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People vs. Mendoza

*
G.R. No. 80845. March 14, 1994.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

ERNESTO M. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 10, and JUAN
MAGALOP y SALVACION, respondents.

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Rule that only the

Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People of the Philippines once such actions are brought before the
Court of Appeals or

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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People vs. Mendoza

the Supreme Court.—It may be stressed that the petition is

defective since it was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the
Solicitor General. We have already ruled in a number of cases
that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions are
brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. As a
matter of fact, in his Manifestation filed with this Court on 8 June
1989, the Solicitor General steered away from the case, explaining
that the petition was filed directly by the Provincial Fiscal of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, “without coursing it through the OSG,” as
a consequence of which it should be the fiscal who should submit
the required pleadings. Nonetheless, even if we overlook this
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procedural lapse and treat the case on the merits, the petition
should, just the same, be dismissed.
Same; Same; Plea of guilt; Case at bar; There is no rule which
provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the
charge that his conviction automatically follows.—This rule is at
most directory. It will certainly be a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the judge to persist in holding the accused bound to his
admission of guilt and sentencing him accordingly when the
totality of the evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule
which provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction automatically follows. Additional
evidence independent of the plea may be considered to convince
the judge that it was intelligently made. Here it is evident, even
from the start, that the case of the prosecution against the three
(3) accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles
were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite
inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the witness
stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified those who sold
him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well
have been the perpetrator of the crime himself. In the absence of
an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen
effects, the possessor is presumed to be the author of the crime of
robbery. Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits
introduced during the trial could breathe life into the moribund
state of the case for the prosecution. While the loss of articles in
the storeroom of the BNSHI was established, there was nothing,
independent of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could link
accused Magalop to the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put
it, “the plea of Juan Magalop was not intelligently done.”

PETITION for certiorari to set aside a judgment of the

Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Br. 10.
Mendoza, J.

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People vs. Mendoza

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for petitioner.
     Public Attorney’s Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the

Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor)
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the
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Philippines, assailing the judgment of respondent Judge

Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264 acquitting
accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private respondent
herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things
notwithstanding his plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that
respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment
exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose upon him the
proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the
storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was
ransacked. After an on-the-spot investigation, the police
found themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit
or culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated
at P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force
upon things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion,
Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias
Ricky. All three (3) were represented by District Citizens
Attorney Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23 June
1987, Magalop pleaded “guilty” while Fernandez pleaded
“not guilty.” The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as
he was “not mentally well.”
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court
a quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat.
Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as
a clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution
likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the
ransacked storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue,
a pair of long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The
last three items were said to have been recovered by the
police.
The defense having opted to waive its right to present
evidence, the case was submitted for decision.
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People vs. Mendoza

On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused

Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced judgment is
quoted hereunder for careful scrutiny and better
appreciation. Thus—

This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible for

forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the Bukidnon

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National School of Home Industries.

It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of the
Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at Maramag,
Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as shown by the
testimonies of the policemen and by the keepers of the storeroom.
After on the spot investigation, the policemen were at a loss to
identify the person or persons responsible thereof.
Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the
identity of the perpetrators remained a problem. Accused Ricarte
Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was separate for
accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the stolen
things were in the possession of a certain Babie Tan, consisting of
two pliers and a saw, and these were all allegedly sold to said
Babie Tan who refused to testify on the matter.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three
accused were responsible for stealing these three articles or tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown who
(how?) they conspired and helped each other in the commission of
the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of Juan Magalop was not
intelligently done. In the course of the proceedings, it was not
established how Juan Magalop and Petronilo Fernandez
participated in the looting. No evidence was introduced to show
that the accused sold the stolen things to Babie Tan, which the
prosecution could have proved to show that the possessors of the
stolen things could have been identified as the thief or thieves;
hence, the prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond doubt (italics supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez
and Juan Magalop are hereby ACQUITTED. With respect to
Ricarte Dahilan,
1
let this case be held in abeyance until he is
mentally well.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioner is now before us contending that the decision of 8
October 1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying
reconsideration are

_______________

1 Annex “C”, Rollo, p. 9.

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“purely capricious and arbitrary, made for no proper reason

at all and rendered without legal authority whatsoever,
thereby amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion,
2
and curtailed the power of the state to
punish criminals.”
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was
assisted by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with
force upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative
but to pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the
acquittal of accused Fernandez.
It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it
was filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor
General. We have already ruled in a number of cases that
only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People of the Philippines once such actions are3
brought before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
As a matter of fact, in his Manifestation filed with this
Court on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General steered away
from the case, explaining that the petition was filed
directly by the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
“without coursing it through the OSG,” as a consequence of
which it should be the fiscal who should submit the
required pleadings.
Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse
and treat the case on the merits, the petition should, just
the same, be dismissed.
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal
of Magalop, insisting that with his voluntary plea of guilt,
the trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce
judgment and impose the proper penalty.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits
his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in
the

_______________

2 Petition, pp. 3-4.

3 People v. Eduarte, G.R. No. 88232, 26 February 1990, 182 SCRA 750;
People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639, 13 January 1992, 205 SCRA 155.

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4
information as well as the consequences of his plea. It is an
unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the offense
charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said
charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to5
impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances.
Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital
offense, the court may receive evidence6
from the parties to
determine the penalty to be imposed.
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the
evidence points to his acquittal. There is no rule which
provides that simply because the accused pleaded guilty to
the charge that his conviction automatically follows.
Additional evidence independent of the plea may be
considered to convince the judge that it was intelligently
made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of
the prosecution against the three (3) accused was virtually
nonexistent as the asported articles were found in the
possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite
inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the
witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified
those who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify.
Or, he could very well have been the perpetrator of the
crime himself. In the absence of an explanation of how one
has come into possession of stolen effects, the possessor
7
is
presumed to be the author of the crime of robbery.
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits
introduced during the trial could breathe life into the
moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the
loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was
established, there was nothing,

_______________

4 People v. Formentera, No. L-30892, 29 June 1984, 130 SCRA 114.

5 People v. Balicasan, No. L-26376, 31 August 1966, 17 SCRA 119;
People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563 (1948).
6 Rule 116, Sec. 4.
7 Sec. 5, par. (j), Rule 131, Rules of Court; People v. Kagui Malasugui,
63 Phil. 221 (1936).

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People vs. Mendoza

independent of the acknowledgment of guilt, which could

link accused Magalop to the robbery. As the trial court
succinctly put it, “the plea of Juan Magalop was not
intelligently done.”
Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge
was not the normal course, as the better procedure8
would
have been that set forth in People v. Padernal, where the
court sustained the exoneration of the accused
notwithstanding his plea of guilt. In that case, in view of
the exculpatory testimony of the accused who had earlier
pleaded guilty to the charge of homicide, the trial court
correctly considered the plea as withdrawn and, in its
place, ordered a plea of not guilty entered. This was not
done by respondent judge. For even after finding that the
plea of Magalop was not intelligently made, Judge
Mendoza proceeded to pass judgment without requiring
Magalop to plead anew to the charge. Applying the
principle laid down in the Padernal case, it can fairly be
concluded that there was no standing plea at the time the
court rendered its judgment of acquittal hence said
acquittal was a nullity.
Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial
justice, we cannot allow such procedural error to prevail
over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In fairness to
Magalop, outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is
absolutely no evidence against him—presented or
forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is
no way by which accused Magalop could have been
implicated. It is for this fundamental reason that, even pro
hoc vice, his acquittal must be sustained. Interdum evenit
ut exceptio quae prima facie justa videtur, tamen inique
noceat. It may sometime happen that a plea which on its
face seems just, nevertheless is injurious and inequitable.
It is so in this instance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the acquittal of the
accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is
sustained.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

_______________

8 No. L-26734, 5 September 1967, 21 SCRA 34, 40.

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     Cruz, (J., Chairman), See concurrence.

CRUZ, J., Concurring:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by

accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice of his
counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the
PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than
conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit
a crime the man did no commit. As the ponencia observes,
“outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely
no evidence against him—presented or forthcoming. From
the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which
Magalop could have been implicated.”
It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is
the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal in
the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without
any moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to
consign an innocent man to prison.
The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to
condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this
case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he
prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to
submit evidence in his behalf.
Petition dismissed; Acquittal of accused-appellant
sustained.

Note.—Conviction must be based on strength of state

evidence (People vs. Nuñez, 208 SCRA 34).

——o0o——

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