Twentieth Edition
(ISO 10423:2009 Modification), Includes Errata (through Errata 7, December 2014), Addenda
1(Nov 2011), 2 (Nov 2012), 3 (March 2013)
[177] Spec API 6D, Specification for Pipeline and Piping Valves, Twenty-Fourth Edition (2014),
includes Errata 1 (2014), Errata 2 (2014), Errata 3 (2015), and Addendum 1 (2015), Errata 5
(2015), Errata 6 (2015), Errata 7 (2016), and Addendum 2 (2016)
[178] Spec API 7B-11C, Specification for Internal-Combustion Reciprocating Engines for Oil Field Service
[179] Spec API 12D, Specification for Field Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids
[180] Spec API 12F, Specification for Shop Welded Tanks for Storage of Production Liquids, Twelfth
Edition
[181] Spec API 12P, Specification for Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Tanks, Third Edition
[182] Spec API 14A, Specification for Subsurface Safety Valve Equipment, Twelfth Edition, Includes
Errata (July, 2015)
[183] Spec API 14L, Specification for Lock Mandrels and Landing Nipples, Second Edition
[184] Spec API 16A, Specification for Drill Through Equipment. Includes Errata, Third Edition (2004)
[185] Spec API 16D, Specification for Control Systems for Drilling Well Control Equipment and Control
Systems for Diverter Equipment Second Edition
[186] Spec API 17J, Specification for Unbonded Flexible Pipe, Fourth Edition (May 2014)
[187] Spec API 19G2, Flow-control devices for side-pocket mandrels, twelfth Edition
[188] API/Std 17F, Standard for Subsea Production Control Systems, Third Edition
[189] API/Std 53, Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Fourth Edition
[190] API/Std 520, Part 1, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices, Part I - Sizing
and Selection, Ninth Edition
[191] API/Std 520, Part 2, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries-
Part II, Installation, Sixth Edition
[192] API/Std 521, Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems, Sixth Edition (2014)
[193] API/Std 526, Flanged Steel Pressure-relief Valves, Sixth Edition (Includes Errata 1, Errata 2)
[194] API/Std 537, Flare Details for General Refinery and Petrochemical Service, Second Edition
(ISO 25457:2008, Identical)
[195] API/Std 537, Datasheets, Datasheets for API 537, Second Edition
[196] API/Std 541, Form-wound Squirrel-Cage Induction Motors-500 Horsepower and Larger, Fifth Edition
[197] API/Std 541, Datasheets, Data sheets for API Std 541
[198] API/Std 547, General-Purpose Form-Wound Squirrel Cage Induction Motors 250 Horsepower and
Larger - First Edition
[199] API/Std 547, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Standard 547, General-Purpose Form Wound Squirrel
Cage Induction Motors - 250 Horsepower and Larger
[200] API/Std 560, Fired Heaters for General Refinery Service, Fourth Edition
[201] API/Std 560, Datasheets, Datasheets for Fired Heaters for General Refinery Services
[202] API/Std 594, Check Valves: Flanged, Lug, Wafer and Butt-welding
[203] API/Std 609, Butterfly Valves: Double-flanged, Lug- and Wafer-type
[204] API/Std 610, Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries, Eleventh
Edition (ISO 13709:2009 Identical Adoption), Includes Errata (July 2011)
[205] API/Std 610Datasheets, Datasheets for Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and
Natural Gas Industries, Eleventh Edition
[206] API/Std 611, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Std 611, Fifth Edition
[207] API/Std 611, Datasheets, Datasheets for Centrifugal Pumps for Petroleum, Petrochemical and
Natural Gas Industries, Eleventh Edition
[208] API/Std 612, Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries-Steam Turbines-Special-purpose
Applications, Seventh Edition
[209] API/Std 612, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Std 612
[210] API/Std 616, Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical, and Gas Industry Services, Fifth Edition
[211] API/Std 616, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Standard 616, Gas Turbines for the Petroleum, Chemical,
and Gas Industry Services
[212] API/Std 617, Axial and Centrifugal Compressors and Expander-compressors, Eighth Edition
[213] API/Std 617, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Standard 617, Axial and Centrifugal Compressors and
Expander-compressors, Eighth Edition
[214] API/Std 618, Reciprocating Compressors for Petroleum, Chemical, and Gas Industry Services, Fifth
Edition, Includes Errata 1 and 2 (2009 and 2010)
[215] API/Std 618, Datasheets, Datasheets for use with Std 618, Fifth Edition, Includes Errata (2009)
[216] API/Std 619, Rotary-Type Positive-Displacement Compressors for Petroleum, Petrochemical, and
Natural Gas Industries, Fifth Edition
[217] API/Std 619, Datasheets, Datasheets for API Std 619
[218] API/Std 620, Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-Pressure Storage Tanks, Twelfth Edition
[219] API/Std 650, Welded Tanks for Oil Storage, Twelfth Edition, Includes Errata 1 (2013), Errata 2
(2014), and Addendum 1 (2014)
[220] API/Std 650, Datasheets, Datasheets for API 650, Welded Steel Tanks for Oil Storage, 12th Edition
[221] API/Std 660, Shell-and-tube Heat Exchangers, Ninth Edition
[222] API/Std 660, Datasheets, Datasheets API Std 660
[223] API/Std 661, Petroleum, Petrochemical, and Natural Gas Industries - Air-cooled Heat Exchangers,
Seventh Edition
[224] API/Std 661, Datasheets, Datasheets for Air-Cooled Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services,
Sixth Edition - Adoption of ISO 13706-1:2005
[225] API/Std 662, Part 1, Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services - Part 1 - Plate-and-Frame
Heat Exchangers, First Edition - ISO Adoption from ISO 15547-1:2005
[226] API/Std 662, Part 2, Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services - Part 2 - Brazed
Alumninum Plate-fin Heat Exchangers First Edition - ISO Adoption from ISO 15547-2:2005
[227] API/Std 662, Datasheets, Datasheets for Plate Heat Exchangers for General Refinery Services,
Second Edition
[228] API/Std 673, Centrifugal Fans for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry Services, Third Edition
[229] API/Std 673, Datasheets, Datasheets for Centrifugal Fans for Petroleum, Chemical and Gas Industry
Services, 3rd Edition
[230] API/Std 674, Positive Displacement Pumps - Reciprocating, Includes Errata (May 2014), Errata 2
(April 2015)
[231] API/Std 674, Datasheets, Datasheets for Positive Displacement Pumps - Reciprocating
[232] API/Std 676, Positive Displacement Pumps-Rotary, Third Edition
[233] API/Std 676, Datasheets, Datasheets for Positive Displacement Pumps – Rotary
[234] API/Std 2000, Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks. Seventh Edition
[235] API/Std 2610, Design, Construction, Operation, Maintenance, and Inspection of Terminal & Tank
Facilities, Second Edition
[266] IEEE C37.13.1-2006, IEEE Standard for Definite Purpose Switching Devices for Use in Metal-Enclosed
Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear
[267] IEEE C37.20.7-2007, IEEE Guide for Testing Metal-Enclosed Switchgear Rated Up to 38 kV for
Internal Arcing Faults
[268] IEEE C37.20.7-2007/Cor 1-2010, IEEE Guide for Testing Metal-Enclosed Switchgear Rated up to 38
kV for Internal Arcing Faults Corrigendum 1
[269] IEEE C57.12.10-2010, IEEE Standard Requirements for Liquid-Immersed Power Transformers
[270] IEEE 1566-2005, IEEE Standard for Performance of Adjustable Speed AC Drives Rated 375 kW
and Larger
[271] IEEE C57.18.10-1998, IEEE Standard Practices and Requirements for Semiconductor Power Rectifier
Transformers
[272] NEMA 20C, Cable tray systems
[273] NEMA MG 1, Motors and generators
[274] NEMA PE 1, Uninterruptible Power Systems (UPS) — Specification and Performance Verification
[275] NEMA PE 5, Utility Type Battery Chargers
[276] NEMA PE 7, Communication Type Battery Chargers
[277] NEMA VE-1, Metal cable tray systems
[278] NEMA VE-2, Cable tray installation guidelines
[279] NFPA 13: Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems. National Fire Protection
Association, NFPA.
[280] NFPA 15: Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection. National Fire Protection
Association, NFPA.
[281] NFPA 16: Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems.
National Fire Protection Association, NFPA.
[282] UL 1072, UL standard for safety medium-voltage power cables
[283] UL 1277, UL standard for safety electrical power and control tray cables with optional optical-
fiber members
[284] UL 1569, UL standard for safety metal-clad cables
[285] UL 2225, UL standard for safety cables and cable-fittings for use in hazardous (classified) locations
[286] UL 2250, UL standard for safety instrumentation tray cable
[287] IMO/COMSAR/Circ.32, Harmonization of GMDSS requirements for radio installations on board
SOLAS ships, 2004
[288] IMO. SOLAS. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974
[289] IMO, SOLAS. MSC.48 (66): Life saving appliances code, 2010.
[290] IMO, SOLAS. MSC.81 (70): Testing and evaluation of life saving appliances, 2010.
[291] MIL-STD-1629A, Procedures for performing FMEA-analysis, 1980
[292] SAE JA1011:1999, Evaluation Criteria for RCM Processes
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