Environmental Ethics

Deontological Ethics

Deontological moral systems are characterized by a focus upon adherence to

independent moral rules or duties. To make the correct moral choices, we have to
understand what our moral duties are and what correct rules exist to regulate those
duties. When we follow our duty, we are behaving morally. When we fail to follow
our duty, we are behaving immorally. Typically in any deontological system, our
duties, rules, and obligations are determined by God. Being moral is thus a matter of
obeying God.

Deontological moral systems typically stress the reasons why certain actions are
performed. Simply following the correct moral rules is often not sufficient; instead,
we have to have the correct motivations. This might allow a person to not be
considered immoral even though they have broken a moral rule, but only so long as
they were motivated to adhere to some correct moral duty.

Nevertheless, a correct motivation alone is never a justification for an action in a

deontological moral system and cannot be used as a basis for describing an action as
morally correct. It is also not enough to simply believe that something is the correct
duty to follow. Duties and obligations must be determined objectively and absolutely,
not subjectively. There is no room in deontological systems of subjective feelings; on
the contrary, most adherents condemn subjectivism and relativism in all their forms.

Perhaps the most significant thing to understand about deontological moral systems is
that their moral principles are completely separated from any consequences which
following those principles might have. Thus, if you have a moral duty not to lie, then
lying is always wrong — even if that results in harm to others. For example, you
would be acting immorally if you lied to Nazis about where Jews were hiding.

The word deontology comes from the Greek roots deon, which means duty, and logos,
which means science. Thus, deontology is the "science of duty." Key questions which
deontological ethical systems ask include:

What is my moral duty?

What are my moral obligations?
How do I weigh one moral duty against another?

Types of Deontological Ethics

Some examples of deontological ethical theories:

Divine Command: the most common forms of deontological moral theories are those
which derive their set of moral obligations from a god. According to many Christians,
for example, an action is morally correct whenever it is in agreement with the rules
and duties established by God.

Duty Theories: an action is morally right if it is in accord with some list of duties and

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obligations.

Rights Theories: an action is morally right if it adequately respects the rights of all
humans (or at least all members of society). This is also sometimes referred to as
Libertarianism, the political philosophy that people should be legally free to do
whatever they wish so long as their actions do not impinge upon the rights of others.

Contractarianism: an action is morally right if it is in accordance with the rules that

rational moral agents would agree to observe upon entering into a social relationship
(contract) for mutual benefit. This is also sometimes referred to as Contractualism.

Monistic Deontology: an action is morally right if it agrees with some single

deontological principle which guides all other subsidiary principles.

Consequentialism
Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is the view that normative properties depend
only on consequences. This general approach can be applied at different levels to
different normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent
example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that
whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of
something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule
requiring acts of the same kind.

Virtue ethics

Virtue theory is an approach to ethics which emphasizes the character of the moral
agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking.

A virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or

generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a "desirable" or "morally valuable"
character trait. It is, indeed a character trait — that is, a disposition which is well
entrenched in its possessor, something that, as we say "goes all the way down", unlike
a habit such as being a tea-drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being a
single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain
reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions
and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests,
expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with
a certain complex mindset

Following Leopold's suggestion, the central issue in the first quarter century of
environmental ethics has been a debate about anthropocentrism and the idea of
intrinsic ethical value. Traditional ethical theories are characterized as anthropocentric
because they regard only humans or human experience (or reason) as having intrinsic
ethical worth. Everything else is valuable only as a means to promoting or enhancing

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human interests. For Aristotle, this much is obvious. "Clearly, then, we must suppose
… that plants are for the sake of animals, and that other animals are for the sake of
human beings.… If then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it must have
made all of them for the sake of human beings" (Politics, 1256b15–22) John Locke,
writing in the seventeenth century, reflected the consensus view when he spoke of the
distinction between man and nature. Mankind is "the workmanship of one
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker," and thus the law of nature teaches us that man
"has not the liberty to destroy himself," and that "no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions" (Second Treatise of Government, chap. 2, par. 6).
But reason also tells us that, "land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no
improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we
shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing" (chap. 5, par. 42). For
land to have value, it must be made to serve human needs and ends.

The classical utilitarians were the first to move explicitly beyond anthropocentrism.
They argued that sentience was the locus of intrinsic value, and thus the ultimate
ethical end was an existence "exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as
possible in enjoyments." Morality consists of "rules and precepts," as John Stuart Mill
(1806–1873) put it in his Utilitarianism (1861). Its aim is to secure such an existence
"to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the
whole sentient creation" (chap. 2). Although utilitarianism may provide a basis for
rejecting anthropocentrism, it will not get us to anything resembling a land ethic.
Even if sentience is a sufficient basis for gaining intrinsic worth or value, it gives us
no reason for regarding endangered species, forests, wilderness, or ecosystems as
worth preserving in their own right. Thus, philosophers who follow Leopold have
rejected utilitarianism along with anthropocentric conceptions of ethics.

The problem with extending the scope of morality beyond sentience is to explain the
basis for attributing intrinsic value to entities that have no inner lives and are not
subjects of experience. Two ways of attempting this extension figure most
prominently in the literature. The first is to identify intrinsic value with having an
interest, which is interpreted in turn as having an end or a natural good. If it makes
sense to say of any thing that it has an end, then we can make sense of talking about
what is good or bad for that thing. And just as sentient beings have an interest in not
suffering, all living things, sentient and nonsentient alike, have an interest in realizing
their natural ends. It is in this sense good for any such thing to thrive (Goodpaster).

One objection to extending the scope of intrinsic ethical value in this way is that the
idea of having an end or a natural good applies to more than living organisms. This
might appear to be a good thing for the purposes of developing environmental ethics
in the direction of a land ethic, because it would allow us to include entities like
species and ecosystems within the community of intrinsically valuable beings. An
ecosystem is not a living organism, but it has a good (however difficult it may be to
determine it), which it is in its interest to realize. The problem is that this analysis
does not allow us to discriminate among living things to exclude deadly viruses or
invasive species from having intrinsic moral worth, nor does it allow us to
discriminate among other nonliving entities with ends, such as gangs, terrorist cells,
or corrupt political regimes. Each of these has ends and an interest in thriving, but
surely they do not all have intrinsic moral worth.

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A second objection to this proposal is that it equivocates on the morally relevant
concept of an interest. Utilitarians extend the idea of intrinsic moral worth to sentient
creatures because nonhuman animals not only have an interest in avoiding suffering,
they can act in ways that show that they take an interest in seeking enjoyment and
avoiding pain. If human suffering is morally relevant not merely because we are
capable of suffering but because as conscious agents we care about or take an interest
in avoiding suffering, then nonhuman suffering should be morally relevant for the
same reason. But when we talk about the interests of nonsentient entities (and perhaps
the interests of many species of lower animals, such as sponges or clams), we do so in
a different sense. They may have interests, but they cannot take an interest in
anything. It begs the question to suppose that having an interest in any sense that does
not presuppose subjectivity or consciousness has any moral relevance of its own.

A second way to reject anthropocentrism and extend the scope of intrinsic ethical
value beyond sentience is associated with deep ecology, a political movement that
emerged in the 1980s in response to disillusionment with large, well-funded
environmental groups that some critics saw as having been co-opted by prevailing
political powers. The "shallow ecology" of these large environmental organizations,
in the eyes of their critics, was associated exclusively with the fight against pollution
and resource depletion, which were seen as elitist and anthropocentric goals of
affluent classes living in developed countries. Deep ecology defends the idea of
ecocentric identification, a form of self-realization, which calls on us humans to see
ourselves not at the top of creation but as merely one part of the "web of life," on an
equal footing with every other part. The deep ecology manifesto claims that
nonhuman life has value in itself that is "independent of the usefulness of the
nonhuman world for human purposes"(Devall and Sessions, p. 70) If a living, free-
flowing river is a good thing to have on this planet, then it is good independently of
human existence and interests, and it would equally be a good thing on a planet that
never hosted conscious life.

Leaving political agendas aside, many people who have sympathy for Leopold's land
ethic find deep ecology an unsatisfying way to develop the idea. It is one thing to
believe that traditional conceptions of ethics have perhaps wrongly viewed nature as
having no value except as resources for human satisfaction. It is quite a different
matter to think that the only alternative to such a conception of ethics is ecocentric
identification in the sense demanded by deep ecology.

Anthropocentric vs Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics

The fundamental issue in environmental ethics is whether there can be a non-

anthropocentric environmental ethic -- that is a basis for right and wrong action
concerning the environment which is not grounded solely in human concerns. This is
the issue of the theoretical foundations of environmental ethics. Obviously, the main
dispute is between those who claim that ethics can only ever have an anthropocentric
basis (though many go on to claim that this will be sufficient for taking account of our
environmental concerns), and those who claim that not only can there be, but there
must be, a non-anthropocentric basis for environmental ethics.

An ethical system could be non-anthropocentric in a number of ways. Any account of

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morality that has the effect or removing humans from being the sole thing of concern
is non-anthropocentric. The main examples in environmental ethics are:

 animal rights/liberation theories (sentient animals have moral standing)

 biocentric theories (individual living things have moral standing)
 ecocentric theories (ecological systems have moral standing)

There are variations within these views, so there is a wide range of possible non-
anthropocentric theories.

Biocentric Egalitarianism

Paul Taylor

Taylor argues for the rather radical view that all living things have inherent value, and
so are deserving or moral respect, equally. For Taylor, all that is required to have
inherent value is to be alive -- essentially, striving towards staying alive. He grounds
his view in the idea of "Respect for Nature", which is an extension of the Kantian
principle of Respect for Persons.

To begin, Taylor clarifies his position by distinguishing it from an ecocentric view --

namely, it is not fundamentally holistic. The 'balance of nature' does not lead us to any
moral principles. Rather, the good or well-being of all individual living things is of
primary concern (so it is no anthropocentric either). There may be duties which
require us to protect ecological systems, but these are only indirect duties to the
individual living things that inhabit the ecological system.

Taylor argues that a biocentric ethic can be established (justified) by us taking on a

new kind of moral attitude. This is the attitude that all living things, and not only
humans, have inherent worth -- i.e., the attitude of respect for nature. But clearly,
quite a bit of work needs to be done to establish that we ought to take on the new
attitude. Two things need to be made clear, first.

(1) All living things have a good of their own -- that is, they can be benefited or
harmed. This is reflected in the idea that all living things have the potential to grow
and develop according to their biological natures. So, things can either go well or not
with respect to this potential. This idea is not grounded, according to Taylor, in the
ideas of having interests, or having an interest in something; and it is not conditional
upon being sentient, or having consciousness. (Taylor thinks it is an open question
whether a machine might have a good of its own in the relevant sense.)

(2) The attitude of respect for nature requires that we accept that all living things
possess inherent worth. This would be reflected in us -- were we to take on the
attitude of respect for nature -- adopting certain dispositions of behaviour, namely, in
general, to act so as to show equal respect for all living things 'good of their own'.

This doesn't justify the claim that all living things do have inherent worth, though. So,
more needs to be done to show this. Taylor's strategy is to argue that the claim that

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living things possess inherent worth will be justified if it can be shown that we are
justified in adopting the attitude of respect for nature. Presumably, he thinks that
respecting nature directly implies that we regard living things as possessing inherent
worth.

Underlying the justification for the adoption of the attitude of respect for nature is the
belief system characterized by Taylor as the "biocentric outlook on nature." This is an
ecological outlook, with the key idea being the interdependence of living things.
Taylor suggests four main components of the outlook:

(1) Humans are merely members of the biotic community -- not special.

- that we are animals -- the product of natural evolutionary processes -- is a

fundamental feature of our existence. Also, as animals, we are entirely dependent on
ecological systems for survival. [Humans might even be regarded as a rather nasty
pest, with nothing but good consequences for the rest of Earth's living things if we
were to be eliminated.]

(2) All ecosystems are built up of a web of interconnected and interdependent

organisms.

- the long term ecological equilibrium is necessary for the continued existence of all
individual living things. This holistic nature of ecosystems, though, is a factual aspect
of the Earth, and does not lead automatically to any moral norms.

(3) Each individual living thing is "conceived of as a teleological center of life" -- i.e.,
with its own goals, its own "biological function."

- when we look at other living things from their point of view -- i.e., with their 'goals'
-- we see that they are a unique "teleological center of life," 'striving' to 'achieve' their
'goals'. [Note all the single quote marks, indicating special uses of those words.]

(4) Humans are not in any way superior to other living things.

- humans must give up their arrogance towards other living things -- there is no reason
to think that our special set of attributes and capabilities is somehow superior to any
other organism's special attributes and capabilities. To do so is analogous to the
hierarchical class structure artificially imposed throughout human history. And, there
is no reason to think that we are fundamentally distinct -- and superior -- because we
possess a soul, even if there exists such a thing/substance.

So, the adoption of this biocentric outlook, Taylor suggests, leads us to adopting the
attitude of respect for nature, with the implication that we now have a non-
anthropocentric environmental ethic.

Taylor cautions that this does not mean that we ascribe moral rights to individual
living things. However, we are left without a clear account of just what it means.

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On Being Morally Considerable

Kenneth Goodpaster

Goodpaster argues for a biocentric or "life centred" environmental ethic. His main
strategy involves attempting to show that argument in favour of restricting moral
considerability to either humans only or to sentient beings only are not convincing.
This leave the door open to regarding all living things to be of moral worth -- though
with the qualification that there are degrees of moral worth.

Goodpaster's paper does a good job of outlining some of the main ideas concerning
the criteria of moral considerability and moral worth. Some important points need to
be noted before we look at these, though. First, Goodpaster states that even though he
sees no reason for thinking that rationality or sentience are necessary for moral
considerability, they may be sufficient. This has the direct implication that anything
that is either rational or sentient will have the relevant moral standing, but it leaves it
open for other things to have moral standing. Second, Goodpaster considers that we
need to distinguish between moral rights and moral considerability. The upshot of this
is that even if it is the case that only humans or sentient beings are legitimately
bearers of rights, it remains possible that other living things legitimately deserve
moral considerability. Third, Goodpaster distinguishes between moral considerability
and moral significance. Significance admits of degrees, and so a criterion of moral
significance could be used to weigh the moral interests of various things, when there
is a conflict. However, all that Goodpaster seeks to show is that all living things have
moral standing -- leaving aside what that turns out to mean in each case.

Arguments against non-humans or non-sentient beings having moral standing

(1) Only moral agents have moral standing.

Only fully rational human persons are moral agents, so nothing else has moral
standing. This seems too restrictive as it would exclude some humans, e.g., small
children, mentally impaired, etc. This might be addressed by refining the criterion to
'potential rational persons', but this looks arbitrary.

(2) Only beings with the capacity to suffer have moral standing.
We have seen a number of arguments concerning this criterion. The main idea is that
things can go either well or not only for beings that can have the right kinds of
interests -- which requires some kind of awareness, i.e., sentience. In non-sentient
things, there is nothing to take into account from the moral point of view. Goodpaster
point, already stated, is that even though the capacity to suffer may be a sufficient
condition for having moral standing, he sees no reason for thinking that it is
necessary. Goodpaster (as well as others) think that there is something to take into
account with respect to non-sentient things, namely, life, or the striving to stay alive.
Things can go either well or not for a tree even though it is never aware of this.
Further, pleasure and pain are merely evolutionary tools (useful signals) for making
one's way in the world, but are clearly not necessary tools for many things don't have
the capacity to feel pleasure and pain (or anything at all) and still manage quite well.
[Goodpaster argument, here, could be circular, though. He is right that pleasure is
merely a signal, but maybe morality concerns only the signals, i.e., not the goal,
which is life.]

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(3) Only beings with desires, wants, etc. have moral standing.
It is clearly in a trees interests to have water, light, etc. But it does not want these
things. That is, it is not interested in these things. Goodpaster runs a fairly standard
biocentric line here arguing that these later kinds of interests (ones which are
somehow noted in consciousness) are not necessary for a thing deserving to be valued
for its own sake. That a thing strives to stay alive is sufficient.

Further considerations

Moral extension is limited by the adopted theory of value. Many think that moral
theories are properly grounded upon theories of value. That is, you first work out what
is of ultimate value, then construct a moral theory to make it so that we ought to act so
as to seek what is of ultimate value. Further, that we are predisposed to adopt some
kind of hedonistic value theory. Given this adoption, we will be directly led to a
sentience-based criterion of moral standing. Goodpaster thinks that this might be
illegitimate in some kind of way -- there is no necessary connection between
hedonism and the sentience criterion.

Goodpaster closes with a discussion of six objections with replies to biocentric

theories. Some points are repeated from earlier in his paper. Some key, new points
are:

 It might appear that life based theories have the problem of not being able to
adequately define life, but this is not so. We have an adequate definition. In
addition, other theories have similar problems -- e.g., do we have a clear
definition of "sentience"?
 Even whole biosystems might be deserving of moral considerability.
 How are we to know what a tree, for example, 'wants' or 'needs'? Goodpaster
thinks that there is no epistemological problem, here. Wee have no problem in
making decisions (i.e., acquiring knowledge) about others wants and needs.
And, it is quite clear what a tree wants/needs.
 Some think that a biocentric ethic would be untenable in that we could never
live by it -- we could not eat, protect ourselves, etc. Goodpaster thinks that we
could do many of the things we now do, but still act in accordance with a
principle of genuine respect for all living things. Presumably, though, many of
our current actions would be wrong.

Ecocentrism: The Land Ethic

Aldo Leopold

Leopold suggests that throughout the history of ethics there has been an underlying
theme of moral extensionism. From this, an ethic for nature (i.e., the Land) can
evolve. This ethic would be philosophically based but also, importantly, ecologically
based.

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Leopold says that

"An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct."

Some might think that this view is somewhat simplistic and perhaps presupposes a
particular conception of morality, but the definition looks good enough for our
purposes. Following this, though, we get Leopold's definition of an ethic understood
from the ecological point of view, namely:

"An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for

existence."

Leopold thinks that these are, in essence, definitions of the same thing, grounded in
evolutionary modes of cooperation. Traditionally, ethics dealt with relations -- or
more precisely, conflicts -- between individuals (and usually individual humans), and
relations between individuals and society (i.e., politics). From this, within moral
contexts, we can talk of both the individual good and the common good. Both need to
be taken into account. Leopold's main concern is that there is no ethic dealing with the
relations between individuals and the Land. Such an ethic is both an evolutionary
possibility and an ecological necessity, according to Leopold.

This ethic is the "Land Ethic". It arises out of a criticism of the conventional way of
viewing the Land -- i.e., in purely economic terms. The key problem, here, is that
most members of the Land community do not have an economic value. Because of
this, there is no grounding for prohibiting or even restricting their destruction. We see
this reflected in a number of ideas and attitudes we commonly have towards various
non-economic pieces of the environment. Wetland areas, dunes, deserts, etc., are
considered 'wasteland'. Further, there is a problem with Conservationist attempts at
dealing with environmental concerns. Conservation, again, will focus primarily on
economically valuable natural resources, without any consideration for other things
and the interconnections between these that enable sustainable biological production
of the resources we use/need.

Opposed to this view of the Land, Leopold suggests we adopt the ecological outlook.
That is, we should see the Land as a pyramidal system with interconnected chains --
"a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soil, plants, and animals." The
ecological point of view recognizes that all species are ecologically valuable, and that
we are likely to never fully understand the relations between things that enable
ecological systems to be sustained. The fundamental principle of the Land Ethic is
this:

"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

With the Land Ethic, Humans' role is changed from conqueror to plain member or
citizen of the biotic community. We see clearly that Leopold proposes a fundamental
shift in the criterion of moral considerability, with the direct result of a considerable
extension of the boundaries of the moral community. Further, that there is a move
from an individualistic ethic to a holistic ethic.

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Leopold thinks that once evolved the Land ethic is not likely to lead to ending of
alteration, management, and use of 'natural resources' -- plants and animal included.
However, it will lead to sustainable practices.

The Outlook

Leopold was somewhat pessimistic of the likelihood of the establishment of the Land
Ethic. An ethical relation to the Land requires love, respect, and admiration for the
Land, and a high regard for its value (moral value, not economic value). But the
likelihood of many people coming to have this view seems not great. We are
separated off from nature -- both physically or geographically, and conceptually --
and so do not have the required connection to the Land. Also, there still remains the
rather strong view that the Land must be conquered and put to use, if it not to be
wasted. The development of the Land Ethic is an intellectual as well as an emotional
process, and like all other similar things, it will take time.

Some Questions

 Is it legitimate to think of ethical systems as arising out of a process of 'social

evolution'?
 How does the extensionism of the Land Ethic fit with other, more traditional,
extensions?

The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic

J. Baird Callicott

Callicott is sympathetic to Leopold's 'Land Ethic' and attempts to make more robust
its theoretical foundations.

Callicott notes at the outset that the Land Ethic has not been well received in
mainstream moral philosophy. Many have been highly suspicious of the idea of an
ecology based ethical system. He thinks that part of the reason for this is Leopold's
style of presentation of his ideas (in a "condensed prose style"), and the radical nature
of his main claims. To claim that the 'Land' is deserving or some kind of moral respect
is a radical departure from conventional ethics.

As we have noted, Leopold grounds his strategy for establishing the grounds for the
Land Ethic on the idea of moral extensionism. Callicott notes that, traditionally,
ethical systems or theories have originated and developed either in religious contexts
(with divine command serving as the grounds) or in secular contexts (with rationality
serving as the grounds). In each of these contexts, moral extensionism is limited by
certain fundamental ideas; in general, only humans, or at best, only rational beings,
have moral standing. Callicott thinks that the Land Ethic suggests an alternative -- one
that is preferable to the others.

This alternative account of the origins and development of morality is grounded in

evolutionary ideas. Briefly, morality is grounded in cooperative survival strategies.
Further, the development of moral sentiments (moral emotions) predates the
development of religion and even rational capacities. This suggests that an

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evolutionary based ethic is possible -- moral behaviour developed as a survival trait
before religion or even rational capacities.

This thinking allows for the extension of the concept of community -- from family or
extended family members only be members of 'your' community, or smaller to larger
groups of humans, or even the so-called 'Global Community' (of humans, again), to
humans being merely members of the biotic community. Thus we get the holistic
approach of the Land Ethic. An important implication of this community conception
of morality is that the interests of individuals become subordinate to the interests of
the whole -- i.e., the interconnected collective. This is modeled on the ecological
status of the individual as merely a component in an ecological system through which
energy flows. The maintenance of the system (the stability and integrity of the flow
mechanisms, etc.) becomes the ultimate concern, or the ultimate good -- i.e., that
which is to be sought by moral action. This gives riser to Leopold's general principle:
"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."

Some less general principles follow from this, but in general we are to act so as to
preserve ecological systems. Evolution tends to increase the diversity of species. So,
maintenance of species diversity becomes a moral requirement. In fact, maintenance
of the conditions under which evolution can expand species diversity likely is the
moral requirement.

One important problem the Land Ethic seems to have is that if humans are mere
members of the biotic community, it seems that there is no reason why humans should
not be greatly reduced in number so that we do not cause destruction of the
environment. This strikes many as a wildly implausible implication of the Land Ethic.
As Callicott noted, Tom Regan called it "environmental fascism."

Callicott suggests that the way out of this difficulty is to recognize that the Land Ethic
does not imply that humans give up their status in the 'community of humans' We still
have standing as humans. So, we could not be killed just for the reason of preventing
loss of species diversity, for instance. Further, our closest community relationship
take priority over more distant ones. This seems to mean that the Land Ethic would
not be overriding. Callicott argues that this is reflective of our thinking that we owe
duties to people close to us -- e.g., family members -- first. He suggests as evidence
our revulsion at children turning in their parents to some authoritarian regime.
However, this looks not to be clearly analogous. Most would think that there may be
some cases in which it was a moral requirement to override familial duties -- e.g.,
when parents are committing some grossly immoral act. Callicott claims that the Land
Ethic does not cancel human ethics, but it is not entirely clear why. This difficulty
aside, though, the Land Ethic is meant to suggest a pervasive, fairly significant level
of concern for environmental systems.

A final issue is whether Leopold's Land Ethic is truly non-anthropocentric. Callicott

argues that even though there are places where Leopold writes as if we ought to
follow the principles of the Land Ethic so as to make things go well for humans, his
expressed ideas predominantly suggest that he thought the Land Ethic provided non-
anthropocentric reasons for acting to preserve nature. The 'biotic community' concept
seems to support this. It is quite clear, though, that these same reasons could be taken

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anthropocentrically -- that is, it is to humans advantage to preserve nature, and further,
that because of this we have moral duties to other humans with respect to
environmental issues.

The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement

Arne Naess

Naess is considered the founder of the so-called "deep ecology" movement. Deep
ecology involves a shift from 'shallow' concerns for the environment -- i.e.,
anthropocentric concerns about pollution, resource depletion, etc. -- to 'deeper' non-
anthropocentric concerns directly for nature.

As is directly implied by the title, deep ecology is influenced by fundamental

ecological principles. As Naess points out, though, this does not mean that the moral
principles or prescriptions that arise follow directly from ecology; ecology is, of
course, descriptive, whereas deep ecology is prescriptive. Rather, the norms of deep
ecology come from having an ecological attitude. Naess characterizes it in detail in
the following way.

(1) Relational, total-field image -- a view of nature such that individual organisms are
understood and not having an independent existence. Rather, each organism is at least
partly constituted by its relations to other organisms in an ecosystem. This includes
humans, so humans are not independent of nature.

(2) Biospherical egalitarianism -- a view that, in principle, all living things deserve a
certain kind of respect. In particular, a respect for their "equal right to live and
blossom;" not according this respect is "anthropocentrism". This does mean that all
living things have equal moral worth. To illustrate, it would not necessarily be wrong
to kill and eat some animal.

(3) Principles of diversity and symbiosis -- a recognition that there is mutual

advantage in having diversity both of organisms and modes of life for humans. With
this is the idea that symbiosis and cooperation (with nature) are better ways of
viewing our relationships to nature rather than domination and control.

(4) Anti-class posture -- the above principles of diversity and symbiosis are meant to
apply to all things and all people. That is, there are no 'classes' of organisms or people,
with respect to choices of modes of life.

(5) Rejection of anti-pollution and conservation strategies. The thinking here is that
concentration on 'conservation' issues rather than deep ecology (and preservation) will
do two things: (i) detract from the requirements of, and need for, deep ecology, and
(ii) enhance rather than reduce class differences.

(6) complexity, not complication -- recognition of the complexity of the biosystem

should make humans suitably modest about our level of understanding of natural
processes. It's not entirely clear what Naess thinks this means for humans, but he
seems to be suggesting that because of our ignorance, our best policy is to adopt
pluralistic modes of life so as to avoid causing systems to fail because of singular

12
destructive actions.

(7) Local autonomy and decentralization -- local control allows for direct
relationships between the seats of power and specific concerns. It also has the
influence of localizing resource use to reduce energy consumption.

These various ideas are meant to characterize an attitude, or perhaps a set of attitudes,
that will lead us to develop norms of conduct that would reflect a concern for the
environment on an ecological level. Such an attitude arises out of what Naess called
"ecosophy" a blend of ecology and philosophy. Specific principles of action will
likely vary according to local contexts, but the underlying ideas are universal.

A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics

Richard Watson

Watson argues against the "egalitarian anti-anthropocentric biocentrism" developed

by writers such as Naess. He proposes an ecologically based anthropocentric
alternative.

In the first section of his paper, Watson attempts to characterize the anthropocentric
environmental ethic labeled biocentrism. Don't worry to much about the details of the
account; the summary at the end of the section suffices to show the position taken by
this group of environmental philosophers. Most of the basic principles should be
familiar by now, but I'll repeat Watson's summary here to lay the foundations for his
further arguments.

1. The needs, desires, interests, and goals of humans are not privileged. [This is
universalizing extended to all living things.]
2. Human should not change ecological systems [excluding, presumably, any
'natural' actions we might take].
3. The complexity of ecological systems make it impossible for humans to
understand fully.
4. The summum bonum (or highest good) for humans is the contemplative
understanding of nature. [It is this good that we (we ought?) ultimately seek.]
5. The complex of nature must be understood holistically. All things are
interconnected.

The upshot is that nature must be understood as being in a state of dynamic

equilibrium, and human conduct must be constrained so as to prevent disturbance of
the state.

[Watson notes that there is a serious philosophical problem in arguing from ecological
facts to moral prescription -- the fact-value problem -- but he sets it aside. We'll do the
same. Just to state the problem, though, most agree that it is illegitimate to argue from
purely factual premisses (reasons) to a value or moral conclusion. An ethic grounded
on ecological principles looks like it does just this.]

13
Watson's key criticism of the biocentric model outlined by Naess, etc., is that it is
internally inconsistent. Here's a breakdown of the argument:

If we accept biospherical egalitarianism, then humans should be treated in no special

way; humans are not to be set part from nature. But by arguing that natural states
occur only when an ecosystem is left untouched by humans, Naess and others are
implicitly separating humans from nature. What human do turns out to be unnatural.
Hence, there is an internal inconsistency.

Further, all human actions must be seen as natural -- including environmentally

destructive ones. Only then do we have humans as being intimately part of nature.

Watson then asks: Should we not, though, halt our environmentally destructive
behaviour? Yes, he answers, but only because it is in our best interests to do so.
Clearly, then, we have reduced the outlook back to anthropocentrism. Human beings
ought to curb their evolutionary tendencies, rather than let them flow as Naess and
others argue, because we have such a great potential for being destructive. The fact
that only human behaviour is subject to moral evaluation does set us apart. If we
really are merely members of the biotic community, then surely egalitarianism implies
that we ought not to be treated differently. But most non-anthropocentric ethical
systems prescribe constraints only on human conduct.

There is a further point. Most non-anthropocentric theorists suggest that we must

preserve certain ecological systems as they are because they are natural, and so are
inherently good. But how do we know what the good is? That is, what kinds of
ecological systems are inherently good? The Earth has changed considerably over its
4.5 billion year history. Why suppose that current ecological systems are somehow
inherently valuable, but others are not? And why suppose that human modified
ecological systems are not valuable? Watson thinks that there are no clear answers
here.

Watson concludes by suggesting that most environmental ethical systems are

anthropocentric at their foundations. Even those who explicitly claim to be non-
anthropocentric will usually make some reference to the human good of actions taken
to preserve nature. And usually, this reference will end up being the grounding reason
for restricting human behaviour. Why preserve a diverse global ecosystem? Because it
is best for humans to do so.

Environmental Justice: Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric

Ethics

James P. Sterba

Sterba attempts a kind of reconciliation between anthropocentric and non-

anthropocentric environmental ethics. His main point is that the most plausible
interpretations of each view will generate roughly the same set of prescriptions
concerning our behaviour towards the environment, even though some fundamental
theoretical disagreements remain.

Non-anthropocentric environmental ethics

14
As we have noted, non-anthropocentric theories can be either individualistic or
holistic. The key aspect of these theories is the view that there is no sound reason for
thinking that any species is special or superior, including humans, with the apparent
direct implication that there are no good grounds for treating either individuals of
different species, or living things collectively, differently. In particular, humans
occupy no privileged place in nature. This has the radical consequence, so it seems,
that human interests count for not more than the interests of any other living thing or
system. Many find this highly implausible. Sterba thinks that this final implication
need not follow.

Sterba's argument is outlined on pp. 179-80. Some key points are:

 It can be morally permissible to act showing preference for human interests on

self-defence grounds. The arguments here are parallel to those justifying self-
defence against other humans. We must note, though, that actions taken in self
defence must be proportional, if possible, to the attack (e.g., with respect to the
degree of force).
 It can be morally permissible to act showing preference for human interests for
the sake of preservation of human basic needs. The caveat here is that it is
impermissible to attain those needs at the expense of other human basic needs.
Even though this shows a preference for humans, Sterba thinks that this is not
a problem because it is the way all species behave, i.e., showing preference to
their own species. In other words, there is no reciprocity between species.
[There looks to be a problem here, though; if reciprocity is necessary for moral
constraint, then why should we have any kind of moral concern for other
species?]
 It is impermissible to show preference to human interests when the goal is
disproportionate to the harm caused. That is, if what humans seek is some
non-basic need, then the action taken against members of other species is not
justified. [Note the radical practical implications of this principle.]

Two things follow:

1. Given the acceptance of an individualistic non-anthropocentric ethic, if basic

needs are at stake, there are good grounds for humans harming other
individuals living things.

2. Given the acceptance of a holistic non-anthropocentric ethic, if only non-basic

needs are at stake, there are no good grounds for humans harming other
individuals living things.

Sterba thinks that the truth of these two claims should lead to a resolution of the
disagreement between individualists and holists.

Anthropocentric environmental ethics

Sterba asks what follows if we adopt an anthropocentric position, general. First,

traditional ethical systems allows both for self-defence and preservation of life by
seeking basic needs. But will there be any moral requirement of proportionality
concerning non-humans?

15
Sterba argues that there will because even though it is the case that human superiority
leads to humans having the greatest value, it does not follow that other species are of
no value. Each has at least some kind of intrinsic value. Moreover, proper recognition
of this value requires that we take their interests or needs into account, again, with the
corresponding practical implications.

The upshot, overall, is that these practical implications are roughly the same for each
view.

Ecofeminism 

 Rejects Patriarchal Dualisms

 
o The domination of nature by men is wrong
 is similar to and related to the domination of women by men.

o Must break the pattern of "power over" relationships

 will benefit both women and the natural world.

Acid attack victims

Ecofeminism, or ecological feminism, is a term coined in 1974 by Françoise

d'Eaubonne. It is a philosophy and movement born from the union of feminist and
ecological thinking, and the belief that the social mentality that leads to the
domination and oppression of women is directly connected to the social mentality that
leads to the abuse of the environment. It combines eco-anarchism or bioregional
democracy with a strong ideal of feminism. Its advocates often emphasize the
importance of interrelationships between humans, non-human others (e.g., animals),
and the earth.

A central tenet in ecofeminism states that male ownership of land has led to a
dominator culture (patriarchy), manifesting itself in food export, over-grazing, the
tragedy of the commons, exploitation of people, and an abusive land ethic, in which
animals and land are valued only as economic resources. Other ecofeminists claim
that the degradation of nature contributes to the degradation of women. For example,
Thomas-Slayter and Rocheleau detail how in Kenya, the capitalist driven export
economy has caused most of the agriculturally productive land to be used for
monoculture cash crops. This led to intensification of pesticide use, resource depletion
and relocation of subsistence farmers, especially women, to the hillsides and less
productive land, where their deforestation and cultivation led to soil erosion,
furthering the environmental degradation that hurts their own productivity (Thoma-
Slayter, B. and D. Rocheleau. (1995) Gender, Environment and Development in
Kenya: A Grassroots Perspective).

Vandana Shiva makes it clear that one of the missions of ecofeminism is to redefine
how societies look at productivity and activity of both women and nature who have
mistakenly been deemed passive, allowing for them both to be ill-used. For example,
she draws a picture of a stream in a forest. According to her, in our society it is
perceived as unproductive if it is simply there, fulfilling the needs for water of

16
women’s families and communities, until engineers come along and tinker with it,
perhaps damming it and using it for generating hydropower. The same is true of a
forest unless it is planted with a monoculture plantation of a commercial species. A
forest may very well be productive, protecting groundwater, creating oxygen,
allowing villagers to harvest fruit, fuel, and craft materials, and creating a habitat for
animals that are also a valuable resource. However, for many, if it is not for export or
contribution to GDP, without a dollar value attached, it cannot be seen as a productive
resource (4 Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development 1988).

Some ecofeminists point to the linguistic links between oppression of women and
land, such as the terms, "rape the land", "tame nature," and "reap nature's bounty."
Terms also express nature as feminine (using the pronoun "she" and the term "Mother
Nature") and women as "wild" and "untamed" (like nature). Ecofeminists also
criticize Western lifestyle choices, such as consuming food that has travelled
thousands of miles and playing sports (such as golf and downhill skiing) which
inherently require ecological destruction.

Feminist and social ecologist Janet Biehl has criticized ecofeminism as idealist,
focusing too much on the idea of a mystical connection with nature and not enough on
the actual conditions of women. However, this line of criticism may not apply to
many ecofeminists who reject both mysticism and essentialist ideas about the
connection between women and nature. This antiessentialist ecofeminism has become
more prominent since the early 1990s [1] : it has an epistemological analysis of the
Enlightenment,[4] places the spirituality in immanent world and then practices modern
activism.[5] The materialist ecofeminism discuss economical and political issues and
can use metaphorically the link of Great mother earth or Gaia (while the idealistic
tendency uses it literally).[6]

Views on technology

Françoise d'Eaubonne proposed a cooperative system in small unities (villages) with

autonomization, without alienating technology. With ecofeminist ideals and pagan
practices,[5] these projects are sometimes seen as a form of primitivism. However,
while some ecofeminists see technology as inherently alienating, many see a
substantial role for modern technologies in the creation and operation of such villages.
A number of ecofeminists advocate the use of technologies such as solar power[7] as a
way to stay off 'the grid', which they regard as more important than relying upon
poisonous industrial processes or materials. The ecological movement is itself split on
issues like this. However, it is likely that an intermediate technology, appropriate
technology, would be preferred in general if an ecofeminist movement sought to
spread into developing nations quickly.

Schools of ecofeminist thought

There are different relevant schools of feminist thought and activism that relate to the
analysis of the environment. Ecofeminism argues that there is a connection between
women and nature that comes from their shared history of oppression by a patriarchal
society; this connection also comes from the positive identification of women with
nature. This relationship can be argued from an essentialism position, attributing it to
biological factors, or from a position that explains it as a social construct. Vandana

17
Shiva claims that women have a special connection to the environment through their
daily interactions with it that has been ignored. "Women in subsistence economies,
producing and reproducing wealth in partnership with nature, have been experts in
their own right of holistic and ecological knowledge of nature’s processes. But these
alternative modes of knowing, which are oriented to the social benefits and
sustenance needs are not recognised by the capitalist reductionist paradigm, because it
fails to perceive the interconnectedness of nature, or the connection of women’s lives,
work and knowledge with the creation of wealth.”[8]

Feminist environmentalists study gender interests in natural resources and processes

based on their different roles in daily work and responsibilities. Social feminists focus
on the role of gender in political economy by analyzing the impact of production and
reproduction of men and women’s relation to economic systems. Feminist
poststructuralists explain gender’s relation to the environment as a reflection of
beliefs of identity and difference such as race, class, gender, age, and ethnicity. In this
way they try to explain the relation of gender and development. Liberal feminist
environmentalists treat women as having an active role in environmental protection
and conservation programs. This role can become problematic. There is a common
symbolism in the idea of ‘man’ pitted against nature while nature is feminized and
“woman” is assumed to have profound connections with her environment.[9] This
becomes problematic because it places all the responsibility for conserving on her
rather than him and doesn’t allow her to be seen as profiting from using the
environment as well.

These views of gender and environment constitute feminist political ecology, which
links feminist cultural ecology, political ecology, geographical ecology and feminist
political ecology into one concept. It argues that gender is a relevant factor in
determining access and control of natural resources as it relates to class, race, culture
and ethnicity to transform the environment and to achieve the community’s
opportunities of sustainable development.[10]

The ecofeminist approach that best fits the Nariva Swamp issue in Trinidad and
Tobago comes from “Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism (1990)
in which the editors, Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein lay out three strands in
ecofeminism (quoted in Mack-Canty, 2004). One strand emphasizes that social justice
has to be achieved in concert with the well-being of the Earth since human life is
dependent on the Earth. Another strand in ecofeminism is spiritual, emphasizing that
the Earth is sacred unto itself. A third strand emphasizes the necessity of sustainability
—a need to learn the many ways people can walk the fine line between using the
Earth as a resource while respecting the Earth’s needs. MacGregor (2004) writes that
a focus on women acting on “survival” or “subsistence” imperatives erases moral
choice and practices of making principled decisions to act, or not to act, in particular
ways by focussing solely on “the view from below”: the moral insight that comes out
of so-called unmediated experiences of survival. MacGregor (2004) states the
problems that arise from the lack of acknowledgement that many of the women who
ecofeminists romanticize as exhibiting a “subsistence perspective” or “barefoot
epistemology” do so in conditions that they did not choose and that “lifestyle” does
not necessarily determine human morality.

18
Other writers (Huggan, 2004; Driver. 2001) seem to mock moral arguments, ignoring
the reality that both Christian and non-Christian populations use moral reasoning.
Jacques (2006) claims that the environmental skeptic Peter Huber argues that humans
have no moral obligation to non-human nature because humanity has the ability to
dominate and control nature and this is what Judeo-Christian doctrine dictates (deep
anthropocentrism - enlightened anthropocentrism favours saving coral reefs for future
medical benefits or for biodiversity reasons and for resources that humans use
currently and that may be used for future generations). Even the law in most former
British colonies (and probably other countries) is based on Judeo-Christian religion,
so how can morality be dismissed as a non-issue? Many of the laws on the books in
Trinidad and Tobago have not been changed since their creation under the British
colonial system (Tompkins et al., 2002). Huggan and Driver don’t seem to realize that
it is in fact Nature that is the non moral agent.

Siurua (2006) discusses how David Schmidtz divides morality into two parts: a
“morality of personal aspiration,”encompassing the ethical convictions and ideals
according to which a person orients his or her actions, and a “morality of
interpersonal constraint,” which forms the basis of institutional arrangements to
regulate social interactions between individuals pursuing their personal goals.
Schmidtz argues that strict preservationism (in the sense of a rejection of any
instrumental utilization of nature in protected areas, often motivated by
nonanthropocentrism) may be acceptable and justified as part of a morality of the first
kind, but as long as the costs of actual preservation are to be borne by people who do
not share preservationist values, the promotion of preservationism as the foundation
of interpersonal morality is doomed to failure and consequently ought not to be
undertaken. Arguable preservationism ought not to be undertaken with people who do
not have preservationist values who as I said at the beginning of the Introduction to
this book - should have been relocated to a more comfortable environment at State
cost.

The push towards quantifying Nature as ‘ecosystem services’, or the economic

benefits provided by natural ecosystems is part of a market-oriented mechanism for
conservation says McCauley (2006) in a much-discussed article in the journal Nature.
The underlying assumption is that if scientists can identify ecosystem services, like
the Manzanilla Windbelt, Bush Bush and Bois Neuf islands for birds, other wildlife,
and the mud volcanoes and the tourist potential they represent, then they can quantify
their economic value, and align conservation with market ideologies. This will then
move decision makers away from environmental destruction (McCauley, 2006).

This McCauley claims is akin to saying that civil-rights advocates would have been
more effective if they provided economic justifications for racial integration. Nature
conservation should be framed as a moral issue and argued as such to policy-makers,
says McCauley, since policy makers are just as accustomed to making decisions based
on morality as on finances.

19
Deep Ecology 

 Humans are deeply connected with nature.

 If humans identify with nature, then taking care of the natural world will
become part of taking care of one's self. 

Deep ecology is a somewhat recent branch of ecological philosophy (ecosophy) that

considers humankind as an integral part of its environment. The philosophy
emphasizes the equal value of human and non-human life as well as the importance of
the ecosystem and natural processes. It provides a foundation for the environmental
and green movements and has led to a new system of environmental ethics.

Deep ecology's core principle is the claim that, like humanity, the living environment
as a whole has the same right to live and flourish. Deep ecology describes itself as
"deep" because it persists in asking deeper questions concerning "why" and "how"
and thus is concerned with the fundamental philosophical questions about the impacts
of human life as one part of the ecosphere, rather than with a narrow view of ecology
as a branch of biological science, and aims to avoid merely anthropocentric
environmentalism, which is concerned with conservation of the environment only for
exploitation by and for humans purposes, which excludes the fundamental philosophy
of deep ecology. Deep ecology seeks a more holistic view of the world we live in and
seeks to apply to life the understanding that separate parts of the ecosystem (including
humans) function as a whole.

The phrase "deep ecology" was coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss in
1973,[1] and he helped give it a theoretical foundation. "For Arne Næss, ecological
science, concerned with facts and logic alone, cannot answer ethical questions about
how we should live. For this we need ecological wisdom. Deep ecology seeks to
develop this by focusing on deep experience, deep questioning and deep commitment.
These constitute an interconnected system. Each gives rise to and supports the other,
whilst the entire system is, what Næss would call, an ecosophy: an evolving but
consistent philosophy of being, thinking and acting in the world, that embodies
ecological wisdom and harmony."[2] Næss rejected the idea that beings can be ranked
according to their relative value. For example, judgments on whether an animal has an
eternal soul, whether it uses reason or whether it has consciousness (or indeed higher
consciousness) have all been used to justify the ranking of the human animal as
superior to other animals. Næss states that from an ecological point of view "the right
of all forms [of life] to live is a universal right which cannot be quantified. No single
species of living being has more of this particular right to live and unfold than any
other species." This metaphysical idea is elucidated in Warwick Fox's claim that we
and all other beings are "aspects of a single unfolding reality". [3]. As such Deep
Ecology would support the view of Aldo Leopold in his book, A Sand County
Almanac that humans are "plain members of the biotic community". They also would
support Leopold's "Land Ethic": "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
otherwise." Daniel Quinn in Ishmael, showed that an anthropocentric myth underlies
our current view of the world, and a jellyfish would have an equivalent jellyfish
centric view[4].

20
Deep ecology offers a philosophical basis for environmental advocacy which may, in
turn, guide human activity against perceived self-destruction. Deep ecology and
environmentalism hold that the science of ecology shows that ecosystems can absorb
only limited change by humans or other dissonant influences. Further, both hold that
the actions of modern civilization threaten global ecological well-being. Ecologists
have described change and stability in ecological systems in various ways, including
homeostasis, dynamic equilibrium, and "flux of nature". [5] Regardless of which model
is most accurate, environmentalists[citation needed] contend that massive human economic
activity has pushed the biosphere far from its "natural" state through reduction of
biodiversity, climate change, and other influences. As a consequence, civilization is
causing mass extinction. Deep ecologists hope to influence social and political change
through their philosophy.

In 1973, Norwegian philosopher and mountaineer Arne Naess introduced the phrase
"deep ecology" to environmental literature. Environmentalism had emerged as a
popular grassroots political movement in the 1960s with the publication of Rachel
Carson's book Silent Spring. Those already involved in conservation and preservation
efforts were now joined by many others concerned about the detrimental
environmental effects of modern industrial technology. The longer-range, older
originators of the movement included writers and activists like Henry David Thoreau,
John Muir and Aldo Leopold; more mainstream awareness was closer to the "wise-
use" conservation philosophy pioneered by Gifford Pinchot.

In 1972, Naess made a presentation in Bucharest at the Third World Future Research
Conference. In his talk, he discussed the longer-range background of the ecology
movement and its concern with an ethic respecting nature and the inherent worth of
other beings. As a mountaineer who had climbed all over the world, Naess had
enjoyed the opportunity to observe political and social activism in diverse cultures.
Both historically and in the contemporary movement, Naess saw two different forms
of environmentalism, not necessarily incompatible with each other. One he called the
"long-range deep ecology movement" and the other, the "shallow ecology
movement." The word "deep" in part referred to the level of questioning of our
purposes and values when arguing in environmental conflicts. The "deep" movement
involves deep questioning, right down to fundamental root causes. The short-term,
shallow approach stops before the ultimate level of fundamental change, often
promoting technological fixes (e.g. recycling, increased automotive efficiency,
export-driven monocultural organic agriculture) based on the same consumption-
oriented values and methods of the industrial economy. The long-range deep approach
involves redesigning our whole systems based on values and methods that truly
preserve the ecological and cultural diversity of natural systems.

The distinguishing and original characteristics of the deep ecology movement were its
recognition of the inherent value of all living beings and the use of this view in
shaping environmental policies. Those who work for social changes based on this
recognition are motivated by love of nature as well as for humans. They recognize
that we cannot go on with industrialism's "business as usual." Without changes in
basic values and practices, we will destroy the diversity and beauty of the world, and
its ability to support diverse human cultures.

21
In 1972, very few people appreciated that Naess was characterizing an existing
grassroots movement, rather than simply stating his personal philosophy. In order to
establish shared objectives, Naess proposed a set of eight principles to characterize
the deep ecology movement as part of the general ecology movement. The platform
can be endorsed by people from a diversity of religious and philosophical
backgrounds as well as differing political affiliations. "Supporters of the deep ecology
movement" (rather than being referred to as "deep ecologists") are united by a long-
range vision of what is necessary to protect the integrity of the Earth's ecological
communities and ecocentric values.

Unfortunately, some vociferous environmentalists who claim to support the

movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone. Supporters of
the deep ecology movement are not anti-human, as is sometimes alleged. Naess's
platform principle Number 1 begins with recognizing the inherent worth of all beings,
including humans. Gandhian nonviolence is a tenet of deep ecology activism in word
and deed. Supporters of the deep ecology movement deplore anti-human statements
and actions.

Accepting the Deep Ecology Platform principles entails a commitment to respecting

the intrinsic values of richness and diversity. This, in turn, leads one to critique
industrial culture, whose development models construe the Earth only as raw
materials to be used to satisfy consumption and production—to meet not only vital
needs but inflated desires whose satisfaction requires more and more consumption.
While industrial culture has represented itself as the only acceptable model for
development, its monocultures destroy cultural and biological diversity in the name of
human convenience and profit.

If we do not accept the industrial development model, what then? Endorsing the Deep
Ecology Platform principles leads us to attend to the "ecosophies" of aboriginal and
indigenous people so as to learn from them values and practices that can help us to
dwell wisely in the many different places in this world. We learn from the wisdom of
our places and the many beings who inhabit them. At the same time, the ecocentric
values implied by the platform lead us to recognize that all human cultures have a
mutual interest in seeing Earth and its diversity continue for its own sake and because
most of us love it. We want to flourish and realize ourselves in harmony with other
beings and cultures. Is it possible to develop common understandings that enable us to
work with civility toward harmony with other creatures and beings? The Deep
Ecology Platform principles are a step in this direction. Respect for diversity leads us
to recognize the ecological wisdom that grows specific to place and context. Thus,
supporters of the deep ecology movement emphasize place-specific, ecological
wisdom, and vernacular technology practices. No one philosophy and technology is
applicable to the whole planet. As Naess has said many times, the more diversity, the
better.

22