Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation PDF

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 12

even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith;

Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in


His/Her Private Capacity for Acts Done in the Course of the
Performance of the Functions of the Office.—In addition, the
Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA
602 (1999), that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 11
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus,
the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be
*
G.R. No. 141309. June 19, 2007. validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent. _______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The
general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages
which a person may suffer arising from the just performance
12
of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned
tasks; However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad
faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no 12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official
actions.— The general rule is that a public officer is not Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from
the just performance of his official duties and within the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she constitutional right of the plaintiff.
heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Special law must
another, as it would virtually be a charge against the prevail over a general law.—A general statute is one which
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special
not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for statute, as the term is generally understood, is one which
acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity particular portion or section of the state only. A general law
for official actions. and a special law on the same subject are statutes inpari
Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or materia and should, accordingly, be read together and
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.
validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is
special and particular and the other general which, if that may give rise to an action for damages against a public
standing alone, would include the same matter and thus officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and
conflict with the special act, the special law must prevail liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are
affect the more particular and specific provisions of the governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human
in order to give its words any meaning at all. Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is
Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the a special and specific provision that holds a public officer
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.
performance of their duties; while said provisions deal in Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
particular with the liability of government officials, the which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in
subject thereof is general, i.e., “acts” done in the performance the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the
of official duties, without specifying the action or omission specific provision which must be applied in the instant case
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned. precisely filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional
— On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the rights.
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability Remedial Law; Cause of Action; Considering that bad
of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on
the performance of their duties. For both superior and Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action.
and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable —The complaint in the instant case was brought under
for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
particular with the liability of government officials, the malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of
subject thereof is general, i.e.,“acts” done in the performance the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will
of official duties, without specifying the action or omission not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
concerned. ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough
that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right
13 of the plaintiff.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of


VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 13 Appeals.
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
          Liwayway Vinzons-Chato for and in her own
behalf.
Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals           Estelito P. Mendoza and Lorenzo G. Timbal for
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public respondent.
officers.— Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in
clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an “act” 14
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 3 329 Phil. 987; 261 SCRA 236 (1996).
4 Prior to its amendment by RA 7654, Section 142(c)(1) of the
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
National Internal Revenue Code, (as amended by R.A. No. 6956),
provides:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
1
“On locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand, fifty-
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision of the five percent (55%) Provided, That this
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167, 2
which
affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order of the 15
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272,
in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioner’s VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 15
motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent
sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
its constitutional rights arising from petitioner’s
issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 “More,” and “Champion” cigarettes to5 the provisions of
(RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in3 RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem
Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent tax of “55% provided that the minimum6 tax shall not
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.”
the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy
among which are “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a
cigarettes. copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993,
Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified
1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993,
‘Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” were considered local respondent filed a motion for reconsideration re-
brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-
45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA _______________
7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93
rate shall apply regardless of whether or not the right to use or title to the
reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” as
foreign brand was sold or transferred by its owner to the local manufacturer.
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing 4
a foreign
Whenever it has to be determined whether or not a cigarette bears a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93
brand, the listing of brands manufactured in foreign countries appearing in
in effect subjected “Hope,”
the current World Tobacco Directory shall govern.”

_______________ 5 Pertinent portion thereof, states:

1 Rollo, pp. 62-71. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes.—
and concurred in by Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Teodoro xxxx
P. Regino.
2 Id., at pp. 598-602. Penned by Judge Reuben P. De La Cruz.
(c) Cigarettes packed by machine.—There shall be levied, assessed and others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the
collected on cigarettes packed by machine a tax at the rates requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
prescribed below based on the constructive manufacturer’s wholesale On April 1110, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC
price or the actual manufacturer’s wholesale price, whichever is a complaint for damages against petitioner in her
higher: private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter
should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of
(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC
classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%) or the
37-93 violated its constitutional right against
exportation of which is not authorized by contract or otherwise, fifty-
deprivation of property without due process of law and
five (55%) provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
the right to equal protection of the laws. 12
Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending
(2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five percent (45%) that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her
provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Three Pesos because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
(P3.00) per pack. her official function and within the scope of her
authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an
6 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, supra
agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the
note 3 at pp. 1001-1003; Separate Opinion of Justice Josue N.
one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint
Bellosillo, Id., at pp. 1014-1015.

16 _______________

7 Id., at p. 1004.
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 8 Rollo, pp. 542-543.
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 9 Id., at p. 569.
10 Supra note 3. The motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
Decision was denied with finality on October 7, 1996.
questing the recall of RMC 737-93, but was denied in a
11 Rollo, pp. 533-552.
letter dated July 30, 1993. The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to
12 Id., at pp. 555-584.

P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) 17


and demanded
8
payment within 10 days from receipt
thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition
for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 17
on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction
9
enjoining Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision
dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice
is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further
or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum
enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This
violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and
principal party who should sign the same.
finally by this Court in Commissioner
10
of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely
decide the merits of the case without allowing the
cured by the submission of the corporate secretary’s
parties to present evidence. It further held that the
certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the
defect in the certification against forum shopping was
same.
cured by respondent’s submission of the corporate
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse
secretary’s certificate authorizing its counsel to execute
contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done
the certification against forum shopping. The
in the performance of her functions as a public officer,
dispositive portion thereof, states:
hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to Code which should be applied. Under this provision,
dismiss filed by the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and liability will attach only when there is a clear showing
the motion to strike out and expunge from the record the said of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further
motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32
Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The which allows recovery of damages for violation of
defendant is ordered to file her answer to the complaint constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of
within ten (10) days13 from receipt of this Order. public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the
SO ORDERED.” Administrative Code is a special law on the superior
public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same gross negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to
was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of state a cause of action. As to the defect of the
the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant certification against forum shopping, she urged the
did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the
court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the complaint.
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38
liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil which treats in general the public officers’ “acts” from
Code is the special law that governs the instant case. which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while
Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged Article 32 which deals specifically with the public
in the complaint for damages. It also sustained the officers’ violation of constitutional rights, is a special
ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification provision which should determine whether the
against forum shopping was complaint states a cause of 14action or not. Citing the
case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, respondent alleged that
_______________ under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
13 Id., at p. 602. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer
was denied on December 4, 1997 (Rollo, pp. 603-606). should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it
concluded that even granting that the complaint failed
18
to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action should be denied
inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to protected17
by the mantle of immunity for official
hold petitioner liable. actions.
The issues for resolution are as follows: Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
_______________ there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the
part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39
14 No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299. of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the
subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by
19
willfulness or negligence. Thus—

VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 19 _______________


Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation 15 Orocio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 75959, August 31,
1992, 213 SCRA 109, 126, cited in Agpalo, Philippine Administrative
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her Law, 2004 edition, p. 473.
private capacity for acts done in connection 16 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86147, February 26,
with the discharge of the functions of his/her 1990, 182 SCRA 721, 728.
office? 17 Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82220, July 14, 1995, 246
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code SCRA 162, 174.
and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative
Code should govern in determining whether the 20
instant complaint states a cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure 20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
to comply with the rule on certification against
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
“Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers.—(1) A public
officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public
performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear
officer is not liable for damages which a person may
showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
suffer arising from the just performance of his official
15
xxxx
duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers.—No
officer who acts within his authority to administer the
subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for acts
affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for
done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
damages that may have been caused to another, as it
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done
would virtually be a charge against the Republic,
by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and
which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
16
good customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of
claims without its consent. However, a public officer
his superior.”
is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, In addition,18the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court
being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer of Appeals, that a public officer who directly or
indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, the special law must prevail since it evinces the
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of legislative intent more clearly than that of a general
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the
malice or bad faith. more particular and specific provisions of the earlier
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe
20
it in
officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity order to give its words any meaning at all.
for acts done in the course of the performance of the The circumstance that the special law is passed
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) before or after the general act does not change the
acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where principle. Where the special law is later, it will be
the public officer violated a constitutional right of the regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the
plaintiff. prior general act; and where the general act is later,
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint the special statute will be construed as remaining an
filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that exception to its terms,21unless repealed expressly or by
the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil necessary implication. 22
Code. Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico, the Court held
A general statute is one which embraces a class of that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which holds
subjects or places and does not omit any subject or provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for
place naturally belonging to such class. A special death or injuries by reason of defective conditions of
statute, as the term is generally understood, is one roads and other public works, is a special provision and
which relates to particular persons or things of a class19
should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409,
or to a particular portion or section of the state only. the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for
A general law and a special law on the same subject defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the
are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising
be read from the failure of the local officials to enforce the
provision of the charter, law, or ordinance, or from
_______________ negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the
same. As explained by the Court:
18 G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 604.
19 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, second edition (1990), p. 197. “Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail
over the latter, because Republic Act 409 is a special law,
21 intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil
Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 21


_______________
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
20 Id., at pp. 197-198.
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to 21 Id., at p. 198.
giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are 22 G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 267.
two acts, one of which is special and particular and the
22
other general which, if standing alone, would include
the same matter and thus conflict with the special act,
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because
it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and,
defines general law as a
we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special
law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards _______________

the subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 23 Id., at pp. 269-270. Emphasis supplied.
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the 24 G.R. No. L-41613, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306, 311-312.
liability of the City of Manila for “damages or injury to (Emphasis added)
persons or property arising from the failure of” city officers
“to enforce the provisions of” said Act “or any other law or 23
ordinance, or from negligence” of the city “Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 23
enforce said provisions.” Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of
the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
“provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages
for the death of, or injury suffered by, any person by universal rule affecting the entire community and special law
reason”—specifically—“of the defective condition of roads, as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not
under their control or supervision.” In other words, said ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact
section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in that one is special and the other general creates a
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining
Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land,
streets,” in particular. Since the present action is the other as the law of a particular case. However, the rule
based upon the alleged defective condition 23
of a road, readily yields to a situation where the special statute
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.” refers to a subject in general, which the general
24 statute treats in particular. Th[is] exactly is the
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez, the issue was circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17
which law should govern the publication of a tax of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of
ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act “ordinance” in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature
which treats ordinances in general and which requires and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local
their publication before enactment and after approval, Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing
or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in taxes, fees or other charges” in particular. In regard,
particular with “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised
fees or other charges,” and which demands publication Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant,
only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it
which should prevail, the Court elucidated that: approaches the realm of “ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges” in particular.
There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a
general provision must give way to a particular provision. abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this
Special provision governs.” remedy is in the nature of a tort.
“Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at fundamental articles introduced in the New Civil Code to
bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public
official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
of fact, we know that there are very few public officials who
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the
to the latter for damages:
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of
xxxx
desire to enforce the law to comply with one’s duty. And so, if
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
we should limit the scope of this article, that would
process of law;
practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
xxxx
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
are justified by a plea of good faith, which is25 in most cases
x x x x”
the plea of officials abusing individual rights.”
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean
Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows: _______________

24 25 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the


Amendments to the New Civil Code, XVI The Lawyers’ Journal, No.
5, May 31, 1951, 258. Cited in Lim v. Ponce de Leon,supra note 14 at
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
p. 309. Article 32 of the Civil Code was also applied in the following
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation cases: Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
590; MHP Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720,
“DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 227; Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so Appeals, supra note 18; Obra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120852,
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of October 28, 1999, 317 SCRA 594; Lui v. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176,
another person’s constitutional rights only if the public May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 449; Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v.
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Soluta, G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 660.
Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
“The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be 25
civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there
should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 25
would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article
32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the 26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
defendant under this Article should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
purpose, which is the effective protection of individual 31
rights. It suffices that there is 26a violation of the the defendant. This is a fundamental innovation in
constitutional right of the plaintiff. the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative
Article 32 27 was patterned after the “tort” in Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers,
American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have
has been defined as the commission or omission of an intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on
act by one, without right, whereby another receives civil liberties. 32
some injury, directly
28
or indirectly, in person, property, In Aberca v. Ver, it was held that with the
or reputation. There are cases in which it has been enactment of Article 32, the principle of accountability
stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the of public officials under the Constitution acquires
conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, added meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No
and there are circumstances under which the motive of longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or
the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure
reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not transgressions committed by the latter against the
the act itself,
29
would determine whether the act was constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act in February 1986 was the widely held perception that
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; the government was callous or indifferent to, if not
that is, liability in tort is not precluded
30
by the fact that actually responsible for, the rampant violations of
defendant acted without evil intent. human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was expect that violators of human rights would easily be
to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain
motive or intent of terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as
_______________
_______________
26 Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. Soluta, supra.
27 Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on the 31 In the report on the Special Joint Committee of the Congress on
Amendments to the New Civil Code, XVI The Lawyers’ Journal, No. the Amendments to the New Civil Code, Dean Bocobo expressed that
5, May 31, 1951, p. 259. while the defendant may not be exonerated on the basis solely of
28 74 Am Jur 2d, Torts, §1, 620. good faith, the inherent justifiability of his/her act, which is up to the
29 Id., § 6, 623-624. courts to decide under the peculiar circumstance of each case, may
30 Id., at p. 624. be the basis of absolution. Thus:

26
CONGRESSMAN DE LEON. So that Mr. Justice, under the Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
provisions [Article 32] of the new Civil Code, there is no more plea of Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
acting in good faith? public officer liable for and allows redress from a
DEAN BOCOBO. It would not be good faith but it would be particular class of wrongful acts that may be
inherent justifiability of the act, which is up to our courts to decide committed by public officers. Compared thus with
under the peculiar circumstance of each case, because we had back Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly
in our minds the old saying that “Hell is paved with good intentions.” deals with civil liability arising from errors in the
(Lawyers’ Journal, No. 5, May 31, 1951, p. 259.) performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is
32 Supra note 25. the specific provision which must be applied in the
instant case precisely filed to seek damages for
27
violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought
VOL. 525, JUNE 19, 2007 27 under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that
bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to
specifically allege the same will not amount to failure
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, to state a cause of action. The courts below
joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the 28
Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for 28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
acts done in the performance of their duties. For both
superior and subordinate public officers, the presence Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements
that will make them liable for damages. Note that therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
while said provisions deal in particular with the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is
liability of government officials, the subject thereof is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
general, i.e.,“acts” done in the performance of official constitutional right of the plaintiff.
duties, without specifying the action or omission that Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule
may give rise to a civil suit against the official against forum shopping, the subsequent submission of
concerned. the secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in sign and execute the certification against forum
clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an shopping cured the defect of respondent’s complaint.
“act” that may give rise to an action for damages Besides, the merits of the instant33
case justify the
against a public officer, and that is, a tort for liberal application of the rules.
impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
the special provision that deals specifically with is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional
other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying
Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While petitioner’s motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The
the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina,
Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with
dispatch. With costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Nachura,


JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—The rule is that a public officer is not liable


for moral or exemplary damages for performing a duty
required by law in the absence of bad faith. (Canonigo
vs. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 596 [2002])

——o0o——

_______________

33 LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25,


2006, 480 SCRA 137, 144-145.

29

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

You might also like