Rti Project 7th Sem 2
Rti Project 7th Sem 2
Rti Project 7th Sem 2
If we look at the past, a varied pattern while dealing with the cases of
defamation had been followed by the Supreme Court. The blasphemy laws,
obscenity law, and sedition laws of the colonial era have been upheld by the
Supreme Court in the cases of Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(1957), Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1964), and Kedar Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) respectively. The Apex Court had also upheld
the pre-censorship of films in the case of K.A Abbas v. Union of India
(1971).
Criminal defamation
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is about the offense of criminal
defamation. The speech that is intended to harm any person’s reputation is
criminalized by this provision. The provision is very wordy and also
mentions the instances where the provision can be abused in order to
silence critical reporting. There are about 125 defamation cases that have
been filed against the Hindu by the Tamil Nadu government where such
abuse of the provision of criminal defamation has happened.
The provision had been present in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 since the
Code was first drafted and has completed around 155 years of being present
in the statute books. Thus, it is very surprising that a constitutional
challenge to this old provision took so long to materialize.
The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression is guaranteed under
the Constitution of India under Article 19(1)(a). However, the power to
impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression
has been given to the state by virtue of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of
India. These restrictions can be imposed in the interests of eight separate
categories, for instance, public order and decency or morality.
Brief facts
It was argued by the counsel for the Petitioner that the concept given under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India is something very broad and
restrictions can be imposed upon it. However, the careful narrow
construction of these restrictions must take place. The principle of noscitur
a sociis (that is, in order to understand and determine the meaning of an
unclear or ambiguous term mentioned under the statute, the words with
which it is associated in the context must be considered) has to be applied
in order to understand the exception.
The counsel for the Petitioner contended that defamation is a civil wrong,
that is, in personam. Therefore, it falls outside the scope of the
Fundamental Rights which are conferred in the interests of the public at
large. Under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, an individual’s right to
reputation is a private right and thus, when a private person makes a
defamatory statement, it cannot be regarded as a criminal act as it does not
promote any public interest. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional to
include defamation as a criminal offense that protects the rights in
rem. Hence, Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 would fall outside
the scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India.
It was also pointed out by the counsel for the Petitioner that since Section
499 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 goes beyond the general public’s
interests, it falls outside the scope of the reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India. Thus, it contended that if a law
deprives a person of their Right to speak the truth, it should be struck down
as being unconstitutional. The requirement of proving that a defamatory
statement was made for public good also stands out of the limits of
reasonableness.
Decision overview
The judgment of the case was delivered by Justice Dipak Misra and Justice
Prafulla C. Pant also agreed with this. If we deeply study the judgment, it
starts with the analysis of the meaning of the terms ‘defamation’ and
‘reputation’ as well as their interaction with the Right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
The Court, after conducting the review of various authorities, found that
both these terms were clear and unambiguous. In addition to this, the
Court said that ‘Reputation’ as a concept is something which is a part of the
protection of ‘Dignity’ that is included under Article 21, that is, the Right to
Life and Personal Liberty.
The Court took this opportunity and emphasized the sanctity as well as the
significance of the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression in a
democracy and at the same time, it was pointed out by the Court that this
right was subject to reasonable restrictions. However, such restrictions
should not be too much, yet they must serve the public interest. The
legislation which imposes such restrictions should not be arbitrary such
that they intrude upon the rights of the people.
Therefore, there shall be a balance between the Right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression and the restrictions imposed on this right. Such a balance
can be achieved by weighing the importance to society of the Freedom of
Speech and Expression against the societal importance to the public
interest that is sought to be protected.
The Court noted that the criminal law has been chosen by the State as one
of the things that would protect reputation. Keeping in mind that
reputation is protected under Article 21, the Court said that it cannot
subscribe to the view that the offense of criminal defamation hinders the
Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. It was emphasized by the
Court that the law on criminal defamation is very clear and thus, this law
can be distinguished from the other laws that had been struck down in the
past as they were infringing the Right to Freedom of Speech.
The Court took the liberty to further emphasize the significance of the
concepts of constitutional fraternity and fundamental duty. As per these
concepts, there is a constitutional duty as well as an expectation from every
citizen of the country to respect the dignity of their fellow citizens. Since
this is a duty that is imposed by the Constitution on each and every citizen
of the country, it would not be sound to conclude that the existence of
defamation as an offense under the law hinders the Right to the Freedom of
Speech and Expression. The Court also addressed the question of whether
the concept of ‘reasonableness’ was violated by the provisions of criminal
defamation whether substantively or procedurally. The Court also
examined whether these provisions of criminal defamation are vague,
arbitrary, or disproportionate.
The Court, after examining the four explanations that are included under
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 concluded that these provisions
are not vague or unambiguous. It was noted by the Court that imputation
can be treated as defamation only if it lowers the character of a person or
their credit in the estimation of others either directly or indirectly. The
Court in this case observed that truth can be taken as a defense in case of
defamation only if the defamatory statement was made for the good of the
public at large. Therefore, the Court gave its view that if a defamatory
statement is not made for serving the public good but only to malign a
person, the statement should not be constitutionally protected.
At last, the Court said that the provision of criminal defamation under the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 is not disproportionate. In addition to this, the
Court said that whether a restriction that is imposed on the Freedom of
Speech and Expression is reasonable and proportional is not determined
from the viewpoint of the person upon whom such restrictions are imposed.
But, this is determined by examining the standpoint of the interest of the
public at large. Applying this, the Court held that the provisions of criminal
defamation are not arbitrary or vague. The Court rejected the contention
made in the case that defamation is a fundamental notion of the majority in
order to crush the Freedom of Speech and Expression of others.
The Court pitched over to Dr. B.R Ambedkar’s speech for addressing the
issue of exaggeration of the term ‘defamation’ by virtue of the restrictions
under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution and it pointed out that the
drafters while drafting Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution and
imposing restrictions on the Freedom of Speech and Expression had the
intention of leaving it to the courts to decide as to what would fall under a
reasonable restriction and thus, did not specifically defined the terms like
‘defamation’ and ‘public order’.
Chilling effect
In the history of the Supreme Court, lies the most powerful and most strong
argument against the constitutionality of criminal defamation. A judgment
was delivered by the Apex Court in 1994 in the case of R. Rajagopal v. State
of Tamil Nadu (1994) in which it was recognized by the Court that the
provision of civil defamation under the Indian legal system poses an
unreasonable restriction on the Right to Freedom of Speech and
Expression. Under this provision, the burden of proving the ‘truth’ of the
defamatory statement is on the maker of such a statement. There is no
space for letting off of honest mistakes or for mistakes that had been made
despite taking all due care by the person.
Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 defines criminal defamation and
the punishment for the same is prescribed under Section 500 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860. In simple terms, defamation can be defined as any
speech or words that are intended to harm the reputation of a person in the
eyes of others. This could be either written words or spoken works. In
addition to this, visible representations also fall under the purview of
defamation. However, the provision of criminal defamation includes some
exceptions like imputation of truth that was required for the good of the
public at large, a person’s conduct that touches any public question or
expressing opinions on a public performance.
The case of Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India placed two challenges
before the Apex Court. First, the Court had to determine whether the
provision of criminal defamation is a superfluid restriction on the Freedom
of Speech and Expression, and secondly, the Court had to determine
whether Section 499 and Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 were
ambiguously and arbitrarily drafted.
However, the Supreme Court in the Subramanian case held that these
Sections are not superfluid restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression. The Court noted that whatever affects an individual, in
turn, affects society as a whole. Thus, it said that defamation must be
considered a public wrong.