Journal of Business Research 101 (2019) 869–874

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Journal of Business Research

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres

Top managers' characteristics as causal explanations for self-reported T

performance☆
⁎
Maria João Guedes , Vítor da Conceição Gonçalves
ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal

A R T I C LE I N FO A B S T R A C T

Keywords: We use a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to examine how four characteristics of top managers (nar-
fsQCA cissism, sense of control, tenure, and workload) explain their high or low self-reported performance. Our survey
Narcissism sample comprises 784 top managers (572 males and 212 females) from non-listed firms in all industries in
Sense of control Portugal. While the results show that none of the characteristics is either a necessary or sufficient condition, they
Workload
do show that three different paths exist that are conducive to high self-reported performance. The results in-
Tenure
Subjective performance
dicate that the self-images of the managers and the control they exert over others influence their judgements
about their performance and the reality of the firm. This finding highlights the important effect that top man-
agers' characteristics have on performance, and stakeholders should consider this effect when analyzing a firm.

1. Introduction Peni, 2014). However, they do not incorporate other dimensions of the
firm.
The research has long recognized the important role that top man- The purpose of this study is to makes three contributions: first, we
agers play in the strategic actions of a firm. Top managers play a key extend the literature on top managers' characteristics and performance
role in the progress of the firm, in the decisions made inside the firm, in by using a measure of performance that accounts for several dimensions
the direction of its activity (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Hambrick & of the firm, from sales growth to product and service variety to cus-
Mason, 1984), and in defining the philosophy of the firm and its ob- tomer satisfaction. To that end, we use a self-reported measure of
jectives (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Due to their very significant performance that enables top managers to evaluate the performance of
role, the characteristics of these individuals inevitably end up being their firms over the last three years as compared to their main com-
reflected in the firm and in its results (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & petitors.
Sanders, 2004). And if something goes wrong, they take the blame (and Second, past studies seldom focus on the individual characteristics
are also the ones that take the credit if things go right) (Adams, 2016). of top managers and, even less common, explain the subjective mea-
Many studies look at how the top management's characteristics, in sures of performance. We investigate how four individual character-
particular the CEO's, might affect investment decisions (Ben-David, istics of top managers, narcissism, sense of control, tenure, and work-
Graham, & Harvey, 2007; Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012), acquisitions load, alone or in combination are conducive to high performance.
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008), sensitivity to cash flows and earnings Third, we contribute to the literature on strategic management and
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, b), confidence regarding future perfor- human psychology that acknowledges that a better understanding of
mance (Libby & Rennekamp, 2012), and accounting fraud (Schrand & individual characteristics may be pivotal to improving a firm's perfor-
Zechman, 2012). Adding to this literature, a vast body of research looks mance (Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011). This is important because top
at how characteristics of top managers can influence the firm's perfor- managers are a mirror of their firm's reputation; and their character-
mance or if there is a pattern consistent to their features that is con- istics affect which, when, and how information is communicated to
ducive to better or worse results. The majority of these studies focus on stakeholders (Amernic & Craig, 2010; Vera & Crossan, 2004) and what
a single measure of performance: either accounting measures such as results the firm might be able to obtain.
the return on assets (ROA) or market measures such as Tobin's Q (e.g.,

☆
The authors acknowledge the financial support from FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal) through the Advance Research Centre (project UID/
SOC/04521/2013).
⁎
Corresponding author at: ISEG, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, gab. 612, 1249-078 Lisboa, Portugal.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (M.J. Guedes), [email protected] (V. da Conceição Gonçalves).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.11.014
Received 10 June 2018; Received in revised form 7 November 2018; Accepted 10 November 2018
Available online 15 November 2018
0148-2963/ © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
M.J. Guedes, V. da Conceição Gonçalves Journal of Business Research 101 (2019) 869–874

2. Causal conditions of self-reported performance are more subject to scrutiny and might fear dismissal. However, the
research shows that the probability of dismissal because of their per-
Performance measures the firm's accomplishments in many different formance declines with their tenure (Allgood & Farrell, 2000; Dikolli,
areas such as finance, innovation, and sales. Performance is a vast and Mayew, & Nanda, 2014; Wang, Holmes, Oh, & Zhu, 2016).
rich area of management research and has attracted the attention of In light of the literature, the present study proposes the following
scholars and non-scholars for decades. Notwithstanding, the research proposition:
has neither exhaustively explored the effects of specific characteristics
Proposition 1. Different combinations of narcissism, sense of control,
of top managers on performance nor does it agree on those effects
workload, and tenure are sufficient to predict self-reported
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). Despite the long interest in the topic,
performance, but each condition alone is not.
researchers seem to pay less attention to self-reported measures of
performance. Our goal is to use a subjective measure of performance
that considers several dimensions of the firm and to explore which 3. Method
characteristics of top managers are conducive to performance.
One of the characteristics that the research has identified is nar- 3.1. Data collection
cissism. It defines narcissism as “excessive self-love, admiration, and
exaggerated attention to the self” (Guedes, 2017, p. 182). Narcissists The present study uses a convenience sample of 784 top managers
are driven by the desire for success, accomplishment, recognition (572 males and 212 females) from non-listed firms in all industries in
(Emmons, 1987; Tamborski, Brown, & Chowning, 2012), and not sur- Portugal. The data were collected through an online survey that was
prisingly to reach the top of the hierarchy (Harms, Spain, & Hannah, sent to the top manager of each firm. We identified these managers
2011). At the top, they can exert their influence and can achieve their through their contact information in Informa D&B. The mean age of the
aspirations. In that position, their actions are likely to affect the course participants was 46 (ranging from 20 to 75 years old), 77.8% were
of the firm, those who work closely with them, and all stakeholders in married, 64.4% were college graduates, and 79.7% had an annual gross
general. Narcissistic managers over-identify themselves with the firms income of 44,999 Euros. The most representative industry was “other
they are part of and engage in actions to achieve their goals, even if that service activities” at 14.4% of the sample and was followed by
means unethical behavior (Capalbo, Frino, Lim, Mollica, & Palumbo, “wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motor-
2018). cycles” at 12.8% of the sample. The least representative industry was
The research that explores how top managers' characteristics affect “Mining and quarrying” and “Water supply, sewerage, waste manage-
performance provides mixed conclusions. On the one hand, some stu- ment, and remediation activities” at 0.5% each. For work, 88% were in
dies find that narcissism has a positive effect on performance (e.g., the private sector, 63.5% were in micro firms (less than 10 employees),
Maccoby, 2000), or a fluctuating effect (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). and only 10.8% were in medium to large firms (more than 51 em-
On the other hand, other studies find a negative relation (e.g., Ham, ployees).
Seybert, & Wang, 2017) or no relation at all (e.g., Judge, LePine, &
Rich, 2006). Narcissistic top managers are less responsive to recent 3.2. Measures
performance (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2011) because their own views
can isolate them from reality. In fact, Guedes (2017) shows that nar- 3.2.1. Outcome: self-reported performance
cissists over-evaluate their performance and that their self-assessment is The firm's performance is assessed through the subjective measure
not correlated with objective indicators. that builds on the work of Wiklund and Shepherd (2003). This scale has
The research refers to the belief that one can deal with any situation the advantage of accounting for several dimensions of performance and
as a sense of control (Keeton, Perry-Jenkins, & Sayer, 2008). Tangney, allowing comparisons between competitive firms. The participants
Baumeister, and Boone (2004) provide evidence that self-control pre- were asked to evaluate the performance of their company compared to
dicts positive outcomes in life domains, such as self-esteem and opti- their main competitors over the last three years in 10 fields of perfor-
mism (e.g., Bandura, 1989; Skinner, 1995) that affect health and well- mance (sales growth, revenue growth, growth in the number of em-
being (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). ployees, net profit margin, product/service innovation, process in-
For top managers, a high sense of control can provide them with the novation, adoption of new technology, product/service quality,
capacity to change and adapt (e.g., Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). product/service variety, and customer satisfaction). The scale ranges
If with a high sense of control comes power over resources, including from 1, which equals much lower, to 5, which equals much higher, and
people (e.g. Fast et al., 2009; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), then it should is presented in Table 1. The overall performance equals the sum of all
be conducive to better outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, there is 10 answers (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007). The Cron-
no past research that explores the link between a sense of control and a bach's alpha coefficient is 0.86 and shows very good reliability
firm's outcomes, such as performance. (DeVellis, 1991).
At the top of the hierarchy, managers should be engaged in their
role and dedicate their efforts to the firm. The research has shown that 3.2.2. Conditions
there is a positive relation between work engagement and performance The causal conditions are narcissism, sense of control, tenure, and
(Gorgievski & Bakker, 2010; Gorgievski, Moriano, & Bakker, 2014). workload. For narcissism, we use the Narcissistic Personality Inventory
Thus, workload is a good proxy for work engagement and should have (NPI-16) proposed by Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006). It is a self-
an influence on performance. reported measure of grandiose narcissism that consists of 16 pairs of
Further, two contrasting views exist on how tenure affects perfor- statements with each pair containing one statement that is consistent
mance (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Miller & Shamsie, 2001). On the with narcissistic behavior and another consistent with non-narcissistic
one hand, when the tenue is short, managers learn fast and are more behavior. Respondents were asked to pick the statement that best de-
willing to take risks (Luo, Kanuri, & Andrews, 2014). As managers gain scribed their way of being, thinking, and acting for each pair. The
experience by acquiring knowledge and skills, their performance should statements that related to leadership, dominance, grandiose belief, and
increase over time (Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005). On the other hand, as a sense of entitlement were framed as a forced choice between a nar-
time passes, managers become more risk averse and less adaptable. cissistic response (=1) and a non-narcissistic response (=0). The
They also tend to have less motivation and to be less engaged in their questions are presented in Table 1. The narcissistic statement of the pair
role. These characteristics can lead to a decrease in performance is scored with one point and the non-narcissistic with zero. The final
(Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller, 1991). Hence, those that sit at the top NPI-16 score results from summing the scores of all chosen statements

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M.J. Guedes, V. da Conceição Gonçalves Journal of Business Research 101 (2019) 869–874

Table 1
Scales summary.
Mean Std. Deviation Cronbach's α

Self-reported performance 3.52 0.54 0.86

Sales growth 3.35 0.87
Revenue growth 3.34 0.88
Growth in number of employees 2.97 0.91
Return on assets 3.30 0.78
Innovation of products and services 3.61 0.77
Innovation in the processes adopted by the firm 3.62 0.77
Adoption of new technologies 3.55 0.82
Qualities of the products and services 3.87 0.71
Variety of the products and services 3.62 0.80
Customer satisfaction 3.93 0.72
NPI narcissism 4.25 3.02 0.74
1. I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so. (n) 0.31 0.46
When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.
2. I like to be the center of attention. (n) 0.16 0.36
I prefer to blend in with the crowd.
3. I think I am a special person. (n) 0.25 0.44
I am no better or worse than most people.
4. I like having authority over people. (n) 0.48 0.50
I do not mind following orders.
5. I find it easy to manipulate people. (n) 0.22 0.41
I do not like it when I find myself manipulating people.
6. I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me. (n) 0.17 0.37
I usually get the respect that I deserve.
7. I am apt to show off if I get the chance. (n) 0.07 0.26
I try not to be a show off.
8. I always know what I am doing. (n) 0.53 0.50
Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing.
9. Everybody likes to hear my stories. (n) 0.14 0.35
Sometimes I tell good stories.
10. I expect a great deal from other people. (n) 0.27 0.44
I like to do things for other people.
11. I really like to be the center of attention. (n) 0.26 0.44
It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention.
12. People always seem to recognize my authority. (n) 0.46 0.50
Being an authority does not mean that much to me.
13. I am going to be a great person. (n) 0.18 0.39
I hope I am going to be successful.
14. I can make anybody believe anything I want them to. (n) 0.43 0.50
People sometimes believe what I tell them.
15. I am more capable than other people. (n) 0.09 0.28
There is a lot that I can learn from other people.
16. I am an extraordinary person. (n) 0.24 0.43
I am much like everybody else.
Sense of control 5.65 0.78 0.77
I can get him/her/them to do what I want. 6.02 0.87
I think I have a great deal of power 5.13 1.71
If I want to, I get to make the decisions 5.39 1.17
I can get him/her/them to listen to what I say. 5.68 1.37
My wishes do not carry much weight. 5.40 1.16
Even if I voice them, my views have little sway. 5.63 1.32
My ideas and opinions are often ignored. 5.74 1.26
Even when I try, I am not able to get my way. 6.17 1.14

Note: N = 784. Responses consistent with narcissism are identified as (n).

where the higher the final value, the more narcissistic the individual is. total number of hours worked per week (Guedes, Gonçalves, & da
The Cronbach's alpha coefficient is 0.74, which shows that the relia- Conceição Gonçalves, 2017).
bility of the measure is good (DeVellis, 1991).
For the sense of control, we use the Personal Sense of Power scale
4. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
developed by Anderson, John, and Keltner (2012). The scale comprises
eight items (such as “I can get the others to do what I want,” “My wishes
The fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) explores the
do not carry much weight,” and “My ideas and opinions are often ig-
combination of causal conditions that are necessary and/or sufficient to
nored”) and has a range from 1, which equals disagree strongly to 7,
reach an outcome (Ragin, 2000). This method acknowledges that dif-
which equals agree strongly. The scale is summarized in Table 1. The
ferent causal conditions might have opposite effects that depend on the
final sense of control score for each individual is computed after reverse
combinations of which they are a part (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010;
coding the items by averaging all the answers. Higher values for a sense
Woodside, 2013).
of control correspond to a higher perception of power and influence
over others. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient is 0.77, which indicates
good consistency (DeVellis, 1991). 4.1. Calibration
Tenure is the number of years as a top manager and workload is the
In order to conduct a fsQCA, the cases need to be evaluated in terms

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Table 2 Table 4
Summary data for conditions and outcome. Intermediate and parsimonious solutions for self-reported performance.
Mean Std. Deviation Min Max Calibration values at Causal configuration Row coverage Unique coverage Consistency

5% 50% 95% Intermediate solution

1 workload * narcissism 0.49 0.06 0.80
Self-reported 3.52 0.54 1 5 2.7 3.5 4.3 2 workload * sense of control 0.54 0.11 0.81
performance 3 narcissism * sense of control 0.55 0.12 0.81
Narcissism 4.25 3.02 0 16 0 4 10 Coverage: 0.72; consistency: 0.76
Sense of control 5.65 0.78 1.38 7 4.13 5.75 6.75
Tenure 11.90 8.82 1 54 2 10 30 Note: ~ represents the absence of a condition, and * symbolizes the logical
Workload 50.25 14.50 6 112 30 50 72 operator AND.

Note: N = 784; Min. is the minimum; Max. is the maximum; Std. Deviation is
configurations. Hence, these conditions in combinations among them-
the standard deviation.
selves lead to high self-reported performance.
As highlighted by Ragin (2008), the configurations that lead to the
of their membership intervals (Ragin, 2008). Following Woodside
outcome can be considerably different from those that lead to the ab-
(2013), the present study uses three different anchors to calibrate the
sence of the outcome. To that end, we conduct the analysis for ~ self-
data: 95% to specify full membership, 50% for the crossover, and 5%
reported performance. Table 5 presents the results. The solution has an
for the full non-membership. Table 2 presents the calibration values and
overall consistency of 0.75 and a coverage of 0.69. It comprises three
the statistics for each condition and outcome.
configurations. The first one, with the highest coverage, consists of the
absence of workload and the absence of sense of control. This config-
4.2. Analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions uration corresponds to the negation of the second configuration for the
outcome. The second configuration comprises tenure and the absence of
A causal condition is considered necessary if the outcome cannot be a sense of control. The third configuration, which has the highest
reached without its presence, but the condition alone is not enough to consistency, contains tenure, the absence of workload, and narcissism.
cause the outcome (Ragin, 2000, 2008). A condition is deemed “ne- Once more, none of the conditions is necessary or sufficient but in
cessary” when the consistency score is above 0.9 (Ragin, 2000). It is combination with other conditions are conducive to the absence of high
considered “almost necessary” if the threshold is above 0.80 (Ragin, self-reported performance.
2000). Table 3 presents the results for the test on the necessity of the
conditions for both the presence of the outcome (self-reported perfor- 5. Discussion and conclusions
mance) and its absence (~ self-reported performance). According to the
results, none of the conditions is either “necessary” or even “almost The present study explores how different combinations of top
necessary” for self-reported performance or for ~ self-reported perfor- managers' characteristics explain self-reported performance. First, the
mance. results indicate that none of the causal conditions is either a necessary
A condition is sufficient if the outcome always occurs in its presence or a sufficient condition but that when combined with other char-
despite other conditions that might also be conducive to that outcome acteristics disclose three different paths (equifinality) that are con-
(Ragin, 2000, 2008). Tables 4 and 5 show the intermediate solution and ducive to high self-reported performance.
the measures of fit for self-reported performance and ~ self-reported Second, tenure is not a part of any of the configurations conducive
performance, respectively. For the purpose of brevity, we only focus on to high self-reported performance but is present in two configurations
the intermediate solution. for its absence. As such, the results seem to align with the research that
According to Table 4, the intermediate solution has a consistency finds that as time passes managers are detrimental to performance
value of 0.76, which is above the minimum that Ragin (2008: p. 118) (Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller, 1991).
recommends, and a coverage of 0.72. It has three configurations that Third, there are two mirror solutions. While working hard but
lead to high self-reported performance. The first configuration (with the having a sense of control leads to high self-reported performance (Fast
lowest coverage) comprises workload and narcissism. The second con- et al., 2009; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), the mirror recipe leads to the
figuration (with the highest consistency) consists of workload and a absence of high self-reported performance. Thus, the belief that top
sense of control. The third configuration (with the highest coverage) managers have that they can deal with and adapt to situations
contains narcissism and a sense of control. Overall, tenure is not present (Rothbaum et al., 1982) while simultaneously having dedication, en-
in any of the configurations, which means that it is not an important gagement, and a heavy workload renders a positive outcome that makes
causal condition that leads to high self-reported performance. Narcis- their role worth it.
sism, workload, and a sense of control are present in two of the three Finally, narcissism is present in two of the recipes for performance,

Table 3
Analysis of necessary conditions.
Condition Self-reported performance ~ Self-reported performance

Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage

narcissism 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.59

~ narcissism 0.63 0.62 0.73 0.66
sense of control 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.58
~ sense of control 0.58 0.63 0.71 0.71
tenure 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.67
~ tenure 0.71 0.68 0.66 0.58
workload 0.67 0.70 0.63 0.61
~ workload 0.63 0.65 0.69 0.66

Note: ~ represents the absence of a condition.

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Table 5
Intermediate and parsimonious solutions for ~ self-reported performance.
Causal configuration Row coverage Unique coverage Consistency

Intermediate solution
1 ~ workload * ~ sense of control 0.54 0.14 0.79
2 tenure * ~ sense of control 0.50 0.10 0.80
3 ~ workload * tenure * ~ narcissism 0.40 0.05 0.82
Coverage: 0.69; consistency: 0.75

Note: ~ represents the absence of a condition, and * symbolizes the logical operator AND.

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