MANU/SC/0101/1957

Equivalent Citation: AIR1957SC 620, 1957(2)AnWR65, (1957) 27 AWR 626, 1957(5)BLJR723, 1957C riLJ1006, (1957)IIMLJ65,
(1957)35MysLJ(SC )159, (1958)60PLR11, [1957]1SC R860

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Petition No. 252 of 1956
Decided On: 05.04.1957
Appellants:Ramji Lal Modi
Vs.
Respondent:The State of U.P.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J., A.K. Sarkar, P. Govinda Menon, S.K. Das and Syed Jaffer
Imam, JJ.
Case Notes:
The case debated on the constitutional validity of a law making an insult to
religion an offence and questioned whether such law violated the freedom
of speech and expression -
In the particular instance, a petition was filed challenging the validity of
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and for quashing the
petitioner's conviction for publishing an article in a monthly magazine for
which he was the printer, publisher and the editor - It was held that the
validity of the Section could not be questioned and that the Section was
within the protection of clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India
JUDGMENT
Sudhi Ranjan Das, C.J.
1 . This is a petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India praying for a
declaration that s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and unconstitutional
and for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the petitioner's conviction under
that section and for ancillary reliefs.
2. The material facts lie within a narrow compass. The petitioner is the editor, printer
and publisher of a monthly magazine called Gaurakshak. The magazine is devoted to
cow protection. In July or August, 1954, a Hindi Daily newspaper named 'Amrit
Patrika' of Allahabad Printed and published an article or a cartoon about a donkey on
which an agitation was started by the muslims of Uttar Pradesh. The editor and
printer and publisher of 'Amrit Patrika' were prosecuted by the State, but they have
been eventually acquitted by the High Court of Allahabad. In the meantime, in its
issue for the month of Kartik Samvat 2009, corresponding to November, 1952, an
article was published in the petitioner's magazine 'Gaurakshak.' On December 12,
1952, the State Government ordered the prosecution of the petitioner on the basis of
the said article. Accordingly of June 8, 1953, a complaint was filed in the court of the
District Magistrate, Kanpur, by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kanpur, against
the petitioner for offences under Sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code.
The Magistrate by his order dated August 5, 1953, charged the petitioner under
Sections 153A and 295A and committed the petitioner to the Sessions Court of

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 Kanpur for trial. The petitioner pleaded not guilty. The learned Sessions Judge, by his
judgment dated November 16, 1953, acquitted the petitioner of the charge under s.
153A but convicted him under s. 295A and sentenced him to 18 months rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default of payment of the fine, to
further rigorous imprisonment of 4 months. The petitioner filed and appeal to the
High Court at Allahabad. The learned Single Judge, by his judgment dated October
25, 1956, held that the article was published with the deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of muslims and that the petitioner was
guilty under s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge, however, reduced
the sentence of imprisonment to 12 months and the fine from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 250
only. An application for certificate to appeal to this Court under Arts. 132 and 134
having been rejected by the High Court on October 30, 1956, the petitioner moved
this Court for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court
dated October 25, 1956. The petitioner also on December 5, 1956, presented the
present petition under Art. 32 for the reliefs mentioned above. The petitioner also
made an application in this Court along with the writ petition for stay of the sentence
passed on him. On December 18, 1956, both the stay application and the petition for
special leave were dismissed by this Court. The petition under Art. 32 has now come
up for hearing. Presumably the petitioner has surrendered and is undergoing the
sentence of imprisonment.
3 . Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition urges that s. 295A of the
Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and void inasmuch as it interferes with the
petitioner's right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to him as a citizen
of India by Art. 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The contention is that this section
cannot be supported as a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the
right conferred by Art. 19(1)(a) as provided in clause (2) of the said Article. Learned
counsel says that the interest of public order is the only thing in clause (2) which
may possibly be relied upon by the State as affording a justification for its claim for
the validity of the impugned section. A law interfering with the freedom of speech
and expression and imposing a punishment for its breach may, says counsel, be "in
the interests of public order" only if the likelihood of public disorder is made an
ingredient of the offence and the prevention of public disorder is a matter of
proximate and not remote consideration. Learned counsel points out that insulting the
religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of India may not lead to public
disorder in all cases although it may do so in some case. Therefore, where a law
purports, as the impugned section does, to authorise the imposition of restriction on
the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in
language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of
constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, the court should
not uphold it even in so far as it may be applied within the constitutionally
permissible limits as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied
for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must,
according to learned counsel, be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.
Reference has been made to the cases of Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras
MANU/SC/0006/1950 : (1950) S.C.R. 594 and Brij Bushan v. The State of Delhi
MANU/SC/0007/1950 : (1950) S.C.R. 605.
4. In Romesh Thappar's case, in exercise of powers conferred on him by s. 9(1-A) of
the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the Governor of Madras, being
satisfied that for the purpose of securing public safety and the maintenance of public
order it was necessary so to do, prohibited the entry into or the circulation, sale or
distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled

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 'Cross Roads', an English Weekly published at Bombay. The impugned section - s.
9(1-A) - was a law enacted for the purpose of securing the public safety and the
maintenance of public order. 'Public order' was said to be an expression of wide
connotation and to signify that state of tranquillity which prevailed among the
members of a political society as a result of the internal regulation enforced by the
Government which they had established. 'Public safety' used in that section was taken
as part of the wider concept of 'public order'. Clause (2) of Art. 19, as it stood then,
protected a law relating, inter alia, to a matter which undermined the security of or
tended to overthrow the State. Some breach of public safety or public order may
conceivably undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State, but equally
conceivably many breaches of public safety or public order may not have that
tendency. Therefore, a law which imposes restrictions on the freedom of speech and
expression for preventing a breach of public safety or public order which may not
undermine the security of the State or tend to overthrow the State cannot claim the
protection of clause (2) of Art. 19. Section 9(1-A) was challenged as it embraced
both species of activities referred to above and as the section was not severable, the
whole section was held to be bad.
5 . In Brij Bushan's case (supra) the validity of s. 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public
Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi, came up for consideration.
That section provided that "the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by
it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating
any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may,
by order in writing addressed to the printer, publisher or editor, require that any
matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be
submitted for scrutiny". It was held by this Court (Fazl Ali J. dissenting) that
inasmuch as the section authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) for the
purposes of preventing activities prejudicial to public safety and maintenance of
public order, it was not a law solely relating to a matter which undermined the
security of or tended to overthrow the State within the meaning of clause (2) of Art.
19 as it then stood. The principles laid down in Romesh Thappar's case were applied
to this case and the law was held to be void.
6. The case of Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0008/1950 :
(1950) S.C.R. 759 has also been relied upon in support of the contention that where
the language employed in the Statute is wide enough to cover restrictions on a
fundamental right both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible
legislative action affecting the right and the possibility of its being applied for
purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, the law must be
held to be wholly void.
7 . After this Court decided the cases of Romesh Thappar (supra) and Brij Bushan
(supra), clause (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution was amended. Clause (2), as
amended, protects a law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right conferred by sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art. 19 "in the
interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence." The question for our consideration is whether the
impugned section can be properly said to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in the
interests of public order.

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 It will be noticed that the language employed in the amended clause is "in the
interests of" and not "for the maintenance of". As one of us pointed out in Debi Soron
v. The State of Bihar A.I.R. (1954) Pat 254, the expression "in the interests of" makes
the ambit of the protection very wide. A law may not have been designed to directly
maintain public order and yet it may have been enacted in the interests of public
order.
8. It is pointed out that s. 295A has been included in chapter XV of the Indian Penal
Code which deals with offences relating to religion and not in chapter VIII which
deals with offences against the public tranquillity and from this circumstance it is
faintly sought to be urged, therefore, that offences relating to religion have no
bearing on the maintenance of public order or tranquillity and, consequently, a law
creating and offence relating to religion and imposing restrictions on the right to
freedom of speech and expression cannot claim the protection of clause (2) of Art.
19. A reference to Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to
freedom of religion, will show that the argument is utterly untenable. The right to
freedom of religion assured by those Articles is expressly made subject to public
order, morality and health. Therefore, it cannot be predicated that freedom of religion
can have no bearing whatever on the maintenance of public order or that a law
creating an offence relating to religion cannot under any circumstances be said to
have been enacted in the interests of public order. These two Articles in terms
contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the
interests of public order.
9. Learned counsel then shifted his ground and formulated his objection in a slightly
different way. Insults to the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of
India may, says learned counsel, lead to public disorders in some cases, but in many
cases they may not do so and, therefore, a law which imposes restrictions on the
citizens' freedom of speech and expression by simply making insult to religion and
offence will cover both varieties of insults, i.e., those which may lead to public
disorders as well as those which may not. The law in so far as it covers the first
variety may be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order within the
meaning of clause (2) of Art. 19, but in so far as it covers the remaining variety will
not fall within that clause. The argument then concludes that so long as the
possibility of the law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution
cannot be ruled out, the entire law should be held to be unconstitutional and void.
We are unable, in view of the language used in the impugned section, to accede to
this argument. In the first place clause (2) of Art. 19 protects a law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and
expression "in the interests of" public order, which is much wider than "for
maintenance of" public order. If, therefore, certain activities have a tendency to cause
public disorder, a law penalising such activities as an offence cannot but be held to
be a law imposing reasonable restriction "in the interests of public order" although in
some cases those activities may not actually lead to a breach of public order. In the
next place s. 295A does not penalise any and every act of insult to or attempt to
insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens but it penalises only
those acts of insults to or those varieties of attempts to insult the religion or the
religious beliefs of a class of citizens, which are perpetrated with the deliberate and
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insults to religion
offered unwittingly or carelessly or without any deliberate or malicious intention to
outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within the section. It only
punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class.

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 The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the
public order and the section, which penalises such activities, is well within the
protection of clause (2) of Art. 19 as being a law imposing reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art.
19(1)(a). Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by the impugned
section, there cannot, in our opinion, be any possibility of this law being applied for
purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution. In other words, the language employed
in the section is not wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the
limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the fundamental right
guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) and consequently, the question of severability does not
arise and the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner have no
application to this case.
1 0 . For the reasons stated above, the impugned section falls well within the
protection of clause (2) of Art. 19 and this application must, therefore, be dismissed.
11. Application dismissed.

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