Doctrine: The Injured Employee or His Heirs in Case of His Death Have The Choice of Cause of Action and
Doctrine: The Injured Employee or His Heirs in Case of His Death Have The Choice of Cause of Action and
Doctrine: The Injured Employee or His Heirs in Case of His Death Have The Choice of Cause of Action and
Doctrine: The injured employee or his heirs in case of his death have the choice of cause of action and
corresponding relief, i.e., either an ordinary action for damages before the regular courts or a special
claim for limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act before the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. In this case, petitioner’s claim for compensation is predicated on the
employer's liability for the death of their employee imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code and
pertains to the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
FACTS:
The late Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private respondents Luningning Feliciano Go and
Joaquin Go, first as baker of 'Joni's Cakes and Pastries," an enterprise owned by respondents located at
1634 P. Guevarra Street, Santa Cruz, Manila and finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to February
16, 1972. On the latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away and/or carnapped the car owned
by respondents and driven by Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carnappers, was shot and
killed by the latter. Up to now, the parties responsible for Severo's death have not been Identified nor
apprehended.
On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an
action against respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death Compensation and Damages," the
complaint inter alia alleging:
a. While the said Ricardo Severo was in the actual discharge of his duties as an employee of
defendants that is, he was driving the car of defendants, carnappers forcefully took away and/or
carnapped the said car of defendants and in his attempts to resist and prevent the subject car from
being taken away, the said carnappers shot and killed the said Ricardo Severo, thus his death
arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendants;
b. That plaintiffs herein depend solely and rely completely upon the late Ricardo Severo for their
financial needs and means of living;
c. That for the loss of the life of said Ricardo Severo, plaintiffs herein are entitled to indemnification
or death compensation from defendants;
d. That because of the sudden and violent death which Ricardo Severo met in the faithful service to
his employers the defendants herein, the plaintiffs herein suffered moral damages in the form of
deep grief, lonesomeness, mental anguish and shock; and
e. That defendants manifested bad faith when they willfully failed to comply with their promise that
they would properly compensate plaintiffs herein for the death of Ricardo Severo, thereby
plaintiffs were compelled to institute this suit whereby they incur litigation expenses and to
contract the services of their counsel on a contingent basis.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
claim of petitioner and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Petitioners filed a reply
(opposition) contending that their claim is not for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act
but for damages under Article 1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by the regular
courts.
The respondent court issued an order stating that petitioners' cause of action falls within the purview of
the Workmen's Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
It declared itself without jurisdiction following the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap
Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 267, to wit:
As provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 722 as amended, 'the Workmen's Compensation shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5 of the Act provides that
the rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury
entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to an
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under
the Civil Code or other laws, because of said injury.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction over petitioners’ cause of action
RULING:
Yes, the regular courts have jurisdiction over petitioners’ cause of action, i.e. for damages under Article
1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The ruling in the case of Robles vs. Yap Wing that the action of the injured employee or that of his heirs
in case of his death is restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act relied upon by the trial court, no longer controls. The Court has abandoned the same in
the recent case of Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Hon. Celso Avelino, G.R. No. L-43674, promulgated
on June 30, 1987, citing the case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company, L-30642, April 30, 1985, 136
SCRA 141, viz.:
In the recent case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company involving a complaint for damages for
the death of five miners in a cave-in on June 28, 1967, the Court was confronted with three
divergent opinions on the exclusivity rule as presented by several amici curiae. However, the
view that was adopted by the majority in the Floresca case was that the action is selective and the
employee or his heirs have a choice of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by reason
of his negligence. But once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no
longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other words, the employee cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously. In so doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and
remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in the Robles case.
The employee or his heirs have the choice of cause of action and corresponding relief, i.e., either an
ordinary action for damages before the regular courts or a special claim for limited compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act before the Workmen's Compensation Commission. However, this right
of choice is qualified in that the employee should be held to the particular remedy in which he has staked
his fortunes and must pursue even his alternative claim for compensation exclusively in the same regular
courts once he has opted to seek his remedy there rather than in the Workmen's Compensation
Commission. This is what the petitioners did in filing their complaint for "Death Compensation and
Damages" before respondent Court. Petitioners have opted to seek their remedy before the regular court.
Their demand for compensation is predicated on the employer's liability for the death of their employee
(Ricardo Severo) imposed by Article 1711 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the
death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees even though the
event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to fortuitous cause if the death or personal
injury arose out of and in the course of employment ...
Petitioner's claim for compensation based on the Civil Code pertain to the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.